Did this declassified report lead to the firing of CIA Director Allen Dulles and others?

[Douglas Caddy]

 

 

RFKOH-MDT-01-TR.pdf (jfklibrary.org)

[Kirk Gallaway]

Wow! interesting stuff Doug! You get the impression from Taylor that neither Mongoose or Lansdale really got off the ground!

Re: Mongoose

HACKMAN: Can you remember any dissatisfaction on Robert
Kennedy's part in terms of the Mongoose Com-
mittee with the kinds of things that were being
suggested either by Lansdale or by the CIA people who were
working with Lansdale?
TAYLOR: Well, yes, I would. I think we all were critical
in a sense. Many times it didn't seem to make
much sense to try something in Cuba which ~ould
endanger the lives of some of the Cubans who were involved in
the thi~g. I think ±hat that sense of responsibility he [RFK]
had very, very deeply. "Why lose lives if the return isn't
clearly clearly worth it?" he would ask. And so many of
these little tasks were just annoyances to Castro and of
very questionable v.alue.

RE:Lansdale:

 

HACKMAN:
TAYLOR:
HACKMAN:
~l5-
Do you know why at some point fira.lly the
Lansdale thing on Cuba, the Mongoose operation,
was sort of shifted to State? Is this just
because he runs out of things to do?
I didn't know that it had •.
so, I'd forgotten.
Finally, yes , it was.
. it was. If
TAYLOR: See, Lansdale was really chosen on the grounds
of being a reputed Cold Warrior who had won
his spurs in various places in the Far East.
So it was really his personal background that got him his
job rather than what he happened to be--a general in the
Air Force.
HACKMAN: Had his appointment on that been primarilyat
Robert Kennedy's suggestion, or was it your
suggestion, or can you remember how that was
made?
TAYLOR: I can't recall. I can't recall how it became
Lansdale. I would say that the general feeling
was that he disappointed us because he didn't
come up with programs which, even if successful, would be
very . effective. And there always seemed to be a wordiness
about his proposals; they were not concise effective plans
which offered some hope of progress

******

TAYLOR: Well, since the Bay of Pigs , we really had
the choice of ejecting Castro by military
means, which nobody proposed after the Bay
of Pigs, of simply doing nothing and taking a philosophical
point of view, "Well, time will take care of Castro," or
doing something in between which would make his life gs
unpleasant as possible, · make it just as hard as possible, and
so to facilitate time, to be a helper to time . Well, the
latter was really what we were doing, but little by little
we saw that Castro was not getting weaker. If anything, ·he
was getting stronger. And as I recall, the Mongoose effort
just gradually died down. I don't ever recall it being
called off. Now I've never consulted the record. As a
matter of fact , you see, in October '52 I went over, and I
became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and gave up the Chair-
man of the Mongoose Committee

*****

I always like insights like these. Re: RFK

TAYLOR: I don't think that he did, although I would say
it seemed to me that Bob had a sense for
organization as a device, as a useful tool of
government, beyond what the President had. Duri?g the Bay
of Pigs we had a lot of discussions on what kind of adjust-
ments of the federal relationshii:swould be necessary to
permit the kind of .focusing of inter-departmental power that
we thought was necessary. And it seemed to me that he under-
stood organization and was for it, whereas I never felt that '
President Kennedy ever eared about it--he talked in terms of
people. When I started to work for him, one of the things
Bob told me was, "Now, you'll have to remember my brother
doesn't think the way you do," referring to my old military
past, which he was always throwing up to me. "He thinks
<bout issues and people, and he likes to talk things out."
And I soon found that the most carefully prepared fact sheet
would rarely get read. Bob had been a great help to me in
pointing out the P~esident's foibles, but it always seemed to
me Bobby talked my language to a very great degree and sensed
the need for order around the President, which he realized
was not present in that first year, a very disorderly year.

******

Re: RFK

HACKMAN: Did he ever have any problems in understanding
any of either the written materials that you
gave him or the discussion that was going on?
TAYLOR: No. We had many military debates during t h e
Bay of Pigs, and, of course, I'd accuse him of
becoming a field marshal after the first week.
But we'd get on and argue the tactics of the 1anding and
what was reasonable and what was unreasonable . And ever y
now and then in later years he'd say whenever I would

:
..;26-
criticize his position on Viet Nam, "Well, you're the man
responsible. You taught me all these things about not
taking armies into Asia." Of course, he was a very quick
intellect, and he was very perceptive, also he was a good
listener during a period of time that he wasn't sure of him-
self. Then after when he knew what he was talking about,
he didn't hesitate to make his views known.
He also had a good sense of humor and an ability to
laugh about himself which I've never heard commented on.
He could kid himself in an awfully nice way--a very, very
appealing way.

Edited September 27, 2022 by Kirk Gallaway

[W. Niederhut]

     Reading this Taylor interview transcript brings something to mind for me.

     I'm currently reading Stephen Kinzer's book, The Brothers, about Allen and John Foster Dulles, and I recently read Kinzer's account of the successful CIA op to oust Jacob Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954.

     What caught my eye was the report that the CIA op in Guatemala was actually failing until Eisenhower agreed at the last minute to send in additional bombers.

     And, needless to say, Eisenhower was quite pleased with the success of Allen Dulles's low-budget covert ops to oust Mossadegh in Iran and Arbenz in Guatemala.

     Dulles must have expected the same thing to happen at the Bay of Pigs invasion that had salvaged his op in Guatemala-- supplemental bombing.

     But JFK didn't share Eisenhower's conviction that you have to win the thing if you intend to start shooting.

     

Edited September 27, 2022 by W. Niederhut

[Guest]

8 hours ago, Kirk Gallaway said:

Wow! interesting stuff Doug! You get the impression from Taylor that neither Mongoose or Lansdale really got off the ground!

Re: Mongoose

HACKMAN: Can you remember any dissatisfaction on Robert
Kennedy's part in terms of the Mongoose Com-
mittee with the kinds of things that were being
suggested either by Lansdale or by the CIA people who were
working with Lansdale?
TAYLOR: Well, yes, I would. I think we all were critical
in a sense. Many times it didn't seem to make
much sense to try something in Cuba which ~ould
endanger the lives of some of the Cubans who were involved in
the thi~g. I think ±hat that sense of responsibility he [RFK]
had very, very deeply. "Why lose lives if the return isn't
clearly clearly worth it?" he would ask. And so many of
these little tasks were just annoyances to Castro and of
very questionable v.alue.

RE:Lansdale:

 

HACKMAN:
TAYLOR:
HACKMAN:
~l5-
Do you know why at some point fira.lly the
Lansdale thing on Cuba, the Mongoose operation,
was sort of shifted to State? Is this just
because he runs out of things to do?
I didn't know that it had •.
so, I'd forgotten.
Finally, yes , it was.
. it was. If
TAYLOR: See, Lansdale was really chosen on the grounds
of being a reputed Cold Warrior who had won
his spurs in various places in the Far East.
So it was really his personal background that got him his
job rather than what he happened to be--a general in the
Air Force.
HACKMAN: Had his appointment on that been primarilyat
Robert Kennedy's suggestion, or was it your
suggestion, or can you remember how that was
made?
TAYLOR: I can't recall. I can't recall how it became
Lansdale. I would say that the general feeling
was that he disappointed us because he didn't
come up with programs which, even if successful, would be
very . effective. And there always seemed to be a wordiness
about his proposals; they were not concise effective plans
which offered some hope of progress

******

TAYLOR: Well, since the Bay of Pigs , we really had
the choice of ejecting Castro by military
means, which nobody proposed after the Bay
of Pigs, of simply doing nothing and taking a philosophical
point of view, "Well, time will take care of Castro," or
doing something in between which would make his life gs
unpleasant as possible, · make it just as hard as possible, and
so to facilitate time, to be a helper to time . Well, the
latter was really what we were doing, but little by little
we saw that Castro was not getting weaker. If anything, ·he
was getting stronger. And as I recall, the Mongoose effort
just gradually died down. I don't ever recall it being
called off. Now I've never consulted the record. As a
matter of fact , you see, in October '52 I went over, and I
became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and gave up the Chair-
man of the Mongoose Committee

*****

I always like insights like these. Re: RFK

TAYLOR: I don't think that he did, although I would say
it seemed to me that Bob had a sense for
organization as a device, as a useful tool of
government, beyond what the President had. Duri?g the Bay
of Pigs we had a lot of discussions on what kind of adjust-
ments of the federal relationshii:swould be necessary to
permit the kind of .focusing of inter-departmental power that
we thought was necessary. And it seemed to me that he under-
stood organization and was for it, whereas I never felt that '
President Kennedy ever eared about it--he talked in terms of
people. When I started to work for him, one of the things
Bob told me was, "Now, you'll have to remember my brother
doesn't think the way you do," referring to my old military
past, which he was always throwing up to me. "He thinks
<bout issues and people, and he likes to talk things out."
And I soon found that the most carefully prepared fact sheet
would rarely get read. Bob had been a great help to me in
pointing out the P~esident's foibles, but it always seemed to
me Bobby talked my language to a very great degree and sensed
the need for order around the President, which he realized
was not present in that first year, a very disorderly year.

******

Re: RFK

HACKMAN: Did he ever have any problems in understanding
any of either the written materials that you
gave him or the discussion that was going on?
TAYLOR: No. We had many military debates during t h e
Bay of Pigs, and, of course, I'd accuse him of
becoming a field marshal after the first week.
But we'd get on and argue the tactics of the 1anding and
what was reasonable and what was unreasonable . And ever y
now and then in later years he'd say whenever I would

:
..;26-
criticize his position on Viet Nam, "Well, you're the man
responsible. You taught me all these things about not
taking armies into Asia." Of course, he was a very quick
intellect, and he was very perceptive, also he was a good
listener during a period of time that he wasn't sure of him-
self. Then after when he knew what he was talking about,
he didn't hesitate to make his views known.
He also had a good sense of humor and an ability to
laugh about himself which I've never heard commented on.
He could kid himself in an awfully nice way--a very, very
appealing way.

A fascinating transcript. Thanks 

[David Andrews]

Did Northwoods never go into action because the plan was too complicated and wordy?  Wow.