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Commander Anderson


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In the FBI Memorandum dated 22nd June 1962, Alexander Irwin Rorke claimed that their (Rorke and Sturgis) contact man was "Commander Anderson of the United States Navy, who is assigned to CIA overt office in New York". This claim is supported by a declassified CIA memo's from Anderson to Robert Trumbull Crowley, Robert Trumbull Crowley, Assistant Deputy Director of Clandestine Operations of the CIA, on 9th January 1961: "Alex Rorke phoned from Miami to report that personnel in Varona group and other groups in process joining Dr. Bosch - Commander (of) Diego Party. According (to) Rorke, Frank Fiorini has been power behind scene."

Does anyone know anything about "Commander Anderson"

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Alexander Irwin Rorke claims that his contact was “Commander Anderson of the United States Navy, who is assigned to CIA covert office in New York”. His name also appears on a declassified document that has been sent from Anderson’s CIA office in New York to Robert Trumbull Crowley. It is a report of an interview with Frank Fiorini that had taken place on 3rd March, 1961. The document includes details of Fiorini’s plans to enter Cuba and organize resistance to Castro. At the end of the interview Anderson “requested Fiorini write up concept of this operation covering logistics requirements, personnel required, intelligence set up, etc.”

The document refers to Crowley being a member of CD/OO/Support Branch. I have been sent a document dated 3rd December, 1993, that shows that Dr. John M. Newman was very interested in the identity of Anderson. In a letter written to the CIA, Newman attached a CIA document number 287-690, dated 3rd December 1963. It is a memo from "Birch D. O'Neal, Chief, CI/SIG, Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald". On the upper right hand corner is a handwritten comment: "Andy Anderson OO on Oswald". He then quotes from an interview that the HSCA carried out with Donald Deneselya, a CIA employee in the Contacts Division in 1962, who read Anderson's debrief of Oswald. Newman recommends that the CIA should find all surviving members of CD/OO/Support Branch.

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Guest Tom Scully
Alexander Irwin Rorke claims that his contact was “Commander Anderson of the United States Navy, who is assigned to CIA covert office in New York”. His name also appears on a declassified document that has been sent from Anderson’s CIA office in New York to Robert Trumbull Crowley. It is a report of an interview with Frank Fiorini that had taken place on 3rd March, 1961. The document includes details of Fiorini’s plans to enter Cuba and organize resistance to Castro. At the end of the interview Anderson “requested Fiorini write up concept of this operation covering logistics requirements, personnel required, intelligence set up, etc.”

The document refers to Crowley being a member of CD/OO/Support Branch. I have been sent a document dated 3rd December, 1993, that shows that Dr. John M. Newman was very interested in the identity of Anderson. In a letter written to the CIA, Newman attached a CIA document number 287-690, dated 3rd December 1963. It is a memo from "Birch D. O'Neal, Chief, CI/SIG, Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald". On the upper right hand corner is a handwritten comment: "Andy Anderson OO on Oswald". He then quotes from an interview that the HSCA carried out with Donald Deneselya, a CIA employee in the Contacts Division in 1962, who read Anderson's debrief of Oswald. Newman recommends that the CIA should find all surviving members of CD/OO/Support Branch.

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.ph...st&p=156272

WHO WAS LEE HARVEY OSWALD?

THE WECHT INSTITUTE, DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY, PITTSBURGH, PA.

OCTOBER 5, 2008

By Joan Mellen

.....Let's turn for a moment to why CIA Counter Intelligence Chief James Jesus Angleton was so anxious to discount the testimony of Soviet defector, the late, ill-fated Yuri Nosenko. Having read KGB's files on Oswald, Mr. Nosenko reported that the KGB had never used Oswald; and that, by the way, the Soviet Union did not sponsor the Kennedy assassination. Yet a caveat is in order here too since in 1964 Nosenko said there was only one thin file. By 1977, when Nosenko talked to the HSCA, the file had grown to "eight bulky volumes."

Oswald's appearance in the Soviet Union was as a participant in the Agency's "false defector" program, in which he was joined by several other young men, whose files can be found at the National Archives. There is no document that names a "false defector program," but that does not mean such a program did not exist, and there are copious files about various of the participants. James Angleton ran that program. By putting the lie to the possibility that the Soviet Union had sponsored the assassination, Nosenko's statements implicitly threatened to expose for whom Oswald was acting. Nosenko's life became a living hell after that.

There are reasons for challenging Nosenko's credibility that we needn't get into here. That Nosenko settled on the "lone nut" theory of the assassination is odd. To quote Lee Oswald's mentor, David Ferrie, "people are no damn good," and the "true" motives of defectors are too opaque to penetrate. That he suffered does not elevate Nosenko to credibility. That Nosenko failed two polygraphs gives one pause. (These polygraphs stood up when re-examined by HSCA experts, agreeing on the areas of deception).

Yet evidence suggests that Oswald was indeed in the Soviet Union on behalf of the CIA. I received a telephone call last November from one Donald Deneselya, who had worked for the CIA as a Russian language translator in the Soviet Russia section at the time of Oswald's return to the United States from the Soviet Union.

As we know, the CIA, from John McCone on down, denied that CIA had ever debriefed Oswald upon his return. Had Oswald been debriefed by the Agency, we would have had further confirmation that he was, indeed, as were a whole list of people, a participant in the "secret defector" program run by CIA counter intelligence. CIA's debriefing Oswald in itself did not mean that he was theirs. But the curious nature of his defection, with all its contradictions, combined with this debriefing, at least points to the existence of Angleton's program.

I was not the first person to whom Mr. Deneselya revealed his proof that Oswald had been debriefed by the CIA. Deneselya had come forward first to Senator Richard Schweiker (they met together twice), to the House Select Committee, and later to the television program "Frontline." What Mr. Deneselya did for me was to provide more details of what he had seen.

What Mr. Deneselya witnessed was a document detailing how a man, a defector, (his name was not mentioned), but who had been working at a radio factory in Minsk, had,upon his return to the United States, been debriefed by one "Anderson," a CIA employee with an 00 designation. Deneselya did not remember the given name of Anderson, which has created a certain amount of confusion.

A Commander Anderson indeed was "seconded" to the CIA NYC field office by the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Commander Anderson of the United States Navy who was assigned to CIA's covert office in New York was the original contact for Alexander Rorke, who accompanied Geoffrey Sullivan, the pilot who flew in and out of Cuba for the CIA along with Frank Fiorini (Frank Sturgis). Commander Anderson's name appears in a CIA document dated June 28, 1962, to the Director of Central Intelligence from John Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, in connection with Rorke and Fiorini.

Yet it seems that "Commander Anderson," was not the person who debriefed Oswald. Nor was the debriefer one "ANDY Anderson," as Donald Deneselya assumed after conversations with author, John Newman. There was yet another "Anderson," operating out of the Soviet Russia 6 Division, who was responsible for debriefings. "Anderson" was a pseudonym used by a woman named Eleanor Reed, a deputy chief of the Section 6 Soviet Russia research branch who was near the age of retirement. (Reed joined SR6 in 1956 and transferred out in 1964; she retired in 1970). "Anderson" turns out to have been a woman!

What was SR6? Thomas Casasin became Chief of the Soviet Russia, SR6 Branch in 1960. Casasin told the HSCA in an interview conducted on August 17, 1978, that "the function of Section 6 was operations in support of the Soviet Russia Division of the CIA," including "classical espionage work."

The "Anderson" who debriefed Oswald was, strictly speaking not working directly for Robert T. Crowley, who headed up the CIA Contact Division, Support Branch, the primary function of which was Counter Intelligence. But she may have acted on his behalf in the debriefing. I recount this information in my new little book, the prequel to "A Farewell To Justice," which I called "Jim Garrison: His Life and Times." (It was published by jfklancer).

Who ordered Eleanor Reed to debrief Oswald has emerged in a piece of investigative work worthy of Sherlock Holmes himself. A CIA document, number 287-690, Memo for Record, 3 December 1963, by Birch D. O'Neal, Chief, CI/SIG, Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, deals with Mexico City and Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte. Urgarte had walked into the U.S. Embassy on November 25, 1963 and said he had witnessed Oswald at the Cuban Embassy on September 18th accepting $5,000 from a "red-haired Negro" to kill President Kennedy. Alvarado later failed a CIA polygraph and retracted the whole story.

This document was perused by historian, John Newman. Newman looked at a signature on the upper right hand corner, a signature that apparently had leaked off or burned off from another document, because it's in reverse, as if it were viewed through a mirror. Newman concluded that the signature belonged to "Andy Anderson" because "00 Oswald" was written beneath it. The 00 Oswald were clear, but the signature was not that of Andy Anderson!

This signature, revealing who ordered the debriefing of Oswald, in fact belongs to one E.M. Ashcraft, who was a close associate of Robert Crowley in that Support Branch, which worked Counter Intelligence as its prime function. Reed's overall boss would have been David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Russia Division. Robert Crowley may have just about left 00/OSB (Operational Support Branch) where he was replaced by George S. Musulin by the time Oswald returned from the Soviet Union in June of 1962.

This is how it might have worked. Ashcraft would have called Thomas Casasin or Richard L. Winch or Donald E. Poole at SR6. This person in turn would have talked to Rudy Balaban (SR6 Research). Balaban would have consulted with Reed, who then called OS, the Office of Security, requesting permission to debrief Oswald. OS would pass the request on to Personnel Security Division, who would give a green light or a red light.

In the meantime, OS would liaise with CIA/SIG (Special Investigations Group), probably Anne (CIA nickname "Betty") Egerter, then with the Counterintelligence Staff or with Paul Hartmann, who was Birch O'Neal's "gofer." (The Special Investigations Group was a secret, small elite unit consisting of eight of James Angleton's most trusted and closed-mouthed people. Among them in addition to Egerter were Newton (Scotty) Miler, Birch O'Neal, and others. SIG's original brief was to investigate possibilities that CIA might have been penetrated by KGB. Soon after the inception of Counterintelligence, James Angleton expanded and established such components as R & A (Research and Analysis), Ops, and others. Each of the branch chiefs and deputies reported directly to Angleton. The Special Investigations Group was a closed book and most Agency people were denied access to it).

Sometimes Soviet Russia Counter Intelligence was called in at the briefings. So the mystery of Oswald in the Soviet Union unravels. The above trajectory offers further evidence that Oswald was a creature of the CIA, worked for the CIA, and, quite understandably, was debriefed by them upon his return.

Additional evidence that CIA debriefed Oswald after his return from the Soviet Union resides in the unredacted version CIA document 435-173A, dated 25 November 1963, by the same Thomas B. Casasin.

This document is familiar because we have long had a redacted version of Casasin's 25 November 1963 memo to Walter P. Haltigan, whom Casasin subsequently revealed to be one "Jim Flint." Flint was part of SR9, the operations part of the Soviet Division and was Casasin's "normal contact" in Paris where Casasin arrived in September 1962.

In this memo, Casasin writes that "Oswald's unusual behavior in the USSR" made him look "odd," leading Casasin not to use him in operations in the REDWOOD target area. REDWOOD was an action indicator for the SE Division. (SED was a CIA geographic designator for the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc countries of Eastern Europe). It seems now a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing, a not infrequent CIA situation.

In that unredacted version of Thomas B. Casasin's memo to Walter P. Haltigan, Casasin writes: "as chief of the 6 Branch I had discussed – sometime in Summer 1960 (he later corrected that date to "1962") with the then Chief and Deputy Chief of the 6 Research Section the laying on of interview(s) [with Oswald] through KUJUMP [the operations division] or other suitable channels." KUJUMP had a contacts division for debriefing persons. KUJUMP was synonymous with 00 (Contacts Division).

Casasin closes his addendum to the memo with this line, indicating that was not aware of Angleton's program: "It was partly out of curiosity to learn if Oswald's wife would actually accompany him to our country, partly out of interest in Oswald's own experiences in the USSR, that we showed operational intelligence interest in the Harvey story." Casasin was looking for links between Soviet women marrying foreigners and the KGB. Casasin also refers in his 25 November 1963 memo to a program called AEOCEAN 3, then run out of SR10, and referring to Oswald in particular: this was the legal travelers program, i. e. the intelligence use of legal travelers to the Soviet Union. It seems apparent that Casasin, a pseudonym, was not in the loop, and is struggling to make sense of Oswald and his defection.

In his HSCA interview, while speculating, without any real evidence, that Oswald might have been a "lay-low Soviet operative," Casasin fills in some gaps in our knowledge about what Oswald was doing in the Soviet Union. He reveals that "there were some type of special design plants in Minsk which were of interest to the CIA." Casasin adds that CIA "had some type of encyclopedic information at the agency on the radio factory in Minsk where Oswald worked." He is talking about a component of CIA called the "Industrial Registry." In passing, let us note that the Warren Commission never contacted Casasin about his Oswald memo.

Casasin's HSCA interview, released in 2000, reminds us of how heavily compartmentalized, how much on a need to know basis, counterintelligence operated: Casasin told the HSCA that "he does not recall any discussions concerning the possible use of American defectors to penetrate the Soviets." Casasin does admit: "Counterintelligence did have their own closely held operations…and "it was possible or even probable that Counterintelligence ran operations in his own geographical target."

Back to Donald Deneselya, who worked at a far lower rung of the Soviet Russia Division than Casasin, not to mention Crowley and Ashcraft. When Deneselya asked his Agency confreres about the document, he was told that the subject was Robert Webster, although Webster was located not in Minsk, but at a plant in Leningrad, and there was a parallel document mentioning Webster by name.

Mr. Deneselya was convincing. Among the details he added was that some time after he witnessed the Oswald debriefing document, he asked James Angleton where he might find a copy so that he could peruse it again.

"You'll never find that document," Angleton said. The bad faith of the House Select Committee is reflected in the "Outside Contact Report," dated September 26, 1978, in which the Oswald revelation is barely mentioned, and Deneselya's information is almost completely confined to his work with a KGB defector named Golitsin. Ken Klein should have been excited by the appearance of proof that Oswald had been debriefed by the CIA. Instead, in his report he affects disinterest. You can see him yawning ostentatiously over what should have been an astonishing revelation. Klein behaves no differently than the specious "Frontline" program which allows Deneselya a few words, then rapidly brings on Richard Helms and Robert Oswald, the brother whose bona fides I have already called into question, to discount the information that Oswald had been debriefed by CIA.

I've always believed that many documents have been destroyed and been wary of the notion that somehow once ALL the files were opened, we would gain the truth. I know of mounds of materials that were removed from libraries by "men in suits," never to be seen again, despite FOIA requests. (In one case the men lied outright and said that they had been sent by the University where the papers had been willed: they hadn't been).

So I doubt whether the debriefing report witnessed by Mr. Deneselya, will emerge. Yet it is also true that new information is always appearing: for example, I was telephoned after the publication of "A Farewell to Justice" by a witness who observed the Gurvich brothers in New Orleans at Saturn Aviation, a company run by one Al Crouch, and for whom David Ferrie flew. The Gurviches took away with them, never to be seen again, the flight record showing Ferrie's movements. These included a flight Ferrie made to Dallas the week of the assassination.

After the assassination, knowing how sensitive they were, Crouch had put Ferrie's log books in a floor safe, and they survived even a break-in.

Crouch was threatened, getting an anonymous phone call, saying, "Do you have a little girl about three years old who rides a tricycle?" Then he turned the log books over to the brothers Gurvich, one of whom, William Gurvich, had ingratiated himself into the Garrison investigation. Gurvich claimed he would deliver these records to Jim Garrison. Of course, Garrison never saw Ferrie's log books.

Another lead that has emerged, this time from a newly released document, has a figure named Hugh Williams, released from the East Louisiana State Hospital on one of many writs of habeas corpus, meeting Oswald and Ferrie. On one occasion they went into the Gulf on a boat for target practice with World War II M-1 rifles. They talked about going to Cuba and assassinating Fidel Castro. This information matches Oswald's rant at the hospital, overheard by Dr. Frank Silva.

Donald Deneselya's having witnessed a document describing CIA debriefing of Oswald alone places Oswald as a participant in U.S. intelligence. That Oswald was a CIA asset, is this news? At a meeting of the National Board of the Communist Party, USA, held on December 4, 1963, the party's National Secretary," Benjamin J. Davis, rejecting the idea that Oswald was one of their own, commented, "Oswald was with the Central Intelligence Agency." (This comes from a 12/11/63 FBI confidential document).....

Edited by Tom Scully
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  • 10 months later...

Since JVB now says that Rorke was in on her operations I thought this was appropriate to revive. BK

Alexander Irwin Rorke claims that his contact was “Commander Anderson of the United States Navy, who is assigned to CIA covert office in New York”. His name also appears on a declassified document that has been sent from Anderson’s CIA office in New York to Robert Trumbull Crowley. It is a report of an interview with Frank Fiorini that had taken place on 3rd March, 1961. The document includes details of Fiorini’s plans to enter Cuba and organize resistance to Castro. At the end of the interview Anderson “requested Fiorini write up concept of this operation covering logistics requirements, personnel required, intelligence set up, etc.”

The document refers to Crowley being a member of CD/OO/Support Branch. I have been sent a document dated 3rd December, 1993, that shows that Dr. John M. Newman was very interested in the identity of Anderson. In a letter written to the CIA, Newman attached a CIA document number 287-690, dated 3rd December 1963. It is a memo from "Birch D. O'Neal, Chief, CI/SIG, Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald". On the upper right hand corner is a handwritten comment: "Andy Anderson OO on Oswald". He then quotes from an interview that the HSCA carried out with Donald Deneselya, a CIA employee in the Contacts Division in 1962, who read Anderson's debrief of Oswald. Newman recommends that the CIA should find all surviving members of CD/OO/Support Branch.

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.ph...st&p=156272

WHO WAS LEE HARVEY OSWALD?

THE WECHT INSTITUTE, DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY, PITTSBURGH, PA.

OCTOBER 5, 2008

By Joan Mellen

.....Let's turn for a moment to why CIA Counter Intelligence Chief James Jesus Angleton was so anxious to discount the testimony of Soviet defector, the late, ill-fated Yuri Nosenko. Having read KGB's files on Oswald, Mr. Nosenko reported that the KGB had never used Oswald; and that, by the way, the Soviet Union did not sponsor the Kennedy assassination. Yet a caveat is in order here too since in 1964 Nosenko said there was only one thin file. By 1977, when Nosenko talked to the HSCA, the file had grown to "eight bulky volumes."

Oswald's appearance in the Soviet Union was as a participant in the Agency's "false defector" program, in which he was joined by several other young men, whose files can be found at the National Archives. There is no document that names a "false defector program," but that does not mean such a program did not exist, and there are copious files about various of the participants. James Angleton ran that program. By putting the lie to the possibility that the Soviet Union had sponsored the assassination, Nosenko's statements implicitly threatened to expose for whom Oswald was acting. Nosenko's life became a living hell after that.

There are reasons for challenging Nosenko's credibility that we needn't get into here. That Nosenko settled on the "lone nut" theory of the assassination is odd. To quote Lee Oswald's mentor, David Ferrie, "people are no damn good," and the "true" motives of defectors are too opaque to penetrate. That he suffered does not elevate Nosenko to credibility. That Nosenko failed two polygraphs gives one pause. (These polygraphs stood up when re-examined by HSCA experts, agreeing on the areas of deception).

Yet evidence suggests that Oswald was indeed in the Soviet Union on behalf of the CIA. I received a telephone call last November from one Donald Deneselya, who had worked for the CIA as a Russian language translator in the Soviet Russia section at the time of Oswald's return to the United States from the Soviet Union.

As we know, the CIA, from John McCone on down, denied that CIA had ever debriefed Oswald upon his return. Had Oswald been debriefed by the Agency, we would have had further confirmation that he was, indeed, as were a whole list of people, a participant in the "secret defector" program run by CIA counter intelligence. CIA's debriefing Oswald in itself did not mean that he was theirs. But the curious nature of his defection, with all its contradictions, combined with this debriefing, at least points to the existence of Angleton's program.

I was not the first person to whom Mr. Deneselya revealed his proof that Oswald had been debriefed by the CIA. Deneselya had come forward first to Senator Richard Schweiker (they met together twice), to the House Select Committee, and later to the television program "Frontline." What Mr. Deneselya did for me was to provide more details of what he had seen.

What Mr. Deneselya witnessed was a document detailing how a man, a defector, (his name was not mentioned), but who had been working at a radio factory in Minsk, had,upon his return to the United States, been debriefed by one "Anderson," a CIA employee with an 00 designation. Deneselya did not remember the given name of Anderson, which has created a certain amount of confusion.

A Commander Anderson indeed was "seconded" to the CIA NYC field office by the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Commander Anderson of the United States Navy who was assigned to CIA's covert office in New York was the original contact for Alexander Rorke, who accompanied Geoffrey Sullivan, the pilot who flew in and out of Cuba for the CIA along with Frank Fiorini (Frank Sturgis). Commander Anderson's name appears in a CIA document dated June 28, 1962, to the Director of Central Intelligence from John Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, in connection with Rorke and Fiorini.

Yet it seems that "Commander Anderson," was not the person who debriefed Oswald. Nor was the debriefer one "ANDY Anderson," as Donald Deneselya assumed after conversations with author, John Newman. There was yet another "Anderson," operating out of the Soviet Russia 6 Division, who was responsible for debriefings. "Anderson" was a pseudonym used by a woman named Eleanor Reed, a deputy chief of the Section 6 Soviet Russia research branch who was near the age of retirement. (Reed joined SR6 in 1956 and transferred out in 1964; she retired in 1970). "Anderson" turns out to have been a woman!

What was SR6? Thomas Casasin became Chief of the Soviet Russia, SR6 Branch in 1960. Casasin told the HSCA in an interview conducted on August 17, 1978, that "the function of Section 6 was operations in support of the Soviet Russia Division of the CIA," including "classical espionage work."

The "Anderson" who debriefed Oswald was, strictly speaking not working directly for Robert T. Crowley, who headed up the CIA Contact Division, Support Branch, the primary function of which was Counter Intelligence. But she may have acted on his behalf in the debriefing. I recount this information in my new little book, the prequel to "A Farewell To Justice," which I called "Jim Garrison: His Life and Times." (It was published by jfklancer).

Who ordered Eleanor Reed to debrief Oswald has emerged in a piece of investigative work worthy of Sherlock Holmes himself. A CIA document, number 287-690, Memo for Record, 3 December 1963, by Birch D. O'Neal, Chief, CI/SIG, Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, deals with Mexico City and Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte. Urgarte had walked into the U.S. Embassy on November 25, 1963 and said he had witnessed Oswald at the Cuban Embassy on September 18th accepting $5,000 from a "red-haired Negro" to kill President Kennedy. Alvarado later failed a CIA polygraph and retracted the whole story.

This document was perused by historian, John Newman. Newman looked at a signature on the upper right hand corner, a signature that apparently had leaked off or burned off from another document, because it's in reverse, as if it were viewed through a mirror. Newman concluded that the signature belonged to "Andy Anderson" because "00 Oswald" was written beneath it. The 00 Oswald were clear, but the signature was not that of Andy Anderson!

This signature, revealing who ordered the debriefing of Oswald, in fact belongs to one E.M. Ashcraft, who was a close associate of Robert Crowley in that Support Branch, which worked Counter Intelligence as its prime function. Reed's overall boss would have been David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Russia Division. Robert Crowley may have just about left 00/OSB (Operational Support Branch) where he was replaced by George S. Musulin by the time Oswald returned from the Soviet Union in June of 1962.

This is how it might have worked. Ashcraft would have called Thomas Casasin or Richard L. Winch or Donald E. Poole at SR6. This person in turn would have talked to Rudy Balaban (SR6 Research). Balaban would have consulted with Reed, who then called OS, the Office of Security, requesting permission to debrief Oswald. OS would pass the request on to Personnel Security Division, who would give a green light or a red light.

In the meantime, OS would liaise with CIA/SIG (Special Investigations Group), probably Anne (CIA nickname "Betty") Egerter, then with the Counterintelligence Staff or with Paul Hartmann, who was Birch O'Neal's "gofer." (The Special Investigations Group was a secret, small elite unit consisting of eight of James Angleton's most trusted and closed-mouthed people. Among them in addition to Egerter were Newton (Scotty) Miler, Birch O'Neal, and others. SIG's original brief was to investigate possibilities that CIA might have been penetrated by KGB. Soon after the inception of Counterintelligence, James Angleton expanded and established such components as R & A (Research and Analysis), Ops, and others. Each of the branch chiefs and deputies reported directly to Angleton. The Special Investigations Group was a closed book and most Agency people were denied access to it).

Sometimes Soviet Russia Counter Intelligence was called in at the briefings. So the mystery of Oswald in the Soviet Union unravels. The above trajectory offers further evidence that Oswald was a creature of the CIA, worked for the CIA, and, quite understandably, was debriefed by them upon his return.

Additional evidence that CIA debriefed Oswald after his return from the Soviet Union resides in the unredacted version CIA document 435-173A, dated 25 November 1963, by the same Thomas B. Casasin.

This document is familiar because we have long had a redacted version of Casasin's 25 November 1963 memo to Walter P. Haltigan, whom Casasin subsequently revealed to be one "Jim Flint." Flint was part of SR9, the operations part of the Soviet Division and was Casasin's "normal contact" in Paris where Casasin arrived in September 1962.

In this memo, Casasin writes that "Oswald's unusual behavior in the USSR" made him look "odd," leading Casasin not to use him in operations in the REDWOOD target area. REDWOOD was an action indicator for the SE Division. (SED was a CIA geographic designator for the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc countries of Eastern Europe). It seems now a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing, a not infrequent CIA situation.

In that unredacted version of Thomas B. Casasin's memo to Walter P. Haltigan, Casasin writes: "as chief of the 6 Branch I had discussed – sometime in Summer 1960 (he later corrected that date to "1962") with the then Chief and Deputy Chief of the 6 Research Section the laying on of interview(s) [with Oswald] through KUJUMP [the operations division] or other suitable channels." KUJUMP had a contacts division for debriefing persons. KUJUMP was synonymous with 00 (Contacts Division).

Casasin closes his addendum to the memo with this line, indicating that was not aware of Angleton's program: "It was partly out of curiosity to learn if Oswald's wife would actually accompany him to our country, partly out of interest in Oswald's own experiences in the USSR, that we showed operational intelligence interest in the Harvey story." Casasin was looking for links between Soviet women marrying foreigners and the KGB. Casasin also refers in his 25 November 1963 memo to a program called AEOCEAN 3, then run out of SR10, and referring to Oswald in particular: this was the legal travelers program, i. e. the intelligence use of legal travelers to the Soviet Union. It seems apparent that Casasin, a pseudonym, was not in the loop, and is struggling to make sense of Oswald and his defection.

In his HSCA interview, while speculating, without any real evidence, that Oswald might have been a "lay-low Soviet operative," Casasin fills in some gaps in our knowledge about what Oswald was doing in the Soviet Union. He reveals that "there were some type of special design plants in Minsk which were of interest to the CIA." Casasin adds that CIA "had some type of encyclopedic information at the agency on the radio factory in Minsk where Oswald worked." He is talking about a component of CIA called the "Industrial Registry." In passing, let us note that the Warren Commission never contacted Casasin about his Oswald memo.

Casasin's HSCA interview, released in 2000, reminds us of how heavily compartmentalized, how much on a need to know basis, counterintelligence operated: Casasin told the HSCA that "he does not recall any discussions concerning the possible use of American defectors to penetrate the Soviets." Casasin does admit: "Counterintelligence did have their own closely held operations…and "it was possible or even probable that Counterintelligence ran operations in his own geographical target."

Back to Donald Deneselya, who worked at a far lower rung of the Soviet Russia Division than Casasin, not to mention Crowley and Ashcraft. When Deneselya asked his Agency confreres about the document, he was told that the subject was Robert Webster, although Webster was located not in Minsk, but at a plant in Leningrad, and there was a parallel document mentioning Webster by name.

Mr. Deneselya was convincing. Among the details he added was that some time after he witnessed the Oswald debriefing document, he asked James Angleton where he might find a copy so that he could peruse it again.

"You'll never find that document," Angleton said. The bad faith of the House Select Committee is reflected in the "Outside Contact Report," dated September 26, 1978, in which the Oswald revelation is barely mentioned, and Deneselya's information is almost completely confined to his work with a KGB defector named Golitsin. Ken Klein should have been excited by the appearance of proof that Oswald had been debriefed by the CIA. Instead, in his report he affects disinterest. You can see him yawning ostentatiously over what should have been an astonishing revelation. Klein behaves no differently than the specious "Frontline" program which allows Deneselya a few words, then rapidly brings on Richard Helms and Robert Oswald, the brother whose bona fides I have already called into question, to discount the information that Oswald had been debriefed by CIA.

I've always believed that many documents have been destroyed and been wary of the notion that somehow once ALL the files were opened, we would gain the truth. I know of mounds of materials that were removed from libraries by "men in suits," never to be seen again, despite FOIA requests. (In one case the men lied outright and said that they had been sent by the University where the papers had been willed: they hadn't been).

So I doubt whether the debriefing report witnessed by Mr. Deneselya, will emerge. Yet it is also true that new information is always appearing: for example, I was telephoned after the publication of "A Farewell to Justice" by a witness who observed the Gurvich brothers in New Orleans at Saturn Aviation, a company run by one Al Crouch, and for whom David Ferrie flew. The Gurviches took away with them, never to be seen again, the flight record showing Ferrie's movements. These included a flight Ferrie made to Dallas the week of the assassination.

After the assassination, knowing how sensitive they were, Crouch had put Ferrie's log books in a floor safe, and they survived even a break-in.

Crouch was threatened, getting an anonymous phone call, saying, "Do you have a little girl about three years old who rides a tricycle?" Then he turned the log books over to the brothers Gurvich, one of whom, William Gurvich, had ingratiated himself into the Garrison investigation. Gurvich claimed he would deliver these records to Jim Garrison. Of course, Garrison never saw Ferrie's log books.

Another lead that has emerged, this time from a newly released document, has a figure named Hugh Williams, released from the East Louisiana State Hospital on one of many writs of habeas corpus, meeting Oswald and Ferrie. On one occasion they went into the Gulf on a boat for target practice with World War II M-1 rifles. They talked about going to Cuba and assassinating Fidel Castro. This information matches Oswald's rant at the hospital, overheard by Dr. Frank Silva.

Donald Deneselya's having witnessed a document describing CIA debriefing of Oswald alone places Oswald as a participant in U.S. intelligence. That Oswald was a CIA asset, is this news? At a meeting of the National Board of the Communist Party, USA, held on December 4, 1963, the party's National Secretary," Benjamin J. Davis, rejecting the idea that Oswald was one of their own, commented, "Oswald was with the Central Intelligence Agency." (This comes from a 12/11/63 FBI confidential document).....

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Since JVB now says that Rorke was in on her operations I thought this was appropriate to revive. BK

Is it possible that JVB read this thread before "discovering" that Rorke was in on her operations?

George Whelan Anderson, Jr, was placed in charge of the blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and during the mid 1970's later served on the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

ANDERSON, GEORGE W., JR. (ADM.) Sources: Armies of Ignorance, Corson, p. 372; Widows, Corson & Trento, pp. 86-87; Farewell America, Hepburn, pp. 148-149; CIA & the Cult of Intelligence, Marchetti & Marks, pp. 315, 321; Invisible Government, Wise & Ross, p. 187; JFK Collection List, pg. 50 (AMKW 88)

Mary's Comments: (The AARC has a 1-pg. FBI document re Adm. George Anderson.)

Home/Archive/Documents/JFK Assassination Documents/Rockefeller Commission/Rockefeller Commission Files/

NARA Record Number: 178-10002-10077

INTERVIEW, GEORGE ANDERSON, CHAIRMAN PFIAB, 4/16/75

http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/....do?docId=32038

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Since JVB now says that Rorke was in on her operations I thought this was appropriate to revive. BK

Is it possible that JVB read this thread before "discovering" that Rorke was in on her operations?

George Whelan Anderson, Jr, was placed in charge of the blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and during the mid 1970's later served on the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

ANDERSON, GEORGE W., JR. (ADM.) Sources: Armies of Ignorance, Corson, p. 372; Widows, Corson & Trento, pp. 86-87; Farewell America, Hepburn, pp. 148-149; CIA & the Cult of Intelligence, Marchetti & Marks, pp. 315, 321; Invisible Government, Wise & Ross, p. 187; JFK Collection List, pg. 50 (AMKW 88)

Mary's Comments: (The AARC has a 1-pg. FBI document re Adm. George Anderson.)

Home/Archive/Documents/JFK Assassination Documents/Rockefeller Commission/Rockefeller Commission Files/

NARA Record Number: 178-10002-10077

INTERVIEW, GEORGE ANDERSON, CHAIRMAN PFIAB, 4/16/75

http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/....do?docId=32038

Thanks for that document Robert.

Mr. Ober?

BK

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Since JVB now says that Rorke was in on her operations I thought this was appropriate to revive. BK

Is it possible that JVB read this thread before "discovering" that Rorke was in on her operations?

George Whelan Anderson, Jr, was placed in charge of the blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and during the mid 1970's later served on the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

ANDERSON, GEORGE W., JR. (ADM.) Sources: Armies of Ignorance, Corson, p. 372; Widows, Corson & Trento, pp. 86-87; Farewell America, Hepburn, pp. 148-149; CIA & the Cult of Intelligence, Marchetti & Marks, pp. 315, 321; Invisible Government, Wise & Ross, p. 187; JFK Collection List, pg. 50 (AMKW 88)

Mary's Comments: (The AARC has a 1-pg. FBI document re Adm. George Anderson.)

Home/Archive/Documents/JFK Assassination Documents/Rockefeller Commission/Rockefeller Commission Files/

NARA Record Number: 178-10002-10077

INTERVIEW, GEORGE ANDERSON, CHAIRMAN PFIAB, 4/16/75

http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/....do?docId=32038

Thanks for that document Robert.

Mr. Ober?

BK

III. PFIAB LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PARTICULAR ACTIVITIES

Admiral Anderson indicated he had not known of the activites of Mr. Ober's Special Operations Group. However, in retrospect he does not consider them improper. He feels that certainly some government agency should have undertaken to investigate potential foreign support for domestic dissident organizations....

I guess it shouldn't be suspicious that Alexander Rorke and Sullivan took off for Central America (Nicaragua?) on September 24, 1963, a day when a lot of agents and assets were moving - towards a rendezevous at DP.

http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...mp;sortBy=title

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Guest Tom Scully

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&saf...q=&gs_rfai=

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/Team%20B.htm

....Footnotes

...(2) As of August 1975, the PFIAB's members, In addition to Chairman George W. Anderson, Jr. (Adm. USN, Ret.), were William O. Baker, Leo Cherne, John S. Foster, Jr., Robert W. Galvin,. Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, Clare Booth Luce, George P. Shultz. and Edward Teller. As of mid-1976, Mr. Cherne had become chairman, and these additional members had joined the PRIAB: John B. Connally. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Robert P. Murphy, and Edward Bennett Williams. The PFIAB function has since been abolished by President Carter.

Bill,

I am unable to grasp your point. Please elaborate. If you are looking for an "Anderson" likely holding the rank of commander, circa 1963, I can pm a list of more than a dozen names to you.

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http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&saf...q=&gs_rfai=
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/Team%20B.htm

....Footnotes

...(2) As of August 1975, the PFIAB's members, In addition to Chairman George W. Anderson, Jr. (Adm. USN, Ret.), were William O. Baker, Leo Cherne, John S. Foster, Jr., Robert W. Galvin,. Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, Clare Booth Luce, George P. Shultz. and Edward Teller. As of mid-1976, Mr. Cherne had become chairman, and these additional members had joined the PRIAB: John B. Connally. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Robert P. Murphy, and Edward Bennett Williams. The PFIAB function has since been abolished by President Carter.

Bill,

I am unable to grasp your point. Please elaborate. If you are looking for an "Anderson" likely holding the rank of commander, circa 1963, I can pm a list of more than a dozen names to you.

Hi Tom,

Yea, I don't know that Admiral Anderson is the same Anderson who ran Rorke out of NY.

I find Rorke interesting however, as he was tangled up in some operations that overlapped with others that end up at Dealey Plaza. The day Oswald takes off for Mexico City, Rorke and Sullivan take off for Nicaragua, via Panama and/or ? and dissapear. Where were they going and what was their mission?

The PFIAB certainly was a hornet's nest - with Leo Cherne - Oswald's pen pal from Russia, and Clare Booth Luce, whose DRE pals tangled with Oz in New Orleans, and former JCS, et al.

BK

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  • 1 year later...

(2) As of August 1975, thePFIAB's members, In addition to Chairman George W. Anderson, Jr. (Adm. USN,Ret.), were William O. Baker, Leo Cherne, John S. Foster, Jr., Robert W.Galvin,. Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, Clare Booth Luce, George P. Shultz. andEdward Teller. As of mid-1976, Mr. Cherne had become chairman, and theseadditional members had joined the PRIAB: John B. Connally. Gen. Lyman L.Lemnitzer, Robert P. Murphy, and Edward Bennett Williams. The PFIAB functionhas since been abolished by President Carter.

U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of the SenateSelect Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Collection, Production, andQuality, "The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode ConcerningSoviet Strategic Capability and Objectives," February 16, 1978(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978)

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/TeamB.htm

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES A-B TEAM EPISODE CONCERNING SOVIET STRATEGICCAPABILITY AND OBJECTIVES

The Senate Select Committee onIntelligence, as part of its oversight function, has conducted a study of the1976 "A Team-B Team" experiment in comparative assessments of Sovietstrategic strength which was initiated by the President's Foreign IntelligenceAdvisory Board (PFIAB). The committee conducted this inquiry under its mandateto evaluate the collection, production, and quality of U.S. intelligence, in this case assessingwhether the A-B experiment had proved to be a useful procedure in improvingNational Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) on a centrally important question.

The pertinent facts of the A-Bcase are (a) that PFIAB commissioned three ad hoc outside groups (composing the"B Team") to examine the data available to the U.S. intelligencecommunity's analysts (the "A Team"), to determine whether such datawould support conclusions on Soviet strategic capabilities and objectivesdifferent from those presented in the community's NIE's; and (B) that duringthe exercise details of these sensitive questions leaked on several occasionsto the press.

The committee has prepared aclassified report on the subject, sent copies of that report to the executivebranch, made copies available to certain members of the B Team for review andcomment, and subsequently rechecked the record thoroughly and accommodated someof the B Team members' comments. A summary of the committee's report follows.

SCOPE OF THE COMMITTEE INQUIRY

The committee sought to determinethe facts and issues central to the A Team-B Team case, and to give a critiqueof the procedures which underlay the principal judgments and conduct of boththe A and B Teams. The committee's report makes no attempt to judge whichgroup's estimates concerning the U.S.S.R. are correct. The report focuses onthe processes followed; its findings and recommendations for improving thequality and utility of future NIE's on Soviet strategic capabilities andobjectives are primarily directed at procedural issues.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In the broadest sense, the NIE-BTeam episode derived from a growing concern over the U.S.S.R.'s steady increasein strategic weapons strength over the course of the past decade anddisagreement within the U.S. intelligence community (1) on the meaning of thisgrowth.

The B Team experiment incompetitive analysis stemmed from the PFIAB's opinion that the NIE's had beenunderestimating the progress of Soviet strategic weapons. (2) In an August 1975letter to President Ford, PFIAB Chairman George W. Anderson, Jr., proposed thatthe President authorize the NSC to implement a "competitive analysis." The thenDirector of Central Intelligence (DCI) William E. Colby, speaking with theunanimous agreement of the U.S. Intelligence Board (the chiefs of theintelligence community components), responded with 'a proposal that the PFIABfirst examine an applicable NIE then underway and thereafter determine whatspecific course of action to take.

The PFIAB found weaknesses inthat NIE and, after having made further investigations of its own, againproposed (3) (in April 1976) an experiment in "competitive analysis."The PFIAB recommended that the exercise be placed under the DCI's jurisdiction and that it addresscertain critical estimative issues.

PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee's report includesthese central judgments:

That the concept of a review ofthe NIE's by outside experts was a legitimate one.

That the B Team made some validcriticisms of the NIE's, especially concerning certain technical intelligencequestions, and some useful recommendations concerning the estimative process,but those contributions were less valuable than they might have been because(1) the exercise had been so structured by the PFIAB and the Director ofCentraJ Intelligence (DCI) that the B Team on Soviet objectives reflected the views of onlyone segment of the spectrum of opinion; and (2) that Team spent much of itseffort on criticizing much earlier NIE's rather than, as had been earlieragreed upon 'by the PFIAB and the DCI, producing alternative estimates fromcertain of those of the 1976 NIE.

That the value of the A-Bexperiment was further lessened by the fact that details concerning thesehighly classified questions leaked to the press, where these appeared ingarbled and one-sided form. It has not been determined who was responsible forthe leaks.

That, most importantly, NIE's onSoviet strategic capabilities and objectives still need improvement in a numberof important respects.

The report's principalrecommendations include:

That a collegial estimative groupbe formed in place of individual National Intelligence Officers.

That outside critiques of NIE'sshould continue to be conducted, but should, in each instance, be made byexpert groups which are broadly representative in character, and whoseprocedures are thereafter more strictly monitored by the commissioningauthorities than obtained in the A-B case.

The committee's investigation wasbased upon study of primary documents; examination of the NIE record since 1959on Soviet strategic weapons developments; and interviews with principals fromthe A and B Teams, the intelligence community, and the PFIAB. The committee hasenjoyed the full cooperation of all the above parties. The comments of DCI Stansfield Turner on the report and thepresent statement and the views of certain members of the B Team on SovietObjectives have been given consideration by the committee.

Responding to the PFIABinitiatives, the new DCI, Mr. George Bush, consented to the experiment, and by June 1976,the PFIAB and the DCI had worked out ground rules for a competitive assessmentexperiment. The DCI, through his representatives, made arrangements for, andmonitored the experiment in accordance with, those ground rules. Members of thePFIAB were called upon to assist in the formation of the three B Teams and tookan active role in the selection of team members.

The exercise did not simply pitan A (or NIE) team against a B Team. There were three B Teams: two on technicalquestions and one on Soviet thjectives. As for the A side, an NIE on Sovietstrategic weapons had already been regularly scheduled earlier in the year, andwork on it by the intelligence community had already begun before the B Teamscame into being. This NIE was much broader in scope than the particularestimative questions the B Teams had been commissioned to address, and theindividual civilian and military analysts involved in producing that NIErepresented a wide range of views hold within the departments and agencies ofthe intelligence community on the NTE's many questions.

The NIE participants and the BTeams proceeded to produce their two sets of studies independently, with onlyoccasional direct contact during the drafting phase. After the initial draftsof the three B teams were completed, the two sides confronted one anotherformally on three occasions. Once the decision to proceed with the' exercisehad been made, procedural cooperation was good between the intelligencecommunity and the three respective B teams. The specific results differed,however, in the three cases. Those concerning technical questions were the mostrewarding: there was a mutual give-and-take, and these B Teams clearly made aconstructive contribution. By contrast, the discussions concerning Sovietobjectives were more controversial and less conclusive. The B Team on SovietObjectives contributed some useful critiques concerning certain technicalintelligence questions, but there was not much give-and-take on broader issues.The view cited in a December 1976 press article (4) that the B Team challengeturned the NIE "around 180 degrees" is incorrect.

CRITIQUE

It is the view of the committeethat past NIE's could have profited from drawing on experts on Soviet strategicquestions from outside the intelligence community, both in and out ofGovernment, and from subjecting NIE analyses and judgments on this and otherareas to competing assessments from such sources. The PFIAB's 1975-76proposition that outside expertise should be used to criticize and evaluate theNIE's was a legitimate one. The exercise in practice, however, fell short ofthe initial conception.

The composition of the. B Teamdealing with Soviet objectives was so structured that the outcome of theexercise was predetermined and the experiment's contribution lessened. Theprocedures followed by the intelligence community in the A-B episode alsoweakened the overall effort to some degree. The intelligence agencies were castinaccurately in the role of "doves," when they in fact represented abroad spectrum of views. They needlessly allowed analytic mismatches, bysending relatively junior specialists into the debating arena againstprestigious and articulate B Team authorities. And the monitoring of theprocedures of the B Team on Soviet Objectives was subsequently fairly loose.

The B Team contributions and the1976 NIE can also be faulted on various substantive grounds. Because of itsnarrowly specified purpose and scope., influenced strongly in recent years bythe preferences of senior policymaking readers regarding format, the NIE didnot, address the question of how Soviet strategic weapons development fits intoimportant larger concerns [the entire panoply] of Soviet domestic, military,diplomatic, economic, and cultural efforts. As a consequence, the NIE'sdiscussion of Soviet objectives was. too brief to be useful. In the view ofsome readers, its discussion of Soviet military hardware in certain respectswas inadequate to be helpful to high-level officials.

A weakness in both the NIE andthe B Team report is their lack of expressed sensitivity to the fact and thesignificance of world developments other than those directly related to theU.S.-Soviet arms race. The strategic weapons balance is the chief subject ofboth documents, but both documents nonetheless are dominated by militaryhardware questions and define "strategic power" quite narrowly. Bydesign, in neither the NIE nor the B report are U.S.-Soviet strategic mattersset within the wider framework of other dynamic world forces, many of which areessentially the creatures of neither U.S. nor Soviet initiative or control.

COMMITEE FINDINGS

Estimates should, of course, bewritten in an accurate and dispassionate manner. They should reflect the bestand most broadly representative expert knowledge possible, from both inside andoutside the Government. The sensitive estimative questions at hand should notbe argued in the press. These requirements did not obtain in the case of theNIE-B Team exercise.

The field of strategic weaponryis complex, and there is much valuable expertise on the subject outside of theintelligence community. The quality of NIE's on these subjects would benefitfrom more extensive use of this outside knowledge than is now the case. In thisrespect, the PFIAB initiative was justifiable and desirable.

To be of maximum value, however,such efforts must employ the best and most competent expertise available.Panels representing only one perspective, whether "hard" or"soft," are not desirable. In this respect, the B Team"experiment" was not as constructive as it could have been concerningSoviet objectives.

The exercise in competitiveanalysis was devalued by the fact that, contrary to the expressed directions ofboth DCI George Bush and PFIAB Chairman LeoCherne, word of these sensitive matters leaked to the press, where it appearedin garbled form.

The A-B Team experience sharplydemonstrated the intense preoccupation of the CIA, the rest of the intelligence community,the PFIAB, and policymakers with Soviet strategic weapons and theirconsequences. This subject is of enormous significance to U.S. policymaking, but there are also othersignificant questions. The greatest intelligence attention often is given tothe least likely Soviet actions, nuclear attack, rather than to Sovietintentions and assertive world activity short of those extremes.

Of most significance, the A-BTeam case has demonstrated: (a) that the key question of Soviet strategicintentions and conduct is one which demands the best possible marshalling of U.S. intelligence resources and Americanbrainpower; and (B) that the estimative process needs improvement in this areaof concern.

The committee's recommendationsfor improving National Intelligence Estimates concerning Soviet strategicweapons capabilities and objectives included these judgments:

The intelligence community mustmore effectively meet the particular needs of particular policymakers. Creativeuse should be made of other estimative formats, in addition to the currentcategories of NIE's, tailored to the particular needs, but not the views, ofdifferent policymaking entities and levels.

There is need for competitive andalternative analyses. Both within the estimative body and with respect tooutside expertise, competing and on occasion alternative estimates should beencouraged. To be fully useful, such initiatives must avoid panels with narrowpreconceptions, of whatever kind, to assure the balance necessary for thecompetitors to evaluate evidence which is often both conflicting and ambiguous.

Estimates must openly expressdifferences of judgment, and clearly indicate the assumptions, the evidence,and the reasoning which produce adternative readings.

Estimates should highlightsignificant changes from related past estimates, including changingprobabilities, the emergence of new important alternatives, and findings thatmake past estimates false or less relevant.

NIE's should define"strategic matters" more comprehensively than has obtained in recentyears, so that Soviet military developments can be better seen within thecontext of Soviet interests and policies, and in interaction with U.S. and world developments. Enchantment withthe details of military hardware must not permit either the producers or thepolicymaking consumers of intelligence to become deflected from pursuit of themost important estimative questions at hand, those of intentions.

Reliable net assessments areneeded to complete an effective estimative process, so that policymakers canbetter appreciate Soviet strengths and weaknesses by having systematicallycompared them with those of the United States--a function which the NIE's are notdesigned to perform. The NSC should commission such net assessments, to be prepared by expertsat the national level, including some from the intelligence community.

Policymakers must define thequestions, not the answers. The DCI and the intelligence community's estimative body must remainindependent in judgment. Judgments must not be bent or suppressed by outsidepressures or fear of an uncongenial reaction.

SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR GARY HART

The most unfortunate result ofthe experiment in competitive analysis was that the objectivity of one of theNation's most important intelligence judgments was compromised. And throughleaks to the press, the credibility and quality of earlier estimates wasunfairly and inaccurately brought into question.

The National IntelligenceEstimate (NIE) on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict is one of themost important intelligence documents produced each year.

As the Director of CentralIntelligence's official report to the President on the Soviet strategic threat,it is a document that can affect tens of billions of dollars in defensespending; the potential for arms control agreements, and the confidence withwhich we guarantee our own security and fulfill our commitments abroad.

Thus, it is essential to protectthe objectivity of this judgment of the strength and intentions of our mostformidable adversary.

The committee report andinformation from other sources has convinced me that "competitiveanalysis" and use of selected outside experts was little more than acamouflage for a political effort to force the National Intelligence Estimateto take a more bleak view of the Soviet strategic threat.

The correspondence about theexercise shows that the President's Foreign intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)included members more interested in altering the conclusions of the nationalestimate than in improving its quality. From the outset of the PFIAB'sinitiative in this case, it believed existing NIE's were "deficient"because the PFIAB's members disagreed with the NIE conclusions.

William Colby, who was then theDirector of Central Intelligence, was successful in halting PFIAB's firsteffort to have "competition" in analysis. Later, DCI George Bush consented to such anexperiment.

The A-Team/B-Team experiment hasalso been explained as an effort to allow greater dissent and conflictingviews. This overlooks the procedures to accommodate differing viewpoints thatare already a part of the national estimates process. Representatives of theDefense Department, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and State Department work withthe CIA in producing the estimates. Theparticipating departments also have, and frequently exercise, the right todissent from an estimate as a whole or in part. In producing the 1976estimates, for example, the Department of Defense had more members of theA-Team than either CIA or the State Department. Because of the selection of outside expertswith known views and a mandate to advocate a specific position, theA-Team/B-Team experiment did not promote dissent. To the contrary, itintimidated and stifled the expression of more balanced estimates of the Sovietthreat.

I also disagree strongly with oneof the apparent goals of the B-Team exercise: That is, to make a "worstcase" analysis of the Soviet threat. There is real value in such analysisbut it should not be the mainstay of the National Intelligence Estimate.

In his NIE's, the Director ofCentral Intelligence should provide not only a catalogue of what an adversarycountry might do, but also his own best judgment of what is actually likely tohappen--a judgment that should not be tainted either by a desire to justifygreater defense spending and new weapons systems, or by any motive to limitthese expenditures.

The Pro-B Team leak and publicattack on the conclusions of the NIE represent but one element in a series ofleaks and other statements which have been aimed at fostering a "worst case"view for the public of the Soviet threat. In turn, this view of the Sovietthreat is used to justify new weapons systems.

It is neither possible nornecessarily desirable to remove such politics and debate from the defensebudget. But it is essential to protect our key intelligence judgments fromthese pressures.

The business of intelligence mustbe restricted to reporting the unvarnished facts Any attempt to bendintelligence to serve political needs other than the truth is a danger as greatas the Soviet threat itself.

In conclusion, let me add tworecomniendations to supplement those contained in the committee report We needbetter mechanisms--some outside the national estimates procedure--to create amore orderly and balanced debate about Soviet strength, objectives, andintentions.

The estimates themselves shouldbe better protected from political influence and remain the Director of CentralIntelligence's best judgment about key intelligence questions. These estimatesshould remain highly classified to help guarantee the President the bestpossible advice, unaffected by fears of political consequences of reportingfacts that do not support established policy or preconceptions.

At the same time, the DCI should take steps to allow a more orderlyand informed public debate about Soviet strength, objectives, and intentions. Agreat deal of this information already becomes available through selectiveleaks and occasional public disclosure. To replace this haphazard andoccasionally illegal process, the DCI should regularly review our strategicintelligence product to determine what information may be safely released topromote an informed public debate.

SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

The subject of the "BTeam" report has been before our committee for a year now, during which,if I am not mistaken, rather a striking shift has taken place in the attitudeof what might be called official Washington to the then unwelcome views of this groupof scholars and officials. Their notion, that the Soviets intend to surpass theUnited States in strategic arms and are in the process of doing so, has gonefrom heresy to respectability, if not orthodoxy.

In his annual report, DefenseSecretary Brown referred to "a substantial and continuing Soviet[strategic] effort, [which] is highly dynamic." Although puzzled as to"why the Soviets are pushing so hard to improve their strategic nuclearcapabilities," Brown noted that "we cannot ignore their efforts orassume that they are motivated by considerations either of altruism or of puredeterrence."

Last month, a member of the Houseof Representatives, Mr. Les Aspin, in a paper the State Department promptlyendorsed, warned that if the Senate did not ratify a proposed SALT agreement,we would be "entering a race in which we are already behind." Evenafter spending $20 billion on strategic arms, in his judgment, we would stillbe comparatively worse off.

This, by the way, is not acompletely new argument in favor of SALT. In 1972, then-Presidential AssistantHenry Kissinger had reference to the "not the most brilliant"bargaining position in which he found himself due to the imbalance between theSoviet and Amencan paces of strategic arms development.

It is worth reflecting on how wegot into this unfavorable bargaining position, if we are indeed in it. Whilemany different political and economic factors could be adduced, it isimpossible to ignore the quality of the intelligence that our top leaders werereceiving throughout the long period during which American nuclear superioritywas eroded, and during which we placed ourselves in the situation so alarminglydescribed by Representative Aspin.

It was a sense that the NationalIntelligence Estimates had not adequately performed their function of informingour top leaders as to the dynamism of the Soviet strategic buildup that led tothe "B Team" episode. Prior to its abolition in early 1977, thePresident's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board had the mandate (in the wordsof Executive Order 11460) to "conduct a continuing review of foreignintelligence . . ." and to "report to the President concerning [its]findings and appraisals and make appropriate recommendations for actions toachieve increased effectiveness. . . in meeting national intelligence needs."This group persuaded the then Director of Central Intelligence, thedistinguished George Bush, to take the courageous step of allowing an outsidegroup of experts full access to the resources of the Intelligence Community.This group (the "B Team") was to examine all the data available tothe analysts of the intelligence commünity to, in the words of the committeestatement, "determine whether such data would support conclusions onSoviet strategic capabilities and objectives different from those presented inthe intelligence community's National Intelligence Estimates." The B Teamreached "somber assessments" of the Soviet strategic challenge, whichsubsequently leaked to the press, most notably in a New York Times article of December 26, 1976.

Given the B Team's purpose, it ishardly surprising that its members' views reflected "only one segment ofthe spectrum of opinion." Inasmuch as the main purpose of the experimentwas to determine why previous estimates had produced such misleading picturesof Soviet strategic developments, it was reasonable to pick Team members whoseviews of Soviet strategy differed from those of the official estimators, justas a similar experiment, had one been conducted in 1962, might have called fora "B Team" composed of strategic analysts who had been skeptical ofthe "missile gap."

The goal of the B Team was toplace Soviet weapons developments of the past dozen or so years in the contextof an overall Soviet "grand strategy." In its view, the estimates hadavoided a conscious discussion of Soviet strategy and, a.s a result, hadresorted willy-nilly to explaining Soviet developments in terms of U.S. strategic concepts. Unfortunately, theseconcepts corresponded to the Soviet reality less and less as the years went by.

This contribution should not bedisparaged on the grounds that the B Team did not reflect the whole spectrum ofopinions on the questions it discussed; surely the point of "competitiveanalysis" is to sharpen the issues and to force bureaucraticcommittees--so often characterized by consensus-seeking, to say nothing ofplain inertia--to face the difficulties in the lines of argument with whichthey have become comfortable.

The committee statement concludesthat "judgments must not be bent or suppressed by outside pressures or fearof an uncongenial reaction." This is certainly an important objective, andone in terms of which the current trend toward centralized management of theintelligence community ought to be evaluated. While "national"control might help dampen the bureaucratic rivalry (interservice, and militaryvs. civilian intelligence) which occasionally raises its head in the estimates,it would tend to make it even more difficult for intelligence analysts to drawconclusions which would complicate the lives of the senior policymakers.Calling in outside experts from time to time is a healthy corrective againstthe tendency of any organization to become set in its own way of thinking. Theparticular panel of experts chosen, however, will always be subject to chargesof being "unrepresentative" or "biased" by those who do notlike its findings, including those in the intelligence community who are, afterall, the ones being criticized.

Knowledge is power; and theability to define what others will take to be knowledge is the greatest power.It is not to be wondered then, that the National Intelligence Estimates--thesources of "official truth"--escape irrelevance only at the price ofcontroversy. Any attempt to improve the estimates will be denounced as anattempt to manipulate them by those who disagree with the new directions theytake. The objective standard will be to look at how well one institutionalarrangement, or one line of argument, has predicted and explained recentevents.

In the current case, it wouldappear that the National Intelligence Estimates of the past dozen years have,by and large, failed this test. The B-Team Report, the heart of which did notfind its way into the press, was in my view a creditable attempt to placerecent developments in a context which makes them more understandable, andwhich offers the possibility of greater predictive success. No one should haveexpected that the intelligence community would accept the entire B Teamposition; but it should not miss the opportunity, provided by a powerfulcritique of some of its past failures, to sharpen its own thinking.

SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR MALCOLM WALLOP

The drafters of the NIE's onSoviet strategic forces, and the members of Dr. Richard Pipes' B Team came upwith substantially different evaluations of the Soviet Union's intentions andfuture capabilities. The committee--especially the Subcommittee on Quality ofIntelligence--rightly found this difference of opinion interesting, and aftergaining the views of Dr. Pipes and certain other members of his Team on thecommittee's report, asked the staff to recheck the "facts and issues"of the controversy. This remained an inquiry, however, into the quality of competing products. Butalthough the rechecking has produced a report on the A-B Team episode which ismuch improved from the original, it is still fundamentally flawed, because, inthe words of the report, it "makes no attempt to judge which group'sestimates concerning the U.S.S.R. are correct." Therefore, the report's"findings and recommendations for improving the quality of future NIE's onSoviet capabilities and objectives are primarily directed at proceduralissues." But it is logically impossible to determine the quality of opposing arguments withoutreference to the substance of those arguments. After all, the quality of an estimate depends, above all,upon its accuracy. In order to make judgments concerning quality, never mindsuggesting improvements, one must judge where the truth lies against which theestimate's accuracy is to be measured.

Of course, because there iscontroversy over the significance of the Soviets' buildup of strategic forces,any report that touches on the facts is likely to be fought over. But we cannotand should not try to avoid responsibility for substantive judgments in thisarea. The flow of events won't let us. Moreover, as is the case here, judgmentson substance turned away at the front door often come in through the windows.

Although the report finds someelements of value in the fact that the NIE's drafters had some competition, itstill tries to denigrate the B Team by giving the impression that the NIE teamcontains a wide variety of points of view, while its competitor was a. narrowband of zealots with preconceived notions. It even implies that Dr. Pipes, headof Harvard's Russian Institute, wrote on Soviet intentions before looking atthe data. In fact, Dr. Pipes did no such thing. The report focuses on theleakage of information about the B Team's report. Although it states that theleakers were "persons unknown," it leads the reader to ask cui bono? and gives the impression the B Teambenefited. This is pure innuendo.

But above all, this sort of thingdistracts from the main point: The B Team was constituted because, for 10 yearsin a. row, the NIE's had been giving a picture of Soviet strategic programswhich appeared out of touch with reality. (I am not referring to relativelyshort-range projections of numbers of launchers, which can hardly help but becorrect.)

While the Soviets were beginningthe biggest military buildup in history, the NIE's judged that they would nottry to build as many missiles as we had. When the Soviets approached ournumber, the NIE's said they were unlikely to exceed it substantially; when theyexceeded it substantially, the NIE's said they would not try for decisivesuperiority--the capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Only very recentlyhave the NIE's admitted that possibility as an "elusive question."Now the NIE's say the Soviets may be trying for such a capability but theycannot be sure it will work. While there were divisive views in theintelligence agencies responsible for the NIE's, the views which dissented fromthe above-mentioned line were confined to little footnotes. Only recently,under the pressure of events, have dissenters gained the privilege of settingout contrasting views in parallel text. Thus, while it would be inaccurate tocast the agencies in the role of doves, it is quite accurate to characterizethe NIE's thrust and tone as very doveish indeed! The President's Foreignintelligence Advisory Board was therefore quite right to ask whether the dataon Soviet strategic programs would support more somber views.

The report's main charge againstthe B Team on Soviet Objectives is that it "reflected the views of onlyone segment of the spectrum" and that consequently "the outcome ofthe exercise was predetermined and the experiment's contributionlessened." One might ask whether the report is to be read to imply thatwhat it calls the "prestigious and articulate B Team authorities"wrote predetermined, that is to say academically dishonest, analyses. The BTeam's critique was indeed pointed. It had a definite thrust. But, it seems tome, the direction of that thrust was called for by the relationship between theNIE's past analyses and the reality of the Soviet buildup.

The fundamental argument, ofcourse, is over the Soviet Union'sintentions. Soviet professional literature has not deviated from the patternset in Sokolovskii's book, "Soviet Military Strategy," that nuclearweapons do not change the fundamental nature of warfare. Nuclear wars, like allothers, have winners and losers. The Soviet military's task is, above all, towin wars. The Soviets have considered the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction(MAD), on which our military posture is based,but they have always rejected it. As the report states, the NIE's in questiondo not deal adequately with how the Soviet leadership views nuclear war. In myopinion, the problem is not brevity, but rather that while consciously refusingto entertain the Soviets' own conception of what they are about militarily, theauthors of the NIE's over the years have evaluated Soviet strategic forcesusing indexes which tend to stress our own doctrine of MAD. In 1976, the NIE mentioned that theSoviets think in terms of the ability to win wars. Nevertheless, it continuedto evaluate both U.S. and Soviet forces using MAD criteria. The B Team's position is thatbecause the Soviet Union has builtits forces all along with a view to fighting, surviving, and winning a war, theuse of MAD criteria in evaluating Soviet forcesmakes no sense. Instead of arguing the contrary explicitly, some of the BTeam's detractors now try to minimize the existence of a fundamental clash ofapproaches.

We need more confrontation ofopposing points of view on the basis of evidence. It is well known thatexperts, especially in bureaucratic settings, acquire interest in positionspainstakingly built and long defended. Too often they seek consensus incarefully hedged anaiyses, so that whatever events ensue, they can point tothis or that paragraph to justify themselves. This sort of thing does not servethe country well. The last thing we need are mechanisms for reaching moreconsensus on intelligence estimates, least of all should any such mechanisms beplaced under so politicized a body as the National Security Council. Rather weneed separate, competitive, teams of analysts, each making the best possiblecase for what the evidence at hand seems to indicate. Of course it is morecomfortable for a policymaker to receive a single estimate on any givensubject, especially if that estimate tells him what he wants to hear. But,while competitive analysis is not likely to make either policymakers or the intelligencecommunity happy, it is likely to make all concerned more responsible.

Footnotes

(1) In the past, the U.S. intelligence community Included theCentral Intelligence Agency. the Defense Intelligence Agency, the NationalSecurity Agency, and the intelligence components of the State Department, Army,Navy, Air Force, FBI, Energy Resources DevelopInent Administration, andTreasury.

(2) As of August 1975, thePFIAB's members, In addition to Chairman George W. Anderson, Jr. (Adm. USN,Ret.), were William O. Baker, Leo Cherne, John S. Foster, Jr., Robert W.Galvin,. Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, Clare Booth Luce, George P. Shultz. andEdward Teller. As of mid-1976, Mr. Cherne had become chairman, and theseadditional members had joined the PRIAB: John B. Connally. Gen. Lyman L.Lemnitzer, Robert P. Murphy, and Edward Bennett Williams. The PFIAB functionhas since been abolished by President Carter.

(3) Through its Committee on NIEEvaluation (Messrs. Robert Galvin, Edward Teller, and John Foster).

(4) New York Times, Dec. 26, 1976

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(2) As of August 1975, thePFIAB's members, In addition to Chairman George W. Anderson, Jr. (Adm. USN,Ret.), were William O. Baker, Leo Cherne, John S. Foster, Jr., Robert W.Galvin,. Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, Clare Booth Luce, George P. Shultz. andEdward Teller. As of mid-1976, Mr. Cherne had become chairman, and theseadditional members had joined the PRIAB: John B. Connally. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Robert P. Murphy, and Edward Bennett Williams. The PFIAB functionhas since been abolished by President Carter.

U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of the SenateSelect Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Collection, Production, andQuality, "The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode ConcerningSoviet Strategic Capability and Objectives," February 16, 1978(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978)

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/TeamB.htm

Footnotes

(1) In the past, the U.S. intelligence community Included theCentral Intelligence Agency. the Defense Intelligence Agency, the NationalSecurity Agency, and the intelligence components of the State Department, Army,Navy, Air Force, FBI, Energy Resources DevelopInent Administration, andTreasury.

(2) As of August 1975, thePFIAB's members, In addition to Chairman George W. Anderson, Jr. (Adm. USN,Ret.), were William O. Baker, Leo Cherne, John S. Foster, Jr., Robert W.Galvin,. Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, Clare Booth Luce, George P. Shultz. andEdward Teller. As of mid-1976, Mr. Cherne had become chairman, and theseadditional members had joined the PRIAB: John B. Connally. Gen. Lyman L.Lemnitzer, Robert P. Murphy, and Edward Bennett Williams. The PFIAB functionhas since been abolished by President Carter.

(3) Through its Committee on NIEEvaluation (Messrs. Robert Galvin, Edward Teller, and John Foster).

(4) New York Times, Dec. 26, 1976

Edited by William Kelly
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