Jim Root

Gerry Two days before the attempted assassination of Edwin Walker, John J. McCloy received this information from John McCone. Remember that McCloy was now "out of the loop" in arms negotiations. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/ Washington, April 8, 1963. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers-Nuclear Test Ban 3/1/63-1/2/64. Secret. Circulated to McCloy. With respect to the test ban treaty, I have not gone over the last draft./2/ However, it is my understanding that the present negotiating position provides for seven on-site inspections, seven black boxes within the USSR, and an inspection area of 500 square kilometers, and that the treaty deals with all the other issues which have been developed through the years. Some consideration is being given to reducing the seven on-site inspections to six, or even to five. There is also a difference of opinion as to the value of the black boxes. /2/Reference is to a March 23 draft comprehensive test ban treaty. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/CRSC Files: FRC 77 A 59, Basic Policy, Pol 3-3, Proposals to President) One would have to make a penetrating study of the results of the Vela experiments to make a final judgment as to the adequacy of the verification provisions of the treaty. However, Mr. Foster, at a recent Executive Committee meeting,/3/ stated that the threshold is on the order of one kiloton in granite, two kilotons in tuff, and 10 to 20 kilotons (and possibly 30 kilotons) in alluvium. He added that this was the threshold for a single test. Based on a theory of probabilities, he further concluded that a series of tests which included a meaningful number of underground shots in a single location would, with a small number of inspections, undoubtedly be detected and identified as nuclear rather than natural. /3/Not identified; the test ban was not discussed in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during 1963. On the basis of these threshold figures, I have expressed the view to Mr. Foster and to the President/4/ that the degree of verification is not sufficient, as it cannot prove adherence to a suspension of testing in an important area of yields. Of greater importance, however, is the fact that under present political circumstances a test ban between the U.S., USSR, and UK would not, in the final analysis, answer the "proliferation" problem because the Soviets cannot handle the Chinese Communists and we and the British cannot handle the French. /4/In a memorandum for the record, April 4, McCone wrote he had told the President that day that former President Eisenhower had expressed opposition to the present draft treaty "because of inadequate verification, the threshold, etc.," and that he, McCone, agreed with this position and also opposed it because "the Russians could no longer handle the Chinese situation and we and the British could no longer handle the de Gaulle situation, and hence the proliferation problem. The President seemed to agree, and restated that he did not think we were going to get a treaty anyway." (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 4/1/63-6/30/63) McCone's memorandum of April 4 of a meeting held with Eisenhower on March 30 is ibid. As for the advantages to the United States of further testing, doing so would yield a continuing improvement in our technology through the further development of small weapons, improvement of weight/yield ratios and increased knowledge of weapons effects. With respect to the first two of these items, improvements are important. Our failure to pursue them while the Soviets do so (clandestinely) would probably deprive us of our superior nuclear position. However, this would not necessarily affect the military balance as the improvements are expected to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, although important information would be provided. With respect to effects of testing, more study would be necessary before I would have an opinion. There is a great danger of engaging in a treaty, living under it for a number of years, and permitting our laboratories to go downhill (which they undoubtedly would do) while the Soviets covertly pursue developments in their laboratories. The Soviets could then abrogate the treaty for some reason they claim provocative, and confront us with a situation under which they had made a significant forward step in their technology. This, as will be recalled, was exactly what they did in 1961. I do not see how we can avoid this risk if we engage in a treaty unless the treaty is subscribed to by all world powers and contains substantial penalties for such abrogation. The Plowshare problem must be considered. Meaningful Plowshare experiments involve our most advanced weapons technology and, if the inspection arrangements outlined in the treaty are undertaken, it would mean exposing to the Soviets our most advanced weapons technology. This might mean abandoning Plowshare and therefore one must consider whether Plowshare is important to our national interest. Intelligence will make some contribution to the verification of a test ban. Some indicators which have been meaningful in the past are now lost to us, some useful indicators are still available but they, too, could be lost. Aerial surveillance might help in some circumstances, and clandestine penetrations might also help. Soviet fear of the latter might also serve as a deterrent. No useful figure can be placed on the contribution of intelligence. It seems to me that there has been an overemphasis on the importance of the test ban treaty and the whole issue of testing for many years, and most particularly, during the last two or three years. The issue at first centered around fallout. The most responsible scientific judgment seems to indicate that the effects of fallout were vastly overemphasized by the test ban advocates. I feel the whole issue should be brought into proper perspective and question whether much is to be gained by an agreement to stop testing so long as the United States, Soviet Union, and the British continue the production of fissionable material, nuclear weapons, and delivery systems at a high rate, and in addition, the French and the Chinese Communists pursue an independent and uncontrolled program, and rumor has it that the Israelis are now doing likewise. Hence, stopping testing does not slow down the arms race, does not remove the dangers of a nuclear holocaust, and does not end the proliferation problem. One important consideration is that if we reach an agreement with the Soviets, we have "broken through" in our effort to negotiate with the USSR on an issue of disarmament, and this might lead to other more meaningful agreements. This consideration is important and we could sacrifice a great deal to accomplish such a "break through". However, this consideration is of value only if the test suspension agreement provides reasonable means of verification and reasonable guarantee for conformance with all treaty terms, including some protection against unilateral revocation or abrogation of the treaty. If, however, we are reckless on the question of verification, then the "break through" will be a decided disservice to the United States' security interests because it will establish a precedent for further steps in disarmament without adequate means of verification. I have not personally studied the most recent developments in detection and identification techniques and cannot render a judgment on the proposed treaty. However, Mr. Foster's disclosure of the threshold set forth in the second paragraph of this memorandum represents a drastic departure from US policy so often stated, i.e. we will only agree to a suspension of tests which can, in the opinion of responsible and informed people, be verified with reasonable assurance. Is this what began the movement toward Dallas? Jim Root

Commission Exhibit 1248 is an interview with Virginia Marian Belasco, the Granddaughter of David Belasco and a friend of Jack Ruby's. David Belasco was known as "The Bishop of Broadway" and produced plays and operated the Belasco Theater in New York City. David Belasco is credited with the discovery of Charlotte Walker a famous actress both on Broadway and in silent films. Charlotte Walker, in her Broadway debut, stared with such notables as Cecil B. DeMille and Mary Pickford in the long running play The Warrens of Virginia." Charlotte Walker was the aunt of Edwin Anderson Walker and mother of Sara Haden another well known actress. There is some evidence that Edwin Walker may have been in a Broadway production himself. While a cadet at West Point Walker had access to New York City and the Broadway productions that both his aunt and cousin were staring in. Jack Ruby met Virginia Belasco while in San Francisco in 1936 and dated her while he was in New York in November of 1941. The interview of Ms Belasco, conducted by agents Norton and Kidwell on Dec. 2, 1963, states: "..and advised she received a telephone call from EVA GRANT, from Dallas, Texas, about a month ago. It was just a social call concerning mutual acquaintances including JACK RUBY. She has never met EVA GRANT personally. BELASCO advised she first met JACK RUBY in about 1936 at the Jewish Community Center in San Francisco.....She also understands that RUBY has a cousin by the name of JUDY, who is employed as a waitress at Blum's Restaurant in San Francisco." I have been reading a great deal about Ruby's associations with underworld figures and how those associations may connect within the assassination story. Just thought a call from Ruby's sister, Eva Grant, to Virginia Belasco, whose family had been instrumental in the careers of Walker's aunt and cousin, in the days immediatly before the assassination would be of interest as well. By the way Virginia Belasco's father was living in Mexico preceeding the assassination. Just coincidence. Jm Root

John Few points to make. Walker died in 1993 some 30 years after the death of Kennedy and some 31 years after the event that is quoted, "The general's health worsened after Attorney General Robert Kennedy committed Walker to Fort Leonard Wood's psychiatric facility following the commander's repudiation of the Kennedy-ordered Invasion. Rumors, never confirmed, held that mind-altering drugs had been administered to "brainwash" Walker." Slandering of public officials and public figures is as American as the 1st Amendment. The quote, "Chief Justice Earl Warren overturned 1,000 years of English law in order to deny $1 million in libel damages awarded to Walker by a Texas jury" hardly needs any explaining. What is interesting is exactly how Walker's pension was restored. It seem he had reapplied for his pension following all the normal channels only to be denied. He then exhausted all the normal appeal processes when "suddenly" his pension was approved by persons unknown......another mystery of the Walker saga. A few interesting facts. It has always been considered illegal for the military to spy on civilians in America, at least in time of peace. If Walker, as I suggest, was assigned to infiltrate the far right a legal necessit would be his resignation from the military. Also I might point out that before the HSCA began its meetings the Army destroyed its collection of intelligence information that had been gathered on civilians in American....because it had been decided that it had been aquired illegally. (They therfore never turned over any information that they had on Lee Harvey Oswald). The Walker papers are stored at the Univ. of Texas at Austin. Access is denied to all researchers. Would I love to have a few hours and copy machine access at that library. Jim Root

John I am sorry it has taken me so long to reply. I am attempting to reorganize and relocate my materials in a manner that will be more conducive to continued research. Walker's commitment to fighting the communist movement in every conceivable nook and corner that it might be found is something I am very willing to concede even to the the point of the MAD Magizine incident. Where I have trouble is in the arena of racism and anti-government rethoric that I feel that things do not add up when looking at the sum of the mans life. Several comments that I have seen or read about his attitude toward the integrated military seem to indicate that Walker did not hold the racial bias that many of the "Southern" officiers displayed in such an obvious manner during the 30's and 40's. His willingness to accept any assignment, dispite the risks both in war and in peace lead me to believe that he believed in his country and was loyal, perhaps to a fault. This is the enigma of Walker, what he is remembered for in history (right wing racist) versus what he was in reality (loyal, patriotic American who played a central roll in the development of Special Forces and Covert Opps while being involved in military intelligence/counter intelligence). A man who is connected to several of the leading Generals in the Kennedy administration while being an outspoken administration critic. Walker is the "other" person who Lee Harvey Oswald is accused of shooting at but whom no one wants to connect to Lee Harvey Oswald. His life and his role in the assassination of JFK is a contridiction...... that continues to bother me. Jim Root

Ron I remember a pastor who once said if the King James version was good enough for Christ it was good enough for him. Jim Root

Stephen Your question connecting a motive to Oswald has been one that has driven me from the beginning of my research. Searching for a motive for the assassination attempt on the life of Edwin Walker has been more fruitful and may lead to the motive for a conspiracy to assassinate the President. Jim Root

John As a young child I remember Elvis Presley being on the Ed Sullivan show. The networks and most "good Americans" were pleased by the fact that, in good taste, the network required that the cameras stay focused on Elvis above the waist only. It seems that they and their sponsers were concerned about the negitive publicity that they might receive if they were to do otherwise. The McCarthy era was still fresh in everyones minds, people in my neighborhood were building bomb shelters, Richard Nixon became VP based upon his willingness to uncover communists everywhere, lynchings were still common, the missle gap was preceived as real, the Soviets had launched the first sattelite, Kruschev was pounding his shoes on the table at the UN and people were scarred of the reds. In hind sight it all seems so silly. At the time I would sometimes wake up at night in a cold sweat dreaming about the Nuclear War we all knew might begin at any minute. Every Friday at exactly 10 AM the Airaid horns would sound and each school child would drop and cover. We were taught to be on the alert for subversives......A Russian spy was actually arrested that lived in the same apartment complex that we were staying in. Our pastor would give sermons (about evey other week) on the evils of communism, the wearing of makeup and the subliminal subversive messages in Rock and Roll. There were a whole lot of paranoid people at that time....most were considered mainstream. Jim Root

Robert Thanks Robert, please post any additional information that you have found. The John B. Hurt from "Wytheville, VA." is the NSA codebreaker and person that I looked for for years. I will reiterate that this same man can be connected to Edwin Walker (loose connection, approx. 1935), Maxwell Taylor (stronger connection, 1935 - 1942) and John J. McCloy (strongest connection, 1941 - ?). Maxwell Taylors work as a Japanese linguist and some of the positions that he held in pre-war Japan lead me to believe that his 1935 - 1939 period may have put him in the center of the codebreaking intelligence gathering target. While he was in Japan a Japanese codebook was stolen from a Japanese government office that Taylor frequented. It is tantilizing to speculate that it may have been Taylor that liberated that book. Understanding some of the infiltration type of covert operations that he was involved in during WWII it would not surprize me if he was the man. McCloys familiarity with the work of John B. Hurt results in one of the most interesting historical realities of our time. McCloy, when asked by Harry Truman, at a June 18, 1945 where the invasion of Japan was decided would give as a reason not to invade an almost verbatum quote from a Japanese intercept that was translated by John B. Hurt. McCloy was the person who decided who would see the "Magic" intercepts that were translated by Hurt and who would not be privy to this information. Here the noose is drawn rather tight. Jim Root

Ron I do not have all of my information handy but let me attempt to answer some of your major question. "How did Oswald return, i.e. leave Russia so easily?" If you start from Oswald's diary entry or from the first letter that is received at the US Embassy in Moscow, It took Oswald about 17 months, from start to finish, to secure his exit from Russia (January 1961 to June 13, 1962). I am not in a position to say if that exit experience was an easy experience or it was not so unusual for a US Citizen that had defected but had not given up his US citizenship. Once again I do not have my folder in hand so I am drawing from memory on this. When the US Embassy in Moscow received Oswald's request they forwarded to the US State Department. There was a flurry of research and messages that went back and forth before it was decided that Oswald had never formally given up his rights as an American and he would therefore be allowed to reenter the US. It is immediatly at this point in time that General Walker begins his Pro Blue Program that lands him in hot water with the Kennedy administration a few months later. What I have found interesting about this is that (17 month later) when Oswald returns, Walker has a new identity (Right Wing Nut/Leader). After studying Walkers career for over a decade: to have a soldier that has been highly decorated, is closely connected to some of the top Army Officiers of the time (i.e. Taylor, etc.), has been placed and involved in some of the most sensitive Cold War jobs of the period (Taiwan, Greece, POW exchange in Korea, Little Rock), I find it difficult to believe that this man, who was trained it seems in counter intelligence, would suddenly go whacky (as the Warren Commissioners would have us believe). Having said that one most also consider the fact that his mentor, Maxwell Taylor, is during this period emerging as the top military leader in the Kennedy administration. Three of the missions stated above were given to Walker by Taylor. If Oswald were to return to the US and IF he could identify Walker as the man who provided him with the information necessary to enter the Soviet Union and IF Oswld had provided the Russians with information that was used to down the American U-2 on May 1, 1960, the Army, Taylor and others could have a big problem. How much would they let Walker know about the return of Oswald to the US? I would assume as little as possible. It does not make any sense that these military people would approach Walker and say,"we have a problem and we need you to ruin your career to help us solve it." I would assume that he was given an order and he clicked his heels and carried the order out that he was given (in my opinion to infiltrate the far right in America). From what I know of Walker he would follow the order that was given to him. I do know that Walker attempted to explain his "new" position to the people of his home town. Calling together friends and relative he called a town hall meeting where he apparently spoke about the times and how each American had to do his duty as they saw fit etc. I add this piece of information because I feel that he was concerned about what he was doing and how it would be perceived by his oldest friends. From what I understand he did not give a right wing speech to this group, just a "trust me" type of speech. I look at the possibility that the shot taken at Walker possibly alerted those "conspirators" that they may have had a ready made "patsy" at their disposal. It is at this time that the CIA seems to begin watching the moves of Oswald and as you suggest, may have made contact with him and started to build his "legend." Was Oswald a double or triple agent? Was he an "orchid man?" I leave open the possibility that he was the Orchid man and unaware of just who he was working for. I also believe that the conspirators were not sure who he was working for and that the KGB and CIA were not sure who he was working for.....giving all a reason to be willing to participate in a coverup. I still believe that perhaps only two people would have known for sure, McCloy at the top, and Taylor, perhaps the only man who knew that Oswald had been helped into the Soviet Union by his man , Walker. Jim Root

Ron, you stated "Jim, I think you’ve drawn a fascinating picture with your research as set forth in this and previous posts. I tend to agree with you on the involvement of Taylor, possibly McCloy as well, on Walker and Oswald likely crossing paths for informational purposes on Oswald’s way to Russia, and the NSA’s Hurt being the Hurt that Oswald tried to reach from the Dallas jail. That said, there are a couple of elements in the scenario you’ve presented that I question, and I wonder if you consider these elements to be essential to the mix. First, I question the idea that Oswald actually tried to shoot Walker. This is exactly what the conspirators want us to believe, of course, that Oswald was this lone nut who showed himself capable of shooting the president by having already taken a shot at this general. I see Oswald as a U.S. intelligence operative who did what he was told to do and apparently did it well. He was sent on a mission to Russia and accomplished what he was supposed to. Upon his return, he was placed in various jobs apparently for the ostensible purpose of reporting to the FBI on possible subversives (e.g. Molina at the TSBD). He built a pro-Castro legend for himself in New Orleans under the guidance of Banister and others, again being a good soldier, not knowing what the true purpose of this charade would turn out to be. This man had no reason to go take a shot at Walker, and (this brings us to the second element I question) Walker had no reason to be surprised and panic upon Oswald’s arrest. I rather suspect that Walker at least had knowledge of who the designated patsy was going to be, the same person who (it would eventually be alleged) had tried to kill him too." Ron I have found an interesting memo from McCone to McCloy dated April 8, 1963 two days before the attempted assassination of Edwin Walker that adds an air of mystery to this scenario. It may be of interest to those that "question the idea that Oswald actually tried to shoot Walker" while providing another connection, perhaps, to the need for the Walker assassination attempt as a lead up to the assassination of the President. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/ Washington, April 8, 1963. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers-Nuclear Test Ban 3/1/63-1/2/64. Secret. Circulated to McCloy. With respect to the test ban treaty, I have not gone over the last draft./2/ However, it is my understanding that the present negotiating position provides for seven on-site inspections, seven black boxes within the USSR, and an inspection area of 500 square kilometers, and that the treaty deals with all the other issues which have been developed through the years. Some consideration is being given to reducing the seven on-site inspections to six, or even to five. There is also a difference of opinion as to the value of the black boxes. /2/Reference is to a March 23 draft comprehensive test ban treaty. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/CRSC Files: FRC 77 A 59, Basic Policy, Pol 3-3, Proposals to President) One would have to make a penetrating study of the results of the Vela experiments to make a final judgment as to the adequacy of the verification provisions of the treaty. However, Mr. Foster, at a recent Executive Committee meeting,/3/ stated that the threshold is on the order of one kiloton in granite, two kilotons in tuff, and 10 to 20 kilotons (and possibly 30 kilotons) in alluvium. He added that this was the threshold for a single test. Based on a theory of probabilities, he further concluded that a series of tests which included a meaningful number of underground shots in a single location would, with a small number of inspections, undoubtedly be detected and identified as nuclear rather than natural. /3/Not identified; the test ban was not discussed in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during 1963. On the basis of these threshold figures, I have expressed the view to Mr. Foster and to the President/4/ that the degree of verification is not sufficient, as it cannot prove adherence to a suspension of testing in an important area of yields. Of greater importance, however, is the fact that under present political circumstances a test ban between the U.S., USSR, and UK would not, in the final analysis, answer the "proliferation" problem because the Soviets cannot handle the Chinese Communists and we and the British cannot handle the French. /4/In a memorandum for the record, April 4, McCone wrote he had told the President that day that former President Eisenhower had expressed opposition to the present draft treaty "because of inadequate verification, the threshold, etc.," and that he, McCone, agreed with this position and also opposed it because "the Russians could no longer handle the Chinese situation and we and the British could no longer handle the de Gaulle situation, and hence the proliferation problem. The President seemed to agree, and restated that he did not think we were going to get a treaty anyway." (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 4/1/63-6/30/63) McCone's memorandum of April 4 of a meeting held with Eisenhower on March 30 is ibid. As for the advantages to the United States of further testing, doing so would yield a continuing improvement in our technology through the further development of small weapons, improvement of weight/yield ratios and increased knowledge of weapons effects. With respect to the first two of these items, improvements are important. Our failure to pursue them while the Soviets do so (clandestinely) would probably deprive us of our superior nuclear position. However, this would not necessarily affect the military balance as the improvements are expected to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, although important information would be provided. With respect to effects of testing, more study would be necessary before I would have an opinion. There is a great danger of engaging in a treaty, living under it for a number of years, and permitting our laboratories to go downhill (which they undoubtedly would do) while the Soviets covertly pursue developments in their laboratories. The Soviets could then abrogate the treaty for some reason they claim provocative, and confront us with a situation under which they had made a significant forward step in their technology. This, as will be recalled, was exactly what they did in 1961. I do not see how we can avoid this risk if we engage in a treaty unless the treaty is subscribed to by all world powers and contains substantial penalties for such abrogation. The Plowshare problem must be considered. Meaningful Plowshare experiments involve our most advanced weapons technology and, if the inspection arrangements outlined in the treaty are undertaken, it would mean exposing to the Soviets our most advanced weapons technology. This might mean abandoning Plowshare and therefore one must consider whether Plowshare is important to our national interest. Intelligence will make some contribution to the verification of a test ban. Some indicators which have been meaningful in the past are now lost to us, some useful indicators are still available but they, too, could be lost. Aerial surveillance might help in some circumstances, and clandestine penetrations might also help. Soviet fear of the latter might also serve as a deterrent. No useful figure can be placed on the contribution of intelligence. It seems to me that there has been an overemphasis on the importance of the test ban treaty and the whole issue of testing for many years, and most particularly, during the last two or three years. The issue at first centered around fallout. The most responsible scientific judgment seems to indicate that the effects of fallout were vastly overemphasized by the test ban advocates. I feel the whole issue should be brought into proper perspective and question whether much is to be gained by an agreement to stop testing so long as the United States, Soviet Union, and the British continue the production of fissionable material, nuclear weapons, and delivery systems at a high rate, and in addition, the French and the Chinese Communists pursue an independent and uncontrolled program, and rumor has it that the Israelis are now doing likewise. Hence, stopping testing does not slow down the arms race, does not remove the dangers of a nuclear holocaust, and does not end the proliferation problem. One important consideration is that if we reach an agreement with the Soviets, we have "broken through" in our effort to negotiate with the USSR on an issue of disarmament, and this might lead to other more meaningful agreements. This consideration is important and we could sacrifice a great deal to accomplish such a "break through". However, this consideration is of value only if the test suspension agreement provides reasonable means of verification and reasonable guarantee for conformance with all treaty terms, including some protection against unilateral revocation or abrogation of the treaty. If, however, we are reckless on the question of verification, then the "break through" will be a decided disservice to the United States' security interests because it will establish a precedent for further steps in disarmament without adequate means of verification. I have not personally studied the most recent developments in detection and identification techniques and cannot render a judgment on the proposed treaty. However, Mr. Foster's disclosure of the threshold set forth in the second paragraph of this memorandum represents a drastic departure from US policy so often stated, i.e. we will only agree to a suspension of tests which can, in the opinion of responsible and informed people, be verified with reasonable assurance. The memo is interesting because it seems that McCloy has been out of the loop in the test ban talks for some time. Between September 1961 and August 1962 I can only find reference to McCloy in two meetings dealing with the subject yet he receives a memo from McCone on April 8, 1963 and Walker is shot at two days later. Coincidence perhaps. McCloy was being pushed out of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty negotiaiton from a very early point and by an interesting cabal of persons. On June 26, 1961 we find this quote in a memo from McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy: "One great advantage of closing out these talks quickly is that they are pre-occupying McCloy at a time when we really should be pressing for serious headway on an agreed disarmament plan. Another reason, I fear, is that the gossip at the second level is that we are not doing a very good job in this particular debate (this kind of gossip should be taken with some reservation, because it often means simply that our spokesman is not saying exactly what the gossip wishes he would). McCloy is our man, and we can't substitute someone else at this point. So the best way may be to let the talks end after a few more days. One further thought--Foster is a serious administrator, and perhaps his first crash job could be to take the disarmament position and wrestle it into shape." Four days later at a meeting with the President and Soviet Ambassador Zorin (McCloy was also present) that took place on June 30, 1961 we can find this quote from Zorin: "Mr. Zorin said that he had had a rather extensive exchange of views with Mr. McCloy. However, frankly speaking, greater progress could have been achieved if a more definite discussion of specific programs had been conducted. He said that sooner or later we would have to deal with such programs." As the meeting continued we find this exchange: "The President then expressed his disappointment over the lack of progress in the nuclear test negotiations. He said he had hoped that agreement in that area could set the stage for progress in the general field of disarmament. He felt that the nuclear test issue was rather easy to resolve and that agreement on that problem would have a very favorable effect not only on US-USSR relations but also on the world at large. The President said he believed that the respective positions of the two sides at Geneva were not very far apart and that agreement on a nuclear test ban could also make these discussions more profitable. Furthermore, it would show the world the usefulness of the US and the USSR's discussing these difficult matters. The President reiterated his disappointment but said that he was still hopeful that agreement could be reached at Geneva. Mr. McCloy noted the difference of views between the two sides on the purpose of the present talks. He said that our interpretation of our mission differed from Mr. Zorin's interpretation but that in spite of that he felt that this exchange of views had been useful. He expressed the hope that both sides could agree on a proper forum and framework for negotiations and then engage in serious negotiations. The President again expressed his pleasure at meeting Mr. Zorin and his group and said that he wanted to see all matters standing between the US and the USSR settled; therefore, he felt that any progress in these talks would be useful. Mr. Zorin said he appreciated very much the President's willingness to devote his time to this meeting and said that he would, of course, inform his government of the wishes expressed by the President. However, he said, success could be achieved only as a result of efforts by both sides and not just one. Therefore, he hoped that Mr. McCloy would receive appropriate instructions so that in Moscow progress could be made on the basis of the views of both sides.." Futher we find: "In telegram 205 from Moscow, July 20, McCloy reported that on the basis of meetings held so far he saw "little prospect" of reaching agreement on a set of principles to guide general disarmament negotiations or on a suitable forum for such negotiations. While he believed the United States had built a "reasonable record" on a number of contended points, he considered that there was "little point in continuing while Zorin talks about plans and I talk about principles," and wanted to suggest to Zorin winding up the meetings on July 26 or 27 and convening a meeting of the full Disarmament Commission in September. (Ibid., 600.0012/7-2061)" By September we find very little further imput by McCloy. Nearly two years later he is informed of the negitive position the CIA holds of the test ban treaty about to be entered into. Two days later Walker is shot at. Four months later the Limited Test Ban Treaty becomes law. Three months later Kennedy is dead. Two months after that McCloy is back in Geneva negotiating at the Nuclears Arms talks. Coincidence? Jim Root

Robert The linguist John B. Hurt is mentioned in several books about William Friedman's group of codebreakers. Since Hurt was a Japanese linguist rather than being trained in mathematics, as most of the original codebreakers were, and given the fact that he died before his work during WWII was declassified he seems to have been swept under the carpet so to speak. Was this done because his name could be associated with the assassiation of JFK or not I can not give you a diffinitive answer but I to find it odd that he has vanished from history. Yet books such as the Puzzle Palace mention Hurt as an original member of Friedman's team. I have about 250 pages of declassified documents written by Hurt but all are pre 1947. Several passages are very interesting and have provided some leads that I am not yet ready to post on...they may be nothing more than just interesting tidbits of history. Some things lead me to believe that he may have been a Socialist but that is only speculation based upon his discription of Nazi's as a hated evil that must be destroyed vs his discription of Communists and the Japanese...saying such I must keep in mind that during the war we were allies of the communists but we were also at war with the Japanese. In one area he gives a good reporting on the Japanese willingness to surrender before the dropping of the Atomic bomb. I was surprised by how similar Hurt's words were to the words used by John J. McCloy at the famous June 18th meeting with Truman where the invasion of Japan was discussed. I have been assured by Edward Drea (a Pentagon historian) that McCloy not only had access to the Magic intercepts but was the person who decided who was also given access to them. McCloys use of "inside information" to make himself look good for future history is an interesting trait that I believe led to J. Edgar Hoover's cold reception to having McCloy on the Warren Commission. When Edward Eptsein interviewed McCloy shortly after the Warren Report was made public McCloy said these words about Oswald in response to Epsteins question: "Q. Did you have any pet area of interest? A. Yes. I was interested in the espionage angle. I spent 10 years investigating Black Tom explosions--that's how I got into Government. I thought Oswald was trained in Espionage. I saw a pattern--mail drops, micro dots, his code(?), his knowledge of sabotage, etc. I thought he might be a sleeper Soviet agent who went haywire. I think we put something of that in the Report, I did, but it was toned down. The others said my evidence was not "evidential." I still believe it is possible some document will turn up showing Oswald might have been an agent. Not necessarily a conspiracy but an agent gone haywire." Did McCloy know, just as he knew about the Japenese willingness to surrender in 1945, that some piece of evidence might show up that Oswald was an agent? It is interesting that he mentions "micro-dots" in that quote. The person who researched that information for the Warren Commission was NSA employee Frank Rowlett, another original member of Friedman's Team and a friend of John B. Hurt. Coincidence? Jim Root

Robert In a recent post Hemming made reference to a visit to the Walker residence in Dallas after the assassiantion attempt and during the heat of 1963. In the book Breach of Trust, Gerald McKnight suggest that Hemming was in New Orleans at the same time as Oswald. I too "wish Gerry Patrick Hemming would "fill us in" on the particulars of the(se) meeting(s)" Jim Root

Ron Once again you have cut to the chase! Let me begin to answer your first question: "First, I question the idea that Oswald actually tried to shoot Walker." Gerald McKnight in his recently published book, Breach of Trust, makes the same case. He refers to what he calls the "Walker note," which is the note that Marina turned over to the FBI about a week after the assassination, as one of the most important pieces of evidence that would point toward the quilt of Oswald IF the note is in fact real (which McKnight questions). For eleven years I have followed a research trail that included the question, "If Oswald did shoot at Walker what would have been his motive?" With that question in mind the discovery of the overlaping travel to Germany/Russia while interesting becomes more than coincidental when we discover that there is a possibility that the Walker could in fact have met Oswald while he traveled to Russia. But neither person, when you consider the compartmentalization of covert activites, needed to know exactly who or what the other person was involved in. Walker would have only needed to know that information was to be passed to Oswald and could easily have assumed that since it was him (a Major General) being asked to pass the information the operation would have been important. You stated, "I see Oswald as a U.S. intelligence operative who did what he was told to do and apparently did it well. He was sent on a mission to Russia and accomplished what he was supposed to. Upon his return, he was placed in various jobs apparently for the ostensible purpose of reporting to the FBI on possible subversives (e.g. Molina at the TSBD)" Where I offer an alternative for your thoughts is that I do not believe that Oswald was expected to return to the United States nor do I believe that he (Oswald) thought that he was working for a US Intelligence agency. I do believe that US Intelligence led Oswald to believe that he was working for some organization, perhaps the Socialist Party. Upon his return to the US the intelligence personal that were working Oswald would have been put into a cunnundrum of not knowing who Oswald was now working for or with. I would suggest that the reeturn of Lee Harvey Oswald to the United States created a problem for someone in US Intelligence, a problem that had to be considered and countered. Once again the timelines come into play. Within one week of the State Departments legal decision that Oswald will be allowed to return to the United States, General Walker begins to indoctrinate the 24th Infantry Division with the John Birch "Pro Blue" program. While Oswald is working his way around the buracratic maze necessary to return to the US, Walker is turned into a "Right Wing fanatic" and resigns for the military (providing plausible deniabilty to US policy involvement in the U-2 shootdown, deflecting possible expousure to right wing elements in the military). Within a week of Oswald's departure from the Soviet Union Yuri Nosenko makes contact with the CIA, defecting to the US shortly after the assassination with a great deal of information about Oswald. It is my belief that both countries had reason to worry about how they had used this man and that both countries were keeping their distance while creating their own legends about Lee Harvey Oswald, protecting themselves from what he might say, who he might identify and what he might do. You stated, "I rather suspect that Walker at least had knowledge of who the designated patsy was going to be, the same person who (it would eventually be alleged) had tried to kill him too." Please allow me to present an alternative scenerio here. If ever there was a potential patsy I believe it was Walker. This true American Hero may have been "asked" to resign from the military to infiltrate the far right in America. He would have done so without question, just as he had done his entire life, following the orders of his superiors. In an alternate scenario we would have Walker being forced to play along with the conspirators rather than being a part of the conspiracy. Suppose for a moment that Walker's reactions immediatley following the assassination may have saved his life. If the McCloy letter to Walker was a way to associate Walker with the conspirators if they were caught and given the Walker "legend" of leader of the "far right" movement in America we have the perfect "alternate" patsy if Oswald were somehow able to escape. Imagine for a moment that Walker was the one man in the United States who would know, without a doubt (if he had passed information to Oswald on October 10, 1959), that Oswald had been used by US Intelligence. Walker would know immediatly that the assassination was the result of a conspiracy orchestrated at the highest levels of government. Walker would know that he could be associated with Oswald and he could surmise that Oswald would be associated with the U2 shootdown from the news reports that were broadcast within hours of the assassination. All this information would be spewing forth from a television set at the Captain Shreve Hotel in Shrevepost, LA while Walker would be contemplating what had just happened. Somehow a German newspaper would contact Walker, in his hotel room at exactly 7 AM the following morning and that newpaper would then report the Oswald assassination attempt on Walker. With the death of Oswald the conspirators would be content to watch as Walker would fall into historical oblivion. It is my belief that the conspirators would have much rather we believed (as most people do) that Oswald did not shoot at Walker! But for these thoughts to hold water we need to look at the "legend of Oswald" that begins to emerge at the time before the assassination but after the attempt on the life of Walker. For this I go to the Testemony of James P. Hosty. "Mr. STERN. If you will look at page 2 of the report we have marked for identification No. 829 Mr. HOSTY. Yes, sir. Mr. STERN. The last paragraph on that page relates--well, tell us what information that refers to. Mr. HOSTY. It says, "On April 21, 1963, Dallas confidential informant T-2 advised that Lee H. Oswald of Dallas, Tex, was in contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York City at which time he advised that he passed out pamphlets for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. According to T-2, Oswald had a placard around his neck reading, 'Hands Off Cuba, Viva Fidel.'" Mr. STERN. Did you attempt to verify that information? Mr. HOSTY. When I got it, it was approximately 6 or 7 weeks old, past the date it allegedly took place, and we had received no information to the effect that anyone had been in the downtown streets of Dallas or anywhere in Dallas with a sign around their neck saying "Hands Off Cuba, Viva Fidel." It appeared highly unlikely to me that such an occurrence could have happened in Dallas without having been brought to our attention. So by the time I got it, it was, you might say, stale information and we did not attempt to verify it. Mr. STERN. When you record this as something that an informant advised about on April 21, that doesn't mean he advised you or the Dallas office on April 21? Mr. HOSTY. That is right. Mr. STERN. Did this information come from another part of the FBI? Mr. HOSTY. Yes, sir; it came from the New York office of the FBI. They were advised on the 21st of April. Mr. STERN. But the information didn't get to you until some time after? Mr. HOSTY. In June, I believe. Mr. STERN. Did you have any information apart from this that there was an organization active in the Dallas area called, "The Fair Play for Cuba Committee"? Mr. HOSTY. No, sir; we had no information of any organization by that name. Mr. STERN. Had you at this time ever heard of such an organization? Mr. HOSTY. Yes, sir; I had. Mr. STERN. In what connection? Mr. HOSTY. The New York office had advised all offices of the FBI to be on the alert for the possible formation of chapters of this organization which was headquartered in New York. Mr. STERN. Had you investigated the Dallas area in that connection? Mr. HOSTY. We had checked our sources, I had and other agents assigned to the internal security division had checked sources. We were on the alert for it. Mr. STERN. And you found what? Mr. HOSTY. We found no evidence that there was any such organization in Dallas. It seems that about eleven days after the assassiantion attempt on Walker, confidential imformant T-2 is saying that Oswald was passing out FPFC information. This information comes from New York. Within the record we find that Oswald does not actually make contact with the FPFC group until several months after this event. Hosty's investigation of this April 21st information seems to show that the allegation was false....never the less the Oswald file is reopened and his movements are wathced by the CIA beginning at this time (Morley). I might suggest that it is because Oswald took the shot at Walker that "those" who needed a patsy would then know that Oswald had a weapon and that he was willing to use it making him the perfect candidate for the "assassin character" that was to be needed in this plot. I might also suggest that the conspirators would begin to build the "legend" even before Oswald was participating in the building of his "legend." Once Oswald became a participant, the conspirators may have needed to tie up the loose ends that could lead to the exposure of the conspirators (McCloy Walker letters). Let me suggest that Oswald may believe that he is working with an organization such as the Socialist Pary once again at this time. He begins his activities with a letter to the FPFC (May 1963). Perhaps in the same way that, a few weeks before he joined the Marines, his letter to the Socialist Party began his decent into the world of espionage. I might suggest that Oswald may have known that by writting these letters he would make contact with his handlers. This new letter may have once again began his journey toward destiny. As a sidebar to the creation of the "legend" of Oswald, I might add some speculation on Oswalds journey to Mexico City in the weeks leading up to the assassination of Kennedy. First, the pictures of Oswald emerging from the Soviet/Cuban Embassy's in Mexico City were generated within hours of the assassination. We now know that they were not Oswald. For what purpose would US Intelligence be led to belive that that was Oswald? Someone had to have had the ability to decieve our own intelligence agencies....does the purpose becomes obvious. Once again from the Hosty testemony: "Mr. HOSTY. I then received a communication on the 25th of October from the New Orleans office advising me that another agency had determined that Lee Oswald was in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in the early part of October 1963. Mr. STERN. Did they tell you anything else? Mr. HOSTY. No. Just very briefly that there had been a contact. Mr. STERN. Did this increase your effort to find him? Mr. HOSTY. Very much so, yes. I became curious then. Shortly thereafter, on the 29th of October, I received another communication from the New Orleans office advising that they had a change of address for Lee and Marina Oswald to 2515 West Fifth Street, Irving, Tex. " "....Mr. STERN. And at what time did you know of Oswald's trip to Mexico City and his apparent appearance there at the Russian Embassy? Mr. HOSTY. The 25th of October." Not only do I believe that Oswald may have been mad about being used by "Walker's group" of "right wingers" when he went to Russia, Oswald may have felt that the FBI was closing in on him for his assassination attempt on Walker. Hosty never talked with Oswald until after the assassiation but Oswald was very aware that Hosty was asking questions and monitoring his moves. A "guilty" Oswld may have felt that time was running out for him and that the "law" was closing in. How would he be allowed to tell his story? How could he let the world know that all these horrible people were conspiring to control the world and hold the people in subjugation? And then it is announced that the Presidential motorcade would slowly move past the office building where Oswald worked. Jim Root

Brought back for the curiosity value. Jim Root

Way back on Oct. 29, 2004 I posted two letters. One was written by General Edwin Walker on June 5, 1963 and resulted in a reply from John J. McCloy on June 12, 1963. (I will bring those letters back after I make this post). They seem innocuous enough except for the historical curiosity that they are two pieces of correspondence between two people that would soon (five months later) become associated with the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Over the last few weeks I have found and posted the further coincidence of the change in US policy concerning the Limited Test Ban Treaty that was taking place at exactly the same time these two letters were written. On June 10, 1963 Kennedy made a speech which changed the position of the US (from the McCloy position if you wish) which led to the LTBT. That policy changing speech was replied to by the Soviets on the following day. As my earlier posts showed General Maxwell Taylor (one of the "Big Fish" I believe) would continue to argue with Kenndy against the treaty until put in his place and silenced by Kennedy in July. So what is new to add to this flurry of activity on the part of these three players (McCloy, Walker and Taylor)? Let me attempt to briefly overlap the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald during this same exact time period. Most all of us agree that the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald in New Orleans are significant to the assassination. But let us look at when his activities begin in light of this additional information? On May 29, 1963 Lee Harvey Oswald orders 1000 handbills for his Fair Play for Cuba activities. On June 3, 1963 Lee Harvey Oswald rents a P.O. Box and leaves the name A. J. Hidell as a person who will receive mail at that location. On June 16, 1963 Oswald is distributing literature on Dumaine Street in New Orleans. On June 24, 1963 Oswald applies for a new passport. Over the past year I have made many posts that deal with the overlap of timelines by various persons and Lee Harvey Oswald. Many of these time lines overlap the areas where we find information "gaps" in the Warren Report. For example Oswalds travel to Russia that overlaps Walkers travel to Augsburg, Germany. Or that Oswald begins his journey to Russia with his application for a passport in Santa Ana, California on Sept. 4, 1959, the same day that the US Embassy in Helsinki indicates to the State Department that an entry visa can be issued quickly by the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki. The missing travel day for Oswald (Oct. 9, 1959) that overlaps with a second message from the Helsinki Embassy that provide the information about First Class Intourist Vochers being needed by a person wishing to gain easy entry into the Soviet Union (something Oswald obtains before he applies for his visa into Russia). Add to this information the fact that I can draw an association between McCloy (backed up by Edward Drea a current Pentagon Historian), Taylor and Walker with a little known historical character by the name of John B. Hurt who remained an employee of the NSA until just about this same time in 1963. We do know for a fact that Lee Harvey Oswald did attempt to contact a person by this same name while he was in custody after the assassination of JFK. We also know that this attempted phone call by Oswald was another piece of information that was left out of the Warren Report. These are either coincidences or pieces to a puzzle. To me the picture seems to be comming into focus. Jim Root

Mark "I think nuclear weapons figured significantly into the assassination equation, but to exactly what degree I have yet to determine. I believe Jim Root has as good a handle on that area as anyone, and still the evidence is more elusive than conclusive." Perhaps it is not as "elusive" as it would seem. Think for a moment. Oswald is a radar operator at a U-2 base and "defects" to the Soviet Union (perhaps with help from intelligence sources). While in Russia a U-2 is downed that sabotages the Paris Summit where a Limited Test Ban Treaty is to be signed. Kennedy is elected and in his first press conference he names John J. McCloy his top negotiator for nuclear arms discussions, then brings Maxwell Taylor in as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Over the next two years he reverses positions, dumps McCloy and stops taking Taylors advice. Oswald is named as the assassin of John F. Kennedy. Do we have a complete circle? In the past I have suggested that the 1960 election may have gone to Nixon if the Paris Summit had been successful and a thaw in the Cold War was used by the Republicans as an election platform (the Peace Party). Kennedy's platform was centered, in many ways, on the missle gap, bomber gap and that the Eisenhower presidency had gone soft on communism. Did the same people who got Kennedy elected in 1960 feel betrayed by Kennedy in 1963? One could certainly argue that both Taylor and McCloy received prestigious positions during the earliest portion of the Kennedy administration. Were the positions that were given to Taylor and McCloy rewards for the part they played in staging the U-2 incident and his election? I have been troubled by that question for several years now. The opening of this discussion on the Limited Test Ban Treaty (exactly the same issue that the Paris Summit was centered on), the timing of the change of position by Kennedy (June 10, 1963), the odd timing of a letter from McCloy to General Walker (June 12, 1963) and the alienation by Kennedy of both McCloy and Taylor (and Dullas as well) seems more than coincidental. Could the motive for assassination be centered on a motive of betrayal? If this makes any sense you would have the same people working Oswald in 1959 that would work him again in 1963. If on October 10, 1959 General Edwin Walker (Taylor's man) passed the detailed information on how to enter the Soviet Union via the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki to Oswald (provided to the State Department by our Ambassador to Finland,John Hickerson, on October 9, 1963), which I believe I have shown is possible, this may not only be a key piece of the puzzle it may focus the picture clearly upon two major conspirator, Taylor and McCloy, who have both means and motive to pull off the assassination and control the official investigation. Jim Root

Tim I do not have the information at hand but recall that one of the arguments on why the Soviets would not have been involved in the assassination of JFK was that they felt he was easier to negotiate with than Johnson (the Texas Right Wing Conservative, anti-communist, racist, Southern Democratic war monger) would be. Perhaps others in our own government thought the same of Johnson. Jim Root

Lynne This area of research is relatively new to me. It has peaked my interest recently because I find that the opposition to the LTBT comes from persons who should have been and were previously some of Kennedy's closest advisors. There names, General Maxwell Taylor and John J. McCloy have come to my attention because of their association or links to General Edwin Walker. From the first two paragraphs of Kennedy's very first press conference: "Good afternoon. Won't you be seated. I have several announcements to make, first. I have a statement about the Geneva negotiations for an atomic test ban. These negotiations, as you know, are scheduled to begin early in February. They are of great importance, and we will need more time to prepare a clear American position. So we are consulting with other governments, and we are asking to have it put off until late March. As you know, Mr. John McCloy is my principal adviser in this field, and he has organized a distinguished panel of experts, headed by Dr. James Fisk of the Bell Laboratories -- and Mr. Salinger will have a list of the names at the end of the conference -- who are going to study previous positions that we have taken in this field, and also recommend to Mr. McCloy, for my guidance, what our position would be in late March, when we hope the tests will resume." (State Department Auditorium, Washington, D. C. January 25, 1961, 6:00 p.m., EST) By June of 1963 McCloy is no longer participating in the Test Ban "Principals" meetings. By July of 1963 Kennedy would have to curtail Taylor's continuing distrurst of the Soviets and the changing US position on a Limited Test Ban Treaty. From the Journals of Glenn T. Seaborg, Volume 6, July 1, 1963-November 22, 1963 (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 1989,) Entry for 9 July 1963 "Early in the evening of 9 July, Kennedy met with the NSC to discuss the Harriman mission. Still unsure whether a limited three environments test ban treaty was negotiable, the participants briefly discussed an agreement that permitted a quota of underground tests. Nevertheless, if an atmospheric test ban was feasible, Rusk wanted Harriman to be able to conclude an agreement "on the spot." Bundy wondered whether the French should be consulted, which raised the question of whether it would be possible to induce Paris to sign a limited test ban treaty. Maxwell Taylor's comments questioning the advantages of an atmospheric test ban raised the continuing problem with the Chiefs, but Kennedy declared that the issue was settled: "such a ban is to the advantage of the U.S." Nevertheless, Taylor vainly pushed away on the issue." Could we have a motive? Jim Root

Lynne "Jim your research on the nuclear Test ban Treaty is very interesting and I think it is vital to a genuine appreciation about the dynamics of the Kennedy Administration. Have you noted that Kennedy relied upon Robert McNamara to ram the Treaty down the throats of his many detractors. When it came to Vietnam however, Robert McNamara was Johnson's man [even when Johnson was VP] and Kennedy was isolated. That is why I constantly claim that Vietnam was the vital issue that left Kennedy alone and vulnerable. If Kennedy didn't have McNamara on board, I don't think he would have gotten anywhere with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Do you agree with that?" I would not particularly agree with your statement. As a cabinet member McNamara was going to follow the policy that was decided upon by the President. In this case it is Kennedy who actually "ram(med) the Treaty down the throats of his many detractors," many of whom had legitimate fears that a Limited Test Bay Treaty might harm the chances of non-proliferation. At the February 13th meeting the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency we find that "the relationship between a test ban treaty and the problem of nuclear proliferation received considerable attention from the Kennedy administration. ACDA analysts did not believe that a test ban would pose a significant obstacle to nuclear proliferation; nevertheless, they believed that with a test ban in place, "the chances of taking other measures which might successfully cope with the problem of non-proliferation are significantly greater." On February 16, 1963 "McNamara provided Kennedy with an estimate of the number of countries that had the capability to develop nuclear weapons in the coming years and the general motives for countries to or not to do so. Owing to the heavy costs of nuclear programs and the likelihood of international pressure, he believed that it was unlikely that all countries able to produce nuclear weapons would do so during the next decade. Like the ACDA analysts, McNamara believed that a comprehensive test ban was necessary but not sufficient to deter countries from developing atomic weapons. He also discussed the problem of the Chinese nuclear program. China, of course, was unlikely to sign a test ban agreement, but the possibility of Moscow putting pressure on Beijing to sign was no more likely than Washington joining with Moscow to place pressure on France to halt its nuclear program." The "Committee of Principals" at this time was chaired by the Secretary of State who it seems would be the one that I would vote for as "most likely to have crammed" the Limited Test Ban Treaty down anyones throats. By April 17, 1963 you have the "... Committee of Principals discussion suggests the bleak political climate for the test ban negotiations during the spring of 1963. The U.S. negotiating position was under attack from Republican and Democratic conservatives who argued that its verification procedures were insufficiently tough. While Kennedy, Macmillan, and Khrushchev had secret exchanges of correspondence on the possibilities of further negotiations, top policymakers continued to treat the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) as a legitimate goal because they saw nowhere else to turn. (Note 58) For Rusk and McNamara a CTBT, even without ironclad verification provisions, was better than any alternative: as McNamara put it, "the risk to the United States without a test ban treaty was greater than with a test ban treaty." As bad as the problems with Congress was the opposition by the Joint Chiefs, who saw a treaty without a threshold as an invitation to cheating. By June 10, 1963 Kennedy 'A few days after the President's speech, Kennedy's advisers discussed the significance of the Harriman mission to Moscow and the prospects for a comprehensive agreement. While Rusk had "no illusions" about the prospects, he cited Kennedy's thinking that the Harriman trip was a "last chance" for an understanding with the Soviets; Rusk also believed that the Soviet concern about "bloc problems"--which ranged from Sino-Soviet tensions to growing divergences between Eastern Europe and Moscow-- might produce some flexibility. The administration had tabled various CTBT drafts since 1961, but the Principals were now reluctant to publish the latest draft for fear that it invite controversy--a "head-on collision"--especially if the Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized the draft when testifying before Congress." Once again we find that Rusk seemed to be the man pushing the treaty. Jim Root

Ron It was approved by Congress (August/September 1963). After the assassination the Geneva talks resumed leading to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 (signed by 61 countries). If you recall, McCloy became a central figure in these talks again. McCloy missed at least one meeting of the Warren Commissioners to attend these talks in Geneva. If I am correct it was at that same Geneva meeting that Yuri Nosenko "defected" to the US. Coincidence? Jim Root

Tim "At the time, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was the big issue, especially for nuclearists like LeMay." I have been doing a great deal of research on this issue recently. The debate over the LTBT (Limited Test Ban Treaty) and the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) was huge. My research suggests that my two favorites (Taylor and McCloy) were at odds with the President on this issue. It seems that McCloy was replaced by Harriman around June of 1963 and by August the US had folded its hand and had given into the British and Soviet position with the acceptance of the LTBT. The LTBT of 1963 was similar to what had been attempted and what failed in 1960 when the Paris Summit was sabotaged by the shoot down of the U-2 (was Oswald involved?). Was this the spark that ignited the conspirators? Interesting question as I look at the facts. If Taylor was involved and the wheels of assination were already in motion because of the Presidents June change in position on the Test Ban Treaty, then your choice "C" may have led Taylor to prepare and execute a coup in Vietnam in preperation for a new President that could be presuaded toward deeper involvement. We have Jackie Kennedy's statements to the Soviet Ambassador about Nuclear Disarmament talks at the funeral of her husband and you have the Johnson "X" millions of deaths in a nuclear war arm twisting to motivate membership on the Warren Commission. Did Ms Kennedy and President Johnson's statements have more truth to them than we have given them credit for? Key dates that I find coincidental: Document 19: State Department memcon, "Meeting of the Secretary's Disarmament Advisers," 3 November 1959 Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1955-1959, 600.0012/11-359 "Sharp inter-agency disagreements over whether to publicly abandon the goal of a comprehensive test ban and resume nuclear testing persisted but the State Department's stance against any sudden policy changes prevailed. Instead, the Department supported proposals for technical discussions with the Soviets as a way to "sharpen the issue of underground control to the point where we could propose a limited agreement" that would include provisions for a research program on underground test verification...General Gruenther explained many believed that the U.S. was pushing the difficulty of underground test verification as a "device to get out of the negotiations." Killian explained the theoretical challenge posed by the "Latter Hole" although McCloy was doubtful because "the difficulties of constructing the big hole were almost insurmountable." This meeting took place within days after Oswald had defected to the USSR. Document 24: State Department memcon, "Nuclear Test Negotiations - Meeting of Principals," 10 May 1960 Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1960-63, 700.5611/5-1060 "By early May, the U-2 crisis was unfolding which doomed the Paris summit. Nevertheless, in the hope that something might turn up, the Principals met to discuss black boxes and seismic research, high altitude tests, and the U.S. position on inspection quotas." Document 50: Commencement Address by President John F. Kennedy at American University in Washington, DC, 10 June 1963 Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President. January 1 to November 22, 1963. (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, DC. 1964), pp. 459-464 "In this famous speech, Kennedy broke the ice with Khrushchev by making a public declaration in favor of peace and arms control. An important influence was the writer and editor Norman Cousins who had met secretly with Khrushchev several times since 1962 in an attempt to get the two powers beyond the dispute over the number of inspections. Even some of Cousin's own language, such as "making the world safe for diversity" found its way into the text. (Note 59) Toward the end of the speech, after Kennedy discussed the test ban negotiations and the problem of nuclear proliferation, he announced that the United States would not conduct any more atmospheric tests as long as other nations refrained from doing so. Drawing upon the understanding that he, Macmillan, and Khrushchev had already reached about high-level talks, Kennedy also declared that Washington, London, and Moscow would soon resume negotiations on a test ban treaty and that United Kingdom and the United States would send a senior delegation to Moscow for the discussions. While Kennedy did not name any names, he quickly settled on Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman, who had met with Khrushchev before and had the stature needed for a mission of this sort." Document 51: CIA Information Report, "Soviet Reaction to June 10 Speech of President Kennedy," 11 June 1963, excised copy Source: John F. Kennedy Library, box 100, Disarmament-Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations, 4/62-8/63 "That President Kennedy's speech had an immediately favorable impact on Soviet opinion is suggested by this CIA information report based on intelligence gleaned from a Soviet official working for the secretariat of an international organization, probably the United Nations." June 12, 1963: McCloy writes letter to Edwin Walker. Document 52: ACDA Memcon, "Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Meeting of Committee of Principals," 14 June 1963 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Records Relating to Disarmament and Arms Control, box 6, Def 18-8 Testing and Detection, 1963-1966 (Also published in FRUS 1961-1963, VII, pp. 719-726) "The administration had tabled various CTBT drafts since 1961, but the Principals were now reluctant to publish the latest draft for fear that it invite controversy--a "head-on collision"--especially if the Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized the draft when testifying before Congress. That the Joint Chiefs, according to Chairman Maxwell Taylor, were possibly more amenable to an atmospheric test ban offered some hope, but only if the Soviets switched gears." Document 56: Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Glenn Seaborg, Journal Entry for 9 July 1963 Source: Journals of Glenn T. Seaborg, Volume 6, July 1, 1963-November 22, 1963 (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 1989) "Early in the evening of 9 July, Kennedy met with the NSC to discuss the Harriman mission. Still unsure whether a limited three environments test ban treaty was negotiable, the participants briefly discussed an agreement that permitted a quota of underground tests. Nevertheless, if an atmospheric test ban was feasible, Rusk wanted Harriman to be able to conclude an agreement "on the spot." Bundy wondered whether the French should be consulted, which raised the question of whether it would be possible to induce Paris to sign a limited test ban treaty. Maxwell Taylor's comments questioning the advantages of an atmospheric test ban raised the continuing problem with the Chiefs, but Kennedy declared that the issue was settled: "such a ban is to the advantage of the U.S." Nevertheless, Taylor vainly pushed away on the issue." Document 64: Statement of the Position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Three-Environment Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 12 August 1963Source: FRUS 1961-1963 Supplement "The negotiation of the LTBT proceeded relatively quickly and Dean Rusk was soon on his way to Moscow for the formal treaty signing on 5 August. A week later, the Joint Chiefs signed off on an analysis of the impact that the treaty would have on US national security. Looking at the pros and cons of the treaty, the Chiefs saw some military disadvantages, for example, they believed that Moscow was ahead of the United States in testing high-yield nuclear weapons. Like Adenauer, they saw political disadvantages: "euphoria in the world" could erode the "vigilance" needed to wage the Cold War." Just thoughts, documents and a coincidence. Jim Root

Tim Just for the record I believe it is possible that Oswald was "a" shooter and that there may have been multiple shooters. In my opinion Lee was not a "nut" in the WC sense although an examination of his life may lead one to believe that he had numerous idiosyncrasies. I am also of the opinion that the route of the motorcade was directed past where Oswald worked rather than Oswald being placed in a job where the motorcade would pass. If there were in fact multiple shooters and Oswald was unaware of them before he attempted his first shot, can you imagine his surprise when he realized that there were multiple shooters? Jim Root

Jefferson Morley wrote: "I am not interested in the variety of narratives about 22 November 1963. With all due respect to your contributors, their ‘theories’ don't interest me anymore than my own do. One and only one causal chain of events led to the president's death. That is the only story that interests me. I want articulation of what we, and any reasonable person, can agree is historical fact…’ ‘This is fact. We don't increase the credibility of these facts by installing them in "theory" designed to vindicate the view that unseen political forces were behind Kennedy's death. Quite the contrary. We should use the facts to eliminate the bad theories and work on interpretations of the assassination that are carefully designed to maximize consensus so that people today can understand the forces that culminated in a great historical crime. ‘Here's what the historical records shows: JFK's assassination was the result of a still-unexplained intelligence failure involving a group of CIA officers who knew of Oswald's existence, his pro-Castro activities and his movements in the weeks before 22 November 1963. This group includes: Dick Helms, Tom Karamessines, John Whitten, Jane Roman, David Phillips, George Joannides and possibly others. What is unexplained is why they deliberately chose not to report their knowledge of Oswald's activities and movements, even when asked by colleagues such as Win Scott, Mexico City station chief.” “This is not the final statement on the subject. It is a very narrow statement. But it is indisputably factual and its implications are profound. That's what needs discussing, not ‘theories." I could not agree more. For eleven years I have attempted to disprove the possibility that General Walker could have met Oswald in October of 1959 and that Edwin Walker was an integral part of the intelligence community of the US Government. I have been unable to disprove either of these points, I wish, in many ways, that I could have disproved them by now. Instead my attempts to disprove have led to the "discovery" of several alternative routes that Oswald could have taken from London to Helsinki that would also have accommodated the movements of Walker during this same time period. This is fact! It is a provable fact that in 2005 members of this forum have been able to "discover" information that was, for some "reason" left out, although obviously available, of the official Warren Report. It's signifigance may be of importance. In researching the life of Edwin Walker I have found factual links to people such as John J. McCloy, Maxwell Taylor, Gordon Blake, Chester Clifton, Clifton Carter, etc. and circumstantial links to the likes of Thomas Karamessines, George Joannides and John B. Hurt, etc. I have found factual evidence that supports the involvement of General Walker in intelligence activities that date back to the early 1930's. Circumstantial or coincidental information that correlate Walker's career from October of 1959 until November 1963 to the movements of Lee Harvey Oswald. The Warren Report ties Oswald and Walker together without providing information on the factual past military career of General Walker. Yet, I have a copy of a letter that was written by Warren Commissioner John J. McCloy five months before the assassination of JFK that states: "I am also very familiar with your very fine record in World War II and in Korea..." This makes sense because it is a fact that McCloy was present for one action that Walker participated in (first officier ashore at Kiska) and later, when McCloy "requested" that the movements of Bernard Bernstein be monitored during the closing days of WWII, Walker and his elite military unit were assigned to escourt Bernstein in Germany and France. I am still perplexed by the November 4, 1963 Hosty note that provided exact information on where Oswald was working in Dallas and the "fact" that previous Hosty notes had been forwarded to the office of Richard Helms. Yet it seems that the Nov. 4th note never received an official WC exhibit number. Why? If there was in "fact" a conspiracy it was not the events of November 22, 1962 that created the conspirators, as Morley states, "JFK's assassination was the result of a still-unexplained intelligence failure involving a group of CIA officers who knew of Oswald's existence, his pro-Castro activities and his movements in the weeks before 22 November 1963." The one place where I, as of now, withhold agreement with Morley is that I am not yet willing to concede the fact that the assassination was, "the result of a still-unexplained intelligence failure involving a group of CIA officers who knew of Oswald's existence..." I do not believe that we have the facts to eliminate the possibility that there was a "group of CIA officers" (or others) that might not have called the assassination a "failure." Jim Root

As many of you know I have been led to believe that John J. McCloy, along with Maxwell Taylor, may be the "Big Fish" in a conspiracy to assassinate John F. Kennedy. It is my belief that if there was in fact a conspiracy to assassinate the President that the conspiators would have to be positioned to accommodate both the assassination and the cover-up. Both McCloy and Taylor, in my opinion, meet this criteria. In a circumstantial evidence case one would need to demonstrate that a character, like McCloy, would be willing to deceive the public, tamper with evidence and protect the guilty if he were to deem it necessary (for the good of the nation) to do so. Two cases in point: The Korematsu Case (dealing with the relocation of an American citizen during the relocation of Japanese- Americans during WWII) demonstrates just such a proclivity on the part of John J. McCloy. As an interesting side note: During the process of relocating the Japanese-Americans during WWII McCloy first worked with Earl Warren. From an article by Harvey A. Silverglate and Carl Takei that appeared in the Boston Pheonix: "In the spring of 1943, the Supreme Court was preparing to hear two cases — Yasui v. United States and Hirabayashi v. United States — challenging a wartime curfew for people of Japanese ancestry. A third case, Korematsu v. United States, which challenged the internment of this group, was coming down the pike as well. 'The War Department knew it would have to provide military justification for these racially discriminatory measures. However, a month before oral arguments in Yasui and Hirabayashi, it encountered a problem. General John L. DeWitt, who directed the internment of Japanese-Americans, submitted a report to justify the program. In it, he wrote: "It was impossible to establish the identity of loyal and disloyal with any degree of safety. It was not that there was insufficient time in which to make such a determination; it was simply a matter of facing the realities that a positive determination could not be made, that an exact separation of the ‘sheep from the goats’ was unfeasible." He grounded this assertion on the notion that the Japanese race was "a potentially dangerous element" with peculiar traits that made their loyalties and intentions inscrutable. This rationale, War Department officials realized, was legally indefensible. 'Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy and several Army officials asked DeWitt to rewrite the report so as not to jeopardize the Supreme Court cases. DeWitt complied; he removed the racist language and replaced it with the assertion that wartime circumstances demanded immediate action, that there was no time to investigate the loyalty of each Japanese-American. McCloy then forwarded the doctored report to the Justice Department for use in the upcoming Korematsu case. The War Department destroyed all copies of the original, racist report, except for one that was accidentally misplaced and which eventually made its way to the National Archives, only to be rediscovered nearly a half-century later. 'The Supreme Court issued opinions in the Yasui and Hirabayashi cases on June 21, 1943, and in Korematsu on December 18, 1944. In all three, the court ruled for the government, relying heavily on the Justice Department’s assertion (which the lawyers derived primarily from the doctored report) that the exigencies of war demanded immediate action, and that there had been insufficient time to separate loyal from disloyal Japanese-Americans. 'In his dissent in Korematsu, Justice Robert Jackson expressed concern that the court, "having no real evidence before it, has no choice but to accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any cross-examination." Justice Robert Jackson and McCloy would differ on another occassion. Jackson would preside over the Nuremburg Trials, McCloy would overturn or change the sentences of many of those that had been convicted. This would occur seven years after the 1944 opinion in the Korematsu Case was written. In "The Legacy of Nuremberg," a documentary project of Minnesota Public Radio we find this statement about McCloy and his part in "reconsidering" Nuremburg "judgments." "The man who appointed the review board, John McCloy, stressed that the board was not reconsidering judgments but would examine fairness in sentences imposed by the tribunal. Many prosecutors suspected that politics were involved, though John McCloy always denied that he was acting on any political directives from Washington, according to prosecutors and historians. "Between 1949 and 1958," says William Caming, "all of the prisoners had sentences reduced and were then released. Including, surprisingly enough, four of the leaders of the Einsatzgruppen death squads. It was a political measure. No members of the prosecution staff and none of the judges at Nuremberg were even consulted." 'Among the first released were the German industrialists, including Alfried Krupp and Karl Krauch, the I.G. Farben executive. Many of the former prisoners, like Krupp, would re-establish their wealth and positions in German society. Years later, a handful of the convicted war criminals would be tried again in a series of war crimes trials in Germany that continue to this day. The German government and German industry also paid out billions of dollars in compensation to victims of Nazi crimes. And beginning in the 1960s, a post-war generation of German writers, intellectuals and politicians confronted many of the demons of Nazism. 'In addition, 20 of the 24 Einsatzgruppen officers convicted by Benjamin Ferencz were released, including nine men originally sentenced to death, according to historian Peter Maguire. The last two left Landsberg prison in 1958. Recently declassified U.S. documents and CIA files obtained by Peter Maguire suggest that at least two former Einsatzgruppen officers later may have worked as spies for western intelligence agencies, including the CIA." Would John J. McCloy do "anything" to protect the "integrity" of the US Government and its intelligence activities? I can imagine Judge Jackson, if he had lived till 1964, writting his "opinion" of McCloy and the Warren Commission Report. He might have said, ""having no real evidence before it, THE NATION has no choice but to accept THE WARREN COMMISSIONS own..., self-serving statement, untested by any cross-examination." Jim Root

James You know the picture with Harrod Miller that is missing John Hurt. I now know that that picture was taken just out side of "the vault" in the Old Munitions Building. Hurt liked to work in the vault, away from other people and preferred to be away from the noises associated with everyday life. I have heard one silly story about him. He was walking accross a street and was hit by a car. As he was gettin up off the ground the driver of the car approached and asked, " Are you hurt?" John looked at him and replied, "Of course, John B." as he walked away. He seems to have spent more time listening to music than associating with other people although I have read letters that he wrote to family members that are both sincere and genuine reflections of a caring man. In total I believe that John B. Hurt was a man that was absorbed by his work and lived as a genius within an enclosed world surrounded by other geniuses. I have read one persons account that says if you met him today you would consider him a geek. Yet Hurt seems to have been a man that was sensitive to the Japanese people and culture even as he was part of the machine that was developed to defeat those same peole and that same culture in a total war. You must remember that John B. Hurt did suffer a mental breakdown and did realize and accept his own physical limitations. He may have had TB and it has been related that he never was in very good health. His name remained classified until after his death but I would like to believe he preferred his own anonymity and never sought fame. Jim Root