Michael Griffith

Micallef is right about the importance of the battle, but he is egregiously wrong in believing that FDR would have supported a Japanese drive to the north, and that such a drive would have avoided the Pacific War. I'm baffled as to how Micallef could believe such a thing, given FDR's obsessive determination to preserve the Soviet Union and his hostility toward the Japanese. The Japanese actually floated the idea of attacking the Soviet Union as an ally of the U.S., and FDR summarily and adamantly rejected it. The best book on the Khalkhin Gol battle (more accurately Nomonhan) is Stuart Goldman's work Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II. Goldman provides much more detail on the fighting than Micallef could provide in an article, and he also presents an informative look at Japanese policy in China at the time. Goldman also covers an area that most Americans have no clue about: the Soviet drive to annex a large chunk of northern China, and Japan's prolonged efforts to prevent that drive. As I discuss at length in The Real Infamy of Pearl Harbor, Japan had valid interests and a credible claim in Manchuria. FDR's refusal to recognize this fact and his deeply flawed and biased view of Japan's war with the Chinese (actually, some Chinese) led to tragic consequences that could and should have been avoided.

Actually, positing that Sirhan fired blanks makes a lot of sense because at least one of his first few shots should have hit RFK or a bystander, given how close Sirhan was to RFK.

I did not say that Veith served in Vietnam or that he has spent time in Southeast Asia. He is, however, one of the most thorough Vietnam War scholars around. BTW, Dr. Christopher Goscha, a noted Canadian scholar on Southeast Asia and author of the recent widely acclaimed book The Road to Dien Bien Phu, praised Veith's research in Vietnamese sources in a recent Wilson Center roundtable discussion involving Veith, Goscha, and McHale: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_u5XnGSjqFk (1:17:30) As for Kissinger's role, Veith sent Kissinger a copy of the final manuscript of Black April. Kissinger was so impressed with it that he arranged to meet Veith in person and then arranged for Encounter Books to publish the book. Veith's list of Vietnam War myths is similar to the list I have on my Vietnam War website. Regarding his myth #9, even most liberal scholars, including Edwin Moise, have long admitted that Tet was a military disaster for the Communists, although you still find some liberal amateurs repeating the myth in online discussions. Finally, anyone who denies that news media coverage of the war was misleading needs to deal with the examples that Braestrup cites in his book on the subject, as well as with the examples cited by other scholars, such as those cited by Charles Wiley and Dolf Drodge in their presentation "The Culpability of the Media" (LINK).

The case that nuking Japan was immoral and unnecessary is powerful and compelling, but making that case can be difficult because many people believe the Japanese "had it coming" due to the Japanese army's barbaric conduct. Many of these folks do not realize that the Japanese army's hardliners (the militarists) held a strong grip on the government and hated the Japanese moderates almost as much as they hated Westerners. Most of Japan's civilian leaders were disgusted by the army's barbarism but were unable to stop it. Even some Japanese senior officers (e.g., Homma, Suzuki, and Yamashita) opposed the army's brutal conduct but could not stop it. This mistake of seeing all Japanese as militarists, and also not understanding how the Japanese government worked, played a role in FDR's refusal to reach a peace deal with Japan in 1941. His draconian sanctions and rejection of all Japanese peace offers crippled the moderates and enabled the hardliners to determine Japan's reaction. Ambassador Grew and other Japan experts told FDR and his advisors that the last two Japanese peace offers were as far as the moderates could go without provoking an outright coup by the militarists, but their input was rejected. To get some idea of how brutal the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was, I recommend reading Paul Maruyama's book Escape from Manchuria (2017). Born in Japan, Maruyama was a Lt. Col. in the U.S. Air Force. He and his family were trapped in Manchuria when WWII ended, and the Maruyamas were not repatriated to Japan until January 1947.

The fact that Sirhan was clearly hypno-programmed points unmistakably to elements of the CIA as the culprits.

For those who would rather watch a video than read a book or long article, here is a good video that makes extensive use of North Vietnamese sources and that deals with the last three years of the Vietnam War, Congress's betrayal of South Vietnam, and ARVN's performance. It is a presentation by Dr. George Jay Veith given to the Marines' Memorial Association in 2013: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zuxksqqoz8E&t=972s Dr. Veith discusses some of the information contained in his 2013 book Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-1975, as well as information from Communist sources that became available after the book was published. Veith interviewed nearly 50 former South Vietnamese military members and arranged for Merle Pribbenow to help translate newly available North Vietnamese sources. Dr. Veith is a former Army officer who earned his doctorate in history from Monash University in Australia. He is the author of four books on the Vietnam War. He is also the executive director of the National League of POW/MIA Families. Dr. Veith is the scholar who, just last year, exploded the old liberal myth that during the 1968 presidential campaign Richard Nixon used Claire Chennault to persuade South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu not to attend the Paris peace talks. Veith, using newly available sources and interviews, has proved (1) that Nixon did no such thing, (2) that South Vietnam's Ambassador Bui Diem did not serve as an intermediary for Chennault, (3) that Chennault used the South Vietnamese charge d'affaires in Taiwan as her intermediary, and (4) that Chennault acted at the behest of Taiwan's President Chiang Kai-Shek, not Nixon. It should be added that Thieu hardly needed any convincing that it would not be in South Vietnam's best interests to attend the Paris talks at that time. Here is Dr. Veith's article on the subject: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/anna-chennault-affair-south-vietnamese-side-wars-greatest-conspiracy-theory And, for those who might be interested, here is Dr. Veith's review of Ken Burns and Lynn Novick's 2017 documentary The Vietnam War: https://lawliberty.org/burns-and-novick-on-vietnam-a-neutral-film-or-a-rifle-butt-to-the-heart/

A few points: Horne is wrong about FDR not knowing Pearl Harbor would be attacked. I have written a book on this subject (The Real Infamy of Pearl Harbor). The bomb-plot messages alone clearly indicated that Pearl Harbor was being reconnoitered for an air attack (the Japanese did not obtain bomb-plot information about any other American port). Congressman Dies later revealed in his memoir that FDR's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, told him that FDR was aware of Japan's preparations to hit Pearl Harbor. FDR's decision to provoke Japan to attack us was criminal and tragic. Japan made very reasonable peace offers, offering FDR virtually everything he said he wanted, but FDR was determined to provoke war with Japan. Japan was willing to attack the Soviet Union, but FDR was fanatically determined to preserve the Stalinist gulag state. Japan would have surrendered before the Soviet invasion of Manchuria if Truman had simply given private assurance that the emperor would not be deposed, and the Japanese moderates would have had a much easier time bringing about a surrender if FDR had not announced his unconditional surrender policy. The Soviets literally raped Manchuria, so I fail to see how FDR should be praised for allowing Stalin to do this. The Soviet devastation of Manchuria caused enormous death and destruction among the civilian population. It is the one of the most overlooked atrocities of the 20th century. Allowing Stalin to enter the Pacific War led to the creatin of the Stalinist state of North Korea and the Korean War, among other tragedies. FDR's refusal to even talk with the German resistance was inexcusable. His unconditional surrender policy directly led to thousands of needless American casualties in Europe and to unspeakable Soviet atrocities against the civilian population in eastern Germany. There was absolutely nothing positive about the results of the unconditional surrender policy. It was a senseless, cruel policy. It was the result of FDR's hatred of Germans, his racist attitude toward the Japanese, and his perverse desire to aid the Soviet Union. The fact that we now know that several of FDR's aides/advisers/officials were Soviet spies or Soviet sympathizers probably contributed to his pro-Soviet handling of the war.

An excellent documentary on the Vietnam War is Ride the Thunder: A Vietnam War Story of Triumph and Honor, the 2015 film based on Richard Botkin's 688-page book by the same title. The documentary is actually about 60% movie and 40% documentary. The movie is the true story of American military legend John Ripley and South Vietnamese war hero Le Ba Binh. In between every scene or two, there are interview segments with military experts and video clips that were televised during the war. One of the clips shows Jane Fonda assuring America that our POWs were not being tortured and that the North Vietnamese were treating our prisoners exceptionally well. Another clip shows John Kerry being confronted by a fellow veteran who served in the same area where Kerry served and challenging Kerry to name officers who committed atrocities and to state when and where the atrocities occurred. Another clip shows a liberal college professor insisting that the South Vietnamese had nothing to fear from a Communist takeover. Here is a link to the documentary: https://www.amazon.com/Ride-Thunder-Vietnam-Victory-Betrayal/dp/B077K8KGWB Botkin's book Ride the Thunder was published in 2009 and received great reviews from numerous Vietnam veterans and Vietnam War scholars. Here are a few examples: General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Retired): “Richard Botkin has written a brilliant account of the bravery and skill of a small group of American Marine advisors and the courageous Vietnamese Marines who fought to the end. For those of us who served as advisors to these Marines, it is a moving, personal story magnificently told. It is a must-read for all who want to understand the true nature of the Vietnam War.” General Carl E Mundy, Jr., USMC (Retired), 30th Commandant of the Marine Corps: “Richard Botkin places the reader in the middle of the war through the experiences of several U.S. Marine officers who served as advisors to the Vietnamese Marines—a Corps that, like our own, was one of the elite units of the Vietnamese armed forces. The resulting story gives the reader a personal view of the men from both Corps who fought so nobly together, and a glimpse of true heroism, sacrifice, and overcoming challenges few are familiar with.” Rear Admiral Jeremiah Denton, US Navy (Retired): “Ride the Thunder by Richard Botkin is a great contribution toward correcting the myths that still prevail about the Vietnam War. This is a powerful book, one that every veteran and patriotic American should read.” As for Botkin himself, he is a former Marine Corps officer. He made nine trips to Cambodia between 1998 and 2007 and four trips to Vietnam, including one with his main Vietnamese character, Le Ba Binh, to do research for Ride the Thunder. https://www.amazon.com/Ride-Thunder-Vietnam-Story-Triumph/dp/193507105X

I am not convinced that John Foster Dulles was a Nazi collaborator. I find the evidence that is cited for this claim to be unconvincing. Foster Dulles publicly advocated establishing a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine in 1944, and he played an important role in getting a plank in the Republican Party platform that called for a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. I cannot imagine a Nazi collaborator doing these things. Yes, Foster Dulles briefly became critical of Israel in the 1950s as Ike's Secretary of State, but he soon abandoned his criticism of Israel after he dealt with Arab leaders, especially Nasser of Egypt, and realized they were fanatically unwilling to compromise with Israel, even unwilling to officially acknowledge Israel's existence. Kinzer cites the fact that in the early and mid-1930s, Foster Dulles supported investments and business dealings with Germany and, for a time, held a positive view of Hitler. This is a weak basis for calling him a Nazi collaborator. Quite a few Western politicians and businessmen initially viewed Hitler positively and supported doing business with Germany. We must remember that Kristallnacht did not happen until late 1938, and the Holocaust did not start until after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. When Hitler revealed himself to be an evil monster, Foster Dulles changed his mind about him and became as anti-Hitler as anybody else; he also condemned the Nazi government even before the war started.

My website on the Pacific War and the Atomic Bomb includes numerous articles that show that nuking Japan was unnecessary and immoral. The Pacific War and the Atomic Bomb (google.com) Here is the subpage with article links on the unnecessary and immoral nuking of Japan: unnecessary.pdf - Google Drive This horrible tragedy may not have occurred if FDR had not committed the U.S. to the policy of "unconditional surrender." This foolish policy played right into the hands of the militarists in Japan and made it much harder for the moderates to bring about a surrender. In Germany, the anti-Hitler plotters lost considerable support after FDR announced the unconditional surrender policy.

Thank you. Yes, of course. What in the devil is there to "negotiate"? Russia invaded a peaceful, liberal democracy in a naked act of aggression. It is just bizarre to see ultra-liberals attacking Biden and/or Ukraine for not negotiating with Putin. It's like arguing that a woman who is resisting an attempted rape should "negotiate" with her rapist. It is sad to see the lack of moral clarity and the lack of a basic sense of right and wrong that some liberals exhibit when it comes to Ukraine. Anyway, as I have mentioned, there are several hawkish statements in the American University speech (the peace speech), and JFK delivered the very hawkish Berlin and Fort Worth speeches after the peace speech. One gets the feeling that certain ultra-liberals here would stop caring about the JFK assassination if they were forced to face the fact that JFK was not a peacenik liberal but a right-leaning centrist who favored massive across-the-board tax cuts, fiscal restraint, a balanced approach toward labor issues, a strong national defense, and the containment of communism.

Regarding the unlikelihood of Chinese entrance into the war and ARVN’s effectiveness, lately I have been reading the second edition of Stanley Karnow’s famous book Vietnam: A History (1997), which contains some useful information on these issues. PBS used the first edition of the book as the basis for its 1983 documentary Vietnam: A Television History. In the second edition of his book, Karnow announced that he had changed his mind on some issues based on new information, so there are some notable differences between the first edition (1984) and the second edition (1997). In the 13 years between the first and second editions, Karnow conducted numerous additional interviews with former North Vietnamese Communists, former Viet Cong members, and American officials and military personnel. Also, in the second edition, he sparingly used some of the newly available North Vietnamese sources. Lo and behold, we see that Karnow supported the conservative argument that China had no intention of entering the war. China was willing to give military and economic aid, and even to provide some support troops to help with logistics, but Mao Tse Tung (aka Mao Zedong) had no intention of entering the war. In describing the situation as of 1963, Karnow said the following: But the Chinese camp was uncomfortable for the Vietnamese Communists. . . . Fresh in their mind as well was China’s betrayal at the Geneva conference in 1954. Now they resented the pressures being put on them by Chairman Mao Zedong to wage war in Vietnam according to his formula. He urged them to conduct a protracted conflict. . . . Mao’s advice concealed an ulterior purpose. He had not forgotten the Korean War, in which a million Chinese had died, among them his own son, and he was eager to avert a major conflict in Southeast Asia that might again pit China against overwhelming U.S. technology. He was then also contemplating a showdown against adversaries with his own Chinese Communist party, and he intended to use the Chinese army as his instrument for that enterprise rather than in an external venture. . . . The Vietnamese Communists were never blind to Mao’s duplicity. Out of necessity, though, their propaganda during the early 1960s proclaimed their bonds with China to be “as close as lips and teeth.” It was not until much later, after the war, that they uncorked their real feelings—with a vengeance. As we chatted in Hanoi in 1981, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Van Dong delivered a tirade against Mao, saying: ‘He was already read to fight to the last Vietnamese.” (pp. 394-395) And Karnow noted that Mao’s position had not changed as of 1965: Mao was then preparing to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, his devastating purge of the Chinese Communist party, and he needed his army to help him carry out the political campaign at home. Also, a big war in Southeast Asia would compound the threat to Chinese national security at a tie when the Soviet Union was building up its forces along China’s northern borders. He wanted to avoid a conflict like the one in Korea, in which China had sustained horrendous casualties. (p. 467) Yet, American liberals constantly argued that making full use of our air power and attacking the sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos would cause China to enter the war. Military and CIA analysts, noting China’s internal situation, argued that Mao would not intervene, but LBJ believed the liberals. He frequently cited his fear of Chinese intervention as his excuse for rejecting the Joint Chiefs’ and Westmoreland’s repeated requests that we hit the sanctuaries and make full use of our air power in North Vietnam. As I have noted before, when Nixon finally approved massive bombing of North Vietnam and mining Haiphong Harbor in 1972, China did not enter the war, even though we bombed facilities right next to the Chinese border and even destroyed some Chinese ships. In short, conservative scholars such as Mark Moyar are right on this key point and liberals are still wrong on it. Walt Rostow and many others were right to propose a large-scale ground movement into North Vietnam from 1964 onward. Mao bluntly stated for the record in 1964 that China would not enter the war unless Chinese territory were attacked. And the Soviets certainly were not going to enter any war in Southeast Asia. Regarding the effectiveness of South Vietnam’s army (ARVN, pronounced ar-vin), Karnow noted that one reason the Hanoi regime refused to withdraw their troops from South Vietnam in 1969 was that the Viet Cong were “no match for the Saigon government army.” In speaking of North Vietnam’s reaction to a Nixon peace proposal in mid-1969, Karnow said, The response from the North Vietnamese was predictably negative, as it would be again and again on the same point. They were not going to redeploy their troops to the north, since the Viet Cong alone were no match for the Saigon government army. (p. 610) Huh, so as of 1969, the Viet Cong were “no match” for ARVN. That is not what we hear from nearly all liberal scholars to this very day. It is certainly not what we heard from the anti-war movement, from Hanoi Jane, from John Kerry, and the rest of that ilk, who constantly portrayed South Vietnamese soldiers as being cowardly, unwilling to fight, incompetent, etc., etc.

I agree that Allen Dulles can be called a Nazi collaborator, but I am not sure we can say this about John Foster Dulles.

Wiley and Droge's 2004 interview didn't much impress me ... the former makes apologies for the Gulf of Tonkin chicanery and the latter wasn't really a journalist, but rather a government employee who worked for the Agency for International Development. I notice you did not address any of the many examples of biased and/or inaccurate reporting that Wiley and Droge discuss. Peter Braestrup discusses many more examples in his book The Big Story. BTW, Droge also worked for the U.S. Information Service and spent years on the NSC's Vietnam Information Group, so he was in an excellent position to talk about news media coverage of the war. Are you denying that there was an attack on U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2, 1964? I agree that the reported August 4 attack was a case of jittery nerves, a rookie radar operator, and pressure from Washington to provide a quick confirmation or denial, but no credible scholar denies that the North Vietnamese attacked our ships on August 2. I did come across a 2020 paper by Brock J. Vaughan, Wilfrid Laurier University that examines the role that media played in coverage of Vietnam, and its effect in shaping the ultimate outcome of the Vietnam War. Entitled "War, Media, and Memory: American Television News Coverage of the Vietnam War", it references quite a few sources and writers on this subject. Here is a link: https://scholars.wlu.ca/bridges_contemporary_connections/vol4/iss1/5 [SNIP] Yes, I have read Vaughan's article. It is one of many attempts by liberal scholars to deny that the major news media behaved badly during the war. Did you notice that Vaughan does not address a single one of the examples of biased and/or inaccurate reporting discussed by Wiley and Droge, not to mention the examples documented in Braestrup's seminal book? In fact, Vaughan does not even mention Braestrup's massive book. How can any article that pretends to discuss the issue of media bias during the Vietnam War not even mention, much less fail to address, Braestrup's 630-page work on the subject? I do give you credit for being willing to read the other side of the story. However, if you read the other side with a determination to disbelieve it no matter what, the value of the effort declines considerably. Speaking of sources available online, I should mention The Boston Manifesto, written and published in 2004 by the Vietnam Veterans for Factual History (formerly known as Vietnam Veterans to Correct the Myths) (LINK). Several noted Vietnam War scholars helped write the 186-page book, including Dr. Peter C. Rollins, Dr. Robert F. Turner, and Stephen Sherman. The Boston Manifesto deals with the following issues, among others: -- John Kerry and the Winter Soldier Investigation -- Operation RAW -- Drug use among U.S. forces in Vietnam -- Undermining efforts to get humane treatment for American POWs -- Treasonous conduct by some leaders in the anti-war movement -- The brutal, mass-murdering nature of the North Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists -- How and why the Vietnam War started -- The insane restrictions placed on our air operations during most of the war -- The insane restrictions placed on our ground operations throughout the war -- LBJ and McNamara's mistreatment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Hanoi's propaganda campaign and the American anti-war movement -- The evidence that we had the war won in South Vietnam by 1972 -- The media's conduct during the war -- The liberal myths about Ho Chi Minh -- The issue of elections and the 1954 Geneva Accords -- South Vietnam's government compared to North Vietnam's government -- The Phoenix Program -- The Domino Theory -- The reign of terror imposed on the South Vietnamese after the war

It seems to me that ever increasingly on the forum that if Israel is implicated in any plot, whether it be the JFKA, USS Liberty attack or other, the poster is accused of being antisemitic or a holocaust denier. That is because the vast majority of those who attack Israel on these issues are anti-Semites and Holocaust deniers. I came across an article last night which mentioned Mordechai Vanunu, who alleged that Israel was almost certainly behind the killing of President John F. Kennedy. https://zeenews.india.com/news/world/israel-behind-jfk-assassination-vanunu_169996.html Oh, boy. Vanunu holds racist views against Ashkenazi Jews and has given bomb-making instructions to Hamas terrorists. Vanunu was a technician at the Dimona nuclear facility who turned whistleblower and spent not 18 years in prison after being kidnapped by Mossad in Italy. He is still forbidden from leaving Israel and is not allowed to talk to foreigners. He is lucky he was not hanged. He violated his oath. If he had committed similar treason in Russia or China, he would have been executed in short order. Muramar Gadaffi also accused Israel of giving the green-light in the killing of President John F. Kennedy. Oh, there's a great source! Did Israel have a strong enough motivation? They were desperate to achieve their nuclear ambitions. Their track record has an heir of fanaticism. The way they have treated the Palestinians, the kidnappings, the assassinations, the utterly ruthless behaviour. This is radical Islamic anti-Israeli propaganda and a total distortion of the historical record. If militant Jews in Egypt had done what militant Palestinians have done in Israel, the Egyptian army would have wiped them out long ago. Most Palestinians are not militants. Many Palestinians want to become Israeli citizens. Far more Palestinians have been killed by radical Palestinians than by the Israelis. Would Mossad have seen killing a US president as a step too far? Or did they see it as necessary for their survival? Did you post anonymously, as a guest, so you could float this anti-Semitic trash without attribution?

Leslie, can you just give us a brief summary (i.e., just a few sentences) of what has been done to authenticate the datebook?

Gerry, you obviously have not gotten the JFKA research community memo that insists that all Republican presidents since the 1920s have been warmongers, tyrants, and robber barons (if not fascists). If we read the American University speech with any care, we quickly see that it was not the hugs-and-kisses dovish speech that liberals paint it as being. Furthermore, liberals ignore the fact that JFK gave the very hawkish Berlin speech after the American University speech. They also forget the speech that JFK gave in Fort Worth hours before he was killed, which included the following statements: Three years ago last September I came here, with the Vice President, and spoke at Burke Burnett Park, and I called, in that speech, for a national security policy and a national security system which was second to none--a position which said not first, but, if, when and how, but first. That city responded to that call as it has through its history. And we have been putting that pledge into practice ever since. . . . In the past 3 years we have increased the defense budget of the United States by over 20 percent; increased the program of acquisition for Polaris submarines from 24 to 41; increased our Minuteman missile purchase program by more than 75 percent; doubled the number of strategic bombers and missiles on alert; doubled the number of nuclear weapons available in the strategic alert forces; increased the tactical nuclear forces deployed in Western Europe by over 60 percent; added five combat ready divisions to the Army of the United States, and five tactical fighter wings to the Air Force of the United States; increased our strategic airlift capability by 75 percent; and increased our special counter-insurgency forces which are engaged now in South Viet-Nam by 600 percent. I hope those who want a stronger America and place it on some signs will also place those figures next to it. This is not an easy effort. This requires sacrifice by the people of the United States. But this is a very dangerous and uncertain world. As I said earlier, on three occasions in the last 3 years the United States has had a direct confrontation. No one can say when it will come again. No one expects that our life will be easy, certainly not in this decade, and perhaps not in this century. But we should realize what a burden and responsibility the people of the United States have borne for so many years. Here, a country which lived in isolation, divided and protected by the Atlantic and the Pacific, uninterested in the struggles of the world around it, here in the short space of 18 years after the Second World War, we put ourselves, by our own will and by necessity, into defense of alliances with countries all around the globe. Without the United States, South Viet-Nam would collapse overnight. Without the United States, the SEATO alliance would collapse overnight. Without the United States the CENTO alliance would collapse overnight. Without the United States there would be no NATO. And gradually Europe would drift into neutralism and indifference. Without the efforts of the United States in the Alliance for Progress, the Communist advance onto the mainland of South America would long ago have taken place. So this country, which desires only to be free, which desires to be secure, which desired to live at peace for 18 years under three different administrations, has borne more than its share of the burden, has stood watch for more than its number of years. I don't think we are fatigued or tired. We would like to live as we once lived. But history will not permit it. The Communist balance of power is still strong. The balance of power is still on the side of freedom. We are still the keystone in the arch of freedom, and I think we will continue to do as we have done in our past, our duty. . . .

All true. However, most of our best evidence that points to suspects points to the Mafia. In many cases, the Mafia practically functioned as an arm of the CIA. It is reasonable to believe that the rogue government elements behind the assassination employed the Mafia as the tip of the spear, just as the CIA did with the plots to kill Castro. Also, Jack Ruby's silencing of Oswald clearly proves the Mafia played a major role in the plot, as do the Mafia killings of some key witnesses. Remember, too, that David Ferrie was closely linked to Carlos Marcello.

For those who want to better understand the news media's conduct during the Vietnam War, here is an informative article by two men who were in a position to speak with authority on the subject: "The Culpability of the Media," by Charles Wiley and Dolf Droge (LINK). Wiley did four tours as a journalist in South Vietnam. He covered the 1968 Tet Offensive and the 1972 Easter Offensive. Droge served in the U.S. Information Service and in the diplomatic corps in Thailand, Laos, Poland, and Vietnam during part of the war. He also worked with the National Security Council’s Vietnam Information Group under LBJ and Nixon. Wiley and Droge discuss numerous examples of severe media bias and false reporting during and after the war.

I hope Leslie Sharp will address this issue, or perhaps Alan Kent.

This makes a lot of sense. I have always believed that revenge was one of the major motives of the plotters, and probably the biggest motive for some of them. Since JFK had no intention of allowing South Vietnam to fall to the Communists, and since LBJ only (and very reluctantly) escalated the war effort after Hanoi vastly escalated their war effort, Vietnam is not a plausible motive. Mafia bosses Marcello and Trafficante had two powerful motives: revenge and survival. JFK, through Bobby, had not only infuriated and attacked them but posed an existential threat to them. CIA figures such as Dulles, Cabell, and Harvey, along with many anti-Castro Cubans (especially veterans of the Bay of Pigs), undoubtedly felt an intense desire for revenge against JFK.

Oh, boy. Uh-huh. And we wonder why the Smithsonian associates the JFKA conspiracy case with nutcase theories such as the Princess Diana conspiracy theory: here we have several folks in this forum peddling the theory. First off, no, Diana's death did not happen in the same manner she said it would. She said Charles would have someone tamper with her brakes (she also said Charles was going to kill both her and Camilla, so clearly she was a bit paranoid). Her car crashed because her driver was drunk and was dangerously speeding, and because she was not wearing a seatbelt, not because her brakes were tampered with. The CCTV cameras? Oh, sheesh. You know the crash happened very late at night, right? Besides, several people witnessed the crash, and their accounts suggest no foul play Several people also saw the driver a short time earlier and said he was visibly drunk, which the autopsy toxicology report confirmed. Have you read Lord Stevens' report on Diana's death? (LINK) Among other things, it notes that none of the CCTV cameras along the route to the Alma tunnel were in position to observe Diana's car. Those cameras, logically enough, were only pointed toward the front of the buildings on which they were installed to protect. Also, there was no camera, flashing or otherwise, at the Alma underpass at the time of the crash to photograph speeding vehicles. Photographs taken of the outside of the underpass on that night confirm this. Your nutcase claims about the WTC buildings have been soundly refuted and are rejected by 99% of the scientists who have examined them. This is exactly the kind of crackpot stuff that so thoroughly discredits valid conspiracy theories in the eyes of your average educated person. We rightly complain when the Smithsonian compares the JFKA conspiracy case with nutty conspiracy theories, but then some JFKA researchers peddle many of those nutty conspiracy theories, even in this forum. Finally, as for your statement that I am "the David Cole of the Vietnam War," yes, I certainly do believe that it was a noble and moral endeavor to try to keep 18 million South Vietnamese from falling under Communist brutality and tyranny. And when your side finally managed to betray South Vietnam and enabled the Communists to execute tens of thousands of South Vietnamese and to send nearly a million others to brutal concentration camps, 98% of your side said nothing about it, and for the most part your side continues to pretend that it never happened.

Below are excerpts from another source that is available online: Colonel Harry Summers’ famous book On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (U.S. Army War College, 1982) (LINK). Among other things, Summers was a Vietnam veteran and a professor at the Army War College. General Jack Merritt, the commander of the Army War College at the time, noted in the book’s foreword that Summers’ study had received “overwhelmingly favorable” reviews from both active-duty senior officers who were middle-grade officers during the Vietnam War and from retired officers who were involved with war planning and strategy during the war: As a critical strategic analysis, I believe that this book is firmly on the mark. This conviction is reinforced by the overwhelmingly favorable comments that the War College has received since the book was originally published in the spring of 1981. They came not only from the current leadership of the Army (who, it must be remembered, were captains, majors and colonels during the 1960s, primarily concerned with tactical operations), but also from many retired general officers who were intimately involved in the strategies and plans of the war at the highest level. The War Was Winnable Writing after the US withdrawal from Vietnam, Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, editor of RUSI, the distinguished British military journal of the Royal United Services Institute, commented on the view that the war in Vietnam was unwinnable. "This is rubbish," he said, blaming our failure on our election of a strategy which "not only conferred on the North Vietnamese the privilege of operating on safe exterior lines from secure bases but threw away the advantages of a tactical and strategic initiative." He went on to note that by "using firepower of crushing intensity" we succeeded in defeating both the insurgency and the 1972 North Vietnamese offensive. . . . In Vietnam as in Korea our political objectives dictated a strategic defensive posture. While this prevented us from destroying the "root" at the source through the strategic offensive, Korea proved that it was possible to achieve a favorable decision with the strategic defensive. It restored the status quo ante, prevented the enemy from achieving his goals with military means, and provided the foundation for a negotiated settlement. All of this was within our means in Vietnam. (pp. 76-77) The Negative Impact of Not Invading North Vietnam, of the Failure to Fully Use Our Air Power, and of Allowing the North Vietnamese Sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia Unlike the China sanctuary which at least made some strategic sense in avoiding a wider war against a major adversary, the sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia were a self-inflicted wound. The myth of their neutrality gave North Vietnam an immense tactical and strategic advantage that plagued us throughout the war. (p. 66) The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, had a clear appreciation of the relationship between the strategic and tactical dimensions of the offensive. . . . After their initial attempt to gain their objective with guerrilla forces alone, they launched a tactical offensive in 1964 with the commitment of regular forces. Frustrated by the massive commitment of US combat ground forces, and their defeat in the battle of the Ia Drang in November 1965, they reverted to the tactical defensive. As they had done earlier against the French, their objective was to wear us down. This time, however they had an added advantage. Because of our public decision not to invade North Vietnam they were able to accomplish this with an economy of force effort-Viet Cong guerrillas supplied and augmented by selected North Vietnamese regular units-while preserving the bulk of their regular forces in their homeland sanctuary. (p. 69) As we will see, our so-called strategic offensive in the South was never more than a tactical offensive, since we were unable to carry the war to the enemy's main force-the North Vietnamese Army-and instead expended our energies against a secondary force-North Vietnam's guerrilla screen. Admiral Sharp's second strategic element-the nation building effort in South Vietnam was a task that could only be accomplished by the South Vietnamese themselves. While US forces could provide a shield against external aggression from North Vietnam behind which this activity could take place, "nation building" itself was clearly an inappropriate military task. As we will see in a subsequent chapter on Coalition Warfare, it was not until we "Vietnamized" this task after 1967 that nation building became a reality. His third strategic element-our air and naval offensive against North Vietnam-was faulted by Admiral Sharp himself. As he said: “From a military standpoint, both air and naval programs were inhibited by restrictions growing out of the limited nature of our conduct of the war... The bombing of North Vietnam was unilaterally stopped by the United States a number of times, for varying periods of time, in the hope that the enemy would respond by stopping his aggressive activities and reducing the scope and level of conflict. In every case the Communists used the bombing pause to rush troops and supplies to reinforce their army in South Vietnam. Such unilateral truce efforts, while judged politically desirable, accrued some temporary military disadvantages to successful prosecution of the war.” But these bombing halts were more than "temporary military disadvantages." They were fatal flaws. As Clausewitz had warned: “If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of the situation must not of course be merely transient-at least not in appearance. Otherwise, the enemy would not give in but would wait for things to improve...." Ironically, the air offensive did have a strategic impact, but its impact was not on North Vietnam. The debate over the nature of our bombing campaign produced a strategic theory that was to have a devastating effect on American offensive operations--the theory of graduated response. In his analysis of the Vietnam war, Brigadier General Dave Palmer tells how this came about: “Within the larger framework of the debate over whether to bomb had raged an argument over how to go about it ... civilian planners wanted to start out softly and gradually increase the pressure by precise increments which could be unmistakenly recognized in Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh would see the tightening pattern, the theory went, and would sensibly stop the war against South Vietnam in time to avoid devastation of his homeland. Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton dubbed the strategy "slow squeeze" and explained it in musical terms-an orchestration of activities which would proceed in crescendo fashion toward a finale. "The scenario," he wrote, "would be designed to give the United States the option at any point to proceed or not, to escalate or not, and to quicken the pace or not." “The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not like McNaughton's tune. The generals argued that if force were to be used at all it should be applied hard and fast to obtain maximum impact with minimum loss. To start lightly and escalate slowly, they held, would be like pulling a tooth bit by bit rather than all at once and getting it over with. If the purpose were to affect Hanoi's will, the Joint Chiefs said, the United States would have to hit hard at vital points and demonstrate a willingness to apply unlimited force.... “The intelligence community--a panel comprising members of the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency, and State's Bureau of Intelligence--entered the debate strongly on the side of the military.... “President Johnson overrode the objections of his intelligence and military advisors. Indeed, it is not at all clear whether Secretary McNamara ever even bothered to convey their arguments to him. Ambassador Taylor, still addressed as "General," had given his blessings to their theory, approval which apparently cancelled the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus was born the strategy of "graduated response.'"" (pp. 72-73) I might add that even Colin Powell said that the strategy of gradual escalation and repeated bombing halts was a "disaster."

ME: Anyway, how have I decided there was no conspiracy in Diana's death? One, no one had a motive for assassinating her. YOU: How do you know that? How do you know that anyone had a motive for wanting her dead? The only motive I've seen floated is that Charles wanted her dead so he could marry Camilla (proof positive that Charles is either half-blind or has horrible taste in women). ME: Three, her driver was drunk and on drugs and was driving exceedingly fast and just lost control of the vehicle. YOU: How do you know that what was reported was the truth? There was an autopsy. Are you saying they faked the toxicology blood test done at the autopsy? Who would have done this? How? When? Also, several staffers at the Ritz who saw the driver shortly before the accident said he appeared to be drunk ("visibly drunk"). I might add that the driver was not even a licensed chauffeur but was a security manager at the hotel who was asked to do the driving by Diana and her lover at the last minute, so the guy had no idea he'd be driving the famous couple until shortly before they all departed. ME: Four, there is no evidence of any conspiracy to kill her. YOU: How do you know that? Because no one has yet presented any credible evidence that there was a conspiracy to kill her, nor has anyone identified a plausible motive (unless one buys the tale that Charles was willing to have her whacked so he could marry the hound-faced Camilla). BTW, one year before she wrote her paranoid letter saying she feared Charles would arrange a car accident to kill her, she told her attorney that she feared that Charles would kill both her and Camilla! Clearly, the young lady had an active imagination. It is embarrassing that we are even having this discussion. Princess Diana's death was clearly nothing more than a tragic accident.

As I've said, Dr. Sorley is certainly not the only scholar who has noted that by 1971 we were clearly winning the war in South Vietnam. Indeed, the same thing can be said about the war in South Vietnam for the first three months of 1972 and from September until the end of the year (the interval being the first four months of the NVA's Easter Offensive, which began on March 30: the offensive was battered to a halt by May, and ARVN began to counter-attack in June, driving the NVA from most of the areas they had seized). John Collins, an expert in military strategy, likewise made the point that by 1972 we had effectively won the war in South Vietnam. Collins served in Vietnam from 1967-1968 and retired from the U.S. Army as a Colonel in 1972. After retiring from the Army, he served as the Senior Specialist in National Defense for the Congressional Research Service. In addition to being a Vietnam veteran, he was a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and of the Armed Forces Staff College. During his last few years in the Army, he was appointed as the director of Military Strategy Studies at the National War College and then as the chief of the college's Strategic Research Group. His book Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices was published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press in 1973. I quote from Collins' famous essay "Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy," in Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, 40:4 (Winter 2010): All the same, a spectacular shift in strategic balance occurred by 1972, even though an arbitrary timetable transferred power to our ally too quickly. Insurgency was inert [lifeless/motionless], for all practical purposes. Its causes were kaput. Pacification programs, including Operation Phoenix, took care of hard-core Vietcong who were spared by the Tet offensive. US ground combat operations ceased. Air and naval support for the ARVN continued, but on a low-key basis. Antiwar demonstrations in the United States were sporadic after the Vietnam Moratorium in October 1969 and massive rallies one month later. The Cambodian incursion caused a very brief revival in the spring of 1970. South Vietnam was politically stable, compared with the previous 10 years. President Thieu was scarcely a Jeffersonian democrat--the tiger cage scandal and charges of corruption cost him dearly in this country--but he sat still for several social changes that solidified his constituency and undercut the Communists. Socioeconomic woes, such as rampant inflation and a rash of refugees, were never really controlled. However, major roads reopened; resettlement began; land reforms took root; and rice bowls were filled. Our side had won at counterinsurgency and could cope with conventional conflict, which is what it then came down to. Giap, striving to reseize initiative, struck in great strength at Eastertime in 1972, ignoring all rules of revolutionary war. Some commentators in the United States compared that surge with the Tet offensive four years earlier, but Tet had been a Vietcong show. This was a naked invasion, and the Communists "crapped out" because they had lost their strength in the South. The popular uprising they expected didn't come. There were no Dien Bien Phus. Bled white, blocked on the battlefield, and battered at home, Ho's successors sued for peace, and unskilled US statesmen gullibly snapped at the bait. (p. 12, available at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA510934.pdf and https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol40/iss4/5/)