Roger Odisio

Yeah, Bundy knew that for a fact, Cliff.

I think we can be more assertive, Jeff. If you know anything about Kennedy's view of a war in SE Asia, developed in particular after he went there, and the thorough process he went through to produce 263, and I think you do, it's clear he was not going to sign 273. Johnson and Bundy knew it too 273 was not written for Kennedy's signature. It was to replace Kennedy's policy with Johnson's. Johnson later admitted to McNamara that he never agreed with Kennedy's decision to withdraw, but he kept his mouth shut. So, why was the draft of 273 written before Kennedy was murdered? It doesn't take a genius to conclude that Johnson and Bundy did not expect Kennedy to return from Dallas.

Vince Salandria first came across the message to Air Force One, which, btw, was also sent to the Cabinet Plane on its way back from Hawaii, from reading Theodore White's Making of the President, 1964. According to Salandria, White wrote that the presidential party "learned that there was no conspiracy, learned of the identity of Oswald and his arrest". He contacted both White and Pierre Salinger who wrote about it in his book, With Kennedy. Salinger contacted NARA and tried to get the message for Salandria, but surprise! it had disappeared. Undaunted, Salandria contacted the White House Communications Agency and was rebuffed with the response: the logs and tapes of radio transmissions "...are kept for official use only. These tapes are not releasable, nor are they obtainable from commercial sources." Even though White and probably Salinger had seen them. This was in 1968. The contents of the messages also was confirmed by Robert Manning, Kennedy's Asst Sec of State for Public Affairs in 1993, who was on AF One. This info is from Salandria's speech at the 1998 COPA conference, False Mystery Concealing a State Crime. He goes on to explain the message, and its worth repeating: what those on the plane "had heard, smelled and seen was of no consequence. The patsy had been selected, and the conclusion of conspiracy ruled out. Bundy was indirectly instructing the presidential party and the cabinet members that he was speaking for the killers. He was telling them that what they had observed in Dealey Plaza was merely evidence, and that the needs of the state rose above evidence....They were being circuitously informed that the assassination had been committed by a level of US power that was above and beyond punishment." IOW, don't interfere. There is no confusion about the content of the message. In his speech, Salandria tells of a speech he gave in 1971 about Bundy, hoping that Bundy would sue him. He didn't. Salandria's opinion of Bundy may have been formed without even knowing about Bundy's role in rewriting NSAM 263 while Kennedy was still alive. Yes, this is important and I'm a little perturbed more people here haven't responded to it.

When Salandria said he knew Kennedy was murdered by the top echelons of his own government, he fingered Bundy as a likely participant. I thought that was based primarily on Bundy running the White House situation room at the time of the murder, and sending a message to Air Force One on the way back from Dallas that the lone assassin had been arrested. Something no one could have possibly known at the time. The message to the plane was part of the process to frame Oswald that began right away. The officials on the plane were a prime target to be convinced that the murder had already been solved and to stay out of the way no matter what you think you saw in Dallas. A message so quickly disseminated without even a pretense of gathering facts to support it is an indication it was planned in advance of the murder. Now add in the story of Bundy drafting a reversal of Vietnam policy that suits Johnson's views, not Kennedy's, before Kennedy was dead. It's another element to support Salandria's view.

Jeff, we don't need to look for an indication Kennedy knew about or had requested 273. He didn't. You have clearly set out the reversal of Kennedy's policy that 273 was. Kennedy views on war in SE Asia were developed over decades. Before 263, he had spent concentrated time developing the policy in it with the advisers he trusted. 263 was signed October 11. Bundy's draft of 273 was started one day before Kennedy was murdered. Johnson signed it one day after Kennedy was buried. It is impossible to believe that in the time between Oct. 11 and Nov. 21 Kennedy would have so completely changed his mind, and without consulting those advisors, unilaterally ordered a policy reversal. A new policy in 273, that happens to be in line with Johnson's views (LBJ later told McNamara he never agreed with JFK on Vietnam but kept this mouth shut). "It is not known why or under what direction McGeorge Bundy initiated the draft [of 273 on] November 21, 1963." Those are the key questions aren't they? Why start writing the draft while JFK was still alive? They had to know he wouldn't sign it. Who ordered it? If you believe that Vietnam policy was a key reason JFK was murdered, is it too much to suggest that the answers to those questions are likely to lead to the planners of the murder? That reversal of 263 was part of the plan from the start.

Yes, LBJ's picking the 7 great Americans to front the WC, which hired a bunch of lawyers to cherry pick, distort, and ignore evidence in order to frame Oswald was a straightforward appeal to authority. Vince Salandria came to believe that the WR story was intentionally riddled with holes, which over time would be realized. It was intentional because the murderers *wanted* people to figure out what they had done. The message: Yes, we have done it, we're in control, and there is nothing you can do about it. In part, Salandria's thought came about because he himself was so quick to realize what had happened. The weekend of the murder he was telling his brother in law, if they kill Oswald, we will know who is behind it. He focused on the "upper echolons" of JFK's own government. 35 years after the murder in a famous speech, he was imploring researchers to stop inspecting the endless rabbit holes the murderers had laid out for them and try to finish off the details of what we already know about what happened. His words are still largely ignored today.

So what do you make of the fact that the draft that became 273 was started while Kennedy was still alive. It's obvious Kennedy had no part in it, didn't know about it. He would not have signed it. It was being written by McGeorge Bundy, as I recall. Who else knew about it? Who ordered it? Why would that person or persons have been working on it unless they knew Kennedy was going to be eliminated? Johnson signed it shortly after Kennedy was buried.

You can avoid Amazon and rent it for $5 on YouTube. The episode out so far is an overview of the 4 part series.

Yes, in the well known 1967 memo, the CIA suggested the term "conspiracy *theory*" be used to try to discredit all who challenged the WR. The idea was that the WR conclusion of a LN assassin was based on the facts; all those who dissented were merely offering theories without the facts. It can now be seen by anyone who cares to look that this was backwards. It was a lie upon which all of the lies in the WR were built. In fact it is the WR conclusion that requires acceptance of a theory--the single bullet theory--which is contradicted by the facts. The term conspiracy theory has grown to be used everywhere as a primary tool to cut off dissent. Conspiracies are everywhere. People, particularly people here, should think twice before appending "theory" to the term when discussing them

No, alteration of Zapruder is not an extraordinary claim. It's an entirely logical outcome of what we know. In fact the killers had no choice but to try alteration. In planning the murder, they would have created a hierarchy of objectives. The choice they made in meeting each objective would then affect the choices for the next one and soon on down the line. The top objective, the one with the highest priority for the project, would have been that the murder must succeed. That Kennedy must not escape the ambush. That means multiple shooters from different directions to ensure, as much as possible, that Kennedy does not survive. Dealey Plaza was a perfect location for that setup. But as part of the plan, they were going with a very different story--of Oswald as the lone assassin with 3 shots from behind. They planned to kill him quickly before he could talk to a lawyer, so they would have relatively free rein to concoct their story. They controlled the WC "investigation" such that it consisted of a bunch of lawyers cherry picking evidence to frame Oswald. They controlled the information disseminated by the media. They intimated and sometimes killed people who threatened their story. But the Zapruder film was a problem. Zapruder had already been on TV explaining what he had shot with his camera. Dan Rather saw the film that weekend. There was already a bidding war for the rights to the film, mainly between Life Mag and CBS. Life was planning to feature stills from the film in its next issue. The film could not be lost or destroyed. It had to be altered and quickly. You know the rest of the story, I hope. Off to Hawkeye Works for alteration. Realizing, however, that they couldn't do enough to obscure what happened, it was back to Zapruder that weekend to give him another $50,000 for the full rights to the film, including the right to show it in full as a motion picture. They then buried it from public view until a bootleg copy (not even the original, which was gone) was shown in1975 on TV to gasps in the audience. Their job finished, Life sold the rights back to Zapruder for $1.

How unfortunate, Aaron, that the first response you've gotten to your thoughtful piece on the inanity of, and the many holes in, the official story is an attempt by Von Pein to discourage further inquiry. He has all of the answers. Carry on. Do not be discouraged. You're on (several) right tracks. Welcome to this place where some good information is discussed amid a lot of nonsense. Let me respond to one argument you mentioned you said about there not being enough time to alter the Zapruder film. It's a common misconception. The weekend of the murder, the film was diverted from its supposed destination at Life's headquarters in Chicago, after Life purchased limited rights to it, to the CIA's photo lab in DC. Dino Brugioni enlarged key frames and made briefing boards, so the CIA could tell just how much the film contradicted their Oswald from the window with 3 shots story. Turns out it destroyed their fairy tale. They (the CIA) then flew it to Hawkeye Works early Sunday morning, a then secret CIA lab in Rochester to try to alter the film. Think about that. They were already offering the story about a lone gunman firing 3 shots from behind when they knew, and evidence would later show, that JFK was murdered in a crossfire. The Zapruder film was already becoming known as a record of the murder. They had no choice but to try to alter it. They made some changes but failed in their main task, given the technology they had to work with. So Life, acting as a front for the CIA, went back to Zapruder that Sunday and bought the rest of the rights to the film, including the right show it in full as a film. Then they buried it from public view. The public did not see it until a bootleg copy was shown in 1975 on Geraldo Rivera's show. The gasps in the audience were palpable. Imagine what the reaction would have been had they seen the real version of the head shots instead, as described by what Brugioni said he saw that night instead of the one frame depiction in the extant film at NARA. Point is, the work on the film was not confined to the ten hours or so it was at at Hawkeye Works. This is partially confirmed by Homer McMahon when he told Doug Horne that work on the second set of briefing boards (Brugioni's set from the original film were later destroyed) continued after he left Sunday night.

I'm nobody's proxy.

The Gannon memo misinterprets the JFK Act by claiming Congress intended to eliminate the Act's standards for postponing record releases when the 2017 deadline for releasing records had passed. Therefore allowing Trump and Biden to substitute their own, weaker standards. Which they have done. My problem with assigning such importance in the MFF case to the Gannon memo is I don't see where Seeborg relied on it in either order. Perhaps you or Andrew can direct me to that passage if I have missed it. Seeborg used a different argument to dismiss the heart of the MFF case against Biden and NARA. He said Congress intended to shut down the whole process of releasing records when it mandated that the ARRB close. This is a massive and crucial misreading of the Act. As to your first question. The central point of the MFF suit is that NARA has the power to take up the Review Board's obligations under the Act, but has not been using it.

Section 12 is titled Termination because (a) terminates the ARRB's role in the obligations that Act establishes, and after that (b) establishes how the task itself shall end--when the Archivist notifies the President and Congress that all records have been released. I am not arguing "obliquely" about the impact of (b). It's straightforward. That is not just the primary importance of (b); it is its purpose.

Whoa. That the Act defined Archivist and NARA in separate sentences does not establish they have separate and unique roles! The Archivist is a part of NARA, and in fact your cite says that in defining NARA: (7) National Archives means NARA and "all components thereof". Neither does the Section 4 passage of the Act you cite explain how the Act imposes separate and distinct and duties on NARA and the Archivist. It merely says NARA shall establish the JFK Collection and charges the Archivist with some duties in that process: to ensure the physical integrity and original provenance of the records put there, and while he's at it to publish a guidebook and index of the Collection. But of course it was NARA's Archivist who set up the Collection on the site he administered as required by the Act.

No, it's not a lie of omission, either. Surely you know how the testimonies worked. WC staff's job was to frame Oswald, not find out what happened. They were gathering information that would help them do that, and ignoring or discarding everything else. They knew what Oswald's alibi was. There was no reason to ask a friendly witness like Shelley if he saw Oswald on the steps. With Vickie Adams, for example, Belin went through a mock interview first and then told her she must answer everything he was going to ask for real exactly as she just had.

Actually I didn't say Shelley lied. I said he told them what they wanted to hear. And as we know, Ball and Belin typically made it known to witnesses what it was they wanted to hear,and what they wanted to cover, before the official testimony started.

My statement about 12(b) is virtually verbatim from the section. How can you disagree with it? No, both (a) and (b) do not deal with termination of provisions. (a) does. (b) deals with what Act provisions shall continue after the ARRB terminates. You know that. Of course (b) deals with the "job of releasing records". That's what the Act is about! Provisions for doing that job are what is to continue after the Board closed. Which I believe you yourself said yesterday or the day before. Section 12(b) establishes the grounds for when the release of records ends. It's more specific and obviously binding than picking a calendar day, as anyone who knows anything about Washington can understand. That's what is important. Where is Andrew? What have you done with him?

Here is the definition of the Archivist's job from their website: "The Archivist plans, develops, and administers all programs and functions of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA or the agency), in accordance with the National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984." So you're saying that the Archivist, when acting in her official capacity running NARA, is nevertheless a distinct entity separate from NARA itself. Could NARA the entity come to a different conclusion about some aspect of the duties proscribed under the JFK Act than its administrator? What would happen if it did? How would that work? If not, that is evidence that they are in fact one in the same entity. You say this distinction is "statutorily defined". What statute? You say the "specific and unique roles" are mandated by the JFK Act. Is that the statute you mean? Where does the JFK Act specify these different and distinct roles of the Archivist vs. NARA itself? I have said, repeatedly, NARA's Archivist because I believe they are one, inseparable entity. When the Archivist does something in her official capacity she acting for NARA.

Shelley's testimony suggests nothing at all, other than he was going to go along with what they wanted him to say. It was April 7, 1964 when he testified to Ball. Oswald was long dead; there would be no trial and it was clear Oswald was the guy the authorities had fingered for the murder. Shelley was not going to provide Oswald with an alibi. Even if he had seen Oswald on the steps.

The word "operations" is not in 12(b), Jim, which is titled "Other Provisions". "The remaining *provisions* of this Act shall continue until such time..." Nor does 12(b) refer to the Board. It says the job of releasing records shall continue (after the Board closes per 12(a)) until NARA's Archivist certifies to the President and Congress that all JFKA records have been made available to the public. Bill and Larry say that job fell to NARA after 1998. Even so, what is your point? When you say "on its own" NARA did not, and presumably does not, have the powers wielded by the Board, you are agreeing with Seeborg's take and disagreeing with the MFFsuit. Whether you realize or not. But Seeborg is wrong, as I said. He misinterpreted 12(a) and tried to ignore12(b), which contradicts his claims

In his first order, Judge Seeborg said the*obligations* (his word) that Congress gave to the ARRB ended when the Board closed. Therefore, neither NARA nor any other agency, on its own volition, can "legally assume obligations so terminated by Congress" (p. 13, original order) The MFF lawsuit fails because NARA does not have the power to do the job the MFF wants it to do. Do you agree with him, Jim? That's what you are saying. Do you disagree with the lawsuit when it seeks an order to compel NARA to do the job it claims they have? Seeborg is wrong. Congress did not terminate the obligation it created to release records when it terminated the Board; it just terminated the Board's role in the process at a certain point. That's what 12 (b) means when it says the job of releasing records to the public shall continue until NARA's Archivist certifies that all records have been released. Seeborg has tried to ignore 12(b).

When it created the ARRB, Congress originally gave it only a 2 year life, with the possibility of a one year extension. Off to a slow start, the Review Board didn't even publish its final definition of a "JFKA record" until the summer of '95 or roughly when it was supposed to close. Point is, Congress knew the disclosure problems well enough to know there was no chance that all records would be released by time the Board closed. That became even clearer when the Board decided to define "record" as broadly as possible by including any information relevant to understanding the murder.. That's why Congress set a 2017 deadline for completion. More importantly, that's why they also said the job would not be done until NARA's Archivist certified that all records had been released for public view (12(b)). I think they chose NARA's Archivist for the job, rather than the President or a committee of themselves, because they wanted to remove the decision from the politics that had so hamstrung document releasing in the first place. Giving the job of certifying the end to NARA's Archivist was just one way Congress was indicating that NARA was to take up where the Board left off. Bill and Larry offer others. That NARA was intended to be the successor agency to the Board with all necessary powers to finish the job is in fact the heart of the MFF lawsuit.

AI: Roger, my point is more direct and has nothing to do with searching for new records. It has everything to do with the ongoing operability of section 6. I think we can agree that the Archivist has NOT certified that ALL assassination records have been released. Therefore section 12(b) mandates that all provisions of the Act not pertaining to appointments to the ARRB and ARRB operations SHALL remain in full force and effect. And I think we have established that no part of section 6 has anything to do with the ARRB’s appointments or operations. It therefore logically and legally flows that section 12(b) mandates that section 6 remains operable law. RO: All of the above is clear. AI: if section 6 remains operable law, to whom does it apply, if not the President? …… especially since section 9(d)(1) explicitly states that the President, in his sole and non-delegable authority is required to comply with section 6. RO: Section 9(d) is titled "Presidential Authority Over Review Board Determination". Under Section 9(d)(1), after the Review Board has made a formal determination about public disclosure or postponement of an "executive branch assassination record" (only), the President has the authority to review that determination. Should he consider postponing disclosure he must do so using the standards for postponement "set forth under Section 6". Two things are clear. The President must use Section 6 "Grounds for Postponement" to postpone release, and he has authority over the disposition of only "information contained in an assassination record obtained or developed solely within the executive branch" (9)(d)(1) Under 12(b), Section 6 standards for postponement remain intact as long as records remain outstanding, as you said. AI: t would seem contrary to the purposes of the Act that mandate an ongoing downgrading and declassification process set out in sections 5 and 9 to then render sections 6 and 9 inoperable and to create an entirely arbitrary and unreviewable framework, when the entire purpose of the Act is to create an enforceable and accountable process for the public disclosure of all records. (See section 2(a)(3) below.) RO: Of course. AI: Again, what is the status of section 6 under Judge Seeborg’s rulings? RO: The short answer is Section 6 postponement standards never came before Seeborg for decision because he dismissed the suit against NARA on the grounds that neither NARA nor any other federal agency is the legal successor in function to the ARRB, and so have no authority to continue the job after the ARRB closed. But he did discuss the Section 6 standards. IOW, Seeborg views NARA as simply a passive repository for JFK records. The Act established the JFK Records Collection to be housed there. But, he says, Congress intended release decisions about executive branch records to be the joint effort between the executive agencies, NARA's Archivist (somehow disembodied from NARA) and the President. With the President having the final say. All postponed records are reviewed by the executive agencies and the disembodied Archivist to make periodic release determinations. Section 5(g)(2)(D) gives the President "substantial discretion in determining whether continuing postponement of records disclosure is appropriate". Section 5(g)(2)(D) contains a summary of the four postponement standards detailed in Section 6. Seeborg even waives away the clear requirement in the Act that the President make his postponement determination for each record. No, he says, Trump's and Biden's blanket assertions that all records being withheld meet the postponement standards are enough, without specifics. I don't see any specific reference to Section 6 itself in Seeborg's orders. But I think the answer to your question is that he relies on, and misuses, the Section 5 summary of those standards. Seeborg's reasoning is nonsense. It not only disembodies the Archivist from the agency she runs as one way for the judge to claim NARA has no role in the process, it ignores the clear intent of the Act which established a presumption for release after almost 30 years of hiding information, which was to be set aside only in the "rarest of circumstances" and for compelling reasons. Instead the judge reads the Act to give one politician, the President, "substantial discretion" to make postponement decisions himself in the face of the very evidence that drove the passage of the Act in the first place--the failure of the political system to explain the murder to the public's satisfaction. A presumption for release has become, in the judges eyes, substantial discretion for the President to decide postponement decisions as he sees fit, as long as he includes a blanket statement that all withheld records meet the Section 6 standards. Seeborg even says the President can add other reasons, besides claiming Section 6 standards have been met, to justify his decision if he wants to. AI: It is quite clear that Curtis Gannon’s interpretation that section 6 expired on October 26, 2017 is grossly wrong, because section 12(b) makes it clear that section 6 remains operable law. RO: Yes.