The Otis Pike Report

[Tim Gratz]

Tim I assume you agree that it is always legally wrong but (in your opinion anyway) not always morally wrong to leak classified information.

What about the gentleman who leaked classified information to one of our allies, Israel. Was what he did, in your opinion, morally wrong if he did it to aid or protect Israel?

[Tim Carroll]

Tim I assume you agree that it is always legally wrong but (in your opinion anyway) not always morally wrong to leak classified information.

"Legally," it is currently always a violation of the law to leak classified information.

What about the gentleman who leaked classified information to one of our allies, Israel. Was what he did, in your opinion, morally wrong if he did it to aid or protect Israel?

As I distinguished the Judyth Miller matter as not being covered under any conceived future shield law, so also espionage would not be covered. The law should reflect my moral position, if I may say so, that the distinctions between circumstances need to be better codified.

Tim

[Tim Gratz]

Tim I was refering to a CIA agent convicted of passing secrets to Israel, one of our allies.

I assume I did not make that clear.

I assume you would agree that a CIA official cannot disclose classified material even to an ally and the good intentions of the agent are irrelevant to a prosecution?

[John Simkin]

John wrote:

I am fully aware that you are against the leaking of CIA documents unless they show that Castro/KGB were behind the assassination of JFK. You did not seem to mind when James Angleton leaked documents suggesting a left-wing conspiracy against JFK.

John, obviously I never said this and I have written that the security laws should be enforced regardless of who wants to violate them or for what purpose.

So, though you may disagree with why or how Congress voted not to release the Pike Report, do you agree that it was wrong for whoever leaked it to the press to do so?

This is a moral and not a legal issue. I believe it is completely immoral to name a CIA agent working in the field. This would clearly endanger their life and those agents who they were working with.

I do not think it is immoral to name a journalist who is working as a CIA asset. Their life is clearly not at risk. What is put at risk is their integrity. People tend to reply on journalists to tell the truth. The American people obviously need to be protected from people who have prostituted themselves by working for the intelligence services in some propaganda/disinformation campaign.

Of course, the Otis Report was never about naming CIA agents. If never sought to do this. The CIA's objection to the publication of this report concerned Pike’s claims about how the agency had been using taxpayers’ money to fund illegal activities. They were particularly appalled by the fact they had spent so much money on disinformation campaigns in the media. The Democrats on the committee thought this was undermining democracy in America (and the rest of the world). The Republicans were not concerned about this. When we look at the records of people like Nixon, Reagan and Bush, we can understand why.

There was also another important feature to the Pike report that the CIA did not want to enter the public domain. Pike’s committee found evidence of financial corruption within the CIA. This was inevitable giving the secrecy of its operations. The CIA was paying out large sums of money to individuals and organisations to provide equipment and services. The CIA refused to provide the paperwork to explain what they were up to. In other words, they were not accountable to Congress for their activities. Given such a system, it was inevitable that the CIA would give out money and contracts to individuals or companies in return for backhanders. They would also provide money to friends and relatives. Pike’s committee, rightly concluded, that the American people expected Congress to oversee this process in order to make sure corruption did not take place.

The Republicans on the committee disagreed. They thought the CIA should have the freedom to edit and rewrite the report. It is not clear why this was. Officially they said it was because of threats to “national security”. By arranging for the report to be published in the media, the Democrats proved that this was a lie. Why then did the Republicans, Gerald Ford and the CIA work together to promote this lie? Maybe Tim Gratz can explain it? If not, I have a few suggestions why this happened.

[Tim Carroll]

Tim I was refering to a CIA agent convicted of passing secrets to Israel, one of our allies. I assume I did not make that clear. I assume you would agree that a CIA official cannot disclose classified material even to an ally and the good intentions of the agent are irrelevant to a prosecution?

I believe I understood about the Israeli spying when I previously responded: "As I distinguished the Judyth Miller matter as not being covered under any conceived future shield law, so also espionage would not be covered." Jonothan Pollard was engaged in espionage by any definition, regardless of whether or not he was working for an ally.

Tim

[Pat Speer]

I believe I understood about the Israeli spying when I previously responded: "As I distinguished the Judyth Miller matter as not being covered under any conceived future shield law, so also espionage would not be covered." Jonothan Pollard was engaged in espionage by any definition, regardless of whether or not he was working for an ally.

Tim

What makes you think Israel's an ally?

[Tim Carroll]

What makes you think Israel's an ally?

I fell in love with Israel during a visit there in 1975 and never questioned U.S. support for that country until 2000, when Sharon was elected and began overtly provoking trouble. Since then it's all been downhill.

Tim

[John Simkin]

Namebase entry for Otis Pike:

http://www.namebase.org/main3/Otis-G-_28d_2Dny_29-Pike.html

Agee,P. On the Run. 1987 (143)

Jeffreys-Jones,R. The CIA and American Democracy. 1989 (207-9)

Kaufman,R. The War Profiteers. 1970 (65, 118)

Mackenzie,A. Secrets: The CIA's War at Home. 1997 (66, 172)

Mintz,M. Cohen,J. Power, Inc. 1977 (477, 494)

NameBase NewsLine 1997-04 (8)

Olmsted,K. Challenging the Secret Government. 1996

Prados,J. Presidents' Secret Wars. 1988 (334-6)

Quirk,J. Central Intelligence Agency: A Photographic History. 1986 (196)

Scott,P.D. Marshall,J. Cocaine Politics. 1991 (163, 250-1)

Tarpley,W.G. Chaitkin,A. George Bush. 1992 (303-4)

Willan,P. Puppetmasters. 1991 (114-5)

Wise,D. The American Police State. 1978 (202)

[Ron Ecker]

What makes you think Israel's an ally?

I fell in love with Israel during a visit there in 1975 and never questioned U.S. support for that country until 2000, when Sharon was elected and began overtly provoking trouble. Since then it's all been downhill.

"Remember the Liberty."

[John Simkin]

The Otis Report was never about naming CIA agents. If never sought to do this. The CIA's objection to the publication of this report concerned Pike’s claims about how the agency had been using taxpayers’ money to fund illegal activities. They were particularly appalled by the fact they had spent so much money on disinformation campaigns in the media. The Democrats on the committee thought this was undermining democracy in America (and the rest of the world). The Republicans were not concerned about this. When we look at the records of people like Nixon, Reagan and Bush, we can understand why.

There was also another important feature to the Pike report that the CIA did not want to enter the public domain. Pike’s committee found evidence of financial corruption within the CIA. This was inevitable giving the secrecy of its operations. The CIA was paying out large sums of money to individuals and organisations to provide equipment and services. The CIA refused to provide the paperwork to explain what they were up to. In other words, they were not accountable to Congress for their activities. Given such a system, it was inevitable that the CIA would give out money and contracts to individuals or companies in return for backhanders. They would also provide money to friends and relatives. Pike’s committee, rightly concluded, that the American people expected Congress to oversee this process in order to make sure corruption did not take place.

The Republicans on the committee disagreed. They thought the CIA should have the freedom to edit and rewrite the report. It is not clear why this was. Officially they said it was because of threats to “national security”. By arranging for the report to be published in the media, the Democrats proved that this was a lie. Why then did the Republicans, Gerald Ford and the CIA work together to promote this lie? Maybe Tim Gratz can explain it? If not, I have a few suggestions why this happened.

I am still waiting for Tim Gratz to answer this point.

Here is an interesting passage from Otis Pike's book, CIA: The Pike Report (1977)

When legal proceedings were not in the offing, the access experience was frequently one of foot-dragging, stonewalling, and careful deception.

A few examples should suffice.

The President went on television June 10, 1975, and reassured the nation that the uncompleted work of the Rockefeller Commission would be carried forward by the two intelligence committees of the Congress. The files of the Commission, President Ford announced, would be turned over to both committees

immediately.

The Committee began requesting those files within the week. We requested and requested.86 We negotiated.

Finally, by threatening to announce publicly that the President's word had not been kept, the files were turned over-in mid-October, some four months late.

In another case, likewise involving basic research information, the Committee in early August, requested a complete set of what has become known as the "Family Jewels." This 693-page document was the very foundation of the current investigations. It had come into existence as the result of an order by former CIA Director James Schlesinger, on May 9, 1973, in the wake of Watergate revelations. Dr. Schlesinger had ordered CIA employees to report any possible past wrongdoing, and those reports were compiled into the "Jewels" on May 21, 1973.

By the end of August, the Committee had been provided only a sanitized version of the document. Letters were sent and negotiations proceeded throughout September. On October 7, 1975, the staff was told that they would not be allowed to see the complete record of wrongdoing as assembled in May 1973.

A second sanitized version was sent in mid-October, but it was hardly less sanitized than the first. As an interesting sidelight, the second version did have one page that was not in the first. It was a photocopy of a lack Anderson newspaper article, nothing more. In the first version, that page had been blanked out, with the message, "This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods." The second version was not deleted, but it was classified.

The Chairman demanded a complete copy of the report, and was told that one would be forthcoming. None was. As a result, he scheduled a press conference for 12:00 noon on October 11, 1975.

At 11:45 a.m. on October 11, 1975, the report was finally delivered," after the life of the Committee's investigation was more than half over.

These two examples represent some of the most basic research materials available to the Committee. Their contents were crimes, abuses, and questionable conduct, not sophisticated or legitimate intelligence secrets.

Other important information was withheld, such as a Committee request for certain records of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. On August 25, 1975, a letter was sent asking for a copy of the Board's agendas since 1961. No written response to that letter has even been received.

The Board interested the Committee from the standpoint of command and control. There have been numerous recommendations, for example, that a pending executive reorganization make this group the key command and control unit for foreign intelligence?

The Committee is still waiting for the Board's documents to be delivered, despite the fact that the ranking minority member of the Committee took a personal interest in the matter. A month of his efforts produced only a limited right to see certain information, not the documents themselves....

The first matter of business between the CIA and the Committee was a request by the Agency that all of the staff be required to sign six pages of CIA oaths.

These elaborate oaths stipulated, in effect, acceptable conduct for Congressional employees with respect to things CIA had determined were secret. Without oaths, secrets would not be forthcoming. The staff represents, of course, Committee members, but the members were not asked to sign oaths. Perhaps this was because members would not do anything untoward with secrets. More likely, it was because they would protest loudly.

The Committee reminded CIA that subjecting our employees to Executive oaths would violate the concept that Congress is an independent and co-equal branch of government.

It is the Constitutional responsibility of Congress to control its own staff, and this is the course the Committee followed. It required every employee to sign a statement, drafted by the Committee, reflecting the needs and considerations of Congress. and enforced by Congress.

This may seem like so much posturing; but it is important not to underestimate the significance of firmly establishing the premise that a target of an investigation does not lay down ground rules. As the Agency noted, this has not been the case in the past; and it may be one of the reasons this investigation had become necessary lm

The next move was to require the Committee to enter into agreements.

When this was rejected, a modified version of those agreements set forth proposed rules and regulations the Committee would abide by if certain classified information were to be made available. These agreements also included a proposal to "compartment" our staff. Compartmenting would mean dividing them up and restricting their access to each other's work.

The Committee refused to sign. It refused even to agree, as a matter of "understanding," that Executive rules would be binding. Such proposed understandings included allowing intelligence officials to review the notes of investigators before notes could be brought back to Committee offices. Other committees have consistently been subjected to that arrangement.

The FBI then came forward with a six-page agreement that they requested be signed before classified information could be handled by the Committee.

The FBI proposal was even more restrictive than CIA's. Secret documents would be made available in special rooms at the FBI, with FBI monitors present. Notes would be reviewed by FBI agents. After notes had been appropriately sanitized, they would be sent to our offices.

Once again, the Committee refused to sign. It did agree orally to put all future requests for documents in writing. The repercussions of this oral agreement illustrate quite nicely the problem with agreements. A few days later the Committee received a letter from the Justice Department stating that requests for materials that had been made a month earlier by Committee members in public hearings had not been fulfilled. Even though FBI officials had publicly agreed to furnish the documents promptly, the requests had not been "in writing.

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKpikeO.htm

[John Simkin]

Another extract from Otis Pike's, CIA: The Pike Report (1977)

The first matter of business between the CIA and the Committee was a request by the Agency that all of the staff be required to sign six pages of CIA oaths.

These elaborate oaths stipulated, in effect, acceptable conduct for Congressional employees with respect to things CIA had determined were secret. Without oaths, secrets would not be forthcoming. The staff represents, of course, Committee members, but the members were not asked to sign oaths. Perhaps this was because members would not do anything untoward with secrets. More likely, it was because they would protest loudly.

The Committee reminded CIA that subjecting our employees to Executive oaths would violate the concept that Congress is an independent and co-equal branch of government.

It is the Constitutional responsibility of Congress to control its own staff, and this is the course the Committee followed. It required every employee to sign a statement, drafted by the Committee, reflecting the needs and considerations of Congress. and enforced by Congress.

This may seem like so much posturing; but it is important not to underestimate the significance of firmly establishing the premise that a target of an investigation does not lay down ground rules. As the Agency noted, this has not been the case in the past; and it may be one of the reasons this investigation had become necessary lm

The next move was to require the Committee to enter into agreements.

When this was rejected, a modified version of those agreements set forth proposed rules and regulations the Committee would abide by if certain classified information were to be made available. These agreements also included a proposal to "compartment" our staff. Compartmenting would mean dividing them up and restricting their access to each other's work.

The Committee refused to sign. It refused even to agree, as a matter of "understanding," that Executive rules would be binding. Such proposed understandings included allowing intelligence officials to review the notes of investigators before notes could be brought back to Committee offices. Other committees have consistently been subjected to that arrangement.

The FBI then came forward with a six-page agreement that they requested be signed before classified information could be handled by the Committee.

The FBI proposal was even more restrictive than CIA's. Secret documents would be made available in special rooms at the FBI, with FBI monitors present. Notes would be reviewed by FBI agents. After notes had been appropriately sanitized, they would be sent to our offices.

Once again, the Committee refused to sign. It did agree orally to put all future requests for documents in writing. The repercussions of this oral agreement illustrate quite nicely the problem with agreements. A few days later the Committee received a letter from the Justice Department stating that requests for materials that had been made a month earlier by Committee members in public hearings had not been fulfilled. Even though FBI officials had publicly agreed to furnish the documents promptly, the requests had not been "in writing."

[Mark Stapleton]

What makes you think Israel's an ally?

I fell in love with Israel during a visit there in 1975 and never questioned U.S. support for that country until 2000, when Sharon was elected and began overtly provoking trouble. Since then it's all been downhill.

"Remember the Liberty."

Nobody does, Ron. That's the problem. One of LBJ's best coverups, IMO. Much better than his JFK job. Understandable, LBJ was an old hand by 1967. Back to the thread.........

[John Simkin]

One member of the Otis Pike committee who really upset the CIA was Ronald V. Dellums. He was seen as a young radical (a former social worker from Oakland, California). He added his own section to the report. It is as relevant today as it was in 1976.

I supported the committee majority in bringing to the House of Representatives those recommendations finally adopted by the committee. However, this should not indicate my approval of all the adopted recommendations; several are not strong enough and several additional recommendations should have been adopted.

These recommendations should stimulate extremely important and timely discussion, debate and consensus about such vital and basic questions as:

(1) Is secrecy compatible with principles of democracy ostensibly embodied in our constitutional form of government?

(2) If and where is secrecy necessary?

(3) How much secrecy is required and what forms should it take?

(4) What safeguards against abuse are required?

(5) What, if any, are our legitimate and necessary intelligence needs?

(6) How much change, restructuring, and/or elimination of organizations are required to meet on the one hand the "legitimate" intelligence needs of our Nation, and on the other hand safeguard against abuse of people, power, and the Constitution?

(7) Our world continues its rapid changes and shifts, what level of our already limited resources do we perceive as necessary to meet our intelligence needs?

These and other questions must be discussed and debated within an atmosphere of reason. To resolve these questions and reach some consensus, it will demand the best within each of us as representatives of the people. The issues both implicitly and explicitly raised by the committee recommendations are of extreme importance and must be addressed within that context.

I oppose the committee's recommendation regarding: (i) A House Committee on Intelligence, insofar as, " The committee shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... for all covert action operations." I believe that this information should be more widely shared. Discerning oversight is facilitated by involving several relevant committees, and I think jurisdiction over covert action operations should be shared with those committees presently involved.

I am opposed to that part of the recommendation regarding: (ii) Release of information "The select committee recommends that the rules of the House be revised to provide that any member who reveals any classified information which jeopardizes the national security of the United States may be censored or expelled by a two thirds vote of the House."

"National security" is now an infamous phrase, one open to mischievous interpretation. There is a great danger in constructing a chilling system which allows demagogues the easy opportunity of injuring a member by making reckless charges.

The committee's recommendation on covert action is not satisfactory. The committee recommendations say, "The select committee recommends that all activities involving direct or indirect attempts to assassinate any individual and all paramilitary activities shall be prohibited except in time of war."

We should prohibit all covert action.

We live in a world becoming increasingly smaller and interdependent, a word d in which secrecy and cloak and dagger methods, in my estimation, are anachronisms from the past. They should have no place today in the world we will continue to live in. It seems to me that whatever action this country takes in a world that is becoming this small and this interdependent ought to be overt action. The United States ought to begin to play an aggressive role as an advocate of peace in the world, as an advocate of humanitarian concerns, and frankly I believe that the level of secrecy that we have been exposed to as members of this committee flies in the face of democratic principle.

Many people conveniently wrap themselves quite fully in the flag, but when pressed to the wall on whether or not they are willing seriously to support democratic principles, I find that they are willing to sidestep principle.

Democracy is based on a notion of the development of a consensus. In my estimation covert action does not provide for that consensus. It does not provide for debate needed to achieve consensus. Instead, covert actions are recommended and approved by a small select group of people. The actions can at some point be extremely expensive, at some point extraordinarily risky and at some point fly in the face of open debate on any given question. I think that detrimental to the democratic process.

I am willing to try democracy. My concern is that our democracy has been, for the most part, a charade or merely symbolic, and I am not sure that many of us truly believe in the concept of majority rule.

I am concerned about secretly providing arms and aid to other countries, presidents able to sit down with other presidents and making deals. Yet these things are issues we found that are part of the range of covert actions utilized by this country.

I think our world is much too complicated to continue to function effectively in this manner.

[Nathaniel Heidenheimer]

RE: the Pike report and the Media

Historian Kathy Olmsted wrote an interesting book in 1995 about the role of the NYT and Washington Post in

changing public perceptions regarding Pike and Church.

She says that in 1975 the public was gung ho for more sunshine on the CIA

By the end of 1976, however, the public had changed in favor of less disclosure about the CIAs covert opperations.

She attributes this to articles and editorials written in these two influencial newspapers.

Yes Seymour Hersh could appear on the front page of NYT in 1975. Yet, Prof. Olmsted suggests that these newspapers did more to protect the cia than to reaveal its messy secrets.

With this role of NYT in mind, its interesting to recall how the movie Three Days of the Condor (1975) ends.

Robert Redford is outside of the Times, and the other character asks something to the effect of "yes, but will they print it"

[John Simkin]

RE: the Pike report and the Media

Historian Kathy Olmsted wrote an interesting book in 1995 about the role of the NYT and Washington Post in

changing public perceptions regarding Pike and Church.

She says that in 1975 the public was gung ho for more sunshine on the CIA

By the end of 1976, however, the public had changed in favor of less disclosure about the CIAs covert opperations.

She attributes this to articles and editorials written in these two influencial newspapers.

Yes Seymour Hersh could appear on the front page of NYT in 1975. Yet, Prof. Olmsted suggests that these newspapers did more to protect the cia than to reaveal its messy secrets.

With this role of NYT in mind, its interesting to recall how the movie Three Days of the Condor (1975) ends.

Robert Redford is outside of the Times, and the other character asks something to the effect of "yes, but will they print it"

Sounds an interesting book. I think this is an area that needs more research. The reporting on Watergate needs further investigation. The Washington Post has been given a lot of credit for breaking the story. But it could be argued that guided by Deep Throat, Bob Woodward moved away from what was the real scandal, Operation Sandwedge. I think Carl Bernstein was aware of this. For example, see his article, CIA and the Media (Rolling Stone Magazine, 20th October, 1977).