Evan Burton
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Posts posted by Evan Burton
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Oh, and:
Mr Fetzer said:
Moreover, the effects of a strong EM hit not only include taking out the electronic
components of the plane (the CDI, the stall warning system, the communications
equipment) and the electrical systems (including the switches that control the pitch
of the props, among others) but can have unhealthy effects on human beings and
other living things, such as rendering them unconscious, incapable of voluntary muscle control, or even dead. Does Burton also know, based upon his vast experience, this did not happen in this case? Under the conditions, how could he possibly know? The extensive, intense, and long fire surely would have destroyed physical effects.
Yes, I can say it did not happen because the aircraft is fitted with additional mechanical linkages for prop pitch and engine power control, mechanical & pressure operated flight instruments, all which do not rely on electrical power or signals to work. The aircraft was capable of being flown safely. The aircraft did NOT crash because of those reasons mentioned above.
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Mr Fetzer, you keep on ignoring the arguements put before you and maintain your tirade, insisting that you are right - no matter what is shown to the contrary.
Please continue to do so, because it simply further weakens your credibility as far as the cause of the accident is concerned.
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Like I have said: Mr Fetzer (and now Jack), you do not have the appropriate qualifications, experience, or training to challenge the NTSB report. You do not know what you are talking about. If there was 'foul play' involved, it was NOT as you have asserted.
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Aviation experience is not necessary to judge facts, photographs, testimony
and news reports. A little common sense, which Jim has in abundance, is
what is necessary. Am I the only one who finds it strange that a fire consumed
an airplane and people, but did not even scorch a tree? Science is not needed
to observe this...just common sense.
Jack
Common sense can lead you astray.
Have a look at these images:
It's the crash site of a Sea King helicopter, SHARK 02, that killed nine Australian service personnel during the Nias relief effort in April 05.
The fire after the crash completely burnt the aircraft - yet the surrounding grass is untouched. Oh - and notice the white smoke. The Sea King uses AVTUR, just like a KingAir.
Come on Jack - or Mr Fetzer - tell me that this crash was staged or suspicious.
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Pat,
Let's assume for a moment that Mr Fetzer is correct about a 'high energy' weapon of some type 'luring' the aircraft off-course and completely frying all the aircraft electrics.
That would make his theory about the crash correct, wouldn't it?
Simple answer: no.
If all electrical systems are completely fried:
1. Engine power and blade pitch controls still have a mechanical linkage that would allow close to normal performance - sufficient to fly out of the stall;
2. Aircraft still has altimeter - pressure operated, no electrical power required;
3. Aircraft still has Air Speed Indicator (ASI); pressure operated from pitot tube and static port on fuselage - no electrical power required;
4. Aircraft still has Vertical Speed Indicator (VSI); operated by pressure - no electrical power required; and
5. Aircraft still has Standby Atitude Indicator (AI), sometimes called the 'artifical horizon'. Main AI runs off electrics; standby AI run off vacuum reserve specifically in case of total electrical failure. FAA standards say it must run for at least 30 mins with no power.
So you still have control of your engines to deliver power, you know your pitch / roll (AI), how fast you are going (ASI), your altitude, and how fast you are descending / climbing (VSI) - everything you need to fly out of the situation. Even if the stall warning was disabled, part of instrument flying is maintaining an instrument scan - looking at all those primary flight instruments.
EVERYTHING indicates they didn't have a proper scan going (PIC responsibility), they should have seen the airspeed bleeding off, failed to recognise the impending stall, then failed to correctly recover from the stall.
It's a classic case - it's happened before and will no doubt happen again.
The NTSB has drawn the correct conclusions from the available data.
Mr Fetzer does not have the experience or training to analyse the events, and fails to recognise that he is plain wrong.
If there WAS 'foul play', it was NOT as Mr Fetzer describes.
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Evan,
I don't disagree nor agree with you, but did you even go to the link that Jack posted before you said It was ridiculous?
Yes, I did. You could tell it was garbage after reading it. I don't believe it to be a real 'report' at all.
9.39PM (2139) - Altitude 2500 ft, final radio contact.
"When detected on radar 29 seconds later he was at 1,800 feet,"
yet it then says:
"Within app. 10 seconds of this final radio contact at 9:39 P.M.... was identified on Radar by both Military personnel and Martha’s Vineyard Airport tower personnel as descending 1,200 feet in 12 seconds..."
So at 2139:00 it was at 2500', then at 2139:12 it was at 1300', then at 2139:29 it was at 1800'?
"Reporter has been ‘gotten to, compromised. Unknown as to who, at this time"
Nobody would put this in an official report because it's an opinion - and they wouldn't use such terminology. Agents are trained to report FACT, not opinion.
"All indication from Forensics and Physical evidence investigations lend themselves to a violent explosion, either from an altitude or barometric pressure device, or from a Particle Beam laser. [Delbert said Particle Beam laser was left out of final classified report] Aircraft ‘broke up’ in mid-air, as evidenced by wide spread debris gathered from the ocean and several different beaches. This can only be caused by an onboard explosion, or an attack by a missile or Laser."
Total garbage. An explosive device would typically leave residue traces on the aircraft. Destruction from an explosion would have a very different stress pattern and could be identified from the remains. A "particle beam" or "laser" would affect the aircraft in an entirely different way - even if it caused the aircraft fuel tanks to explode.
The entire thing is garbage; made up; false - a joke in bad taste.
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I'm not going to put up with any more of Mr Fetzer's dribble; he has fixated on the idea that the crash was an 'assassination' and nothing will convince him otherwise. I suspect that if the ghosts of the flight crew appeared before him and said they screwed up, Mr Fetzer would accuse them of being part of a 'cover up'.
The NTSB report is based upon the KNOWN FACTS and, based on those facts and past incidents, determines the most likely reasons for the accident. They have done a thorough investigation and there is nothing CREDIBLE to disagree with their conclusions.
If there is anything factually incorrect about the report, then inform the NTSB.
I don't talk about high energy weapons because I am not qualified to seriously discuss them.
You, Mr Fetzer, do not have the qualifications, training, or experience to judge the report. You are not qualified flight crew, you have little (if any) aviation experience, and cannot speak with any authority about the cockpit environment.
Simply put, with regard to the NTSB report - its investigations and conclusions - you don't know what you are talking about.
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...that the Challenger was shot down with a beam weapon....
You're not serious about that, are you?
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Mr Fetzer,
I'm not looking at the politics surrounding the Senator.
I am looking solely at the facts of the flight and subsequent crash.
If there was anything to suggest that outside interference was responsible for the events of that flight, THEN those political motivations might explain why those events happened. The simple fact is, however, there is nothing to suggest that this was anything more than pilot error. Nothing.
Jack,
Perhaps you'd prefer a more unbiased view? I can give the report to a couple of people. One is a former senior air accident investigator for CASA (now the ATSB); the other is a work mate who performs a similar role but for the Navy.
Would yourself and Mr Fetzer be interested in their opinions regarding the NTSB report and the conclusions they drew? I am willing to pass the report (along with the various URLs Mr Fetzer has supplied)
I suspect that if they both concurred with the NTSB report, Mr Fetzer would 'dismiss' their opinions on some ground and continue with his original assertions.
This leads me to a question for Mr Fetzer which I have asked Jack on a different subject: what WOULD convince you that you were wrong and the crash was caused by nothing more sinister than pilot error?
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>
>Kirk Otteson, Director of Operations at Aviation Charter, was asked by the
>NTSB about the type of autopilot installed in the Wellstone plane. His
>response (image below) told the NTSB something they did not want to know:
>the Senator's plane was a special version of the King Air, originally
>designated a C100, which was fitted with upgraded avionics, autopilot and
>engines.
>
>This is buried in Attachment 1-43 to the Operational Factors Group report,
>which was not in the initial release of NTSB documents. The document can
>be viewed here:
>
>http://assassinationscience.com/n41be/ntsbcd/253070.pdf
>
>This fact was not mentioned anywhere else in the NTSB's reports. It is
>supported by the fact that the Wellstone plane's serial number was one of
>the last in the series, and also by the fact that it was sold to a number
>of "prestige" clients during its operational life.
>
. . .
>
>In other interviews, the NTSB try to make the case that the GPS would not
>have been used for an instrument landing. However, it would make sense
>that, if the instruments were giving confusing readings, the pilots would
>have been justified in checking the GPS as a backup.
>
. . .
>
>If any of you can verify this GPS blackout with other pilots, let me know
>asap. Also note that GPS is used for many other things as well, so others
>may be able to comment. If the satellites went down for a short time, it
>would affect a huge area. However, if it was just local jamming, then it
>would be localised to the area.
>
>If true, this would add to the "melted cloud pocket" around Eveleth at the
>time of the accident, and the other evidence (phones/garage doors) as
>evidence of some sort of electromagnetic foul play.
>
In response to this email from John Costella, Ph.D., I confirmed with the
pilot, his chief pilot, and the owner of his charter company the experience
I have reported previously. There does not appear to have been a global
satellite problem, which supports the inference that the manipulation of the
GPS data was a local phenomenon (still covering several states). Certainly,
no solar flare interference would be expected to have such systematic and
regular effects, where the intensity and direction of the deviation is in the
same direction and of similar magnitude--and at essentially the same time!
A very weak post that Colby recruited suggests that the weather was poor
and the pilots preoccupied with their efforts to control the plane. But the
weather was not bad (ceiling at 500-1000 feet with visibility 3-5 miles and
not only no snow or freezing rain but not even any rain). This guy does
not appear to be up-to-speed, since even the NTSB cleared the weather of
having caused the crash. Moreover, he ignores that there were two pilots,
where the co-pilot had been handling most of the communications. If he is
a pilot, then he should know that they can't both be trying to control the
aircraft, lest they work against each other. In a situation where it would
be of the highest priority that first responders make it to the crash scene
rapidly (with a US Senator, his wife and daughter, as well as three aides
aboard), it would be highly probable that a distress call would have been
made, if the communications equipment was still functioning. Similarly,
if this guy is a pilot, he should have acknowledged that it was very odd
they did not respond to the loud stall warning alarm, which should have
told them they were threatening to stall and allowed them ample time to
respond, if the stall warning system was still functioning. The simulations
with a weaker engine and at slower speeds are devastating to the NTSB's
conclusions, because they demonstrate that they had no evidence at all
to support their inference to a stall, nor any explanation as to why this
plane was on the wrong bearing (268 vice 276), yet proceeding as if it
were on the right bearing, which is readily explainable if they were going
by their GPS when the data was being manipulated, with spill over effects
that affected the pilot and co-pilot heading into the Waukengan Airport!
No other explanation comes close to accounting for what is known about
this crash than than they were led into the "kill zone" and taken down.
More on Costella's observations about the "melted cloud packet" is in
our co-authored piece, "The NTSB Failed Wellstone", links given above.
Of course, I anticipate the usual barrage of garbage posts from Lamson,
Colby, and Thompson. But I am glad to read occasional "enlightened"
posts from Pat Speer, David Healy, and other members of the forum.
Mr Fetzer,
You insist on 'harping' on! The FACTS are:
1. The weather WAS marginal. The reason the NTSB concludes it was not a factor was because it was still within limits. Being within limits does NOT make it 'fine'. Refer to an aviation meteorologist if you need guidance on this.
2. The aircraft requested, and was cleared for, a VOR approach to RWY 27. That is the approach they were vectored for. That is the approach they conducted.
3. If they had set up the GPS to monitor the approach, it would have been different. The GPS RWY 27 approach tracks 273 to the FAF from the COLLS intersection (see http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/0509/05236G27.PDF).
4. If the GPS signal had been "manipulated" in any way, a 'GPS UNRELIABLE' or 'GPS DEGRADE' flag / warning would have appeared.
5. If they had a problem with the VOR approach, and the GPS became unreliable, and they had ANY doubt about what was happening, the CORRECT thing to do would have been to conducted a missed approach, gone around, and sorted out the problems.
6. There is NO evidence they attempted to power up the engines and fly out. This does not mean the engines or systems did not respond, it means there was no attempt to do so.
7. There is NO evidence that the communications system was inoperative.
8. There is NO evidence that any systems were damaged by any type of EMR, as would have been apparent if any systems had been subjected to sufficient EMR as to cause a malfunction.
9. It is unknown if the stall warning went off. Even so, as the reports show, the stall warning may have only sounded (IIRC) 5-7 kts above stall speed. The airspeed was bleeding off quite rapidly, so they may have only had a few seconds to react (not 'ample time'). This, combined with a preoccupation to regain the radial and get the aircraft back on the profile, may (and most likely did) lead to momentary confusion and a failure to react in time to the stall. A stall, 400-800 ft AGL when transitioning from IFR to visual, without dedicated and proper prior training, is DEADLY. More experienced and capable pilots than that flight crew have been killed in similar circumstances.
10. Pilots can and have 'worked against each other', each trying to do what they thought was right in an emergency situation. That's what CRM is all about.
Mr Fetzer, you make wild assumptions and draw conclusions from data which you are not qualified to assess.
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2] Explain how the "troika" could have expected killing Wellstone to have increased Coleman's chances of winning when it should of had the opposite effect. Coleman won because of the funeral/rally and how it was perceived by the state's independent voters - this was widely reported in the Minnesota and national press.
Len
Len, without taking a stand on whether or not Wellstone was killed by a conspiracy, I believe this argument weakens your case. Should someone have wanted to kill Wellstone and make it look like an accident, waiting until after he was elected would have drawn too much attention and made it all too obvious to the American people. Do you think the murder of Bobby Kennedy before he received the nomination makes it less likely he was killed by a conspiracy??? Seriously... Just as Bobby's winning the California primary made him look unstoppable, Wellstone was on very solid ground to win his election, enough that someone might want to have killed him before it would be impossible to make it look like an accident.
As for the public's response to the funeral, I've read enough to know that the poor behavior by some of Wellstone's friends was blown way out of proportion by the supposedly left-wing media. There's no reason to believe Karl Rove and his pals were not in some way responsible for the spin created. Should you think the man incapable of such behavior, you should remember that Nixon (whom he idolized) was concerned that the killings at Kent State would make him look bad, and, as per Haldeman, immediately began trying to spin the incident so that the victims and the anti-war movement would look responsible for the deaths. Think about it.
Your arguments with Fetzer are far more solid when you stick to the possibility of pilot error than when you try to make the case that no one would try to kill Wellstone before the election. This gives the appearance you are trying to show the undecided, including myself, that Wellstone being murdered is unthinkable. Many of us on this Forum have read enough about the Kennedyassassination and the CIA to know that nothing is "unthinkable." People hate. People lust for power. People kill. People use whatever technology they have at their disposal to kill. If Fetzer is able to show that these rays exist, will you then admit his theory is possible? It seems just as he may be pre-dispositioned to believe in conspiracies you and your pilot friend may be pre-disposioned not to believe in them, even though a five-minute course in history will show they exist. While he may be guilty of misrepresenting evidence, you may be guilty of lying to yourself. As I admitted earlier, I'm intrigued by those who devote an inordinate amount of energy to show that conspiracies DON'T exist. Is it really truth you're after? To prove me wrong, please list some conspiracy theories you believe have some merit.
I'm with Pat on this.
There is no way to either prove or disprove that some parties may have wanted Wellstone dead.
That being said, there is absolutely no evidence that the crash was anything other than pilot error.
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Who killed John John? John John.
Precisely. Well said.
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Oh for F sake - this is ridiculous.
People are seeing conspiracies any time anything happens.
My car broke down - Blame the government.
The computer has a fault - Bush conspiracy.
This beer is warm - CIA Dirty Tricks team.
Some of you people should think about visiting the real world.
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...the latest being evidence that GPS data may have been manipulated to bring the plane into the "kill zone"...
You voice this opinion several times.
1. The aircraft was flying a VOR approach, not a GPS approach. I don't have a GPS approach plate for EVM, so I don't know if they followed similar paths and may have been set up as a backup. In any case, if the pilots noticed a discepancy between the VOR and GPS approaches, they should have immediatly conducted a missed approach, climbed to a safe altitude in a holding pattern, and investigated what was happening.
2. Please explain HOW the GPS was being 'manipulated'.
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After reading the accident investigation report, I can only concur with its findings.
The aircraft was high on approach, and had to lose a lot of height to get back on the correct descent profile. When they found themselves off the radial and at low airspeed, they should have called a missed approach and gone around again. Instead, they pushed a bad approach and it killed them.
This situation has happened before, and it will most likely happen again.
Now, there are assertions made by Mr Fetzer I'd like to comment on.
He said:
[There was no distress call, even though the plane--whose passengers included
a US Senator, his wife and daughter, and three aides--was going down in a
remote, swampy area where the rapid arrival of first responders might make
the difference between life and death. There were two pilots. He is committing
a fallacy of equivocation by playing with words. That the copilot, who had handled
most of the communications, did not send a distress call suggests he sent no call
because communications were disabled and he was unable to send out a call.]
It is also just as feasible that no call was made because the crew were in a high workload situation, pushing a bad approach, and did not realise the situation they were in. There is nothing to suggest that the comms were in any way inoperative.
[This is a nice example of "spinning" by trying to turn vice into virtue. Since
the plane was in distress, the pilots would be expected to "power up" and get out
of trouble, which is exactly what happened during the NTSB's own simulations.
They were unable to bring the plane down, even when it was flown abnormally
slowly. They were not landing. The field was miles to the north from where they
were. This remark displays either massive ignorance or deliberate deception.]
I think the ignorance is on your part here. The simulation demonstrated that it would have been possible for the aircraft to climb out and conduct a missed approach; there was sufficient power available from the engines. The fact that the engines were still in Flight Idle shows the crew did NOT attempt to apply power - another indication that they did not have SA.
"... the weather was fine..."
It was not. The AWOS was reporting scattered at 400, overcast at 700 (AGL). With a field elevation of 1378 ft, this means it was overcast at about 2080 ft AMSL. The MDA was 1840 ft AMSL - a difference of a little over 200 ft. That's about 10 seconds to get visual with the field and transition from the instruments to a visual approach before reaching MDA and having to conduct a missed approach. Factor in the fact it was scattered at about 1780 ft AMSL (400 AGL + FE), altimeter tolerance of +/- 50 ft, and an increased rate of descent to maintain profile, and they may have been breaking out at minimas. That is NOT fine weather. That is marginal - at best - and is further confirmed that the pilots planned an alternate, and the ATCO asked about intentions after a missed approach.
"...Richard Healing, a member of the NTSB team that wrote the report, admitted that they had no idea what caused the crash and were merely speculating..."
Was that a direct quote? I think he may have phrased it differently although, in some regards, it is correct. There was no physical evidence to indicate that the aircraft should not have been able to make an approach and land safely. Because there was no CDR / CVR, they have no record of what occurred in the cockpit apart from the radio transmissions. With nothing to positively identify what caused the crash, they have to look at the known facts and develop a most likely hypothesis as to why the accident occurred.
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After reading the accident investigation report, I can only concur with its findings.
The aircraft was high on approach, and had to lose a lot of height to get back on the correct descent profile. When they found themselves off the radial and at low airspeed, they should have called a missed approach and gone around again. Instead, they pushed a bad approach and it killed them.
This situation has happened before, and it will most likely happen again.
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Do you have any evidence that they were using GPS? They were definately using VOR my understanding is that pilots use one or the other but not both [Evan?].
How could the assassins know they would use GPS?
You would only be flying one type of an approach at any one time, however it is common to have another system as a backup. This is especially so if the approaches follow the same path but even if they do not, having another approach set up can help you maintain situational awareness.
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"The Safety Board has investigated numerous accidents and incidents involving commercial flight crews that inadvertently failed to maintain adequate airspeed. For example, the Board has investigated at least 11 events since 1982 involving Part 135 flights and at least 7 events involving Part 121 flights in which stall or failure to maintain airspeed during the approach or landing phases was cited as a causal or contributing factor and in which icing was not cited as a factor."
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"However, because the airplane was not equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), because of the approximate nature of the airspeed calculations, and because abrupt airplane maneuvering or even small amounts of ice accumulation can defeat the airplane’s stall warning system, the Safety Board was not able to determine when or if the stall warning horn activated before the onset of the stall."
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Also:
"However, stall warnings do not always provide flight crews with timely notification of developing hazardous low-airspeed conditions. For example, abrupt maneuvering can increase angle-of-attack so rapidly that a stall could occur nearly simultaneously with the stall warning, and ice accumulation, which raises the stall speed, could degrade the stall warning margin to the point at which little or no stall warning is provided."
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Now, looking at the safety recommendations, the first thing I notice is:
"These discrepancies included the following: Aviation Charter was not operating in accordance with its weight and balance load manifest procedures, it did not have adequate stall recovery guidance, it did not have consistent deicer boot operational guidance, it did not have an in-range checklist, it was not adequately making its pilots aware of its standard operating procedures (SOPs), and it was not training its pilots on CRM in accordance with its FAA-approved training module."
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"The Saab 340B’s autopilot was in the altitude-hold mode and the engines were producing near-flight-idle power during a circling approach. The stall-warning system did not activate before the aircraft stalled. The flight crew recovered control of the aircraft 112 feet above the ground."
"The flight crew of the Ilyushin IL-76TD freighter conducted two approaches based on a user-defined global positioning system waypoint that incorrectly depicted the location of the runway threshold. The first approach led to a go-around. The second approach was not stabilized; the descent rate was high when the airplane struck rising terrain."
"Improper Response to Stall Warning Cited in A310 CFIT off Ivory Coast - The pilot flying applied forward pressure on the control column but did not increase power when the stall-warning system activated during takeoff. The airplane descended into water soon thereafter. The controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT) accident occurred on a dark night with limited external visual references available for the flight crew."
"Investigators said that published procedures were not followed when the repair was performed more than 20 years before a structural failure occurred and the aircraft broke apart during flight."
"Noncompliance With Instrument Approach Procedures Cited in King Air CFIT Accident in Australia - The report said that dark night conditions during the emergency medical services positioning flight also were a significant factor in the fatal controlled-flight-into-terrain accident."
"During the approach, the crew was unaware of 40-knot winds that led to the controlled-flight-into-terrain accident during instrument meteorological conditions. At the time of the accident, no emergency locator transmitter was required on the turbojet; the accident site was not located until nearly three years after the aircraft was reported missing."
"Pilot Becomes Spatially Disoriented, Aircraft Breaks Apart During Descent - A Raytheon Super King Air 200 was transporting members of a collegiate basketball team in instrument meteorological conditions when the alternating-current electrical system malfunctioned. The report said that the pilot became spatially disoriented. The pilot’s control inputs placed a large aerodynamic load on the aircraft and caused it to break apart at low altitude."
"Pilot Incapacitation by Hypoxia Cited in Fatal Five-hour Flight of Beech King Air - The report said that the pilot apparently was unable physically to respond to air traffic control radio transmissions after the aircraft ascended above the assigned altitude, 25,000 feet. The aircraft likely continued flying on autopilot, with no input from the pilot, for several hours before it struck terrain."
"The crew of a Raytheon Beech 1900D used self-programmed global positioning system (GPS) waypoints for navigation during a night approach to a Canadian airport with weather conditions below minimums for the published nonprecision instrument approach."
"The Boeing 747 was configured for a dry-runway landing when heavy rain occurred on final approach to Bangkok, Thailand. The captain told the first officer (the pilot flying) to go around but then retarded the throttle levers when the main landing gear touched the runway. The airplane was substantially damaged. None of the occupants was injured seriously during the approach-and-landing accident, but the delay in evacuation of the aircraft focused attention on improving training for emergencies."
"Investigators concluded that a flammable mixture of fuel and air in the center-wing fuel tank likely was ignited by voltage from an external short circuit that was conducted into the tank by electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system." TWA 800
"Investigators said that the controlled-flight-into-terrain accident resulted from the flight crew’s failure to properly plan for a night departure from an unfamiliar airport. The crew of the U.S. Air Force C-130H did not follow published instrument departure procedures."
"The accident report said that the corporate pilot selected an incorrect source of distance-measuring equipment information and did not fly the proper descent profile for the instrument landing system approach. Airspeed decreased rapidly during the final segment of the approach before the Beech Super King Air 200 stalled and struck the ground."
"Investigators concluded that the airplane had a blocked pitot tube and that, during departure, the flight crew became confused by false indications of increasing airspeed and did not respond to a stall warning. All the occupants were killed when the airplane struck the Caribbean Sea off the northern coast of the Dominican Republic."
"Deviations from standard operating procedures, deficient crew resource management and crew distraction were cited as factors in a controlled-flight-into-terrain accident that caused substantial airplane damage but no injuries"
"The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board said that the absence of adequate aircraft-certification standards and operating procedures for flight in icing conditions was a probable cause of the accident, and that the flight crew’s acceptance of a relatively low airspeed restriction while operating in icing conditions was a contributing factor."
Aviation can be a hazardous business.
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Low-airspeed systems recommended by NTSB
by Gordon Gilbert
The NTSB believes currently required stall-warning systems are not adequate to cover all critically low-airspeed conditions and has recommended that the FAA require the installation of so-called “low-airspeed alert” systems on all airplanes used in FAR Parts 121 and 135 commercial operations.
The Safety Board's recommendation stems from its investigation into several Part 121 and Part 135 accidents since 1982 (most recently the crash of a King Air that killed the two pilots and six passengers, including Sen. Paul Wellstone [D-Minn.]) in which “a stall or failure to maintain airspeed during the approach or landing phases was cited as a causal or contributing factor and in which icing was not cited as a factor.”
In the Wellstone accident, the NTSB determined that the airplane was being flown below the “recommended approach speed for about the last 50 seconds of the flight.”
Current systems provide a warning at a speed that is at least five knots higher than the stall speed. But the NTSB doesn’t believe this is adequate for all situations. “Stall warnings do not always provide flight crews with timely notification of developing hazardous low-airspeed conditions. For example, abrupt maneuvering can increase angle of attack so rapidly that a stall could occur nearly simultaneously with the stall warning, and ice accumulation, which raises the stall speed, could degrade the stall-warning margin to the point at which little or no stall-warning is provided.”
Because the King Air carrying Wellstone did not have a cockpit voice recorder, because of the approximate nature of the airspeed calculations and because abrupt maneuvering or even small amounts of ice accumulation can defeat the airplane’s stall-warning system, the Safety Board was not able to determine “when or if the stall-warning horn activated before the onset of the stall.” Regardless of when or whether the stall-warning horn activated, it is clear that the pilots “failed to maintain airspeed during the approach,” the NTSB said.
A 1996 FAA/industry report titled “The Interfaces Between Flight Crews and Modern Flight Deck Systems” expressed concern about the history of Part 121 and 135 accidents involving lack of low-airspeed awareness in the context of flight crews’ monitoring automated systems. This report states: “Flight crews may not be provided adequate awareness of airplane energy state, particularly when approaching or trending toward a low-energy state…Transport-category airplanes are required to have adequate warnings of an impending stall, but at this point the airplane may already be in a potentially hazardous low-energy state. Better awareness is needed of energy state trends such that flight crews are alerted prior to reaching a potentially hazardous low-energy state.”
Low-airspeed Warnings Proposed for New Airplanes
Regulatory action toward requiring a low-airspeed warning system when using autopilots is already under way as a result of a Jan. 9, 1997 accident involving a Comair Brasilia that crashed near Monroe, Mich., during a rapid descent after an uncommanded roll excursion in icing. Also considered was the March 19, 2001 incident involving another Comair Brasilia, whose crew lost control during cruise and descended 10,000 feet after the airplane encountered icing. A low-airspeed alert system was developed for the Brasilia, and installation is mandated by an AD.
An FAA/industry aviation rulemaking advisory committee has proposed a change to FAR 25.1329 (automatic pilot systems) that would require low-airspeed protection and alerting during autopilot operations for newly certified transport-category airplanes. But the ARAC recommendation has yet to be turned into an FAA notice of proposed rulemaking.
The requirement for speed protection is based on the premise that reliance on flight-crew attentiveness to airspeed indications alone during autopilot operation “is not adequate to avoid unacceptable speed excursions outside the speed range of the normal flight envelope…Standard stall warning and high-speed alerts are not always timely enough for the flight crew to intervene to prevent unacceptable speed excursions during [autopilot] operation,” the NTSB said.
For example, a low-speed alert and a transition to the speed-protection mode at approximately 1.2 Vs or an equivalent speed defined in terms of Vsr (reference stall speed) for the landing flap configuration has been found to be acceptable. If a low-airspeed alert activates when the airspeed drops below 1.2 Vs, pilots would receive several seconds advance notice before reaching the airplane’s estimated stall speed. In addition, if the pilots maintain an airspeed at or above the threshold set by such an early low-airspeed alert the additional airspeed could prevent an accelerated stall initiated by an abrupt last-second maneuver or provide an improved speed margin above a premature stall caused by ice accumulation on the wings.
The Board said it recognizes “that there are unresolved technical, operational and human-factors issues that will need to be carefully evaluated and addressed in connection with the design and implementation of a low-airspeed alert system.” Some of the issues that should be addressed include defining the target speed at which the alert system would activate; effectively integrating such a system with other aircraft systems; preventing nuisance alarms and flight-crew over-reliance on such a system; differentiating such an alert from other kinds of cockpit alert and warning; and developing flight-crew procedures and training for the use of such systems.
“Despite these unresolved issues, the Safety Board concludes that the development of and requirement for the installation of low-airspeed alert systems could substantially reduce the number of accidents and incidents involving flight-crew failure to maintain airspeed.”
At press time the FAA had not responded to the recommendation.
http://www.ainonline.com/issues/01_04/01_0...irspeedp32.html
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"TWA 800 and Electromagnetic Interference: Work Already Completed and Work that Still Needs to be Done By Elaine Scarry"
Now this reference is completely ridiculous. The causes of TWA800's explosion were very well documented. People tried to claim it was a USN missile, that it was a bomb, etc - it was a combination of events.
In regard to aviation accidents, people should look up 'the Reason model' and the Boeing 'chain of events'.
Jim Fetzer: The Strange Death of Paul Wellstone
in History and Political Books: Debates with Authors
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All which were happening while the aircraft was still in radio contact with ATC and continued after the final transmission.
You assume that because there was no apparent reaction to a stall-warning which may or may not have sounded that it must have been disabled. It may have been disabled - being switched off by the crew.
No, it isn't. It's been explained to you many times. You can see in the images of the Shark 02 crash that the burning fuel & fuselage was giving off white smoke.
You haven't been able to prove an electrical fire took place, so you cannot say that any post-impact fire was caused by the same. The fire was more likely caused by post-impact by hot engine components and / or electrical arcing caused by the crash.
If you once again look at the images of the Shark 02 crash site: that fire occurred after the aircraft impacted from about a 100ft hover. No great forward speed, and only from about 100ft - yet the impact caused a fire which consumed the aircraft.
The aircraft was on a VOR approach, not a GPS. This is a fact explained to you (yet again) many times. Additionally, you have presented no explanation about how the GPS data can be manipulated. Why don't you explain to all of us how the GPS works, specifically with reference to aviation?
Refer once again to the Shark 02 images.
Mr Fetzer, you ignore everything that is put in front of you. Not only are ignoring facts which invalidate your theory about the cause of the crash, you ignore openings which - if explored - might show that the crash was the result of 'foul play'; just not as you have hypothesized.