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Charles Drago

As usual, I found your last post to be vague, circular, and stating a most "general" point with out the slightest indication that you have studied the subject.

You stated that you did not in any way agree with my asessment of the Little Big Horn Battle.

I will challenge your knowledge and perceptions.

What do you not agree with? Just please answer the following.

1) Did Custer perform proper reconaissnce on the enemy village before the attack ? This would be the most basic and primary error. Attacking an enemy without knowing his strength or position is in military thinking undefendable.

2) Dividing the inferior number of the attacking force into three even smaller units cannot be rationally explained to any military strategist.

3) A commander conducting a military attack without his primary sub commanders even being aware of ANY battle plan, is absolutely unforgiveable and can only lead to chaos and mass confusion.....which it did.

4) He disobeyed his "general orders" by attacking a day ahead of the planned three pronged atack. He did not wait for the other elements as ordered. He imagined a plausible explanation of why he could have considered it necessary to disobey orders and atack with "his command only". He was a known "glory seeker" of the lowest caliber.

5) His attack, as pitiful as it was, reeks of the lack of reconaissance. It became obvious that he not only did not know the strength of his enemy, but worse yet he, absolutely inexcusably, did not even know the layout of the village or at what point he could ford the river.

6) He issued Major Reno orders to attack and that he (Reno) would be suppored by the rest of the force. Custer instead "abandoned" Reno, whose small detachmet was met by the full enemy force.

7) During this attack, he ridiculously had Captain Benteen's third Batallion, acting upon very muddled and unreaonable orders, to proceed away from the village and halt any attempted "Escape" of the hostiles.

8) He proceded with his attack knowng that his needed ammunition wagons were miles away.

Charles ! This is but a sampling of the myriad of miltary "very basic errors" which Custer set into play.

Please explain to me your understanding of military battle tactics which forces your statemet that you Disagree with my tactical asessment: as you most always "disagree with most that I post".

Pleae don't circle away from this post by stating that it is "Unworthy" of your reply...as you have done so frequently in the past.

Let us hear from you Charles Drago !

Charles Black

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Charles Drago

As usual, I found your last post to be vague, circular, and stating a most "general" point with out the slightest indication that you have studied the subject.

You stated that you did not in any way agree with my asessment of the Little Big Horn Battle.

I will challenge your knowledge and perceptions.

What do you not agree with? Just please answer the following.

1) Did Custer perform proper reconaissnce on the enemy village before the attack ? This would be the most basic and primary error. Attacking an enemy without knowing his strength or position is in military thinking undefendable.

2) Dividing the inferior number of the attacking force into three even smaller units cannot be rationally explained to any military strategist.

3) A commander conducting a military attack without his primary sub commanders even being aware of ANY battle plan, is absolutely unforgiveable and can only lead to chaos and mass confusion.....which it did.

4) He disobeyed his "general orders" by attacking a day ahead of the planned three pronged atack. He did not wait for the other elements as ordered. He imagined a plausible explanation of why he could have considered it necessary to disobey orders and atack with "his command only". He was a known "glory seeker" of the lowest caliber.

5) His attack, as pitiful as it was, reeks of the lack of reconaissance. It became obvious that he not only did not know the strength of his enemy, but worse yet he, absolutely inexcusably, did not even know the layout of the village or at what point he could ford the river.

6) He issued Major Reno orders to attack and that he (Reno) would be suppored by the rest of the force. Custer instead "abandoned" Reno, whose small detachmet was met by the full enemy force.

7) During this attack, he ridiculously had Captain Benteen's third Batallion, acting upon very muddled and unreaonable orders, to proceed away from the village and halt any attempted "Escape" of the hostiles.

8) He proceded with his attack knowng that his needed ammunition wagons were miles away.

Charles ! This is but a sampling of the myriad of miltary "very basic errors" which Custer set into play.

Please explain to me your understanding of military battle tactics which forces your statemet that you Disagree with my tactical asessment: as you most always "disagree with most that I post".

Pleae don't circle away from this post by stating that it is "Unworthy" of your reply...as you have done so frequently in the past.

Let us hear from you Charles Drago !

Charles Black

Post #180

Post #182

Two complete postings with absolutely noting to disagree on!

I would however add that Indian History states that on some instances, Custer's troops, when surrounded, threw up their hands and attempted to surrender.

They were unaware that this was not the Civil War, or some of the European battles in which a few had engaged in which one could be expected to surrender to the enemy and thus be spared.

How is that for knowing your enemy and being well trained.

Tom

P.S. Charles, I have a friend who found one of Custer's branding irons just outside Ft. Sill (where he camped prior to moving on to Ft. Supply).

He apparantly could not even keep up with his equpment, and a smaller cannon was also ultimately located not too long aftewards, once the site was known exactly.

Although it has yet to be absolutely proven,(1970's) the cannon appears to have been assigned to Custer, and he merely went off and left it as it slowed him down.

Or else they forgot (intentional or not) to bring it along also.

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Good lord, this is against my better judgment, what with Bud and Lou riding to the sound of the guns. But what the heck, I've got a spare five minutes.

My responses are in red.

Charles Drago

As usual, I found your last post to be vague, circular, and stating a most "general" point with out the slightest indication that you have studied the subject.

Your mastery of complexity and nuance never fails to impress. So to your genteel nature.

You stated that you did not in any way agree with my asessment of the Little Big Horn Battle.

I will challenge your knowledge and perceptions.

You won't even come close.

What do you not agree with? Just please answer the following.

1) Did Custer perform proper reconaissnce on the enemy village before the attack ? This would be the most basic and primary error. Attacking an enemy without knowing his strength or position is in military thinking undefendable.

The nature of the reconnaissance -- admittedly less than what the textbooks would call for -- was dictated by battlefield exigencies, as were subsequent decisions in the field. The best laid plans ...

2) Dividing the inferior number of the attacking force into three even smaller units cannot be rationally explained to any military strategist.

The division of forces at LBH was consistent with previous and successful assaults on large villages. It failed to produce the desired and emminently attainable results due to the cowardice and dereliction of duty of battalion commanders.

3) A commander conducting a military attack without his primary sub commanders even being aware of ANY battle plan, is absolutely unforgiveable and can only lead to chaos and mass confusion.....which it did.

Custer's battle plan was clear, and it was communicated in as much detail as possible to Reno and Benteen, the sub-commanders previously referenced.

4) He disobeyed his "general orders" by attacking a day ahead of the planned three pronged atack. He did not wait for the other elements as ordered. He imagined a plausible explanation of why he could have considered it necessary to disobey orders and atack with "his command only". He was a known "glory seeker" of the lowest caliber.

Custer's orders allowed for a wide lattitude of interpretations as events warranted. See my earlier post. As for what Custer may have "imagined" -- does John Edward know you're cutting into his act?

5) His attack, as pitiful as it was, reeks of the lack of reconaissance. It became obvious that he not only did not know the strength of his enemy, but worse yet he, absolutely inexcusably, did not even know the layout of the village or at what point he could ford the river.

Quite wrong. The layout of the village and its size/strength were plain to see, and Custer's Arikara scouts ably directed the command column to at least two accessible fording points.

6) He issued Major Reno orders to attack and that he (Reno) would be suppored by the rest of the force. Custer instead "abandoned" Reno, whose small detachmet was met by the full enemy force.

Quite wrong (big surprise). Custer did not abandon Reno. Reno panicked in the middle of his charge on the lower end of the village. Reno abandoned Custer.

7) During this attack, he ridiculously had Captain Benteen's third Batallion, acting upon very muddled and unreaonable orders, to proceed away from the village and halt any attempted "Escape" of the hostiles.

Benteen's column always was within striking distance. Benteen was ordered to come on; instead, he dallied at the morass. Benteen disobeyed a direct order to ride to the sound of his commander's guns, thus dooming Custer.

8) He proceded with his attack knowng that his needed ammunition wagons were miles away.

The pack train too was within striking distance in the event of a prolonged seige (it reached Reno's position without difficulty and in a timely fashion). Custer's command column enjoyed plentiful ammunition for the assault phase of the operation. Benteen refused to obey Custer's orders to bring up the "pacs", issued when, due to the perfidy of Reno and Benteen, Custer was forced to change plans in the face of such unforseen developments [sic].

Charles ! This is but a sampling of the myriad of miltary "very basic errors" which Custer set into play.

You have been corrected, sir.

Please explain to me your understanding of military battle tactics which forces your statemet that you Disagree with my tactical asessment: as you most always "disagree with most that I post".

In the overwhelming majority of instances, I find your posts to reflect the musings of an undisciplined, ill-informed, ego-driven intellect with which no amount of rational discourse can make much headway.

Pleae don't circle away from this post by stating that it is "Unworthy" of your reply...as you have done so frequently in the past.

I'm done.

Let us hear from you Charles Drago !

So you have.

Charles Drago

Edited by Charles Drago
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Mark,

I take your point.

But if you'll permit me just a bit of latitude, perhaps I can indicate where the connective tissue -- thin though it may be -- lies.

At the level of the "Kennedy-Lincoln coincidences" nonsense, we find the three Custer brothers -- George, Tom, and Boston -- getting theirs at LBH. Armstrong was glamorous, popular, celebrated in a major faction of the media of the period. He harbored presidential aspirations. There were rumors of rampant womanizing by the elder two, etc. etc. etc.

I can give you more, but you get the drift.

The significant relevance of a Custer discussion to this Forum? As is the case with the events of 11/22/63 at Dealey Plaza, the events of 6/25/1876 at LBH cannot be understood if they are viewed in a vacuum -- which is to say, outside the deep political context of the period. Imperialistic interests (political, economic), for whom even a dimunition of hostilities with a foreign power perceived to pose a threat to their respective bottom lines (the tribes of the Great Plains and elsewhere) was unacceptable, directly benefited from Custer's demise. And at least one had a family score to settle.

Did they help bring about the end of Yellow Hair? Such is my hypothesis.

But said hypothesis has ZERO impact on my analysis of what factually went down. For regardless of their hidden motivations (conscious and/or otherwise), Reno and Benteen acted -- and failed to act -- in manners that doomed the command column.

Further, this Custer discussion has prompted some extremely one-dimensional "analyses" (examples: going "by the book" trumps dealing with cold, hard realities in the field; the officially generated, press-supported versions of the "truth" are to be accepted without question or dissent; etc.) and in so doing has provided meaningful insight into the value of their originators' views on JFK-related issues.

This sort of thing.

Charles

Edited by Charles Drago
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Charles Drago

If you ever commanded troops, I don't suppose that many are left that could criticize you. Your hero Custer committed nearly every battlefield error on that June 26th possible. Every decision which I originally enumerated was a mistake. Whether he had success in the past disobeying orders, attacking without proper reconaissance, and splitting his forces is why, I had in a prior post stated, that it was only luck or providence that prevented him from having a command unnecessarily slaughtered a decade and a half earlier. It was referred to in the military at his time as "Custers Luck". This was meant to infer, that despite his continued and repeated mistakes, that he had somehow come out smelling like a rose.

He had received a court martial within his last year, was nearly dishonorably discharged for improper procedure. He had been suspended from duty for one year with no pay. It was with reluctance only and with the persuasion of Generals Sherman and Sheridan that U.S. Grant conceded, and allowed him to engage in the planned engagement. He was very nearly court martialed on another occasion for abandoning a Major and his troops on the battlefield, without searching for them. They were later found to all have been slain. The mistakes which he made on that 26 June were not "new to him".....he had made each of them on many prior occasions. He is an prime example of the "Peter Principle" in play. He had thru LUCK, not tactics, risen to a position above his abilities.....and he continued to show both that lack of ability and disconcern for his troops. His cavalry commands suffered the highest percentage of casualties of any cavalry unit in the War Between the States. He was willing to pay for glory with the price of men.

He tried it however, once too often.

It was never a question of "IF" this man would be the cause of a calamity; only a question of when.

There are many who defend the indefensible actions of this "HERO". His unglorious end was not the result of any actions, or lack of, by his primary subordinates, Major Reno and Captain Benteen. But his own disregard for the most basic of still accepted tactics, a failure to communicate his plan to anyone (if he had one other than shouting "Charge"), and one of the most blatant examples of not knowing or understanding your enemy.

Some may commend your praise for Custer. But his was however, one of the most chaotic examples of poor and undisciplined leadership that can be found in the history of any military commander. He put himself into such a position that he could not be supported without the slaughter of what remained of his command.

As a matter of fact, several years later, Major Reno requested a court martial of himself which was convened. He made this request so that he might defend himself against the Charles Drago's of that era, who were confirmed Custer enthusiasts. The court held that there was no wrong doing or the withholding of support for Custer, by Major Reno or any of the command.

None of the tactics which he employed can be defended as being militarily sound....neither then nor now. He even carried a number of the male element of his family with him. He may have, were it possible, considered himself lucky to not have survived his "last charge".....He would have no doubt been immediately and severely disciplined and discharged from service.

Enough has been said...at least by me ! Tho I have barely begun !

Charles Black

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Sir,

Your analyses of the events which in the agregate are commonly referred to as "Custer's Last Stand" might engender, oh, a tad more respect if you got the damn date right!

Good God, your ignorance even of the copiously documented uncontested events in question is impenetrable. As the saying goes, you are entitled to your own opinions, but not to your own facts.

Shame on me for going even this far with you.

One final -- and this time, I mean final -- comment: George Armstrong Custer is not my "hero." Nor am I a Custer "enthusiast" -- whatever that means. Again, saying so does not make it so.

Custer was in fact a witting and horrifically effective instrument for the extermination of the tribal peoples of North America, one who was discarded by his masters when they deemed him to be more useful dead than alive. As such, he engenders in me nothing but contempt.

And oh yeah, the date of the destruction of Custer's command battalion at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, or the fight at Greasy Grass, was June 25, 1876.

What color is the sky on your world?

Charles Drago

Edited by Charles Drago
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Charles D:"Custer was in fact a witting and horrifically effective instrument for the extermination of the tribal peoples of North America, one who was discarded by his masters when they deemed him to be more useful dead than alive. As such, he engenders in me nothing but contempt."

Aye,

"The only good Indian is a dead Indian” - General Philip Sheridan.

General Sherman is also a controversial figure depending on which side of the fence one looks at him.

He shared Custers 'luck' in battle, and he also is regarded as the first scorched earth total war tactician, that presaged the German 'Blitzkrieg' particularly as applied in OP Barbarossa (which in itself was also predated by USSR Lieutenant-General Georgi K. Zhukov, later a Marshal of the USSR in the east, against the Japanese, a decisive victory by the first use of what became known as modern 'Blitzkrieg'.)

These were Custers supporters: Ruthless, scorched earth tacticians that supported daring (or depending on the outcome, reckless) charges.

Charles B: "None of the tactics which he employed can be defended as being militarily sound....neither then nor now."

As applied to a small scale, poorly scouted theatre of war, yes. One might as well flip a loaded coin.

In principle, it is a tactic with devastating potential.

Edited by John Dolva
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John,

Thank you for your reasoned contribution to this discussion.

I would suggest that tactical choices made in the midst of a highly dynamic and, in the case of LBH, unique battlefield environment cannot be fairly evaluated based solely upon the degrees to which they conform to textbook formulae.

An aside: To venture into post-Aristotelian territory, the answer to the question "Did the Indians lose at LBH, or did Custer lose?" is "yes."

Charles Drago

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Charles Drago

In my part of the country only the poorly bred, when confronted with errors of their mouths doing their thinking rather than their brains, decide that their only recourse is "name calling". It is obvious that you have fallen to that low level.

You are right about one point only. The LBH Battle lasted from the mid afternoon of June 25, thru the night and on thru June 26th when the remainder of the 7th cavalry was relieved by the force with whom they were originally ordered to have joined on the 26th of June, prior to attacking. It was planned to be a multi pronged attack by a much superior force. This was the "Battle Plan", to which as many times previously, Custer had paid little attention. It was a plan to ensure victory. Because I stated that Custer expired on June 26 rather than June 25th, it should be obvious to any follower of this thread that my "written error", was not due to any confusion regarding the major factors of this battle. It was a hurried error of expression...and not a misunderstanding of fact.

However you Charles, being the affable gentleman that you are, when confronted with your total misunderstanding of military procedure, chose to state..."Good God, your ignorance even of the copiously documented uncontested events in question is inpenetrable ". That statement to me was a true childish response to the embarrasment that your lack of military understanding was very obviously unveiled. Anyone who has truly made a significant point in a debate, need not refer to the other party in such a manner. In even elementary psychology, this behavior is an angered admission that one has been soundly defeated and has recourse to nothing other than name calling. It must be quite demeaning to you, to realize that you continue to be "outdone" by one whom you so readily characterize as "Ignorant" ! Frustration does tend to seriously anger!

Another "Major Indication" of your lack of knowledge of the events which are referred to as "The Indian Wars" is your statement that...."Custer was in fact a witting and horrifically effective instrument for the extermination of the tribal peoples of North America". This Charles Drago, is quite another "untruth"....perhaps a little fib !

He had no success figthing the tribals except on those occasions when the great percentage of the enemy engaged were women, children and the very old.

In his reports, he inferred "these Hostiles" were warriors. The true fact is that Custer had very little success as an Indian Fighter, as any who have studied that period and place in American History, referred to as "The Indian Wars", will be eager to explain to you.

Charles Drago, you unfortunaely are what is referred to in my section of the country as an arrogant "Blow Hard".

Since military history is apparently not your field of expertise....would you mind telling me what is.... as I have no clue based on your self seeking and often ill informed ramblings on every subject that emerges.

One should not enter events in which they do not have the qualifications to compete or truly add to the event.

As usual you immediately prior post, except for the mention of one date "correction?", stated nothing of significance. It indicated, IMO, the angst of an embittered old man who is just beginning to realize his true worth!

Ramble on Drago !

Charles Black

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John,

Thank you for your reasoned contribution to this discussion.

I would suggest that tactical choices made in the midst of a highly dynamic and, in the case of LBH, unique battlefield environment cannot be fairly evaluated based solely upon the degrees to which they conform to textbook formulae.

An aside: To venture into post-Aristotelian territory, the answer to the question "Did the Indians lose at LBH, or did Custer lose?" is "yes."

Charles Drago

I am most happy to see that Charles Drago did in fact get one thing right. He is correct in his inference that Custer did not CONFORM to "Textbook Formulae".

That Mr.Drago was the whole point. And that exactly sir is why he was solely responsible for the unecessary extermination of his command, in an event that could only very loosely be characterized as a "battle" !

Charles Black

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Charles Drago

In my part of the country only the poorly bred, when confronted with errors of their mouths doing their thinking rather than their brains, decide that their only recourse is "name calling". It is obvious that you have fallen to that low level.

As usual you immediately prior post........ stated nothing of significance. It indicated, IMO, the angst of an embittered old man who is just beginning to realize his true worth!

Ramble on Drago !

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Guest Gary Loughran
As I might have opunned previously: Given the Lakota name for the Little Bighorn area -- the Greasy Grass -- I am currently searching for bowmen on the Greasy Knoll.

CD

Be careful, that greasy knoll is a slippery slope for researchers.

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