Larry Hancock

David, I think your point is very accurate - and very real. I've spoken to DPD members and a lot of other folks in Dallas who realized that "the fix was in" quite quickly - say within 48 hours. That applies to certain of the statements from the fellows on the fifth floor and perhaps most obviously to the sudden disappearance of remarks from the TSBD manager who was quoted on the first day as having seen Oswald in the entry way around the time of the shooting. Heck, even senior DPD officers knew and later commented that the fix was in - direct from D.C. I'm not sure Oswald was that close to anybody who would have risked their job, their future in Dallas and maybe even more to move against the entire official story that was so quickly set in place. Still, some stubbornly tried. Last week I listened to Buell Frasier say again that the Oswald he knew was not the Oswald that was written and talked about so widely and that he still couldn't believe he had killed the President.

Terry, actually the Joint Chiefs first issued a general forces alert and then followed that up in about an hour with an actual elevation of one level of the overall DefCon defense condition status. Of course that would have been way too late in the event that the assassination had truly been a chain of command strike. Beyond that, certain senior commanders had the authority to actually move all or elements of their commands to even higher levels. SAC appears to have done that with its ICBM forces, CINCPAC did it with Naval forces in the western pacific and in Germany the commander moved the Army forces to an elevated state of alert. On a side note, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs also moved local military forces in the DC area to a higher state of alert although he never provided any details of exactly what that involved or why he had done so...

Robert, you may not be aware of it but Lovelady was wearing the long sleeved shirt in the photo Ray posted previously in this thread - not a short sleeved shirt. There are also very clear photos of him both in front of the building and in the sheriff's office afterwards in that same shirt. Hopefully you have reviewed the threads which were suggested to you earlier but I have to join in with Ray and urge you to do so if you have not, the photo record of high quality images extending to the sheriff's office is solid and credible.

Well Johnson sure wasn't, within a relatively short period of time he dismissed all the military aides JFK had and did away with the individual aide system, he replaced two Generals and a Navy Captain with a single major and that was an officer whose experience had been as Johnson's pilot. He took great pleasure in reducing service access to the President and it wouldn't be long before he started cussing out the Joint Chiefs in meetings. The early part of the process is described in a book by White House Military Officer Bill Gulley, titled Breaking Cover....Bill Kelly recommended it to me and if you want some real inside scoop on how military affairs worked from that point on I would certainly recommend it...

The Majors, Colonels and Navy Commanders who were in and communicating though the Situation Room are identified on the transcript available at Bill's web site. http://jfkcountercoup.blogspot.com/2013/11/combined-air-force-one-radio-tapes.html The Generals I'm aware of were on the Air Force One aircraft and were Presidential aides....those are also identified. Bill may have some other Generals in mind as well....

The short answer is no....actually Johnson himself pushed for a Texas Court of Inquiry held under authority of the State AG. Its pretty clear he expected it simply to validate the FBI report. When it became obvious that there was broad push back to the idea of no national investigation he moved to a fall back position. In sequence, his first solution was to simply accept the FBI report, the second to let Texas run an inquiry and endorse the FBI report. Ultimately he was forced to create a Presidential Commission - which was still intended to endorse the FBI report. One of the fundamental problems with that was that the FBI report had been so rushed that its shooting scenario was flawed (based on the Teague injury among other things) and had to be replaced with another solution. In doing so the WC virtually ignored the discrepancies with the FBI report.

Nagell is a tough source to deal with, requires a lot of work ...but certain of his items, such as Oswald's unknown exile contacts pushing him towards some action back east in September can be corroborated by Oswald's letters to CPUSA and SWP about moving back there and about even potentially going "underground". That was a level of self "set up" far beyond his FPCC leafleting.

Bill, we had a good deal of interest and a group discussion which lasted about half an hour. Basically we covered all the areas where we know there are missing conversations as well as the likely possibility that that there were secure voice conversations that are missing. We also covered the issue of multiple edits to the tape - all the basics. Most of the folks were not aware of the 2012 find so all in all it was a good way to raise interest in one more area where the official record has been intentionally altered - just like with the Hoover/Johnson tape conversation erasure.

Brad, the ARRB had a separate group covering military and related records, when you get the Lancer CD you will find their internal mems, correspondance etc. Doug Horne was not involved in that area or with their interviews or records collections on the 112th MIG. The ARRB interview with Prouty definitely explores the subject of his comments on the use of the military in presidential security.

Files most recent - like every November - visibility has been going on for a couple of weeks already. Tis the season....sigh

Brad, probably the best source for how that story emerged is in Prouty's extended interview with the ARRB. That may be online but if not it and a detailed study of the 112th itself, its work, who commanded when etc as well as the ARRB interview and the response to it is available from JFK Lancer on my CD, Keys to the Conspiracy. All the primary documents are there including all the ARRB interviews with former 112th personnel including those from their Dallas field office. It was something both the HSCA and later the ARRB paid a lot of attention to. I've talked with other people who were stationed at the Fort Worth base who have told me that gossip about the "stand down" was in circulation in the officers club and possibly other places - but only after the fact. In addition, you might check out the documents on the Secret Service planning for the motorcade in which they specifically do not request either assistance from the sheriff's department nor the military. While military units did occasionally provide security, the records show that was primarily on bases or in instances where major metropolitan police forces were not available. I think its nailed down pretty well with what you find on the CD and with Prouty's interview but you should be able to make your own call with what;s available.

Cliff, I wish you well....hopefully will turn your research into a monograph or extended essay on the use of Bundy, his dialog with Johnson and how that all pulled the lone assassin cover up together. I promise that when you do I'll be eager to read it. I've given my own scenario of how the Lone Nut thing evolved already but I'm always open to alternatives.

Paul, the call about LeMay that you refer to was a call from his aide to SAM control, advising them that LeMay was in transit and trying to get in touch with him. His aide was in DC, not on any aircraft. SAM control (where the tape's were recorded) handled all the VIP aircraft flights and was in communications with Air Force One, the Cabinet plane and would routinely been in communication with other aircraft - but as you can see from the transcript, the SAM communications staff had little time to spare for anything else. The confusion about LeMay's travel primarily relates to what aircraft he was on when - there appears to have been a small jet dispatched by SAM - and of course which airfield he actually landed out and where he went at that point. Personally I think he likely that he might have gone to Bethesda. Of course he should have gone to the Pentagon where McNamara should have been as well but nobody very much was doing what their actual duties should have required at that point. As I recall the matter is further muddied up by his biographers who relate his being on vacation but only arriving back in DC in time for the funeral.

The Joint Chiefs only real authority and role as of 1963 was to offer advice to the President and SecDef. The Chiefs did have their own organization to perform staff studies such as strategic balance assessment and they also had support groups that were formed to do logistics - but in later decades crossed way over that line into operations (Oliver North only being one example). The Chiefs also had resources for quick intelligence studies....some were done real time during the missile crisis. LeMay certainly pushed for an immediate military response to the missile crisis, but he did so in meetings with the President. He pushed so hard JFK considered him insubordinate. But technically, on Nov. 22, other than offering advice the Chiefs only functional role was to communicate (through the National Military Command Center) alerts, warnings, and defense condition messages to the actual military commands. In the case of strategic nuclear action they were only to relay commands from National Command Authority ie. the SecDef or President. However, Eisenhower had set certain practices in place, continued for decades, allowing major commanders to initiate first nuclear defensive response if the chain of command was broken and Natl Command Authority could not be contacted - and a nuclear attack was obviously in progress. So, any of the Chiefs or the Chiefs as a body, could recommend and push for any level of military action but they could not command it themselves. They also held command authority with the actual service commands, they held no release codes and more importantly no NCA identification codes which only the President and SecDef held. Now of course all that is simply the protocol and anyone can think of ways the system could have been bypassed in the event of a true military coup, occurring during a security crisis. Probably the quickest and easiest way that could have happened in 1963 was for them to contact Johnson in the air, convince him the nation was under attack (with McNamara tied up in another room) and scare Johnson into issuing the orders they wanted. His military record gives plenty of evidence that Johnson himself was a coward under fire, as does his behavior in 1963. However, there is no evidence that anyone tried to push McNamara into a heavier military response or even tried to contact Johnson at all. Manchester writes of the Chairman wondering of Johnson even had the bomb bag...but doing nothing to find out. Also, based on what we have in the tapes, SAC and SAC command were not in direct communication with Johnson or he with they...a major oversight. Now whether all that is as inept as it sounds - without answering the outstanding questions about AF1 communications traffic, we just don't know. I wills ay that based on the rest of my studies, if it was as bad as it sounds it surely was not the last time...

I could provide a list of the places that should have held meeting records, what we have for the Chiefs and SecDef are nothing more than their calendars for that day which primarily focused on an extended meeting with German Military staff over the just ending major deployment exercise in Western Europe. Officially the Chiefs actually remained in that meeting after the assassination other than for a couple of brief sessions with McNamara, one of which led to the issuance of the DefCon elevation. Other than that I'm told by all the service historians that there were no studies and that the only true record would have been the logs maintained in the various command centers and headquarters, all of which are routinely destroyed after a set period. That leaves you with oral history and Manchester did a bit of that with the head of the Joint Chiefs and McNamara....but actually very light on their activities as compared to his detailed work on the Secret Service, White House staff etc. All of which leaves room to look for biographies, autobiographies etc for the Chiefs and other staff officers. A short note on LeMay, although we are all interested in him, he was not in a command position that day, but rather strictly staff. If the actual SAC commander or any one of some half a dozen other major commanders had declared an attack on US forces to be in progress they could have elevated their condition and done everything except launch a full nuclear retaliation - Officially the only two people who could have given that order were Johnson and McNamara. But with what we have learned about predelegated release authority in recent years, (predesignated) major force commanders could have done that as well. We know that both SAC and CINCPAC did "surge" ready forces including ships and planes and SAC apparently moved their missile forces up to launch condition. And on another side note, we know that Johnson had no idea of the release codes or how to use them, the officer who had them was separated from him for some time and there is no discussion of whether McNamara even took the time to call for his set of codes. We also know that the Joint Chief's chairman alerted local Army forces in DC and raised their alert level and we have an oral history which suggests an Army unit at Fort Bliss was alerted and organized units to move to Dallas, although that was cancelled by early evening.

David, it was just that question that caused me to spend an extra two years to learn more about the national command protocols, communications practices and ultimately to compare the crisis response of not only the Chiefs but the National Command Authority and major military commands during major security events from 1941 to 2014. Although that was quite a slog, it was certainly was educational and it will all be contained in a new book (tentatively titled Surprise Attack) that should be out in the Fall of 2015. Its another 400 plus page effort on the order of Shadow Warfare so it won't be a light read by any standard. As you know, I do explore the areas you mentioned in chapter 15 of SWHT - to the extent that the frustratingly lacking military record allows. I've also spent time working with Larry Haapenan who has studied the military response for some 30 years - he did the earliest work on Silver Dollar and the mystery of its communications to a base outside Fort Worth on November 22. I think by now its safe to say that we know what should have happened in terms of communication and command, not only at the National Military Command Center, with Johnson and McNamara, with the Chiefs (although by that point the Chiefs had been moved into a relatively secondary role in strategic command authority, based on JFK's concerns about what had gone down during the Cuban missile crisis). Actually the individual commands had more authority to respond in the event of a true attack on the US than the Chiefs - who were expected to simply pass orders from the National Command Authority i.e. President and SecDef. One of the reasons that the holes in AF1 communications are so important is that based on the official record nobody did what should have been standard protocol and neither McNamara, the Chiefs, nor Johnson's military aides performed as would have been expected....and there was no subsequent staff study of the failures comparable to the study done on the Secret Service. We can say at this point that the elevation of the Defense Condition alert was relatively slow; but then again no incoming threats were identified and tracked and there were no reports of attacks overseas or at other points that would have been leading indicators of a Soviet preemptive strike. It is also true certain commands and command levels were authorized to independently elevate their readiness beyond the DefCon condition orders - and several did so, including SAC, Commander in Chief Pacific and the Army commander in Germany. Given that the elimination of the President and Vice President was assumed as basic to a surprise first strike, in retrospect it appears that the Chiefs and especially McNamara were very slow to respond and that communication with Johnson was very lacking. Whether it was better than it seems and has been covered up by tape edits and lies about the lack of security voice circuits is an open question. Whether it reveals an immense personal failure on Johnson's part is another. I will say that for perspective my forth coming book digs into that specific question in regard to all the presidents who have faced national security emergencies. All of which is a long winded answer to say the subject of your questions has been very much on my mind for some time now.

OK Cliff, lets walk though this again and you can point out what I've missed, its pretty complex so perhaps I did miss something. The following is a link to the Salandria article: http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=4269&relPageId=12 On White: The Salandria article linked above quotes White as saying that there was a tape recording of communications to AF 1 and the Cabinet plane. Then it quotes from his book saying that on the flight back people learned there was no conspiracy, of Oswald and his arrest… It does not state how that happened, it just says people learned. It says nothing specific about a Bundy call to Johnson or vice versa for that matter. There has been speculation that either “people” in general or Johnson specifically got that news from a radio call from Bundy in the situation room, does White specifically state that and say it came from Bundy? The only other source we have on how people heard such information is from Manchester - who said that only those listening to broadcast TV news heard about the arrest, etc. On Salinger: He confirmed there was a transcript of the taped communication with the Cabinet plane…that’s it...he had that but nothing pertaining to communications with Air Force 1 So, both men confirmed that communications was being taped, White stated that people on the plane heard news about the arrest, Oswald etc. Salinger was on the Cabinet plane so of course he had no direct knowledge of communications on Air Force One. The same is true for the other State Dept individual on the Cabinet plane, who separately confirmed that communications had been taped. On Roberts: His information is actually the most interesting since he sources it to a personal talk with Bundy….as I mentioned earlier, I’m not blowing him off, I’m just pointing out that none of what we now have in the tapes, Manchester’s writing and Bundy’s notes confirms that information so it remains an open question. ....but then lets take it a step further. There is no argument that people on both planes had access to information coming in over the news wires and in AF 1 to broadcast TV coverage. So anyone following that did learn of Oswald's arrest, of his Russian connections and anything else coming from the media. So it seems what we are talking about is some information provided from Bundy to Johnson which would have assured him there was no concern about the Russians and absolutely nothing suggesting any sort of conspiracy, Oswald was a lone nut and that was all there was to it - no need for anything but to make sure that people didn't jump to the wrong conclusions. Do I understand correctly that is what you would expect us to find in the original tapes or is there more....and I'm not saying it was not on the original tape either.

We know that the Cabinet plane was receiving the wire service feed and reading it, that is mentioned on the tape. We also know they asked the Situation Room to also repeat information to them and there are several early instances of the Situation Room literally reading information off the services or repeating it off TV to them. Most of that is earlier in the afternoon and I have seen no mention of Oswald's capture in that but perhaps I missed it. It seems safe to say the Cabinet plane did get the wire service reports of a suspect's capture and of Oswald being named and his Russian connection. But we also know that the wire services carried conflicting information....Manchester specifically talks about the the specific wire service story about the President being shot from the front of the limo. It might be an interesting research story to see how many wire service/broadcast TV items suggested multiple shooters or indications of conspiracy. Certainly there were reports of multiple weapons recovered. Beyond that we know from Manchester that the people on AF I were watching broadcast TV and heard of the suspect's arrest, Oswald, etc. Again if would be interesting if any of the wire service or broadcasts referred to a lone assassin or single assassin and how early that happened. What we don't know for certain is who Johnson might have talked to from the plane about a conspiracy (Bundy or others such as perhaps Hoover), whether he did it on an open circuit and that has been erased from the tape or whether he did it on a secure circuit that would not be recorded - and everybody lied about no such circuits existing. So for starters we know people on both aircraft did hear about the arrest and about Oswald being in custody. We also know, anecdotally, that Johnson continued to talk about Russian involvement that afternoon and privately about conspiracy for the next several days and even longer. We know that Hoover pitched indications of conspiracy to him Saturday morning, also told him they had a very weak case against Oswald on both Saturday morning to Johnson's aide Jenkins on Sunday morning. I have no definite opinion on who started the "lone nut" , no conspiracy, Oswald alone pitch - but it appears certain, based on calls to Dallas from DC and the rewrite of the charges against Oswald, that it was in play from Johnson and his people by Friday night.

Very possibly Cliff, as long as we understand street smarts are handy for investigators but in the end even they have to come up with some facts that will convince a DA to take a case to court. At this point all I'm trying to do is present the range of what is known about the subject....everybody is free to apply their own smarts and take themselves where they want to go. I've already written two books about where I think it all goes so I've no need to keep repeating my own theory (street smart or not). And to be clear, I'm not at all suggesting anybody should walk away from the subject, I'm spending time on it and will continue to do so. I'm just trying to get straight what we do know from multiple sources and what parts of it can be corroborated. If I were trying to walk away from it I would certainly not be investing time here, working with Bill and even holding a roundtable on it at this weeks conference. In no way am I trying to stifle it, actually just the opposite.

Cliff, I'm aware of that source but we simply cannot confirm that from the actual tape of the calls, nor do we have a time stamp for such a discussion with Johnson. Nothing like that was in Bundy's notes on the call nor his description to Manchester of what Johnson talked about in the one call we know of....that certainly doesn't mean the remarks were not made but we cannot corroborate it. I've talked this over with Bill Kelly this morning and he agrees that based on the factual information we just can't absolutely confirm the Bundy "lone assassin, no conspiracy" call story based what is currently known. He agrees with my other comments on the additional sources in that they really just confirm that a) there was a tape made and in regard to the Cabinet plane the two sources on that are clearly referring to wire service info coming over the radio to the plane and wire service information being read to it from the Situation Room. (since Bill is monitoring this he can of course comment if I misunderstood). I'm more than eager to know what Johnson did talk about to Bundy, in a number of areas including the discussion of the oath of office....which Johnson pretty clearly lied about. But at this point I'm just not comfortable with basing any large scale theory on what Bundy told Johnson on the one call we know of...and of course it was Johnson calling Bundy, not any special call from Bundy to Johnson. I realize that my relatively hard nosed view of such matters is not shared by everyone but my inclination is to document what we do know and let everyone take it for just that. That's one reason I contacted Bill this morning and asked him to slap me around if he thought there was stronger support for the Bundy lone assassin call than I was representing - he agreed that my analysis was correct based on what factual information is available now - but we also both agreed that there seems to be plenty on that original tape that Johnson very much wanted to disappear from the historical record and that is very suspicious on many levels. Just as much as the tape erasure of the Hoover call to Johnson the following morning, which has been factually confirmed. In that regard it should be noted that on Saturday morning Hoover was evidently providing Johnson with evidence of a conspiracy in and around Oswald and Johnson simply made no response - well actually he probably did but the rest of the conversation has been erased and the extant transcript is way short of the actual call. I should also note that both Bill and I (he much more than I actually) have been pursuing this story for some time including talking with individuals involved with the actual Air Force One communications; I had one such dialog myself for about two hours a week or so ago. I certainly still consider it an open issue.

He was inside the last two years, not currently sure of if he still is....

Malcolm, I agree that Johnson's behavior during the first 24 hours is indeed hard to fathom; I felt suspicious enough to present an argument in SWHT that he at least had some minimal foreknowledge of something targeted against JFK. Beyond that there is literally no doubt that he was the prime driver in suppressing a broad based conspiracy investigation and in supporting the cover up of actual evidence suggesting conspiracy. Others have made those arguments, Doug Horne does a good job of that and I offer evidence for that in SWHT. I do have to admit at this point - after doing several years of research and just finishing a new book on the subject - that Johnson's incredible failures to assume his role as Commander in Chief during a National Security crisis are far from unique. I examine that in considerable detail in my upcoming book and it perhaps minimizes one the areas I thought suspicious. The others remain. Manchester is probably the best reference on the flight back, I'd also refer you to the Air Force One articles on Bill Kelley's counterpoint blog -- Larry

Paul, indeed somebody was worried about what might have been caught on the clear transmissions....and since there is nothing especially significant from a national security standpoint in the transcript we have, it certainly raises some questions. I will say this though, as part of a new book coming out next year, I spent a great deal of time researching Air Force One communications and protocols during several national security emergencies from 1963 to the present. I've talked and communicated with people who were involved with communications on 1963 and there is an understandable caution in giving out details about certain aspects of the planes communications - which proved to be very ineffective on a number of occasions. But there is no sign that in the other incidents anybody was concerned about what hams or others might have intercepted - including the fact that military radio hobbyists monitored AF1 on 9/11 and came up with some extremely embarrassing observations from traffic off that flight. All of which makes me suspect that back in 1963 it was Johnson himself, clearly technically and communications clueless, who became very concerned about some to the calls he had made and things he had said when he came to realize that there were records of them. Unlike JFK, Johnson was not a man who wanted his true actions visible to history....

Malcolm, thanks for posting the Angel piece. I had read it but I need to caution readers that to me this is largely a "theater" piece, the sort of thing that would have been written by a Johnson publicist - or apologist in earlier times. To be clear on this point, it represents Johnson as being efficient, effective and in full control in his new role - which he was not - and totally avoids all the issues of national command authority and exercise of Commander in Chief responsibilities which should have been his first responsibility but which he totally ignored. Its a good example of how writing can be accurate in regard to what is discussed but woefully inaccurate related to what is left out. I would also challenge his statement that "LBJ also talked to McGeorge Bundy directly throughout the flight, attending to what seemed to be a growing list of matters of state. Johnson was hungry for details of the unfolding assassination investigation. Half an hour after takeoff, word had come that a Dallas policeman, J.D. Tippitt, was dead. Then word that the suspected assassin was in custody, some guy named Lee Harvey Oswald. Who was he? The FBI implied he had ties to Russia. Was this a larger plot?" While several points in the article are based on factual information from the tape/transcript, this is not - unless he has something nobody else has - and indeed it contradicts Manchester's research and writing. There is no evidence of more than one Johnson/Bundy phone conversation and no concrete proof of what was discussed in that other than what Manchester relates from his discussion with Bundy and Bundy's notes. Certainly Johnson was initially interested in information about what was going on and spent a good deal of time watching the TV news broadcast. The rest of the author's comment is pure speculation, again unless he has a new source which he does not cite. So, interesting background but it needs to be read along with Manchester's much more detailed discussion of the flight and with an understanding that it is a very nice but incomplete piece of writing.

Paul, Manchester writes that when Johnson was advised their was a phone he could use on AF One (ponder for a moment that the new Commander in Chief who might be facing a Soviet preemptive strike doesn't even know if the plane has a darn phone or anything at all about nuclear release codes) he immediately made calls to RFK, to Jenkins and to Bundy. He suggests it was in that order but had no way to prove that....in reality we have no absolute list of the calls Johnson made much less the sequence. Manchester relates that the calls to RFK and Bundy focused on the issue of returning to Washington and of taking the oath in Dallas. He appears to have gotten that from Bundy and Bundy's notes. On page 272 Manchester notes that the first three calls were to RFK, Jenkins and Bundy - none of those calls show on the currently available tape / transcript. We also need to remember that Manchester was writing on his manuscript for months before he was allowed to review the edited tape transcript.