William Kelly

DVP quotes Deputy Mooney as saying the shells were pretty close to how he originally saw them and pretty close is no cigar. They were where he originally saw them or they weren't and he testified they were close but not, confining Tom A's account. BK

I talked to Katz last October and exchanged emails with him since then and he's the real deal. He told me both Blaine and Hill checked him out too. Although the reporter got some of the story wrong, Katz was not in Dallas but at the White House at the time of the assassination. He was at Site R during Cuban Missile Crisis. He was recruited out of college ROTC to be a specially trained COG officer and worked for a previously unknown (to me or PDS) - the Army Inter-Agency Security Agency. He got special dispensation from DOD to give approved talks about his role. Katz is not in the imposter category. BK

Those who reject the second floor lunchroom encounter that exonerates Oswald, are only fooling thselves, and it has yet got be established that Oswald is Prayerman, though he is a candidate. BK

Two top ARRB staff executive directors resigned, Jeremy Gunn under a cloud that was not clear why. I don't think Doug Horne even knows, but I think it was because of the ONI chiles and the LTCM Terri Pike affair, that was covered up until after the ARRB had disbanded. BK

Pete and one of the Kennedys, I think RFK, Jr., worked closely on cleaning up the polluted Hudson River. Pete was in a small class of folk affectionados with Alan Lomax and only a few others, who searched out, listened to and sang old some ancient songs and ballads that were sung around the fire, and passed on the same way Seeger learned them. Mrs, McGrath

After the AK47 the MC was the most popular weapon in the Libyan revolution. The sixth floor sniper, whether Oswald.or someone else, would be classified as a Level 3 Sniper, a military trained marksman with a standard issue rifle, who was, as Craig Roberts says, probably a diversion, whose job was to put ballistic evidence connected to Oswald's rifle into the car, while a specially trained Level 1 sniper took the head shot from the front. BK

Bump

Hi Tommy I think PDS will correct his misstatement regarding Powell being on the sixth floor but he's still in the running for the Army Intel officer Revell gave a lift . Hoary was also meeting an army intel agent for lunch at the time of the assassination; does Hosty ID him? BK

That JfK was a speed reader was a well known fact as was that he read five newspapers a day before breakfast. I mention more details in JFKCountercoup.blogspot.com January 6. 2014 post called The Watchman at Dealey Plaza, a lead-in to an analysis of Gen Clifton's AF1 radio conversations. Also in these regards please take note of the fact that it was on JFK's watch that the Situation Room was set up in a basement corner after the Bay of Pigs and the CIA's daily briefing reports, that for November 22 1963 is still classified today. BK

So what soda.bottles are in evidence today? None. What does that mean? BK

"There was a guy in the doorway and I asked him for a phone,... He didn't appear stressed." - Pierce Allman See interview in Daily Mail - 11/22/63

What about Welcome Barnett and the two officers named Smith who were directing traffic and crowd control at Houston and Elm - they filed reports?

The City of Dallas has been pretty good about scanning and posting their official records on the assassination at their web site including DPD docs. The reason there are so many sheriff reports is because there offices are right there at Houston and Elm and there were literally dozens of deputies watching the motorcade and they took witnesses there to take their sworn statements. BK

I'm sure the Dealey Plaza Cleanup Crew will get right on it. Have also made a recent post on The Watchman at Dealey Plaza at JFKCountercoup BK

Nightwatch is the title of DA Phillips non-fictional autobio so his fictional manuscript must have another name.

I didn't go any where I just haven't been posting. Will do so when necessary BK

Which Jafffe was partners w/ Wynne ?

Thanks Robert Tanenbaum is important as well as Lesar after which they play a two minute recording of the late Gaeton Fonzi

Thanks for that Robert, Katz killed himself not far from where I am right now - Cranberry is just down the road. And might I point out that Mike Rago, who gave me so much trouble on this thread has been exposed as an alias and agent provacateur as I expected. Kelly's back in town

Besides PJM and George deMorenschildt, Navy Lt. Oliver Hallett, who was stationed at the US Embassy in Moscow when Oswald defected, was in the White House Situation Room when the assassination occurred, and knew both JFK and Oswald.

Twisting With Oswald http://jfkcountercoup.blogspot.com/2013/11/twisting-with-Oswald-in-mexico-city.html Reading the government documents concerning the assassination of President Kennedy released under the JFK Act of 1992, one is struck by the numbers of records still being withheld for reasons of national security, but there are some tantalizing stories within the documents that have been released, especially those that concern the short trip the accused assassin made to Mexico City a month before the assassination. Those records indicate that while in Mexico City, Oswald tried to get a visa to Cuba from Syliva Duran, a Mexican national who worked at the Cuban embassy there. According to some accounts, Oswald attended a Twist Party at the home of Duran, and may have even been intimate with her, although she denies seeing Oswald outside of the embassy. The stories persisted however, and it was alleged that Oswald was not the only American at Duran’s Twist Party, but an American film actor was also there. While the actor’s name is not mentioned in some of the records, it is mentioned in others that the American actor at the Twist Party with Duran and Oswald was Richard Beymer, a young American film star, who played opposite Natalie Wood in the famously successful movie adaption of West Side Story. Beymer, the records show, was in Mexico to attend a film festival and met Sylvia Doran and according one report that the CIA felt significant enough to cable Washington about, Beymer called the Cuban Embassy and specifically asked for her, so he must have known her, giving some credence to the Twist Party stories. Today, in a telephone interview from his home in Iowa Richard Beymer acknowledges he was there – in Mexico City trying to get a visa to Cuba. And did call the Cuban Embassy and went there to see about getting a visa to Cuba, and may have even dealt with Sylvia Duran, though he doesn’t remember her. But Beymer is a bit perplexed about the CIA records that mention him, but he says that he very well could have attended a Twist Party, maybe even one with Duran and Lee Harvey Oswald. While it’s certainly possible he says, the timing is a little off. According to a CIA document released among the JFK Assassination records, Beymer telephoned the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and specifically asked for Sylvia Duran, the Mexican national who had previously dealt with Lee Harvey Oswald when he allegedly went to Mexico City to get a visa to Cuba. There are also government reports that indicate that while in Mexico City Oswald attended a Twist Party at the home of Duran, a party that included two other Americans, one an American film actor, Richard Beymer. Originally from Iowa, Beyermer moved to California where his acting career included starring roles in The Diary of Anne Frank and West Side Story. Taking a break from acting in 1963, Beymer moved to New York City and began directing advent guard documentary films. With a friend, Bradley Pierce, who is now a Catholic priest in upstate New York, they went to Mexico City in an attempt to get visas to Cuba. While there, they did indeed attend a film festival that included West Side Story, and visited Alcapulco when they were told there would be a delay in the visas. “We wanted to get to Cuba,” explained Beymer, who would like to set the record straight. “We wanted to get to Cuba, so we called the Cuban Embassy and then went to Mexico City to visit the Cuban Embassy to try to get a visa to Cuba.” While he doesn’t remember her by name, he may have tried to contact Syliva Duran because they were told she could assist them in getting the visa. “We were young and attracted to beautiful women,” said Beymer, “so if we were invited to a Twist Party we may have gone as a social thing, but I don’t recall too much about that Mexican adventure. It’s like trying to remember a dream.” He does recall however that, “We were in contact with someone at the embassy, and maybe hooked up with people on a personal level, - it would have been something we would have done.” But as Beymer points out, it is a different time frame than when Oswald was said to have been there – September 25- October 1, 1963. Beymer believes he was there later, after Oswald had left. “We were in an elevator in a Mexico City hotel, and when we got off, there was some commotion, and people asked if we had heard the president had been shot. So if I was there on November 22nd, when Oswald was in Dallas, it’s unlikely we were there at the same time.” Beymer says that he is still making documentary films, and thinks there might be one here. “I was at a Twist Party with Oswald,” could be a catchy title, he said.

Roger Stone often vacations at the Jersey Shore, and was interviewed in the November edition of the Atlantic City Boardwalk Journal, which also includes my article on JFK in Atlantic City - What Might Have Been - had he lived and been renominated at the 1964 Democratic National Convention held at the Atlantic City Convention Hall - and short profiles of four Atlantic City personalities - John Martino, Charles Ford, Skinny D'Amato and Carroll Rosenbloom, who got entwined in the assassination drama. There is also an excellent article by former Congressman and son of Sen. Edward Kennedy - Patrick Kennedy - who writes about his uncle Jack, and their mutual commitment to mental health. While I can't post the link to the Boardwalk Journal right now, you can google the Boardwalk Journal and read all three articles on line. BK

INTERVIEWEE: GENERAL CURTIS LEh1AY INTERVIEWER : Joe B . Frantz Date : June 28, 1971 F : This iINTERVIEWEE: GENERAL CURTIS LEh1AY INTERVIEWER : Joe B . Frantz Date : June 28, 1971 F : This is an interview with General Curtis LeMay who made his home in Newport Beach, California . The interviewer is Joe B . Frantz . General, just to get started . Incidentally, I'm a World War II veteran so I have been following you for a long time . When did you first become acquainted with Mr . Johnson? Was it in his senatorial days or was it later than that? L : Yes, I first met President Johnson when he was Majority Leader of the Senate . F : They gradually got a little tired . Were you aware at all of Mr . Johnson's participation in the Bay of Pigs problem? L : Well the Bay of Pigs problem, I wasn't in on parts of it . My first contact with it came in a Joint Chiefs meeting while I was still Vice Chief of Staff with the Air Force . And General White was out of town on a trip overseas visiting some of the bases . And I attended all the Joint Chiefs meetings in his place just when he was gone of course . In this particular meeting there was an item on the agenda which I wasn't cleared for, which surprised me, and I think it probably went through the President . I had to get cleared before I could discuss it . After 20 or 30 minutes of delay I finally was cleared and we proceeded with the item, and it was on the Bay of Pigs . And a member of the CIA appeared to brief the Joint Chiefs on the question at hand, which was to effect that they wanted the Joint Chiefs' opinion on changing the landing beach in Cuba of the invasion force . Now wait a minute before I can participate in this, I would like to have a little more background in this . And I found out that some time before the CIA had presented to the Joint Chiefs three landing beaches and asked their opinion on which one was the best one to land on from a military standpoint . And as far as I knew this was all they knew about so called invasion, and they had given an opinion . Then CIA changed their mind and decided that they ought to have a beach that had a landing strip on it, or close by . So they picked a couple of others and they wanted to know which was the best of those . That was the item on that particular day . I said, "Well I need a little more information . What's the size of your landing force?" Seven hundred men was the answer . "And are you planning on taking Cuba with 700 people?" Yes . "Well I don't quite understand this . I know Henry Morgan took Panama with 700 people, but this seems to be a little bit different . I presume that things are well enough organized inside Cuba to be simultaneous uprisings over the country, and it will give some chance success ." In blunt terms I was told this was none of my business . F : I see . L : All they wanted was an answer to a question which beach was the best . And that's all the information I could get, so we came up with the answer of a purely military standpoint of which was probably the best beach to land on that had a landing strip . And that was all that took place . The next time the subject came up that I participated in--now remember, no Vice Chief of any of the services was aware of this item . Only the Chiefs of each of the services was aware of what was going on . How much detail they knew I don't know, but it was very sketchy I am sure . F : To a great extent it was politically handled . L : This was not a military operation--not a military operation, and the Joint Chiefs had nothing to do with the planning of it, control of it, or anything else . I'm sure that all that happened was they ever asked a couple of questions, like which was the best beach to land on . They were aware of what was going on, but the details I don't think they knew anything about . It's true that there was some military participation along the way because the CIA had military people from all of the services assigned to the CIA, but working for the CIA and not reporting back to the military at all . They were working as individuals over there because they had some background training that the CIA required to carry out their work . Also from time to time for various things that they were doing, they would ask for people from military services with certain specialities which were furnished, but we didn't know what they were doing . So there was military participation, but as far as being a military operation with military planning and military control, no, it was not an operation of this sort . Well the next I heard of the operation is the time of the actual invasion . As a matter of fact, a couple of days before there was a Joint Chiefs meeting which General White was absent that I attended at which it was brought up that the activity was going to take place a couple of days later . Landing at daylight on the beaches, and there was a preparation to be made which they wanted to destroy the Cuban Air Force with the Air Force such as it was that the invasion force had of which was few B-26's . They can be gathered off of every junk pile around the world as a matter of fact . They didn't want any of this thing to be traced to the United States . That was our greatest fear that they find out the United States had been dabbling in this . There was an attack to be made on the Cuban Air Force on the ground--surprise attack by the invasion Air Force two days before, and they cooked up some sort of a story that two of these B-26's with Cuban markings on them would take off from our base down in Central America and bomb the air fields in Cuba . And then Cubans would land over in Florida and say that they were Cuban Air Force people that had defected, and they had participated in the bombing and so forth . This got tied up and wasn't very well executed . The whole mission wasn't very well executed, and they failed in destroying the Cuban Air Force, and only one of them got to Florida . But they didn't fool very many people, I am sure . Anyway they failed in the mission of destroying the Cuban Air Force, but decided to go ahead with the landing anyway . The landing force was supposed to have air cover during the landings which meant that they had to take off around midnight in Central America to get up there by daylight . And the night before, this air cover was called off because of the failure of the story they had worked out looked too much like American participation, so they called it off . No one knew anything about this in the Joint Chiefs of Staff until the morning of the invasion when there wasn't a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . And I knew this was coming up so I went down early to try to find out what was going on, and I found out then about 15 minutes before the meeting that Secretary Rusk had called it off, or he said the President had called it off . Maybe the President did call it off, but the story I heard was from Pre Cabell (General Charles P .), who was the deputy of CIA and at the time he was an Air Force General Officer and was a deputy of the CIA . And when the air cover was called off, he knew the implications of this, of course, and went personally to Rusk, who gave him the same cavalier treatment that most military people got from the administration, to the effect that : "Well, the President is now dressing to attend a party . If you want to interrupt him, you can go to him, but he has already made the decision to call this off ." Well I think Pre made a mistake by not going to him, but here again he had been butting his head against a stone wall I guess for a long enough he didn't think it would do any good . Anyway it had been called off . Mr . McNamara was supposed to be at the meeting that morning at the Joint Chiefs, but he didn't come down . Mr . Gilpatric came down to represent him . As soon as he came in, I went right to him before the meeting ever started and said : "Look you have just cut the throat of every man on the beach down there . Without this air cover, there can't be any success ." And he said, "Well I didn't know anything about it ." Said, "Well it is done ." Sure enough the invasion force did catch them by surprise, and they were doing quite well until they ran out of ammunition . And of course what happened the Cuban Air Force came over and sunk the ships that had the reserve ammunition on them, and when they ran out of ammunition, that was all ; the whole force was captured of course . I sat in on the critique of the operation for General White too in which the President attended, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, CIA, and all the rest of them . And it got around to the point that the lack of air cover was what caused the failure . Secretary Rusk was asked about the cancellation of air cover . The President turned to him to see what his answer was . He said, "Well, I didn't know anything about the importance of this," and that ended the discussion . All these articles that you have seen that have been written by the great brains of the Kennedy Administration, including Robert Kennedy, on the Bay of Pigs as to the bad military advice and the betrayal of the military to President Kennedy is just a bunch of hogwash because it was not a military operation . The Joint Chiefs as far as I know were not asked to participate except as I mentioned, and it was not a military operation--it was a civilian operation from start to finish . F : No one in Cuba doubted where it came from or would have I think under any circumstances . What do you get that this feeling that this is just kind of a bunch of amateurs wanting to--that they were playing toy soldiers? L : Well, I try not to exaggerate but everyone that came in with the Kennedy Administration and is the most egotistical people that I ever saw in my life . They had no faith in the military ; they had no respect for the military at all . They felt that the Harvard Business School method of solving problems would solve any problem in the world . They were capable of doing it ; they were better than all the rest of us ; otherwise they wouldn't have gotten their superior education, as they saw it . And the fact that they had it entitled them to govern the rest of us, and we shouldn't question their decisions . I try not to exaggerate but that's exactly the case . So all during the administration we found it impossible to get experience or judgment cranked into the solution of any problem . As a matter of fact, I have had a man tell me, "No, General, this is not the kind of weapon system that you want to use, this is what you need ." This man was in knee pants when I was commanding the division in combat . He had no experience on the use of weapons at all . And certainly the military are not without knowledge of the use of computers and other methods of gathering statistics and solving problems and so forth . But war is an art, not an exact science, and you are dealing with people, and judgment and experience are very valuable in solving that kind of problem . And we couldn't get those factors ever ground into the solution . F : That's interesting in view of the fact that the big run on the missile gap was 1960, which may or not have been an actual gap . L : Well there wasn't any . We may have been at one time a little behind in missiles because we didn't do too much about them early in the game . We were doing a little something about them, but mainly we had to catch up 33 on everything . Remember at the end of the war we were ten years behind the Germans in technology at that time . Aerodynamics, rocketry, missiles, everything, we were ten years behind and had to catch up . As I say, I was running the research and development effort for the Air Force at that time, chief officer for it on the staff and we tried to get some of these German scientists over to the United States . This was resented and objected to by our own scientists . They didn't want them over here, but we brought them anyway . The only way we could get them in was as prisoners of war . Now we would go and talk to these people and, in effect, we'll hire them to come over and work for us, and "We'll see that your family is taken care of back here . We'll see that they have a place to live, food, and taken care of ." We had quite a time convincing some of them that we would do this . But we got a lot of them to come over . Von Braun was one who came over at this time, Dornberger,who had commanded Peenemunde . But the Russians got a great number of them because the research centers were back away from our bombing and closer to the Russians, so they overran most of them . We got a few B-1 missiles, but the Russians got most of them, and they got most of the scientists that were working on them . And they carried right on with that program full blast, moved everything right back into Russia, and carried on with it . We got some of them, but we didn't carry on with the full field development program . We had to get all of our ducks in a row under a very strict budget and we had a lot of other things to do too . So the fact that the Russians started early carrying on with the B-1, which was based on carrying TNT, was for this reason that the Russians came up with much bigger missiles than we did, because when we finally started our missile program, we started it with atomic warhead on it and this was a lighter smaller weapon--smaller payload--that we could carry . Therefore the rocket that we built was a 34 smaller rocket than the Russians built . And this is the reason we were behind in the payload that we could put into orbit if you want to measure it this way . And it took a little while to catch up on that . And you could say for awhile we were behind in basic rocketry, because the fact that the Russians got more of the technical people that knew something about it and kept right on going over the program, while we had a little lag . But in overall strength there wasn't any big gap or anything of that sort, and when we finally put the money into it and got all of our people ready to work, very soon it became apparent that there wasn't any missile gap at all….. F : . . . . Where were you atthe time of the assassination? L : I was in Washington at the time--the Chief of Staff of the Air Force . F : You were at work on that particular day? L : No, I was off some place, at the actual time of the assassination, I was called back . F : Yes, what was the situation that you found when you got back to Washington? Was there a little bit of tenseness or was it pretty well decided that Lee Harvey Oswald was just after one man? L : Well there wasn't much of a flap . Everybody was a little concerned that they didn't know what made the attack, the assassination, so they wanted everybody present for duty . That's the reason they were called back . F : Was there any great difference between working on the Joint Chiefs under Johnson than it had been with Kennedy or did the fact that you had the same Secretary of Defense insure the continuity? L : No, I didn't understand exactly what was going on . For several months before the President was assassinated they were rumors, and then they got to be a little more than rumors, Vice President Johnson was going to be dropped for the coming election . And all the Kennedy team was finally got to openly to giving to the Vice President to the back of their hands, and it was rather embarrassing for the country around Washington because it was so apparent. Then bang, all at once he is President F : Yes. L : And I believe all of this hard feeling grew up around the flight from Fort Worth back was brought on by these people who had really been vulgar in my opinion and snubbing the Vice President who expected to be stepped on like the cockroaches they were, and he didn't do it. As a matter of fact quite the contrary. From all I got the President was extremely polite to Mrs . Kennedy and the family and bent over backwards to do everything he could to soften the blow if that is possible. It isn't, but he certainly was a Southern gentleman in every respect during this period. And I think this rather surprised these people because they expected the same kind of treatment that they had given him and he didn't give it to him. Why, I don't know : I really don't know because well I can understand in having to face an election and I can understand him being a smart enough politician to know if he threw out all of the Kennedy crowd and put his in, this might split the Democratic party at the time in the next election and so forth . So I can understand him keeping these people around until the election was over, but then he won the election--he won it with the greatest majority that any President has ever had, but he still kept these people around . The same people that had treated him so miserably during this period just before President Kennedy's assassination . F : This is curious . L : Yes . I could never understand, never could figure it out yet . The only answer I could come up with is that knowing the vindictiveness of these people, knowing the moral standards of these people, how ruthless that they were, they must have had some threat over the President that he knew that they would carry out . F : You had your term extended by President Kennedy . Was this any surprise to you? L : Mr. Johnson was president when my tenure was extended. Actually my extension wasn't recommended by the Secretary of the Air Force or the Secretary of Defense . As a matter of fact I was told this by Mr. Zuckert . And I didn't expect it to be because George Anderson was fired, and I fully expected to be too . However, I was over at a cocktail party to celebrate the birthday of NATO, and Mr . Johnson had invited all of the NATO ambassadors and their military representatives at the White House for a cocktail party on NATO's birthday. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was gone . I was a senior member of the Joint Chiefs present, so I went over to represent the United States military. And after things had gone underway the President pulled me off to a little anteroom and asked me who was available to replace me as Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Well I wasn't about to recommend anybody to give them a kiss of death. I certainly didn't agree with what was going on in the administration, and they knew it, and anyone I would recommend they probably wouldn't take into consideration for appointment . So I said, "yell, Mr . President, we have got a dozen people who could do with a job for as Chief of Staff of the Air Force," and I started running off some names and their qualifications . "Then well how about something for you? Now how about being an ambassador?" They'd just sent Anderson to Portugal as ambassador . And he said, "I need a roving ambassador around some of these countries upon the Russian border to keep them bucked up or try to help them and so forth and I particularly want to get them to buy this F5 airplane," which was made by Northrup designed for backward countries . It was a simplier airplane, but it wasn't a first line airplane and wouldn't compete with the Russian first line airplanes . I thought well, first of all, I don't see any reason for stopping doing something I know how to do to take on a job that I don't know how to do . I don't have any experience as an ambassador, and as for selling these F5 airplanes, I can't do that . I couldn't face my counterparts in these foreign countries because they're airmen too, and being airmen, are well aware that this is not a first line system . It's a second line weapon system, if you want to get these people to fight first line equipment with . And I haven't recommended it in the past ; I have been against the F5 in the past for that reason, and I just can't go to face these people and say, "Now it is a good one," I said, "No . If you haven't got anything that I really can do, why let me goon to retire and go into industry ." And he said, "Well, you haven't made any commitments yet have you And I said, "No, I have no form of course until I retire ." And he said, "Well, give me about ten days ." Well two weeks went by ; I guess it was about two weeks . I was down on the Joint Chiefs . We were having an exercise of some sort and the telephone rang, and it was the White House asking me to come over . So I got somebody to replace me and went over there . It was late in the afternoon about 5 :30 then . And I saw the President and he said, "Look I got an election coming up, and I don't know what is going to happen there . I don't think your military career ought to be interrupted until your retirement date, so I'm going to extend you until your retirement date ." Which was about four months short of two-year four-year tour that the chiefs normally serve . "Mr . President, if that's what you want I'll certainly do the best I can, but I'm sure that in coming to this judgment you've taken into account the fact that I don't agree with what your Secretary of Defense is trying to do ." And he said, "Yes, I understand that ; just go back over there and do what you think is best for the country ." "Well that's certainly easy to do, and thank you very much for your confidence ." Well, by this time, it is about 7 :30, so I didn't go back to the Pentagon. I went in to see the Secretary the next morning and saw the Air Secretary and told him who his next Chief of Staff was going to be. He didn't know it . Mr. McNamara didn't know it either. So I was of course grateful to President Johnson for his confidence in me to carry on . But in sitting down and trying to figure out . . . . F : Johnson didn't break the news to McNamara? L : No, he surely didn't--he let me do it . But I remained more skeptical all the time of being in a rat race in Washington . I wonder how much of this was confidence in me and how much of it was political and not wanting a big battle in the Congress, because he just as in effect fired Admiral Anderson, which caused a little stir in the Congress, not much. s an interview with General Curtis LeMay who made his home in Newport Beach, California . The interviewer is Joe B . Frantz . General, just to get started . Incidentally, I'm a World War II veteran so I have been following you for a long time . When did you first become acquainted with Mr . Johnson? Was it in his senatorial days or was it later than that? L : Yes, I first met President Johnson when he was Majority Leader of the Senate . F : They gradually got a little tired . Were you aware at all of Mr . Johnson's participation in the Bay of Pigs problem? L : Well the Bay of Pigs problem, I wasn't in on parts of it . My first contact with it came in a Joint Chiefs meeting while I was still Vice Chief of Staff with the Air Force . And General White was out of town on a trip overseas visiting some of the bases . And I attended all the Joint Chiefs meetings in his place just when he was gone of course . In this particular meeting there was an item on the agenda which I wasn't cleared for, which surprised me, and I think it probably went through the President . I had to get cleared before I could discuss it . After 20 or 30 minutes of delay I finally was cleared and we proceeded with the item, and it was on the Bay of Pigs . And a member of the CIA appeared to brief the Joint Chiefs on the question at hand, which was to effect that they wanted the Joint Chiefs' opinion on changing the landing beach in Cuba of the invasion force . Now wait a minute before I can participate in this, I would like to have a little more background in this . And I found out that some time before the CIA had presented to the Joint Chiefs three landing beaches and asked their opinion on which one was the best one to land on from a military standpoint . And as far as I knew this was all they knew about so called invasion, and they had given an opinion . Then CIA changed their mind and decided that they ought to have a beach that had a landing strip on it, or close by . So they picked a couple of others and they wanted to know which was the best of those . That was the item on that particular day . I said, "Well I need a little more information . What's the size of your landing force?" Seven hundred men was the answer . "And are you planning on taking Cuba with 700 people?" Yes . "Well I don't quite understand this . I know Henry Morgan took Panama with 700 people, but this seems to be a little bit different . I presume that things are well enough organized inside Cuba to be simultaneous uprisings over the country, and it will give some chance success ." In blunt terms I was told this was none of my business . F : I see . L : All they wanted was an answer to a question which beach was the best . And that's all the information I could get, so we came up with the answer of a purely military standpoint of which was probably the best beach to land on that had a landing strip . And that was all that took place . The next time the subject came up that I participated in--now remember, no Vice Chief of any of the services was aware of this item . Only the Chiefs of each of the services was aware of what was going on . How much detail they knew I don't know, but it was very sketchy I am sure . F : To a great extent it was politically handled . L : This was not a military operation--not a military operation, and the Joint Chiefs had nothing to do with the planning of it, control of it, or anything else . I'm sure that all that happened was they ever asked a couple of questions, like which was the best beach to land on . They were aware of what was going on, but the details I don't think they knew anything about . It's true that there was some military participation along the way because the CIA had military people from all of the services assigned to the CIA, but working for the CIA and not reporting back to the military at all . They were working as individuals over there because they had some background training that the CIA required to carry out their work . Also from time to time for various things that they were doing, they would ask for people from military services with certain specialities which were furnished, but we didn't know what they were doing . So there was military participation, but as far as being a military operation with military planning and military control, no, it was not an operation of this sort . Well the next I heard of the operation is the time of the actual invasion . As a matter of fact, a couple of days before there was a Joint Chiefs meeting which General White was absent that I attended at which it was brought up that the activity was going to take place a couple of days later . Landing at daylight on the beaches, and there was a preparation to be made which they wanted to destroy the Cuban Air Force with the Air Force such as it was that the invasion force had of which was few B-26's . They can be gathered off of every junk pile around the world as a matter of fact . They didn't want any of this thing to be traced to the United States . That was our greatest fear that they find out the United States had been dabbling in this . There was an attack to be made on the Cuban Air Force on the ground--surprise attack by the invasion Air Force two days before, and they cooked up some sort of a story that two of these B-26's with Cuban markings on them would take off from our base down in Central America and bomb the air fields in Cuba . And then Cubans would land over in Florida and say that they were Cuban Air Force people that had defected, and they had participated in the bombing and so forth . This got tied up and wasn't very well executed . The whole mission wasn't very well executed, and they failed in destroying the Cuban Air Force, and only one of them got to Florida . But they didn't fool very many people, I am sure . Anyway they failed in the mission of destroying the Cuban Air Force, but decided to go ahead with the landing anyway . The landing force was supposed to have air cover during the landings which meant that they had to take off around midnight in Central America to get up there by daylight . And the night before, this air cover was called off because of the failure of the story they had worked out looked too much like American participation, so they called it off . No one knew anything about this in the Joint Chiefs of Staff until the morning of the invasion when there wasn't a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . And I knew this was coming up so I went down early to try to find out what was going on, and I found out then about 15 minutes before the meeting that Secretary Rusk had called it off, or he said the President had called it off . Maybe the President did call it off, but the story I heard was from Pre Cabell (General Charles P .), who was the deputy of CIA and at the time he was an Air Force General Officer and was a deputy of the CIA . And when the air cover was called off, he knew the implications of this, of course, and went personally to Rusk, who gave him the same cavalier treatment that most military people got from the administration, to the effect that : "Well, the President is now dressing to attend a party . If you want to interrupt him, you can go to him, but he has already made the decision to call this off ." Well I think Pre made a mistake by not going to him, but here again he had been butting his head against a stone wall I guess for a long enough he didn't think it would do any good . Anyway it had been called off . Mr . McNamara was supposed to be at the meeting that morning at the Joint Chiefs, but he didn't come down . Mr . Gilpatric came down to represent him . As soon as he came in, I went right to him before the meeting ever started and said : "Look you have just cut the throat of every man on the beach down there . Without this air cover, there can't be any success ." And he said, "Well I didn't know anything about it ." Said, "Well it is done ." Sure enough the invasion force did catch them by surprise, and they were doing quite well until they ran out of ammunition . And of course what happened the Cuban Air Force came over and sunk the ships that had the reserve ammunition on them, and when they ran out of ammunition, that was all ; the whole force was captured of course . I sat in on the critique of the operation for General White too in which the President attended, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, CIA, and all the rest of them . And it got around to the point that the lack of air cover was what caused the failure . Secretary Rusk was asked about the cancellation of air cover . The President turned to him to see what his answer was . He said, "Well, I didn't know anything about the importance of this," and that ended the discussion . All these articles that you have seen that have been written by the great brains of the Kennedy Administration, including Robert Kennedy, on the Bay of Pigs as to the bad military advice and the betrayal of the military to President Kennedy is just a bunch of hogwash because it was not a military operation . The Joint Chiefs as far as I know were not asked to participate except as I mentioned, and it was not a military operation--it was a civilian operation from start to finish . F : No one in Cuba doubted where it came from or would have I think under any circumstances . What do you get that this feeling that this is just kind of a bunch of amateurs wanting to--that they were playing toy soldiers? L : Well, I try not to exaggerate but everyone that came in with the Kennedy Administration and is the most egotistical people that I ever saw in my life . They had no faith in the military ; they had no respect for the military at all . They felt that the Harvard Business School method of solving problems would solve any problem in the world . They were capable of doing it ; they were better than all the rest of us ; otherwise they wouldn't have gotten their superior education, as they saw it . And the fact that they had it entitled them to govern the rest of us, and we shouldn't question their decisions . I try not to exaggerate but that's exactly the case . So all during the administration we found it impossible to get experience or judgment cranked into the solution of any problem . As a matter of fact, I have had a man tell me, "No, General, this is not the kind of weapon system that you want to use, this is what you need ." This man was in knee pants when I was commanding the division in combat . He had no experience on the use of weapons at all . And certainly the military are not without knowledge of the use of computers and other methods of gathering statistics and solving problems and so forth . But war is an art, not an exact science, and you are dealing with people, and judgment and experience are very valuable in solving that kind of problem . And we couldn't get those factors ever ground into the solution . F : That's interesting in view of the fact that the big run on the missile gap was 1960, which may or not have been an actual gap . L : Well there wasn't any . We may have been at one time a little behind in missiles because we didn't do too much about them early in the game . We were doing a little something about them, but mainly we had to catch up 33 on everything . Remember at the end of the war we were ten years behind the Germans in technology at that time . Aerodynamics, rocketry, missiles, everything, we were ten years behind and had to catch up . As I say, I was running the research and development effort for the Air Force at that time, chief officer for it on the staff and we tried to get some of these German scientists over to the United States . This was resented and objected to by our own scientists . They didn't want them over here, but we brought them anyway . The only way we could get them in was as prisoners of war . Now we would go and talk to these people and, in effect, we'll hire them to come over and work for us, and "We'll see that your family is taken care of back here . We'll see that they have a place to live, food, and taken care of ." We had quite a time convincing some of them that we would do this . But we got a lot of them to come over . Von Braun was one who came over at this time, Dornberger,who had commanded Peenemunde . But the Russians got a great number of them because the research centers were back away from our bombing and closer to the Russians, so they overran most of them . We got a few B-1 missiles, but the Russians got most of them, and they got most of the scientists that were working on them . And they carried right on with that program full blast, moved everything right back into Russia, and carried on with it . We got some of them, but we didn't carry on with the full field development program . We had to get all of our ducks in a row under a very strict budget and we had a lot of other things to do too . So the fact that the Russians started early carrying on with the B-1, which was based on carrying TNT, was for this reason that the Russians came up with much bigger missiles than we did, because when we finally started our missile program, we started it with atomic warhead on it and this was a lighter smaller weapon--smaller payload--that we could carry . Therefore the rocket that we built was a 34 smaller rocket than the Russians built . And this is the reason we were behind in the payload that we could put into orbit if you want to measure it this way . And it took a little while to catch up on that . And you could say for awhile we were behind in basic rocketry, because the fact that the Russians got more of the technical people that knew something about it and kept right on going over the program, while we had a little lag . But in overall strength there wasn't any big gap or anything of that sort, and when we finally put the money into it and got all of our people ready to work, very soon it became apparent that there wasn't any missile gap at all….. F : . . . . Where were you atthe time of the assassination? L : I was in Washington at the time--the Chief of Staff of the Air Force . F : You were at work on that particular day? L : No, I was off some place, at the actual time of the assassination, I was called back . F : Yes, what was the situation that you found when you got back to Washington? Was there a little bit of tenseness or was it pretty well decided that Lee Harvey Oswald was just after one man? L : Well there wasn't much of a flap . Everybody was a little concerned that they didn't know what made the attack, the assassination, so they wanted everybody present for duty . That's the reason they were called back . F : Was there any great difference between working on the Joint Chiefs under Johnson than it had been with Kennedy or did the fact that you had the same Secretary of Defense insure the continuity? L : No, I didn't understand exactly what was going on . For several months before the President was assassinated they were rumors, and then they got to be a little more than rumors, Vice President Johnson was going to be dropped for the coming election . And all the Kennedy team was finally got to openly to giving to the Vice President to the back of their hands, and it was rather embarrassing for the country around Washington because it was so apparent. Then bang, all at once he is President F : Yes. L : And I believe all of this hard feeling grew up around the flight from Fort Worth back was brought on by these people who had really been vulgar in my opinion and snubbing the Vice President who expected to be stepped on like the cockroaches they were, and he didn't do it. As a matter of fact quite the contrary. From all I got the President was extremely polite to Mrs . Kennedy and the family and bent over backwards to do everything he could to soften the blow if that is possible. It isn't, but he certainly was a Southern gentleman in every respect during this period. And I think this rather surprised these people because they expected the same kind of treatment that they had given him and he didn't give it to him. Why, I don't know : I really don't know because well I can understand in having to face an election and I can understand him being a smart enough politician to know if he threw out all of the Kennedy crowd and put his in, this might split the Democratic party at the time in the next election and so forth . So I can understand him keeping these people around until the election was over, but then he won the election--he won it with the greatest majority that any President has ever had, but he still kept these people around . The same people that had treated him so miserably during this period just before President Kennedy's assassination . F : This is curious . L : Yes . I could never understand, never could figure it out yet . The only answer I could come up with is that knowing the vindictiveness of these people, knowing the moral standards of these people, how ruthless that they were, they must have had some threat over the President that he knew that they would carry out . F : You had your term extended by President Kennedy . Was this any surprise to you? L : Mr. Johnson was president when my tenure was extended. Actually my extension wasn't recommended by the Secretary of the Air Force or the Secretary of Defense . As a matter of fact I was told this by Mr. Zuckert . And I didn't expect it to be because George Anderson was fired, and I fully expected to be too . However, I was over at a cocktail party to celebrate the birthday of NATO, and Mr . Johnson had invited all of the NATO ambassadors and their military representatives at the White House for a cocktail party on NATO's birthday. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was gone . I was a senior member of the Joint Chiefs present, so I went over to represent the United States military. And after things had gone underway the President pulled me off to a little anteroom and asked me who was available to replace me as Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Well I wasn't about to recommend anybody to give them a kiss of death. I certainly didn't agree with what was going on in the administration, and they knew it, and anyone I would recommend they probably wouldn't take into consideration for appointment . So I said, "yell, Mr . President, we have got a dozen people who could do with a job for as Chief of Staff of the Air Force," and I started running off some names and their qualifications . "Then well how about something for you? Now how about being an ambassador?" They'd just sent Anderson to Portugal as ambassador . And he said, "I need a roving ambassador around some of these countries upon the Russian border to keep them bucked up or try to help them and so forth and I particularly want to get them to buy this F5 airplane," which was made by Northrup designed for backward countries . It was a simplier airplane, but it wasn't a first line airplane and wouldn't compete with the Russian first line airplanes . I thought well, first of all, I don't see any reason for stopping doing something I know how to do to take on a job that I don't know how to do . I don't have any experience as an ambassador, and as for selling these F5 airplanes, I can't do that . I couldn't face my counterparts in these foreign countries because they're airmen too, and being airmen, are well aware that this is not a first line system . It's a second line weapon system, if you want to get these people to fight first line equipment with . And I haven't recommended it in the past ; I have been against the F5 in the past for that reason, and I just can't go to face these people and say, "Now it is a good one," I said, "No . If you haven't got anything that I really can do, why let me goon to retire and go into industry ." And he said, "Well, you haven't made any commitments yet have you And I said, "No, I have no form of course until I retire ." And he said, "Well, give me about ten days ." Well two weeks went by ; I guess it was about two weeks . I was down on the Joint Chiefs . We were having an exercise of some sort and the telephone rang, and it was the White House asking me to come over . So I got somebody to replace me and went over there . It was late in the afternoon about 5 :30 then . And I saw the President and he said, "Look I got an election coming up, and I don't know what is going to happen there . I don't think your military career ought to be interrupted until your retirement date, so I'm going to extend you until your retirement date ." Which was about four months short of two-year four-year tour that the chiefs normally serve . "Mr . President, if that's what you want I'll certainly do the best I can, but I'm sure that in coming to this judgment you've taken into account the fact that I don't agree with what your Secretary of Defense is trying to do ." And he said, "Yes, I understand that ; just go back over there and do what you think is best for the country ." "Well that's certainly easy to do, and thank you very much for your confidence ." Well, by this time, it is about 7 :30, so I didn't go back to the Pentagon. I went in to see the Secretary the next morning and saw the Air Secretary and told him who his next Chief of Staff was going to be. He didn't know it . Mr. McNamara didn't know it either. So I was of course grateful to President Johnson for his confidence in me to carry on . But in sitting down and trying to figure out . . . . F : Johnson didn't break the news to McNamara? L : No, he surely didn't--he let me do it . But I remained more skeptical all the time of being in a rat race in Washington . I wonder how much of this was confidence in me and how much of it was political and not wanting a big battle in the Congress, because he just as in effect fired Admiral Anderson, which caused a little stir in the Congress, not much........

Okay, the Detroit Free Press Story was picked up by USA Today, and went nationwide. Can somebody post a link to the USA Today article, that I believe was edited - cut back. Then CNN Inside Edition did a piece with Ed Primeau - the acoustics engineer I worked with - and John McAdams - what does he have to do with any of this? Can someone post a link to this CNN program? Thanks, BK