James Richards

Thanks, Gerry. Lots to absorb there.

The 'Bayo being betrayed' stuff is most interesting indeed.

Cheers,

James

Thanks, Gerry. That is terrific information.

On Izquierdo, do you have a theory as to why there is just so little on him to be sourced? Being a million miles away from Miami, I can't dig there but if you Google him, there is virtually nothing. He was obviously much respected given that the exile community through Gilberto Casanova spent $60,000 on a statue to be displayed in Little Havana.

You also mentioned Manolo Rebozo. I have him solidly connected to Bernard Barker. I also have a photo of them together somewhere which I will try to dig up. Was Rebozo related to Bebe do you know?

Cheers,

James

While researching Tony Izquierdo, I came across this item from 1977; two years before he was killed in Nicaragua. As a Miami resident, the San Antonio angle is curious. I have no more details than what is written so if anyone can fill in the gaps, it would be greatly appreciated.

James

John D. Marks and Victor Marchetti below.

FWIW.

James

Hi Marcel,

The man you have tagged as B is in fact Malcolm Wallace.

Cheers,

James

Hello again, James

Yes, absolutely. O'Hare could have been at the Trade Mart in case plan "B" had to be activated, or..... maybe, just maybe, he WAS with good ole' Rip Robertson in Dealy Plaza the whole time, instead. He DOES kind of look like the guy standing next to the Robertson lookalike at Houston and Main.... And the man walking across the grass with the Robertson lookalike and the very dark-complected man (Izquierdo?) does kind of look like O'Hare as shown in the only confirmed picture of him that I've seen so far (the one that shows him wearing military-like clothes (I think), a cap, and glasses, and he's looking almost straight up into the sky).

Although I've been on this Forum for a short time, I've already come to hold your opinions, theories, and work in very high regard. So, when you say you have a friend who has a photo showing O'Hare from the front and that you've seen this photo and that the man standing next to the Rip Robertson lookalike at Houston and Main very strongly resembles the John Adrian O'Hare in your friend's photograph, that's good enough for me (although I must confess that I'd love to see your friend's photo-- is there a possibility you could borrow it for him and scan it and post it to this Forum?).

I just had a humorous thought-- all of the people who who are still alive and who were involved in assassinating JFK must have really started sweating bullets (pardon the pun) when online research and Internet forums like this one came into existence. I guess the ones who are already dead are turning over in their grave.....

Cheers, Thomas (Thomas Graves)

Hi Thomas,

Thank you for the kind words.

I wish I could post the O'Hare image. In fact, there are several images I wish I could post but for now I will just have to be patient; something I am not too good at. Suffice to say, there are still some unpublished photographs out there which I believe would go a long way to prove conspiracy.

Bishop is a strange bird and I'm sure if he was present in Dealey Plaza, he was never going to admit it. He was reported to have died but there was a suggestion that he actually went to Costa Rica.

FWIW.

James

James

I think I may have who Rip Robertson's friend is - John Adrian O'Hare aka Colonel William Bishop.

The comparison below is not going to convince anyone but it's all I have at the moment. A friend of mine has a good front on photograph of O'Hare and I have to say the resemblance to our man in Dealey Plaza is remarkable.

That aside, O'Hare does makes sense. He was connected to Military Intelligence and was well associated with prominent Cuban exiles like Veciana and Masferrer. He also knew Leopoldo and Angel.

In Dick Russell's 'The Man Who Knew Too Much', Bishop/O'Hare claimed he was waiting at the Trade Mart for Kennedy's arrival when he heard about the shooting. He then proceeded to Parkland hospital. I guess he isn't going to say that he was in Dealey Plaza standing next to Rip Robertson.

Anyway, more food for thought.

James

Hi James,

Interestingly and tellingly, Mr. O'Hare, unlike E. H. Hunt, admitted to at least being in Dallas (and in connection to JFK's visit!) at the time of the assassination.........

Cheers, Thomas

Hi Thomas,

Yes, O'Hare/Col. Bishop claimed he was at the Trade Mart when news came through of the shooting and from there he went to Parkland hospital.

It does make one wonder if Dealey Plaza was aborted for any reason, that assassins may have been positioned at the Trade Mart. The Oswald/Castro frame may well have been discarded in favor of getting the job done swiftly and cleanly.

Also interesting to note in the Roy Hargraves interview printed in Larry Hancock's wonderful book, Hargraves has several individuals being moved around at the time of the assassination. He also claims that handlers like Bishop would always be on the ground with his people. There would be risk and exposure so the hands on people would know they were not being duped.

This aspect I find most curious.

James

1) Identifying the two gentlemen with Maheu has been troubling. Maybe James Richards has some knew ideas. (Tim Carroll)

The original source of what I call the 'Robert Maheu in Las Vegas' photos didn't know who the men were and I have been unable to lock anything in. The guy in the middle of the image posted above is the same guy with Maheu below. To state the obvious, he is obviously someone.

James

Some food for thought.

James

I wonder if Tony Izquierdo could drive a Rambler station wagon...............

FWIW, Thomas

Thomas,

I guess this all comes down to timing. If Izquierdo was positioned in the Dal-Tex building during the shooting, how fast does he make his escape? Does he hook up with Robertson and company back at the corner of Main and Houston, then proceed to just mingle with the crowd hiding in plain sight, or does he make a mad dash out of the Plaza altogether. Given that DCM and TUM were not in a hurry to depart the scene, maybe he too hung around.

His description does loosely fit the driver of the Rambler who picked up Oswald or the Oswald impersonator on Elm. Interesting speculation indeed.

James

Here is a "Large Blow Up" i have been working on, of the carpark image. (Robin Unger)

Good stuff, Robin. Nice work.

What do you make of that activity in the top left corner? Do you see that particular individual potentially as a hatless DPD officer; or could this be someone dressed as a DPD officer? Curious indeed.

James

You may well be right here, Ron. Interesting indeed.

James

Hello again,

I just noticed something else in this photograph-- the man in the foreground in the lower left corner (wearing suit, hat, glasses) looks like he's watching the man who's approaching the Rambler in the upper right hand corner. Could these two guys be Rip Robertson and his "companion?" (Maybe it was a case of "I'll stay here and keep watch while you go over and check out the Rambler to make sure everything's o.k./while you relay info/etc."

FWIW, Thomas (Thomas Graves)

Hi Thomas,

I don't think the guys you have pointed out are the Robertson and O'Hare possibles, but the guy in the dark suit leaning into the vehicle in the top left of frame might well be one of them.

Interesting indeed.

James

The above photo is also? in the Hughes film see the thread (Sharing some new pics and large old pics.) (Robert Howard)

Hi Robert,

Sorry if I have misunderstood you, but are you saying that Jorge Rodriguez Fleites, or at least a man who looks like him appears in the Hughes film?

James

In addition to the Phillips article, here is a very interesting piece by Col. Jack Hawkins. He makes no secret about who he believes was to blame.

James

**************************************

The Bay of Pigs operation was doomed by presidential indecisiveness and lack of commitment.

By JACK HAWKINS

THIRTY-FIVE years ago, 1,500 exiled Cuban patriots landed on the south coast of their country, at the Bay of Pigs, in a gallant effort to free Cuba from Communist rule. They were abandoned on the beach without the supplies, protection, and support that had been promised by their sponsor, the Government of the United States. They had no chance of succeeding in their mission, and nearly all of them were captured or killed.

For 35 years, bound by my oath not to reveal classified information, I kept silent about the fatal errors in judgment that led to this disaster. Now this information is no longer classified, and I believe the facts should be reported.

My involvement with the Cuba Project began during the Eisenhower Administration. In late August of 1960, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Shoup, told me that the CIA had requested the services of a Marine officer to assist in the landing of a small force of Cuban exiles. I had the required experience in amphibious operations, and also in guerrilla warfare (Philippines, 1943), and so he was assigning me to the job. I reported to the CIA on September 1.

At the CIA, I was assigned duty as Chief of the Paramilitary Staff of the Cuba Project, responsible directly to the Chief of the Cuba Project, Mr. Jacob Esterline.

I soon learned that the Cuba Project had been initiated by President Eisenhower in January 1960, when it had become clear that Castro was a Communist bent not only on establishing a Communist state in Cuba but also on subverting other Latin Arnerican countries. President Eisenhower decided that Castro should be overthrown and directed the CIA to prepare plans to that end.

The concept of the operation, developed by the CIA before involved training paramilitary teams of Cuban exiles to be introduced secretly back into their country for purposes of intelligence, sabotage, propaganda, and political and guerrilla activity. Each team would have a radio capable of communicating with the United States. It was planned also to form a small infantry force of 200 to 300 men that could be sent in to augment guerrilla activity fostered by the teams.

The project was flawed from the outset owing to diplomatic/political considerations. The safest and most efficient venues for both training camps and bases of operations would have been in the United States or Puerto Rico. However, the CIA was anxious not to have the operation appear to be run by the United States, and so training camps and airfields were established in Guatemala and Nicaragua, at extremely unsuitable locations. The training camp in Guatemala was located on the side of a remote volcano with very little level ground. Conditions there were extremely crowded and became health-threatening as additional recruits arrived. And from the airfield in Nicaragua chosen for tactical air operations, Cuba was just barely within range of the B-26 bombers procured by the CIA for the exile air force.

If the Cuban forces had been trained here, they could have been ready for action months earlier than they were, an important consideration. While the preparations continued, the Soviet Union was pouring great quantities of arms and other matCriel into Cuba, enabling Castro to organize and equip large militia forces and consolidate his security system for control of the Cuban people. In view of these rapidly growing capabilities, the Deputy Director for Plans at the CIA, Mr. Richard Bissell, decided that the planned infantry force of 200 to 300 would not be large enough; more like 1,500 men would be needed to establish a serious presence in Cuba. I expressed reservations about a force this large in view of the increased difficulties in recruiting, training, and providing support. However, President Eisenhower directed that preparations be made for a larger force.

In late 1960 and early 1961, teams of paramilitary agents were landed in many places on the Cuban coast. Most of the teams established radio communication with the CIA, but some were captured immediately and never heard from again. The surviving teams reported that there were large numbers of men in all provinces of Cuba who were willing to fight against Castro if they were armed. The CIA tried to supply arms and ammunition to some of the teams by nocturnal parachute drops, but without success. The Cuban pilots were not experienced enough for these difficult missions, and our request for permission to use American contract pilots was denied, again so that the U.S. would not appear to be too deeply involved. The only sizable delivery of arms through the efforts of the agent teams was made by sea to a 400-man guerrilla unit operating in the Escambray mountains of central Cuba. About 1,000 guerrillas operated in this area in separate groups for many months.

Soon after President Kennedy's inauguration, Mr. Bissell briefed him about the Cuba Project. The new President was interested and scheduled a series of meetings at the White House involving the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk; the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert McNamara; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer; and Mr. Bissell. Each of these officials brought assistants to these meetings, and I usually accompanied Mr. Bissell.

President Kennedy emphasized that operations would have to be conducted in such a way that U.S. involvement could be "plausibly deniable." This was the fundamental mistake underlying the other fatal errors that led to the failure of the operation. It should have been apparent to all concerned that the recruiting of large numbers of Cubans in Miami, followed by the landing of a well-armed Cuban exile force in Cuba with air support, would be attributed to the United States. If that was held to be unacceptable, the operation should have been canceled; if it was not canceled, it should have received the support required for success. As it was, the Administration neither escaped blame nor succeeded in liberating Cuba.

THE crucial point at issue was air support. Throughout my participation in the Cuba Project, I frequently emphasized, both orally and in formal correspondence, the absolute necessity for complete destruction of the opposing air force at the outset of the operation. In January 1961, in a memorandum to higher CIA authority, I recommended that the landing operation be canceled if sufficient air operations were not to be allowed. In another memorandum in early 1961, I stated flatly that if Castro's aircraft were not all destroyed before the troop transports arrived at the landing beaches, a military disaster would occur. An unarmed freighter cannot approach a hostile shore, drop anchor, and unload troops, supplies, and equipment while under fighter and bomber attack. Mr. Rusk did not seem to grasp this point. At the White House meetings, it became clear that he was unalterably opposed to any air operations whatsoever. To my surprise and chagrin, neither Mr. McNamara nor Gen. Lemnitzer spoke up in these meetings in defense of the necessity of eliminating Castro's air force completely by preliminary air strikes. And so, when the recommendations of the State Department conflicted with those of the CIA, the President usually adopted Mr. Rusk's position.

Absolute control of the air was essential not only for the landing but also for further operations in Cuba. Our Cuban Brigade was small and could not be expected to undertake operations beyond its initial lodgement unless the strength of the opposing militia was seriously reduced by combat losses-or by defection to our side. Many of the militia were of dubious loyalty to Castro and might well have turned against him had this operation been properly launched.

As the spring of 1961 approached, the Brigade, now up to planned strength, and its supporting tactical air force of 16 B-26s were nearing readiness for combat. Commercial freighters were chartered for the operation, four for the assault phase and three for follow-on delivery of supplies. Meanwhile, the time element was becoming critical. The Soviet Union continued delivering arms and equipment to Cuba and was training jet pilots for Castro in Eastern Europe. Soon Castro would have a modern jet air force, and a paramilitary effort to overthrow him would have no chance of success.

After long study, the Paramilitary Staff had concluded that by far the best place, and probably the only place, where a successful landing (i.e., one likely to lead to the overthrow of Castro) could be made was at Trinidad near the middle of the southern coast of Cuba. Good landing beaches were available very near the Escambray mountains, where, as noted above, anti-Castro guerrillas were already operating. The Brigade could quickly establish itself in these mountains and incorporate the guerrillas already there.

Trinidad itself had a population of about 18,000, offering the possibility of recruiting additional volunteers. Our agent teams had informed us that most of the people in the area were opposed to Castro.

The Paramilitary Staff prepared a complete plan for the Trinidad operation, which was presented to the President and his advisors. Mr. Rusk strongly opposed the plan, saying that it was too much like an invasion and too easily attributable to the United States. He thought the Soviet Union might be provoked to the extent of taking action against the United States in Berlin o elsewhere in the world.

Once again, the President agreed with Mr. Rusk. He rejected the Trinidad plan and directed that a plan be developed that would be less noisy and less like an invasion. He also adopted the restriction advanced by Mr. Rusk that an airfield capable of supporting B-26 operations would have to be captured on the first day so that all air operations could be attributed to that field.

This was the first fatal error made by President Kennedy:

Rejecting a plan that offered a good chance of success and placing "plausible deniability" ahead of military viability.

Pursuant to Mr. Bissell's oral instructions to me, the Paramilitary Staff studied the entire coast of Cuba in an effort to find a landing area that would satisfy the President's requirements. We found that the only place on the Cuban coast which did so and could be held even for a minimal time was at the Bahia de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs).

I reported this orally to Mr. Bissell and briefly described the area. Behind the beach lay a long narrow strip of flat, scrub-covered land from three to six miles in depth and forty miles wide. This land was cut off from the interior by a great swamp, impassable except for three narrow causeways approaching the beach from the north and a coastal road from the east, all of which could probably be blocked for a time by the Brigade (and on the other side of the swamp by Castro's militia).

I pointed out to Mr. Bissell that the Brigade could hold on there for only a limited time and would have no hope of breaking out through the swamp and reaching guerrilla country in the Escambray mountains eighty miles away. However, since the Bay of Pigs was the only place that met the President's requirements, Mr. Bissell decided on the spot that we would have to go ahead on that basis. This was another fatal error, as Mr. Bissell later acknowledged, lamenting that he had never informed the President that landing at the Bay of Pigs ruled out the possibility of guerrilla warfare in the Escambray mountains.

Our plan for the Bay of Pigs landing provided for an attack on three Cuban military airfields by 16 B-26 bombers on April 15, the landing itself during darkness in the early morning of April 17, and a second 16-bomber attack against the military airfields at first light on April 17. The President approved the plan and directed that all preparations continue. However, he also stated that he would not finally decide whether to execute the operation until 24 hours before it was scheduled to begin.

Not long after this, the Chief of the Cuba Project, Mr. Esterline, and I had a serious talk about the outlook for the Bay of Pigs operation and found ourselves in complete agreement that it was certain to fail. We went to Mr. Bissell at his home on a Sunday to attempt to dissuade him from continuing with the operation. We even went so far as to say that we did not want to be parties to the disaster we believed lay ahead.

Mr. Bissell tried to reassure us and implored us not to let him down. He said he thought he could persuade the President to permit an increase in our air capability to ensure destruction of Castro's air force. But he gave no assurance about other weaknesses of the plan.

I thought that after hearing unequivocal predictions of complete disaster from his two principal staff officers who were most familiar with the military aspects of the plan, Mr. Bissell would re-examine the whole operation. It had become obvious that the military requirements for a successful operation and the President's insistence on plausible deniability were in irreconcilable conflict. However, Mr. Bissell could not bring himself to give up on the plan. This was another fatal error.

On April 14, devastating instructions me from the White House. The President informed Mr. Bissell that he wanted the number of participating aircraft reduced to the minimum. Mr. Bissell, without consulting Mr. Esterline or me, volunteered to cut the number by half, from 16 to 8 -- although 16 was considered the minimal number for destroying 18 opposing aircraft scattered on three different fields. The President accepted Mr. Bissell's offer. Military failure was now virtually assured.

The attack was carried out the next morning with only eight B-26s, and our fears were confirmed when post-strike photography revealed that half of Castro's military aircraft, including five fighters, had escaped destruction. These posed a deadly threat to the landing and to our B-26s as well.

News of the attack spread rapidly. At the United Nations, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, a leading figure in the Democratic Party, who had not been informed about the operation, denied U.S. involvement. When he learned the truth, he was outraged and protested to the President that this affair was extremely embarrassing both to the President and to him. He was reinforced in that position by Mr. Rusk.

This led the President to make another decision, which made disaster absolutely certain. I was in the CIA operations room at about 10 P.M. on April 16, three hours before the troops were to commence landing, when Mr. Esterline hurried in with an ashen face and told me that the President had canceled the second attack on Castro's air force, the one scheduled for first light the next morning. Appalled, I rushed to the telephone and called Mr. Bissell, who was at the State Department, and urged him in the strongest terms to call the President and explain that the invasion force faced certain destruction unless the order was reversed. I predicted that our troop transports would be under air attack and some or all would be sunk.

After my plea, Mr. Bissell and General C. P. Cabell, the Deputy Director of the CIA, spoke to Mr. Rusk. He telephoned the President, who had left Washington, and told him that the CIA wanted to reinstate the air strike that he believed the decision should be changed. McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor, seconded Rusk's advice. The cancellation remained in effect.

This final incredible mistake doomed Brigade 2506. The President himself had initially approved the original operation plan, which provided for forty B-26 sorties in preliminary air strikes. After his last-minute cuts, only eight sorties were flown, a reduction of 80 per cent.

While Washington floundered, the troops of Brigade 2506 landed successfully in darkness. But when morning came, Castro's fighters and bombers attacked, and they continued to attack all day. Unloading supplies from the ships was impossible. Two ships were sunk, and the remaining two had to flee at top speed.

The Brigade fought hard and well for three days and was not overrun or driven from its position. With their supply ships either sunk or chased away, the troops eventually ran out of ammunition and had to surrender.

During three days of combat, from 3,000 to 4,000 casualties were inflicted upon Castro's hard-core militia, mostly by B-26 attacks on troop convoys. The hard-core militia, the only troops trusted by Castro, were limited in number and could not long have endured casualties of such magnitude.

Before the surrender, Admiral Arleigh "31-knot" Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, requested permission from the President to have carrier aircraft eliminate the rest of Castro's air force and fly cover and support for the Brigade, and to use Navy landing craft to evacuate the troops from the beach. The President refused.

It was noteworthy that when the Brigade landed, the defending militia unit fought little and surrendered quickly. About 150 men were captured, and nearly all volunteered to join the Brigade and fight against Castro. Civilians in the landing area also volunteered to help the Brigade.

THESE facts confirmed that our concept of the operation had merit, and that, if the landing had been made at Trinidad as recommended, and with adequate air support, the objective of overthrowing the Communist government might well have been accomplished.

But, as things turned out, Brigade 2506 was left stranded on the beach, shamefully misled and betrayed by the Government of the United States. The last message from Jose "Pepe" San Roman, the Brigade Commander, was, "How can you people do this to us?"

Less than four months into the Kennedy Administration, the Bay of Pigs fiasco caused the U.S. Government to be perceived as weak, irresolute, and inept. Undoubtedly, Chairman Khrushchev was reassured that he had little to fear from the United States as he pressed on with his plans to turn Cuba into a Soviet armed camp.

If those plans had been aborted at the outset, there would have been no missile crisis bringing us to the brink of nuclear war, and Cuba would be a free and prosperous country today.

Jack Hawkins is a retired colonel in the United States Marine Corps.

Thomas and John,

Some time back, I pointed out that the vehicle in question is indeed is a 1959 Rambler. The man in the dark suit leaning into the other vehicle in the top left of frame and the hatless DPD officer is certainly suspicious in my book.

The Jim Murray photograph that shows the Rambler on Elm and a man strolling down the knoll toward the footpath was snapped 10 minutes after the shooting. I guess if we can lock in a time when the image in the parking lot was taken, then we might be able to determine if there is a chance that these cars are one in the same.

Cheers,

James

In the interview Roy Hargraves gave to Noel Twyman, it was mentioned that De Torres had relocated to Chile.

FWIW.

James

Thanks, Lee.

My Spanish is pretty good and that article interested me greatly. I came across it some time back and then tried to hunt that photo which was mentioned down. I wasn't able to find that one but was successful in finding another image of Izquierdo which was owned by a private collector who would not allow me to copy it.

The article mentions that one of the men Izquierdo was photographed with was one Joe Rodrigues Fleitas. This is in fact Jorge Rodriguez Fleites. He was one of the Fort Benning Cubans who graduated with the likes of Luis Posada Carriles, Felix Rodriguez and Jose 'Yayo' Varona. (see below)

'Quijote' I believe is someone who needs to be identified and an important clue.

What I did find curious was Izquierdo's close relationship to Manuel Artime before their defections. Lots of possible connections to ponder there.

James

James,

That version seems a bit different than 'Nightwatch' where Phillips seems to remove the blame from Kennedy.

- lee

Hi Lee,

I believe that article was published in the Miami Herald in April of 1986.

James

Here's an interesting piece penned by Phillips in the mid 1980's.

FWIW.

James

*********************************

The Bay of Pigs revisited—25 years later

By David Atlee Phillips

Twenty-five years ago today the worst cover-action fiasco in American history occurred when a brigade of CIA-sponsored Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs.

The memory of that day haunts me because I was one of the CIA officers who planned the operation. But I recall more vividly and painfully the 19th of April, 1961, when after two days we knew the defeat was beyond salvage. In Washington we listened to the final radio report from the Cuban commander on the beach. His invasion force of 1,400 Cuban exiles had been routed. He reported that he was standing in the shallows, that he was about to abandon his gear and head for the swamp.

Then he cursed the U.S. government, and he cursed us as individuals.

The question about the Bay of Pigs most frequently asked—particularly by those who were young or not even born at the time—is a simple one: Why did it fail?

There is no simple, single answer.

Some history should be set straight. It has often been argued that the root cause for the disaster was that the CIA promised President Eisenhower and, after his inauguration, President John Kennedy, that a spontaneous uprising would be sparked in Cuba by the landing at the Bay of Pigs. That has become a durable myth; but it is a myth.

The Bay of Pigs operational plan was based on the 1954 successful covert action, in which I was also involved, that led to the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala. No one in a responsible position ever contemplated a sudden victory in the Guatemalan endeavor. And it didn’t occur until enough Guatemalans were convinced the invading army was well entrenched the time had arrived to hop on the bandwagon. Nor, in the Cuban operation, did anyone from the lowest operator to CIA Director Allen Dulles believe that immediate uprisings would topple the charismatic Fidel Castro.

Then why did it fail? For the first few years after the Bay of Pigs my observation were too subjective to be trusted. In 1975, however, I mustered as much objectivity as I could to list four principal reasons for the failure:

First, the successful argument made to President Kennedy by his political advisers that the CIA’s original plan to land at a small town called Trinidad near Cuban mountains would make the operation unacceptably "noisy"; thus the change to the isolated, swampy landing site at the Bay of Pigs.

Next, Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson was not thoroughly informed of pre-invasion air strikes against Cuba, CIA sorties by exile pilots who claimed they were defecting from the Castro’s air force. Stevenson was understandably incensed after he denied charges by Cuba’s foreign minister that the planes were on CIA-supported missions. His protest to Kennedy, who admired him, might have been critical in the decision to truncate the operation.

Then, those of us within CIA—including Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, the senior acting officer of the operation—should have ignored the agency’s "can-do" and "good-soldier" tradition and told the White House that an operation of the dimensions of the Bay of Pigs, if to be conducted at all, should be managed openly by the Pentagon and not by a secret army.

Finally, the decision by President Kennedy to cancel at zero hour the air cover that the 1,400 Cuban exiles in the amphibious force had been promised.

Now, after pondering the sad event for another decade, I must add a fifth element to the list of reasons the Bay of Pigs operation failed: There was a tacit assumption among those concerned with the operation in CIA—an assumption that hardened into certainty by D-Day—that John Kennedy would bail out CIA if things went awry.

Everyone, including Richard Bissell and Allen Dulles, believed deep down that Kennedy would rescue the operation with U.S. armed forces if need be. There had to be some sort of overt military option ready in the wings if defeat loomed. (Surely Eisenhower would have had one in reserve and used it.) But there was no contingency plan in fact or in Kennedy’s mindset. Those involved in the project, from top to bottom, ignored an intelligence basic: Don’t assume; know.

For those who demand a simple explanation of the Bay of Pigs debacle and for those who will not entertain the thesis that there was sufficient blame to share among everyone concerned, perhaps the curious incident of Fidel Castro’s not making a speech should be recalled.

In a crowded press conference, one of the first American newsmen to visit Havana after the Bay of Pigs asked Castro, "Why did the Americans fail?" Everyone expected one of Castro’s customary lengthy political diatribes. Instead, Castro shrugged and replied, simply, "They had no air support."

Years after the event, a man who had worked with me on the project explained what he had decided about the Bay of Pigs. ""t was inevitable," he said . "The fiasco, I mean. The disaster. If it hadn’t been the Bay of Pigs it would have been something else sometime in the future. In 1953 Kermit Roosevelt and a few fellows manipulated that crowd that toppled Mossadegh in Iran without any trouble at all. Then in 1954 we took care of Eisenhower’s little problem in Guatemala. So easy, it seemed. All those successes just had to lead to a failure eventually, because the system kept calling on us for more and more even when it should have been obvious that secret shenanigans couldn’t do what armies are supposed to do.

"If it hadn’t been that time at the Bay of Pigs," he concluded, "it would have been somewhere else at some other time."

We didn’t call them that in 1961, but the exiles stranded on the beach at the Bay of Pigs were our contras. We should have scrapped the operation or, once committed to it, followed through with enough support that our contras would never have only one option of heading for the swamp.

As a curiosity, Fidel Castro liked to drink Coke-a-Cola.

James

Tim, any remark I may have made about photos of Ferrie and Sturgis would have been

incorrect and a result of posting too late in the day. My statement about having seen photos

of Ferrie and De Joeseph stands. Hopefully this will clarifiy my posts and that's

about all I can say to the subject. Anyone can may further mystery out of it if they wish.

-- Larry

Larry is right. Photos of Ferrie and Larry DeJoseph do exist as I have copies of them. I do not have permission to post them.

James

Just to add to Tim's collection.

James

James,

Shackley is a possibility, but I've never seen him in a photo without his glasses, which suggests that he needed them to see.

If you look at the part of the man's head that's visible on page 12 in TKOAP, the hair is a very close match to Shackley's hair in the photo you posted.

Ron

Ron,

There is a photo of Shackley as a very young man not wearing glasses. (see below) Were contact lenses around back then do you know?

The hairline is something that caught my attention also.

James

This fellow standing right below Lamppost Man in the Willis photo has always intrigued me. He must be a lookalike. The question is, who does he look like. (Ron Ecker)

Ted Shackley without his thick rimmed glasses?

James

Hi Ron,

McKnight also authored the excellent book, 'The Last Crusade', which primarily looked at how the FBI subverted Martin Luther King's ideals and political goals.

FWIW.

James