Upcoming October event with David Talbot and Craig McNamara

[Douglas Caddy]

 

Because Our Fathers Lied: Craig McNamara with David Talbot (tockify.com)

[Douglas Caddy]

David Talbot wrote on Facebook today:

"Because Our Fathers Lied"... On Saturday October 15 at 7 pm in the evening, I will have the great pleasure of conversing onstage at the Throckmorton Theatre in Mill Valley, CA with Craig McNamara, author of the new searing memoir about his father, the late Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. I have not seen Craig, an organic farmer, since I interviewed him in 1984 for a cover story about his father's reincarnation as a peace advocate during the nuclear freeze movement. That article drove a wedge between father and son, but later Craig acknowledged it was true. (He writes about the family fallout from my article in his book.)

Like Craig himself, I had a complicated relationship with Robert McNamara. I interviewed him again for my 2007 book "Brothers," zeroing in on the Kennedy presidency and JFK's plans to completely withdraw troops from Vietnam after the 1964 election. McNamara, who became a Vietnam hawk under President Johnson, could have easily elided the truth. But instead he strongly confirmed JFK's peace intentions.

In my book, I portrayed McNamara as a tragic, complex, haunted public official. If President Kennedy had lived, McNamara would've gone down in history as a hero -- one of the men who helped Kennedy keep the peace. As it was, he became a war criminal with a conscience, a man so racked with guilt that LBJ shunted him to the World Bank. After "Brothers" was published, McNamara had the courage to call me and tell me "you got it right."

Late in his life, McNamara's efforts to explain himself -- as in Errol Morris's Oscar-winning documentary "Fog of War" -- were both convoluted and moving. As far as I know, Robert McNamara is the ONLY high U. S. national security official to feel any guilt for what he did.

I'm looking forward to speaking with Craig again -- not just about his father, but our own deeply and bitterly divided national family.

See above to get tickets to the Litquake event.

(The photo shows McNamara -- in his trademark wire-rim glasses, with Joint Chiefs chairman General Maxwell Taylor and President Kennedy.)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Douglas Caddy]

David is exploring the option to get the event live streamed.  

[Ron Bulman]

4 hours ago, Douglas Caddy said:

David is exploring the option to get the event live streamed.  

That would be great!

[James DiEugenio]

I think this is true:  Craig was so against the Vietnam War he placed a Viet Cong flag in his bedroom.

[Michael Griffith]

20 hours ago, Douglas Caddy said:

David Talbot wrote on Facebook today:

McNamara, who became a Vietnam hawk under President Johnson

In reality, McNamara was anything but a Vietnam hawk under Johnson. In public, McNamara voiced support for the war effort, but he did everything he could to undermine the war effort in private, just as he had done with JFK. He talked LBJ into insane, suicidal restrictions on our bombing raids and ground operations, placing entire crucial areas and vital targets off limits and giving the NVA sanctuary areas to which their troops could retreat and mobilize without fear of attack.

In public, McNamara supported the bombing, but in private he told anyone who would listen that the bombing was ineffective. In one case, McNamara was caught markedly misrepresenting the views of Admiral Sharp, the CINCPAC (Commander in Chief Pacific), to make it appear that Sharp supported McNamara's restrictions. McNamara did all he could to isolate LBJ from the Joint Chiefs. McNamara exercised unprecedented micromanagement over the war effort, usurping the rightful authority and judgment of the commanders on the ground, with negative results over and over again.

At least as early as 1967, McNamara began telling LBJ that the war was "unwinnable," an outrageous and galling claim coming from the guy who had handcuffed our military and had enabled the North Vietnamese to enjoy protections that no competent leader would have allowed, protections that most Americans would have found shocking, if not treasonous, in World War II and in the Korean War.

The first six or seven iterations of the Rolling Thunder bombing operations were so limited and restricted that they were largely worthless and ineffective. Under pressure from Congressional conservatives, the JCS, and senior officers just below the JCS, LBJ, over McNamara's objections, finally lifted a few of the insane restrictions for the last five Rolling Thunder raids. Those raids did, at best, only moderate damage and still left dozens of key (and entirely valid) targets untouched. Yet, we know from North Vietnamese sources that the last five raids did enough damage to cause some consternation in Hanoi and to hinder some NVA operations. 

In late 1967, McNamara announced his intention to resign, and he left office in February 1968, soon after the 1968 Tet Offensive, an offensive that would have been impossible without his disastrous handling of the war effort. 

McNamara was never a "Vietnam hawk." And if Vietnam was one of the plotters' main motives and concerns, they surely did not show it. A plot run by powerful people who viewed Vietnam as a vital issue never would have allowed LBJ to so horribly mismanage and hamstring the war effort.

 

 

[James DiEugenio]

"By most U.S. measures, ROLLING THUNDER appears to severely damage North Vietnam’s ability to continue the war. According to one estimate, between March 1965 and April 1967, American aircraft destroy or disable 85 percent of North Vietnam’s petroleum storage capacity, 70 percent of its power generation capacity, 70 percent of its ammunition storage resources, and 25 percent of its barracks facilities, among other targets. However, nearly all observers agree with the conclusion of a 1967 CIA report that, “these losses . . . have not meaningfully degraded North Vietnam’s material ability to continue the war in South Vietnam.”

In response to the bombing, the North Vietnamese disperse their military assets widely throughout the country, reducing U.S. bombers’ ability to attack large or significant targets. The Hanoi government also directs more and more material through Laos and Cambodia via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It mitigates most damage to bridges, roads, and supply routes by continuously constructing numerous bypasses and alternate routes. Finally, North Vietnam replaces any materiel losses suffered as a result of U.S. bombs with large amounts of supplies, ammunition, weapons, aircraft, and other equipment from China and the Soviet Union, both of which increase their support of North Vietnam as a result of the bombing."

[James DiEugenio]

The above situation is what Clifford faced after LBJ shoved McNamara out.

This is the tactical and strategic option he was left with.  

When Clifford talked to LBJ after his 3 weeks at the Pentagon, he told him he should get out. He added:  But if you stay in you have to expand the war into Cambodia and Laos, cut the supply lines coming in from China--therefore risking Chinese intervention like Korea-- and generally create a World War 2 operation out of a guerilla war. (Walt Rostow actually wanted to land American troops in North Vietnam and have them fight their way to Hanoi.)

To Clifford, it just was not worth it. 

Now, if you look at the plans for Operation Duck Hook, under Nixon, that greatly resembles the option Clifford gave to LBJ and recommended against it. It was the massive student protests that took place in Washington DC that, Jeff Kimball notes, probably caused Nixon to call it off. Nixon's version included tactical atomic weapons.  To the best of my memory, Clifford's did not.

 

 

Edited September 21, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

From an interview with Clifford, talking about his conversation with LBJ after his stay at the Pentagon. .I think this was for the Karnow TV special on PBS:

 

"At that particular time, we questioned every prominent Southeast Asian and Far Eastern expert. They were absolutely unanimous in saying, if we invaded North Vietnam with American troops unquestionably, North Vietnam would ask for aid from China, it would be given, and we would then be embroiled in a land war in Southeast Asia with Red China which had no limitation as to the millions of men that they could put in the field against us. It seemed to me under the circumstances that was the worst possible move that could be gained. Greatly to President Johnson’s credit, he never really seriously considered doing that. He also, at the same time, never seriously considered the military recommendation that we go over and spread the war out in Cambodia. He thought only that made it a wider and larger war with more casualties on each side, and so he also refused to spread it into Cambodia, as he refused to spread it into North Vietnam."

 

 

[Ron Bulman]

3 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

(Walt Rostow actually wanted to land American troops in North Vietnam and have them fight their way to Hanoi.)

Never read that before.  Between this and your post after it, WWIII.

[James DiEugenio]

Clifford said that in his interview. 

Rostow was nuttier than Nixon about Vietnam.  Which is why Kennedy moved him out of the White House and into the State Department.

If you read the 2017 version of JFK and Vietnam, you will see that McNamara was worried about Chinese intervention in Vietnam, like Clifford was. (See p. xviii)

This was one of the first things he brought up with Newman at their first meeting.  Not knowing that John has three degrees in East Asia history. John agreed with him by saying that most American leaders did not know that Chinese defense minister Lin Biao's position on intervention was hawkish. He told McNamara that he did understand how prominent this was in Bejing and that if America had gone much further.... 

McNamara finished the sentence, "we would have brought the Chinese into the war." John then commented, "Exactly."

Edited September 22, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[Michael Griffith]

14 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

 

The above situation is what Clifford faced after LBJ shoved McNamara out. This is the tactical and strategic option he was left with.  

You keep ignoring the fact that the Rolling Thunder bombing raids left dozens of key targets and entire regions untouched, not to mention the fact that they were intermittent, which gave North Vietnam ample time to recover and move assets. Admiral Sharp rightly called them "powder-puff" raids. That's why their effectiveness was modest at best. As I've noted before, the NVA moved many assets into the prohibited areas that LBJ-McNamara allowed them to have, including the sanctuaries in eastern Laos and Cambodia.

When Clifford talked to LBJ after his 3 weeks at the Pentagon, he told him he should get out. He added:  But if you stay in you have to expand the war into Cambodia and Laos, cut the supply lines coming in from China--therefore risking Chinese intervention like Korea-- and generally create a World War 2 operation out of a guerilla war. (Walt Rostow actually wanted to land American troops in North Vietnam and have them fight their way to Hanoi.)

Clifford was nearly as bad as McNamara, and seemed to be just as clueless about even the basics of military operations as McNamara was.

Rostow's proposal, provided that we had supported the ground assault with sound air support, would have worked in a matter weeks, judging from the effects that Linebacker II had in 1972.

Linebacker II proved beyond any rational doubt that using legal and long-recognized standard air operations would have ended the war in months, if not weeks. I'll repeat again that we know from North Vietnamese records and memoirs that Linebacker II, in just 11 days, brought North Vietnam to the verge of collapse and caused the Hanoi hardliners to hurriedly agree to resume negotiations. 

Why? Because in Linebacker II, we mined Haiphong Harbor, which disabled the port where most of the Soviet aid entered North Vietnam. We hit valid-but-long-untouched targets in Hanoi and the surrounding regions, including transportation hubs, power plants, fuel storage depots, SAM sites (without having to wait to be fired on first), MIG airfields (without having to wait to be fired on first), communications centers, and weapons depots. Life in Hanoi and in several other parts of the northern half of North Vietnam literally ground to a halt due to the destruction of power plants and transportation hubs. Our multi-wave bombing raids on Hanoi overwhelmed Hanoi's air defenses. When Hanoi's leaders suddenly and urgently called for resumed talks, they were just about out of SAMs and their economy was teetering on total collapse. All of this in just 11 days. 

To Clifford, it just was not worth it. 

That's because he was incompetent and ignorant of even basic military strategy. It says volumes about his incompetence that he could conclude "it just was not worth it" based on the results of a hamstrung war effort that insanely left numerous crucial targets untouched and that, equally insanely, put several strategic entire areas off-limits. 

Now, if you look at the plans for Operation Duck Hook, under Nixon, that greatly resembles the option Clifford gave to LBJ and recommended against it. It was the massive student protests that took place in Washington DC that, Jeff Kimball notes, probably caused Nixon to call it off. Nixon's version included tactical atomic weapons.  To the best of my memory, Clifford's did not.

Tactical nukes were only posited as a last-ditch option if everything else had failed. Linebacker I and Linebacker II proved that no nukes of any kind were even remotely needed.

Yes, Nixon, being human, did feel great pressure from the  screams of the misguided, duped "anti-war" students, and from the howls coming from the news media and Congressional Democrats. Yet, these supposedly "anti-war" folks didn't seem to mind war at all when North Vietnam trashed the Paris Peace Accords and launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam in late 1974, not to mention the repeated probing and attrition attacks that the NVA began launching in late 1973. In fact, many, if not most, of these "anti-war" folks even  repeated North Vietnam's obscene claim that they were merely responding to South Vietnam's "aggression" and "violations of the Paris Peace Accords." 

Nor did these "anti-war" folks have anything to say when the North Vietnamese began murdering tens of thousands of South Vietnamese and sent 1-2 million others to concentration camps after Saigon fell. The same "anti-war" liberals who were "morally outraged" when Nixon attacked NVA sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia apparently didn't have any objections to the NVA's horrific crimes after South Vietnam collapsed.

Edited September 22, 2022 by Michael Griffith

[James DiEugenio]

Mike:

When did you become an expert on China?

Can you please go ahead and list your education and background in such?

You can note above that Clifford consulted with as many such experts as he could.  John Newman has three degrees in the subject and was actually going to write his Ph D thesis on it.

China was quite disappointed at what happened in Indonesia in 1965.

They would have intervened if anyone had listened to Rostow.

It would have been a repeat of Korea.  Except probably worse.  Since I think they would have gone all the way to Saigon this time.

[Michael Griffith]

14 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

Mike:

When did you become an expert on China?

Can you please go ahead and list your education and background in such?

You can note above that Clifford consulted with as many such experts as he could.  John Newman has three degrees in the subject and was actually going to write his Ph D thesis on it.

China was quite disappointed at what happened in Indonesia in 1965.

They would have intervened if anyone had listened to Rostow.

It would have been a repeat of Korea.  Except probably worse.  Since I think they would have gone all the way to Saigon this time.

Sorry, but these are more claims that are 10-20 years behind the information curve. We know from Chinese sources and North Vietnamese sources that China was *not* going to intervene to save North Vietnam.

Also, we know from Soviet sources and North Vietnamese sources that the Soviets made it clear to Hanoi that they would not intervene to save North Vietnam if it meant risking a military confrontation with the U.S., even if North Vietnam were on the verge of collapse, as was the case in December 1972 when we brought the Hanoi regime to its knees with Linebacker II.

Numerous books discuss these facts, such as Dr. Moyar's Triumph Forsaken, but your reading apparently has not included any of them.

Indeed, in a fascinating twist, it has come to light that China was actually wary of a North Vietnamese victory over South Vietnam. This is why China began to limit its aid to North Vietnam after 1965. After U.S. ground troops arrived in large numbers in South Vietnam, the Soviets complained to Hanoi that China was starting to limit how much war material it could transport over Chinese rail lines. China's lack of enthusiasm for a North Vietnamese victory is why most of the foreign aid that North Vietnam received after 1965 came from the Soviets. 

In an especially surprising twist, over the last 10 years or so, evidence has emerged that China actually explored trying to create a neutral South Vietnam to prevent Hanoi from conquering South Vietnam.  

Edited September 23, 2022 by Michael Griffith

[James DiEugenio]

Funny how your North Vietnamese sources essentially jibe with what the rightwing revisionists have been writing since the fall of Saigon.

The comments about China are like what MacArthur was saying before hundreds of thousands of them poured across the border in Korea.

So after watching the  massacre of the PKI take place in Indonesia, Bejing was going to let Hanoi then fall to the USA?

And therefore everyone that Clifford talked to was wrong, as was Newman in retrospect and after studying the subject for 6 years. And Newman studied the VIetnam War under Kennedy for ten years.

To give you idea of what Moyar's book is about, here are some of the major points, summarized by a sympathetic commentator:

1. Ho Chi Minh was a dedicated communist who had to be stopped.

2. Diem was an effective leader, the leader that South Vietnam and Vietnam required.

3. The USA was correct to enter the war on the basis of the Domino Theory.

4. The US effort there under Kennedy was not failing but had achieved remarkable success.  It was the flawed reporting on the Buddhist crisis and the Battle of Ap Bac that gave the wrong impression.

5. The US was on the verge of victory until the ouster of Diem.

 

Edited September 23, 2022 by James DiEugenio