Evan Burton

Thanks, Don. I have yet to see any research by Lee. All he does is post his opinions and adhoms.

Jack

Jack,

Please do not comment on the researching abilities of members. It is in violation of Rule (iv):

(iv) Members should not make personal attacks on other members. Nor should references be made to their abilities as researchers. Most importantly, the motivations of the poster should not be questioned. At all times members should concentrate on what is being said, rather than who is saying it. It is up to the reader to look at the biography submitted by the poster, to judge whether they are telling the truth or not. The word “xxxx” is banned from use on the forum.

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=2243

What's the difference between Iceland and Ireland?

6 months and a letter.

It's a simple question Jack. Is there a reason you won't publicly answer?

Jack,

I asked this in a previous thread but I never saw an answer: You have many studies proclaiming fakery in the Apollo images, but have you ever visited Houston or Kennedy Space Center to examine the various spacecraft?

You have publicly questioned the ability of the LM to land on the Moon, but have you ever examined one at close range?

Thanks for your time in answering this inquiry.

Jack - a reminder. Please do not accuse a member of lying.

So I said two sentences to a guy I did not know, and you are making a federal case out of it?

And I can tell your account is false when you say:

"Tony soon came back to me and told me that he had talked to you and that you had asked him who I was. He told me that he replied with "Todd Vaughan.". He further stated that upon hearing that you said "Oh, xxxx.". Thinking that odd, I asked him again, and he repeated what he had just told me."

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, I DO NOT USE THAT SORT OF LANGUAGE, ESPECIALLY IN PUBLIC AND

TO A STRANGER. (maybe in private if I hit my thumb with a hammer). I had never met Tony nor

you and would NEVER say "Oh, xxxx" to either of you. One of you LIED about this!

So Todd Vaughan, I bid you adieu. I do not wish to associate with a person like you in any way.

Go elsewhere to peddle your version of the LN lie.

Jack

(who once shook the hand of the famed (in his own mind) Todd Vaughan!)

First, look at the first image Jack supplied (Jack has cropped it, possibly for reasons of viewer discretion). The full image is available here:

http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/...ion/P200316.jpg

A collection of images of the WTC complex.

http://manhattan.about.com/od/september11t...-2001/index.htm

http://trile.wordpress.com/2007/11/12/worl...d-trade-center/

http://robertdfeinman.com/wtc/images/old_w...rade_plaza2.jpg

http://www.september11news.com/WTCPlazaFountain.jpg

Please - anyone else but Jack and indeed everyone else - please post if you think that WTC6 was (pre-attack) greyish (or similar, whatever Jack claims) or if it was black (or blackish, as I and others claim).

And of course, my usual lament: why won't Jack white try to defend all the multitude of claims he has made... such as on Aulis.

Bulldust. You change the situation to 'protect' him. Let's look at what you have said:

I don't 'do' Apollo. That said, whether Jack is correct or not; whether you think Jack is correct or not on Apollo says NOTHING about whether he is correct or not on Dallas or 9-11.

I agree to a point. As far as Jack's JFK studies are concerned, I have constantly said I am not qualified to judge - being a layman and ignorant in the JFK area - and make no comment on them. As far as Jack's 9-11 studies are concerned, they have shown the same disposition towards error and inability to admit fault.

Personally, I think the endless preemptive attacks on Jack's Apollo studies are really designed, IMO, to discredit his Dallas and 9-11 work more than Apollo studies per se.

I have always primarily been here to rebutt Jack's Apollo claims. Jack has made "endless" claims and I have mainly addressed those claims - most often showing the claim I refer to. They are NOT "pre-emptive" and such a claim is not in accordance with fact... fact on which I am prepared to demonstrate.

I'm not fooled by the character assassination and the attempts to conflate separate things.

I have attacked Jack's Apollo claims and his refusal to defend them. Jack, on the other hand, constantly attacks people's motives, their employers, etc. Jack is the one who practices character assassination. Again, there are numerous examples of this throughout the Forum and I am happy to illuminate them.

I find Jack motivated by the most noble of motives, I don't think I can say that for most of his detractor-stalkers.

So you call us - me - "stalkers". If it means demonstrating that certain claims are erroneous - and their proponents fear trying to defend the validity of their claims - then I am happy to wear this badge.

Another point that should be addressed is Jack's disingenuous statement that "I have great admiration for many achievements of NASA". He has constantly attacked the achievements of NASA:

"Did NASA booboo in saying LUNAR MODULES were left on the moon?"

(Incidentally, that thread is another example of how Jack refuses to admit error when proven wrong)

"I have news for the young folks at NASA who faked this photo..."

"THIS IS CLEARLY A NASA LIE."

"If NASA lies about the evidence, how can we believe them on the trips?"

"When official information from NASA is used to "debunk" any of my studies, I ignore them...since NASA is the one who faked the photos, and any info from them is self-serving."

"NASA is the one on trial. Any "evidence" they supply is suspect."

"I doubt that you used a genuine Apollo flag and flagpole unless your NASA folks loaned you one."

"As far as Burton goes, google him and you find he is connected to Australian military...and I am told that MANY NASA PROJECTS WERE DONE IN AUSTRALIA BECAUSE OF SECRECY CONCERNS. So maybe Burton has a dog in the NASA fight. But he is not telling. Secrecy oath?"

(I like that one because it not only shows Jack's error, but also how he ignores both fact and my own public statements. It also shows how he attacks anyone who disagrees with him)

anyway: etc, etc, etc.

Now, I previously did this one here, but I was probably getting tired and didn't explain it very well so I thought I'd revisit this one.

THE MYSTERY OF THE APOLLO MOONROVERS: CHAPTER 1 - TRACKS WHILE STILL PACKAGED

The crux of this claim is that the area to the left of the ladder (from our viewpoint) is where the the Lunar Roving Vehicle (LRV) was stowed.

Wrong. Nowhere in any photo, in any documentation, in any diagramme does it have the LRV stowed on the left of the ladder. In every single image, document and diagramme that is called the Modular Equipment Stowage Area. Note also that it is that area which is used for stowage of the lunar TV camera, geology tools, core sample tubes, etc, during the Apollo 11 to Apollo 14 missions... which did not carry a LRV.

Let's look at the evidence. When was the image taken? It was taken at 163 hours 56 minutes Ground Elapsed Time (GET).

When did Apollo 17 start its first EVA? When, Gene Cernan deployed the MESA at 117 hours 9 minutes GET... nearly 55 hours before Jack's image was taken. During that time there are numerous images and video footage of the LRV on the lunar surface.

So - perhaps NASA is hiding something and this image accidentally slipped through. Is there anything in the image to prove the LRV had already been deployed? APART from all the documentation to show the LRV was on the RIGHT of the ladder (not left as Jack and Aulis claim: Note to Aulis - port is LEFT), what can we see in the image Jack has provided?

Now, what did Grumman provide in their Apollo documentation about the LRV deployment?

Notice what is to the right of the LRV, attached to the lunar module? But that's just an artist's depiction. What about actual operating instructions or diagrammes?

Have a look at this image of the Apollo 15 LRV fit checks:

http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/...71-HC-684HR.jpg

What's that just to the right and above the wheels?

Jack has made an error, and mistakes the MESA (left) for the LRV stowage (right). Will he admit this error and withdraw his claim? I doubt it but stay tuned; miracles have happened before...

It doesn't help the Forum, but Firefox has an add-on called AdBlock Plus. I use it and simply do not see the advertising.

Please do so. Civilised debate on contentious subject are always beneficial.

Players would not be players if they were not enabled by Forum members who are willing to spend endless hours engaging them in mostly pointless arguments and debates that lead nowhere.

Good point. You point out things that are wrong but they go on merrily ignoring the faults. Perhaps it is better just to tag them as a "non-player", indicating their status not worthy of consideration.

I tag Aulis as one of those sites.

Bernice - I have never owned one of the (in)famous 'Dogs Playing Poker' prints.... but secretly I have always wanted one! Actually - the whole series.

Please - the name is Evan. Otherwise known as "shill", "disinfo agent" or "borg"!

Same CSM – different look

This is a deceptive claim made by Jack. As stated previously, AS17-148-22756 was taken enroute to the Moon.

Now, let’s have a look at an UNCROPPED image of AS17-145-22272:

The two images are completely different. One was taken on the way TO the Moon, the other (22272) was taken a few days later after the lunar landing had been completed and the ascent stage of the LM was on its way back to dock with the CM.

It’s also worth looking at the hi-resolution image:

http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/...145-22272HR.jpg

You can also check for yourself that when images are taken close to the CM, you can often see the tape lines. When images are taken from a distance, they are not visible. Pretty simple for anyone with an ounce of sense. Also, you can see various aspects between the two images that match up, proving they are of the same object but at different times:

Three light sources used to illuminate the CSM

This is easily explained. Being a layman in Apollo matters, Jack is ignorant of many of the smaller details. The "scotch tape" Jack refers to is kapton tape, placed on the outside of the spacecraft to help reflect heat. The early Command Modules (CM) were actually painted white.

Don't confuse the white - sometimes light blue - colour of the Block I CMs with the white Boost Protective Cover (BPC) that was placed on top of them for launch. This was jettisoned at high altitude after launch.

The Block II CMs were all covered with the kapton tape, to assist with thermal control of the spacecraft.

You can even see the remains here:

There are numerous images available showing how the CM was covered with this tape… and not just Apollo 17.

The “shadow anomaly” Jack claims is likewise easily explainable. The image Jack has shown is taken from the Lunar Module (LM), which is itself covered with various materials with a high albedo. So you have the Sun, and the sunlight reflected of various surfaces on the LM.

It’s just another example of Jack grasping at straws.

I reckon all us "major players" should get round a card table and play some poker...

A Defensive Buildup in the Gulf

February 1, 2010

By George Friedman

This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR

This weekend’s newspapers were filled with stories about how the United States is providing ballistic missile defense (BMD) to four countries on the Arabian Peninsula. The New York Times carried a front-page story on the United States providing anti-missile defenses to Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman, as well as stationing BMD-capable, Aegis-equipped warships in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, the front page of The Washington Post carried a story saying that “the Obama administration is quietly working with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf allies to speed up arms sales and rapidly upgrade defenses for oil terminals and other key infrastructure in a bid to thwart future attacks by Iran, according to former and current U.S. and Middle Eastern government officials.”

Obviously, the work is no longer “quiet.” In fact, Washington has been publicly engaged in upgrading defensive systems in the area for some time. Central Command head Gen. David Petraeus recently said the four countries named by the Times were receiving BMD-capable Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) batteries, and at the end of October the United States carried out its largest-ever military exercises with Israel, known as Juniper Cobra.

More interesting than the stories themselves was the Obama administration’s decision to launch a major public relations campaign this weekend regarding these moves. And the most intriguing question out of all this is why the administration decided to call everyone’s attention to these defensive measures while not mentioning any offensive options.

The Iranian Nuclear Question

U.S. President Barack Obama spent little time on foreign policy in his Jan. 27 State of the Union message, though he did make a short, sharp reference to Iran. He promised a strong response to Tehran if it continued its present course; though this could have been pro forma, it seemed quite pointed. Early in his administration, Obama had said he would give the Iranians until the end of 2009 to change their policy on nuclear weapons development. But the end of 2009 came, and the Iranians continued their policy.

All along, Obama has focused on diplomacy on the Iran question. To be more precise, he has focused on bringing together a coalition prepared to impose “crippling sanctions” on the Iranians. The most crippling sanction would be stopping Iran’s gasoline imports, as Tehran imports about 35 percent of its gasoline. Such sanctions are now unlikely, as China has made clear that it is not prepared to participate — and that before the most recent round of U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan. Similarly, while the Russians have indicated that their participation in sanctions is not completely out of the question, they also have made clear that time for sanctions is not near. We suspect that the Russian time frame for sanctions will keep getting pushed back.

Therefore, the diplomatic option appears to have dissolved. The Israelis have said they regard February as the decisive month for sanctions, which they have indicated is based on an agreement with the United States. While previous deadlines of various sorts regarding Iran have come and gone, there is really no room after February. If no progress is made on sanctions and no action follows, then the decision has been made by default that a nuclear-armed Iran is acceptable.

The Americans and the Israelis have somewhat different views of this based on different geopolitical realities. The Americans have seen a number of apparently extreme and dangerous countries develop nuclear weapons. The most important example was Maoist China. Mao Zedong had argued that a nuclear war was not particularly dangerous to China, as it could lose several hundred million people and still win the war. But once China developed nuclear weapons, the wild talk subsided and China behaved quite cautiously. From this experience, the United States developed a two-stage strategy.

First, the United States believed that while the spread of nuclear weapons is a danger, countries tend to be circumspect after acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, overreaction by United States to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other countries is unnecessary and unwise.

Second, since the United States is a big country with widely dispersed population and a massive nuclear arsenal, a reckless country that launched some weapons at the United States would do minimal harm to the United States while the other country would face annihilation. And the United States has emphasized BMD to further mitigate — if not eliminate — the threat of such a limited strike to the United States.

Israel’s geography forces it to see things differently. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said Israel should be wiped off the face of the Earth while simultaneously working to attain nuclear weapons. While the Americans take comfort in the view that the acquisition of nuclear weapons has a sobering effect on a new nuclear power, the Israelis don’t think the Chinese case necessarily can be generalized. Moreover, the United States is outside the range of the Iranians’ current ballistic missile arsenal while Israel is not. And a nuclear strike would have a particularly devastating effect on Israel. Unlike the United States, Israel is small country with a highly concentrated population. A strike with just one or two weapons could destroy Israel.

Therefore, Israel has a very different threshold for risk as far as Iran is concerned. For Israel, a nuclear strike from Iran is improbable, but would be catastrophic if it happened. For the United States, the risk of an Iranian strike is far more remote, and would be painful but not catastrophic if it happened. The two countries thus approach the situation very differently.

How close the Iranians are to having a deliverable nuclear weapon is, of course, a significant consideration in all this. Iran has not yet achieved a testable nuclear device. Logic tells us they are quite far from a deliverable nuclear weapon. But the ability to trust logic varies as the risk grows. The United States (and this is true for both the Bush and Obama administrations) has been much more willing to play for time than Israel can afford to be. For Israel, all intelligence must be read in the context of worst-case scenarios.

Diverging Interests and Grand Strategy

It is also important to remember that Israel is much less dependent on the United States than it was in 1973. Though U.S. aid to Israel continues, it is now a much smaller percentage of Israeli gross domestic product. Moreover, the threat of sudden conventional attack by Israel’s immediate neighbors has disappeared. Egypt is at peace with Israel, and in any case, its military is too weak to mount an attack. Jordan is effectively an Israeli ally. Only Syria is hostile, but it presents no conventional military threat. Israel previously has relied on guarantees that the United States would rush aid to Israel in the event of war. But it has been a generation since this has been a major consideration for Israel. In the minds of many, the Israeli-U.S. relationship is stuck in the past. Israel is not critical to American interests the way it was during the Cold War. And Israel does not need the United States the way it did during the Cold War. While there is intelligence cooperation in the struggle against jihadists, even here American and Israeli interests diverge.

And this means that the United States no longer has Israeli national security as an overriding consideration — and that the United States cannot compel Israel to pursue policies Israel regards as dangerous.

Given all of this, the Obama administration’s decision to launch a public relations campaign on defensive measures just before February makes perfect sense. If Iran develops a nuclear capability, a defensive capability might shift Iran’s calculus of the risks and rewards of the military option.

Assume, for example, that the Iranians decided to launch a nuclear missile at Israel or Iran’s Arab neighbors with which its relations are not the best. Iran only would have a handful of missiles, and perhaps just one. Launching that one missile only to have it shot down would represent the worst-case scenario for Iran. Tehran would have lost a valuable military asset, it would not have achieved its goal and it would have invited a devastating counterstrike. Anything the United States can do to increase the likelihood of an Iranian failure therefore decreases the likelihood that Iran would strike until they have more delivery systems and more fissile material for manufacturing more weapons.

The U.S. announcement of the defensive measures therefore has three audiences: Iran, Israel and the American public. Israel and Iran obviously know all about American efforts, meaning the key audience is the American public. The administration is trying to deflect American concerns about Iran generated both by reality and Israel by showing that effective steps are being taken.

There are two key weapon systems being deployed, the PAC-3 and the Aegis/Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). The original Patriot, primarily an anti-aircraft system, had a poor record — especially as a BMD system — during the first Gulf War. But that was almost 20 years ago. The new system is regarded as much more effective as a terminal-phase BMD system, such as the medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) developed by Iran, and performed much more impressively in this role during the opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. In addition, Juniper Cobra served to further integrate a series of American and Israeli BMD interceptors and sensors, building a more redundant and layered system. This operation also included the SM-3, which is deployed aboard specially-modified Aegis-equipped guided missile cruisers and destroyers. The SM-3 is one…”of the most successful BMD technologies currently in the field and successfully brought down a wayward U.S. spy satellite in 2008.

Nevertheless, a series of Iranian Shahab-3s is a different threat than a few Iraqi Scuds, and the PAC-3 and SM-3 have yet to be proven in combat against such MRBMs — something the Israelis are no doubt aware of. War planners must calculate the incalculable; that is what makes good generals pessimists.

The Obama administration does not want to mount an offensive action against Iran. Such an operation would not be single strike like the 1981 Osirak attack in Iraq. Iran has multiple nuclear sites buried deep and surrounded by air defenses. And assessing the effectiveness of airstrikes would be a nightmare. Many days of combat at a minimum probably would be required, and like the effectiveness of defensive weapons systems, the quality of intelligence about which locations to hit cannot be known until after the battle.

A defensive posture therefore makes perfect sense for the United States. Washington can simply defend its allies, letting them absorb the risk and then the first strike before the United States counterstrikes rather than rely on its intelligence and offensive forces in a pre-emptive strike. This defensive posture on Iran fits American grand strategy, which is always to shift such risk to partners in exchange for technology and long-term guarantees.

The Arabian states can live with this, albeit nervously, since they are not the likely targets. But Israel finds its assigned role in U.S. grand strategy far more difficult to stomach. In the unlikely event that Iran actually does develop a weapon and does strike, Israel is the likely target. If the defensive measures do not convince Iran to abandon its program and if the Patriots allow a missile to leak through, Israel has a national catastrophe. It faces an unlikely event with unacceptable consequences.

Israel’s Options

It has options, although a long-range conventional airstrike against Iran is really not one of them. Carrying out a multiday or even multiweek air campaign with Israel’s available force is too likely to be insufficient and too likely to fail. Israel’s most effective option for taking out Iran’s nuclear activities is itself nuclear. Israel could strike Iran from submarines if it genuinely intended to stop Iran’s program.

The problem with this is that much of the Iranian nuclear program is sited near large cities, including Tehran. Depending on the nuclear weapons used and their precision, any Israeli strikes could thus turn into city-killers. Israel is not able to live in a region where nuclear weapons are used in counterpopulation strikes (regardless of the actual intent behind launching). Mounting such a strike could unravel the careful balance of power Israel has created and threaten relationships it needs. And while Israel may not be as dependent on the United States as it once was, it does not want the United States completely distancing itself from Israel, as Washington doubtless would after an Israeli nuclear strike.

The Israelis want Iran’s nuclear program destroyed, but they do not want to be the ones to try to do it. Only the United States has the force needed to carry out the strike conventionally. But like the Bush administration, the Obama administration is not confident in its ability to remove the Iranian program surgically. Washington is concerned that any air campaign would have an indeterminate outcome and would require extremely difficult ground operations to determine the strikes’ success or failure. Perhaps even more complicated is the U.S. ability to manage the consequences, such as a potential attempt by Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian meddling in already extremely delicate situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Iran does not threaten the United States, the United States therefore is in no hurry to initiate combat. And so the United States has launched a public relations campaign about defensive measures, hoping to affect Iranian calculations while remaining content to let the game play itself out.

Israel’s option is to respond to the United States of its intent to go nuclear, something Washington does not want in a region where U.S. troops are fighting in countries on either side of Iran. Israel might calculate that its announcement would force the United States to pre-empt an Israeli nuclear strike with conventional strikes. But the American response to Israel cannot be predicted. It is therefore dangerous for a small regional power to try to corner a global power.

With the adoption of a defensive posture, we have now seen the U.S. response to the February deadline. This response closes off no U.S. options — the United States can always shift its strategy when intelligence indicates — it increases the Arabian Peninsula’s dependence on the United States, and it possibly causes Iran to recalculate its position. Israel, meanwhile, finds itself in a box, because the United States calculates that Israel will not chance a conventional strike and fears a nuclear strike on Iran as much as the United States does.

In the end, Obama has followed the Bush strategy on Iran — make vague threats, try to build a coalition, hold Israel off with vague promises, protect the Arabian Peninsula, and wait — to the letter. But along with this announcement, we would expect to begin to see a series of articles on the offensive deployment of U.S. forces, as good defensive posture requires a strong offensive option.

Some people consider Jack to be a 'major player', too:

Jack White first made a name for himself by trying to show that the famous photographs (e.g., Fig. 1) of accused Kennedy assassin Lee Harvey Oswald holding a rifle in his back yard had been falsified. Claiming, among other things, that he had found discrepancies between the measurements of that rifle taken from the photo, and other photographs of the rifle recovered from the Texas School Book Depository, White maintained that Oswald was holding a different rifle than the one believed to be used to shoot President Kennedy.

Unfortunately under examination before the U.S. House Select Committee on Assassinations White's evidence completely fell apart. He demonstrated almost no understanding of the mathematical and geometrical principles of photogrammetry. He admitted to having received no training in photogrammetry or the forensic analysis of photographs.

His embarrassment before Congress did not stop White from continuing his research on the Kennedy assassination, although his findings remain questionable. Some researchers into Kennedy's assassination consider White something of a crackpot.

Does this have anything to do with Apollo?

Directly, no. We are not interested in examining the Kennedy assassination or supporting or refuting any specific points of view that relate to it. However, Jack White's skill, methodology, and training in photographic interpretation are relevant to his recent study of the Apollo photographs. The best evidence of that skill, methodology, and training are his own statements given under oath, and the reactions of those who heard those statements.

Jack White and his associates initially entertained private Apollo-related discussions in a web site at JFKResearch.com where they discussed their ongoing Kennedy research. Since late 2000 White has turned his attention increasingly to Apollo photographs. He believes he has evidence that they were falsified. He published that evidence at JFKResearch privately, then publicly at the Education Forum and at Aulis.

White's approach to Apollo photography is especially clumsy. While we are not Kennedy assassination experts, we are Apollo experts, and his assertions regarding the Apollo photographs are frequently absurd. In many cases White demonstrates he doesn't understand what various Apollo equipment is or what it's used for. And in a few cases he has edited and composed the photos in a way that creates "anomalies" that weren't there otherwise.

Such as?

See the photo analysis page for some specific examples.

For example, White cropped and resized two photos of the same lunar mountain in order to argue that the mountain "changed size" between the two photos, suggesting the same studio backdrop was used in two different occasions. In fact, when the unaltered photos are examined the mountain is proportionally the same size.

It is very difficult to follow White's research because he habitually "forgets" to include the standard Apollo photo reference numbers, forcing critics to search through thousands of photographs to find the source image and make sure he hasn't left out something important, or that he's not trying to compare photographs from two different missions.

Where can I talk to Jack White about his Apollo theories?

He has been most active lately at the Education Forum. In general White refuses to discuss his theories except within the carefully controlled environment of web sites and other forums in which some moderator protects his interests. White is fond of calling his critics "agents provocateurs," and of construing any questions regarding his expertise or skill as "personal attacks," all the while refusing to answer material questions regarding his claims.

White's "studies" (i.e., attempts to determine the authenticity of Apollo photographs) are online at the Aulis web site, but no discussion is allowed there.

So Jack White admitted he isn't a scientist or a physicist, and that he wasn't able to account for perspective effects in his JFK analysis. So much for what he isn't. He must have some professional qualifications. What are they?

He holds a bachelor of arts degree in journalism with a minor in history from the Texas Christian University. (Proceedings of the House Select Committee on Assassinations vol. 2, p. 322.)

We concede that White's work with Witherspoon and Associates establishes he is an expert in photographic compositing and duplication. But we hasten to emphasize that these are not the same skills required to reliably characterize objects that appear in photographs, and their relationship to each other and to the camera. White's demonstrated skills may aid in the detection of forgery based on artifacts of photographic composition. But we dispute his expertise at identifying forged photographs on such grounds as lighting, parallax, perspective, and photogrammetry.

White's allegations regarding Apollo photography do not correspond to his demonstrated area of expertise. They instead tend to derive from photogrammetric analysis, shadow analysis, and perspective analysis -- topics White admits are not within his expertise.

So why does anybody pay any attention to Jack White?

That's a good question. Someone who is so frequently wrong should not normally enjoy credibility. However, because White's embarrassment was handed to him by elected representatives of the U.S. government, White has acquired a sort of folk hero status with the anti-government conspiracy theorists. They apparently see him as a sort of "little guy" who was inappropriately squashed by the Goliath of the United States Congress, and who bravely continues the fight.

Except that Congress properly rejected his testimony. Other experts whose credentials are not in question testified that White's analysis of the Oswald backyard photos is wrong and did not consider factors White would have probably understood had he been properly trained. It's hard to argue that White was being "suppressed" when he himself admitted he didn't have the appropriate knowledge.

http://www.clavius.org/jackwhite.html

Hi BA!

Welcome to the Forum, and I hope you enjoy yourself here. If you need any assistance with Board functions, please don't hesitate to call on us!

That appears to be the newest clam that I can find. If anyone can find a claim I have not addressed, I would appreciate it if you would point it out to me. Also, if you disagree with one of my assessments, please challenge me to defend it. Unlike some I am happy to take on all comers.

PLEASE NOTE: All studies here are copyrighted by Jack White and reproduced under the Fair Use doctrine of Section 107 of the US Copyright Legislation.

APOLLO 11 PHOTOS SHOT OUT OF SEQUENCE / The flag that flew too soon

This has a similar explanation to one made by Jack some time ago, where he claimed we could see a ladder or lighting scaffolding (or similar) in the LM window.

It involves marking that were made on the LM window, to aid the Commander (CDR) to tell where his landing spot would be. The Lunar Module (LM) had the ability to do a completely automatic landing on the Moon, without the astronauts touching the controls (it could not land unmanned though). The onboard computer used radar and velocity information to compute exactly where it would land. On the CDRs window, a grid was marked on the inner and outer panes. This was called the Landing Point Designator (LPD), and it could be used to show the CDR where the onboard computer was planning to land the LM. The CDR would ask the Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) for an LPD:

102:42:33 Armstrong: (On-board) (With some urgency in his voice, possibly as he sees West Crater) Give me an LPD (angle).

102:42:34 Aldrin: Into the AGS, 47 degrees.

When given a number, the CDR would look through the scale on the window. They would look for the LPD angle given, and that would show them the point on the lunar surface that the LM would land. The system was simplicity itself, allowing for different heights of the CDR by having the CDR line up the inner and outer scales. This is what the LPD looked like:

Okay - so what does that have to do with Jack's claim? Well, the "staff" of the "flag" Jack see is in actual fact the LPD. The "flag" is just a reflection of one of the Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters on the LM.

How can I be so sure of this? Two reasons.

Firstly, the "flag" reflection appears on the RIGHT window (looking from outside the LM). The flag was on the LEFT of the LM.

http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/...S11-40-5886.jpg

http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/...1-S69-40308.jpg

(Remember that the LM landed with the Sun behind it, and in one image you can see the TV camera which was on the RHS (LHS looking from outside the LM)).

Next, the CDRs LM window reflected objects from ABOVE or level with and to the RIGHT (looking from outside the LM). Have a look at this example from the LM at Kennedy Space Center.

Zoom in on the image on the window. Recognise it? It's the edge of the Apollo 12 mission patch which is to the right of the LM.

Think I am telling porkys? Go to KSC and take your own photograph. Recreate the position and see if you think it could reflect an object on the surface. Please - post your results here.

It appears to have no facility for attaching photos. That will diminish the forum

usefulness by at least fifty percent.

Jack

It has the same facility for uploading images as the current board. It might look a little different, but the method is almost exactly the same.

They changed over at UM and didn't lose anything. The new format is quite okay, and you'll find a lot of forums now use it.