Douglas Caddy

http://www.coasttocoastam.com/show/2014/01/14 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerome_Corsi I sent an email recently to the producer of coasttocoastam radio show suggesting that the program interview John Simkin about Corsi's claim of Hitler escaping. Apparently my suggestion had no impact because only Corsi will be interviewed on the topic on tonight's show. Corsi's biography in Wikipedia reveals a man who routinely plays fast and loose with facts.

http://www.10news.com/news/investigations/mysterious-san-diego-man-claims-to-be-tramp-at-jfk-assassination-112213

Film: Ruth and Marina http://op.amspictures.com/our-shows/ruth-marina/

The Biggest Hit! Posted in History on Wednesday, November 27, 2013. Written by Scott M. Deitche Tampa Bay’s Cigar City magazine http://www.cigarcitymagazine.com/articles/history/item/jfk-mob-hit-theroy

The origin of Scientology

Jerome Corsi, author of the new book on Hitler, gained infamy for taking vast amounts of money from Texas oilmen to mount a Swift Boat slander campaign against Democratic Presidential candidate John Kerry in 2004. Corsi was instrumental getting Texan George W. Bush re-elected and the world now knows what happened as a result of that. Corsi does not like for anyone to bring up his past in this regard. I have sent an email to the producer of coasttocoastam radio show, which frequently gives Corsi time to do his commentaries, requesting that John Simkin be interviewed on the radio show about the nonsense in Corsi's new book on Hitler.

January 8, 2013, press release of the Institute for Public Accuracy: http://www.accuracy.org/news-releases/

In which JFK puts space scientists firmly in their place Posted on January 7, 2014 | By Eric Berger Houston Chronicle http://blog.chron.com/sciguy/2014/01/in-which-jfk-puts-space-scientists-firmly-in-their-place/?cmpid=hpts#19440101=0 Another link to the article: http://blog.chron.com/sciguy/2014/01/in-which-jfk-puts-space-scientists-firmly-in-their-place/#19440101=0

From the article: “It wasn’t just spying on Americans,” said Loch K. Johnson, a professor of public and international affairs at the University of Georgia who was an aide to Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho. “The intent of Cointelpro was to destroy lives and ruin reputations.” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/07/us/burglars-who-took-on-fbi-abandon-shadows.html ----------------------------------------------------------- Poster's note: I was a victim of Cointelpro in the 1970's even though I was a recognized leader of the Conservative Movement. As revealed by FBI Confidential Informant Robert Merritt, Washington D.C. Police Detective Carl Shoffler, who was actually a Military Intelligence agent, and the FBI ordered Merritt to disclose publicly that I was gay in an attempt to destroy my career as an attorney and ruin my life. Their clandestine Cointelpro campaign against me started about 10 days after the Watergate case broke but went public in1973. Merritt said that Shoffler (a closeted married man who had a gay sexual relationship with Merritt, his informant) took special delight in planning to "expose Caddy is gay" because I represented Hunt, Liddy, and the five burglars arrested in the Watergate break-in.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonanno_crime_family For what it is worth, which may be nothing, about the time of the 50th anniversary event in Dallas an older female member of the Bonanno crime family wrote this brief response to someone else's posting on my Facebook page that "Kennedy's assassination was planned at a meeting of George Bush and Lyndon Johnson in Galveston." I tried to copy the posting to save it but was unsuccessful because Facebook at times makes this difficult to do. What intrigued me was the blunt assertiveness of the statement by a Bonanno and the location being Galveston, which to anyone who does not live in Texas may sound strange but not to those who reside in the Lone Star State.

Shocking evidence Hitler escaped Germany World Net Daily January 5, 2013 http://www.wnd.com/2014/01/shocking-evidence-hitler-escaped-germany/

Judyth Baker posted this on my Facebook page today and although it is not precisely on topic here, it is still relevant: ------- What military information did Oswald have access to? According to Oswald's Marine crew commander at El Toro, Lt.. John Donovan: "He had access to the location of all bases in the west coast areas, all radio frequencies for all squadrons, all tactical call signs, and the relative strength of all squadrons, number and type of aircraft in a squadron, who was the commanding officer, the authentication code of entering and exiting the ADIZ, which stand for Air Defense Identification Zone. He knew the range of our radar. He knew the range of our radio. And he knew the range of surrounding units' radio and radar... There are some things which he knew on which he received instructions that there is no way of changing, such as the MPS 16 height-finder radar gear... He had also been schooled on a piece of machinery call a TPX-1, which is used to transfer radio--radar and radio signals over a great distance. Radar is very susceptible to homing missiles, and this piece of equipment is used to put your radar antenna several miles away, and relay the information back to your site which you hope is relatively safe. He had been schooled on this." [WC Vol. 8 p.298] YET LEE OSWALD GOT HIS PASSPORT BACK AT THE US EMBASSY, GOT A LOAN TO RETURN TO THE USA WITH A SOVIET WIFE AND BABY IN TOW, AND UPON HIS RETURN TO THE USA WAS NOT ARRESTED. FOR YEARS, THE US GOVT. DENIED THAT LEE HAD EVEN BEEN INTERVIEWED, THOUGH LEE TOLD ME HE HAD BEEN DEBRIEFED UPON BOTH HIS RETURN TO THE USA AND AGAIN UPON HIS RETURN FROM MEXICO CITY (AT THE YMCA IN DALLAS). NOT ONLY IS LEE NOT ARRESTED, HE ALSO GETS HIS UNEXPIRED PASSPORT RENEWED IN JUST 24 HOURS -- AND I WAS GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET THE MAN WHO 'EXPEDITED' THAT EVENT. We need Justice for Kennedy, an understanding of who took over our country illegally, and justice for Lee Oswald's family. SPREAD THE WORD AND JOIN ME IN THE FIGHT FOR TRUTH AND FREEDOM. Thank you.

Interview of Dan Moldea, author of the new book, "Confessions of a Guerilla Writer" Investigative journalist Moldea, among other intriguing topics, discusses the role of the mafia in the JFK assassination and his 14 hours of quizzing Sirhan, Shihan on the Robert Kennedy killing. Published December 30, 2013

Hearings on Disclosure of the JFK Assassination Records

Chauncey Marvin Holt Dallas Interview

January 3 – Anniversary of the death of Jack Ruby http://uk.news.yahoo.com/on-this-day--the-killer-of-jfk%E2%80%99s-assassin-dies-weeks-before-he-could-speak-out-in-second-trial-171758211.html?vp=1#T3BkhLT

I posted the YouTube video of the Nix film only because I thought its existence should be noted for the record in the forum. I still think there is a long suppressed film out there of the actual JFK assassination that would clarify some of those involved in the shooting. This was what I was led to believe about seven months ago. My hope is that it does see the light of day -- and soon.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bdv3rbsA1uY&feature=youtu.be Yet another entry.

Here are four recent interviews of Joseph McBride on Black Op Radio: http://blackopradio.com/archives2013.html Show #640, July 25, 2013 Show #641 August 1, 2013 Show #642, August 8, 2013 Show #643, August 15, 2013

Ken: I am going to respond to your question with an indirect answer that I may supplement at a later date. But at this time I would associate myself with the views of Joseph McBride, who in my opinion comes closest to what I believe happened before, during and after the JFK assassination. Mr. McBride's views can be found in his new book, "Into the Nightmare," which is the product of 31 years of intense research by him. Below are four recent interviews of Mr. McBride on Black Op Radio. If you or other members of the forum have not yet listened to these, I recommend doing so as it would be time well spent. http://blackopradio.com/archives2013.html Show #640, July 25, 2013 Show #641 August 1, 2013 Show #642, August 8, 2013 Show #643, August 15, 2013

From the article: Five decades have passed since the death of John F Kennedy but the mystery surrounding his demise continues to fascinate and perplex. Will we ever get a fuller picture? Or will the conspiracy theories continue to flourish for many more decades to come? Dr Fry isn’t holding her breath. “Fifty years is still a relatively short time, it’s within living history. I’d be surprised if anything is released within living memory.” http://www.hamhigh.co.uk/news/golders_green_historian_believes_the_cia_killed_us_president_jfk_1_3156103 Golders Green historian believes the CIA killed US president JFK Ham & High December 28, 2013

View C-Span videos of Wecht JFK Conference http://www.c-spanvideo.org/event/225884

What JFK Really Said The author checked the Cuban-missile-crisis transcript in The Kennedy Tapes against the recorded words. He discovered "errors that undermine its reliability for historians, teachers, and general readers" The Atlantic Sheldon M. SternMay 1 2000, 12:00 PM ET http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/05/what-jfk-really-said/306407/?single_page=true MY twenty-three years as the historian at the John F. Kennedy Library, in Boston, were punctuated by intensive work on sound recordings. I conducted scores of taped oral-history interviews and verified the accuracy of the transcripts, edited President John F. Kennedy's recorded telephone conversations, and, in 1981-1982, evaluated tapes made during the Cuban missile crisis, in October of 1962, as the library prepared for their declassification. The work was fascinating and exhilarating, but the poor technical quality of the tapes frequently required that I listen to the same words dozens of times, sometimes to no avail. It was, notwithstanding, a historian's ultimate fantasy—a chance to be a fly on the wall during one of the most dangerous moments in history, and to know, within the technical limits of the recordings, exactly what happened. I spent just over a year on the tapes, and in 1983 I received an award for "careful and perceptive editing and proofreading of the JFK tapes" from the archivist of the United States. From 1983 to 1997 the library declassified twenty-two hours of tapes, and I continued to review them before each declassification. Imagine my surprise when, in the summer of 1997, I learned that Harvard University Press was about to publish The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, edited by Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow—complete transcripts of all twenty-two hours. Months of lead time are required to prepare a book for the printer, so I was astonished that the editors could have completed this task less than a year after the majority of the tapes were released to the public. The editors explained that they had commissioned a team of professional court reporters to prepare a set of "draft transcripts" from the Kennedy Library tapes. Audio experts, using NONOISE, a "technically advanced noise-reduction system," had then produced an improved set of tapes, subsequently checked by the court reporters to be sure that nothing had been lost. However, May and Zelikow stressed their own responsibility for the final product. The two of us then worked with the tapes and the court reporters' drafts to produce the transcripts printed here. The laboriousness of this process would be hard to exaggerate. Each of us listened over and over to every sentence in the recordings. Even after a dozen replays at varying speeds, significant passages remained only partly comprehensible.... Notwithstanding the high professionalism of the court reporters, we had to amend and rewrite almost all their texts. For several especially difficult sessions, we prepared transcriptions ourselves from scratch. In a final stage, we asked some veterans of the Kennedy administration to review the tapes and our transcripts in order to clear up as many as possible of the remaining puzzles. The reader has here the best text we can produce, but it is certainly not perfect. We hope that some, perhaps many, will go to the original tapes. If they find an error or make out something we could not, we will enter the corrections in subsequent editions or printings of this volume. An unforgettable moment in these unique historical records concerns JFK's apprehension that military action in Cuba might touch off the ultimate nightmare of nuclear war, which he grimly describes at a meeting on October 18 as "the final failure." Brian McGrory, of The Boston Globe, who listened to this tape with me in 1994, after it was declassified, used those words in the lead of his article on the newly released tapes. But when I checked the transcript recently, I was unable to find "the final failure." Certain that the editors must be right, since they had technically cleaner tapes, I listened again; there is no question that Kennedy says "the final failure." The editors, however, have transcribed it as "the prime failure." I decided to check the entire transcript for October 18 against the tape, and what I discovered left me dismayed. The transcript abounds in errors that significantly undermine its reliability for historians, teachers, and general readers. Spot checks turned up similar errors in all the other transcripts. Despite the often poor sound quality of the Kennedy Library recordings, many of the relevant passages are clear enough to be heard conclusively. Since details are everything in this kind of microhistory, in which an inaccurate word or phrase can distort our perception of the historical record, we should examine some representative examples. IN the first days of the secret meetings between Kennedy and his advisers, before the American people knew that the Soviets had missiles in Cuba, the President grappled with decisions that could determine the fate of the world. Should the United States bomb the missile sites or invade Cuba? If it became necessary to take decisive action, would the other nations of the Americas condemn the United States as the aggressor? The United States belonged to the Rio Pact, a mutual-defense treaty signed by more than twenty countries in North and South America. A two-thirds vote by the pact's member nations would authorize U.S. action against Cuba, and would preserve a unified front against the Soviets. On the October 18 tape Secretary of State Dean Rusk clearly assures the President, "I would suppose there would be no real difficulty in getting a two-thirds vote in favor of necessary action. But if we made an effort and failed to get the two-thirds vote, which I doubt would be the result, then at least we would have tried as far as the American people are concerned, to have done ... to have done our ... to have done our best on that." Twice Rusk said that he expected to get the needed two-thirds vote. But here is how The Kennedy Tapes transcript reads (words in brackets were added by the book's editors for clarification): "But I suppose the only way we have of [using that is] getting [a] two-thirds vote to take necessary action. But if we made an effort and failed to get the two-thirds vote [unclear], then at least we will have tried as far as the American people are concerned. We'll have done that." Both of Rusk's assurances are missing. To understand Kennedy's decision-making process, readers must know what advice he was given. But this crucial evaluation of the diplomatic situation by Kennedy's highest foreign-policy official is lost in the gaps of the published transcript. (The United States did receive the two-thirds vote.) JFK's decision to begin with a blockade rather than with air raids is all the more striking given these assurances of hemispheric support for "necessary action." The discussion soon turned to several proposed plans for bombing Soviet nuclear missiles, nuclear-capable bombers, and anti-aircraft sites in Cuba. If the missiles alone were struck, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara warned, Soviet bombers could attack the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo or even the East Coast of the United States. A key factor in any decision was whether the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were operational, and if not, how soon they might be. General Maxwell Taylor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, strongly urges the President to destroy the SAMs. Even if they are not yet functional, Taylor insists, "the SAM sites would soon become operational" and compromise crucial surveillance flights. JFK observes that attacks on the nuclear missiles and bombers might be possible before the SAMs are armed. Taylor counters that "they may be operational at any time." The Kennedy Tapes has Taylor saying the "SAM site facilities have become operational"—the very point about which Taylor was so uncertain—and then meaninglessly telling the President that "they'll be operational at the same time." General Taylor's assessment, crucial to JFK's decision for military action, is thus reduced to a contradiction and a non sequitur. A short time later Kennedy speculates about whether Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev should be given twenty-four hours' notice before the United States bombs the missile sites. But no hotline between the Kremlin and the White House then existed, and Kennedy was unsure how to reach the Soviet leader. "How quick is our communication with Moscow?" he asks. The Kennedy Tapes substitutes "If we have a communication with Moscow ..." obscuring Kennedy's primary concern. One adviser suggests that the President simply use the telephone. Robert Kennedy then asks, "It wouldn't really have to go in code, would it?" The Kennedy Tapes misidentifies the speaker as JFK and turns the remark into the immaterial "It wouldn't really have to be a call, would it?" A few minutes later RFK frets about the dangers of the blockade, including the military risks in forcing "the examination of Russian ships." The Kennedy Tapes renders this as "the invasion of Russian ships," inaccurately suggesting the very sort of confrontation the blockade was meant to avoid. SOME of the most gripping moments on the tapes occur during JFK's tense meeting with the Joint Chiefs on October 19. General Earle Wheeler, the Army chief of staff, argues that only air strikes, an invasion, and a blockade "will give us increasing assurance that we really have got the offensive capability of the Cuban Soviets cornered." As transcribed in The Kennedy Tapes, however, Wheeler's recommendation—these actions "will give us increasing assurance that we really have gone after the offensive capability of the Cuban/Soviets corner"—would hardly have made sense to Kennedy. General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, also bluntly tells the President that a failure to invade Cuba would be almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich before World War II. LeMay then predicts that the blockade would appear weak to the American people and our allies. "You're in a pretty bad fix," he smugly warns the President. JFK, always skeptical about the military, reminds the general with a mocking laugh "You're in with me." The Kennedy Tapes merely tells the reader that JFK makes "an unclear, joking, reply." In fact Kennedy's biting response is perfectly audible. By Monday, October 22, the decision to begin with a blockade had been made, and the President was scheduled to give a speech to the nation that evening. As the afternoon meeting begins, JFK reiterates that the United States must respond to the situation in Cuba to preserve the balance of power and blunt the "inevitability" of Soviet advances. But, he cautions, the blockade may not work, and if it comes to bombing and invasion, "Khrushchev will not take this without a response," either in Cuba or against Berlin. The Kennedy Tapes renders this critical line as "Khrushchev will not complete this without a response," which makes no sense and deprives the reader of the tension in JFK's words. Moments later, acknowledging the dissatisfaction of the Joint Chiefs, JFK concedes that the blockade will complicate any subsequent military steps: "I want to say very clearly to the military that I recognize that we increase your problems in any military action we have to take in Cuba by the warning we're now giving." The Kennedy Tapes transcribes this line as "I want to say very clearly to the military that I recognize the appreciable problems in any military action ..." thus losing Kennedy's key point: a failed blockade would increase the danger and difficulty of any bombing or invasion that followed. Kennedy goes on to argue that the United States has commitments all over the world, not just in Cuba. He concludes that heavy air strikes without warning could be politically counterproductive: "I think the shock to the alliance might have been nearly fatal." The Kennedy Tapes mangles these words: "I think we get shocked, and the [damage to the] alliance might have been nearly fatal." Kennedy then raises the most chilling question: "What happens when the work on the bases goes on?" The editors miss this vital question entirely by transcribing it as "What happens when work [unclear]." THE next day, October 23, JFK and his advisers discuss how to implement the blockade and win support in the press and on Capitol Hill. John McCone, the director of the CIA, offers to call the former President Dwight D. Eisenhower for permission to use his name in talking with members of Congress and to get "his view of this thing, as a soldier." The Kennedy Tapes, inexplicably, has McCone saying "his view of this thing, as a facilitator." At a meeting that evening JFK zeroes in on the Soviet ships approaching the quarantine line. "Now, what do we do tomorrow morning when these eight vessels continue to sail on?" he asks. "We're all clear about how we handle it?" McCone interjects, "Shoot the rudders off them, don't you?" The Kennedy Tapes muddles JFK's question—"We're all clear about how we enter?"—and omits McCone's reply entirely. By October 26 the discussion had turned to how to handle press questions about ships stopped at the quarantine line. McNamara reports that just one cargo ship has been boarded. "In any case," he says, "it's been successful and I think to do any good the story must be put out immediately." The Kennedy Tapes distorts this important conclusion beyond recognition: "In any case, it was successful and I think the destroyers [unclear]." McNamara never mentions destroyers. The participants then discuss evidence that work on the missile sites is continuing. They debate whether to add petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) to the list of quarantined materials immediately, or to wait twenty-four hours to see if talks proposed by UN Secretary-General U Thant produce a breakthrough. McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser, suggests that they "leave the timing [on adding POL] until we've talked about the U Thant initiative." The inaccuracy in The Kennedy Tapes is especially bizarre in this case, with Bundy saying "leave the timing until we've talked about the attack thing." These last two examples—"the destroyers [unclear]" and "the attack thing"—could easily leave a reader wondering what in the world these men were talking about. (Three days later, on October 29, U Thant was mentioned again. JFK asserts, "We want U Thant to know that Adlai [uN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson] is our voice." But The Kennedy Tapes transcribes this line as "We want you [unclear] to know that Adlai is our voice.") October 27 saw the darkest moment in the crisis. An unconfirmed report was received at midday that a U-2 spy plane had been shot down over Cuba by a Soviet SAM missile, and the pilot killed. On the tape of the late-afternoon meeting Kennedy discusses whether to order an air strike on the SAM sites if the incident is repeated (a delay that produced consternation at the Pentagon). He declares that two options are on the table: begin conversations about Khrushchev's proposal to swap Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. missiles in Turkey, or reject discussions until the Cuban crisis is settled. Kennedy chooses the first, with the caveat that the Soviets must provide proof that they have ceased work on the missile sites. He repeatedly refers to "conversations" and "discussions" and concludes, "Obviously, they're not going to settle the Cuban question until they get some conversation on Cuba." Incredibly, The Kennedy Tapes substitutes "compensation" for "conversation." It's easy to imagine how Cold War veterans like Rusk, Bundy, and McCone would have reacted to any suggestion of compensation for the Soviets in Cuba. On October 29, the day after Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles, the President and his advisers, relieved but not euphoric, conclude that surveillance and the quarantine will continue until the missiles have actually been removed. After a lull in the meeting, during which the conversation turns to college football, the President observes, "I imagine the Air Force must be a little mad," referring to the division of responsibility for aerial photography between the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs' photo-reconnaissance office. The Kennedy Tapes transcribes this as "I imagine the airports must be looking bad," which must leave many readers scratching their heads: the removal of the missiles had nothing to do with Cuban airports. Kennedy then ponders why, in the end, the Soviets decided to back down. He notes, "We had decided Saturday night to begin this air strike on Tuesday." No effort was made to conceal the military buildup in southern Florida, and Kennedy wonders if the impending strikes pushed the Russians to withdraw their missiles. The Kennedy Tapes, however, has JFK saying "We got the [unclear] signs of life to begin this air strike on Tuesday," making his shrewd speculation unintelligible. ONE particular error, among scores not cited above, seems to epitomize the problems with these transcripts. On the October 18 tape Dean Rusk argues that before taking military action in Cuba, the United States should consult Khrushchev, in the unlikely event that he would agree to remove the missiles. "But at least it will take that point out of the way," The Kennedy Tapes has Rusk saying, "and it's on the record." But Rusk actually said that this consultation would remove that point "for the historical record." The historical record is indeed the issue here. Of course, the editors of The Kennedy Tapes and other historians would never assume that any transcript is absolutely accurate. The tape itself must always remain the primary historical document. Nonetheless, as the editors affirm, "reliable transcripts—ideally, annotated transcripts—are essential to make the tapes intelligible." These published transcripts, however, require substantial work. The revisions suggested above will inevitably contain some errors; the editing process can never be final or perfect. But if the editors disagree with these findings, we can listen to any of these disputed passages, in private or in public, using the Kennedy Library tapes or the NONOISE tapes. May and Zelikow, both distinguished scholars, have assured readers that if they listen to the tapes and discover errors or make out unclear remarks, corrections will be included in future editions or printings. And as we go to press, a fourth printing of the book has corrected three of the errors cited above ("the invasion of Russian ships"; "What happens when work [unclear]"; and "the [unclear] signs of life"). However, the editors have not acknowledged these corrections in the preface or identified them in the transcripts, and, of course, uncorrected copies continue to circulate. Readers deserve to know that even now The Kennedy Tapes cannot be relied on as an accurate historical document. Sheldon M. Stern was the historian at Boston's John F. Kennedy Library from 1977 to 1999

http://aangirfan.blogspot.com/2013/12/barry-seal-and-jfk-assassination.html?spref=fb

Poster's Note: I am posting this blog by John Delane Williams because it is relevant to this forum's topic although I am unable to vouch for its accuracy in all aspects. ---------------------------------------------------- Why is Morris Jaffe Interesting? By John Delane Williams November15, 2010 http://johndelanewilliams.blogspot.com/2010/11/why-is-morris-jaffe-interesting.html