John F Kennedy's Fight to Stop WW3 and America's Tragic Slide into Empire

[Paul Rigby]

From the Youtube intro:

On Sunday Nov 19, Rising Tide Foundation President Cynthia Chung delivered a presentation honoring the life’s mission, and combat against imperialism, and the threat of WW3 led by America’s martyred president John F Kennedy who’s life was cut short in Dallas Texas on November 22, 1963.

 

A rare, serious, extended attempt to define Kennedy's radical foreign policy perspectives and initiatives. 

[Bill Fite]

@Paul Rigby Thanks for posting this.  Listening to it now.

Edited November 23, 2023 by Bill Fite

[Michael Griffith]

Regarding Patrice Lumumba, liberals tend to whitewash or ignore his tyrannical actions and deadly political blunders that triggered his assassination. The segment on Lumumba in JFK Revisited is typical of the uncritical, one-sided liberal portrayals of him. 

No, I do not condone Eisenhower's decision to order Lumumba's death, and I certainly do not condone how the CIA carried out the order, but I can certainly understand why Ike, John and Allen Dulles, and others in the intel community believed that Lumumba had to be eliminated. 

If you want to get the other side of the story on Lumumba, here is a good article on him in the UN's publication UN News:

Character Sketches: Patrice Lumumba by Brian Urquhart | UN News

[Paul Rigby]

 

[Paul Rigby]

3 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Regarding Patrice Lumumba, liberals tend to whitewash or ignore his tyrannical actions and deadly political blunders that triggered his assassination. The segment on Lumumba in JFK Revisited is typical of the uncritical, one-sided liberal portrayals of him. 

No, I do not condone Eisenhower's decision to order Lumumba's death, and I certainly do not condone how the CIA carried out the order, but I can certainly understand why Ike, John and Allen Dulles, and others in the intel community believed that Lumumba had to be eliminated. 

If you want to get the other side of the story on Lumumba, here is a good article on him in the UN's publication UN News:

Character Sketches: Patrice Lumumba by Brian Urquhart | UN News

New York Review of Books, December 20, 2001

https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2001/12/20/the-tragedy-of-lumumba-an-exchange/

 

To the Editors:

In the review of my book The Assassination of Lumumba [NYR, October 4], Brian Urquhart focuses on the role of the UN in the Congo crisis (1960–1964). Thus Urquhart draws attention to a subject highly relevant for international politics today. The way he handles the issue, however, is less constructive. Research shows that UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld played a decisive role in the overthrow of the Congolese government of Patrice Lumumba. Overlooking the facts, Urquhart calls this conclusion “ridiculous.” Once a member of the UN Secretariat himself, he clings to the official view that the UN is neutral and impartial, and that its intervention in the Congo had no other purpose than to keep “the cold war” out of Africa. If only this had been true.

In July 1960 the Security Council sent Blue Helmets to the Congo, where Belgian troops had invaded and seceded the rich copper province of Katanga. The UN mission was to provide the Congolese government with military aid until it could fulfill its tasks properly. Formally responding to the request of Lumumba, the operation was conceived not to hurt Washington’s ally. The UN asked Belgium to withdraw, but without a deadline. UN troops were deployed in the Congo, but not in Katanga. This gave Brussels crucial time to build up a puppet regime in Katanga around Moïse Tshombe. Urquhart pretends that Lumumba was “obsessed” with the secession. Lumumba had good reasons for this: the secession deprived the Congo of two thirds of its income and was throttling the country. UN troops finally entered Katanga, but only after Hammarskjöld guaranteed that the Belgian troops could stay, provided they put on a “Katangese” uniform. Belgian functionaries were unhindered to construct the “independent” state.

In September President Kasa Vubu carried out a coup and deposed Prime Minister Lumumba. Urquhart maintains that the UN didn’t take sides. In fact, the secretary-general had told US diplomats in secret that “Lumumba must be broken.” He gave the green light for the UN to support the coup. The UN closed the airports, so that loyal troops couldn’t come to the help of Lumumba. The UN also closed the radio station, so that Lumumba couldn’t appeal to the population. And the UN distributed money to the Congolese soldiers on condition that they stayed passive before the coup. (In his book Hammarskjöld Urquhart “forgets” to mention that the money was secretly provided by Washington…)

After the coup, the Congolese parliament renewed its confidence in Lumumba. But Colonel Mobutu dissolved parliament, and Lumumba was locked up in his residence, surrounded by a double cordon: one of UN guards protecting him, and a second cordon of Mobutu’s soldiers, who officially wanted to arrest him. Urquhart states that the US wanted Mobutu to arrest Lumumba, but that Hammarskjöld refused this, and wanted a reconciliation between Lumumba and Kasa Vubu and the reopening of parliament. The truth is that the UN and the US agreed to keep Lumumba locked up: this signified “Lumumba’s political death,” as the US ambassador in the Congo wrote. UN leaders sent home a UN official who tried to reconcile Lumumba and Kasa Vubu. While the UN helped to destroy Congolese democracy, the secretary-general built his image of “neutrality.” His aides were to answer Lumumba’s letters for a particular reason: “I think more of our record than of courtesy to a certain individual. It would be good to be able later on, if necessary, to publish replies as having been sent before an attack” on the attitude of the UN…

At the end of November, Lumumba fled his residence to join his supporters in the east. Halfway through his trip, he fell in the hands of Mobutu’s soldiers. Urquhart doesn’t mention that this happened after Lumumba had asked for UN protection but this was refused by UN Commander Von Horn… While in Mobutu’s death cell, and after his transfer to Katanga, while Lumumba was tortured and killed, the UN made not one move to save his life. Urquhart contests that the UN force was “huge.” However, compared with the extremely weak forces of Mobutu and Tshombe, it was overwhelming. In fact, without UN military support the Katangese secessionists would have been toppled by the nationalists long before they could lay their hands on Lumumba. Hammarskjöld’s problem was not a lack of military force, but of political will. Before Lumumba’s death, the UN wouldn’t even consider measures to reopen parliament, although its mandate was to help restore law and order. The UN followed in this the objectives of Washington, who feared Lumumba’s political power. The West and the UN favored the reopening of parliament only after his death, when the nationalist danger was gone.

Urquhart is right that the West criticized aspects of the UN operation in the Congo. However, these criticisms were for public consumption, or a counterweight to the Afro-Asian pressure on the UN leadership to help Lumumba. In itself they don’t prove the “neutrality” of the UN. History shows that this neutrality is a myth. The UN was the most important vehicle of destroying the Congolese government and laying the groundworks for the dictatorship of Mobutu which wrecked the country.

Ludo De Witte

Louvain, Belgium

[Michael Griffith]

2 hours ago, Paul Rigby said:

New York Review of Books, December 20, 2001

https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2001/12/20/the-tragedy-of-lumumba-an-exchange/

 

To the Editors:

In the review of my book The Assassination of Lumumba [NYR, October 4], Brian Urquhart focuses on the role of the UN in the Congo crisis (1960–1964). Thus Urquhart draws attention to a subject highly relevant for international politics today. The way he handles the issue, however, is less constructive. Research shows that UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld played a decisive role in the overthrow of the Congolese government of Patrice Lumumba. Overlooking the facts, Urquhart calls this conclusion “ridiculous.” Once a member of the UN Secretariat himself, he clings to the official view that the UN is neutral and impartial, and that its intervention in the Congo had no other purpose than to keep “the cold war” out of Africa. If only this had been true.

In July 1960 the Security Council sent Blue Helmets to the Congo, where Belgian troops had invaded and seceded the rich copper province of Katanga. The UN mission was to provide the Congolese government with military aid until it could fulfill its tasks properly. Formally responding to the request of Lumumba, the operation was conceived not to hurt Washington’s ally. The UN asked Belgium to withdraw, but without a deadline. UN troops were deployed in the Congo, but not in Katanga. This gave Brussels crucial time to build up a puppet regime in Katanga around Moïse Tshombe. Urquhart pretends that Lumumba was “obsessed” with the secession. Lumumba had good reasons for this: the secession deprived the Congo of two thirds of its income and was throttling the country. UN troops finally entered Katanga, but only after Hammarskjöld guaranteed that the Belgian troops could stay, provided they put on a “Katangese” uniform. Belgian functionaries were unhindered to construct the “independent” state.

In September President Kasa Vubu carried out a coup and deposed Prime Minister Lumumba. Urquhart maintains that the UN didn’t take sides. In fact, the secretary-general had told US diplomats in secret that “Lumumba must be broken.” He gave the green light for the UN to support the coup. The UN closed the airports, so that loyal troops couldn’t come to the help of Lumumba. The UN also closed the radio station, so that Lumumba couldn’t appeal to the population. And the UN distributed money to the Congolese soldiers on condition that they stayed passive before the coup. (In his book Hammarskjöld Urquhart “forgets” to mention that the money was secretly provided by Washington…)

After the coup, the Congolese parliament renewed its confidence in Lumumba. But Colonel Mobutu dissolved parliament, and Lumumba was locked up in his residence, surrounded by a double cordon: one of UN guards protecting him, and a second cordon of Mobutu’s soldiers, who officially wanted to arrest him. Urquhart states that the US wanted Mobutu to arrest Lumumba, but that Hammarskjöld refused this, and wanted a reconciliation between Lumumba and Kasa Vubu and the reopening of parliament. The truth is that the UN and the US agreed to keep Lumumba locked up: this signified “Lumumba’s political death,” as the US ambassador in the Congo wrote. UN leaders sent home a UN official who tried to reconcile Lumumba and Kasa Vubu. While the UN helped to destroy Congolese democracy, the secretary-general built his image of “neutrality.” His aides were to answer Lumumba’s letters for a particular reason: “I think more of our record than of courtesy to a certain individual. It would be good to be able later on, if necessary, to publish replies as having been sent before an attack” on the attitude of the UN…

At the end of November, Lumumba fled his residence to join his supporters in the east. Halfway through his trip, he fell in the hands of Mobutu’s soldiers. Urquhart doesn’t mention that this happened after Lumumba had asked for UN protection but this was refused by UN Commander Von Horn… While in Mobutu’s death cell, and after his transfer to Katanga, while Lumumba was tortured and killed, the UN made not one move to save his life. Urquhart contests that the UN force was “huge.” However, compared with the extremely weak forces of Mobutu and Tshombe, it was overwhelming. In fact, without UN military support the Katangese secessionists would have been toppled by the nationalists long before they could lay their hands on Lumumba. Hammarskjöld’s problem was not a lack of military force, but of political will. Before Lumumba’s death, the UN wouldn’t even consider measures to reopen parliament, although its mandate was to help restore law and order. The UN followed in this the objectives of Washington, who feared Lumumba’s political power. The West and the UN favored the reopening of parliament only after his death, when the nationalist danger was gone.

Urquhart is right that the West criticized aspects of the UN operation in the Congo. However, these criticisms were for public consumption, or a counterweight to the Afro-Asian pressure on the UN leadership to help Lumumba. In itself they don’t prove the “neutrality” of the UN. History shows that this neutrality is a myth. The UN was the most important vehicle of destroying the Congolese government and laying the groundworks for the dictatorship of Mobutu which wrecked the country.

Ludo De Witte

Louvain, Belgium

None of this addresses Lumumba's violent repression and severe political blunders. He ordered violence against people for voicing the slightest criticism of him. He was hardly the paragon of virtue and democracy that many liberals paint him as being.

Two of his serious political errors were accepting Soviet aid and then publicly bragging about his Soviet support. Given the vital strategic importance of the Congo, those actions put a target on his back. 

[James DiEugenio]

This is pretty good I think.  There are a couple of points I disagree with, but overall I think its an honest attempt to place JFK in historical perspective.

Somebody wrote me about that episode she mentions in The Crown with JFK and his wife.  I watched it and she is correct.  It was almost like a cartoon which actually was the inverse of what really happened.

Everyone should read that testimony by DeGaulle at 1:59:28.  He was just as insightful as Castro on what really happened in Dallas. And he predicted what would happen afterwards concerning the cover up.

Let me add, Paul should also be lauded for putting in that reply by De Witte.  I knew that Hammarskjold was late in sending aid to Lumumba.  I did not know he was trying to assuage the Belgians, however slightly. (Which would make the Russian criticism of him partly warranted.) But if De Witte is correct, that was a real mistake by Dag. And this made Kennedy's goal even harder to achieve.

What happened in Congo, as Jonathan Kwitny noted, was a really overlooked epic tragedy.  Let me quote the most eloquent passage in a fine book:

The democratic experiment had no example in Africa, and badly needed one.  So perhaps the sorriest, and the most unnecessary, blight on the record of this new era, is that the precedent for it all, the very first coup in postcolonial African history, the very first political assassination and the very first junking of a legally constituted democratic system, all took place in a major country, and were all instigated by the United States of America. (Endless Enemies, p. 75)

I would not say that it was all on the USA, as the Belgians and British had a role in it.  But it is important to note that Lumumba won an election, and that his government was part of a constitutional republic. Therefore, America was not supporting democracy as we said we are.  Eisenhower requested the murder of a democratically elected leader and Dulles then allotted a budget of 100,000 dollars to do it, the equivalent of a million today. To say that the results of Lumumba's murder were disastrous is  an understatement.  And Jeff Sachs, in one of his most laudatory moments, addressed it on a visit over there. 

 

Edited November 29, 2023 by James DiEugenio

[Paul Brancato]

Jim - thanks for reminding me of where I heard that upside down story in the Crown about Nkrumah. That’s really troubling. 
btw I finally put someone on my ignore list. Feels good. 

[James DiEugenio]

Someone actually wrote me about that episode and said, did not Kennedy have a good relationship with Nkrumah? I said yes.  She said you should see this episode on The Crown then because that is not what they are depicting.  So I watched it and was really startled as to how bad it was. 

LOL,  😃 I won't ask who.

I should add, when I see something like this presentation, and I get a note like I mentioned above, it makes me feel a bit better about the last 11 years of my life, in which I have spent excavating Kennedy's real foreign policy.

Edited November 29, 2023 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

BTW, I would like to congratulate Paul RIgby on this.

Paul digs up some of the most elusive yet valuable pieces of information on the web.

He does not post that often, but when he does, it is interesting.

This group, for instance,  is out of Montreal. And I would have never heard of them if not for Paul.

[Paul Rigby]

Cold Case Hammarskjöld (2019)

Danish director Mads Brügger and Swedish private investigator Göran Björkdahl are trying to solve the mysterious death of Dag Hammarskjöld. As their investigation closes in, they discover a crime far worse than killing the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

 

[James DiEugenio]

I saw the film and its quite interesting.

If you have not seen it, do so.

[Paul Brancato]

Agree