Tim Carroll

This is silly, and completely misses the significance of possible look-alikes in DP. If such good matches for Lucien Conein, James McCord and E. Howard Hunt were planted in DP, that would be as significant a proof of conspiracy as those actual persons being present. But since a whole thread was started for this, I will take the opportunity to reassert a look-alike identification for which I've yet to obtain any positive response: Guillermo Novo, supposed participant in the Miami to Dallas caravan. T.C.

Both situations, to an idealist, compromise the very nature of what makes America great. As for a pedestrian comparative analysis of tactics, don't leave out torture and secret detention facilities, the suspension of due process and the violations of international standards of sovereignty. In an interview recently, Andrea Mitchell asked someone if CNN's Christianne Amanpour had been listened to in the illegal eavesdropping, obviously implying that she has reason to believe it occurred. Wouldn't a journalist, expected to protect sources, consider this a significant trampling of the freedom of Americans? I have yet to hear a reason from the administration or Tim Gratz for why it's necessary to circumvent the FISA process, which doesn't require any warrant ahead of time, just that the eavesdropping be reported eventually. Why violate a fundamental constitutional precept for no reason, apparent or explained? Is this really a partisan issue; Republicans don't care about civil liberties? "Extra-legal" is illegal. If a perjury-trapped fib about a BJ warranted impeachment, what is the appropriate consequence for these current abominations? Or shall we just wait for the next big terrorist attack, not because it was inevitable but because it was actively provoked? T.C.

Given the political philosophy I expressed in my essay, The Construction of Legitimacy, the connection that should be obvious to Tim Castro-did-it Gratz is that these supralegal measures can come back to bite. Not only do they diminish our nation's integrity, but they don't help and they often have unintended consequences. Provocation is not the same thing as peace through strength. T.C.

Are you sure about that, Jim? Jackson was a Democrat. He had been promised the Chief Justice spot by FDR but Truman was President when the seat became vacant. He blamed Hugo Black for being passed over and their very public feud dimmed both their stars. Eisenhower appointed Warren to the seat eight years after FDR's death. I don't know what Truman or Black had to do with that. Regarding the Patriot Act and all of the other programs, known or unknown, being enacted in the supposed interest of security, the issue boils down to how America defines itself. It's not about tactics; it's about national identity. To the degree that America resorts to tyranny to combat terror, it becomes a tyranny itself. T.C.

What was the first public disclosure of Bayo-Pawley and Operation Tilt? A matrix chart of the various participants would likely include the person who first exposed it for public consumption. Gaeton Fonzi's description of the run-around he was given by Clare Booth Luce is interesting. T.C.

I am still waiting for somebody to "CITE" to some "AUTHORITY" when they pose an inquiry in my direction.Perhaps a constructive approach would be to ask the Big Guy what "authority" he would "cite," just the name of a scribbler or tome that got something, anything, correct.Yes Timmy: IT IS A LOATHESOME RECORD. And why don't YOU cite the book(s) and page numbers of where" "...In the recent spate of books, Hemming is the 'source?' for assertions that RFK had 'DIRECT' meetings with Roselli and Oswald..."!! From Ultimate Sacrifice, p. 408: "A former anti-Castro activist, whose CIA and FBI files are extensive, claims that Bobby Kennedy actually met Johnny Rosselli on one occasion in Miami. The meeting occurred in '1962,' sometime 'before the Cuban Missile Crisis' of October 1962." Source: "Phone interview with Gerry Patrick Hemming, 4-10-96." From A Farewell To Justice, p. 201: "Without corroboration, offering none, Hemming spins a story of Bobby choppering from Palm Beach to a training facility near Homestead Air Force base. There, Hemming imagines, Bobby met with Cubans, many of them Bay of Pigs veterans, who were part of his Special Group. According to Hemming, among the Cubans that day stood one Lee Harvey Oswald, even as independent corroboration does indeed place Oswald in Miami that summer of 1963." Source: "Interviews with Gerald Patrick Hemming, November 15, 2000; June 5, 2005." Those are just the two most recent examples. I'm not defending the authors, so there's no need to play kill the messenger. A simple confirmation or denial that these claims came out of Hemming's mouth would suffice. I've given Hemming two recent examples, with title and page number, of the forty plus years of BS. I'm not interested in an adjusted version. A simple confirmation or denial that these authors did or did not accurately present his comments would suffice. As for the challenge to go on the Internet, why access Weberman if it's unreliable? Why waste time on the decades of work by flawed scribblers. Why can't Hemming point to a single book and say: that is the best of the lot. Then as a basis for discussion, that work could be used to move forward. Consider me to be defending Tosh here and now. I have personally posted documents which support the timing and substance of his assertions. I also went scuba diving from Marathon in November, 2004, and there was a large inlet lined with docks. So, whether my defense is deemed adequate or not, it's time for Hemming to deliver on his commitment: "FAX his whole goddamn file to John forthwith !!" I have "kindly" cited the most recent alleged quotes. I have no interest in working through forty plus years of Hemming's inability to have a clearcut communication with any historian, absent him naming just one whose work he supports. Any reader of this forum can get a sense of the difficulty. As for whether or not I'm a "person," what are the alternatives in Hemmingworld? T.C.

I am still waiting for somebody to "CITE" to some "AUTHORITY" when they pose an inquiry in my direction. The most recent stupidity is: Citing Tony Summer's mistake in placing Rorke, et al. at the FBI "seizure" at McLaney's "West of" LaCombe, LA property. Perhaps a constructive approach would be to ask the Big Guy what "authority" he would "cite," just the name of a scribbler or tome that got something, anything, correct. The loathesome record of people who have relied upon Hemming's statements only to have him disclaim them subsequently is extensive. In the recent spate of books, Hemming is the source for assertions that RFK had direct meetings with Roselli and Oswald. So how about naming the people who have interviewed Hemming and correctly recorded his assertions (if there are any)? After all, people like Summers, Weberman, Mellen, Waldron, Hartmann, etc., either don't understand plain English or there is some more bizarre aspect to Hemmingspeak that eludes even the most sincere scribblers and bookreaders. This approach would avoid the misdirectional blather and absurdly exaggerated use of adjectives. T.C.

Thanks. High praise indeed! Hopefully, the essay is partisan-proof and not in any way tilted toward any political party. It is tilted against the cost of troublemaking for political gain. It's actually way too academic to be found in any kind of press, mainstream or otherwise. I especially enjoy the quote of Carl Oglesby as it applies to the Patriot Act and other post 9-11 measures: "Tyranny and terror promote and multiply each other so well because each is the other’s only possible 'legitimation.' But they are actually the same . . . they cannot 'legitimate' each other. . . . The authentic rejection of terror mandates the rejection of tyranny. The authentic rejection of tyranny mandates the rejection of terror. There is no way to defend the democracy by the use of antidemocratic means. There is no antirepublican method corresponding to a republican purpose. There is no furtherance of national and personal, political and social independence through submission to national police controls. The state cannot at the same time uphold the law and trample it underfoot." T.C.

I second that. It is as good as anything you would get in the mainstream press. Thank you for taking the time to read it. It's a cut and paste job from my Masters thesis, which was primarily concerned with Cuba. But the lessons are even more appropriate in the current environment. T.C.

Why else would the administration call such an un-American program the "Patriot Act?" THE CONSTRUCTION OF LEGITIMACY by Tim Carroll In virtually all societies people are bound by laws and standards of conduct which dictate their behaviors. And in those societies elite groups exercise power over others and claim a legitimacy for their actions. "Legitimate government is a relationship between state and subjects." Political sociology, as opposed to political philosophy, asks not whether any such domination is actually legitimate, but rather concerns itself with the perceived legitimacy of various forms of domination. Examining the reasons for particular acts of domination and the methods employed for the exercise thereof involves evaluation of those reasons and whether they are supported by the facts. As one analyst put it, "The question for policy is often not, 'What is reality?' but rather, 'Whose image of reality will prevail?'" In the formal sense, political legitimacy refers to the valid standing of a government in the eyes of its people domestically, and the nations having relations with that government in the international arena. It involves consent for the governing by the governed and an attribution of credibility in an international relations setting. A requirement for achieving this consent and credibility is the ability to provide coherent and understandable explanations. According to Rodney Barker, states actively promote their legitimacy in three ways. First they engage in rituals, second, they employ propaganda, and third, they use education. These tactics involve the promotion of constructions that are self-serving to state interests, regardless of the truth. Such justifications for policies and actions include both representations and misrepresentations, depending on which best serve the advancement of the goals and postures of the leadership. The reasons given for a particular course of action may be valid or contrived. The level of public embrace and the scrutiny those reasons will receive is more closely related to how well they resonate with a given audience than with how they relate to the facts at hand: "There are two reasons for doing things - a very good reason and the real reason." Producing seemingly "good" reasons that justify and muster support for "real" reasons is the objective of such artificial legitimizing activities. There are times when the two are not in conflict and there is no need to construct realities apart from what the facts dictate. Often, however, leaders feel the need to generate a logical acceptance and consent for objectives that cannot be revealed publicly. This can be rationalized as protecting national secrets or national security. However, manufactured realities are frequently promoted to endorse national goals that do not fit within any socially acceptable framework. The undermining of foreign governments and the abrogation of another's sovereignty through covert sabotage are examples of undertakings that would generally not be recognized as valid foreign policy. Persuasion, a fundamental ingredient of politics, is accepted as a given aspect of authority. However, persuasion applied to mass audiences often involves numerous constructs designed to unify and maintain governing authority. Like an errant child caught with a hand in the cookie jar, governmental leaders find themselves obliged to manufacture justifications that explain behaviors that are not generally considered reasonable or legitimate. This often results in misrepresentations of fact, however well-intentioned, designed to convince the public that leaders are behaving in a manner consistent with recognized values and propriety. The assumption underlying such deception, however, is that the public is not sufficiently advanced to understand the true context of such actions. An example of this manufacturing would be a public rationale designed to cover-up a policy that utilizes political subversion and assassination, means which are publicly disavowed by political actors who aspire to any respectability. Nevertheless, we find an American policy that included precisely these types of extreme mechanisms in the form of CIA-sponsored attempts to destabilize the Castro regime and to kill Castro himself during the period of time that is the object of this study. No civilized nation espouses the invasions of sovereign nations or assassination as legitimate methods of foreign policy. This apparently didn't prevent such planning by the United States, the supposed moral leader of the free world; it only prevented the disclosure of it. The standard requiring that "a legitimate social order should be able to explain itself to its citizens" could not be met in this case or in the case of many of the tactics employed by the United States to undermine the Castro regime. What makes problems, leaders, and enemies political is the fact that their meanings are subject to interpretation. Total consensus removes an issue from being a political one. So the legitimation process involves an effort to reduce uncertainty and reassure observers that their own interpretations are valid. The belief in and need for this validity, however, encourages self-assurance and even dogmatism, as well as claims to power over others. Robert Jay Lifton has noted that much of the emotion and energy that has been directed to religion in the past has been redirected toward science and politics. This arises from the need to identify issues and people according to a posture of self-righteousness which separates good and bad, rewarding virtue while punishing evil. This kind of self-righteousness serves to reduce stress and protect the self against threats; it is a method of reducing internal conflicts by transferring them onto external scapegoats. The human need to escape uncertainty provides fertile soil for reassuring constructions, versions of reality that enhance the appearance of legitimacy. The measure of the resonance of these constructions has more to do with their ability to reduce ambiguity than with providing any kind of truth. However, as Murray Edelman notes, "There is reason for tentativeness about all forms of explanation. . . . Reasons for support or for doubt are all mortals can hope for. Final conclusions, like final solutions, are for dogmatists." He continues: "It is moral certainty, not tentativeness, that historically has encouraged people to harm or kill others. Genocide, racial and religious persecution, and the rest of the long catalogue of political acts that have stained human history can only come from people who are sure that they are right." A recognition that the facts don't speak for themselves is generally the last thing desired by a political audience. Skepticism about the orchestration of support for policies leads to deeper issues in which one's very identity comes into question. Thus, "we wage war on real and imagined enemies from within and without, and from the point of view of the self and society, partly to enable good to triumph over evil, and partly to realize who we are." To avoid such an identity crisis, symbols are invoked which shore up the dilemmas and uncertainties. A flag may be a simple piece of cloth, but it may also be a reminder of struggles justified by patriotism, an evocation of nostalgia for one's homeland or of a narrative history one learned as a child. It may serve as a ready symbol ever available to wave away doubt. Through this process, people become assured that their course is correct, their loyalties well-placed, and their lives meaningful. Such symbols also serve to simplify the identification of enemies as anyone in opposition to the values thought to be represented by the symbol. Principles of nonaggression, national self-determination, and the rights of sovereignty - however abused in practice - are the closest things the international system has to a universal set of rules and norms. Although it may be argued that "international law is not law," and that therefore legitimacy is an internal reflection of support and consent not applicable to foreign policy, there are general standards of international conduct which may be found in treaties, resolutions of international organizations, the judgments of international courts, and the customary practice of states. The moral authority that comes with international legitimacy is important in its own right, but even more important is the greater coercive potential of a broad-based international coalition that brings to bear the authority and resources of other countries and of international institutions. This principle was demonstrated by the importance placed by the U.S. during the Cuban Missile Crisis on a ratifying vote taken by the Organization of American States (OAS) in support of a quarantine of Cuba. In this context, however, it must be noted that even the coercive force of such a broad-based coalition may be the product of a construction of legitimacy that may not be everything it appears on the surface. Legitimation is an essential element in the public acquiescence of governance. Jürgen Habermas has postulated a theory of legitimation and legitimation crises in which he refers to legitimation as any way in which a political order strives to maintain mass loyalty. When a system cannot account for basic contradictions, such as a capitalist system accounting for contradictions between social production and private property, it is said to be undergoing a legitimation crisis. If the state cannot achieve legitimacy, it will become politically unstable, or it will resort to coercion. However, coercive methods cannot be employed flagrantly if the state wants to retain stability and continue to generate mass loyalty. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence: "Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." Habermas argues that the system only allows for the creation of a general sentiment of loyalty, rather than a high level of individual involvement. "The arrangement of formal democratic institutions and procedures permits administrative decisions to be made largely independently of specific motives of the citizens. This takes place through a legitimation process that elicits generalized motives-that is, diffuse mass loyalty - but avoids participation." Habermas' view of legitimation through the creation of mass loyalty reflects the sentiments of political symbolists such as Murray Edelman, who has argued that elections only serve as public rituals to make people feel that the system is working. The election ritual serves to circumscribe the opposition, to some degree, and addresses the state need to maintain public acceptance of future as well as current actions. The system must be seen not only as working, but people must perceive that it will continue to work for some time to come. It is important to note that striving for greater public legitimation is not necessarily an inauthentic process. Adherence to the law, both internal and international, is an aspect of authentic legitimacy. A government telling the truth to a democratic populace expected to cast informed votes would be another. The use of the word "construction," however, implies methodologies involving a degree of manipulation of truth, fabrication, embellishment, "spin control," and at times, just plain lying, not only through public pronouncements and misinformation disseminated by leaders, but through posturing, promotion, propaganda, false crises, and enemy-making. This study is concerned with these inauthentic modes of manipulating public perceptions and attitudes as they apply to the promotion of an anti-Castro American foreign policy. It questions whether the public postures were a reflection of mass values, or if it was the other way around. When Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in 1959 it was not at all certain that he was the Communist zealot and threat to U.S. interests that we have come to know through political discourse. He was clearly nationalistic, and that nationalism could be expected to raise long-simmering issues about American imperialism that had underlain the relationship between the two countries since the late 1800s. And being a charismatic figure, it could reasonably be anticipated that he would be somewhat difficult, if not obstinate, in the face of any attempt at external dominance. But why was it necessary to portray him as creating a Western Hemispheric base for Soviet Communism? The fact that this eventually came about does not necessarily mean that it was Castro's initial choice. Because such extremes in policy still require some kind of validation, it would be the approach of U.S. leaders to engage in manipulation of language, exaggeration of the threat, invocation of patriotism, and misleading portrayals of events to further an ideology-based policy geared toward the removal of any Communist interests in the Western Hemisphere. Anti-communism became a convenient explanation for opposing any threat to American hemispheric hegemony. This easy explanation resonated well with the American people and obviated any rational and more detailed examination. An awareness of the methods for constructing legitimacy and how they influenced the manufacturing and selling of U.S. policy toward Cuba is essential to understanding the processes of reality-making in that circumstance and how they entrapped decision-makers down the road. A further issue involves consideration of whether it was conscious decision-making that led to the United States finding itself on the verge of nuclear war in a few short years. The construction of oppositional legitimacy necessarily involves a promotion of an enemy's illegitimacy. However, in the history of such doings, the potential conse-quences have never been so dire. Why would U.S. leaders seek to misrepresent the threat posed by a Third World revolution to the point that public rhetoric and posturing would virtually imprison their decision-making abilities, placing them in a position of having to legitimize considerations of launching a third world war? The answer lies in the political mindset in which the participants were operating. Robert Jervis notes, ". . . there is evidence . . . that when expectations and desires clash, expectations seem to be more important. . . . Actors are apt to be especially sensitive to evidence of grave danger if they think they can take action to protect themselves against the menace once it has been detected." There is a self-validating aspect to the kinds of constructions designed to facilitate mass approval for policies that, if revealed completely, would be found to be socially unpalatable, if not repugnant. Each step taken in this regard sets the stage for the subsequent steps. A piecemeal process involving desensitization of the public to nuance increases indoctrination into the overriding ideology that is to be the framework of under-standing. In the 1950s there was already the framework of a belief in the threat of monolithic godless communism which ipso facto would mean that a hint of socialism in Cuba would necessarily mean that Cuba was actually a Soviet satellite. The methodologies incorporated to meet this supposed threat constitute a menu of the techniques that may be employed for the construction of legitimacy. Among the few remaining places where myth and phantasy still have power for modern man are advertising and international relations. . . . International politics has its incantations (the right to self-determination), its spells (we have a commitment), its contagious magic (a threat to freedom in Asia is a threat to freedom in Podunk, U.S.A.), and its analogic magic (another Munich). Because legitimacy relates to the approval and acquiescence of the masses, constructions are designed to distract, if not directly mislead the public about policies normally considered inappropriate or wrong. The consent theory advanced by Thomas Hobbes and the contractarianism of John Locke raise the issue of whether deception of the governed by the government can be construed as legitimate governance. The notion of consent to a social contract between the citizens and their government would seem to be rendered null when that government seeks to artificially influence the will of the people. Recognizing that a government cannot afford to subvert will openly, leaders engage in manufacturing consent through constructions of legitimacy. When Locke noted that rulers must put the people "under such a frame of government, as they willingly, and of choice, consent to," he implicitly raised the question of whether there can be consent when there is deception and lawlessness. Hobbes discusses the basic ability of humans to be free to choose: ". . . beasts that have deliberation, must necessarily also have will. . . . For a voluntary act is that, which proceedeth from the will, and no other." Spinoza addressed the circumstance of coerced choice and choice founded on deception when he wrote that "a compact is only made valid by its utility." In this view, "a man need not, for example, give a highway robber what he has promised to give him." The handing over of authority can therefore only be deemed consensual and the social contract binding when the agreement is based upon a valid representation on the part of the leaders. Once the power is conveyed, the leaders acquire full rights and powers while those of the citizens are diminished. Thus, obligation and legitimacy are part of a two-way pact: Many states, of course, proceed in blithe disregard of their citizens' - or better, regardless of legal formalities, their subjects' - wishes. Some are overtly tyrannical and make no pretensions about what they're up to. Others pay hypocritical tribute to the virtues of responsiveness, going through the motions of plebiscites and the rest before then imposing their will. Still others run publicly open institutions undergirded by nocturnal death squads, secret police, and the like. The Manipulation of Language Alexander George observes that if consensus could always be manufactured through public relations campaigns, it would not matter whether one policy objective was more inherently consistent with the truth than another. Language is so very malleable that often the validity of policy or its correspondence with verifiable truth does not matter. What does matter is the resonance of the language used to persuade the public. "As with Harry Truman and Dean Acheson in the selling of the Truman Doctrine, the right words and framing of an issue could evoke support even from a reluctant Congress and an isolationist public." Language serves to assimilate the unfamiliar to the familiar, and thereby give meaning. Rebellions of the have-not peoples in Cuba against foreign domination, or revolutions of have-not peoples against domestic tyranny, are only too easily reconfigured into congruence with the familiar Good American/Bad Communist polarity. It is by such a basic process that the have-nots are characterized as belonging to the bad regions of the semantic world. The Cold War was readily framed in terms that appealed to the pivotal concepts of God and Devil for its sustenance, shaping that struggle into a kind of Holy War. This simplistic form of black and white narrative produces a coherence that is valuable in the negation of doubt and conflict. When the public is conditioned to perceive communism as the hallmark of all that is evil, it becomes consonant to believe that if both the Soviet Union and China are communist then they would automatically be allies. For this reason, when the facts supported the reality of a Sino-Soviet split, both the public and leaders were slow to accept it; and many continued to believe it to be a sinister hoax. It was this kind of thinking that made the consonance offered by the notion of monolithic communism so appealing. Cleverly contrived language can provide tactical benefits. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, when President Kennedy considered a blockade to be the mildest option available to him, consideration was given to the fact that according to international rules of engagement, a blockade was itself an act of war. To lessen the impact of such an action it was decided that the term "quarantine" would be perceived as less aggressive and warlike. Of course, there is no difference between a blockade and a quarantine, but the use of the less historically-loaded word provided the United States with a less aggressive appearance. The manipulation of language in politics is a commonplace in modern society and is routinely accepted as part and parcel of public discourse. Although history contains too many recent lessons of the potential dangers of public quiescence in the face of inflammatory rhetoric, the degeneration continues. According to Orwell, the mother tongue's deterioration may be traced to the present state of politics. "We live in an age of political orthodoxies, and orthodoxy has taken its toll on truth and on the vehicle for conveying truth, language. Listen to almost any politician on the platform. Instinctively he spouts clichés and cloudy language. . . . Not by reasoned argument, therefore, but by lapsing into euphemism and dredging up shopworn metaphors that deaden the brain-both his own and his listener's - the orthodox politician attempts to handle unpalatable facts and to uphold injustice. His thoughts are corrupt-he admires a foreign dictator, let us say, or believes that the end justifies the means-and as a consequence his language will be corrupt as well. It will conceal and not elucidate the truth." Leaders as Authorizing Figures In organized societies, decisions are implemented through a hierarchical structure that starts with a leader or leaders who administer actions in various ways. This ability to begin the chain of actions that implements decisions is authority. A leader with great influence over others is considered to have a large amount of authority; a leader who cannot exert such control is considered to be lacking in authority. Max Weber focused his theory of authority on the idea of imperative control, defined as "the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons." Weber described three grounds by which a leader could engender obedience: authority based on rational-legal grounds; authority based on traditional grounds; and authority based on charismatic grounds. These grounds provide the legitimating and authorizing platform from which a leader can generate support for public positions. Among the devices used to motivate, solidify, and manage constituencies is the authorizing figure. Leaders are able to boost their own authority by referencing it to other figures, thereby magnifying the legitimacy of their own actions. These leaders can be living or dead, but the power to increase authority this way is proportional to the perceived historical force of the invoked figure. The referencing of historical figures for present purposes is a common practice and is frequently utilized in politics. The myth of the official leader as protector against enemies encourages acceptance of the official view. Thus, the leader becomes a powerful legitimizer of established policies, furthering the acquiescence of the masses and representing policies that favor elites, in disregard of the public good. The question must be asked, how do leaders become the public symbols of private interests? Legitimating charismatic myths are the most effective and the most volatile way to propel leaders' attitudes into their nations' psyches. Political actors be-come symbols to other observers: "they stand for ideologies, values, or moral stances and they become role models, benchmarks, or symbols of threat and evil." A central goal in leadership is the maximization of power. To authorize is to increase the force, power, or effect of something. By manufacturing a mythic persona, a leader becomes a significant validation symbol for the positions and groups he represents. According to Edelman: "Governmental action always depends on popular acquiescence or resistance. But myth personifies consequences, attributing good or bad outcomes to particular individuals who symbolize success or failure. Myth substitutes heroes and villains for complicated social interactions, providing ready 'explanations' that are popular because they offer an outlet for anger or for satisfaction without criticizing the institutions that give people their roles, even when those institutions yield policies that fail." American presidents attemp to promote self-images that transcend the restraints of bureaucratic control. In this regard, at least in the area of international relations, they are not unlike a number of the banana republic dictators the U.S. has supported. Bill Stewart has noted that "the connection between an authoritarian style of leadership and 'personalism' is strong." While necessarily more concealed in the U.S., in many Latin American countries, "the classic case has been that of the 'strong man,' and the leader/follower relationship has been that of patron to client." In this model, the management team operates through very personal ties with the leader. "The main problem with authoritarian leadership patterns in the bureaucracy is that binding decisions are reserved to the leader." Edelman notes that "a 'messy' structure of this kind assures that on crucial issues conflicts will not be resolved inside the bureaucracy and so come to the attention of the chief executive." Although certain presidents have used the tactic routinely, it is generally "feasible only at times the public regards as 'crises': wars and potentially catastrophic economic social situations." Through ambiguous political speech and public exhortation to virtue, leaders encourage people in their natural tendency to avoid a critical examination of issues, and to trust in an official leader instead. Leaders distract attention from group conflict and focus it upon a personality, thereby mustering support for their own positions. This requires the appearance of certainty; "a leader must look potent, not stalemated." This requirement of certainty, however, produces handicapped governance. A shrewd official takes a stand on a controversial issue only when he is confident that his position will prevail. The benefits of such political battling flow less from the matter itself than from the demonstration of the leader as clearly in command. Crisis as Condensation Symbol Condensation symbols evoke the emotions associated with the situation. They condense into one symbolic event . . . patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promises of future greatness. There is a tendency among political leaders to magnify problems into crises. Through this process, problems are brought into the public domain cloaked in the symbolic trappings of threat and urgency. According to Victor Turner, these "symbols instigate social action" by condensing "many references, uniting them in a single cognitive and affective field." Condensation symbols can include the flag, patriotism, enemy-making, and ultimately some sort of crisis construction to create coherence and unity in the public view. Once a leader defines a problem as a crisis it is endowed with a compelling emotional dynamic which diminishes the need for rational understanding. The lack of semantic precision empowers it as a condensation symbol which can support whatever beliefs and meanings are consonant with each observer. As Murray Edelman notes, "To defeat a communist conspiracy against the free world sanctifies the deaths of civilians and soldiers and justifies other deprivations which, in a different context, would evoke strong and wide resistance and protest; price inflation, pollution of the environment, denial of funds to save cities from degradation, and alliances with venal and despotic oligarchies. For the official policymaker the myth entails an even more flattering self-conception than it does for his followers. For him there is the possibility of attaining greatness, wide power, and influence, while furthering a noble cause. A perception of vulnerability is therefore likely to stir him to create a crisis, while he perceives and justifies his action as a response to outside events. . . . The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and thousands of other managed crises in the history of the world look different to uninvolved contemporaries and to later generations than they look to the policymakers and the politically involved whose ego needs and roles are tied to the myths that engage them." If a widely publicized event can be interpreted as confirmation that an enemy is dangerous, political support can be broadened. The sinking of the Maine in Havana harbor in 1898 and the siege of the Alamo in 1836 served just such a function. According to Edelman, "When such interpretations of ambiguous events are widely accepted, the event itself becomes a condensation symbol and can be used to build support for later military actions." Corresponding political oratory can generate a simple and coherent assumption that war is legitimate in such cases. Slogans such as "Remember the Alamo," Remember the Maine," and "Remember Pearl Harbor" are highly effective in inculcating fear and loathing of an enemy. Some crises are created semantically by leaders who promote widespread anxiety about an alleged threat that may or may not be real. There are plentiful examples in history of official leaders publicizing and exaggerating supposedly threatening actions by possibly hostile countries. Edelman cites the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Missile Gap as just such examples. About the Missile Crisis, he states, "The Kennedy administration did not see the maintenance of American missiles in Turkey . . . as creating a crisis, but chose to define Russian missiles in Cuba as an intolerable threat." Such lopsided reasoning, especially when fed to a hungry public, provides fertile soil for crisis construction and its supposed benefits. A regime that promotes itself as expert at crisis management will surely find crises to manage, and crisis management is always available as an expeditious way to muster public support. Edelman observes, "A crisis, like all other news developments, is a creation of the language used to depict it; the appearance of a crisis is a political act, not a recognition of a fact or a rare situation." Reflecting this view that a crisis is a political construction with a range of purposes not necessarily related to an objective, external threat, Ron Hirschbein has written, "A crisis, then is not brought to life by events beyond human control-crises are made, not born." He notes that rather than crisis discourse mirroring reality, reality mirrors crisis discourse. Hirschbein has asserted another, albeit dangerous, benefit of crisis invocation. "Likewise - as an absolution from past fiascoes - the crisis is represented as a salutary learning experience. . . ." In the case of U.S. Cuban policy, according to Arthur Schlesinger, the effect of the Missile Crisis on the mindset of Soviet and American officials would be to "purge their minds at least temporarily, of cold war clichés. . . . The chief lesson learned from the first nuclear crisis was not how to conduct the next one-but how to avoid it." This hopeful analysis, however, disputes those who argue that the seeming success of Gradual Escalation during the Missile Crisis led directly to the mistakes that embroiled the U.S. in the Vietnam conflict. The public catharsis generated by crises was reflected in a cynical remark Kennedy made to Hugh Sidey shortly after Khrushchev's capitulation: "The country rather enjoyed the Cuban quarantine. It was exciting, it was a diversion, there was the feeling we were doing something." He did also state that "it might have been a different story if there had been thousands killed in a long battle." Enemy-Making The construction of enemies is an important device for rallying support and engendering an unquestioning attitude amongst the public. Political enemies may include foreign countries, adherents of unappealing ideologies, groups of different backgrounds or races, or figments of imagination. Nevertheless, enemies are inherent in the political world. They help give this world the power to arouse passions, to solidify loyalty, and to silence critics. There is a strong self-interest for a regime to exaggerate the threat posed by some supposed enemy in order to marshal greater support. The counter-productive effects of such enemy exaggeration and myth-making are generally ignored by leaders who benefit from their promotion. The polarization of good and evil creates a need for enemies or for some form of demonology. The construction of enemies as demons magnifies the ongoing struggle between the pure and the impure, between in-groups and out-groups, between identity and non-identity. By identifying an enemy and portraying him as evil, the nation-state is able to adopt a posture of self-righteousness, allowing for the transcendence of the threat through the elevation of the nation to a position of moral superiority. Thus we wage war on real and imagined enemies, partly to enable good to triumph over evil, and partly as a means of gaining identity. By attributing different motives to ourselves and our opponents, the very same behavior by both can be rationalized in terms of public values. This ego-centered rationalization contributes to a double standard of national morality. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States defined missiles being based in Cuba as “offensive” in nature, whereas comparable American missiles already based in West Germany, Italy, and Turkey were defined as “defensive.” Of course, the Soviet Union applied the same definitions, but in reverse. There is a self-fulfilling prophecy aspect to enemy-making. When Castro is depicted as a Soviet dupe before that is necessarily the case, he eventually becomes precisely that. When the Soviets deny that portrayal and then send missiles to the island, ostensibly for defensive purposes, they wind up confirming the very notion they sought to deny. The construction of enemies can thus be seen as convoluted, multi-faceted, and self-feeding. In the long run, negative, undesired outcomes often result from the short-term exploitation of the benefits. The construction of legitimacy in the pursuit of overthrowing the Castro regime resulted in state-sponsored terrorism on the part of the United States. This is so extreme a result that there can be no mincing of words in this regard. Terrorism, even when employed by nations, amounts to international tyranny of the first order. Of course this was ostensibly justified by the allegation that Castro was exporting terrorism to other countries, most notably in Latin America. However, as Carl Oglesby asserts, tyranny is not a remedy for terror, tyranny is terror: "Tyranny and terror promote and multiply each other so well because each is the other’s only possible 'legitimation.' But they are actually the same . . . they cannot 'legitimate' each other. . . . The authentic rejection of terror mandates the rejection of tyranny. The authentic rejection of tyranny mandates the rejection of terror. There is no way to defend the democracy by the use of antidemocratic means. There is no antirepublican method corresponding to a republican purpose. There is no furtherance of national and personal, political and social independence through submission to national police controls. The state cannot at the same time uphold the law and trample it underfoot." In the contemporary world, the constructions directed toward the appearance of legitimacy are as prevalent as ever. Contriving events and the spinning of news about them generates goals and anxieties, reassurances and fears that in turn fuel an even greater need for legitimating symbols. Citizens are unable to do little more than react to such constructions, primarily by keeping abreast of the news and by acquiescing in the realities that are constructed. An alternative to processes involving verifiability and falsifiability and their resultant certainties and dogmatisms is a more interpretive approach that allows for multivalent responses to representations and circumstances. An insight and skepticism about the construction of legitimacy is integral to such a posture.

Gerry may well be right on this one. I've searched in vain for this, for years. Everybody knows there were training camps north of the lake in 1963, right? There was certainly a training area north of the lake involving some 20 Cubans from late June to late July, 1963, involving Victor Paneque and the Movimiento Democratico Cristiano. It was closed after the Mandeville arms bust, and Carlos Jose Bringuier was called upon to help some of the trainees back to Miami.... After his August 1961 arrests and the September Houma caper, Ferrie was ostracized by the FRD/CRC, the "official" anti-Castro group. I can find little, if any, verifyable anti-Castro activity by him after that date! I always wondered if Garrison simply mixed up the chronology, and conflated the 1961 activities with the 1963 camp. The Garrison documents seem to support this confusion.... It's one of those widely held and repeated assassination stories that might prove to be wrong. Although it may well be true that assertions about Banister-Ferrie-Oswald being present at the Lacombe camp in 1963 may be incorrect, the record does show that McLaney's property was raided in late July. The HSCA found no evidence that the Louisiana camp was connected to the CIA or the Mafia. According to Summers' Not In Your Lifetime, p. 252: "Among those detained or formally cautioned in the raid were a number of American advisors, including members of a group called Interpen - more grandly known as the Intercontinental Penetration Force. They included Alexander Rorke and Frank Sturgis, both of whom had persistently flouted government orders ever since the missile crisis." Healthy skepticism might warrant a review of previous assertions about Banister-Ferrie-Oswald being at the camp and Garrison may have confused dates, but Hemming's assertion that there were "No camps ... No Diddly Squat !!" goes too far. T.C.

We can agree that the internment of the Japanese took place in time of declared war and reflected society's general rascism, which has no place in the 21st century. I thought our agreement was on the point that Bush's election was fear-inspired. Unlike some wrongful actions following Pearl Harbor, Bush has promoted fear for no such good reason, but rather for a generalized and long-term conservative agenda to install a police state. I would add my conviction that making enemies all over the world doesn't make us tough; it makes us stupid. Bush has made nothing and no one safer, while seeking to remove constitutionally guaranteed rights permanently. T.C.

The Cold War still involved international law and recognition of the sovereignty of nations. To discuss the war on terrorism in the same way is to mix apples and oranges. Robin Hood was a terrorist. The Boston Tea Party was terrorism. My best friend's daughter is facing 290 years in prison because her environmental activism, allegedly involving some monkeywrenching, is now deemed terrorism. T.C.

The idea that Sorenson was kept from being found suitable as a CIA Director because he used sensitive material to write his book, Kennedy, is particularly delicious given Gerald Ford's problem only three years earlier in his confirmation hearings to become the first unelected V.P. in history (and eventually president) when he was shown to have explicitly used classified materials to write his book about Oswald. T.C.

It is the evasion of appropriate scrutiny that is the issue. I believe it was Jim Root who wrote a great piece for this forum about the Korematsu case. I am not about to defend the state of the right of privacy or that of rascism during the 1940's. We have hopefully grown up as a people some since then. But I do not agree that the Japanese internment can be used in a comparative analysis, since, as I mentioned earlier, that was a legitimately declared war. Terrorism is as old as the hills; a "War On Terror" is a prescription for perpetual war against an ephemeral enemy without borders or sovereignty. Let's not applaud the safety of fundamentalist Muslims in America too soon. T.C.

Ted Sorenson was one of only six men in the room when the Secret Deal to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis was approved. In comparison, what were George H. W. Bush's qualifications? Anything in his past that might qualify has been denied. T.C.

Rather than the rule of law, we should just allow such a great constitutional scholar and honorable gentleman as George Bush to decide autonomously where the line exists that separates the American Way Of Life from loathesome totalitarian, expansionist regimes? I don't thing so. T.C.

This particular quote is particularly irritating given the 2000 election, in which for the only time in its history, the Supreme Court confessed that its intervention had so little legal basis that it should not be applied as precedent in any future case. To do so, to apply equal protection in election methodology, would cripple America's ability to hold elections at all. This analysis is technically accurate but misleading. Even garbage is private until it's placed outside the residence. Get real about letting Bush run hogwild with our civil liberties?!? Tim Gratz contradicts himself when he uses the term "reasonable grounds" when that is precisely what the president won't provide or explain. Procedures were in place for special anti-terrorism circumstances, procedures that may themselves be too intrusive. But to be cavalierly dismissive about the slippery slope possibilities of a hysteria-based usurpation of constitutional civil liberties during a non-declared war is not simple reality, it's being a proverbial "Good German." Tim

This is an inherently illogical argument. The Fourth Amendment cited herein demonstrates what most reasonable people would construe as a right to privacy. The Amendment makes clear that the only exception to the requirement of a warrant is "probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation," yet Tim Gratz argues probable cause as just one of many examples that demonstrate the lack of requirement of a warrant. He is correct that the Fourth Amendment's lack of a directly stated right to privacy has led to a developmental process which has now come to include a right to privacy. But these constitutional originalists who claim that these developments, both judicial and legislative, stray from the Framers' intent could also logically claim that slavery isn't illegal. Actually, I don't consider said position to be that from their Neo Conservative agenda, which is actually Neo Confederate. A state which can engage in "unreasonable state searches" is generally considered fascistic. This certainly applied to the struggles of WWI and II. I happen to consider that Anne Frank's lack of the simple right to be secure while hiding in her own attic to be pertinent to the purposes for fighting the world wars. Who cares about "most Americans?" Has Tim Gratz forgotten that this isn't a representative democracy; it is a democratic republic. What is the ratio of my representation in the U.S. Senate as a resident of California in comparison with a resident of Wyoming? Has he forgotten Thomas Jefferson's warnings about the "Tyranny of the Majority?" That most people might desire security over civil liberties has no bearing on the moral imperatives of America being America. The Framers arranged it that way. And that final comment about "a time of war" is something else again. If we are going to have special security protocols for times of war, then the existence of that war should also conform with constitutional requirements. A declaration of war by the Congress is not the same thing as voting for interim authority based upon the 1973 War Powers Act. If the administration wants full wartime privileges, it is required to obtain a full declaration of war - something that hasn't been done since December 8, 1941. And beyond the idealistic argument, what is the practical justification to skirt the FISA procedures? Finally, while Tim Gratz acknowledged the developmental aspect of the right to privacy, his litany deliberately (I assume) omitted Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which found: "Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new constitutional right, the right to privacy in marital relations." In other words, putting the various protections in the Bill of Rights together does establish a right to privacy. Griswold was a birth control issue pertaining to privacy in marital relations, but as Tim Gratz well knows, this right has continued to develop since 1965, and was instrumental in the dreaded 1973 decision, Roe v. Wade. T.C.

Given the radically changed geography of the United States since the time when the Constitution and its Bill of Rights was adopted, what has been considered "America" has been more a set of ideals than a fixed region. When those ideals are usurped, America loses its noble identity. How can it be that conservatives, supposedly concerned with the dangers of governmental intrusion into individual lives, generally support domestic surveillance? This is nothing new to the post 9-11 world. As a reading of the recent Nixon thread shows, wiretapping and violating the privacy of Americans has long been a policy goal of right-wing Americans. T.C.

What constructive purpose is served by challenging Gerry Hemming on anything? I certainly sympathize with Tosh's frustration that Hemming has such a platform for disseminating false history here and that his privileged treatment enables such free-wheeling distortion, but whenever a probative question is asked, Hemming quickly resorts to personal abuse and obfuscation. To his credit, Hemming has at times admitted that he is not telling forum members what he supposedly knows about Dallas. My take on Hemming's remarks is that anyone who thinks he can be charmed, cajoled or tricked into a statement of substance about Dallas is wrong. Therefore, his pronouncements about what transpired are of the misleading, debunking and ridiculing sort. The overall result of such contribution is worse than no contribution at all. T.C.

The way that Sorenson's nomination was blocked is illustrative of the forces with which Carter had to contend. There was no up or down vote. There was no insinuation of any impropriety or unfitness on the part of Sorenson. CIA Director Bush and his cronies just couldn't have a true Kennedy loyalist in the position of being Director of the CIA during the post Watergate era, and they kicked and screamed until Carter caved in to the political calculus. In hindsight, Carter should have recognized that the battle lines had been drawn sooner than he'd expected, and that he needed to exert the political will to press forward with Sorenson. T.C.

This is a very nice gesture. Thanks for going to the trouble to do that! The index is indeed very helpful. Having just read William Harvey's Church Committee interview, it's clear that it can't be the basis for Joan Mellen's assertion that "William Harvey would testify under oath before the Church Committee that on at least two occasions there was White House approval and 'initiative' of the 'specific Rosselli operation' to murder Castro." T.C.

It's interesting that in 1963 the assassination of a president wasn't any different, criminally, than any other local murder. I have found recent examples in dictionaries of the degeneration of language and the precision of definitions. I was frustrated that "malfeasance" is now defined generically as wrongdoing, rather than a betrayal of position and trust. I have always generally considered a coup d'etat to involve the group that is seizing control. According to Webster's, a coup could just mean that some North Texas University guys who spent too much time at General Walker's decided Kennedy had to go, and therefore ... pulled of a coup. Silly. T.C.

Sorry to be so ambiguious, but my point was that if the three coup plots - JFK/USA, Castro/Cuba and Diem/Vietnam all went down between Oct. 31 - Nov. 2 - and resulted in the assassinatons of Diem, JFK and Castro, within days of each other, or in a simultanious Al Quada style chop off their heads swoosh, then all three would have been recogized as the political crimes they were. I believe Tim Gratz was simply correcting the mischaracterization of the planned date for the Castro coup as being November 1, rather than December 1, as described in Ultimate Sacrifice. I agree with Bill that it seems the authors of Ultimate Sacrifice bought into the same old Roselli-generated cover-up story about Bobby having caused his brother's death. I admit to personally considering Bobby's role to be paramount in any understanding of the anti-Castro dynamics in late 1963. However, I certainly do not believe that "Col. Roselli" of JM/WAVE was working from the same playbook as Bobby. Trying to fathom Bobby's role is like the metaphor of blind men describing an elephant, one feeling the leg and thinking it's a tree, another feeling the tail and thinking it's a snake. He was running numerous compartmentalized Cuban special groups, deliberately keeping participants from knowing the entire scheme, if there was in fact any single overall scheme. The authors of Ultimate Sacrifice felt a certain part of the anatomy and came to their narrow conclusion. Richard Reeves noted about the president, and by extension, his brother: "Kennedy was decisive, though he never made a decision until he had to, and then invariably he chose the most moderate of available options." The peace overtures were still in play at the time of JFK's death, despite what Harry Williams may have believed. T.C.