NSAM 273

[Bernice Moore]

A work in progress...at this link: http://www.jfklancer.com/NSAM273.html

BY Gregory Burnham..

b

Edited October 26, 2010 by Bernice Moore

[Greg Burnham]

Hey Bernice,

I guess this means everyone agrees that, "I got it right" -- since there's been no rebuttal? Cool...

[Bernice Moore]

:lol:shhhhhhh....

[Greg Burnham]

I might need to "stir the xxxx storm" in a new thread, I guess. It just seems to me that this isn't a NEUTRAL issue, right? Seems to me that this is important. Either I'm on to something here or I'm "on crack" -- but it isn't neutral!

[William Kelly]

I might need to "stir the xxxx storm" in a new thread, I guess. It just seems to me that this isn't a NEUTRAL issue, right? Seems to me that this is important. Either I'm on to something here or I'm "on crack" -- but it isn't neutral!

Hi Greg,

I just thought that the whole NSAMs on Vietnam was hashed to death after Stone mentions it in JFK, and Newman and Scott and Prouty and those who argued with them seemed to have talked it to death.

While I really didn't get into iit too much at the time, I tried to follow along, and from what I understand, there's a few basic things you have to understand before getting into it all.

For one, everybody JFK sent to Vietnam to look into the situation came back with a different report and different recomendations, even when he sent two people over at once. His Ambassador to Vietnam, Henry Cabott Lodge, was a Conservative New England Republican and former and possible future political opponent. The CIA chief - Richardson? - was acting on his own and without consultation with Lodge or apparently anybody. The Diems were Roman Catholic holdovers from the former Colonial French regime and in JFK's eyes, they lost contact with their own people, especially with the Buddests burning themselves up. While JFK warned Diem about staying in touch with his people, when JFK's attitude changed towards them, so did the attitude of their military, and hence the coup, ie. Prouty.

Then there's the differences in the NSAMs on Vietnam - the last one signed by JFK and the first one signed by LBJ, clearly reflect the differences in policy from withdraw to defeat the commies at all costs.

But the one thing that caught my attention in the discussions of these NSAMs is the early draft of the second memo, written by McGeorge Bundy BEFORE JFK was killed, and kept by Prouty, as it also reflects some wording that is not in the final draft signed by LBJ, that possibly indicates a major event was about to happen, which Prouty Discusses:

(I understand Prouty was a friend of yours and you attended his funeral. While I did meet him at some COPA conferences, I didn't know him as well as you did - BK)

Fletcher Prouty: NOTES - In paragraph four of Bundy's first draft of NSAM #273 (j) it appears that he may have had something else, other than Vietnam policy, on his mind on Nov 21, 1963.

Rather strangely, in this original draft that he circulated among many of the top echelons of the Government, with personal "Cover Letters" to the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone and to his brother William in McNamara's office, he wrote some most important lines that appear to have more to do with a potential emergency situation in the United States than any connection with Vietnam policy as described by NSAM 263, October 11, 1963. One of these powerful statements follows:

"4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and abroad."(j) <BR style="mso-special-character: line-break"><BR style="mso-special-character: line-break">

Read that carefully! This draft places the "highest importance" on the fact that the "U.S. Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination (FOR WHAT?) from one part of it ("it" is a singular pronoun and limits this subject to the U.S. Government, alone, and does not include Vietnam!) against another."

What type of "recrimination" was Bundy expecting on the day before Kennedy died; and what was this "recrimination" by one part of the U.S. Government against another? For some obscure reason did these men believe that there would be some enormous uprising in the United States as a result of "WHAT?" After all, these first draft memos were dated Nov 21, 1963. (Copies of memo to McCone of CIA, and to William Bundy, enclosed (k) and (l).

What did Bundy and these other top officials know on Nov 21, 1963, that caused them to circulate such a document? Could they have been aware of the elaborate decision that had been made for the assassination planned for the very next day?

On the other hand, this hardly seems like the type of highest level policy statement that Kennedy would have dictated on, or just before, Nov 21, 1963. He had left on a speaking tour of Texas. Certainly if he had thought some major event that would create a massive up-rising was about to take place, he would not have gone off to Texas with Lyndon, Connally and Yarborough, nor would he have authorized the majority of his Cabinet officers to fly together to Japan on Nov 19th.

This "Mac" Bundy draft was written and circulated widely throughout the upper echelons of the government from the White House on Nov 21, 1963 the day before Kennedy was assassinated.

I possess copies, dated Nov 21, 1963, with brief covering memos, on White House stationary, addressed to such top level officials as the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone (k); to Don Wilson (k) with USIA and a special note to his brother William Bundy (l), who was working with McNamara at that time. Several of these copies are marked for changes. One of these sets does mark out this strange Par. #4, see above.

The William Bundy copy is interesting because it too is dated Nov 21, 1963. Mac asks his brother to "compare it with your own notes and check with Bob McNamara..." This raises at least two ideas: a) both McGeorge and Bill Bundy had been at the Honolulu Conference on Nov 20, 1963, therefore "Mac" Bundy may have been asking Bill to refer to notes made there during those sheltered meetings, or during the long flight from Honolulu to Washington.

Then by suggesting he "check with Bob McNamara" he may have believed that McNamara, who was in Honolulu with them, and with whom "Mac" Bundy may have traveled late on the night of Nov 20, may have come up with some later ideas during inflight discussions.

I have other copies of this draft document that were done on various typewriters and they certainly indicate that this draft document had to have been quickly circulated through all of the highest governmental levels...on the 21st. On these draft copies there are some notes, and line outs. One of these (m) suggests the deletion of this troublesome, perhaps prophetic "Par 4" above.

Keep in mind the opening lines of Bundy's draft are:

"The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned:..."

Then in paragraph 4, of the Nov 21, 1963, first draft of this NSAM we find this Presidential policy statement....considering that the assassination took place during the next twenty-four hours, saying:

"4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and in the field."

If this policy of NSAM 273 was actually dictated by Kennedy, then what was Bundy's real intention with that cryptic bit of writing on the day before President Kennedy's death? Was that Bundy's secret warning of the impending assassination? Did he know about the assassination plot? Where was Bundy himself when he wrote it? In the normal course of events that draft of an NSAM would have been circulated to other top officials and then signed by Kennedy as his "Vietnam Policy". Consider these choices with care:

a) was Bundy telling us what Kennedy wanted done, i.e. "all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and abroad."

Or, was this a concealed warning highlighted in the draft of NSAM 273, from McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's "Special Assistant for National Security Affairs" to other top officials of the U.S. Government informing them that he believed the President was going to be assassinated? Does this mean that Bundy, among others, knew of the assassination plot on Nov 21? If not, why would he have written such an ominous statement without a reference to the main subject of these NSAMs: VIETNAM?

Then, in the routine processing and coordination of draft documents, and with the passing of time and other events...in this case an Assassination, this strange Par. #4 of the Nov 21, 1963, first draft was deleted right after the President's death. It does not appear, in its initial awesome language of Nov 21st, in the draft documents of Nov 24, 1963, and it is no where to be seen in the final and Presidentially approved draft of Nov 26, 1963. This important progression warrants careful study and consideration of its relevancy to the possibility of top level knowledge of the assassination planning beforehand.

No where in the final, Presidentially approved, version of the Nov 26th draft of NSAM #273 does that quotation from paragraph 4 of the Bundy draft of Nov 21, 1963, appear as written.

Edited October 27, 2010 by William Kelly

[Greg Burnham]

As I posted elsewhere:

My position is that the wording of this DRAFT document is much too CERTAIN. After all, it is a REVERSAL of the then "central object" of the US Government, i.e., WITHDRAWAL, as per NSAM 263. However, Bundy isn't even mildly concerned with the appearance of impropriety. He drafts a document that dramatically altered the focus of the military from total withdrawal to total commitment!

If it was true that JFK had just signed a NSAM (263) in a half-baked manner, without all the facts, from a position of ignorance--then maybe--maybe, we could dismiss this as a very macabre coincidence.

But, that version of history is contrived.

JFK did NOT sign NSAM 263 without knowing exactly what he was doing. After all, he authored the McNamara-Taylor Report himself (through the work of General Victor Krulak and Colonel L Fletcher Prouty).

The entire purpose of the McNamara-Taylor Mission was to allow JFK the appearance of having responded to a military recommendation; to order our personnel home, but do it in a manner consistent with his having received a recommendation from the MILITARY to that effect.

There is no question as to JFK's intentions to withdraw from Vietnam. That Bundy wrote a NSAM (that's not a "normal" memo--it's a National Security ACTION Memo), which began the REVERSAL of such a well considered withdrawal policy--and worded it so confidently, against all odds that JFK would have EVER signed such a thing, is extremely suspect. Bundy knew something.

IMO: It is a "bridge" document. It is meant to deceive. Its purpose was to attempt to link JFK's policy before his assassination to the policy that LBJ adopted 4 days thereafter. It has taken decades to unravel what is perhaps the simplest and most obvious act of treason in the JFK assassination. Why obvious, you ask? Because it's been right under our noses all along...

[William Kelly]

As I posted elsewhere:

My position is that the wording of this DRAFT document is much too CERTAIN. After all, it is a REVERSAL of the then "central object" of the US Government, i.e., WITHDRAWAL, as per NSAM 263. However, Bundy isn't even mildly concerned with the appearance of impropriety. He drafts a document that dramatically altered the focus of the military from total withdrawal to total commitment!

If it was true that JFK had just signed a NSAM (263) in a half-baked manner, without all the facts, from a position of ignorance--then maybe--maybe, we could dismiss this as a very macabre coincidence.

But, that version of history is contrived.

JFK did NOT sign NSAM 263 without knowing exactly what he was doing. After all, he authored the McNamara-Taylor Report himself (through the work of General Victor Krulak and Colonel L Fletcher Prouty).

The entire purpose of the McNamara-Taylor Mission was to allow JFK the appearance of having responded to a military recommendation; to order our personnel home, but do it in a manner consistent with his having received a recommendation from the MILITARY to that effect.

There is no question as to JFK's intentions to withdraw from Vietnam. That Bundy wrote a NSAM (that's not a "normal" memo--it's a National Security ACTION Memo), which began the REVERSAL of such a well considered withdrawal policy--and worded it so confidently, against all odds that JFK would have EVER signed such a thing, is extremely suspect. Bundy knew something.

IMO: It is a "bridge" document. It is meant to deceive. Its purpose was to attempt to link JFK's policy before his assassination to the policy that LBJ adopted 4 days thereafter. It has taken decades to unravel what is perhaps the simplest and most obvious act of treason in the JFK assassination. Why obvious, you ask? Because it's been right under our noses all along...

I agree with you, and I think that the most significant evidence Mac Bundy knew something was going down - is the fact that Prouty managed to get a copy of the pre-11/22/63 version of this NSAM and it contained the alarming statement that was later removed, that:

"4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and abroad."

PROUTY: Read that carefully! This draft places the "highest importance" on the fact that the "U.S. Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination (FOR WHAT?) from one part of it ("it" is a singular pronoun and limits this subject to the U.S. Government, alone, and does not include Vietnam!) against another."

What type of "recrimination" was Bundy expecting on the day before Kennedy died; and what was this "recrimination" by one part of the U.S. Government against another? For some obscure reason did these men believe that there would be some enormous uprising in the United States as a result of "WHAT?" After all, these first draft memos were dated Nov 21, 1963. (Copies of memo to McCone of CIA, and to William Bundy,.....

BK: While Bill Bundy, Mac's brother, was at the Honolulu conference, and Mac at the White House Sit Room, the director of the CIA John McCone, at the time of the assassination, was briefing the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, talking mainly about Cuba and Vietnam, with Vietnam taking up most of the minutes of the meeting. McCone complained about the New York Times reporter James Reston's articles blaming the CIA for the Vietnam coup and assassination of the Diems, which he strongly denied and was wondering how he - they could counter these accusations. The meeting was interupted by the news of the assassintion, and Reston became one of the first to suggest that the assassination was the work of a Lone Nut case.

Now having read all that about the original wording of the draft, and knowing that it might be an expression of some looming catistrophie, it is also interesting that William Manchester and Teddy White were permitted to read an unedited transcript of the radio communicaitons from AF1 on its return flight from Dallas. And according to Vince Salandria, they quote excerpts that are not on the existing, edited transcript and audio tape currently available from LBJ Library.

The original tape and unedited transcript allegedly contains a report emanting from McGeorge Bundy in the Situation Room at the White House that a suspect has been caught and there was no conspiracy.

But If you listen to Bundy in the Situation Room talking with Gen. Clifton aboard AF1 on the audio tapes:

On Reel 2, Side One - Patch #7, there's a really interesting exchange, with Gen. Clifton giving the orders to Bundy, as to who to invite to the bipartisan meeting with LBJ when they get back to DC, and where in the White House they were to have the very first meeting between LBJ, Mac Bundy, MacNamara and the few key people that were to take over the helm of government.

It's quite clear from this tape that it is Clifton who is giving the orders and calling the shots, and not Mac Bundy - who Clifton clearly yells at at one point -

http://jfkcountercou...anmissions.html-

.......That is correct. For about seven thirty. Over.

- Seven thirty at the White House? Over.

- Seven thirty in the Cabinet Room. Over.

- Tell the Vice President [sic ] the Cabinet Room is under rearrangement, but the Oval Room will be ready. Over.

- The Oval Room it will be, you mean the Fish Room?

- I mean, both the Fish Room, and the President's Study and we will try to have the Cabinet Room. But that's a detail, we can work that out. Over.

- This is Watchman. [Gen. Clifton] HE DOES NOT WANT TO GO IN THE MANSION OR IN THE OVAL ROOM OR THE PRESIDENT'S STUDY OR THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. (Loud and with emphasis)

- Correct. [bundy].

- IF THE CABINET ROOM ISN'T READY PUT IT IN THE FISH ROOM. OVER.

- I have you. I understand. Always in the West Wing. Over.

- I have nothing further. Over.

- This is Watchman, now please brief Duplex about the changes, so we don't confuse it. Duplex is Jerry Behn. Over.

- Alright I will.

- See you in a little while. Over.

- Okay.

So while Mac Bundy may be in the Situation Room in the basement of the White House, he is certainly not in charge, or calling the shots, as he was suspected of doing.

BK

Edited October 27, 2010 by William Kelly

[Greg Burnham]

Good stuff, Bill. As usual, I don't find myself disagreeing with you--just approaching the same truth from a different direction. Indeed, Bundy was not in charge--but, he was apparently "dancing to the beat of the drum" of someone other than his boss, JFK--and whoever that was (or they were) did not have the best interest of the POTUS in mind. Still, the fact remains...BUNDY KNEW SOMETHING!

As I posted elsewhere:

My position is that the wording of this DRAFT document is much too CERTAIN. After all, it is a REVERSAL of the then "central object" of the US Government, i.e., WITHDRAWAL, as per NSAM 263. However, Bundy isn't even mildly concerned with the appearance of impropriety. He drafts a document that dramatically altered the focus of the military from total withdrawal to total commitment!

If it was true that JFK had just signed a NSAM (263) in a half-baked manner, without all the facts, from a position of ignorance--then maybe--maybe, we could dismiss this as a very macabre coincidence.

But, that version of history is contrived.

JFK did NOT sign NSAM 263 without knowing exactly what he was doing. After all, he authored the McNamara-Taylor Report himself (through the work of General Victor Krulak and Colonel L Fletcher Prouty).

The entire purpose of the McNamara-Taylor Mission was to allow JFK the appearance of having responded to a military recommendation; to order our personnel home, but do it in a manner consistent with his having received a recommendation from the MILITARY to that effect.

There is no question as to JFK's intentions to withdraw from Vietnam. That Bundy wrote a NSAM (that's not a "normal" memo--it's a National Security ACTION Memo), which began the REVERSAL of such a well considered withdrawal policy--and worded it so confidently, against all odds that JFK would have EVER signed such a thing, is extremely suspect. Bundy knew something.

IMO: It is a "bridge" document. It is meant to deceive. Its purpose was to attempt to link JFK's policy before his assassination to the policy that LBJ adopted 4 days thereafter. It has taken decades to unravel what is perhaps the simplest and most obvious act of treason in the JFK assassination. Why obvious, you ask? Because it's been right under our noses all along...

I agree with you, and I think that the most significant evidence Mac Bundy knew something was going down - is the fact that Prouty managed to get a copy of the pre-11/22/63 version of this NSAM and it contained the alarming statement that was later removed, that:

"4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and abroad."

PROUTY: Read that carefully! This draft places the "highest importance" on the fact that the "U.S. Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination (FOR WHAT?) from one part of it ("it" is a singular pronoun and limits this subject to the U.S. Government, alone, and does not include Vietnam!) against another."

What type of "recrimination" was Bundy expecting on the day before Kennedy died; and what was this "recrimination" by one part of the U.S. Government against another? For some obscure reason did these men believe that there would be some enormous uprising in the United States as a result of "WHAT?" After all, these first draft memos were dated Nov 21, 1963. (Copies of memo to McCone of CIA, and to William Bundy,.....

BK: While Bill Bundy, Mac's brother, was at the Honolulu conference, and Mac at the White House Sit Room, the director of the CIA John McCone, at the time of the assassination, was briefing the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, talking mainly about Cuba and Vietnam, with Vietnam taking up most of the minutes of the meeting. McCone complained about the New York Times reporter James Reston's articles blaming the CIA for the Vietnam coup and assassination of the Diems, which he strongly denied and was wondering how he - they could counter these accusations. The meeting was interupted by the news of the assassintion, and Reston became one of the first to suggest that the assassination was the work of a Lone Nut case.

Now having read all that about the original wording of the draft, and knowing that it might be an expression of some looming catistrophie, it is also interesting that William Manchester and Teddy White were permitted to read an unedited transcript of the radio communicaitons from AF1 on its return flight from Dallas. And according to Vince Salandria, they quote excerpts that are not on the existing, edited transcript and audio tape currently available from LBJ Library.

The original tape and unedited transcript allegedly contains a report emanting from McGeorge Bundy in the Situation Room at the White House that a suspect has been caught and there was no conspiracy.

But If you listen to Bundy in the Situation Room talking with Gen. Clifton aboard AF1 on the audio tapes:

On Reel 2, Side One - Patch #7, there's a really interesting exchange, with Gen. Clifton giving the orders to Bundy, as to who to invite to the bipartisan meeting with LBJ when they get back to DC, and where in the White House they were to have the very first meeting between LBJ, Mac Bundy, MacNamara and the few key people that were to take over the helm of government.

It's quite clear from this tape that it is Clifton who is giving the orders and calling the shots, and not Mac Bundy - who Clifton clearly yells at at one point -

http://jfkcountercou...anmissions.html-

.......That is correct. For about seven thirty. Over.

- Seven thirty at the White House? Over.

- Seven thirty in the Cabinet Room. Over.

- Tell the Vice President [sic ] the Cabinet Room is under rearrangement, but the Oval Room will be ready. Over.

- The Oval Room it will be, you mean the Fish Room?

- I mean, both the Fish Room, and the President's Study and we will try to have the Cabinet Room. But that's a detail, we can work that out. Over.

- This is Watchman. [Gen. Clifton] HE DOES NOT WANT TO GO IN THE MANSION OR IN THE OVAL ROOM OR THE PRESIDENT'S STUDY OR THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. (Loud and with emphasis)

- Correct. [bundy].

- IF THE CABINET ROOM ISN'T READY PUT IT IN THE FISH ROOM. OVER.

- I have you. I understand. Always in the West Wing. Over.

- I have nothing further. Over.

- This is Watchman, now please brief Duplex about the changes, so we don't confuse it. Duplex is Jerry Behn. Over.

- Alright I will.

- See you in a little while. Over.

- Okay.

So while Mac Bundy may be in the Situation Room in the basement of the White House, he is certainly not in charge, or calling the shots, as he was suspected of doing.

BK

[Greg Burnham]

I received a very encouraging email from Paris Flammonde this evening after his having reviewed my thesis on NSAM 273. He wrote:

"It was with dubiety that I approached the "report" by Greg Burnham, having,

during the past near half-century remarked the torrent of ill-informed

"analyses" (much drawn from astonishing ignorance of the subject),

misunderstanding and misinterpretation of speculative if not wholly specious

postulations regarding the assassination and concomitant conjecture,

consummately wearied by the density and dubiety of all but a limited effort

by a handful of genuine experts and scholars of the subject. Yet, I was not

surprised that a few words, recognized by a remarkably astute perception,

carried more convincing intimation of the prelude to the perfidy than

volumes of self-important fictionalizing."

[Martin Blank]

Hello everyone. New here as a member though I have been reading the forum for some time.

I read the posts in this thread a few weeks ago and have been thinking about them since. In particular, I was interested in the discussion of this section of the draft of NSAM 273:

.

4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and in the field.

Ultimately, I came to believe that this section had more to do with a context that already existed than it was a portent of a context yet to come. That context is reflected in the reporting of Arthur Krock and Richard Starnes (and others) that concerned an “Intra-administration War in Vietnam” and the “ ‘Arrogant’ CIA Disobey(ing) Orders in Viet Nam.”

In this context, the section of the draft NSAM 273 reflects Kennedy’s desire to retain control of Vietnam policy and he is instructing the entities and individuals (CIA, military) who are opposing his moves in Vietnam and elsewhere to cease and desist, stop running to the press, and get in line with the program. A tall order, indeed, given the circumstances.

While this section may have portended further moves by Kennedy in this conflict, I don’t believe it was indicative of the planned assassination.

After the assassination, this section of NSAM 273 was no longer necessary because those entities mentioned previously were to be given the playground they wanted in Vietnam by Johnson. All opposition, such as it was, would now be swept aside, muted, or co-opted. A different team with a different coach was now in charge.

Edited November 5, 2010 by Martin Blank

[Greg Burnham]

Hello everyone. New here as a member though I have been reading the forum for some time.

Welcome to the forum, Martin!

I read the posts in this thread a few weeks ago and have been thinking about them since. In particular, I was interested in the discussion of this section of the draft of NSAM 273:

4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and in the field.

Ultimately, I came to believe that this section had more to do with a context that already existed than it was a portent of a context yet to come. That context is reflected in the reporting of Arthur Krock and Richard Starnes (and others) that concerned an “Intra-administration War in Vietnam” and the “ ‘Arrogant’ CIA Disobey(ing) Orders in Viet Nam.”

In this context, the section of the draft NSAM 273 reflects Kennedy’s desire to retain control of Vietnam policy and he is instructing the entities and individuals (CIA, military) who are opposing his moves in Vietnam and elsewhere to cease and desist, stop running to the press, and get in line with the program. A tall order, indeed, given the circumstances.

While this section may have portended further moves by Kennedy in this conflict, I don’t believe it was indicative of the planned assassination.

After the assassination, this section of NSAM 273 was no longer necessary because those entities mentioned previously were to be given the playground they wanted in Vietnam by Johnson. All opposition, such as it was, would now be swept aside, muted, or co-opted. A different team with a different coach was now in charge.

I agree with much of what you have written here. Unfortunately, due to the lack of reliable records and "reportage" from the STATE Dept., et al, we are unable to reach definitive conclusions in this regard. However, even though I tend to defer to the judgment of my good friend (the late) L. Fletcher Prouty, I still prefer to suspend judgment on that particular portion of this document. Make no mistake, "push come to shove" (absent any further proof otherwise) I would bet on Prouty's judgment without question.

However, my interest concerns other items of this [DRAFT] document. Many very intelligent and scholarly individuals have written extensively on the FINAL VERSION of NSAM 273. Some have indicated their belief that it wasn't a big departure from the DRAFT--I agree with that. However, where they cite that fact as an exculpatory indicator, I take exception. The problem is that the DRAFT document was no more a KENNEDY document than is the subsequent FINAL version. Neither document is consistent with Kennedy policies or intentions. There exists NO documentation to even suggest otherwise and the existing documentation refutes such a claim.

My thesis deals with how (NSAM 273 DRAFT) the prima facie evidence--BEFORE the FACT--relates to the apparent perfidy during and after the fact...which is a subject that has not been adequately addressed.

[Guest Robert Morrow]

I agree with Martin Blank on that particular clause.

But I also think what it may be referring to is the post DIem conditions that were now arising.

But Greg is correct here that JFK did not see either version of 273.

Now, in Newman's book he says that the changes made to the draft were done on orders of LBJ. This is through an interview with Bundy which Newman did in 1991.

What is interesting about this is that in the book VIrtual JFK and the film of the same name, it is made clear that Bundy was not in on Kennedy's real Vietnam policy. Its really obvious in the film when its clear he does not know what Kennedy and McNamara are talking about when McNamara says "We need a way to get out of Vietnam."

This is a point that Newman does not really elucidate in his book. SInce most of the materials on this did not emerge until after the ARRB.

The more I LEARN about the JFK assassination, the more SUSPICIOUS I am about the role of McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor of John Kennedy. McGeorge Bundy was the one writing that NSAM 273 which contained a major shift in Vietnam policy that John Kennedy would not have approved. Additionally, Bundy was a hawk on the Vietnam War.

I think that both McGeorge Bundy and Henry Cabot Lodge (who JFK was going to FIRE as ambassador to Vietnam) were both involved with the plotting of the JFK assassination.

[Martin Blank]

I agree with Martin Blank on that particular clause.

But I also think what it may be referring to is the post DIem conditions that were now arising.

But Greg is correct here that JFK did not see either version of 273.

Now, in Newman's book he says that the changes made to the draft were done on orders of LBJ. This is through an interview with Bundy which Newman did in 1991.

What is interesting about this is that in the book VIrtual JFK and the film of the same name, it is made clear that Bundy was not in on Kennedy's real Vietnam policy. Its really obvious in the film when its clear he does not know what Kennedy and McNamara are talking about when McNamara says "We need a way to get out of Vietnam."

This is a point that Newman does not really elucidate in his book. SInce most of the materials on this did not emerge until after the ARRB.

if bundy was in fact "not in on Kennedy's real Vietnam policy," how could be expected to draft a document reflective of that policy? such guidance could only have come during the drafting procedure (which I believe we are relatively certain it didn't) or during a post-drafting editing phases (which it never had a chance to be subjected to under kennedy). why would someone who was known to be in the dark on this issue relative to "real policy" be given the task of drafting this document in the first place?

Edited November 8, 2010 by Martin Blank

[Guest Robert Morrow]

NOTE TO WORLD: I AM EXTREME SUSPICIOUS OF THE ROCKEFELLERS AND ALSO MCGEORGE BUNDY AS TO THEIR POSSIBLE ROLES AS ELITE SPONSORS OF THE JFK ASSASSINATION. THIS IS AN AREA THAT HAS BEEN IGNORED TOO LONG.

Do I think HL Hunt, Clint Murchison, Sr and Lyndon Johnson did it? Yeah sure, of course. But the OTHER HALF was the Eastern Establishment CIA/ Rockefeller/Allen Dulles/Edward Lansdale intelligence nexus who probably did the actual killing of JFK. And possibly McGeorge Bundy was in league from the Rockefeller end of things.

Who do you think Lyndon Johnson supported for President in 1968? NELSON ROCKEFELLER ... Hellllllloooooo, folks. If you did not know that or understand the significance of that, then you have got a LOT to learn. LBJ knew that Nelson Rockefeller would be best to both cover up the JFK assassination and possibly beat Bobby Kennedy in a general election, LBJ hoped. Yes, I do think Nelson Rockefeller was an elite sponsor of the JFK assassination.

McGeorge Bundy - Bilderberger and CFR. So what does that mean? It means he was completely plugged into the Rockefeller intelligence and political networks. The CIA is like the army for the CFR. http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/bloodlines/bundy.htm

MeGeorge Bundy - also Skull and Bones at Yale. Just like George Herbert Walker Bush ... and GWB and Prescott Bush. Places like Yale and Princeton (Dulles brothers) and Notre Dame were heavy recruiting areas for the CIA.

Also, check out this link: http://www.questionsquestions.net/feldman/ff_divest.html

As NATION magazine contributing editor Kai Bird recalled in his MacArthur Foundation, LBJ Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation-subsidized book THE COLOR OF TRUTH: MC GEORGE BUNDY AND WILLIAM BUNDY: BROTHERS IN ARMS:

[in 1949,] Mac took on a project with the Council on Foreign Relations in New York to study Marshall Plan aid to Europe...The council's study group on aid to Europe included some of the foreign policy establishment's leading figures. Working with young Bundy on the project were Allen Dulles, David Lilienthal, Dwight Eisenhower, Will Clayton, George Kennan, Richard M. Bissell and Franklin A. Lindsay. Dulles, Bissell and Lindsay...would shortly become high-ranking officials of the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency...Their meetings were considered so sensitive that the usual off-the-record transcript was not distributed to council members. There was good reason for the secrecy. These were probably the only private citizens privy to the highly classified fact that there was a covert side to the Marshall Plan. Specifically, the CIA was tapping into the $200 million a year in local currency counterpart funds contributed by the recipients of Marshall Plan aid. These unvouchered monies were being used by the CIA to finance anti-communist electoral activities in France and Italy and to support sympathetic journalists, labor union leaders and politicians.

Both Bundy brothers were also good friends of Frank Wisner, the legendary intelligence officer who ran these covert programs in Western Europe. They socialized with Wisner and his...wife Polly, often at dinner parties hosted by Joe Alsop...Phil and Kay Graham of the WASHINGTON POST were also part of the same social scenery. In short, the council's study group placed Mac Bundy among a small group of like-minded men who fully understood and endorsed the necessity for waging psychological warfare against the Soviet Union.

The policy paper Mac wrote that summer, "Working Paper on the Problem of Political Equilibrium," assumed that such covert activities in Western Europe were worthy endeavors.

THE COLOR OF TRUTH book also contains the following additional reference to the ties between former Ford Foundation President Bundy, the CIA and the Council on Foreign Relations:

Bundy...thought it only natural that the historian William L. Langer...had taken a leave from Harvard to organize the CIA's Office of National Estimates [ONE]...Langer had gone to Washington at the call of the CIA and promptly hired Mac's brother Bill as one of his top aides. They were old friends and political allies...Mac had published a review in THE REPORTER of a massive two volume study of America's entry into World War II written by Langer and S. Everett Gleason. Langer had finished the project while at the CIA and Gleason was a high-ranking official in the National Security Council. Bundy called it a "magnificent achievement...so thorough that it will never be done again"...Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations to the tune of $139,000--an extraordinary sum in those years--and written with privileged acces to classified documents, the Langer-Gleason volumes were official history parading as independent scholarship...

According to a chapter entitled "How The Power Elite Make Foreign Policy" that appeared in the 1970 book THE HIGHER CIRCLES by G. William Domhoff, the Ford Foundation-subsidized Council on Foreign Relations

[Greg Burnham]

if bundy was in fact "not in on Kennedy's real Vietnam policy," how could be expected to draft a document reflective of that policy?

Hi Martin,

I disagree (I think) with Jim on this issue. I don't buy the idea that Bundy was "out of the loop" on JFK's real Vietnam (withdrawal) policy. Not for a second. NSAM 263 was authored and signed (on behalf of JFK) by Bundy! NSAM 263 is unequivocal. Again, it was the result of the McNamara-Taylor Mission Report. The ONLY part of the ENTIRE report that was approved by JFK was the portion placing a time limit on completing the "military campaign in Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965." McGeorge Bundy, as the president's Special Advisor on National Security, was definitely IN THE LOOP on this issue. How could he NOT be? He wrote the National Security Action Memorandum 263 that ordered the withdrawal of the bulk of all US personnel by the end of 1965! If we claim that Bundy didn't know what the policy was, I really don't know how we can "get there from here" -- ?? -- After all, he wrote the damn official documents!

Such guidance could only have come during the drafting procedure (which I believe we are relatively certain it didn't) or during a post-drafting editing phases (which it never had a chance to be subjected to under kennedy). why would someone who was known to be in the dark on this issue relative to "real policy" be given the task of drafting this document in the first place?

Again, I think you raise very good points here. I don't think that he was "in the dark" at all. He was the President's Special Advisor on National Security for God's sake! He was definitely privy to the most sensitive material without question. That is why he was given tasks such as writing NSAM's. However, the fact that any NSAM was spawned from the Honolulu Conference is possibly the smoking gun. There doesn't appear to be any reason to expect a new NSAM would have come from that meeting at all, let alone an NSAM that reversed the direction of a very recently implemented policy.

Moreover, there is NOTHING in the JOINT "STATE DEPT / DEFENSE DEPT" Cable indicating that the agenda would include discussions about a change in Vietnam policy. In fact, the opposite is true! There is also NOTHING in the Honolulu Conference memorandum (FRUS Volume IV) that indicates ANY discussions took place that would have spawned the content of the DRAFT of NSAM 273--NOT ONE THING...

Edited November 11, 2010 by Greg Burnham