The Kennedy Tapes

[Matthew Koch]

8 minutes ago, Robert Morrow said:

I asked you a simple question: how do you know that Phillip Zelikow does not want the JFK documents released and you failed to provide any proof/documentation for that.

And your answer was you deduced that because Zelikow was a cover up artist for the Bush Administration when it came to 9/11 which happened on George W. Bush's watch. Actually, I think Zelikow is a toad when it comes to the JFK assassination but it sure would be nice for you to back up your statements here.

Looking at his wiki, he's a Neo Con and involved with alot of unsavory National Security people.. I think guilt by association is enough with this guy to not trust him. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Zelikow

[Matt Cloud]

2 minutes ago, Robert Morrow said:

I asked you a simple question: how do you know that Phillip Zelikow does not want the JFK documents released and you failed to provide any proof/documentation for that.

And your answer was you deduced that because Zelikow was a cover up artist for the Bush Administration when it came to 9/11 which happened on George W. Bush's watch. Actually, I think Zelikow is a toad when it comes to the JFK assassination but it sure would be nice for you to back up your statements here.

Wait -- I asked you to back up your statement that LBJ spiked the brewing exposes of the Bobby Baker scandal in Nov-Dec 1963.  Silence.  Don't get righteous with me.  

Zelikow is not going to tell you that the Cuban Missile Crisis was being hashed out at Pat Moynihan's house in 1962.  Or that among its spin-off functions was to cause to have Oswald "re-enter" the United States, and begin creation of his legend to take blame for U-2 failures.

 

Washington Post, Sept. 10, 1962, p. A2:

"The Russians are casting longing eyes at Tregaron, the longtime estate of the late Joseph E. Davies, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union. ... [A] good many Embassy officials, including Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, have been out recently to look over Tregaron."

At the time, Tregaron was also the headquarters of the CORONA satellite and U-2 reconnaissance programs, before being privatized as COMSAT, the board of which Phil Graham of the Post sat.  See Oswald legend and U-2, above.

 

______

The importance of the secret deal makes it worthwhile to understand how it was implemented, but it also had a broader significance that is worth noting. As historian Philip Nash has argued, by removing Soviet missiles from Cuba and Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey, the Cuban missile swap deserves recognition as a trailblazing arms control agreement, the “first arms reduction agreement” of the Cold War. Nash contends that, even though it was “verbal, informal, secret, spontaneous,” and part of a larger tacit arrangement, the secret deal was the “first agreement in the history of the arms race under which both sides dismantled a portion of their operational nuclear delivery systems.”[4] It would take nearly ten more years before Washington and Moscow would agree to the new dismantling decisions that were incorporated in the SALT I agreement in 1972.

By then, the secrecy surrounding the deal over the Jupiters was beginning to erode. In 1970, former Turkish president and prime minister İsmet İnönü made an extraordinary statement to the Grand National Assembly, saying that, during 1963 “we … learned that [the U.S.] had made a deal with the USSR.” Exactly how Turkish officials learned this remains obscure. Robert F. Kennedy’s memoir of the crisis, Thirteen Days, did not acknowledge an explicit agreement but recounted how he had told Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin that the president wanted to remove the Jupiters, and that, “within a short time after this crisis was over, those missiles would be gone.” Even though Kennedy had denied to Dobrynin that there was a quid pro quo, Harvard University government professor Graham Allison surmised, in 1971, that “it could not have been plainer” that there had been one.[5]

During the 1970s, enough material had been declassified at the Kennedy Library, including detailed summaries of the ExComm discussions and State Department documents, for Stanford University historian Barton J. Bernstein to conclude that Robert F. Kennedy “privately offered a hedged promise … to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey at a future time.” More information became available during the 1980s, but it was not until 1989 that John F. Kennedy’s speechwriter/counsel, Theodore Sorensen, made his “confession” that he had altered Robert Kennedy’s memoir to conceal the fact that removing the Jupiters had been part of the agreement with the Soviets. The release from Russian archives of Ambassador Dobrynin’s telegraphic report of his meeting with Robert F. Kennedy provided essential confirmation of the secret quid pro quo.[6]

 

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cuban-missile-crisis-nuclear-vault/2023-04-20/jupiter-missiles-and-cuban-missile?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=f58ce6ef-2a01-40b0-b2bd-4848ed96c887

 

 

Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

 

Office of the Historian (.gov)

https://history.state.gov › historicaldocuments

 

 

 

 

Moynihan argued that the United States could cripple international heroin trafficking in 1-2 years through diplomatic initiatives with economic inducements.

 

Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

 

Office of the Historian (.gov)

https://history.state.gov › historicaldocuments

 

 

 

 

Washington, May 5, 1970. SUBJECT: Heroin Task Force Meeting, Wednesday, May 6 at 12 noon. Dr. Moynihan has requested a meeting of the Heroin Task Force ...

 

The Transformation of Heroin and Organized Crime in the 1970s

 

Oxford Academic

https://academic.oup.com › book › chapter

 

 

 

 

A CIA report from 1970 muddies the water further, suggesting that Turkish opium in 1968 and 1969 accounted for 80 percent of the heroin consumed in both the ...

 

HEROIN TASK FORCE MEETING, MONDAY, AUGUST 17, ...

 

CIA (.gov)

https://www.cia.gov › docs › LOC-HAK-7-5-29-7

 

 

PDF

 

The White House Task Force on Heroin met for 75 minutes in the Roosevelt Room. The meeting was chaired, in Dr. Kissinger's absence, by Dr. Moynihan; a list of ...

10 pages

 

Drugs: Heroin Diplomacy

 

Time Magazine

https://time.com › archive › drugs-heroin-diplomacy

 

 

 

 

(Pure heroin sells for at least $8,000 a pound in the underworld.) In 1968, the U.S. gave Turkey $3,000,000 to curtail opium production, half of which was used ...

 

TURKEY'S CAPABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO ...

 

CIA (.gov)

https://www.cia.gov › readingroom › document

 

 

 

 

Moynihan White House SUBJECT : Turkey's Capability And Willingness To Collect The 1970 Opium Crop In response to your request of 12 June 1970, we attach a ...

[Matt Cloud]

11 minutes ago, Matthew Koch said:

Looking at his wiki, he's a Neo Con and involved with alot of unsavory National Security people.. I think guilt by association is enough with this guy to not trust him. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Zelikow

The lines of demarcation are indeed easy to spot, once you've identified the issue.

 

https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/practical-path-condemn-and-disqualify-donald-trump

[Matt Cloud]

2 minutes ago, Matt Cloud said:

The lines of demarcation are indeed easy to spot, once you've identified the issue.

 

https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/practical-path-condemn-and-disqualify-donald-trump

(James DiEugenio, who goes on about "fighting the Establishment," doesn't seem to appreciate that The Kennedy Tapes version IS The Establishment's version of history, and will be shown, and rather soon, to be ... well, incomplete.)

[James DiEugenio]

Having to look at what was a decent thread after Cloud and Koch jump on is discouraging. Oh no, Moynihan and the Missile Crisis?

May and Zelikow were working from a baseline, the tapes.  So whatever the politics of Zelikow, there was little wiggle room.  Plus May was his check and balance.  There was a slight debate over this later, but  I checked it out.  I thought it was minor at best.

The whole thing about the Jupiters is silly, if you go back and look at the newspaper stories, they were named at the time.

I will say it again, The Kennedy Tapes, is an invaluable chronicle because its in the participants' own words. Plus its comprehensive, it lays in the prologue and goes all the way to the final removal of the bombers.

Please note, Nitze wanted to retaliate for the U2 shootdown--which was a really dumb thing for Castro to do--Kennedy did not do it.

Edited Thursday at 04:10 PM by James DiEugenio

[Matt Cloud]

2 minutes ago, James DiEugenio said:

Having to look at what was a decent thread after Cloud and Koch jump on is discouraging. Oh no, Moynihan and the Missile Crisis?

May and Zelikow were working from a baseline, the tapes.  So whatever the politics of Zelikow, there was little wiggle room.  Plus May was his check and balance.  There was a slight debate over this later, but  I checked it out.  I thought it was minor at best.

The whole thing about the Jupiters is silly, if you go back and look at the newspaper stories, they were named at the time.

I will say it again, The Kennedy Tapes, is an invaluable chronicle because its in the participants' own words. Plus its comprehensive, it lays in the prologue and goes all the way to the final removal of the bombers.

Please note, Nitze wanted to retaliate for the U2 shootdown--which was a really dumb thing for Castro to do--Kennedy did not do it.

Incomplete, fragmentary and vague sentences are a useful means perhaps of avoiding discussion.  

The book is useful, there is no doubt.  Moynihan was rather engaged with it, keeping it centered on his massive oak sideboard in his office, which he would thumb through from time to time.  I have that very copy next to me as I write.  

The point is that the book, and no book as yet, has ventured into the fundamental manipulation that the Cuban Missile Crisis was designed to set-up by persons both East and West, to force Kennedy's hand into strategic decisions -- "weakenings" if you like; "strategic balance" might be preferred -- to enable a permanent communist base/threat/terror in the Western Hemisphere, centered around the penetration of US intelligence by The Mole or, again if you like "our KGB interlocutor."   That was Pat Moynihan.

As Moynihan wrote to CIA Dir John Deutch in 1997, May 20, just after the time Deutch had been stymying ARRB declassification efforts:

"Query.  Would I be wrong in think that from the time of the U-2, we have been able to know with a high order of certainty whether the Soviets were ever planning a military offensive in the West?  And they never did.  Which means we were never close to war save for some awful inadvertence.  This accords in part with Kennan's early view that the Soviets had no such intention.  Next, the fact that we could watch a mobilization meant that a mobilization would be futile, creating new facts on the ground as you might say.  Why hasn't anyone written about this, or is this just simply a matter of my ignorance?"

 

[Matt Cloud]

I suppose further that most here will see no significance in the fact -- the fact -- that the son of the US Air Force Lt Col J.D. Tippit of Connecticut, who would die from long range gun fire while at a gas station in Bush's Lubbock County in 1980, was married to the daughter of Col James E. Kendrick of Project AQUATONE, PAREPERCLIP, etc., who had responsibility in Turkey for the Jupiters, from 1961-63.  

[Matt Cloud]

20 minutes ago, Matt Cloud said:

Incomplete, fragmentary and vague sentences are a useful means perhaps of avoiding discussion.  

The book is useful, there is no doubt.  Moynihan was rather engaged with it, keeping it centered on his massive oak sideboard in his office, which he would thumb through from time to time.  I have that very copy next to me as I write.  

The point is that the book, and no book as yet, has ventured into the fundamental manipulation that the Cuban Missile Crisis was designed to set-up by persons both East and West, to force Kennedy's hand into strategic decisions -- "weakenings" if you like; "strategic balance" might be preferred -- to enable a permanent communist base/threat/terror in the Western Hemisphere, centered around the penetration of US intelligence by The Mole or, again if you like "our KGB interlocutor."   That was Pat Moynihan.

As Moynihan wrote to CIA Dir John Deutch in 1997, May 20, just after the time Deutch had been stymying ARRB declassification efforts:

"Query.  Would I be wrong in think that from the time of the U-2, we have been able to know with a high order of certainty whether the Soviets were ever planning a military offensive in the West?  And they never did.  Which means we were never close to war save for some awful inadvertence.  This accords in part with Kennan's early view that the Soviets had no such intention.  Next, the fact that we could watch a mobilization meant that a mobilization would be futile, creating new facts on the ground as you might say.  Why hasn't anyone written about this, or is this just simply a matter of my ignorance?"

 

June 1997

 

Advisory Committee on Historical
Diplomatic Documentation
June 23-24, 1997

Minutes

Open Session, June 23

The meeting was called to order at 9:12 a.m. by Chairman Warren Kimball. He introduced Philip Zelikow of Harvard University as a new member replacing Melvyn Leffler. He said that another new member, Michael Glennon, could not be present because his clearance was not yet completed. The minutes of the March meeting were considered and approved as drafted. Kimball then turned to Executive Secretary William Slany for his report.

Report by the Executive Secretary

Slany began by emphasizing that the Foreign Relations series has achieved a great deal toward accomplishing the goals set out in the 1991 legislation. Fifty volumes have been published in 4¸ years, largely eliminating the backlog that existed in 1992. He noted that the office expects to publish 8-12 volumes this year. However, the Office was experiencing difficulties in continuing that record of publication success because of declassification problems. In part this was owing to the fact that compilers were profiting from expanded access to documentary collections to include a wider range of documents in their compilations. Documenting the intelligence aspect of foreign policy posed a particular problem. Slany pointed to the question of how much intelligence-related documentation was necessary and proper to include in the series, and he noted that the compilers in the office were not sure that they were finding all of the documentation on intelligence issues they needed to prepare credible compilations. Tied in with the questions of access to and selection of intelligence materials was the overarching question of the impact on the series of the declassification disputes which have arisen over intelligence related issues.

The upshot of these declassification problems, Slany stated, is that declassification of Foreign Relations volumes is currently at a near standstill. Unless there are breakthroughs on the clearance front, the Office will not be able to clear any volumes this year for publication next year. Publication of the series will essential halt. These declassification problems, Slany noted, are the reasons why the Office is unlikely to progress further toward meeting the mandated 30-year line for publication of Foreign Relations volumes. Slany asked the Advisory Committee for advice on how much documentation on intelligence issues to include in the compilations and how to deal with the declassification problems.

Slany turned to another problem. The Office is called on occasionally to provide advice and analytical support for the Department on key historical issues such as the Bosnia peace process and the Nazi gold project. It posed a management problem to meet these legitimate needs of the Department without adversely impacting on the production of the Foreign Relations series. Slany observed that he had balanced these competing pressures for staff time largely by using support recruited from the ranks of present and former Foreign Service officers. He was not certain that this system would continue to meet the Department's requirements for historical research, and he noted that the two projects he had cited had also involved 3-5 members of the permanent Office staff. Slany said that he did not want to ask the Department for additional resources only to be instructed to use existing resources at the expense of the Foreign Relations series. On this question Slany also turned to the Advisory Committee for advice.

Kimball took up the questions posed by Slany and asked Committee members for their reactions.

Schulzinger recalled that Bennett Freeman had referred at the March meeting to the creation of an "historical swat team." Nothing to his knowledge had been done to implement this concept. He asked whether a timetable had been established for the creation of such a team. Slany responded that the issue was "up in the air." The reorganization of the Public Affairs Bureau to incorporate USIA and the public affairs components of AID and ACDA has to be completed by August. Slany said that he had been assured that the Historian's Office would not be substantially affected by the reorganization, but it was not clear that there was support within the bureau for the creation of an additional historical studies unit. He asked if the Committee wanted to take a position on this issue.

Schulzinger felt that the Committee should take a stand, but it should be a stand on a proposal. No proposal was evident now that Freeman had left the bureau. Van Camp asked how much staff time was currently being devoted to historical studies projects. Slany responded that three staff members were currently engaged, and added that as many as five had been involved in the recent past.

Hogan asked whether the office would continue to be asked to respond to requests for historical studies without additional resources. Slany said that he did not feel the Office would necessarily be heavily impacted if outside support would continue to be provided. Hogan asked whether the office had done this type of research for the Department in the past. Slany confirmed that the Office was formerly divided by function to meet these needs. Tucker asked whether the staff of the Office wanted to deal with historical studies as well as Foreign Relations. Slany responded that he couldn't speak for the staff, but he noted that in many instances people with specialized knowledge in the office were best able to deal with research questions growing out of the knowledge gleaned from work on Foreign Relations compilations. Kimball asked Slany if he wanted outside Foreign Service specialists or trained historians. Slany said that the Office had a proposal calling for both. He wanted a nucleus of staff who could deal with historical studies, but wanted to avoid involving the majority of the staff who should remain focused on the Foreign Relations series.

Zelikow said that he had talked to Richard Holbrooke and Tom Donilon, both of whom were pleased with the work the Historian's Office had done on the Bosnia peace accords. Neither had indicated that they envisioned long-term historical research requirements that the Office would have to meet. Zelikow posed the question of whether the Office should exploit the receptive climate at the top of the Department for the type of historical research the Office could do to expand its capability to perform a larger research role. The Office could propose to do operational histories, like the command histories done by the military services, or it could limit itself to responding to requests. He thought the office should decide which type of program it wanted and make a proposal accordingly.

Kimball agreed, noting that it would be hard for the Advisory Committee to respond unless there was a proposal. Hogan said that the Advisory Committee's mandate relates to the Foreign Relations series. Other matters concern the Committee insofar as they affect the series. Tucker asked about the status of microfiche supplements, noting the recommendation against going ahead with the microfiche supplement to the intelligence volume. Did this limit access to these materials? How costly would such a supplement be? Slany responded that for HO, this was a tradeoff. These materials are supplementary, even tertiary. The production cost would be $5-6,000 and it would require staff time for editing and distribution. It was hard to calculate the complete cost. The alternative was to make sure the documents are accessible in some locations instead of producing 500 copies. He noted that these materials are essentially administrative history; the Committee's interest is primarily in other aspects of the intelligence record. He felt that the time would be better spent working on something else, such as Indonesia in 1957-1958.

Zelikow said he wanted to bring up two other issues in the report. Had reports been filed with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee? Slany said that so far they had not been. Zelikow thought this would be an important political opportunity-a report by the Secretary of State to be made public. He noted that there are congressional committee members who are interested in this, and argued that this could be an "action-forcing" event expressing the Committee's concerns.

Slany commented that HO was waiting for the new administration to take over in PA. There may be discussion of the subject at Jamie Rubin's confirmation hearing. It was better to deal with things in sequence: 1) the Advisory Committee's annual report; 2) Rubin's confirmation; and 3) a report to Congress.

Zelikow said that his other point involved the inclusion of intelligence material in Foreign Relations volumes. He thought this subject could be discussed most fruitfully in relation to individual volumes. Kimball responded that the CIA argued that HO historians were making different kinds of requests, and that given the state of CIA's records, as CIA personnel themselves depicted it, HO needed general guidelines. He noted that the Advisory Committee does deal with individual volumes and would do so later that day.

...

https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/adcom/mtgnts/11705.htm

[Robert Morrow]

19 minutes ago, Matt Cloud said:

I suppose further that most here will see no significance in the fact -- the fact -- that the son of the US Air Force Lt Col J.D. Tippit of Connecticut, who would die from long range gun fire while at a gas station in Bush's Lubbock County in 1980, was married to the daughter of Col James E. Kendrick of Project AQUATONE, PAREPERCLIP, etc., who had responsibility in Turkey for the Jupiters, from 1961-63.  

I see absolutely no significance in that.

[Matt Cloud]

Just now, Robert Morrow said:

I see absolutely no significance in that.

You always match my expectations. 

[Matt Cloud]

 

 

 

 

•  
•  
•  
•  

6 min (1.1 mi) via Cathedral Ave NW

 

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000403370001-7.pdf

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92b01039r002204380030-6

 

electronlics

 

World Radio History

https://www.worldradiohistory.com › Electronics-...

 

https://www.worldradiohistory.com/Archive-Electronics/60s/63/Electronics-1963-08-09.pdf

PDF

 

Tregaron, belies the bustle that permeates the improvised head- quarters of the new Communica- tions Satellite Corporation—or the controversy around it. ComSat.

Yenching Palace – Washington, D.C.

 

Atlas Obscura

https://www.atlasobscura.com › places › yenching-palace

 

 

 

 

 

Nov 16, 2016 — Discover Yenching Palace in Washington, D.C.: The iconic D.C. restaurant where the Cuban Missile Crisis was negotiated, now a Walgreens.

 

[Jonathan Cohen]

37 minutes ago, Matt Cloud said:

I suppose further that most here will see no significance in the fact -- the fact -- that the son of the US Air Force Lt Col J.D. Tippit of Connecticut, who would die from long range gun fire while at a gas station in Bush's Lubbock County in 1980, was married to the daughter of Col James E. Kendrick of Project AQUATONE, PAREPERCLIP, etc., who had responsibility in Turkey for the Jupiters, from 1961-63.  

That's correct. There is no significance about that as it pertains to the JFK assassination.

[Matt Cloud]

8 minutes ago, Jonathan Cohen said:

That's correct. There is no significance about that as it pertains to the JFK assassination.

Oh.  Carry on then.

[Matt Cloud]

24 minutes ago, Matt Cloud said:

Oh.  Carry on then.

What about Harold Talbott?  Did he play a role in handing the U-2 over to CIA from Air Force?  Maybe he gave plans to Harriman who then passed them on to Soviets, via Moynihan, in Geneva, in 1957-58?  

Might that be why Strobe Talbott near-to-authored the "Russian Collusion" allegation against Donald Trump?

As regards Nitze, above, and his conversion from treaty hawk to treaty dove -- a metamorphosis still to this day unexplained, see 

 

 

The monthly magazine of opinion.

FEBRUARY 1989 POLITICS & IDEAS

The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace, by Strobe Talbott

The idea of arms control is surprisingly old. Ancient writers mention a treaty between two Greek cities banning the use…

by Donald Kagan

Heroes, Villains & SDI

The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace.
by Strobe Talbott.
Knopf. 416 pp. $19.95.

...

Thus, Nitze helped negotiate SALT I but, as a key member of the Committee on the Present Danger, helped defeat SALT II. A hard-headed realist, he had no illusions about the dangerous character and intentions of the Soviet Union, about its willingness to employ nuclear blackmail, about the possibility of a nuclear war even in spite of the horrors it threatened and the need, therefore, to think about how such a war might be fought. He favored the development of the hydrogen bomb. He helped write the important directive NSC-68 that urged a massive rebuilding of American military strength in the face of a Soviet military threat. Yet he once advocated placing “the ultimate power of decision on the use of America’s nuclear forces in the hands of the General Assembly of the United Nations.” In an attempt to resolve the impasse in discussions over nuclear forces in Europe in 1982 he took an unauthorized “walk in the woods” with a Soviet negotiator during which he approved a plan that would have left the Soviets with 75 SS-20s and prevented the U.S. from installing any equivalent Pershing II missiles, a plan that was rejected by his own government and denounced by one critic as “an act of intellectual and political cowardice.” At present he is skeptical about the value of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and eager to give it away as a bargaining chip in arms-control negotiations. So interesting and unusual a collection of opinions and actions demands a fuller and more coherent discussion than the reader can get from this book.

...

At the end of the current volume Talbott is less gloomy. Somehow, in spite of themselves, President Reagan and his administration stumbled into easier relations with the Soviet Union and an apparently irreversible progress toward arms control. Ronald Reagan, according to Talbott, had come into office planning a revolution in national security but had been forced by events to put up with a restoration of the old system—“a return to reliance on the strange safety of mutual deterrence and a renewed effort through arms control to make that condition less strange and more safe.” Paul Nitze is a hero because, “of those who brought about that restoration, the most persistent and prominent” was he.

 

https://www.commentary.org/articles/donald-kagan/the-master-of-the-game-paul-nitze-and-the-nuclear-peace-by-strobe-talbott/

 

 

Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace: Talbott, Strobe: New York

 

Taylor & Francis Online

https://www.tandfonline.com › doi › pdf

 

 

 

 

by A Theoharis · 1990 — “Nitze was more than the master of the game; he was also a victor” p. 394), Talbott offers no convincing explanation for Nitze's shift from critic of the ...

 

 

Averting a new NATO-Russian arms race

Angered by the decision to push NATO eastwards and the prospect of other post-Soviet states soon joining the alliance, Russia has become engaged in a game of high-risk brinkmanship with the US. A swift ‘resetting of the reset' is needed if dangerous rivalries are to be prevented from spiralling out of control, says Hall Gardner.

 

Hall Gardner

28 May 2012

 

...

 

In 1997 Paul Nitze was one of the former Cold Warrior signatories to The Open Letter to the Honorable President Clinton, opposing NATO enlargement.  In a letter to Senator Patrick Moynihan, Nitze warned in a prophetic statement that ‘… the open-ended expansion being proposed for the Alliance points toward increasing friction with post-Communist Russia for years to come.’

In many ways, the roots of the contemporary crisis and threat of a new arms rivalry between NATO and Russia stem from NATO’s ‘open-ended’ enlargement into Eastern Europe and the Black Sea/ Caucasus regions. Moscow is concerned that NATO is engaging in an open-ended enlargement and the modernisation of both tactical and strategic nuclear weaponry, in addition to the deployment of missile defence systems throughout much of the Euro-Atlantic region. 

‘George Kennan and Paul Nitze were the founders of US containment policy and arguably the two Americans who had most experience in dealing with the Soviets/ Russians. They both opposed NATO enlargement.’

https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/averting-new-nato-russian-arms-race/

Edited Thursday at 05:47 PM by Matt Cloud

[Matthew Koch]

1 hour ago, Jonathan Cohen said:

That's correct. There is no significance about that as it pertains to the JFK assassination.

The Plot to kill JFK comes out of EXCOMM and is not "Rogue"