Evan Burton

Evan, I've made it so you can see results without giving up your right to vote. Hope this is OK. Simple change to revert if needs be.

Thanks Gary - I think you have sorted out the problems that may have made the polls unworkable.

Hi Rod, and welcome to the Forum.

Engrave pics onto wood? That sounds amazing.

Could you post / link to some pics of your work? I'd imagine it must be fascinating.

Cheers and beers,

Evan

I voted A.

A - 1

B - 0

C - 0

Total votes - 1

I'd like to test how the Forum manages polls. We think that if you view the poll results before voting, you either get a "You have already voted" message or your vote turns up as a null, meaning it is counted in the overall total but does not go to any of the poll choices.

To test this hypothesis, could I ask interested parties to do the following:

- Either select A, B or C, then make a brief post stating what choice you made; or

- View the poll results BEFORE you vote, then make a post saying that you viewed results (and if you don't mind, what the posts results were: A, B, C and total votes).

This will allow us to see exactly how the polling system works. I'll keep the poll open for a week.

Thanks!

This is a really good reason for me not having a Facebook page (nor MySpace, etc).

Thanks Bernice.

On the contrary John, I agree to a large extent. Politics - and dirty politics - do sometimes intrude on what should be a purely military decision.

Regarding the F-111: yes, something definitely stunk with that purchase. Surprisingly though, both the US and the UK had a hand in it. For those who aren't aware of the background...

Back in the 1960s, Australia was considering a replacement for its English Electric Canberra bomber fleet. There were a few contenders but the two front runners were the General Dynamics F-111 swing wing strike aircraft, and the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC, the forerunner of BAe) TSR-2.

The TSR-2 looked like getting the order, but after politicking from the US and a visit to Australia by Lord Mountbatten - who lobbied strongly against the TSR-2 - in 1963 the Australian government decided on 24 x F-111C aircraft. Problems with the wing box (a critical portion of the swing wing assembly) meant that we didn't actually take delivery of the aircraft until 1973 (although we did get 24 x F-4 Phantoms as an interim measure).

The TSR-2 was canceled in 1965 in favour of the UK buying the F-111K... which order was subsequently canceled in favour of the F-4M and F-4K. The debacle cost the UK taxpayer more than it would have cost to develop the TSR-2 (which seemed to have a bright future as a capable strike aircraft). The government went so far as to order the TSR-2 construction jigs destroyed so that the aircraft could not be easily restarted.

The point where I disagree with you John, is that the F-111 did become a very potent weapons platform. Ask the pilots who fly it today (Australia is now the sole operator) and they would prefer it soldier on for many more years. It was so good we expanded our fleet, buying surplus F-111 aircraft and modding them to C standard, and buying the F-111G. Yes, there were upgrades - but the F-111 was considered to be worth the money and I agree.

A telling point is when we bought our B707 (not KC-135) tanker aircraft in the late 1980s. They were equipped for air-to-air refueling, and there were two systems which we utilised: the USN "drogue and probe" system and the USAF "flying boom" method. The USN method had a drogue trailed behind the tanker aircraft, with the receiving aircraft deploying a refueling probe. The receiver flew the probe into the drogue (the basket). Our F/A-18s used this method.

The F-111, on the other hand, used the "flying boom" method. This involved the receiving aircraft flying into a specific position behind the tanker, and the tanker boom operator would "fly" the boom into the refueling receptacle on the receiving aircraft.

When the RAAF got its tankers, the flying boom was specifically not included. Why do you think that happened? Could certain regional nations have felt threatened if the F-111's range could be extended?

Evan you gotta admit that kickbacks and politics has shaped a number pf purchase reasons for many years. I know you disagree with me, but the F111 is a bit suss. Australia is really the only nation who bought it and the costs just kept escalating and the delays necessitating upgrades soon after delivery. ie obsolete pretty quickly, but the committment was locked in. Personally, I think something like what Beazly tried to push through was the way to go.

I might repost the posts I made in the thread on PCs.

Thanks John!

On the contrary John, I agree to a large extent. Politics - and dirty politics - do sometimes intrude on what should be a purely military decision.

Regarding the F-111: yes, something definitely stunk with that purchase. Surprisingly though, both the US and the UK had a hand in it. For those who aren't aware of the background...

Back in the 1960s, Australia was considering a replacement for its English Electric Canberra bomber fleet. There were a few contenders but the two front runners were the General Dynamics F-111 swing wing strike aircraft, and the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC, the forerunner of BAe) TSR-2.

The TSR-2 looked like getting the order, but after politicking from the US and a visit to Australia by Lord Mountbatten - who lobbied strongly against the TSR-2 - in 1963 the Australian government decided on 24 x F-111C aircraft. Problems with the wing box (a critical portion of the swing wing assembly) meant that we didn't actually take delivery of the aircraft until 1973 (although we did get 24 x F-4 Phantoms as an interim measure).

The TSR-2 was canceled in 1965 in favour of the UK buying the F-111K... which order was subsequently canceled in favour of the F-4M and F-4K. The debacle cost the UK taxpayer more than it would have cost to develop the TSR-2 (which seemed to have a bright future as a capable strike aircraft). The government went so far as to order the TSR-2 construction jigs destroyed so that the aircraft could not be easily restarted.

The point where I disagree with you John, is that the F-111 did become a very potent weapons platform. Ask the pilots who fly it today (Australia is now the sole operator) and they would prefer it soldier on for many more years. It was so good we expanded our fleet, buying surplus F-111 aircraft and modding them to C standard, and buying the F-111G. Yes, there were upgrades - but the F-111 was considered to be worth the money and I agree.

A telling point is when we bought our B707 (not KC-135) tanker aircraft in the late 1980s. They were equipped for air-to-air refueling, and there were two systems which we utilised: the USN "drogue and probe" system and the USAF "flying boom" method. The USN method had a drogue trailed behind the tanker aircraft, with the receiving aircraft deploying a refueling probe. The receiver flew the probe into the drogue (the basket). Our F/A-18s used this method.

The F-111, on the other hand, used the "flying boom" method. This involved the receiving aircraft flying into a specific position behind the tanker, and the tanker boom operator would "fly" the boom into the refueling receptacle on the receiving aircraft.

When the RAAF got its tankers, the flying boom was specifically not included. Why do you think that happened? Could certain regional nations have felt threatened if the F-111's range could be extended?

Evan you gotta admit that kickbacks and politics has shaped a number pf purchase reasons for many years. I know you disagree with me, but the F111 is a bit suss. Australia is really the only nation who bought it and the costs just kept escalating and the delays necessitating upgrades soon after delivery. ie obsolete pretty quickly, but the committment was locked in. Personally, I think something like what Beazly tried to push through was the way to go.

The tender that blew up in the army's face

May 6, 2010

A project to source new equipment has been the subject of a Defence investigation, write Linton Besser and Dan Oakes.

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Heath picked up the telephone and dialled a number in Hallam, 45 minutes south-east of Melbourne. The call was over within minutes, but it would spark a chain reaction, exposing Defence's suspect handling of a multimillion dollar tender, and derailing a decade-long effort to modernise Australia's infantry equipment.

It would be two years before Heath's boss revealed the wreckage to the Senate: ''The probity auditor identified that there were process breaches … and recommended its cancellation,'' Brigadier Bill Horrocks said in February.

Now, a Herald investigation can reveal for the first time that the world's wealthiest defence contractor, BAE Systems, was perceived to have been given favourable treatment on the $23 million tender by officials.

The results are being felt by Australia's frontline service personnel. Just days ago, the Herald has established, several army personnel were sent on pre-deployment training for a stint in Afghanistan without the backpacks they need.

Senator David Johnston, the opposition defence spokesman, said the Defence Materiel Organisation demonstrated an ''unacceptable level of accountability''.

''Whilst many areas within Defence require judicial intervention and investigation, I personally believe this area is at the top of the priority list, because there are just too many smoking guns to ignore,'' he said.

The project which Heath was running was meant to provide a giant leap into the future for troops fighting the Taliban - high-tech packs, webbing and pouches that would replace the ageing kit.

For years soldiers had been complaining through official channels of the repeated failures of their boots and packs, their body armour and their ammunition pouches, but these complaints had often fallen on deaf ears.

So in the early 1990s, a new scheme was developed to rid the Australian Defence Force of second-rate personal gear. It was more than a decade later that the DMO finally put out a tender for a suite of modern equipment which was lightweight, comfortable and suited to the fast, asymmetric wars of the future.

In the competition to win that tender, as many as nine companies were swiftly knocked out of the competition.

But in early June 2008, when Heath dialled that telephone number, he was calling one of these very companies that had already been eliminated, Plat-a-tac. Its chief executive, Ben Doyle-Cox, took the call.

Heath, he would later tell investigators, had asked him whether Plat-a-tac was interested in subcontracting to Defence's preferred tenderer for the project, or even to Defence.

But crucially, the contest was still on foot. There were two front-runners on the tender shortlist - the London-based BAE Systems, and a joint venture of two Australian firms, XTEK and CrossFire.

Assuming that it must have been XTEK and CrossFire which needed assistance, Doyle-Cox called a senior employee at XTEK to possibly line up a deal.

But he was wrong - it was BAE that needed help.

Heath has strongly disputed Doyle-Cox's version of the phone call (though not the fact he placed it). But alarm bells were ringing: no decision was meant to have been made yet about which of the bids was preferred.

Two things became obvious to XTEK and CrossFire. The first was that BAE Systems had already found favour in Heath's eyes because the Australian firms had not needed any help, nor asked Defence for any.

The second was puzzling. BAE Systems, which that year turned over £18.5 billion, must have had trouble meeting the tender requirements. How then could the firm possibly have been the preferred tenderer?

Heath's phone call was made less than two weeks after an extensive trial of the samples provided by both bidders, and three months before he recommended BAE win the contract in his formal report.

XTEK's executives waited for formal confirmation in early September that its bid had been ''set-aside''. Soon after, XTEK's chief executive, David Jarvis, and one of his senior employees revealed to Brigadier Bill Horrocks, who had ultimate oversight of the project, what they knew of the phone call. Horrocks called in Defence's internal investigators, the Inspector General.

BAE has gained a reputation for its ruthlessness. In February this year, it pleaded guilty to charges it had paid £29 million and $US9 million in bribes to the governments of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Saudi Arabia during the 1990s - and that the £135 million it had paid agents through offshore accounts since 2001 had not been subject to proper scrutiny.

The Herald is not suggesting Heath was party to any corrupt arrangement with BAE, but the company's guilty plea to the FBI indictment is an illustration of the tough, competitive environment in which such multimillion-dollar defence contracts are let.

Just two days after the meeting with Horrocks, Jarvis discovered a bundle of documents at his front door - it was the secret report on how the trial of gear provided by the tenderers was conducted.

Horrified, Jarvis delivered the documents to Horrocks the following day and the Defence Security Agency would later attempt, unsuccessfully, to locate the source of the leak.

Jarvis later told the Inspector General's investigators that when he delivered the documents to Horrocks, the DMO official had made an extraordinary comment: ''You want to be careful about the people you associate with,'' Horrocks was alleged to have said, ''like Peter Marshall''. Marshall, the chief executive of CrossFire, was Jarvis's joint venture partner on the $20 million tender at hand.

Marshall was already despised by top brass within the Defence Materiel Organisation. Four years earlier, he had helped expose a major contracting scandal in the same area of the DMO, involving an $8 million open tender for fleece jackets. An Inspector General's report revealed not only that the process had been predetermined by officials, but that one of the officials involved, Laurence Pain, had accepted a job with the winning contractor, Walkabout Leisure Wear, either during the tender evaluation or immediately after the contract was awarded.

Jarvis demanded Horrocks' alleged comment be investigated. Horrocks later denied the allegation to the Inspector General and was exonerated by his findings.

But something very wrong did occur during the tender. In January last year, the Inspector General of Defence recommended a probity auditor be appointed after discovering another, separate breach of protocol which Defence has refused to detail.

The lawyers DLA Phillips Fox, when they handed up their independent audit in May last year, came to the same conclusion - and found damage to the $23 million tender was irreversible. Two weeks ago Horrocks wrote to a Senate committee that ''there had been significant administrative breaches that included not following the planned sequence of events such as assessing value for money before completion of the detailed evaluation and tender documentation shortfalls''.

Heath's telephone call was also highly problematic. He gave an interview to the investigators denying Plat-a-tac's account of what had been said. But the DMO confirmed he had received formal counselling. He is now in a senior role working on the development of a new armoured vehicle.

Without a tape of the phone call, and with conflicting recollections of what was said, the Inspector General and Phillips Fox could not make a finding of actual bias. But officials say their reports did find the call alone demonstrated ''perceived bias'' and urged the government to cancel the entire project.

There are also questions about whether the Senate was kept fully informed. Eight days after DMO got the damning Phillips Fox report, its top brass sat before a routine Senate Estimates hearing and avoided the topic of the botched tender entirely. Asked about the progress of the soldier modernisation project, a senior official, Colin Sharp, said only: ''We have rolled out a number of things.''

Neither he, nor Horrocks, volunteered to the committee that a lynchpin tender was to be cancelled because of the failure of its management and at least two separate breaches of Commonwealth probity rules.

Six weeks later, in July last year, Horrocks wrote to Jarvis to admit, following XTEK's allegations of almost 12 months earlier, the tender had been suspect. ''To protect the integrity of the Commonwealth the process has been cancelled,'' he wrote.

The following day, Defence gazetted a new contract. It was a single-source purchase worth more than $2.7 million from Eagle Industries Inc in the US.

The company had not been a bidder during the tender competition for the new packs and webbing. Now the DMO had picked it directly for 1000 sets of gear - including packs for medical kits, grenades and ammunition - which were eerily similar to the items XTEK and CrossFire, and BAE, had spent millions on developing for the ADF.

http://www.smh.com.au/national/the-tender-...00505-uasf.html

Aircraft have run out of fuel before, and sadly will probably do it again - all whilst under the command of experienced crew.

I think that the Powers incident came as a bit of a shock to the US / CIA. At least two other U-2s were shot down by the SA-2 over the next few years, as well as other high altitude aircraft.

Although Soviet planners gradually warmed toward space cooperation in the 1970s, the 1950s and 1960s were characterized by U.S. overtures for space cooperation which were, for the most part, rejected or ignored. They were marked by only sporadic and low-level cooperation, against a background of strident competition.

(Chap 2, p15)

Largely because of Soviet reluctance to engage in extensive information exchange, however, cooperation in space activities both in planning for the IGY and during the IGY itself remained on a token level. Although the Soviet Union did participate in the IGY, it applied restrictions to IGY agreements for exchange of information in space, and Soviet compliance with IGY requirements in space science was poor.

(Chap 2, p16)

Soon after taking office President Kennedy formed a special panel—a Joint NASA-President’s Science Advisory Committee-Department of State Panel, directed by Jerome Wiesner—to study the possibilities for international cooperation in space activities and related fields. Focusing its attention primarily on collaboration between the United States and the U. S. S. R., the Panel made a series of concrete proposals for cooperative activities. Again Soviet interest, however, was not forthcoming on any of these proposals.

(Chap 2, p18)

Despite “frequent and repeated efforts to persuade the Soviets to enter new space projects", U.S.-Soviet relations generally remained cold, and the level of cooperation in space seemed to follow suit.

During the mid to late 1960s, efforts to expand U.S.-Soviet space cooperation became more modest. Despite previous disappointments, the Johnson Administration continued to pursue such cooperation. But now studies on potential areas for U.S. cooperation in space—such as the Webb Report —stressed caution, urging that sights for cooperation be lowered, the serious limitations of cooperating with the U.S.S.R. be recognized, and a “measured approach” with respect to high level initiatives vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. be adopted. While the Kennedy Administration had hoped for big projects—extending even to a proposed joint lunar landing–the Johnson Administration shifted back to an emphasis on small “first steps” which might be a basis for broadening cooperation in the future.’ Cooperation was left primarily for the established NASA-Soviet Academy channels, with few overtures for cooperation coming directly from the President himself. Soviet planners, for their part, seemed less inclined to cooperate, given the greater belligerence in foreign and domestic affairs of the new Brezhnev / Kosygin leadership, the escalation of the war in South Vietnam and, as before, the fact that relationships with respect to space activities were very much determined by the nature of the broader political relationship.

.

.

But proposals for more substantive bilateral cooperation in space were consistently rejected, ignored, or sidestepped by Soviet officials.

(Chap 2, p19-22)

Source: U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-TM-STI-27, July 1985)

Debate in the U.N. divided along ideological lines, and NASA's desire to use that body as the foundation for developing a program of space cooperation foundered.** Glennan and his colleagues came to believe that negotiations with the Soviets would have to be direct, bilateral, and more private than the open forum of either COSPAR or the U.N. As a consequence, the NASA leadership sought to engage the Soviets in less formal talks. Typical of these early contacts were the discussions between representatives of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and NASA during the annual meetings of the American Rocket Society. At the mid-November 1959 meeting of the Society in Washington, for example, Soviet space scientists Sedov, Blagonravov, and V. I. Krassovsky presented papers on the nature of Soviet space research.(27) Dryden met privately with the Soviets to exchange views. They agreed that their countries should cooperate more closely in space science, and Dryden made it clear that NASA was ready to talk about issues of mutual interest. The Soviets warned that such an undertaking should proceed "step by step." However, Frutkin reported that "when pressed, they were not prepared to identify the first possible step."(28)

** In Jan. 1960, NASA created an ad hoc Office for the U.N. Conference that was to address the issues raised by the General Assembly call for an international conference on the peaceful uses of outer space. This office was headed by John Hagen. When the conference failed to materialize, the office was disbanded in Sept. 1961. Rosholt, Administrative History of NASA, pp. 127-128.

27. William Hines, "Soviet Space Scientists Tell Little of Ventures," Washington Star, 18 Nov. 1959.

28. George M. Low to Ezell, "Comments on December 1975 Draft of ASTP History," 29 Dec. 1975; Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space, p. 89; and U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Soviet Space Programs: Organization, Plans, Goals, and International Implications, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, p. 179.

The two-day confrontation between Kennedy and Khrushchev during the June 1961 Vienna summit was from Kennedy's perspective a disaster. But in one of the rare moments of amicability, Kennedy suggested that the two nations pool their space efforts and "go to the moon together." Khrushchev's immediate response was "all right," but upon reflection the mercurial Soviet leader decided that such a venture would not be practical. The boosters used for manned space flight had military implications. That triggered considerations of disarmament, and that brought the discussions back to the Cold War. There the proposed joint trip to the moon died.(53)

53. Dept. of State, Memo of conversation, "Vienna Meeting between the President and Chairman Khrushchev," 3 June 1961 [John F. Kennedy Library]; Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, New York, 1966), p. 178.

Threats to world peace posed by the succession of summer and autumn crises, while not unnoticed, seemed far distant from the pleasant atmosphere of the lodge at Smugglers Notch, Vermont. For four days, 5-8 September 1961, scientists from ten countries, including the U.S.S.R., gathered for the Seventh International Conference on Science and World Affairs. Included in a broad spectrum of proposals relating to greater cooperation among the world's scientists were suggestions for a program of space cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Four areas in which the scientists felt that cooperation was possible were 1) a worldwide system of weather satellites and forecasting; 2) an international program of communications satellites; 3) an international exchange of data relating to space biology; and 4) a joint program for the scientific exploration of the moon and the planets.(55) Despite the international debate engendered by the Soviet resumption of nuclear arms tests, there was an atmosphere of good will at Smugglers Notch.(56) The fragility of such scientist-to-scientist efforts was clearly demonstrated two months later.

In November 1961, NASA and the U.S. Department of Commerce sponsored an International Satellite Workshop in Washington. American representatives explained their plans for the further exploitation of weather satellites and encouraged other nations to participate in the gathering and use of satellite data. The Americans expected delegates from the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Czechoslovakia, since visas had been sought by representatives of those countries. On the second day of the workshop, it became apparent that the Soviets would not attend. To most contemporary observers the lesson was clear: cooperation in space matters was a political consideration that could be understood only in the broader context of East-West relations.(57)

55. Harrison E. Salisbury, "World Scientists Map Coordinations," New York Times, 8 Sept. 1961; and Salisbury, "Space Proposals for World Near," New York Times, 9 Sept. 1961.

56. For the tenor of the time, see Harry Schwartz, "Khrushchev Presses Hard to Force Settlement on His Terms," New York Times, 11 Sept. 1961; John W. Finney, "U.S. Tests to Preserve Lead over Soviets," New York Times, 11 Sept.1961; and Richard Lowenthal, "Negotiating with Russia - What's the Use," New York Times Magazine, 11 Sept. 1961, pp. 21 and 116-117.

57. John W. Finney, "Soviet Block Boycotts U.S. Weather Satellite Symposium," New York Times, 15 Nov. 1961.

Late on the following day, Bundy called Webb to tell him that the President had decided to include a statement about space cooperation with the Soviets in his U.N. address. Bundy informed Webb that Kennedy wanted "to be sure that you know about it."(64) The new paragraph, drafted by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., another Kennedy aide, had not been included in the earlier drafts of the speech circulated at NASA.(65) Upon receiving the President's message, Webb immediately telephoned directions to the various NASA centers "to make no comment of any kind or description on this matter."(66)

The President's proposal for a joint expedition to the moon was intended to be a step toward improved Soviet-American relations. The impact of the speech was quite the reverse. Moscow and the Soviet press virtually ignored the U.N. address.** (67) Officially, the Soviet government did not comment.(68) In the U.S., the public remarks either strongly supported the idea of a joint flight or equally forcefully opposed it.(69)

** The paper Za Rubezhom saw the Kennedy proposal as a propaganda stunt. A Walter Lippman column reprinted by Pravda saw the primary value of Kennedy's speech to be the opportunity it offered the U.S. to escape a unilateral visit to the moon.

64. Interview, Webb, 19 Sept. 1972; and Webb to Ezell, [May 1975].

65. Interview, Dryden-Frutkin, Sohier, and Emme, 26 Mar. 1964, p. 25. Schlesinger's role is related in A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston and Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 918-921.

66. Interview, Webb, 19 Sept. 1972.

67. Za Rubezhom [Abroad], 28 Sept. 1963, as cited in "Russian Says Moon Shot Idea of President Is Premature," Washington Post, 29 Sept. 1963. The Walter Lippman column, "Today and Tomorrow: Purifying the Moon Project," had been published in the American papers on 24 Sept. 1963 and was reprinted in Moscow as "Trezvii podkhod" [sober approach], Pravda, 2 Oct. 1963.

68. Harvey and Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space, pp. 124-126.

69. A sample of the responses is as follows: Howard Simons, "Opinion Divided Here on Joint Moon Shot Plan"; "Russian News Reports Delete Moon Trip Plan"; "Goldwater Criticizes Moon Plan"; "A Lofty Appeal," editorial, Washington Post, 21 Sept. 1963; Thomas J. Hamilton,"Kennedy Asks Joint Moon Flight by U.S. and Soviets as Peace Step; Urges New Accords in U.N. Speech"; and John W. Finney, "Washington Surprised at Retreat from Insistence That U.S. Reach Moon First," New York Times, 21 Sept. 1963. A quick analysis of the Kennedy proposal was prepared for the RAND corporation by Alton Frye, The Proposal for a Joint Lunar Expedition: Background and Prospects, report no. P-2808 (Santa Monica, 1964).

Dryden's cautious testimony during the March 1965 congressional hearings indicated that progress had been slow. Data from ground-based magnetic observatories had been exchanged, and the transmission of weather data on the "cold line," a special cable link between Moscow and Suitland, Maryland, had been started in October 1964. (87) Dryden summarized the status of the joint efforts; "I would describe the situation as a form of limited coordination of programs and exchange of information rather than true cooperation." He continued his report saying, "they have not responded to any proposals which would involve an intimate association and exposure of their hardware to our view." Nor had the Soviets demonstrated "anything in the nature of a joint group working together." When asked if the prospect for the future was one of continued competitiveness, Dryden answered in the affirmative, "As near as we can tell at the moment."(88)

87. An official report on the status of the Soviet-American meteorological exchange was presented by the U.S. Weather Bureau, as cited in Subcommittee on Space Sciences and Applications, 1966 NASA Authorization, p. 900.

88. U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1966: Hearings, Pt. 2, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 1007. For summary of Dryden's last meeting with Blagonravov, see "Memorandum of Conversation between Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, NASA, and Academician A. A. Blagonravov, USSR Academy of Sciences, Held May 14, 1965, at Mar del Plata, Argentina, 2-3:15 PM"; and diary note, Frutkin, "Notes on US/USSR Bilateral and Soviet Participation in COSPAR Meeting, May 1965, Mar del Plata, Argentina," 15 May 1965.

(Source for the above text: The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project NASA SP-4209)

“…But there was no hint of co-operation from Khrushchev, not only because he was convinced he was ahead, but probably also because he believed implicitly that it would have opened the way for American spying in some capacity. It was fear of espionage that prompted him to turn down Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” aerial observation offer.”

(pp 304-305, THIS NEW OCEAN – The Story of the First Space Age, William E. Burrows, Random House 1998)

Don't forget that it was the Soviets who rejected Kennedy's plans for co-operation in space, and the Soviets had a manned lunar landing programme of their own: the N-1 / LOK / LK spacecraft. The LOK was an uprated Soyuz, the LK lander never flew but the N-1 launcher was flown four times... each time unsuccessfully, the last being in 1972 - after the Apollo programme had been canceled. Even in 1968, the USSR proposed a circumlunar flight using the Proton launcher (AKA UR-500) but it was decided not to launch the mission until the Proton was properly man-rated. Alexi Leonov was most upset over that decision, as he would have been on the crew... and probably beating Apollo 8.

Glenn,

I have had to remove bad language from your post, and your tone is bordering on insulting / attacking a member. Please carefully consider your choice of words.

Also, although not active, Judyth is a member here and therefore the provisions of rule (iv) apply.

Thank you.

Warship recovered; North Korea still suspect:

http://media.smh.com.au/world/world-news/c...;exc_from=strap

Personally, I don't think it is. I have scant evidence to go on, but I am still leaning to a mine or internal explosion.

Can I remind people there is no need to repeat verbatim the previous posts made by someone unless there is a specific reason to do so. Having to scroll through repeats of posts is annoying (to me).

A request: Please, don't quote unless it is pertinent to your own post.

John,

The upshot of it is that if you are a McAfee anti-virus user, the latest update has misidentified a Windows file as being a virus. If you downloaded and installed update 5958, then your PC is probably have a problem.

The file affected is called svchost.exe; my firewall and AV have occasionally queried me as to whether it is a "safe application" and I say it is okay.

As well as your firewall and AV, I would also recommend a regular scan with software specifically designed to detect malware or spyware. Two of the best are Spybot Search & Destroy, or Malwarebytes Anti-Malware. Both have free and paid versions available.

Welcome Patrick!

When you refer to yourself as a novice, I presume that is regarding JFK matters? If so, you'll find a wealth of knowledge and information here. Not all agree but there will be much to allow you to make up your own mind as to what is correct and what is not.

Enjoy!

P.S. I'm a JFK novice, but have no real interest in the subject so my opinion on this subject isn't worth the electrons it's displayed with.

Despite being told by the various ISPs and IT companies that this system would fail, despite being told by Google and others that it won't work, despite being told by the US ambassador that this is a bad idea, Herr Conroy still wants to try and control what Australians see on the internet.

Doesn't that just stink of some type of conspiracy? I wonder if Conroy has some type of financial interest in establishing this abortion?

A real space hoax:

Jonathan Nolan had plans for the world's most ambitious reality show - a global cross-continent space challenge pitting prospective astronauts against each other for the chance to win two tickets into space.

He told media, partners and contestants that he had already secured two seats on Russian Soyuz rockets, had a production partner in Britain and had already obtained from foreign investors the tens of millions of dollars required to get the project, dubbed "Starwalker", off the ground.

Nolan, 42, an Australian, even appeared on Channel Seven's Sunrise in a three-minute segment, inviting viewers to sign up as contestants on the show's website.

Today, the project appears to be in tatters, its website is offline and questions are being raised over the whole operation. A former employee claims Nolan has failed to pay him a significant sum of money

Read more at: http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/...00412-s2z6.html

Also: http://echoesofapollo.com/2010/04/04/starw...rnational-scam/

It was some human species, but the experts can't put their finger on it.

LOL!

If the Commanders of these bases are operating in conjunction with JM/WAVE, then they could be sending the U2s up on missions related to tactical maritime commando raids against Cuba, and not necessarily looking for strategic offensive missles.

Yep - that is entirely possible.

Not necessarily directly related to what we are discussing, but interesting nevertheless:

March 21, 2010

U-2 Spy Plane Evades the Day of Retirement

By CHRISTOPHER DREW

The U-2 spy plane, the high-flying aircraft that was often at the heart of cold war suspense, is enjoying an encore.

Four years ago, the Pentagon was ready to start retiring the plane, which took its first test flight in 1955. But Congress blocked that, saying the plane was still useful.

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But in 2006, a U-2 pilot almost crashed after drifting in and out of consciousness during a flight over Afghanistan. The pilot, Kevin Henry, now a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, said in an interview that he felt as if he were drunk, and he suffered some brain damage. At one point, he said, he came within five feet of smashing into the ground before miraculously finding a runway.

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http://finance.yahoo.com/career-work/artic...y-of-retirement

352. Telegram From Acting Secretary of State Ball and the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) in Ireland

Washington, June 25, 1963, 7:45 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, 6/24/63 Cuban Protest Note, 6/63-8/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only. President Kennedy was in Ireland June 25-29. Rusk was in the United Kingdom during the same time.

Sitto 8. From Ball and Kaysen. Bundy eyes only for the President and Rusk. In note from Cuban Government/1/ (delivered by Czech Ambassador this afternoon but intended for delivery June 21 or 22) protesting various exile activities directed against Cuba, following passages included:

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As previously decided, there will be no low-level flights before President's return. High-level flights will continue under existing procedures which call for aborts when Cuban aircraft within 40 miles of U-2 and at altitude in excess of 40,000 feet.

Taking into account need for current intelligence, we believe this provides proper margin of safety to justify continued flights even under special conditions when President out of country.

353. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in the United Kingdom

Washington, June 26, 1963, 8:21 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/24/63 Cuban Protest Note, 6/63-8/63. Secret; Priority. This telegram was apparently also sent as White House telegram CAP 63345 to Ireland. There is a notation on it that the President read it.

Tosec 17. Deptel Sitto 8./1/ FYI. Following is ARA and INR analysis of Cuban note:

/1/Document 352.

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In sum Department regards note as (a) cautiously and unprovocatively worded and carefully handled warning against overflights which affords Cubans flexibility with respect actual response they might make at least to high level flights; and ( as important step (additional to use MIG-21's vicinity U-2 flights) in effort force cessation overflights. High-level flight today was without incident.

Ball

358. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy

Washington, undated.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-77-131, OSD Misc.--1963. Top Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum was undated and unsigned, but it was attached to an August 20 memorandum from Califano to Gilpatric recommending that the Deputy Secretary send it to the President. On August 26 Bundy sent Gilpatric a memorandum indicating that the President had signed this memorandum on August 22. The President asked Gilpatric to undertake the Top Secret and Sensitive distribution of this addition to rules of engagement.

SUBJECT

U.S. Action in the Event of Cuban Attack on U.S. Aircraft/Ships (U)

At your direction on 28 February 1963, Rules of Engagement were promulgated with respect to action by U.S. forces in event of a Cuban attack on U.S. aircraft or ships operating outside Cuban territory./1/ These rules prohibit U.S. forces from penetrating Cuban territory in pursuit of Cuban forces involved.

/1/See Document 290.

Under these rules, overflight of Cuban territory while en route to the scene of attack is not included in the authorized military options for responses to an attack by Cuba on U.S. aircraft or ships operating outside Cuban territory.

Incidents of Cuban attack on U.S. forces operating outside Cuban territory, which are considered most likely, would involve aircraft engaged in reconnaissance efforts, but also could involve U.S. shipping and cases where lives of U.S. nationals or national interests are in jeopardy. Should attacks occur, for example, south of western Cuba and north of eastern Cuba, the en route time for U.S. fighter support can be reduced by 10 to 30 minutes, with a comparable increase in time for action at the scene, by routing over Cuban territory. This quicker en route reaction time could be the difference between providing an effective defense for U.S. interests and arriving too late for action.

In light of the fact that occasions may arise where the presence of U.S. forces on the scene with least possible delay would be in the best national interests, a draft statement of policy which would authorize overflight of Cuban territory in certain instances, and under certain conditions, has been prepared and is attached. The draft policy has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coordinated with the Department of State and, based on the recommendation of that Department, delineates the individuals in the military chain of command authorized to approve overflights of Cuban territory.

I recommend its approval.

Attachment

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON US ACTION IN EVENT OF CUBAN ATTACK ON US AIRCRAFT/SHIPS (U)

The following policy is issued pertaining to US action in the event of Cuban attack in the area surrounding Cuba against US aircraft/ships:

a. In specific instances in which adherence to international airspace would delay significantly the arrival of US fighter aircraft at the scene of a Cuban attack against US aircraft/ships operating outside of Cuban territory, overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized subject to the following:

(1) It must be established that the US aircraft/ship is being attacked, or the US aircraft/ship has been attacked and lives of US personnel are endangered.

(2) Overflight times are minimized with due regard to risk to aircraft. While en route every effort will be taken to avoid provocative acts. Engagement will not be undertaken during the overflight except for self-defense against aircraft attack.

(3) From the time of arrival at the scene current rules of engagement will pertain, with return to home or diversion airfield via air space over international waters, if practicable.

(4) The most expeditious means possible will be used to inform highest national authorities that overflight of Cuba has been directed, and details on the action shall be furnished in the same manner.

b. Decision to overfly Cuban territory may be delegated to but not below the level of Commander Naval Base, Key West and Commander Naval Base, Guantanamo.

(my bolding)

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/histo...XI/351_375.html