Douglas Caddy

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/a-watergate-icon-now-quietly-celebrated-in-a-company-office/2016/02/23/77d1b4b4-d9b9-11e5-891a-4ed04f4213e8_story.html?hpid=hp_local-news_watergate810pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory

http://blackopradio.com/schedule.html Joan will be talking about her new book dealing with Mac Wallace and LBJ. http://www.amazon.com/Faustian-Bargains-Johnson-Wallace-Culture/dp/1620408066/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1456423215&sr=1-3&keywords=Joan+Mellen

Posted on Facebook on Feb. 24, 2016 by Myra Bronstein: JFK's Prime Task Was Bringing The Military Under Control Excerpts from JFK vs. the Military, Robert Dallek, The Atlantic: "By persuading the Soviet leader to remove missiles from Fidel Castro’s Cuba and agree to a ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space, Kennedy avoided a nuclear war and kept radioactive fallout from the air and the oceans, thereby earning the country’s enduring regard for his effectiveness as a crisis manager and negotiator. But less recognized is how much both of these agreements rested on Kennedy’s ability to rein in and sidestep his own military chiefs. From the start of his presidency, Kennedy feared that the Pentagon brass would overreact to Soviet provocations and drive the country into a disastrous nuclear conflict. The Soviets might have been pleased—or understandably frightened—to know that Kennedy distrusted America’s military establishment almost as much as they did. Kennedy’s biggest worry about the military was not the personalities involved but rather the freedom of field commanders to launch nuclear weapons without explicit permission from the commander in chief. Ten days after becoming president, Kennedy learned from his national-security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, that “a subordinate commander faced with a substantial Russian military action could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative.” As Roswell L. Gilpatric, Kennedy’s deputy defense secretary, recalled, “We became increasingly horrified over how little positive control the president really had over the use of this great arsenal of nuclear weapons.”... They regarded Kennedy as reluctant to put the nation’s nuclear advantage to use and thus resisted ceding him exclusive control over decisions about a first strike. The NATO commander, General Lauris Norstad, and two Air Force generals, Curtis LeMay and Thomas Power, stubbornly opposed White House directives that reduced their authority to decide when to go nuclear. The 54-year-old LeMay, known as “Old Iron Pants...shared his subordinate’s faith in the untrammeled use of air power to defend the nation’s security. The burly, cigar-chomping caricature of a general believed the United States had no choice but to bomb its foes into submission. In World War II, LeMay had been the principal architect of the incendiary attacks by B‑29 heavy bombers that destroyed a large swath of Tokyo and killed about 100,000 Japanese—and, he was convinced, shortened the war. LeMay had no qualms about striking at enemy cities, where civilians would pay for their governments’ misjudgment in picking a fight with the United States. During the Cold War, LeMay was prepared to launch a preemptive nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. He dismissed civilian control of his decision making, complained of an American phobia about nuclear weapons, and wondered privately, “Would things be much worse if Khrushchev were secretary of defense?” Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy’s speechwriter and alter ego, called LeMay “my least favorite human being.” The strains between the generals and their commander in chief showed up in exasperating ways. When Bundy asked the Joint Chiefs’ staff director for a copy of the blueprint for nuclear war, the general at the other end of the line said, “We never release that.” Bundy explained, “I don’t think you understand. I’m calling for the president and he wants to see [it].” The chiefs’ reluctance was understandable: their Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan foresaw the use of 170 atomic and hydrogen bombs in Moscow alone; the destruction of every major Soviet, Chinese, and Eastern European city; and hundreds of millions of deaths. Sickened by a formal briefing on the plan, Kennedy turned to a senior administration official and said, “And we call ourselves the human race.” Cuba The tensions between Kennedy and the military chiefs were equally evident in his difficulties with Cuba. In 1961, having been warned by the CIA and the Pentagon about the Cuban dictator Fidel Castro’s determination to export communism to other Latin American countries, Kennedy accepted the need to act against Castro’s regime. But he doubted the wisdom of an overt U.S.-sponsored invasion by Cuban exiles, fearing it would undermine the Alliance for Progress, his administration’s effort to curry favor with Latin American republics by offering financial aid and economic cooperation. The overriding question for Kennedy at the start of his term wasn’t whether to strike against Castro but how. The trick was to topple his regime without provoking accusations that the new administration in Washington was defending U.S. interests at the expense of Latin autonomy. Kennedy insisted on an attack by Cuban exiles that wouldn’t be seen as aided by the United States, a restriction to which the military chiefs ostensibly agreed. They were convinced, however, that if an invasion faltered and the new administration faced an embarrassing defeat, Kennedy would have no choice but to take direct military action. The military and the CIA “couldn’t believe that a new president like me wouldn’t panic and try to save his own face,” Kennedy later told his aide Dave Powers. “Well, they had me figured all wrong.” Meeting with his national-security advisers three weeks before the assault on Cuba’s Bay of Pigs, according to State Department records, Kennedy insisted that leaders of the Cuban exiles be told that “U.S. strike forces would not be allowed to participate in or support the invasion in any way” and that they be asked “whether they wished on that basis to proceed.”When the Cubans said they did, Kennedy gave the final order for the attack. Afterward, Kennedy accused himself of naïveté for trusting the military’s judgment that the Cuban operation was well thought-out and capable of success. “Those sons of bitches with all the fruit salad just sat there nodding, saying it would work,” Kennedy said of the chiefs. He repeatedly told his wife, “Oh my God, the bunch of advisers that we inherited!” Kennedy concluded that he was too little schooled in the Pentagon’s covert ways and that he had been overly deferential to the CIA and the military chiefs. He later told Schlesinger he had made the mistake of thinking that “the military and intelligence people have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals.” His lesson: never rely on the experts. Or at least: be skeptical of the inside experts’ advice, and consult with outsiders who may hold a more detached view of the policy in question. The disaster at the Bay of Pigs intensified Kennedy’s doubts about listening to advisers from the CIA, the Pentagon, or the State Department who had misled him or allowed him to accept lousy advice. Vietnam During the early weeks of his presidency, another source of tension between Kennedy and the military chiefs was a small landlocked country in Southeast Asia. Laos looked like a proving ground for Kennedy’s willingness to stand up to the Communists, but he worried that getting drawn into a war in remote jungles was a losing proposition. At the end of April 1961, while he was still reeling from the Bay of Pigs, the Joint Chiefs recommended that he blunt a North Vietnamese–sponsored Communist offensive in Laos by launching air strikes and moving U.S. troops into the country via its two small airports. Kennedy asked the military chiefs what they would propose if the Communists bombed the airports after the U.S. had flown in a few thousand men. “You [drop] a bomb on Hanoi,” Robert Kennedy remembered them replying, “and you start using atomic weapons!” In these and other discussions, about fighting in North Vietnam and China or intervening elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Lemnitzer promised, “If we are given the right to use nuclear weapons, we can guarantee victory.” By Schlesinger’s account, President Kennedy dismissed this sort of thinking as absurd: “Since [Lemnitzer] couldn’t think of any further escalation, he would have to promise us victory.” The clash with Admiral Burke, tensions over nuclear-war planning, and the bumbling at the Bay of Pigs convinced Kennedy that a primary task of his presidency was to bring the military under strict control. Articles in Time and Newsweek that portrayed Kennedy as less aggressive than the Pentagon angered him. He told his press secretary, Pierre Salinger, “This xxxx has got to stop.” Still, Kennedy couldn’t ignore the pressure to end Communist control of Cuba. He wasn’t ready to tolerate Castro’s government and its avowed objective of exporting socialism to other Western Hemisphere countries. He was willing to entertain suggestions for ending Castro’s rule as long as the Cuban regime demonstrably provoked a U.S. military response or as long as Washington’s role could remain concealed. To meet Kennedy’s criteria, the Joint Chiefs endorsed a madcap plan called Operation Northwoods. It proposed carrying out terrorist acts against Cuban exiles in Miami and blaming them on Castro, including physically attacking the exiles and possibly destroying a boat loaded with Cubans escaping their homeland. The plan also contemplated terrorist strikes elsewhere in Florida, in hopes of boosting support domestically and around the world for a U.S. invasion. Kennedy said no. The events that became the Cuban missile crisis triggered Americans’ fears of a nuclear war, and McNamara shared Kennedy’s concerns about the military’s casual willingness to rely on nuclear weapons. “The Pentagon is full of papers talking about the preservation of a ‘viable society’ after nuclear conflict,” McNamara told Schlesinger. “That ‘viable society’ phrase drives me mad … A credible deterrent cannot be based on an incredible act.” The October 1962 missile crisis widened the divide between Kennedy and the military brass. The chiefs favored a full-scale, five-day air campaign against the Soviet missile sites and Castro’s air force, with an option to invade the island afterward if they thought necessary. The chiefs, responding to McNamara’s question about whether that might lead to nuclear war, doubted the likelihood of a Soviet nuclear response to any U.S. action. And conducting a surgical strike against the missile sites and nothing more, they advised, would leave Castro free to send his air force to Florida’s coastal cities—an unacceptable risk. “These brass hats have one great advantage,” Kennedy told his longtime aide Kenny O’Donnell. “If we … do what they want us to do, none of us will be alive later to tell them that they were wrong.” Cold War In the wake of the missile crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev both reached the sober conclusion that they needed to rein in the nuclear arms race. Kennedy’s announced quest for an arms-control agreement with Moscow rekindled tensions with his military chiefs—specifically, over a ban on testing nuclear bombs anywhere but underground. In June 1963, the chiefs advised the White House that every proposal they had reviewed for such a ban had shortcomings “of major military significance.” A limited test ban, they warned, would erode U.S. strategic superiority; later, they said so publicly in congressional testimony. The following month, as the veteran diplomat W. Averell Harriman prepared to leave for Moscow to negotiate a nuclear-test ban, the chiefs privately called such a step at odds with the national interest. Kennedy saw them as a treaty’s greatest domestic impediment. “If we don’t get the chiefs just right,” he told Mike Mansfield, the Senate majority leader, “we can … get blown.” To quiet their objections to Harriman’s mission, Kennedy promised them a chance to speak their minds in Senate hearings should a treaty emerge for ratification, even as he instructed them to consider more than military factors. Meanwhile, he made sure to exclude military officers from Harriman’s delegation, and decreed that the Department of Defense—except for Maxwell Taylor—receive none of the cables reporting developments in Moscow. “The first thing I’m going to tell my successor,” Kennedy told guests at the White House, “is to watch the generals, and to avoid feeling that just because they were military men, their opinions on military matters were worth a damn.” Persuading the military chiefs to refrain from attacking the test-ban treaty in public required intense pressure from the White House and the drafting of treaty language permitting the United States to resume testing if it were deemed essential to national safety. LeMay, however, testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, could not resist planting doubts: Kennedy and McNamara had promised to keep testing nuclear weaponry underground and to continue research and development in case circumstances changed, he said, but they had not discussed “whether what [the chiefs] consider an adequate safeguard program coincides with their idea on the subject.” The Senate decisively approved the treaty nonetheless. This gave Kennedy yet another triumph over a cadre of enemies more relentless than the ones he faced in Moscow. The president and his generals suffered a clash of worldviews, of generations—of ideologies, more or less—and every time they met in battle, JFK’s fresher way of fighting prevailed." http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/08/jfk-vs-the-military/309496/

Target practice in Dealey Plaza http://coverthistory.blogspot.com/2005/08/target-practice-in-dealey-plaza-from.html

Contrast what happened in the Scalia case with what happened in the Henry Marshall case. In 1961 the LBJ controlled Robertson Country sheriff officially determined Henry Marshall had committed suicide. The Harris County Medical Examiner, after the body was exhumed and autopsy performed, declared otherwise. In 1984 after Billie Sol Estes testified, the Robertson County grand jury changed the determination of death from suicide to homicide. http://spartacus-educational.com/JFKmarshallH.htm

Interesting articles: http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/18/opinions/justice-scalia-no-autopsy-melinek/index.html http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/health/antonin-scalia-autopsy.html

http://nypost.com/2016/02/20/the-weird-parallels-between-scalia-and-another-texas-death-conspiracy-jfk/

Larry Flynt still make the news: http://www.rawstory.com/2016/02/larry-flynt-on-antonin-scalias-death-it-couldnt-have-happened-to-a-nicer-person/

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/crack-down-media-journalists-being-targeted-sarah-k-westall

Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI Kathryn S. Olmsted, Author http://www.publishersweekly.com/978-0-8078-4562-2

Posted by Myra Bronstein on Facebook Feb. 18, 2016: Larry Flynt Can’t Walk ‘Cause the Gov’t Killed JFK Timeline: 60s & Early 70’s--John Lennon helps fund Paul Krassner newsletter The Realist which publishes articles researched and written by great researcher Mae Brussell. http://www.ep.tc/realist/ 1976-1978--The House Select Committee on Assassination is in progress. The CIA is determined to protect the family jewels. February 17, 1978--Larry Flynt places a full page ad in his Hustler magazine offering a $1,000,000 reward for information about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Enquirer publishes story about associated Flynt press conference announcing his quest for truth in the JFK assassination. It features a photo of Flynt standing next to Robert Groden. March 6, 1978--TWO WEEKS AFTER offering a $1,000,000 reward for information about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Larry Flynt and attorney Gene Reeves are shot in attempted murders. Flynt is paralyzed and confined to a wheelchair. Dec 8, 1980—Peace activist and truth funder John Lennon is murdered is before war-profiteers Bush/Reagan are inaugurated. Early 80’s--After researcher Mae Brussell contacted Larry Flynt and told him who was behind his assassination attempt, Flynt's Hustler magazine began sporting hard hitting and serious investigative journalism. 1983--Flynt offers Brussell her own investigative magazine, The Rebel. November 22, 1983--The Rebel magazine debuts on the anniversary of JFK’s assassination. In The Rebel Flynt exposes the Iran Contra players three years before such a phrase existed, as well as ties of the White House to the global cartels and the and plotters of the Kennedy assassination. http://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/Rebel_11-22-83.pdf The Reagan-Bush White House team size Flynt up as a threat and so trusty assets G Gordon Liddy and Gordon Novel were dispatched to infiltrate Larry's empire. Mae ultimately said they'd given Flynt debilitating painkillers. Mae repeatedly warned Flynt to "get these people out of your house." Flynt, a self-made man, thought he could handle them. After it was all over he admitted: "Mae, you were right, I never should have let these guys in." After Liddy and Novel depart, Larry Flynt is almost a vegetable, his wife dead from AIDS, Hustler purged of its investigative articles and writing team, and by 1984 The Rebel is eliminated.

http://whowhatwhy.org/2016/02/15/will-a-fictional-jfk-assassination-series-spur-truth-seeking/

Jim Marrs on JFK’s knowledge of the Alien Presence Published February 8, 2016

Jim Marrs on JFK’s knowledge of the Alien Presence Published February 8, 2016

No, I have no further knowledge on the CIA's strategy to subvert the FSLN.

Greg: I received a letter dated January 27, 2016, from Thomas P. McCann in response to one I had written to him. In relevant part it reads, "I could not tell from your letter if you read my American Company book but you might have. The fact that RFK came to Boston and negotiated for two ships for the Bay of Pigs invasion is in it revealed for the first time. About six months after publication I got a call from a reporter on the Washington Post who had just realized the company's involvement was "new news" and he made a story out of it much to the displeasure of a lot of people. Our VP in charge of steamship operations really disliked RFK. The fellow who later hand delivered the ship logs to Washington was a good friend of mine -- died a few years ago." Here are some reviews of Thomas P. McCann's book, American Company: "...a remarkable tale...compelling...a very personal relevant, occasionally poignant tale of the humanness of a seemingly inhuman corporate world." -- The New York Times "McCann is an excellent story teller and this corporate history is probably as reliable as any written." -- Business Week "...a sensitive, though sometimes critical, account of the company....even non-Bostonians may feel regrets for what happened to this grand old company." -- The Harvard Business Review The book was published by Crown Publishers in 1976. So the Washington Post story likely appeared in 1976 or 1977. Doug

http://whowhatwhy.org/2016/02/04/breaking-news-list-of-withheld-jfk-assassination-documents/

Ray Locker interviewed on The Jewish Channel https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zvDBJi25A8Q&feature=player_embedded

http://www.counterpunch.org/2005/11/29/woodwardgate-still-protecting-the-right-wing/

It would be time well spent to listen to the entire Dark Journalist interview with Dr. Joseph Farrell but if you are only interested in the Nazi connection to the JFK assassination, then start at minute 41 in the interview. The interview before minute 41 lays the foundation for what follows. http://gizadeathstar.com/2016/01/new-interview-here-from-dark-journalist/

http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/01/15/the-chart-that-explains-everything/

Bob Woodward’s Sins of Omission His new book raises fresh questions about the role of America’s most famous journalist in the scandal that made his name JAMES ROSEN / JAN. 15, 2016 Commentary Magazine From the article: In substantive and rhetorical terms, Nixon here sounded a lot like John F. Kennedy, another Navy veteran whose view of the Pentagon deteriorated markedly over his tenure in the Oval Office. “Those sons of bitches, with all the fruit salad, just sat there nodding, saying [the operation] would work,” JFK sneered on his own tapes after the Bay of Pigs. In late 1962, when the Department of Defense slow-walked Kennedy’s request for troops during the integration of the University of Mississippi, the president snapped: “They always give you their bullxxxx about their instant reaction and split-second timing, but it never works out. No wonder it’s so hard to win a war.” https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/bob-woodwards-sins-omission/

Bob Woodward’s Sins of Omission His new book raises fresh questions about the role of America’s most famous journalist in the scandal that made his name JAMES ROSEN / JAN. 15, 2016 Commentary Magazine From the article: In substantive and rhetorical terms, Nixon here sounded a lot like John F. Kennedy, another Navy veteran whose view of the Pentagon deteriorated markedly over his tenure in the Oval Office. “Those sons of bitches, with all the fruit salad, just sat there nodding, saying [the operation] would work,” JFK sneered on his own tapes after the Bay of Pigs. In late 1962, when the Department of Defense slow-walked Kennedy’s request for troops during the integration of the University of Mississippi, the president snapped: “They always give you their bullxxxx about their instant reaction and split-second timing, but it never works out. No wonder it’s so hard to win a war.” https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/bob-woodwards-sins-omission/

2001 documentary http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0267672/?ref_=ttpl_pl_tt

From the article: Is something very ugly brewing in the Persian Gulf that will dramatically push oil prices up later this year? Is a real shooting war between Shi’ite and Saudi Wahhabi oil states brewing? Until now it has been a proxy war in Syria primarily. Since the execution of the Shi’ite cleric and Iranian storming of the Saudi Embassy in Teheran, leading to a break in diplomatic ties by Saudi and other Sunni Gulf Arab states, the confrontation has become far more direct. Dr. Hossein Askari, former adviser to the Saudi Finance Ministry, stated, “If there is a war confronting Iran and Saudi Arabia, oil could overnight go to above $250, but decline back down to the $100 level. If they attack each other’s loading facilities, then we could see oil spike to over $500 and stay around there for some time depending on the extent of the damage.” Everything tells me that the world is in for another big oil shock. It seems it’s almost always about oil. As Henry Kissinger reportedly said back during another oil shock in the mid-1970’s when Europe and the US faced an OPEC oil embargo and long lines at the gas pumps, “If you control the oil, you control entire nations.” That obsession with control is rapidly destroying our civilization. It’s time to focus on peace and development, not on competing to be the biggest oil mogul on the planet. http://journal-neo.org/2016/01/24/whats-really-going-on-with-oil/