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The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was formed under the Eisenhower administration, and adapted to President Kennedy's style. Along with the Natonal Security Council, the Special Group of the NSC, the PFIAB was informed of the most sensitive intelligence information in order to give the President advice on certain matters of national security.

http://www.maryferre...o?docSetId=1062

I first heard of the PFIAB in looking into the background of Leo Cherne, who Lee Harvey Oswald wrote to from the USSR. As head of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), an extension of Nazi Gen. R. Gehlen's Operation Wringer, used to debrief refugees from Communist countries, Oswald solicited help from Cherne in three letters from Russia. Cherne was not with the PFIAB at the time of the assassination but was appoined by a later regime.

CHERNE PAPERS AT FORD LIBRARY : Aids/Cherne, Leo - Papers.htm

Said Leo Cherne on his appointment as Chair of the PFIAB in 1976, "Let me just add very briefly, what an extraordinary privilege it is for me to serve as Chairman of this Board. But the particular privilege includes not only the opportunity to serve the President but to have a group associated with this effort as distinguished, as varied in its extraordinary capabilities as are represented on this Board."

Kennedy said he thought the Board was very successful. Both early administrations are said to have had successful Boards. What accounts for the success of the PFIAB in two very different management styles? Some of the structure of Eisenhower's advisory system in the NSC and White House are still in place today. He preferred a sharply focused debate on current issues. He created a "rigorous process of deliberation and team building" to bring all the best ideas and resources of the executive branch to bear on any new problem. 81 The PFIAB can only be considered part of this debate -- albeit behind the scenes. Kennedy preferred not to rely on a formal advisory system, but after the disorderly run-up to the Bay of Pigs decision, he instituted some changes. He used his closest advisors, Robert F. Kennedy, Theodore Sorensen, and McGeorge Bundy to aid in the examination of debate options as well as to encourage thoughtful deliberation. 82 The PFIAB in Kennedy's administration becomes another informal advisor to counter the "chaotic U.S. President, Executive Order, "Establishing the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, Executive Order 10656," Federal Register, vol. 21, (February 8, 1956) in Congressional Research Service, The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: An Historical and Contemporary Analysis (1955-1975) (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 1975), 25-26. 7 9 George, 153. 8 0 Absher, Desch, and Popadiuk. The authors studied each presidential Board to evaluate their success. Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to George W. Bush, second edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 55. 82 ibid., 68. Cynthia M. Nolan The PFIAB Personality

....It is the adaptability of the PFIAB then, that comes to the fore in this examination of Kennedy's and Eisenhower's success. Johnson and Nixon When Lyndon B. Johnson inherited the White House from Kennedy, he retained his predecessor's somewhat chaotic and fluid organizational structure without Kennedy's interest in policy nor his attentive advisors. Johnson's foreign policy structure, then, provides a cautionary tale, and his PFIAB experience was mixed. He retained the same members as Kennedy, but attended fewer meetings. He preferred to rely on the expertise of the individual members in a personalized one-on-one way. The Board could be viewed as a success because its many and varied recommendations were accepted by Johnson. On the other hand, it was due to the relationship between Johnson and Clifford that made the Board so successful, not its organizational role or standing. The answer to this contradiction lies in Johnson's dominating personality. Rubenzer and Faschingbauer report on his bullying, assertiveness, hostility, impatience, and self-centeredness. This was not a man to rely on organizational systems to give him advice. He surrounded himself with intelligent advisors, including some Kennedy's aides, but he did not enjoy the benefits of debate among men of great skills and thought. His meetings turned political when he even called them. Many of his decisions were ad hoc, rather than in response to formal advice and recommendations -- as one might expect from a judicious use of the PFIAB. In contrast to Johnson's organizational deficiencies, Nixon created an extremely formalistic NSC and tasked the PFIAB to provide regularized reports in contrast to its "as Steven J. Rubenzer and Thomas R. Faschingbauer, Personality, Character, and Leadership in the White House: Psychologists Assess the Presidents.

President Kennedy's letter to the members of the PFIAB:

I am delighted that you have consented to serve as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board which is being reactivated pursuant to the Executive Order which I approved on May 4, 1961.

I am establishing this Board for the purpose of providing me periodically with independent evaluations of the objectives and conduct of U.S. foreign intelligence activities and of the performance of the several agencies engaged in foreign intelligence and related efforts.

It is my desire that the Board should meet periodically to analyze objectively the work of the Government's foreign intelligence agencies. While the review by the Board will be concerned with all U.S. foreign intelligence activities, I would expect particular attention to be devoted to the performance of those civilian and military intelligence elements of key importance to the Government in the fields of national security and foreign relations. I am especially anxious to obtain the Board's views as to the over-all conduct and progress of the foreign intelligence effort as well as its advice as to any modifications therein which would enhance the acquisition of intelligence essential to the policy making branches of the Government in the areas of national security and foreign relations.

It is my hope that you and the others whom I have invited to serve on the Board will be able to meet with me on May 15, 1961, to discuss in detail the scope of the work which you have so generously agreed to undertake.

I know that you and your fellow Board members can make a real contribution to the national interest by your service with this body.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Note: This is the text of identical letters addressed to Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman of the Board; Dr. William O. Baker, Vice President, Research, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, USAF (ret.), Chairman of the Board, Space Technology Laboratories, Inc.; Dr. William L. Langer, Professor of History, Harvard University; Robert D. Murphy, President, Corning Glass International; and Gen. Maxwell Taylor, USA (ret.), President, Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, Inc. Later, on May 15, Clark M. Clifford and Gordon Gray were appointed members of the Board.

Citation: John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web:

In 1963, President John Kennedy called the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) the most useful of all of his advisory boards. In Kennedy's first year of office, the Board met more than twice a month on average, more than its entire history to date. One of its primary tasks under Kennedy was to recommend the reorganization of the many defense intelligence elements. 2 Organization of intelligence, the incorporation of technology, the Soviet threat, and political and intelligence scandals have occupied the PFIAB for most of its history. These tasks are performed at the direction of the President, and thus reflect on his priorities and needs as well as his opinion of the usefulness of this Board of advisors. In focusing on the organization of the intelligence community, Kennedy continued the precedent for the Board to be IN the intelligence community, but not OF the intelligence community. The PFIAB was formed to give reliable, outside advice to the president. Its members serve no concurrent roles in the intelligence community -- thus the Board is not part OF the community -- and may or may not have direct experience in the business. 3 In fact, Eisenhower's original membership in 1956 included Dr. James Killian, Eisenhower's science advisor and president of MIT, and Lt. Gen. James Doolittle, flight pioneer with the U.S. Army. He named it the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA). The Board was formed to investigate intelligence needs and make improvements, not to make policy. According to Executive Order 10656, the Board reviews overall intelligence activities (at the President's direction), finds ways to reduce duplication and costs, and suggests 1 Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995), 272. 2 ibid. 3 Eisenhower set the precedents for the organization and use of the Board. Kennedy solidified most of these precedents: the scientific focus of the membership and its tasks, the professionalism of the Board, a lack of partisanship, access to intelligence, business and military experience among the members, and the soliciting of advice on the improvement of the intelligence community as a whole. Board members receive no salary save for reimbursement for expenses. In the early years (until President Carter's tenure), the Board was small -- around 8 to 10 members, drawn from business and military leaders -- senior professionals in their field, met about once a month on average and provided both regular reports on intelligence needs as well as answered whatever questions the President had regarding intelligence organization and improvement. Cynthia M. Nolan

MEMBERS OF THE PFIAB 1961-63

"Dr. James Killian chaired the panel that recommended building the U-2 aircraft and reconnaissance satellites. He chaired the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the President's Science Advisory Committee. He also worked on Department of Defense-CIA agreements that structured the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)."

Clark Clifford

Robert Murphy

Gordon Gray

J. Patrick Coyne - Ex-Army and Internal Security.

A. Russell Ash - Responsible for Personnel and Internal Security mattrs for the National Security Council.

Gen. James Dootlittle (R.USAF) - World War II bomber commander and hero of attack on Tokyo.

Frank Pace, Jr. - Former Sec. Army under Eisnenhower. Dr. Wm. Langer Harvard prof. gave JFK a C grade, but JFK still appointed him to the PFIAB. William Leonard Langer (March 16, 1896 December 26, 1977) was the chair of the history department at Harvard University and the World War II volunteer head of the Research and Analysis branch of the Office of Strategic Services. Following America's involvement in World War II, Langer was asked by the U.S. government to volunteer his skills with the new Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Langer served as chief of Research and Analysis Branch with the OSS until the end of the war after which he was appointed special assistant for intelligence analysis to the U.S. Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes. In 1950, Langer organized the office of National Estimates in the newly established Central Intelligence Agency. Langer then returned to academia, but from 1961 to 1977 he served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Edwin Herbert Land (May 7, 1909 – March 1, 1991) was an American scientist and inventor, best known as the co-founder of the Polaroid Corporation. Among other things, he invented inexpensive filters for polarizing light, a practical system of in-camera instant photography, and his retinex theory of color vision. His Polaroid instant camera, which went on sale in late 1948, made it possible for a picture to be taken and developed in 60 seconds or less.

BK Notes: I call your attention to the PFIAB because of the documents that were released under the JFK Act and posted at Mary Ferrell Archives, some of which touch on the subjects that have become entweined with the assassination of the President, specifically the officially sanctioned anti-Castro Cuban maritme raids from the JM/WAVE station that are connected to Dealey Plaza (Rex mission of Oct.21), which is specifically mentioned, the downing of a U2 plane on the day before the assassination and the situations with the espionage cases of Prof. Barghorn, and especially Sgt. Jack Dunlap, whose betrayal of the NSA records to the Soviets came on top of the defections of two NSA employees and gave the PFIAB its most serious assignment from the President - to report on how these laspses in security can be addressed.

In September the PFIAB was briefed by CIA's Cuban Ops manager Des FitzGerals, similar in scope and information as presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the September 24, 1963 meeting, including the emphasis on the attempt to recruit members of the Cuban military to engage in a Valkyrie style coup that would ostensibly include the assassination of Castro, the precise planning for which was apparently redirected from Castro to JFK, as many of the aspects of this plot appear in the foreknowldge and psycholoical warfare aspects of the Dealey Plaza Operation.

Most significantly however, is the minutes of the two day meeting of the PFIAB that was held on November 21 and 22, and included briefings on all of these items, as well as the false stories that implied the CIA was behind the coup in Vietnam, and their activities in Cuba, and focused specifically on the Dunlap Report that was prepared by Gen. Carroll of DIA, and the recomendations that the PFIAB were planning on presenting to President Kennedy that would substantially revamp the United States intelligence establishment.

The potential remifications of these recommendations included the resignations of CIA Director McCone and DIA Carroll, and the changing of the law to allow the CIA to take over counterintelligence and counterespionage operations in the USA from the FBI.

Repeated a number of times in the course of the minutes, the special information provided to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne by J. E. Hover appeared to be dynamite, and included the means by which they discovered Dunlap was a mole for the Soviets, information not known to the President.

While the document should be read in full in order to appreciate the impact and implications the assassination had on all this - I have highlighted the most significant parts - leaving out the pages of reports on the situation in Vietnam that I don't believe has any bearing on the assassintation, other than in changing of policy there.

http://www.maryferre...o?docSetId=1062

Edited by William Kelly
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Sgt. Jack Dunlap, USA

His grave is located just a few steps from the place where later was the funeral of President John F. Kennedy. So now one of the greatest heroes of the U.S. rests next to a traitor and a spy, which humiliated considerable harm to his country.

http://persona.rin.ru/eng/view/f/0/18295/dunlap,-jack

Sergeant Jack Dunlap was the usual 'average' American. He lived with his family in a normal house in a suburb of Washington, and brought home the most usual salary - $ 100 per week. Like most 'average' Americans, he moonlighted at night to have additional means of livelihood. But the day job, Dunlap went beyond the usual.

Every morning, Dunlap was a member of spetspropusku at Fort Meade - one of the most impressive buildings across America. The length of its main corridor about three times greater than the length of a football field. Its walls were literally infested with electric cables and wires. In the cellars of Fort Meade were the most powerful computers in the world. Radio antennas receive information from around the globe. The building is surrounded by three rows of barbed wire under an electric voltage. Territory adjacent to the Fort Mido, patrolled by armed soldiers marines.

Inside the cement fortress built in the form of the Latin letter U, the work does not stop for a minute. Hundreds of people day and night to process sensitive information, deciphered coded messages and studied and analyzed the information obtained. This building was the headquarters of the NSA, one of the major U.S. intelligence agencies.

Boy on the premises

Dunlap was not a cryptographer. His position was much more modest. Although Dunlap and had the rank of Sergeant U.S. Army, the NSA, he worked as a simple courier. His work was to distribute documents from one department to another. Officially, his title was 'clerk-messenger' - a little more honorable unless the post of errand boy. If employees know and Dunlap, the only person. His name no one bothered to remember.

But Dunlap was not such a quiet, insignificant country, which seemed to be around. At one time he was awarded several medals for bravery. He also served as a driver for NSA Chief of Staff. But it did not suit such an existence. He believed that deserves a better life. And in 1960. has a chance to achieve the desired. In that year - the third year of service Dunlap from the NSA - with him to contact the agent out of the Soviet intelligence. Dunlap agreed to work on the Soviet Union. He promised a lot of money. From Dunlap needed to make copies of documents passing through his hands, to make them secret NSA from the building and send another Soviet agent, is absolutely safe. Nobody in no suspect. In the end, is not he a sergeant U.S. Army - loyal soldier, worthy of every kind doveriyaN

Beautiful Life

Only during the first year of work for Soviet intelligence Dunlap received about 40 thousand. U.S.. This is much higher than the annual salary of a senior army officer. Style of his life dramatically changed.

Modest and quiet family man who worked part time at night at a petrol station for a dollar an hour, turned into a chic man 'in the full prime of life', literally sorivshego money. In the short time he bought a new car, yacht and powerboat. Luxury mistress followed one another. Leisure Dunlap also conducted 'in a big way': amateur regatta sailing, car racing and race boats, dancing in prestigious clubs were his favorite entertainment.

When someone asked Dunlap, where he got the money, he built himself a holy innocence

"I received a small inheritance," - usually he replied. And if someone has expressed bewilderment why such a rich man to spend your precious time and run a simple courier, Dunlap just smiled enigmatically. His low post, he declared confidently, this is only a cover. In fact, he supposedly serves the NSA one particular secret missions.

Obviously not notice

The NSA, as it were, and did not notice the sudden change in the life of a humble messenger. Nobody paid any attention to the fact that now he comes to work in an expensive car. He excused from work for the day, if he asked for time off, citing the fact that he would like to take part in races on cutters. And when he hurt his back during a sailing regatta, the authorities even sent a carriage 'ambulance' to take Dunlap in the departmental hospital.

Dunlap tried all means to maintain its reputation as an important classified 'bumps'. "They were afraid that I was under anesthesia can inadvertently give some secrets," - he said friends, devoutly attentive to the speeches.

Dunlap went on to copy secret documents directly under the noses of the NSA. Every month he gave his material obtained is connected, the Soviet agent. Most of these meetings took place in the car parks or other public places. Dunlap did not take any security measures. Once he even brought with him another lover.

However, in March 1964. Dunlap contract with the NSA over. Fearing that he might lose its 'warm place', Dunlap met to resign from the army and to join the NSA is already a civil official. This is where it and waiting for a nasty surprise.

Lie detector

The staff of the NSA took both the military and gazhdanskih persons. It was believed that the soldiers suspicion. But civilians, went to work, should have been compulsorily tested for a lie detector.

Dunlap behaved quite calmly, but it did not save him. The test revealed cases of 'petty theft' and 'misconduct'. However, the NSA still has his work and kept him for his position. But two months later, when it was revealed that a modest live messenger is clearly beyond their means, Dunlap was finally denied access to classified information.

And now he realized that he faces big trouble. Contact agent was interrupted. The exposure was inevitable. He was expected to either life imprisonment or death in the electric chair.

Dunlap finds a solution

In June 1964. Dunlap gathered to take part in motor racing to production vehicles. He went there with a noisy company of friends and casually hinted that he wanted to commit suicide. Nobody, of course, he did not believe. But the next day he was found half-dead. He took large doses of sleeping pills and alcohol.

After that incident, the NSA in conjunction with military police and military counter-intelligence division of the U.S. Army conducted an investigation of the case Dunlap. June 20, he tried to shoot

Bystanders friend literally snatched the pistol.

Two days later, Dunlap left the city by car. Stopping at some dried-up stream, it is tightly closed all the windows and left the engine turned. His body was found the next morning. Dunlap died from choking in the exhaust gases.

Management shocked

In August, a month after the suicide of Dunlap, the NSA finally gathered evidence that he was a spy. But they never found out what kind of information Dunlap managed to convey the Soviet intelligence. "Probably we will never know how documents are passed through his hands - said one of the investigators. - It is better for us to play it safe and assume that all information held by his department, is now kept in Moscow. "

The assumption was correct. Information transmitted by Dunlap, were priceless materials for Moscow on the inner life of American intelligence.

All this was very unpleasant for the leadership of the NSA. And besides, as if in mockery of the 'snookered' superiors, Dunlap was buried at Arlington National Cemetery with full honors, relying soldier of the army.

His grave is located just a few steps from the place where later was the funeral of President John F. Kennedy. So now one of the greatest heroes of the U.S. rests next to a traitor and a spy, which humiliated considerable harm to his country.

Jack E. Dunlap

Sergeant, United States Army

Jack E. Dunlap, was an United States Army sergeant stationed at the National Security Agency, who later became a spy for the Soviet Union in the early 1960's.

In order to continue his access to classified information, Sgt. Dunlap applied for civilian employment at NSA. At the time, background investigations were more strict for civilan employees than members of the military. When the NSA began Sgt. Dunlap's background investigation, indications of Dunlap's "high lifestyle" began to emerge. Dunlap's security clearance was revoked on May 23, 1963, and NSA transferred Dunlap to a menial job.

Dunlap committed suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning on July 23, 1963. After the suicide, Dunlap's wife discovered packages of secret materials -- only then did the scope of the breach become evident.

Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap was a NSA courier who allegedly sold secrets to the Soviet Union for three years; he killed himself while under investigation in 1963. Scott Shane, "Some at NSA Betrayed Country," from Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, "No Such Agency," Baltimore Sun, reprint of six-part series, 3-15 December 1995.

Jack E. Dunlap, an employee of the NSA 1958, was found dead of carbon monoxide poisoning - an apparent suicide (see photo below).

He also was a Soviet penetration agent, who had concealed in the attic his house a treasure trove of sealed packets of classified NSA documents bearing on its most secret deciphering and interception operation.

There were many reasons why it would have been inconvenient to arrest and Jack Dunlap. For one thing, he was a liaison with "Staff D" in the CIA, and could expose areas of CIA-NSA cooperation in domestic interceptions that might be deemed illegal. For another, he had been the personal driver, and aide, to Major General Garrison Coverdale the chief of staff of the NSA. General Coverdale, and after Coverdale left in August 1959, Dunlap to the new NSA Chief of Staff, General Watlington. As such, he had top-secret clearance and a "no inspection" status, which meant he could drive off the base with documents hidden in the car and then return without anyone knowing that the material had been removed from the base. Moreover, Dunlap had other high-level connections in the NSA. According to the Carroll Report, which investigated the Dunlap breach, he had helped a ring of officers at NSA pilfer some government property. Dunlap was under interrogation just before he died. His apparent suicide ended the investigation.

Some of it is hearsay, some heresy from un-named sources.

Jack Dunlap was a Boy Scout in New Orleans in his youth. Enlisted and became an Airborne Ranger in the Infantry. Served in the Korean War and received the Combat Infantry Badge (CIB).

The circumstances of his joining the ASA is not known, but is assigned to Det 4 in 57/58 with an unknown MOS. It might have been as a MP. During the 57-58 period there were no known MP's assigned to Sinop. The security for the base was performed by the Turk conscript unit billeted outside the post. It is believed that the name of the blond-haired Hungarian was Alex Klopstock.

Jack Dunlap frequented the beach area at Samsun and enjoyed the Russian females there. After gaining access to operations Dunlap was especially interested in the telemetry signals, etc and on several occasions was seen going into the restricted COMCEN area, but because he was a Senior NCO, no one challenged him and it will NEVER be known if he secreted or photographed anything therein.

Also, many thought it unusual that Jack Dunlap went TDY to Hq's USASAEUR with the CO at Det 4 in 1958 because he was not knowlegable of the mission as was Sergeant Van Pelt. Sergeant Dunlap shot a wild boar and all the Sinop dogs (except Gimp) with his .45. Perhaps we will find the name of the Major who commanded Det 4 in 1958.

Jack Dunlap was transferred to Vint Hill Farms from Fort Meade after he took a polygraph at NSA. He probably knew that he had flunked and was now in a dilemma. He was seen driving a white Cadillac at VHFS and would be gone for days before his death in Maryland. At least one person swears that the autopsy of Jack Dunlap would show that he was 'beaten to a pulp' and that a 'snake in the woodpile' was responsible for placing the hose in his car which caused his death.

Jack E. Dunlap he described as a drunken Army sergeant who was recruited strictly for money. Once a chauffeur-courier for the National Security Agency, Dunlap provided NSA documents to the GRU. For his work Dunlap received lavish payments that permitted him a lifestyle of powerboats, fast cars and an expensive mistress.

Dunlap committed suicide when it appeared federal officers were about to arrest him.

Espionage, since it is based on human vulnerability, can penetrate even the most heavily guarded repositories of national secrets.

Soviet intelligence demonstrated this in the 1950's when it recruited no fewer than five different American sources in the ultra-secret National Security Agency (NSA), the unit that supplies the codes and ciphers used by the American government.

One of these KGB spies, Jack E. Dunlap, the chauffeur for the NSA's Chief of Staff, organized a number of staff officers into a larceny scheme, which allowed him access to the highest level cryptography, the "keys to the kingdom," as one military investigator put it. He delivered this material to his Soviet case officer in the Chief of Staff's limousine (the only car which could leave headquarters without being searched). This human spying made it possible for the Soviet Union to decipher the American data that had been gathered by its technical collection, and also to ascertain many of the targets of American technical collection.

DUNLAP, JACK E

SFC US ARMY

DATE OF BIRTH: 11/14/1927

DATE OF DEATH: 07/23/1963

BURIED AT: SECTION 43 SITE 976

ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY

<B>http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jedunlap.htm<BR style="mso-special-character: line-break"><BR style="mso-special-character: line-break"></B>

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Presidents Foreign Intelligence Adivisory Board - (PFIAB)

http://www.maryferre...975&relPageId=4

September 10, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Panel on Covert Action Operations

The Board Panel me it in the Board's offices on September 6, 1963.

Panel members present were Mr. Robert Murphy, Chairman; Mr. Gordon Gray; and Dr. William Langer. Messrs. Coyne and Ash also attended the meeting.

During the course of its meeting the Panel was briefed by Mr. Richard Helms (Deputy DCI/Plans, CIA) and his assistants, Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald (head of the CIA's headquarters staff dealing with Cuba). Highlights of the briefings were as followed:

MESSRS. HELMS AND MEYER

[REDACTED] Rest of page and next page.

Resumes – Vietnam – [REDACTIONS]

MR. FITZGERALD

(On the subject of Cuba)

In June the NSC Special Group approved a CIA proposal for a package of covert operations against Cuba. The covert programs…. (unreadable)program aimed at precluding acquisition of spare parts for industrial machinery, and other projects needed by Cuba, (5) a sabotage program of a general nature, and (6) support of anti-Castro autonomous groups, by giving them money and the means to act, but under an arrangement which insures against attribution to the United States, and which precludes operations from U.S. or British soil. (The CIA philosophy is to back only the potentially powerful and effective anti-Castro groups, and the military is felt to be the best bet.)

The CIA effort represents a shift from external raids to internal sabotage actions. The CIA mounts about 10 "black" operations a month, and Castro security forces have taken their toll among the CIA teams. Three operations were conducted on August 17 and 18, and among other things the objective is to give encouragement to dissident Cuban elements such as military officers who see no professional future under Castro who is unloading military elements which aided him in his initial seizure of the government. (The Special Group, Mr. Bundy and other White House staff note the successful mounting of CIA's sabotage operations and have asked for more to be conducted. CIA has found it necessary to resist any such pressure for these operations to be increased beyond the present effective capacity which CIA has at this time.) [see: Valkyrie at Dealey Plaza]

Again, referring to the Cuban economy, it is hurting badly….CIA finds that a major problem for their "black" teams is food re-supply in areas where the Cubans are hard to feed themselves.

CIA assets being used against Cuba:

Staff: [REDACTED] (Washington and Miami)

U.S. contractor personnel: [REDACTED] (16)

Foreign Nationals: (16) [REDACTED (mostly Cubans)

Personnel at overseas posts: [REDACTED] (16)

DD/I staff: [REDACTED] (16)

NPIC: a big effort on U-2 photography of Cuba.

CIA considers that of all nationalities, the Cubans are the most unreliable (prone to exaggerate). The best information comes from non-Cuban agents.

There are (16) [REDACTED] agents in Cuba, including friendly diplomatic personnel. There are [REDACTED] illegal teams working, one of which (16) has [REDACTED] sub-agents. There are [REDACTED] agents in Cuban shipping; and there are [REDACTED] penetrations of (16) Cuban installations abroad…..

…..CIA penetration of the Cuban military got underway in April. An agent brought out a Cuban Army [REDACTED' (08). The [REDACTED] says that there is a medium level acceptance among the military of the idea of overthrowing Castro, but although the view is held by individual members of the military they are fearful of communicating it to others within Cuba. [REDACTED] Defectors are naming military personnel to be contacted. There is, however, a fear of the Castro security system….

A.R. ASH

PRESIDENT'SFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA FORMEETING OF NOVEMBER 21-22, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: November 21-22, 1963, Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

November 21, 1963

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board convened in Executive Session at 9:00 a.m. November 21, 1963, on the first day of a scheduled two-day meeting, at the Board's offices, Room 297 Executive Office Building. Present were Chairman Clifford; members Land, Gray, Langer and Doolittle; J. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary; and A. R. Ash.

Chairman Clifford informed Board members that in this two-day meeting, consideration would be given to the Soviet espionage case involving the late U.S. Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap, previously assigned to the National Security Agency. Mr. Clifford said that the Board was in a position to do a unique service in this situation, and was the only Government entity engaged in a detailed, full-time review of the counterintelligence and national security ramifications of the case. Chairman Clifford advised Board members that some of the facts involved are extremely sensitive and must be given extreme security. (Here Mr. Clifford outlined to the Board the substance of highly sensitive information which had been given orally to Mr. Coyne by FBI Director Hover for the information of the Board and the President with respect to a uniquely valuable intelligence source which supplied information concerning the espionage activities of Dunlap.)

HANDLE VIA COMIT CHANNELS ONLY

CORONA [REDACTED] 05

Handle of a [REDACTED] 05

Control system

TOP SECRET

November 22, 1963

The Board re-convened at 8:45 a.m. in executive session. Chairman Clifford announced that General Carroll had called to emphasize that during his remarks yesterday he did not intend to be critical of corrective measures taken by General Blake (Director of NSA) after the Dunlap case, rather his criticisms were directed at the situation existing prior there to…..board members directed their attention to a further review of materials relating to the Dunlap case, and to further work on the draft of the Board's report to President Kennedy.

(Messrs. Pace and Murphy joined the meeting)

At 10:00 a.m. the Board meeting was joined by Mr. McCone, DCI, who was accompanied by CIA officials Fitzpatrick and Helms.

Mr. Clifford informed the DCI that the Board would appreciate his comments on the subject of maters which had previously been indicated as of interest to the Board, and in any comments on other subjects which the DCI or his associates might wish to make.

Mr. McCone said that he was prepared to discuss all of the items listed by the Chairman, plus 3 additional subjects (1) the Soviet Space Anelytical Center, (2) organizational changes in regard to CIA's scientific and technological activities, and (3) Vietnam. He said that at noon he would be available to the Board. Mr. William Colby, CIA headquarters official assigned to Far East matters, who had just returned from a several week's visit to Vietnam at President Kennedy's request. Mr. McCone said that he himself would have to leave the meeting at 12:20 in order to keep an appointment with….

First Mr. McCone said he wanted to refer most emphatically to the damage being done to the CIA through adverse publicity appearing in the press, radio and TV in a campaign which, if not arrested, could well destroy the CIA. If the campaign continues, it will prevent CIA recruitment of good men, and will discourage present CIA personnel at all levels in the organization. Mr. McCone said that there is little he can do to dissuade the press from pursing this line for ideological reasons or otherwise. There are those in the Defense Department who have opposed CIA ever since it was established, and there are Foreign Service Officers in the State Department who are highly critical of the CIA.

Mr. McCone urged most emphatically that the Board bring this matter to President Kennedy's attention and to urge the President to take not one but several occasions to try to correct the CIA's public image. For example CIA has been accused of being a 'Third Government in South Vietnam', and various people have been led to the erroneous conclusion that the anti-Diem coup was engineered by CIA. One result of irresponsible charges may be that Cambodia will swing over to Communist Camp.

Mr. Clifford asked whether these criticisms are traceable back to the Bay of Pigs as a turning point. Mr. McCone said yes, and back to CIA's involvement in Guatemala. The criticism of CIA make interesting copy for the writers who know there will be no denial or defense. For some reason or other, extreme liberals in and out of Government feel that a recent intelligence service is contrary to the democratic principles of our Government. The New York Times is particularly critical and Times staffer James Reston, would destroy CIA if he had his way; and the Washington Post from top to bottom is opposed to CIA.

Mr. Gray asked if Mr. McCone was suggesting that the President should talk to the Secretaries of State and Defense about criticisms of CIA made by persons in those Departments? Mr. McCone said, no, what must be done is for the President to make the matter the subject of a major speech and several press conferences. General Doolittle inquired whether Mr. McCone had discussed this with the President, and Mr. McCone replied that he had and this was the reason for his remarks which the President made 30 days ago during a press conference. Mr. Murphy observed that public statements of the kind urged by Mr. McCone often have a way of proving to be a liability, because they may generate a whole flock of further press and radio commentary and for this reason Mr. McCone might consider the prospect of having to ride out this storm.

Dr. Land asked what is the CIA's role in Vietnam. Mr. McCone said its role was not to overthrow governments, and there are many other reasons why CIA is in Vietnam…..

….Turning to the subject of Counterintelligence which was included on the Board's list of items of interest, Mr. McCone asked Mr. Helms to speak to this matter.

Mr. Helms said that in looking at the subject of our counterintelligence posture he preferred to refer to it as "counter-espionage". He said that it is the most dreary and least attractive job that the CIA has. When CIA goes out for positive collection of intelligence in an espionage operation, the objective is clear - - e.g., the obtaining of information about a Soviet missile site. But counterespionage is like Blind Man's Bluff where you know someone is in the room but you aren't certain who it is. There is a passive side of the effort, involving security checks, safes, fences, guards, etc.; but if the counter effort is only passive, it continues to be a game of Blind Man's Bluff. Therefore, a counterespionage activity is needed for the purpose of identifying hostile espionage agents. In this latter activity CIA has about five years to go before getting to the level that is desired.

Mr. Helms pointed out that the USSR not only has an aggressive cold war policy but it uses the instruments of the GRU and the KGB operating in parallel – with coordination taking place under Khrushchev in Moscow where decisions are reached as to dividing up the slots and espionage missions between the GRU and the KGB.

Next Mr. Helms exhibited a chart reflecting a number of espionage cases which have been uncovered as a result of CIA's counterintelligence efforts: the Able case (an illegal KGB agent who was located by the FBI in New York after Able's subordinate defected to the CIA in Paris); Blake (of Britain's MI-6 who worked for the Soviets for 6 years until uncovered as a result of a Polish defection to the CIA); Philby (the old school tie MI-6 official whose Soviet espionage recruitment dates back to 1934 and who recently fled to the USSR from the Middle East); Clemens and Felfe (who served 9 years in the West German counterespionage service; and were uncovered through a Polish defector's tip to the CIA); Cox (a US citizen who took $500 from the Soviets, returned the money, suffered a heart attack, and the case dropped by the U.S. authorities); Ethel and Harry Houghton (uncovered through a tip from a Polish defector); the Krugers (a U.S.) couple whose real name were Cohen and who disappeared in 1950); the Lansdale case in Englsn; Vessals (a homosexual clerk in the British Admirality); and [REDACTED – Paragaraph]

Mr. Helms also presented another chart dealing with cases of espionage penetrations by other Soviet bloc intelligence services including Czechs, East German , Poles and Yugoslavs.

Mr. Murphy asked whether CIA had concurred in the U.S. release of the Soviet espionage agent, Able, in exchange for U-2 pilot Powers. Mr. Helms said that considerations of national interest prevailed in that decision, although CIA's counterintelligence officers objected to the action.

As a result of information gained through CIA's counterespionage efforts CIA has informed [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] governments that the KGB is obtaining information from them…..

…In answer to General Doolittle's question as to motivation in these cases, Mr. Helms said that in the Western world the primary motivations have been desire for money, blackmail pressures, ideology, and vanity (the agent Blake enjoyed confessing how well he had fooled his British superiors. In blackmail situations, the Soviets developed leads as to personality defects and then exploit them persistently.

Mr. Clifford asked whether CIA's counterintelligence program has uncovered U.S. citizens serving as Soviet agents. Mr. Helms replied that one such instance was the case of Sergeant Rhodes. (Mr. McCone interjected that if there has not been a mix-up in signals, Dunlap would have been turned up as an agent. Mr. Clifford said that the Board knew about that.)

Dr. Langer asked whether the FBI is more active now in its counterespionage coverage in the United States.....

....In answer to Mr. Clifford's query about news accounts of CIA agent operations in Cuba, Mr. McCone said that CIA has a very active operation against Cuba and the Board has been briefed on it from time to time. Although there have been some disappointments and roll-ups of agents, CIA has vastly improved its agent nets and internal agent sources among legal travelers and friendly foreign government missions in Cuba. Of the [REDACTED] (16) agents reportedly executed in Cuba, [REDACTED] (16) were CIA's. One unfortunate experience was the identification of the [REDACTED ] (08) as a CIA support ship. (Mr. Helms said that the story first came to public attention on October 21 when Cuban planes straffed a bauxite ore vessel thinking it was the mother ship which CIA was using to return an agent team from a desolate area in Western Cuba. The CIA agent team had been in 6 weeks, had recruited additional agents, and was scheduled to come out on October 21. The [REDACTED] (08) was lying off shore and personnel were sent ashore in small boats to meet the agent team. The infrared blinker signals from shore were correctly given, although the lights were placed closer together than they should have been. A hailing signal was given from a rubber boat and was acknowledged, but then machine gun fire opened up on the small boats.) [REDACTED] CORONA [REDACTED – two paragraphs ]…. [see: Collins Radio Connections]

Mr. McCone replied that his recommendation to the Secretary of Defense is to overhaul the security system and to ensure that military personnel assigned to NSA be subjected to the same kind of security screening as that which NSA applies to its civilian personnel, ie……a background investigation and polygraph examination. ….

[REDACTED paragraph]

Next Mr. McCone reported to the Board on the recent U-2 cash in the Gulf of Mexico. The whole plane has been found in 9 fathoms of water 40 miles NW of Key West. The ejector canopy is off and the seat is out. An empty life raft and parachute were found. There was no attack made on the aircraft. The pilot reported a successful mission over Cuba, he flied over the Key West station on the return trip and 10 minutes later he was down. When the wreckage is raised it should be possible to determine the cause.

Mr. McCone said this exhausted the list of things he had in mind to discuss at this meeting.

Mr. Clifford asked if there were any intelligence facets of the arrest of U.S. professor Barghorn in the USSR. The DCI said that an analysis of the professor's debriefing had not yet been completed. He had no intelligence mission even indirectly, but was once a CIA consultant and the KGB knew that. No doubt this Soviet move was made because they had run out of pawns to use in …. An exchange for the Soviet spy Egeroff arrested in the U.S. As a matter of fact CIA had forecast that the Soviets would do something like this when they ran out of people to use in exchanges….

…Mr. McCone said he would now ask Mr. Colby to brief the Board, noting that Mr. Clby attended the Honolulu meeting (as did Mr. McCone) and is knowledgeable of the decisions made there. (At 12:25 Mr. McCone left the Board meeting to keep his appointment with Mr. Bundy)....

……(Discussion on Vietnam)

Mr. Colby concluded his discussion with the Board and left the meeting at 1:00 p.m.

In executive session, the Board had a further discussion of its report to be made to President Kennedy on the Dunlap case. Chairman Clifford brought Messrs. Murphy and Pace up to date on the principal matters covered at the preceding day's session of the Board meeting with regard to the extensive review and materials which had been completed thus far by Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne in the Dunlap case. Mr. Clifford summed up the Board's reaction of being aghast at the shocking looseness of security at the NSA. He referred to the many questions which had been put to the Director of NSA at yesterday's session.

Mr. Clifford observed that General Fitch had made a very intelligent presentation, and that an exceedingly valuable session had been had with General Carroll of DIA. Mr. Clifford said that after lunch the Board would complete its consideration of the Dunlap report and recommendations which the Board Panel had drafted. Arrangements had not been made for a meeting of Board members with President Kennedy in conjunction with this particular Board meeting because Mr. Clifford had felt that the Board would require all the time of this 2-day meeting to complete action on its report on a complex subject.

Chairman Clifford said that Board members should plan to convene for half a day at the next Board meeting and then meet with the President for an hour on the Dunlap case report. In view of the serious nature of the counterintelligence problems involved, Mr. Clifford expressed the opinion that the Board's report and recommendations may well constitute one of the most important contributions which the Board has made.

Mr. Clifford then informed Board members Murphy and Pace of the Board's discussion yesterday assessing the degree of damage resulting from Dunlap's espionage activities. Recognizing the difficulty of arriving at an assessment at this time, Mr. Clifford observed that the damage must have been serious, and he noted that the CIA is still evaluating its practice of sending its sensitive documents to the NSA. Mr. Clifford stated that despite differences of opinion which may exist as to the damage done to U.S. interests by Dunlap's espionage service for the Russians, the Board has information which bears on the subject but which cannot be made generally known and which the Board can pass on only to the President. (Mr. Clifford then related to the Board the most sensitive item, consisting of information which had been given to Mr. Coyne by appropriate authority, for reporting to the Board and to the President. It was agreed by Board members that the Board must take particular pains to protect this information, and would do so.)

At 1:35 the Board adjourned for lunch at the White House Staff Mess.

Having heard the report of the assassination of President Kennedy which had just occurred at 2:00 p.m. EST in Dallas, Chairman Clifford reconvened the Board in executive session. Mr. Clifford expressed the keen sense of personal loss which he felt upon the President's death. He joined Board members in their individual expressions of profound sorrow occasioned by the tragic circumstances of the President's death, and their deep sympathy and concern for the President's family.

Chairman Clifford announced that at this point the Board's meeting of the past two days was at a close, and that completion of the Board's report was in preparation for submission to President Kennedy would be suspended pending further developments.

It was Chairman Clifford's feeling that it would be inappropriate and premature, during the transition period following President Kennedy's death, for the Board to present to President Johnson the Board's recommendations calling for substantial changes in the U.S. intelligence effort. Mr. Clifford expressed his intention, and Board members agreed, to indicate to President Johnson as soon as possible the Board's willingness to serve in any way possible. Meanwhile, pending a resolution by President Johnson as to whether the Board will continue as an institution, and as to the President's wishes concerning continued services of the present Chairman and members, Chairman Clifford asked that the Board members be prepared to meet on a quick notice should intelligence developments require it.

Mr. Clifford said that he would inform the DCI of the course of action which the Board was taking at this time.

The Board meeting was adjourned at 3:20 p.m., subject to call of the Chairman as determined by developments.

A.R. Ash

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

CORONA/[REDACTED] 05

http://www.maryferre...62&relPageId=23

BK Notes: So one immediate result of the assassination, within the hour, the PFIAB decided that its report to the President on special knoweldge on the Dunlap case that Mr. Coyne had learned from JEH, and advising substantical changes in the intelligence establishment of the government, would "be suspended pending further developments.

Edited by William Kelly
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Does anyone else think it signficant that the Presdident's top advisory board on intelligence and covert operations was about to request significant changes in structure and policy that were suspended by the assassination and never revived again?

BK

Edited by William Kelly
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Does anyone else think it signficant that the Presdident's top advisory board on intelligence and covert operations was about to request significant changes in structure and policy that were suspended by the assassination and never revived again?

BK

Well I don't like mysteries and I'd like to know what it was that JEH told Coyne that was so important for the President to know, and it appears that it has something to do with Dunlap case and how he was found to be working for the Ruskies. Pretty much nobody ever even heard of the National Security Agency in 1963, it really was a secret to most of the American people, but apparently not the Russians.

All of sudden there is a spurt of revelations, two NSA guys defect, I think around the same time as Oswald, and then they discover Army Sgt. Dunlap, a courier and driver of the general director of NSA, and his replacement, and thus he drove the only car that wasn't inspected at the gate and allowed him to take out unlimited numbers of top secret records that he also apparently had access to.

And he did it for money, his only known motive.

From what I can gather so far, Dunlap also served for awhile in Turkey, where he was apprently recruited by the Soviets. Kim Philby was in the Turkish outback around the same time, and Turkey is the locaton of a remote U2 base and a NSA listening post where Larry Meyers' son was stationed.

So what could it have been that JEH told Coyne regarding the uncovering of Dunlap, a case that was so sensational, at least in military-intelligence circles, that they were going to change the charter of the CIA and let them take over the domestic counter-espionage activites in the USA?

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Does anyone else think it signficant that the Presdident's top advisory board on intelligence and covert operations was about to request significant changes in structure and policy that were suspended by the assassination and never revived again?

BK

Well I don't like mysteries and I'd like to know what it was that JEH told Coyne that was so important for the President to know, and it appears that it has something to do with Dunlap case and how he was found to be working for the Ruskies. Pretty much nobody ever even heard of the National Security Agency in 1963, it really was a secret to most of the American people, but apparently not the Russians.

All of sudden there is a spurt of revelations, two NSA guys defect, I think around the same time as Oswald, and then they discover Army Sgt. Dunlap, a courier and driver of the general director of NSA, and his replacement, and thus he drove the only car that wasn't inspected at the gate and allowed him to take out unlimited numbers of top secret records that he also apparently had access to.

And he did it for money, his only known motive.

From what I can gather so far, Dunlap also served for awhile in Turkey, where he was apprently recruited by the Soviets. Kim Philby was in the Turkish outback around the same time, and Turkey is the locaton of a remote U2 base and a NSA listening post where Larry Meyers' son was stationed.

So what could it have been that JEH told Coyne regarding the uncovering of Dunlap, a case that was so sensational, at least in military-intelligence circles, that they were going to change the charter of the CIA and let them take over the domestic counter-espionage activites in the USA?

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Presidents Foreign Intelligence Adivisory Board - (PFIAB)

http://www.maryferre...975&relPageId=4

September 10, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Panel on Covert Action Operations

The Board Panel me it in the Board's offices on September 6, 1963.

Panel members present were Mr. Robert Murphy, Chairman; Mr. Gordon Gray; and Dr. William Langer. Messrs. Coyne and Ash also attended the meeting.

During the course of its meeting the Panel was briefed by Mr. Richard Helms (Deputy DCI/Plans, CIA) and his assistants, Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald (head of the CIA's headquarters staff dealing with Cuba). Highlights of the briefings were as followed:

MESSRS. HELMS AND MEYER

[REDACTED] Rest of page and next page.

Resumes – Vietnam – [REDACTIONS]

MR. FITZGERALD

(On the subject of Cuba)

In June the NSC Special Group approved a CIA proposal for a package of covert operations against Cuba. The covert programs…. (unreadable)program aimed at precluding acquisition of spare parts for industrial machinery, and other projects needed by Cuba, (5) a sabotage program of a general nature, and (6) support of anti-Castro autonomous groups, by giving them money and the means to act, but under an arrangement which insures against attribution to the United States, and which precludes operations from U.S. or British soil. (The CIA philosophy is to back only the potentially powerful and effective anti-Castro groups, and the military is felt to be the best bet.)

The CIA effort represents a shift from external raids to internal sabotage actions. The CIA mounts about 10 "black" operations a month, and Castro security forces have taken their toll among the CIA teams. Three operations were conducted on August 17 and 18, and among other things the objective is to give encouragement to dissident Cuban elements such as military officers who see no professional future under Castro who is unloading military elements which aided him in his initial seizure of the government. (The Special Group, Mr. Bundy and other White House staff note the successful mounting of CIA's sabotage operations and have asked for more to be conducted. CIA has found it necessary to resist any such pressure for these operations to be increased beyond the present effective capacity which CIA has at this time.) [see: Valkyrie at Dealey Plaza]

Again, referring to the Cuban economy, it is hurting badly….CIA finds that a major problem for their "black" teams is food re-supply in areas where the Cubans are hard to feed themselves.

CIA assets being used against Cuba:

Staff: [REDACTED] (Washington and Miami)

U.S. contractor personnel: [REDACTED] (16)

Foreign Nationals: (16) [REDACTED (mostly Cubans)

Personnel at overseas posts: [REDACTED] (16)

DD/I staff: [REDACTED] (16)

NPIC: a big effort on U-2 photography of Cuba.

CIA considers that of all nationalities, the Cubans are the most unreliable (prone to exaggerate). The best information comes from non-Cuban agents.

There are (16) [REDACTED] agents in Cuba, including friendly diplomatic personnel. There are [REDACTED] illegal teams working, one of which (16) has [REDACTED] sub-agents. There are [REDACTED] agents in Cuban shipping; and there are [REDACTED] penetrations of (16) Cuban installations abroad…..

…..CIA penetration of the Cuban military got underway in April. An agent brought out a Cuban Army [REDACTED' (08). The [REDACTED] says that there is a medium level acceptance among the military of the idea of overthrowing Castro, but although the view is held by individual members of the military they are fearful of communicating it to others within Cuba. [REDACTED] Defectors are naming military personnel to be contacted. There is, however, a fear of the Castro security system….

A.R. ASH

PRESIDENT'SFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA FORMEETING OF NOVEMBER 21-22, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: November 21-22, 1963, Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

November 21, 1963

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board convened in Executive Session at 9:00 a.m. November 21, 1963, on the first day of a scheduled two-day meeting, at the Board's offices, Room 297 Executive Office Building. Present were Chairman Clifford; members Land, Gray, Langer and Doolittle; J. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary; and A. R. Ash.

Chairman Clifford informed Board members that in this two-day meeting, consideration would be given to the Soviet espionage case involving the late U.S. Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap, previously assigned to the National Security Agency. Mr. Clifford said that the Board was in a position to do a unique service in this situation, and was the only Government entity engaged in a detailed, full-time review of the counterintelligence and national security ramifications of the case. Chairman Clifford advised Board members that some of the facts involved are extremely sensitive and must be given extreme security. (Here Mr. Clifford outlined to the Board the substance of highly sensitive information which had been given orally to Mr. Coyne by FBI Director Hover for the information of the Board and the President with respect to a uniquely valuable intelligence source which supplied information concerning the espionage activities of Dunlap.)

HANDLE VIA COMIT CHANNELS ONLY

CORONA [REDACTED] 05

Handle of a [REDACTED] 05

Control system

TOP SECRET

November 22, 1963

The Board re-convened at 8:45 a.m. in executive session. Chairman Clifford announced that General Carroll had called to emphasize that during his remarks yesterday he did not intend to be critical of corrective measures taken by General Blake (Director of NSA) after the Dunlap case, rather his criticisms were directed at the situation existing prior there to…..board members directed their attention to a further review of materials relating to the Dunlap case, and to further work on the draft of the Board's report to President Kennedy.

(Messrs. Pace and Murphy joined the meeting)

At 10:00 a.m. the Board meeting was joined by Mr. McCone, DCI, who was accompanied by CIA officials Fitzpatrick and Helms.

Mr. Clifford informed the DCI that the Board would appreciate his comments on the subject of maters which had previously been indicated as of interest to the Board, and in any comments on other subjects which the DCI or his associates might wish to make.

Mr. McCone said that he was prepared to discuss all of the items listed by the Chairman, plus 3 additional subjects (1) the Soviet Space Anelytical Center, (2) organizational changes in regard to CIA's scientific and technological activities, and (3) Vietnam. He said that at noon he would be available to the Board. Mr. William Colby, CIA headquarters official assigned to Far East matters, who had just returned from a several week's visit to Vietnam at President Kennedy's request. Mr. McCone said that he himself would have to leave the meeting at 12:20 in order to keep an appointment with….

First Mr. McCone said he wanted to refer most emphatically to the damage being done to the CIA through adverse publicity appearing in the press, radio and TV in a campaign which, if not arrested, could well destroy the CIA. If the campaign continues, it will prevent CIA recruitment of good men, and will discourage present CIA personnel at all levels in the organization. Mr. McCone said that there is little he can do to dissuade the press from pursing this line for ideological reasons or otherwise. There are those in the Defense Department who have opposed CIA ever since it was established, and there are Foreign Service Officers in the State Department who are highly critical of the CIA.

Mr. McCone urged most emphatically that the Board bring this matter to President Kennedy's attention and to urge the President to take not one but several occasions to try to correct the CIA's public image. For example CIA has been accused of being a 'Third Government in South Vietnam', and various people have been led to the erroneous conclusion that the anti-Diem coup was engineered by CIA. One result of irresponsible charges may be that Cambodia will swing over to Communist Camp.

Mr. Clifford asked whether these criticisms are traceable back to the Bay of Pigs as a turning point. Mr. McCone said yes, and back to CIA's involvement in Guatemala. The criticism of CIA make interesting copy for the writers who know there will be no denial or defense. For some reason or other, extreme liberals in and out of Government feel that a recent intelligence service is contrary to the democratic principles of our Government. The New York Times is particularly critical and Times staffer James Reston, would destroy CIA if he had his way; and the Washington Post from top to bottom is opposed to CIA.

Mr. Gray asked if Mr. McCone was suggesting that the President should talk to the Secretaries of State and Defense about criticisms of CIA made by persons in those Departments? Mr. McCone said, no, what must be done is for the President to make the matter the subject of a major speech and several press conferences. General Doolittle inquired whether Mr. McCone had discussed this with the President, and Mr. McCone replied that he had and this was the reason for his remarks which the President made 30 days ago during a press conference. Mr. Murphy observed that public statements of the kind urged by Mr. McCone often have a way of proving to be a liability, because they may generate a whole flock of further press and radio commentary and for this reason Mr. McCone might consider the prospect of having to ride out this storm.

Dr. Land asked what is the CIA's role in Vietnam. Mr. McCone said its role was not to overthrow governments, and there are many other reasons why CIA is in Vietnam…..

….Turning to the subject of Counterintelligence which was included on the Board's list of items of interest, Mr. McCone asked Mr. Helms to speak to this matter.

Mr. Helms said that in looking at the subject of our counterintelligence posture he preferred to refer to it as "counter-espionage". He said that it is the most dreary and least attractive job that the CIA has. When CIA goes out for positive collection of intelligence in an espionage operation, the objective is clear - - e.g., the obtaining of information about a Soviet missile site. But counterespionage is like Blind Man's Bluff where you know someone is in the room but you aren't certain who it is. There is a passive side of the effort, involving security checks, safes, fences, guards, etc.; but if the counter effort is only passive, it continues to be a game of Blind Man's Bluff. Therefore, a counterespionage activity is needed for the purpose of identifying hostile espionage agents. In this latter activity CIA has about five years to go before getting to the level that is desired.

Mr. Helms pointed out that the USSR not only has an aggressive cold war policy but it uses the instruments of the GRU and the KGB operating in parallel – with coordination taking place under Khrushchev in Moscow where decisions are reached as to dividing up the slots and espionage missions between the GRU and the KGB.

Next Mr. Helms exhibited a chart reflecting a number of espionage cases which have been uncovered as a result of CIA's counterintelligence efforts: the Able case (an illegal KGB agent who was located by the FBI in New York after Able's subordinate defected to the CIA in Paris); Blake (of Britain's MI-6 who worked for the Soviets for 6 years until uncovered as a result of a Polish defection to the CIA); Philby (the old school tie MI-6 official whose Soviet espionage recruitment dates back to 1934 and who recently fled to the USSR from the Middle East); Clemens and Felfe (who served 9 years in the West German counterespionage service; and were uncovered through a Polish defector's tip to the CIA); Cox (a US citizen who took $500 from the Soviets, returned the money, suffered a heart attack, and the case dropped by the U.S. authorities); Ethel and Harry Houghton (uncovered through a tip from a Polish defector); the Krugers (a U.S.) couple whose real name were Cohen and who disappeared in 1950); the Lansdale case in Englsn; Vessals (a homosexual clerk in the British Admirality); and [REDACTED – Paragaraph]

Mr. Helms also presented another chart dealing with cases of espionage penetrations by other Soviet bloc intelligence services including Czechs, East German , Poles and Yugoslavs.

Mr. Murphy asked whether CIA had concurred in the U.S. release of the Soviet espionage agent, Able, in exchange for U-2 pilot Powers. Mr. Helms said that considerations of national interest prevailed in that decision, although CIA's counterintelligence officers objected to the action.

As a result of information gained through CIA's counterespionage efforts CIA has informed [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] governments that the KGB is obtaining information from them…..

…In answer to General Doolittle's question as to motivation in these cases, Mr. Helms said that in the Western world the primary motivations have been desire for money, blackmail pressures, ideology, and vanity (the agent Blake enjoyed confessing how well he had fooled his British superiors. In blackmail situations, the Soviets developed leads as to personality defects and then exploit them persistently.

Mr. Clifford asked whether CIA's counterintelligence program has uncovered U.S. citizens serving as Soviet agents. Mr. Helms replied that one such instance was the case of Sergeant Rhodes. (Mr. McCone interjected that if there has not been a mix-up in signals, Dunlap would have been turned up as an agent. Mr. Clifford said that the Board knew about that.)

Dr. Langer asked whether the FBI is more active now in its counterespionage coverage in the United States.....

....In answer to Mr. Clifford's query about news accounts of CIA agent operations in Cuba, Mr. McCone said that CIA has a very active operation against Cuba and the Board has been briefed on it from time to time. Although there have been some disappointments and roll-ups of agents, CIA has vastly improved its agent nets and internal agent sources among legal travelers and friendly foreign government missions in Cuba. Of the [REDACTED] (16) agents reportedly executed in Cuba, [REDACTED] (16) were CIA's. One unfortunate experience was the identification of the [REDACTED ] (08) as a CIA support ship. (Mr. Helms said that the story first came to public attention on October 21 when Cuban planes straffed a bauxite ore vessel thinking it was the mother ship which CIA was using to return an agent team from a desolate area in Western Cuba. The CIA agent team had been in 6 weeks, had recruited additional agents, and was scheduled to come out on October 21. The [REDACTED] (08) was lying off shore and personnel were sent ashore in small boats to meet the agent team. The infrared blinker signals from shore were correctly given, although the lights were placed closer together than they should have been. A hailing signal was given from a rubber boat and was acknowledged, but then machine gun fire opened up on the small boats.) [REDACTED] CORONA [REDACTED – two paragraphs ]…. [see: Collins Radio Connections]

Mr. McCone replied that his recommendation to the Secretary of Defense is to overhaul the security system and to ensure that military personnel assigned to NSA be subjected to the same kind of security screening as that which NSA applies to its civilian personnel, ie……a background investigation and polygraph examination. ….

[REDACTED paragraph]

Next Mr. McCone reported to the Board on the recent U-2 cash in the Gulf of Mexico. The whole plane has been found in 9 fathoms of water 40 miles NW of Key West. The ejector canopy is off and the seat is out. An empty life raft and parachute were found. There was no attack made on the aircraft. The pilot reported a successful mission over Cuba, he flied over the Key West station on the return trip and 10 minutes later he was down. When the wreckage is raised it should be possible to determine the cause.

Mr. McCone said this exhausted the list of things he had in mind to discuss at this meeting.

Mr. Clifford asked if there were any intelligence facets of the arrest of U.S. professor Barghorn in the USSR. The DCI said that an analysis of the professor's debriefing had not yet been completed. He had no intelligence mission even indirectly, but was once a CIA consultant and the KGB knew that. No doubt this Soviet move was made because they had run out of pawns to use in …. An exchange for the Soviet spy Egeroff arrested in the U.S. As a matter of fact CIA had forecast that the Soviets would do something like this when they ran out of people to use in exchanges….

…Mr. McCone said he would now ask Mr. Colby to brief the Board, noting that Mr. Clby attended the Honolulu meeting (as did Mr. McCone) and is knowledgeable of the decisions made there. (At 12:25 Mr. McCone left the Board meeting to keep his appointment with Mr. Bundy)....

……(Discussion on Vietnam)

Mr. Colby concluded his discussion with the Board and left the meeting at 1:00 p.m.

In executive session, the Board had a further discussion of its report to be made to President Kennedy on the Dunlap case. Chairman Clifford brought Messrs. Murphy and Pace up to date on the principal matters covered at the preceding day's session of the Board meeting with regard to the extensive review and materials which had been completed thus far by Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne in the Dunlap case. Mr. Clifford summed up the Board's reaction of being aghast at the shocking looseness of security at the NSA. He referred to the many questions which had been put to the Director of NSA at yesterday's session.

Mr. Clifford observed that General Fitch had made a very intelligent presentation, and that an exceedingly valuable session had been had with General Carroll of DIA. Mr. Clifford said that after lunch the Board would complete its consideration of the Dunlap report and recommendations which the Board Panel had drafted. Arrangements had not been made for a meeting of Board members with President Kennedy in conjunction with this particular Board meeting because Mr. Clifford had felt that the Board would require all the time of this 2-day meeting to complete action on its report on a complex subject.

Chairman Clifford said that Board members should plan to convene for half a day at the next Board meeting and then meet with the President for an hour on the Dunlap case report. In view of the serious nature of the counterintelligence problems involved, Mr. Clifford expressed the opinion that the Board's report and recommendations may well constitute one of the most important contributions which the Board has made.

Mr. Clifford then informed Board members Murphy and Pace of the Board's discussion yesterday assessing the degree of damage resulting from Dunlap's espionage activities. Recognizing the difficulty of arriving at an assessment at this time, Mr. Clifford observed that the damage must have been serious, and he noted that the CIA is still evaluating its practice of sending its sensitive documents to the NSA. Mr. Clifford stated that despite differences of opinion which may exist as to the damage done to U.S. interests by Dunlap's espionage service for the Russians, the Board has information which bears on the subject but which cannot be made generally known and which the Board can pass on only to the President. (Mr. Clifford then related to the Board the most sensitive item, consisting of information which had been given to Mr. Coyne by appropriate authority, for reporting to the Board and to the President. It was agreed by Board members that the Board must take particular pains to protect this information, and would do so.)

At 1:35 the Board adjourned for lunch at the White House Staff Mess.

Having heard the report of the assassination of President Kennedy which had just occurred at 2:00 p.m. EST in Dallas, Chairman Clifford reconvened the Board in executive session. Mr. Clifford expressed the keen sense of personal loss which he felt upon the President's death. He joined Board members in their individual expressions of profound sorrow occasioned by the tragic circumstances of the President's death, and their deep sympathy and concern for the President's family.

Chairman Clifford announced that at this point the Board's meeting of the past two days was at a close, and that completion of the Board's report was in preparation for submission to President Kennedy would be suspended pending further developments.

It was Chairman Clifford's feeling that it would be inappropriate and premature, during the transition period following President Kennedy's death, for the Board to present to President Johnson the Board's recommendations calling for substantial changes in the U.S. intelligence effort. Mr. Clifford expressed his intention, and Board members agreed, to indicate to President Johnson as soon as possible the Board's willingness to serve in any way possible. Meanwhile, pending a resolution by President Johnson as to whether the Board will continue as an institution, and as to the President's wishes concerning continued services of the present Chairman and members, Chairman Clifford asked that the Board members be prepared to meet on a quick notice should intelligence developments require it.

Mr. Clifford said that he would inform the DCI of the course of action which the Board was taking at this time.

The Board meeting was adjourned at 3:20 p.m., subject to call of the Chairman as determined by developments.

A.R. Ash

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

CORONA/[REDACTED] 05

BK Notes: So one immediate result of the assassination, within the hour, the PFIAB decided that its report to the President on special knoweldge on the Dunlap case that Mr. Coyne had learned from JEH, and advising substantical changes in the intelligence establishment of the government, would "be suspended pending further developments.

I also find it interesting that the CIA didn't want Powers back and argued against the trade of Able for Powers.

BK

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  • 2 months later...

Given Bill Simpich's latest installment of Oswald in New Orleans, which mentions the signifiance of the betrayal of NSA's Dunlap,

I thought I would revive this thread that mentions how DCIA McCone was briefing the President Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

on the subject of Dunlap at the time of the assassination.

What's more, Mr. Coyne, a board member, said that he was given explosive information concerning Dunlap from J. E. Hoover, information

that he wanted to personally convey to President Kennedy, but didn't have a chance to because of the assassination.

Does anyone know anything about this Mr. Coyne, a member of the PFIAB?

BK

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  • 2 years later...

Hi Bill, here's my thinking on where the explosive information provided by Coyne came from...this is in Part 4 of the Legend Makers series. Coyne, by the way, was an ex-FBI agent and was deep in the world of intelligence. This ties in with Clifford's statement that Hoover had a "uniquely valuable intelligence source which supplied information concerning the espionage activities of Dunlap". Bill S.

The story behind the shootdown of the U-2, and how it played into Oswald's decision to return to the USA

An NSA agent named Jack Dunlap now enters our story in a most dramatic fashion. "An extremely sensitive and reliable source" is quoted in an FBI letterhead memo that "Dunlap gave the Soviets important information regarding the U-2 flights over the USSR and that Dunlap's information provided the Soviet Union with the capability of shooting down the Powers U-2 aircraft...as a result of Dunlap's information, the Soviets were well aware of when the U-2 planes crossed over the Soviet Union. The Soviets always had their anti-aircraft guns trained on those planes." This source was known as TOPHAT. TOPHAT was Lt. General Dmitri Fedorovich Polyakov, exposed by Aldrich Ames - a real mole inside the CIA - whose motivation was money and not ideology.

The FBI memo that recounts TOPHAT's story then adds that "Khrushchev held back from allowing them to shoot down the planes, waiting for an appropriate political time to do this. Khrushchev eventually "gave the okay" to shoot down the Powers U-2 aircraft at a time when he thought it would do the most good for Soviet prestige and at a time when he was being pressed by China to show their hand." From the wording of the memo, it's unclear if TOPHAT was the source referring to Khrushchev's actions.

Dunlap succeeded in his mission even though CI chief James Angleton realized that Dunlap was a mole in 1959, a year before what is known as the U-2 affair. After Dunlap committed suicide in July 1963, and numerous classified documents turned up in his possession, his widow admitted to the FBI on August 20, 1963 that Dunlap told her before his suicide that he had been selling secrets to the Soviets.

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