Richard Helms and W. Lloyd George

[Ashton Gray]

It's been brought to my attention that the 1 May 1963 memorandum by Richard Helms to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, summarizing Helms's interview with ABC newswoman Lisa Howard after her interview with Fidel Castro, is signed this way:

The only thing I've been able to locate with respect to any "W. Lloyd George" and CIA is the rather crucial document below, dated 10 August 1961, the subject and substance of which is an entire study in and of itself (one that so often goes overlooked) concerning CIA and embassies. This pivotal document has the curious attribution: "Drafted by W. Lloyd George of the Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency."

Here is the document in full, with notes and cross references as found in Department of State records:

• Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to All Chiefs of Station/1/
  Washington, August 10, 1961.
  /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files, Dispatch and Book Dispatch, 1963, Box 6, Folder 11. Top Secret. Drafted by W. Lloyd George of the Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency.
  DIR 05454. Rybat.
  1. President Kennedy's letter to Ambassadors of 29 May 1961,/2/ affirms their responsibility "to oversee and coordinate" all programs or activities of the United States in their particular areas, whether of the diplomatic mission or of other US agencies. Further, he made clear he expects Ambassadors to be fully informed of these programs or activities.
  /2/See footnote 2, Document 30.
  2. As you are aware you have always carried the responsibility for reviewing with the Ambassador covert action matters growing out of our responsibilities under the 5412 directive of the National Security Council. Furthermore, most of you have arrived at relationships with Ambassadors in the past which have made you conscious of the need to keep the Ambassador informed so that he may judge the political risks inherent in any activity, whether deriving from "5412" or developed in pursuit of our statutory responsibility in the field of espionage and clandestine counterintelligence. However, the feeling had developed over the past few years within diplomatic missions around the world that Ambassadors are not sufficiently well informed properly to protect them in their responsibility as the principal United States officers in their respective areas who bear the brunt of any covert or clandestine activity that inadvertently becomes known to and represents a serious affront to the local government.
  3. Where espionage and clandestine counterintelligence are concerned we have always been aware of the possible political risks inherent in our activities. This is the reason for the language of NSCID 5, paragraph 6, which states Ambassadors will be kept "appropriately informed."/3/ However, it is clear today that many Chiefs of Mission feel that our officers' interpretation of this phrase has not produced sufficient information.
  /3/National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5/2, September 15, 1958. See footnote 5, Document 84.
  4. Therefore, you will take steps to insure that the Ambassador is informed of your espionage and clandestine counterintelligence programs in addition to your covert action projects. With relation to these operations, he should be made sufficiently aware of them so that, in his capacity as principal officer responsible for the United States position in the country to which he is accredited, he is enabled to make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved.
  5. In advising him of your various programs, you should pay particular attention to clarifying in his mind their general nature, scope, and purpose. Review with him, for example, the categories of covert action such as psychological warfare, black and gray propaganda, political action and economic action in pursuit of approved 5412 programs. Present your clandestine intelligence activities in categories such as scientific, political, technical, economic and military information objectives carried on against approved requirements, through working relationships with local intelligence and security services and through independent activities. Review your clandestine counterintelligence objectives to acquire knowledge of all other intelligence organizations and membership, to manipulate some members of these to a U.S. advantage, to obtain information by counterintelligence activities, as well as espionage, about all Communist Parties and to counter their objectives through local services and independent activities, and to develop higher capability through training the so-called friendly services.
  6. In many of your activities there are involved sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques, which it is desired that you safeguard. The Ambassador at times will feel he needs to know these and, in some instances, has a right to know. Judgment with respect to these, however, may have to be made ultimately in Washington. If you are in doubt about passing these ultimate details, the matter should be referred to Washington where decision will be made after consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence and Chief ODACID as to whether you should give the Ambassador these details.
  7. There will be occasions when an objectively discussed problem will result in an honest difference of opinion between you and your Ambassador regarding whether an operation should be carried on. President Kennedy's letter makes clear that you have your own channels of communication and may use them to refer your problem to higher levels here. While the Ambassador also has his own channels to Washington, he will normally expect you to convey his views on such matters via your channels.
  8. You should consider this instruction to be of interim nature, pending review of the 1957 agreement between this Headquarters and ODACID (STACIA)./4/
  /4/Not found.
  9. ODACID has seen and concurs with this message and is requesting all its chiefs of missions and certain principal officers to confer with you regarding it. They may, of course, see it.
  

And that's it.

I can't find any other "W. Lloyd George" reference related to CIA anywhere.

There was a W. Lloyd George who was editor for the "National Resources Planning Board," which was established in, I believe, 1939, and disbanded in 1943.

Does anyone know anything about the CIA's "W. Lloyd George," and why his signature would be over Helms's name? If he actually existed in CIA, he must have been very, very well placed indeed to then have so little record about him.

Ashton Gray

Edited July 29, 2006 by Ashton Gray

[Dawn Meredith]

It's been brought to my attention that the 1 May 1963 memorandum by Richard Helms to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, summarizing Helms's interview with ABC newswoman Lisa Howard after her interview with Fidel Castro, is signed this way:

The only thing I've been able to locate with respect to any "W. Lloyd George" and CIA is the rather crucial document below, dated 10 August 1961, the subject and substance of which is an entire study in and of itself (one that so often goes overlooked) concerning CIA and embassies. This pivotal document has the curious attribution: "Drafted by W. Lloyd George of the Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency."

Here is the document in full, with notes and cross references as found in Department of State records:

• Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to All Chiefs of Station/1/
  Washington, August 10, 1961.
  /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files, Dispatch and Book Dispatch, 1963, Box 6, Folder 11. Top Secret. Drafted by W. Lloyd George of the Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency.
  DIR 05454. Rybat.
  1. President Kennedy's letter to Ambassadors of 29 May 1961,/2/ affirms their responsibility "to oversee and coordinate" all programs or activities of the United States in their particular areas, whether of the diplomatic mission or of other US agencies. Further, he made clear he expects Ambassadors to be fully informed of these programs or activities.
  /2/See footnote 2, Document 30.
  2. As you are aware you have always carried the responsibility for reviewing with the Ambassador covert action matters growing out of our responsibilities under the 5412 directive of the National Security Council. Furthermore, most of you have arrived at relationships with Ambassadors in the past which have made you conscious of the need to keep the Ambassador informed so that he may judge the political risks inherent in any activity, whether deriving from "5412" or developed in pursuit of our statutory responsibility in the field of espionage and clandestine counterintelligence. However, the feeling had developed over the past few years within diplomatic missions around the world that Ambassadors are not sufficiently well informed properly to protect them in their responsibility as the principal United States officers in their respective areas who bear the brunt of any covert or clandestine activity that inadvertently becomes known to and represents a serious affront to the local government.
  3. Where espionage and clandestine counterintelligence are concerned we have always been aware of the possible political risks inherent in our activities. This is the reason for the language of NSCID 5, paragraph 6, which states Ambassadors will be kept "appropriately informed."/3/ However, it is clear today that many Chiefs of Mission feel that our officers' interpretation of this phrase has not produced sufficient information.
  /3/National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5/2, September 15, 1958. See footnote 5, Document 84.
  4. Therefore, you will take steps to insure that the Ambassador is informed of your espionage and clandestine counterintelligence programs in addition to your covert action projects. With relation to these operations, he should be made sufficiently aware of them so that, in his capacity as principal officer responsible for the United States position in the country to which he is accredited, he is enabled to make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved.
  5. In advising him of your various programs, you should pay particular attention to clarifying in his mind their general nature, scope, and purpose. Review with him, for example, the categories of covert action such as psychological warfare, black and gray propaganda, political action and economic action in pursuit of approved 5412 programs. Present your clandestine intelligence activities in categories such as scientific, political, technical, economic and military information objectives carried on against approved requirements, through working relationships with local intelligence and security services and through independent activities. Review your clandestine counterintelligence objectives to acquire knowledge of all other intelligence organizations and membership, to manipulate some members of these to a U.S. advantage, to obtain information by counterintelligence activities, as well as espionage, about all Communist Parties and to counter their objectives through local services and independent activities, and to develop higher capability through training the so-called friendly services.
  6. In many of your activities there are involved sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques, which it is desired that you safeguard. The Ambassador at times will feel he needs to know these and, in some instances, has a right to know. Judgment with respect to these, however, may have to be made ultimately in Washington. If you are in doubt about passing these ultimate details, the matter should be referred to Washington where decision will be made after consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence and Chief ODACID as to whether you should give the Ambassador these details.
  7. There will be occasions when an objectively discussed problem will result in an honest difference of opinion between you and your Ambassador regarding whether an operation should be carried on. President Kennedy's letter makes clear that you have your own channels of communication and may use them to refer your problem to higher levels here. While the Ambassador also has his own channels to Washington, he will normally expect you to convey his views on such matters via your channels.
  8. You should consider this instruction to be of interim nature, pending review of the 1957 agreement between this Headquarters and ODACID (STACIA)./4/
  /4/Not found.
  9. ODACID has seen and concurs with this message and is requesting all its chiefs of missions and certain principal officers to confer with you regarding it. They may, of course, see it.
  

And that's it.

I can't find any other "W. Lloyd George" reference related to CIA anywhere.

There was a W. Lloyd George who was editor for the "National Resources Planning Board," which was established in, I believe, 1939, and disbanded in 1943.

Does anyone know anything about the CIA's "W. Lloyd George," and why his signature would be over Helms's name? If he actually existed in CIA, he must have been very, very well placed indeed to then have so little record about him.

Ashton Gray

Ashton, Try reversing the names, just a thought. Or it could be a fake name, as the CIA often did that : David A. Phillips a/k/a/ "Maurice Bishop" (according to a rather hesitant Antonia Veciana, and some HSCA members); Documentation on LHO exists under both "Lee Harvey" and "Harvery Lee"; Popa Bush's buddy, running cocaine for the Contragate crowd, Felix Rodriguez went by "Max Gomez". Felon North was known as "John Cathey", and according to Terry Reed- ("Compromised")- Ollie was Reed's handler and the man who put Reed into contact with Barry Seal (Then Seal was murdered to shut him up).

The document you provided re Lisa Howard tells me conclusively that the CIA was completely aware of what Lisa Howard was up to in Cuba: facilitating peace negeotiations between JFK and Castro. They were to actually meet -(JFK and Castro)- after "a brief trip to Dalas".

Dawn

[Robert Howard]

It's been brought to my attention that the 1 May 1963 memorandum by Richard Helms to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, summarizing Helms's interview with ABC newswoman Lisa Howard after her interview with Fidel Castro, is signed this way:

The only thing I've been able to locate with respect to any "W. Lloyd George" and CIA is the rather crucial document below, dated 10 August 1961, the subject and substance of which is an entire study in and of itself (one that so often goes overlooked) concerning CIA and embassies. This pivotal document has the curious attribution: "Drafted by W. Lloyd George of the Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency."

Here is the document in full, with notes and cross references as found in Department of State records:

• Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to All Chiefs of Station/1/
  Washington, August 10, 1961.
  /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files, Dispatch and Book Dispatch, 1963, Box 6, Folder 11. Top Secret. Drafted by W. Lloyd George of the Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency.
  DIR 05454. Rybat.
  1. President Kennedy's letter to Ambassadors of 29 May 1961,/2/ affirms their responsibility "to oversee and coordinate" all programs or activities of the United States in their particular areas, whether of the diplomatic mission or of other US agencies. Further, he made clear he expects Ambassadors to be fully informed of these programs or activities.
  /2/See footnote 2, Document 30.
  2. As you are aware you have always carried the responsibility for reviewing with the Ambassador covert action matters growing out of our responsibilities under the 5412 directive of the National Security Council. Furthermore, most of you have arrived at relationships with Ambassadors in the past which have made you conscious of the need to keep the Ambassador informed so that he may judge the political risks inherent in any activity, whether deriving from "5412" or developed in pursuit of our statutory responsibility in the field of espionage and clandestine counterintelligence. However, the feeling had developed over the past few years within diplomatic missions around the world that Ambassadors are not sufficiently well informed properly to protect them in their responsibility as the principal United States officers in their respective areas who bear the brunt of any covert or clandestine activity that inadvertently becomes known to and represents a serious affront to the local government.
  3. Where espionage and clandestine counterintelligence are concerned we have always been aware of the possible political risks inherent in our activities. This is the reason for the language of NSCID 5, paragraph 6, which states Ambassadors will be kept "appropriately informed."/3/ However, it is clear today that many Chiefs of Mission feel that our officers' interpretation of this phrase has not produced sufficient information.
  /3/National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5/2, September 15, 1958. See footnote 5, Document 84.
  4. Therefore, you will take steps to insure that the Ambassador is informed of your espionage and clandestine counterintelligence programs in addition to your covert action projects. With relation to these operations, he should be made sufficiently aware of them so that, in his capacity as principal officer responsible for the United States position in the country to which he is accredited, he is enabled to make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved.
  5. In advising him of your various programs, you should pay particular attention to clarifying in his mind their general nature, scope, and purpose. Review with him, for example, the categories of covert action such as psychological warfare, black and gray propaganda, political action and economic action in pursuit of approved 5412 programs. Present your clandestine intelligence activities in categories such as scientific, political, technical, economic and military information objectives carried on against approved requirements, through working relationships with local intelligence and security services and through independent activities. Review your clandestine counterintelligence objectives to acquire knowledge of all other intelligence organizations and membership, to manipulate some members of these to a U.S. advantage, to obtain information by counterintelligence activities, as well as espionage, about all Communist Parties and to counter their objectives through local services and independent activities, and to develop higher capability through training the so-called friendly services.
  6. In many of your activities there are involved sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques, which it is desired that you safeguard. The Ambassador at times will feel he needs to know these and, in some instances, has a right to know. Judgment with respect to these, however, may have to be made ultimately in Washington. If you are in doubt about passing these ultimate details, the matter should be referred to Washington where decision will be made after consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence and Chief ODACID as to whether you should give the Ambassador these details.
  7. There will be occasions when an objectively discussed problem will result in an honest difference of opinion between you and your Ambassador regarding whether an operation should be carried on. President Kennedy's letter makes clear that you have your own channels of communication and may use them to refer your problem to higher levels here. While the Ambassador also has his own channels to Washington, he will normally expect you to convey his views on such matters via your channels.
  8. You should consider this instruction to be of interim nature, pending review of the 1957 agreement between this Headquarters and ODACID (STACIA)./4/
  /4/Not found.
  9. ODACID has seen and concurs with this message and is requesting all its chiefs of missions and certain principal officers to confer with you regarding it. They may, of course, see it.
  

And that's it.

I can't find any other "W. Lloyd George" reference related to CIA anywhere.

There was a W. Lloyd George who was editor for the "National Resources Planning Board," which was established in, I believe, 1939, and disbanded in 1943.

Does anyone know anything about the CIA's "W. Lloyd George," and why his signature would be over Helms's name? If he actually existed in CIA, he must have been very, very well placed indeed to then have so little record about him.

Ashton Gray

I would venture a guess, that W. Lloyd George was Ruchard Helms, a pseudonym in the same manner that John Scelso was John Whitten, Don Eduardo was Everett Howard Hunt et cetera.

[Chris Newton]

It's been brought to my attention that the 1 May 1963 memorandum by Richard Helms to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, summarizing Helms's interview with ABC newswoman Lisa Howard after her interview with Fidel Castro, is signed this way:

The only thing I've been able to locate with respect to any "W. Lloyd George" and CIA is the rather crucial document below, dated 10 August 1961, the subject and substance of which is an entire study in and of itself (one that so often goes overlooked) concerning CIA and embassies. This pivotal document has the curious attribution: "Drafted by W. Lloyd George of the Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency."

Here is the document in full, with notes and cross references as found in Department of State records:

• Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to All Chiefs of Station/1/
  Washington, August 10, 1961.
  /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files, Dispatch and Book Dispatch, 1963, Box 6, Folder 11. Top Secret. Drafted by W. Lloyd George of the Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency.
  DIR 05454. Rybat.
  1. President Kennedy's letter to Ambassadors of 29 May 1961,/2/ affirms their responsibility "to oversee and coordinate" all programs or activities of the United States in their particular areas, whether of the diplomatic mission or of other US agencies. Further, he made clear he expects Ambassadors to be fully informed of these programs or activities.
  /2/See footnote 2, Document 30.
  2. As you are aware you have always carried the responsibility for reviewing with the Ambassador covert action matters growing out of our responsibilities under the 5412 directive of the National Security Council. Furthermore, most of you have arrived at relationships with Ambassadors in the past which have made you conscious of the need to keep the Ambassador informed so that he may judge the political risks inherent in any activity, whether deriving from "5412" or developed in pursuit of our statutory responsibility in the field of espionage and clandestine counterintelligence. However, the feeling had developed over the past few years within diplomatic missions around the world that Ambassadors are not sufficiently well informed properly to protect them in their responsibility as the principal United States officers in their respective areas who bear the brunt of any covert or clandestine activity that inadvertently becomes known to and represents a serious affront to the local government.
  3. Where espionage and clandestine counterintelligence are concerned we have always been aware of the possible political risks inherent in our activities. This is the reason for the language of NSCID 5, paragraph 6, which states Ambassadors will be kept "appropriately informed."/3/ However, it is clear today that many Chiefs of Mission feel that our officers' interpretation of this phrase has not produced sufficient information.
  /3/National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5/2, September 15, 1958. See footnote 5, Document 84.
  4. Therefore, you will take steps to insure that the Ambassador is informed of your espionage and clandestine counterintelligence programs in addition to your covert action projects. With relation to these operations, he should be made sufficiently aware of them so that, in his capacity as principal officer responsible for the United States position in the country to which he is accredited, he is enabled to make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved.
  5. In advising him of your various programs, you should pay particular attention to clarifying in his mind their general nature, scope, and purpose. Review with him, for example, the categories of covert action such as psychological warfare, black and gray propaganda, political action and economic action in pursuit of approved 5412 programs. Present your clandestine intelligence activities in categories such as scientific, political, technical, economic and military information objectives carried on against approved requirements, through working relationships with local intelligence and security services and through independent activities. Review your clandestine counterintelligence objectives to acquire knowledge of all other intelligence organizations and membership, to manipulate some members of these to a U.S. advantage, to obtain information by counterintelligence activities, as well as espionage, about all Communist Parties and to counter their objectives through local services and independent activities, and to develop higher capability through training the so-called friendly services.
  6. In many of your activities there are involved sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques, which it is desired that you safeguard. The Ambassador at times will feel he needs to know these and, in some instances, has a right to know. Judgment with respect to these, however, may have to be made ultimately in Washington. If you are in doubt about passing these ultimate details, the matter should be referred to Washington where decision will be made after consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence and Chief ODACID as to whether you should give the Ambassador these details.
  7. There will be occasions when an objectively discussed problem will result in an honest difference of opinion between you and your Ambassador regarding whether an operation should be carried on. President Kennedy's letter makes clear that you have your own channels of communication and may use them to refer your problem to higher levels here. While the Ambassador also has his own channels to Washington, he will normally expect you to convey his views on such matters via your channels.
  8. You should consider this instruction to be of interim nature, pending review of the 1957 agreement between this Headquarters and ODACID (STACIA)./4/
  /4/Not found.
  9. ODACID has seen and concurs with this message and is requesting all its chiefs of missions and certain principal officers to confer with you regarding it. They may, of course, see it.
  

And that's it.

I can't find any other "W. Lloyd George" reference related to CIA anywhere.

There was a W. Lloyd George who was editor for the "National Resources Planning Board," which was established in, I believe, 1939, and disbanded in 1943.

Does anyone know anything about the CIA's "W. Lloyd George," and why his signature would be over Helms's name? If he actually existed in CIA, he must have been very, very well placed indeed to then have so little record about him.

Ashton Gray

Here's a lead to another researcher who had similiar interests (probably for a different reason):

From Weekly Intelligence Notes #28-05

DO YOU KNOW WHEREABOUTS OF CIAer LLOYD GEORGE? - "Could anyone help me get in contact with Lloyd George, who in 1954 was the CIA Tokyo Chief of Station?" Replies to Washington Post researcher/journalist Serge Kovaleski at sergefk@verizon.net

And one more that I'm not sure what to make of:

Wikopedia reference for Thawee Junlasap (i'm sure this is not a reference to ex British PM David Lloyd George or it would be stated as such):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thawee_Junlasap

[James Richards]

Does anyone know anything about the CIA's "W. Lloyd George," and why his signature would be over Helms's name? If he actually existed in CIA, he must have been very, very well placed indeed to then have so little record about him. (Ashton Gray)

Ashton,

There is officially very little available on W. Lloyd George but if you are prepared to put some time into it, may I suggest you seek out information on OSS Operation Siren.

FWIW.

James

[Paul Rigby]

Does anyone know anything about the CIA's "W. Lloyd George," and why his signature would be over Helms's name? If he actually existed in CIA, he must have been very, very well placed indeed to then have so little record about him. (Ashton Gray)

Ashton,

There is officially very little available on W. Lloyd George but if you are prepared to put some time into it, may I suggest you seek out information on OSS Operation Siren.

FWIW.

James

James,

1. What was Operation Siren? 2. And any idea if a Scripps-Howard exec called Oland D. Russell was OSS?

[Robert Charles-Dunne]

I cannot offer much on W. Lloyd George, but thought it striking that two paragraphs from the letter drafted by him offer both a direct order by President Kennedy, and a potential countermand of that order by George/Helms, to wit:

1. President Kennedy's letter to Ambassadors of 29 May 1961,/2/ affirms their responsibility "to oversee and coordinate" all programs or activities of the United States in their particular areas, whether of the diplomatic mission or of other US agencies. Further, he made clear he expects Ambassadors to be fully informed of these programs or activities.

6. In many of your activities there are involved sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques, which it is desired that you safeguard. The Ambassador at times will feel he needs to know these and, in some instances, has a right to know. Judgment with respect to these, however, may have to be made ultimately in Washington. If you are in doubt about passing these ultimate details, the matter should be referred to Washington where decision will be made after consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence and Chief ODACID as to whether you should give the Ambassador these details.

Once again, as is so often the case, we witness the Agency cherry-picking the Executive orders they choose to follow, or to disobey. Kennedy's order seemed clear and umambiguous, yet CIA seemed to be instructing its CoS-es that in the event of any doubt, they should consult with Langley prior to following Kennedy's clear and umambiguous order.

Longtime Forum members will recall that we have already witnessed CIA's disregard for orders given by Kennedy's predecessor Eisenhower, and his successor Johnson. Hence, it seems unlikely the Kennedy administration was singled out for any particular reason. CIA does what CIA wants, irrespective of whatever the President instructs.

Edited July 29, 2006 by Robert Charles-Dunne

[James Richards]

1. What was Operation Siren? 2. And any idea if a Scripps-Howard exec called Oland D. Russell was OSS? (Paul Rigby)

Hi Paul,

Op Siren was a collaboration between U.S. Intelligence and the Thai underground at the end of WW2. The main guy behind this was Nicol Smith. He worked with Intel Specialist W. Lloyd George who in turn was active in Bangkok, Calcutta and Burma. Securing information here is difficult as much of the Intel gathering structure during this period is how the CIA (still two years away) was to build its foundations on and the Agency has always been tight lipped in this department.

As to Oland Russell, he was definitely OSS and then became one of those CIA agents/journalists types much in the mold of Enno Hobbing at Life who was prominent in Guatemala during the early 1950's.

FWIW.

James

[Robert Howard]

1. What was Operation Siren? 2. And any idea if a Scripps-Howard exec called Oland D. Russell was OSS? (Paul Rigby)

Hi Paul,

Op Siren was a collaboration between U.S. Intelligence and the Thai underground at the end of WW2. The main guy behind this was Nicol Smith. He worked with Intel Specialist W. Lloyd George who in turn was active in Bangkok, Calcutta and Burma. Securing information here is difficult as much of the Intel gathering structure during this period is how the CIA (still two years away) was to build its foundations on and the Agency has always been tight lipped in this department.

As to Oland Russell, he was definitely OSS and then became one of those CIA agents/journalists types much in the mold of Enno Hobbing at Life who was prominent in Guatemala during the early 1950's.

FWIW.

James

Well, I was able to find a reference; there was a Lloyd George who was a member of the Cavalier 59 OSOer's, whatever that is; and worked in OSS with Des Fitzgerald circa 1944-45

Edited July 30, 2006 by Robert Howard

[Paul Rigby]

1. What was Operation Siren? 2. And any idea if a Scripps-Howard exec called Oland D. Russell was OSS? (Paul Rigby)

Hi Paul,

Op Siren was a collaboration between U.S. Intelligence and the Thai underground at the end of WW2. The main guy behind this was Nicol Smith. He worked with Intel Specialist W. Lloyd George who in turn was active in Bangkok, Calcutta and Burma. Securing information here is difficult as much of the Intel gathering structure during this period is how the CIA (still two years away) was to build its foundations on and the Agency has always been tight lipped in this department.

As to Oland Russell, he was definitely OSS and then became one of those CIA agents/journalists types much in the mold of Enno Hobbing at Life who was prominent in Guatemala during the early 1950's.

FWIW.

James

Excellent, thank you.

Russell appears to have been the Scripps-Howard exec who dished out appointments and assignments at the CIA's behest, certainly in the late 50s and early 60s.

[Robert Howard]

I cannot offer much on W. Lloyd George, but thought it striking that two paragraphs from the letter drafted by him offer both a direct order by President Kennedy, and a potential countermand of that order by George/Helms, to wit:

1. President Kennedy's letter to Ambassadors of 29 May 1961,/2/ affirms their responsibility "to oversee and coordinate" all programs or activities of the United States in their particular areas, whether of the diplomatic mission or of other US agencies. Further, he made clear he expects Ambassadors to be fully informed of these programs or activities.

6. In many of your activities there are involved sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques, which it is desired that you safeguard. The Ambassador at times will feel he needs to know these and, in some instances, has a right to know. Judgment with respect to these, however, may have to be made ultimately in Washington. If you are in doubt about passing these ultimate details, the matter should be referred to Washington where decision will be made after consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence and Chief ODACID as to whether you should give the Ambassador these details.

Once again, as is so often the case, we witness the Agency cherry-picking the Executive orders they choose to follow, or to disobey. Kennedy's order seemed clear and umambiguous, yet CIA seemed to be instructing its CoS-es that in the event of any doubt, they should consult with Langley prior to following Kennedy's clear and umambiguous order.

Longtime Forum members will recall that we have already witnessed CIA's disregard for orders given by Kennedy's predecessor Eisenhower, and his successor Johnson. Hence, it seems unlikely the Kennedy administration was singled out for any particular reason. CIA does what CIA wants, irrespective of whatever the President instructs.

I concur with what Robert points out, and add that I find this document quite an important one. JFK was trying to wrestle back control from the CIA, under Executive oversight via the Ambassadors. Before, during and after JFK the CIA had done many operations without notifying anyone - and certainly not the Ambassador in the country concerned, as has long been proscribed by law and custom [Ambassador is Chief US officer over all activities in the country on behalf of any US Agency or action]. The War between CIA higher-ups and JFK was in full swing. It culminated in Dallas.

This is from namebase.org,

http://www.namebase.org/cgi-bin/nb01?_GEORGE_LLOYD_%28OSO%29

FYI: personal experience leads me to conclude it is need of updating, In other words, there is more on subject, somewhere

[Robert Howard]

I cannot offer much on W. Lloyd George, but thought it striking that two paragraphs from the letter drafted by him offer both a direct order by President Kennedy, and a potential countermand of that order by George/Helms, to wit:

1. President Kennedy's letter to Ambassadors of 29 May 1961,/2/ affirms their responsibility "to oversee and coordinate" all programs or activities of the United States in their particular areas, whether of the diplomatic mission or of other US agencies. Further, he made clear he expects Ambassadors to be fully informed of these programs or activities.

6. In many of your activities there are involved sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques, which it is desired that you safeguard. The Ambassador at times will feel he needs to know these and, in some instances, has a right to know. Judgment with respect to these, however, may have to be made ultimately in Washington. If you are in doubt about passing these ultimate details, the matter should be referred to Washington where decision will be made after consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence and Chief ODACID as to whether you should give the Ambassador these details.

Once again, as is so often the case, we witness the Agency cherry-picking the Executive orders they choose to follow, or to disobey. Kennedy's order seemed clear and umambiguous, yet CIA seemed to be instructing its CoS-es that in the event of any doubt, they should consult with Langley prior to following Kennedy's clear and umambiguous order.

Longtime Forum members will recall that we have already witnessed CIA's disregard for orders given by Kennedy's predecessor Eisenhower, and his successor Johnson. Hence, it seems unlikely the Kennedy administration was singled out for any particular reason. CIA does what CIA wants, irrespective of whatever the President instructs.

I concur with what Robert points out, and add that I find this document quite an important one. JFK was trying to wrestle back control from the CIA, under Executive oversight via the Ambassadors. Before, during and after JFK the CIA had done many operations without notifying anyone - and certainly not the Ambassador in the country concerned, as has long been proscribed by law and custom [Ambassador is Chief US officer over all activities in the country on behalf of any US Agency or action]. The War between CIA higher-ups and JFK was in full swing. It culminated in Dallas.

This is from namebase.org,

http://www.namebase.org/cgi-bin/nb01?_GEORGE_LLOYD_%28OSO%29

FYI: personal experience leads me to conclude it is need of updating, In other words, there is more on subject, somewhere

[Ashton Gray]

I concur with what Robert points out, and add that I find this document quite an important one. JFK was trying to wrestle back control from the CIA, under Executive oversight via the Ambassadors. Before, during and after JFK the CIA had done many operations without notifying anyone - and certainly not the Ambassador in the country concerned, as has long been proscribed by law and custom [Ambassador is Chief US officer over all activities in the country on behalf of any US Agency or action]. The War between CIA higher-ups and JFK was in full swing. It culminated in Dallas.

Yes, Mr. Dunne's typically perspicacious observation went to the heart of this further damning evidence of CIA's long reign by nihilism. It's that very nihilism that also has allowed them to use the ambassadorships, as it suited them, in another way: as branch CIA emplacements.

In the case of Lodge, CIA played him like a lute to effect the surprise murder of the Diem brothers three weeks before CIA took Kennedy out. Lucien Conien paid $40,000 in tax-funded blood money for the Diem hit, a necessary precursor to their hit on JFK, which, among other CIA "benefits," allowed them to then set up the Tonkin fraud. Naturally, Conein would later be involved with Hunt in the fraud-within-a-fraud to smear the Kennedy administration with the very double murder in Vietnam that CIA had orchestrated. There is no measuring stick in human ken for the plumbless depths of their arrogant, pompous perfidy.

Then there are the many instances of their arranging appointments of their people to important ambassadorships—such as George H. W. Bush, and Helms to get him shunted away after he and Gottlieb destroyed the things that would most likely hang them at the end of 1972. This also set up sliding Schlesinger in to pretend to "clean up" CIA, while of course his only real job was to further protect their dirtiest secrets. Perfected concealment by "admission" is the bloody handprint they leave everywhere.

Ashton

Edited July 30, 2006 by Ashton Gray

[Robert Howard]

FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XI Cuba: List of Persons FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE

UNITED STATES

1961-1963

Volume X

Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

List of Persons

Amory, Robert, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Anderson, Admiral George W., Chief of Naval Operations after August 1961

Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,

February-December 1961; thereafter Under Secretary of State

Barnes, C. Tracy, Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Action,

Central

Intelligence Agency

Battle, Lucius D., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive

Secretary until May 1962

Beerli, Colonel Stanley W., Chief of Air Operations, Branch 4, Western

Hemisphere Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Berle, Adolph A., Chairman of the Department of State Task Force on Latin

America

Bissell, Richard M. Jr., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence

Agency,

until February 1962

Bowles, Chester A., Under Secretary of State, January-December 1961;

thereafter

Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American

Affairs

Brubeck, William H., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State,

August 1961-May 1962; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

and

Executive Secretary

Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs

Bundy, William P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs

Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., Chief of Naval Operations until August 1961

Cabell, General Charles P., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until

January 1962

Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall S., Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence

from April 1962

Castro Ruz, Fidel, Cuban Prime Minister

Castro Ruz, Raul, Cuban Minister of the Armed Forces

Chayes, Abram J., Legal Adviser of the Department of State from February

1961

Clark, Rear Admiral John E., Commander of Special Task Group 81.8

Coerr, Wymberley DeR., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

Inter-American

Affairs

Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International

Organization Affairs from February 1961

Craig, Brigadier General William H., Department of Defense Project Officer

for

Operation Mongoose until June 1962

Crimmins, John H., Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican

Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until

February

1962; thereafter Director of the Office

Decker, General George H., Army Chief of Staff

Dennison, Admiral Robert L., Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury

Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States after March

1962

Donovan, James B., lawyer involved in efforts to secure the release of

prisoners

captured at the Bay of Pigs

Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961

Dungan, Ralph A., Special Assistant to the President

Earman, J. S., Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence

until

April 1962

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States until January 1961

Elder, Walter, Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence

from

April 1962

Esterline, J. D., Chief of Branch 4, Western Hemisphere Division,

Directorate

for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 1961

Goodwin, Richard N., Assistant Special Counsel to the President until

November

1961; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American

Affairs

Gray, Major General David W., Chief of the Subsidiary Activities Division,

Plans

and Policy, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Guevara Serna, Ernesto (Che), President of the Cuban National Bank

Harris, Brigadier General Benjamin T., Department of Defense Project Officer

for

Operation Mongoose from June 1962

Harvey, William K., Chief of Task Force W, Directorate for Plans, Central

Intelligence Agency; Project Officer for Operation Mongoose

Hawkins, Colonel Jack, Chief of Paramilitary Operations, Branch 4, Western

Hemisphere Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Helms, Richard M., Chief of Operations, Directorate for Plans, Central

Intelligence Agency, until February 1962; thereafter Deputy Director for

Plans

Hilsman, Roger, Jr., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,

Department of State, from February 1961

Hurwitch, Robert A., Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs, Office of Caribbean

and

Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State until

February 1962; Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs,

February-June 1962; thereafter Special Assistant for Cuban Affairs, Bureau

of

Inter-American Affairs; also Project Officer for Operation Mongoose

Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President from January 1961

Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

from

April 1961

Kaysen, Carl, Member, National Security Council Staff, June-December 1961;

thereafter Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs

Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from January 1961

Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General from January 1961

Khrushchev, Nikita S., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet

Union

King, Colonel J. C., Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate for

Plans,

Central Intelligence Agency

Komer, Robert W., Member, National Security Council Staff

Lansdale, Brigadier General Edward G., Deputy Assistant for Special

Operations

to the Secretary of Defense until May 1961; thereafter Assistant for Special

Operations; also Chief of Operations for Operation Mongoose after November

1961

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Macmillan, Harold, British Prime Minister

Mann, Thomas C., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

until

April 1961

Martin, Edwin M., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until

May

1962; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence from November 1961

McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense from January 1961

Mikoyan, Anastas I., First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of

the

Soviet Union

Miro Cardona, Jose, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council

Morales-Carrion, Arturo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

Inter-American

Affairs

Murrow, Edward R., Director of the United States Information Agency

Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

Affairs from January 1961

O'Donnell, P. Kenneth, Special Assistant to the President

Parrott, Thomas A., Assistant to the President's Military Representative

Roa Garcia, Raul, Cuban Minister for External Relations

Rostow, Walt W., Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National

Security

Affairs until December 1961; thereafter Counselor of the Department of State

and

Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from January 1961

San Roman, Jose Perez, Commander of the Cuban Expeditionary Force Brigade

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., Special Assistant to the President

Scott, Joseph W., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for

Political Affairs

Shoup, General David M., Commandant of the Marine Corps

Smith, Bromley, Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

until August 1961; thereafter Executive Secretary

Somoza Debayle, General Anastasio, President of Nicaragua

Sorensen, Theodore C., Special Counsel to the President

Stevenson, Adlai E., Permanent Representative at the United Nations from

January

1961

Taylor, General Maxwell D., Chairman of the Cuba Study Group, April-June

1961;

President's Military Representative from July 1961

Thompson, Llewellyn, Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Wheeler, Lieutenant General Earle G., Director of the Joint Staff, Joint

Chiefs

of Staff

White, General Thomas D., Chief of Staff of the Air Force until June 1961

Woodward, Robert F., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American

Affairs,

July 1961-March 1962

Ydigoras Fuentes, General Miguel, President of Guatemala