The Farce Forum

[Craig Lamson]

John wrote:

Several members posted details of the plight of the poor in the United States. Tim replies by pointing out that the US has 740 television sets per 1,000 people.

I was refering to a post by Mark Stapleton who most know is from Australia. I used not only television sets but other indicia of consumptiom, as you know I did John. In addition, you purposely ignored the fact that I was comparing the data from the US with data from Australia. My point was simply that using such criteria as indicative of people living above the level of poverty, there are more poor in Australia than in the United States. Thus Mark's remark about poverty in the US was at a minimum misplaced.

That is, I submit, a logical response.

Just an fyi, its a poll so take it as you will:

http://www.ibdeditorials.com/IBDArticles.a...280109607660233

An America Divided Along Class Lines? 75% 'Haves' Say No

By INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY | Posted Friday, November 16, 2007 4:30 PM PT

As Americans take time this week to count their blessings and think of others less fortunate, they can take comfort in knowing that those who put themselves in the latter category are far fewer than they probably realize.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IBD Series: Uncommon Knowledge — What The Media Misses, Misrepresents, and Ignores

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Contrary to politicians and even polls that claim the U.S. is a nation deeply split between "haves" and "have-nots," a new IBD/TIPP Poll finds that three of four of us (75%) consider ourselves "haves."

This includes even those who make the least money. Fully 60% of those with incomes of $30,000 a year or less count themselves as "haves" vs. 34% who do not.

The percentage of "haves" goes up to 62% among those with incomes between $30,000 and $50,000, to 83.5% between $50,000 and $75,000 and to 90% those over $75,000.

Also contrary to conventional wisdom, a majority of Americans believe that "as a nation, we are materially better off today than we were 20 years ago." A solid 58% of the 924 adults surveyed from Nov. 2 to Nov. 8 were of that opinion vs. 37.5% who disagreed.

All in all, the IBD/TIPP Poll paints a picture of Americans satisfied with — even thankful for — what they have and how much more they have now than a generation ago.

This contrasts with the oft-heard positions of some politicians who see a widening gap between rich and poor and a need to close it. Chief among them is John Edwards, former U.S. senator and current candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, who has made the "Two Americas" the theme of his populist campaign.

The IBD/TIPP findings also differ sharply with those of a similar poll taken in September by the Pew Research Center.

When Pew asked, "Is America divided into 'haves' and 'have-nots'?" 48% answered "yes" and 48% answered "no." When it further asked, "If you had to choose, are you in the 'haves' or 'have-nots'?," 45% chose "haves" and 34% "have-nots." Another 21% didn't know or weren't sure.

IBD/TIPP asked the question this way: "All things considered, do you consider yourself to be part of America's haves or part of America's have-nots?"

The 30-percentage-point difference between IBD/TIPP and Pew on the have/have-not question is huge.

According to IBD's pollster, Raghavan Mayur, president of TechnoMetrica Market Intelligence, the polls differed in several ways, including sample sizes, weighting schemes, answer options, question wording and survey content.

Be that as it may, Pew made much of the divisions that it believed it found and the changes since Gallup polled on the subject 20 years ago.

In a report titled "A Nation of 'Haves' and 'Have-Nots?," it observed that "over the past two decades, a growing share of the public has come to the view that American society is divided into two groups, the 'haves' and the 'have-nots.'

"Of equal importance," it added, "the number of Americans who see themselves among the 'have-nots' has doubled over the last two decades, from 17% in 1988 to 34% today.

"In 1988, far more Americans said that . . . they were probably among the 'haves' (59%) than the 'have-nots.' "

The IBD/TIPP data, however, do not indicate that more Americans have drifted into the "have-not" camp. In fact, the 75% who consider themselves "haves" today vs. the 59% responding to the earlier Gallup survey suggest that more have joined the "haves."

The fact that 58% believe we are materially better off also supports this finding.

A closer look at the IBD/TIPP results finds very little difference in the way men and women or the various age groups categorize themselves.

Wider differences are apparent among political affiliations, with Republicans splitting 82% to 12% among "haves" and "have-nots," Democrats at 68%-27% and independents at 77%-20%.

Racial samples were too small to generalize about. But for the record, the breakdown for blacks and Hispanics was 71% "haves" and 29% "have-nots." (For whites, it was 76%-16%.)

Among regions, the West had the most "haves," with 81%, and the Midwest had the least, with 67%. The poll also distinguished between "investors," 82% of whom said they were "haves." "Non-investors" came in at 63%.

On whether the nation is better off now than in 1987, both Republicans and independents differed with Democrats. By a 76% to 23%, Republicans agreed we're better off (with 52% agreeing "strongly"), and independents agreed 60%-39%. But only 45% of Democrats agreed vs. 49% who didn't.

Differences were also observed among regions, with the Northeast at 69% and the South at 62% agreeing more than the West (51.5%) and the Midwest (51%).

Whites split 61.5% to 36% and blacks and Hispanics 52% to 39%. Sixty-five percent of investors think we're better off than 20 years ago vs. 34% who don't. Non-investors split 50% to 42%. Respondents over 65 were the only age group that didn't think things have improved.

The poll's margin of error was plus or minus 3.3 percentage points.

http://www.ibdeditorials.com/IBDArticles.a...280109607660233

[Terry Mauro]

John wrote:

Several members posted details of the plight of the poor in the United States. Tim replies by pointing out that the US has 740 television sets per 1,000 people.

I was refering to a post by Mark Stapleton who most know is from Australia. I used not only television sets but other indicia of consumptiom, as you know I did John. In addition, you purposely ignored the fact that I was comparing the data from the US with data from Australia. My point was simply that using such criteria as indicative of people living above the level of poverty, there are more poor in Australia than in the United States. Thus Mark's remark about poverty in the US was at a minimum misplaced.

That is, I submit, a logical response.

Just an fyi, its a poll so take it as you will:

http://www.ibdeditorials.com/IBDArticles.a...280109607660233

An America Divided Along Class Lines? 75% 'Haves' Say No

By INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY | Posted Friday, November 16, 2007 4:30 PM PT

As Americans take time this week to count their blessings and think of others less fortunate, they can take comfort in knowing that those who put themselves in the latter category are far fewer than they probably realize.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IBD Series: Uncommon Knowledge — What The Media Misses, Misrepresents, and Ignores

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Contrary to politicians and even polls that claim the U.S. is a nation deeply split between "haves" and "have-nots," a new IBD/TIPP Poll finds that three of four of us (75%) consider ourselves "haves."

This includes even those who make the least money. Fully 60% of those with incomes of $30,000 a year or less count themselves as "haves" vs. 34% who do not.

The percentage of "haves" goes up to 62% among those with incomes between $30,000 and $50,000, to 83.5% between $50,000 and $75,000 and to 90% those over $75,000.

Also contrary to conventional wisdom, a majority of Americans believe that "as a nation, we are materially better off today than we were 20 years ago." A solid 58% of the 924 adults surveyed from Nov. 2 to Nov. 8 were of that opinion vs. 37.5% who disagreed.

All in all, the IBD/TIPP Poll paints a picture of Americans satisfied with — even thankful for — what they have and how much more they have now than a generation ago.

This contrasts with the oft-heard positions of some politicians who see a widening gap between rich and poor and a need to close it. Chief among them is John Edwards, former U.S. senator and current candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, who has made the "Two Americas" the theme of his populist campaign.

The IBD/TIPP findings also differ sharply with those of a similar poll taken in September by the Pew Research Center.

When Pew asked, "Is America divided into 'haves' and 'have-nots'?" 48% answered "yes" and 48% answered "no." When it further asked, "If you had to choose, are you in the 'haves' or 'have-nots'?," 45% chose "haves" and 34% "have-nots." Another 21% didn't know or weren't sure.

IBD/TIPP asked the question this way: "All things considered, do you consider yourself to be part of America's haves or part of America's have-nots?"

The 30-percentage-point difference between IBD/TIPP and Pew on the have/have-not question is huge.

According to IBD's pollster, Raghavan Mayur, president of TechnoMetrica Market Intelligence, the polls differed in several ways, including sample sizes, weighting schemes, answer options, question wording and survey content.

Be that as it may, Pew made much of the divisions that it believed it found and the changes since Gallup polled on the subject 20 years ago.

In a report titled "A Nation of 'Haves' and 'Have-Nots?," it observed that "over the past two decades, a growing share of the public has come to the view that American society is divided into two groups, the 'haves' and the 'have-nots.'

"Of equal importance," it added, "the number of Americans who see themselves among the 'have-nots' has doubled over the last two decades, from 17% in 1988 to 34% today.

"In 1988, far more Americans said that . . . they were probably among the 'haves' (59%) than the 'have-nots.' "

The IBD/TIPP data, however, do not indicate that more Americans have drifted into the "have-not" camp. In fact, the 75% who consider themselves "haves" today vs. the 59% responding to the earlier Gallup survey suggest that more have joined the "haves."

The fact that 58% believe we are materially better off also supports this finding.

A closer look at the IBD/TIPP results finds very little difference in the way men and women or the various age groups categorize themselves.

Wider differences are apparent among political affiliations, with Republicans splitting 82% to 12% among "haves" and "have-nots," Democrats at 68%-27% and independents at 77%-20%.

Racial samples were too small to generalize about. But for the record, the breakdown for blacks and Hispanics was 71% "haves" and 29% "have-nots." (For whites, it was 76%-16%.)

Among regions, the West had the most "haves," with 81%, and the Midwest had the least, with 67%. The poll also distinguished between "investors," 82% of whom said they were "haves." "Non-investors" came in at 63%.

On whether the nation is better off now than in 1987, both Republicans and independents differed with Democrats. By a 76% to 23%, Republicans agreed we're better off (with 52% agreeing "strongly"), and independents agreed 60%-39%. But only 45% of Democrats agreed vs. 49% who didn't.

Differences were also observed among regions, with the Northeast at 69% and the South at 62% agreeing more than the West (51.5%) and the Midwest (51%).

Whites split 61.5% to 36% and blacks and Hispanics 52% to 39%. Sixty-five percent of investors think we're better off than 20 years ago vs. 34% who don't. Non-investors split 50% to 42%. Respondents over 65 were the only age group that didn't think things have improved.

The poll's margin of error was plus or minus 3.3 percentage points.

http://www.ibdeditorials.com/IBDArticles.a...280109607660233

**********************************************************

And, that's most likely due to the "dumbing down" process which has so perfidiously permeated the American consciousness since the death of the New Frontier, which in fact, became the empirical goal of Wall Street's baronial oligarchs.

The majority of the population of the United States remains on the I.Q. level of that of sophisticated morons, who've been hoodwinked and bamboozled into believing they're the most highly educated, state of the art, intelligence-wise, consumers of what America has to offer, simply because they have adequate plumbing and electricity, if you really want to tear it down to the bare basics of the matter.

If we're so high-minded and sophisticated, as we've been brain-washed into believing, then someone please explain to me how we've managed to have been persuaded to vote for a fascist, war-mongering, elitist, prejudiced, administration for the last 25 years, that's done nothing for this country, but bring it to its knees, while back-channeling our major industrial and manufacturing bases to a bunch of Third World backwaters, and for what purpose?

Is anybody awake out there, or are we all just jerking off?

[John Dolva]

A (great) broad (S. O'Connor) outlining* the issues:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCk2YQS8vaw

*(lyrics by Marley)

EDIT:: for those with gentler sensibilities

Edited November 19, 2007 by John Dolva

[Mark Knight]

John, a day or so ago you had the unmitigated gall to accuse me of being "poilitically illiterate".

The meaning of illiterate means lacking the ability to read or not being well-read.

But the collapse of Communism was primarily the result of RR and his determination that he could induce the Soviets to spend themselves into financial ruin.

Ex-counsellor, let me ask you a few questions.

Is China, the most populous nation on the face of the Earth, still Communist?

Is Cuba, a mere 90-some miles from your doimcile, not also still a Communist nation?

Then, OTHER than the former USSR and its Eastern European satellites, exactly WHERE did Communism "collapse"? Or would it be more accurate to say that SOVIET-style Communism may have collapsed, but that the most populous nation on the face of the earth is STILL a Communist nation...and that the CLOSEST non-contiguous neighbor to the US also REMAINS a Communist nation?

So, OTHER than the former USSR and their Eastern European satellites, isn't Communism ALIVE AND WELL, and in little danger of the COLLAPSE, in the MOST POPULOUS NATION on the face of the EARTH?

And yet you claim that "..the collapse of Communism was primarily the result of RR..."

Therefore, I believe the claim that you are "politically illiterate" is based upon sound evidence, Tim...evidence that YOU so willingly provide.

[Tim Gratz]

Well, now Mark, if you were not so politically illiterate (talk about allegations made by a pot!) you would know that historians routinely refer to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites as the collapse of Communism--or the end of the Cold War if you will. I think it is in part because China does not appear as intent as exporting Communism as the Soviets were (it was not Mao who promised to "bury us" after all) but it is unfortunate that all the world's people do not enjoy the freedoms we do.

Since you appear as concerned with Cuba as I am I assume you would support a move by the US to invade Cuba and get rid of that two-bit dictator at long last.

Now since you imply you are plitically literate, why don't you cite the pro-RR books that you have read? I gather from John's lack of response to the same question, he has not read a single one.

Well, below is a good summary of RR's role in ending the Cold War:

If there were few leaders during the Cold War willing to consistently speak out openly about the evils of the communist system, there were fewer still who were willing to battle it directly. No American president throughout the history of the Cold War up until Reagan had been willing to make rolling back and defeating communism a primary goal. Even anti-Communists like Richard Nixon subscribed to the seductive idea that stability was most important and that a healthy Soviet Union was important for long-term peace. But Reagan understood that communism by its nature was a danger to peace because it relied on fear and external enemies to maintain its legitimacy. Only by its defeat would the Cold War end, so he chose to force tensions to a decisive conclusion rather than hiding them.

Many of Reagan’s most critical initiatives were launched alone. He approved massive defense increases in 1981, even though a majority of his cabinet was opposed and former presidents Nixon and Ford were advising him to cut spending. He launched the Strategic Defense Initiative almost entirely by himself, informing his secretary of state and most other advisers only hours before he announced his plans to the public. When he took a hard line over the declaration of martial law in Poland in an effort to keep Solidarity alive, he did so with scant support from any major ally save Great Britain’s Margaret Thatcher. All the while, he was ridiculed for failing to grasp the intricacies of the global situation.

Even when the opportunity arose to secure his place in history by striking a diplomatic bargain with Gorbachev at Reykjavik, Reagan resisted the temptation, much to the consternation of many who were watching. He would not change course, even in pursuit of political glory.

The Victory Lap

When it came, the collapse of the Soviet empire came at a dizzying pace.

On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. It was the first complete military defeat in Soviet history. According to Sergei Tarasenko, an official in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, it made crystal clear that Moscow could not use force to hold its crumbling empire together.

In May 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev let the Sandinista government in Nicaragua know that the Soviet Union could no longer afford to provide aid. The following year, the Sandinistas were voted out of power in free elections.

In early June, 200,000 people gathered for a ceremony in Budapest’s Heroes Square. Five coffins were lying in front of the crowd, each bearing the name of a man who had been sentenced to death as a traitor after the 1956 revolution. The ceremony gave rise to more protests, and a few months later the Communist Party voted itself out of existence.

In mid-October, the East German city of Leipzig was illuminated by the light of thousands of candles as people gathered and sang “Dona Nobis Pacem.” The peaceful protest spread, and two days later, Erich Honecker resigned. Weeks later, the entire Politburo quit. On November 9, the Berlin Wall was breached and thousands of East Germans surged through the Wall’s crossing points and were greeted by West Berliners carrying champagne. “The Wall is gone! The Wall is gone!”

While these events were unfolding, ex-president Reagan watched from California, pleased with what was taking place. Reagan had always said that fear was communism’s most important weapon. Now around the world, in outposts and in the heart of the empire, ordinary people were acting fearlessly. Characteristically, Reagan would not take any credit for what was happening. By early 1990, invitations were being extended for him to return to Europe in what some in the media dubbed his “victory lap.”

In early September 1990 Reagan arrived in Berlin, greeted by a city newspaper that had printed the words to a new love song written in honor of him, “The Man Who Made Those Pussyfooters and Weaklings Feel Ashamed.” He made his final pilgrimage to the Wall and was given a hammer and chisel. He was 79 now, but he took a few pieces out of the large gray edifice. Then he walked along the death strip where East German border guards had once operated with orders to shoot anyone trying to escape. He shook hands with ordinary Germans. “Thank you, Mr. President,” one resident shouted. “Well,” he said in response, “we can’t be happy until the whole world knows freedom the way we do.”

From Germany he traveled to Gdansk, Poland, the birthplace of the Solidarity movement. He was greeted by torrential rain and hail, but 7,000 people had shown up for a public ceremony in his honor, chanting “Thank you, Thank you!” while singing “Sto Lat,” a song in honor of Polish heroes. As the crowd watched, Lech Walesa’s former parish priest presented Reagan with a sword.

“I am giving you the saber for helping us to chop off the head of communism,” he said.

Beyond the Final Scorecard

How did Reagan contribute to the demise of the Soviet empire? You can draw up a scorecard and count the economic costs that Reagan’s policies placed on a struggling Soviet economy, using Moscow’s numbers:

The second strand of the European natural gas pipeline Reagan stopped: lost revenue, $7–8 billion a year

The cost of counterinsurgency operations against Reagan-backed guerrillas: $8 billion a year

Extra arms shipped to Cuba to soothe anxieties following the U.S. invasion of Grenada: $3 billion

Military spending increases announced to match Reagan’s: $15–20 billion a year

Lost revenue due to restrictions on technology imports: $1–2 billion a year

Lost revenue from a sudden drop in oil prices: $5–6 billion a year

Extra aid delivered to Poland after Reagan’s sanctions: $1 billion

This amounts to a hefty price tag for a superpower that had total hard-currency earnings of approximately $32 billion at the time.

Or you can look at the body blows that the Soviet empire suffered. Military defeat in Afghanistan demoralized the Kremlin and the military as they suffered their first defeat of the Cold War. At the same time, the survival and eventual triumph of Solidarity in Poland burned a hole in the heart of the empire that could never be filled. In both of these cases, Reagan proved decisive in victory.

Since the end of the Cold War, a debate has raged about how it ended. It is fashionable now to denigrate Reagan’s role in winning the Cold War. His achievements and strategic vision are minimized in many quarters. We are often offered the image of Reagan as an amiable bumpkin who just happened to be there when it all happened around him. But not only was Reagan passionate and courageous in battle, he had a well-developed plan seeking the demise of the Soviet Union. Developed over the course of 30 years and spelled out in detail through several top-secret national security directives while he was president, the ideas and concepts behind it were largely his own. Make no mistake: This “bumpkin” won the Cold War.

It is revealing, though, that one person who never got wrapped up in this debate was Ronald Reagan. One of the last items to be removed from his Oval Office desk in January 1989 was a small sign that read “It’s surprising what you can accomplish when no one is concerned about who gets the credit.”

Today we live in a world very different from the one only a quarter-century ago. There is no longer talk of a large-scale war in Europe, no fear of a massive nuclear strike. Understanding Reagan’s struggle and final triumph over communism involves more than debating the past or deciding who gets the credit. It provides us wisdom and hope for the struggles of today and tomorrow. Reagan’s hope that we be guided not by fear but by courage and moral clarity is as apt today as it was during the height of the Cold War.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

copy; 2002 by Peter Schweizer. Adapted from the new book Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Communism, by Peter Schweizer, published by Doubleday, a division of Random House, Inc. Reprinted with permission.

[Tim Gratz]

So I await responses from those paragons of political literacy, John Simkin and Mark Knight, with the list of boojks they have read about the role of RR in ending the Cold War. I assume that only one of the highest degree of political literacy would have the audacity to question the literacy of another.

[Tim Gratz]

The most salient portion of the Schweitzer quote bears repeating:

Since the end of the Cold War, a debate has raged about how it ended. It is fashionable now to denigrate Reagan’s role in winning the Cold War. His achievements and strategic vision are minimized in many quarters. We are often offered the image of Reagan as an amiable bumpkin who just happened to be there when it all happened around him. But not only was Reagan passionate and courageous in battle, he had a well-developed plan seeking the demise of the Soviet Union. Developed over the course of 30 years and spelled out in detail through several top-secret national security directives while he was president, the ideas and concepts behind it were largely his own. Make no mistake: This “bumpkin” won the Cold War.

[Tim Gratz]

Also worth reading is this essay:

I'll start for emphasis with the author's conclusion:3

But when all is said and done, it was Ronald Reagan who seized the moment and instituted the right policies at the right time to bring about the Soviet collapse.

Ronald Reagan’s death has revived debates about why the Cold War ended when it did, and what, if any, credit should go to Reagan for the collapse of the Soviet Empire. U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War is often portrayed as a steady, consistent application of the containment doctrine, which was first explained in George F. Kennan’s 1947 article in Foreign Affairs, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." In reality, however, U.S. Cold War policies differed in important respects from president to president.

Harry Truman

The Truman administration initially combined overt resistance to Soviet encroachments in Europe with covert efforts to undermine Soviet power in Eastern and Central Europe. Diplomatic pressure in Iran, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Airlift, financial assistance to non-communist parties in Western Europe, and the formation of NATO—all of which were designed to contain the spread of Soviet communism—were complemented with psychological, political and guerilla tactics behind the iron curtain. Truman’s key policy document, NSC-68, envisioned an offensive strategy to defeat the Soviet Empire. American strategy, according to NSC-68, sought to "induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s control and influence," and to "foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system." When Soviet-backed North Korean forces invaded South Korea in June 1950, the U.S.-led United Nations forces not only resisted the attack, but sought, with Truman’s initial blessing, to liberate all of Korea from communist control. When communist Chinese forces intervened on a massive scale in October-November 1950, Truman, much to the chagrin of U.N and American commander, General Douglas MacArthur, abandoned the policy of liberating Korea and settled for containment.

The early Eisenhower administration gave lip service to a policy of "rolling back" the Soviet Empire. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had promoted such a policy prior to assuming office. In a 1950 memo to Senator Robert Taft, Dulles advocated "stimulating guerilla and insurrectional activities" within Eastern Europe, and "stepping up subversive activities within areas of Soviet control." Dulles subsequently wrote an article that appeared in Life magazine in which he publicly argued for a more offensive strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets. After Eisenhower took office, administration spokesmen publicly encouraged the enslaved nations of Eastern and Central Europe to rise up against their Soviet masters. When that actually happened in East Germany in 1953, and in Poland and Hungary in 1956, however, the United States did nothing to aid the resistance forces. In Korea, moreover, Eisenhower, like Truman, settled for containment. "Rollback" was shown to be merely empty rhetoric. Eisenhower, instead, relied on defensive security pacts with nations on the periphery of the Soviet Empire, and the threat of massive nuclear retaliation to hold the Soviets at bay on the Eurasian periphery.

John Kennedy

John F. Kennedy’s presidency combined inspiring rhetoric about promoting liberty throughout the world ("bear any burden," "pay any price") with a reckless amateurism in the conduct of foreign policy. That amateurism led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the failed summit with Khrushchev in Vienna, the unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, the empty response to the construction of the Berlin Wall, the undermining of Diem in South Vietnam, and the promotion of arms control as a key element in U.S.-Soviet relations. Kennedy and his advisers ("the best and the brightest") moved energetically from crisis to crisis, and time and again, in the words of a recent historian of the Cold War, "energy…outstripped wisdom." Even the one arguably significant Cold War accomplishment of the Kennedy administration, the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, was a "negative" victory in that it merely pushed back a Soviet advance. And Kennedy paid a significant price for that negative victory by publicly promising to refrain from invading Cuba, which served as a Soviet base in the Western Hemisphere for the next twenty-seven years, and by secretly agreeing to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey.

Lyndon Johnson

The Johnson administration fought the Vietnam War encumbered by what James Burnham called the "self-imposed strategic prison" of containment. U.S. strategy throughout the conflict was defensive—to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam, not to liberate the North from communist rule. Containment also dictated Johnson’s unwillingness to aid the popular uprising in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which consequently was crushed by Soviet troops. The Soviets had learned the lesson of 1956: containment meant that the U.S. would shrink from attempting to exploit vulnerabilities within the Soviet Empire. It was a straight line from containment to the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" which proclaimed that once a state or territory fell under Soviet control, it would remain under Soviet control.

U.S. Cold War policy during the Nixon-Ford years de-emphasized the ideological component of the U.S.-Soviet conflict and sought to foster cooperation.

Richard Nixon

This policy—called "détente"—emphasized arms control, trade agreements, superpower summitry, and an overall "lessening of tension" between the superpowers. Containment, to be sure, was still part of U.S. policy, as evidenced by the nuclear alert ordered by Nixon in response to threats of Soviet intervention during the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, and the courting of China as a de facto strategic ally against the Soviet Union. But détente helped to ideologically disarm the West by fostering illusions about the nature of Soviet communism. Détente’s consequences included U.S. acquiescence to the loss of strategic nuclear superiority, a willingness to overlook Soviet cheating on arms control agreements, the U.S. abandonment of longtime allies in Southeast Asia, and formal recognition—in the Helsinki Accords—of a Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Nothing better symbolized the loss of American confidence and will during the years of détente than President Ford’s unwillingness to welcome Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to the White House for fear of offending Soviet leaders.

Jimmy Carter

President Jimmy Carter pursued détente to its logical extreme. In Carter’s first major foreign policy address, he proclaimed that the U.S. had abandoned its "inordinate fear of communism." Longtime allies in the Cold War, such as the Shah in Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua, were tossed aside or abandoned because of human rights violations, only to be replaced by more brutal regimes that pursued anti-American foreign policies. Carter signed arms control agreements with the Soviets that were so flawed that even a Senate controlled by his own political party refused to ratify them. Carter revealed the extent of his ignorance about the nature of the Soviet system when he expressed his disappointment and surprise at Soviet behavior after the Red Army invaded Afghanistan. Under Carter, containment, while still surviving as an overall policy, reached its nadir.

Ronald Reagan shattered the illusions of détente by redefining the nature of the Cold War between the West and Soviet communism, and adopting a strategy that successfully exploited the vulnerabilities of the Soviet system. In the late 1970s, Reagan told Richard Allen, who would become his first National Security Adviser, that his long-term strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union was simple: we win, they lose. During the 1980 campaign, Reagan opined to Lou Cannon of the Washington Post that the Soviets lacked the economic wherewithal to compete in an all-out arms race with the West. After assuming office, Reagan proclaimed in April 1981 that the West "won’t contain communism, it will transcend communism." The Soviet system, he said, was a "bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written." The next year, Reagan told the British Parliament that he had a long term plan "which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history." In January 1983, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 75, which stated that U.S. policy was "[t]o contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism…, [t]o promote…the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system…, [to] exploit…vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire" in an effort to "loosen Moscow’s hold" on Eastern Europe.

Ronald Reagan

Reagan’s offensive strategy included providing aid to anti-communist rebels in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and elsewhere; supporting dissident groups and movements in Eastern Europe; toppling the Soviet-backed government in Grenada; tightening controls on the transfer of militarily useful technology to Eastern bloc countries; promoting SDI; a massive U.S. military build-up; and efforts to exploit Soviet economic difficulties.

In June 1987, Reagan challenged Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to "tear down" the Berlin Wall. Two years later, the Wall came down, then the enslaved nations of the Soviet Empire gradually broke free, and the Soviet Union collapsed.

Reagan’s predecessors, to be sure, deserve credit for keeping the Soviets at bay for more than thirty years. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev also deserves credit for his unwillingness to forcibly crush the rebellion in the satellite nations during 1989-1991. Others who meaningfully contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Empire include Pope John Paul II, the courageous dissident groups within the Empire, and the Western armed forces that stood watch and sometimes fought on the Eurasian periphery and elsewhere during the "long twilight struggle." But when all is said and done, it was Ronald Reagan who seized the moment and instituted the right policies at the right time to bring about the Soviet collapse.

[Tim Gratz]

Also worth reading is this essay:

I'll start for emphasis with the author's conclusion:3

But when all is said and done, it was Ronald Reagan who seized the moment and instituted the right policies at the right time to bring about the Soviet collapse.

Ronald Reagan’s death has revived debates about why the Cold War ended when it did, and what, if any, credit should go to Reagan for the collapse of the Soviet Empire. U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War is often portrayed as a steady, consistent application of the containment doctrine, which was first explained in George F. Kennan’s 1947 article in Foreign Affairs, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." In reality, however, U.S. Cold War policies differed in important respects from president to president.

Harry Truman

The Truman administration initially combined overt resistance to Soviet encroachments in Europe with covert efforts to undermine Soviet power in Eastern and Central Europe. Diplomatic pressure in Iran, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Airlift, financial assistance to non-communist parties in Western Europe, and the formation of NATO—all of which were designed to contain the spread of Soviet communism—were complemented with psychological, political and guerilla tactics behind the iron curtain. Truman’s key policy document, NSC-68, envisioned an offensive strategy to defeat the Soviet Empire. American strategy, according to NSC-68, sought to "induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s control and influence," and to "foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system." When Soviet-backed North Korean forces invaded South Korea in June 1950, the U.S.-led United Nations forces not only resisted the attack, but sought, with Truman’s initial blessing, to liberate all of Korea from communist control. When communist Chinese forces intervened on a massive scale in October-November 1950, Truman, much to the chagrin of U.N and American commander, General Douglas MacArthur, abandoned the policy of liberating Korea and settled for containment.

The early Eisenhower administration gave lip service to a policy of "rolling back" the Soviet Empire. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had promoted such a policy prior to assuming office. In a 1950 memo to Senator Robert Taft, Dulles advocated "stimulating guerilla and insurrectional activities" within Eastern Europe, and "stepping up subversive activities within areas of Soviet control." Dulles subsequently wrote an article that appeared in Life magazine in which he publicly argued for a more offensive strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets. After Eisenhower took office, administration spokesmen publicly encouraged the enslaved nations of Eastern and Central Europe to rise up against their Soviet masters. When that actually happened in East Germany in 1953, and in Poland and Hungary in 1956, however, the United States did nothing to aid the resistance forces. In Korea, moreover, Eisenhower, like Truman, settled for containment. "Rollback" was shown to be merely empty rhetoric. Eisenhower, instead, relied on defensive security pacts with nations on the periphery of the Soviet Empire, and the threat of massive nuclear retaliation to hold the Soviets at bay on the Eurasian periphery.

John Kennedy

John F. Kennedy’s presidency combined inspiring rhetoric about promoting liberty throughout the world ("bear any burden," "pay any price") with a reckless amateurism in the conduct of foreign policy. That amateurism led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the failed summit with Khrushchev in Vienna, the unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, the empty response to the construction of the Berlin Wall, the undermining of Diem in South Vietnam, and the promotion of arms control as a key element in U.S.-Soviet relations. Kennedy and his advisers ("the best and the brightest") moved energetically from crisis to crisis, and time and again, in the words of a recent historian of the Cold War, "energy…outstripped wisdom." Even the one arguably significant Cold War accomplishment of the Kennedy administration, the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, was a "negative" victory in that it merely pushed back a Soviet advance. And Kennedy paid a significant price for that negative victory by publicly promising to refrain from invading Cuba, which served as a Soviet base in the Western Hemisphere for the next twenty-seven years, and by secretly agreeing to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey.

Lyndon Johnson

The Johnson administration fought the Vietnam War encumbered by what James Burnham called the "self-imposed strategic prison" of containment. U.S. strategy throughout the conflict was defensive—to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam, not to liberate the North from communist rule. Containment also dictated Johnson’s unwillingness to aid the popular uprising in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which consequently was crushed by Soviet troops. The Soviets had learned the lesson of 1956: containment meant that the U.S. would shrink from attempting to exploit vulnerabilities within the Soviet Empire. It was a straight line from containment to the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" which proclaimed that once a state or territory fell under Soviet control, it would remain under Soviet control.

U.S. Cold War policy during the Nixon-Ford years de-emphasized the ideological component of the U.S.-Soviet conflict and sought to foster cooperation.

Richard Nixon

This policy—called "détente"—emphasized arms control, trade agreements, superpower summitry, and an overall "lessening of tension" between the superpowers. Containment, to be sure, was still part of U.S. policy, as evidenced by the nuclear alert ordered by Nixon in response to threats of Soviet intervention during the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, and the courting of China as a de facto strategic ally against the Soviet Union. But détente helped to ideologically disarm the West by fostering illusions about the nature of Soviet communism. Détente’s consequences included U.S. acquiescence to the loss of strategic nuclear superiority, a willingness to overlook Soviet cheating on arms control agreements, the U.S. abandonment of longtime allies in Southeast Asia, and formal recognition—in the Helsinki Accords—of a Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Nothing better symbolized the loss of American confidence and will during the years of détente than President Ford’s unwillingness to welcome Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to the White House for fear of offending Soviet leaders.

Jimmy Carter

President Jimmy Carter pursued détente to its logical extreme. In Carter’s first major foreign policy address, he proclaimed that the U.S. had abandoned its "inordinate fear of communism." Longtime allies in the Cold War, such as the Shah in Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua, were tossed aside or abandoned because of human rights violations, only to be replaced by more brutal regimes that pursued anti-American foreign policies. Carter signed arms control agreements with the Soviets that were so flawed that even a Senate controlled by his own political party refused to ratify them. Carter revealed the extent of his ignorance about the nature of the Soviet system when he expressed his disappointment and surprise at Soviet behavior after the Red Army invaded Afghanistan. Under Carter, containment, while still surviving as an overall policy, reached its nadir.

Ronald Reagan shattered the illusions of détente by redefining the nature of the Cold War between the West and Soviet communism, and adopting a strategy that successfully exploited the vulnerabilities of the Soviet system. In the late 1970s, Reagan told Richard Allen, who would become his first National Security Adviser, that his long-term strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union was simple: we win, they lose. During the 1980 campaign, Reagan opined to Lou Cannon of the Washington Post that the Soviets lacked the economic wherewithal to compete in an all-out arms race with the West. After assuming office, Reagan proclaimed in April 1981 that the West "won’t contain communism, it will transcend communism." The Soviet system, he said, was a "bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written." The next year, Reagan told the British Parliament that he had a long term plan "which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history." In January 1983, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 75, which stated that U.S. policy was "[t]o contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism…, [t]o promote…the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system…, [to] exploit…vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire" in an effort to "loosen Moscow’s hold" on Eastern Europe.

Ronald Reagan

Reagan’s offensive strategy included providing aid to anti-communist rebels in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and elsewhere; supporting dissident groups and movements in Eastern Europe; toppling the Soviet-backed government in Grenada; tightening controls on the transfer of militarily useful technology to Eastern bloc countries; promoting SDI; a massive U.S. military build-up; and efforts to exploit Soviet economic difficulties.

In June 1987, Reagan challenged Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to "tear down" the Berlin Wall. Two years later, the Wall came down, then the enslaved nations of the Soviet Empire gradually broke free, and the Soviet Union collapsed.

Reagan’s predecessors, to be sure, deserve credit for keeping the Soviets at bay for more than thirty years. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev also deserves credit for his unwillingness to forcibly crush the rebellion in the satellite nations during 1989-1991. Others who meaningfully contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Empire include Pope John Paul II, the courageous dissident groups within the Empire, and the Western armed forces that stood watch and sometimes fought on the Eurasian periphery and elsewhere during the "long twilight struggle." But when all is said and done, it was Ronald Reagan who seized the moment and instituted the right policies at the right time to bring about the Soviet collapse.

[Tim Gratz]

WOW!! IS THIS A GREAT REVIEW!!

If there was ever a book showing that one person can make a difference, it is "The Crusader," by Paul Kengor. It is amazing how many times Ronald Reagan went against the advice of most if not all of his advisors, and in the end proved to be correct.(Most advisors did not want Reagan to tell Garbachev to "tear down this wall," during his now famous speech.)

Today, President Bush often gets criticized for unilateral inclinations. The book shows that Ronald Reagan was the unilateralsit of all unilateralists. It was even humorous to read how Reagan would go through the motions during his cabinet meetings and often in press conferences, while at the same time he had this whole separate operation going on to bring down the Soviet Union, that very few, even very few of his cabinet members, knew about. Can anyone say leader? It also shows, that even though Reagan was calling the shots, how important Bill Casey and Bill Clark were to the entire operation.

This is the best book I have read on Ronald Reagan, and the best book that I have read on the process that actually ended the Cold War.

It really does put the final nail in the coffin for those clueless "intellectuals" who say that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and even the Berlin Wall would have fallen anyway. The book gives an amazingly detailed step by step account of the economic war against the Soviets and all of the National Security Decision Directives that Reagan virtually single-handedly initiated.

The book shows that Ronald Reagan would often go against conventional wisdom. For example, he had great disdain for the Yalta agreements, and for the policy of containment, and eventually, virtually reversed them.

The book also shows how Reagan's anti-communist passions go way back in his life, and how those sentiments are based on his respect for the human being. It tells of a time when he was in East Germany and saw a lady shopper accosted by an East German guard, and how this incident and others firmed his resolve against the evil of communism. It is pointed out how Reagan was actually motivated to act when others weren't, and how Reagan had an inborn sense of the right thing to do. And the book shows that Reagan's pattern to rescue those in distress goes back to his early days when saved 77 people over 7 summers from the swift currents of the Rock River in Dixon Illinois.

"The Crusader" goes into great detail about the relationship between President Reagan and the great Pope John Paul II, and his role in bringing down communism. And it details Reagan's great admiration for the Polish people, and how they admired him in return, and how Poland's Solidarity Movement was one of the major factors in Reagan's and the Pope's effort to bring down communism. And how the people of Poland, the rest of Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union gave great credit to Reagan for bringing them freedom.

The book also details how Reagan brought freedom to Central and South America.

Before I read "The Crusader," I thought that President Ronald Reagan was our greatest U.S. President. After reading the book, my opinion of him only improved. In fact, he and Pope John Paul II have to be two of the great men of the millenium.

It was often said that Reagan had very few, if any, close friends, except Nancy. Probably my favorite story in the book was when, in 1989, just before the previously unimaginable free elections in Poland, Reagan welcomed two members of Solidarity and the two Polish Americans who were hosting them, to his office in California. Reagan pointed to a picture of Pope John Paul II on his office wall and said: "He is my best friend. Yes, you know I am a Protestant, but he's still my best friend."[/b] If you are going to have a best friend, not a bad on to have. Thankyou. [Emphasis supplied.]

Mark S.Robertson

Independence, Mo.

Mark and John S., I assume you have not bothered to read the book this gentleman reviewed?

Edited November 19, 2007 by Tim Gratz

[Ron Ecker]

I don't understand why people have to read books about Reagan to know what kind of president he was.

I think most people here are old enough to remember how the U.S. under Reagan turned tail and ran from the terrorists after they bombed our Marines in Beirut. This after Reagan's tough talk upon taking office that acts of terror would be met with "swift retribution." What a load of Hollywood-trained BS. He ran from Lebanon like a scalded dog.

I think most people here are old enough to remember Iran-Contra, with Reagan going on national TV for the purpose of lying, saying "We did not trade arms for hostages." And the whole purpose of this criminal activity, in supplying arms to an enemy (which some would call treason), was to support terrorists in Central America. You know, the kind of people who could expect "swift retribution" from this lying coward of a president.

I think most people here are old enough to remember the U.S. mining of the main harbor in Nicaragua, which was discontinued after the media found out and reported it. Another example of this lying coward's steadfastness and character.

I think most people here are old enough to remember the swapping of two spies with the Russians, with Reagan then stating on TV that there was "no connection between these two releases." Never has a president openly exhibited more utter contempt for the intelligence of the citizenry.

But since Reagan, just like George W. Bush, was elected not once but twice to the presidency, I have to say that the contempt of such men and their ilk for the people has been well earned and to be expected.

[Tim Gratz]

From the AP article below:

[Ronald Reagan] is vividly remembered today in Russia as the force that precipitated the Soviet collapse.

You guys may not get it, but the Russians and the East Europeans do!

updated 7:43 p.m. ET, Sat., June. 5, 2004

MOSCOW - He stunned the Soviet Union with his tough rhetoric, calling it an “evil empire” whose leaders gave themselves the “right to commit any crime.”

His famed “Star Wars” program drew the Soviets into a costly arms race it couldn’t afford. His 1987 declaration to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the Berlin Wall — “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall” — was the ultimate challenge of the Cold War.

Ronald Reagan’s determination to destroy communism and the Soviet Union was a hallmark of his eight-year presidency, carried out through a harsh nuclear policy toward Moscow that softened only slightly when Gorbachev came to office.

Story continues below ↓

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He is vividly remembered in Russia today as the force that precipitated the Soviet collapse.

“Reagan bolstered the U.S. military might to ruin the Soviet economy, and he achieved his goal,” said Gennady Gerasimov, who served as top spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry during the 1980s.

Reagan’s agenda toward Moscow started shortly after the start of his first term — and marked a major departure from the mild detente of the Jimmy Carter administration.

In 1981, Reagan backed his rhetoric with a trillion dollar defense buildup. U.S.-Soviet arms control talks collapsed, and the two nations targeted intermediate-range nuclear missiles at each other across the Iron Curtain in Europe.

The deployment of the U.S. missiles in Europe rattled the Kremlin’s nerves, because of the shorter time they needed to reach targets in the Soviet Union compared to intercontinental missiles deployed in the United States.

In an even bigger shock to the Kremlin, Reagan in 1983 launched an effort to build a shield against intercontinental ballistic missiles involving space-based weapons.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), dubbed “Star Wars,” dumped the previous doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction that assumed that neither side would start a nuclear war because it would not be able to avoid imminent destruction.

Even though Reagan’s “Star Wars” never led to the deployment of an actual missile shield, it drew the Soviets into a costly effort to mount a response. Many analysts agree that the race drained Soviet coffers and triggered the economic difficulties that sped up the Soviet collapse in 1991.

“Reagan’s SDI was a very successful blackmail,” Gerasimov told The Associated Press. “The Soviet Union tried to keep up pace with the U.S. military buildup, but the Soviet economy couldn’t endure such competition.”

Yelena Bonner, the widow of Soviet dissident Nobel Prize winner Andrei Sakharov, praised Reagan for his tough course toward the Soviet Union.

“I consider Ronald Reagan one of the greatest U.S. presidents since the World War II because of his staunch resistance to Communism and his efforts to defend human rights,” Bonner said in a telephone interview from her home in Boston. “Reagan’s policy was consistent and precise, and he had a great talent of choosing the right people for his administration.”

Former Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, 61, remembered Reagan fondly for his humor and his toughness.

“His phrase, ’evil empire,’ became a household word in Russia,” said Bukovsky, who now lives in Cambridge, England. “Russians like a staightforward person, be he enemy or friend. They despise a wishy-washy person.”

Retired Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin said that trying to field a response to Reagan’s Star Wars had “certainly contributed” to Soviet economic demise but argued it didn’t play the decisive role.

“The Soviet economy was extremely inefficient and nothing could save it,” said Dvorkin, a senior Soviet arms control negotiator during the 1980s.

But Bonner said her husband — who had played a key role in designing Soviet nuclear weapons — believed that deploying U.S. missiles in Europe was necessary to bring the Soviet rulers back to the arms control talks.

In December 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed a treaty that for the first time eliminated the entire class of intermediate-range missiles.

“Reagan and Gorbachev helped end the Cold War,” Gerasimov said.

© 2007 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Edited November 19, 2007 by Tim Gratz

[Mark Knight]

Well, now Mark, if you were not so politically illiterate (talk about allegations made by a pot!) you would know that historians routinely refer to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites as the collapse of Communism--or the end of the Cold War if you will. I think it is in part because China does not appear as intent as exporting Communism as the Soviets were (it was not Mao who promised to "bury us" after all) but it is unfortunate that all the world's people do not enjoy the freedoms we do.

Since you appear as concerned with Cuba as I am I assume you would support a move by the US to invade Cuba and get rid of that two-bit dictator at long last.

Now since you imply you are plitically literate, why don't you cite the pro-RR books that you have read? I gather from John's lack of response to the same question, he has not read a single one.

Well, below is a good summary of RR's role in ending the Cold War:

[/b].

Tim, your arrogance nearly outweighs your illiteracy...or at least your lack of comprehension of the written word.

It was YOU who said that Reagan ended Communism. I pointed out that Communism is alive and well, in the most populous nation on Earth, as well as in Cuba. So your assertion was faulty, and I called you on it.

As far as ending the Cold war....I never took up that argument, so your challenge to me about that is bogus on its face.

And your assumptions about what I think should or should not be done with Castro's Cuba...laughable. You have no fact-based idea what I think about that subject, because I haven't told you.

And since NOW you're changing the subject from 'the fall of Communism" to "the end of the Cold War," do NOT assume that my thoughts on ONE subject are the sum total of my thoughts on BOTH subjects. Your arrogance here apparently knows no bounds...nor, apparently, does your desire to put in my mouth words that I have not spoken.

And I make no claims to my political literacy...but I know that the MOST POPULOUS NATION ON EARTH is a COMMUNIST nation, so your pronouncement of the DEATH of communism--at the hands of Ronald Reagan , or even Ronald McDonald--is demagoguery at best, a bold-faced LIE at worst.

[but since you brought it up...I think the BEST way to spell the end of communism in Cuba is to end the US trade embargo...and when the people realize that it's the system itself, and NOT the "malevolent hand of Uncle Sam" holding them down--as Fidel has preached for almost 50 years--the Cuban people will stage a NEW revolution and overthrow the Communist bondage they have been under for far too long. And NOW you know what I think...that it's far better to let communist regimes collapse from within--as they invariably do--than to take them out militarily, in the manner in which most of them were imposed upon their citizens.]

My views may not be politically literate, either...but they DO have a firm foundation in a study of history. As I would suppose do those of Mr. Simkin.

[Tim Gratz]

Mark wrote:

My views may not be politically literate, either...but they DO have a firm foundation in a study of history. As I would suppose do those of Mr. Simkin.

Since Mark totally ignored my request to name a SINGLE book--just one--he has read about RR and the end of the Cold War, one can only conclude that his study of history is limited to watching the History Channel! (Not that some of its programs are not well-documented.) I am somewhat nonplussed how one can be a student of history without reading history books.

[Tim Gratz]

Michael Beschloss has been called "the nation's leading Presidential historian."

I have read his excellent book, "Presidential Courage" in which he discusses in a somewhat coloquial way how RR helped bring about the defeat of Soviet Communism.

But why should we listen to Beschloss (who has written EIGHT books on Presidents as well as an excellent study of the U2 affair when we have our own self-styled "student" of history, Mark Knight, who can reach his conclusions without reading a single book.

By the way, have you ever read a well-written history book without a lengthy bibliography? Those who write history read history. (The Beschloss book has over 21 pages of bibliographies. He probably reads more books in a week than Mark has read in the last ten years.