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Larry Hancock

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Everything posted by Larry Hancock

  1. Indeed, I would have problems with the photo as I do with other elements of the book it appeared in, some very good information in it but in other places a real stretch. One thing that is clear about Sanjenis and the boat mission that he led to provide a diversion for the BOP fiasco is that it was a total failure - and that happened because of his personal timidity. There are lots of rumors about that mission, but one thing is sure and that's the fact that he refused to commit his force and that he was not going to be trusted within Agency operations after that. Reportedly he and certain of his exile supporters went on to create a drug connected, violent civilian version of OP40, ostensibly to raise money to fight Castro but in reality just to make money. And I surely do agree with Jim in regard to Ray and the hatred which many CIA officers had for him - by 1963 Hecksher actually ordered Artime's AM/WORLD group to fire on Ray's people if they encountered them on operations into Cuba. The virulent anti communist CIA types considered a socialist like Ray little different from a pure bred Moscow type commie. Along those lines I've felt for a long time that the visit to Odio was no fluke and he had to do with her connection to Ray.
  2. Wish I could help you Ron, it is known that following the Bay of Pigs fiasco some of the group's members became part of the new Cuban Intelligence Group formed at JM/WAVE, over time some of them and others of the original group went their own ways and some became involved directly in or on the periphery of drug smuggling - that continued on through the Contra era. Felix Guiterrez is a name that comes up with some of those activities, with drug shipments into the west coast, etc. However I don't have anything to concretely prove its the same person, folks have speculated on that and its certainly a possibility but I've seen nothing concrete to absolutely prove its the same individual.
  3. Paul, from memory - and Newman would be the proper source on this - that crypt was used for payments out of a variety of offices and over a number of years. I do recall an LA office use, a couple of uses in Europe and of course its use to pay off Roselli but that was out of HQ not a station or field office. I know of no non-CIA info on Mankel. Apparently John has more info on the crypt but he is immersed in his books right now and I've not been able to break through to him... And yes, there were a couple of layers of subterfuge as you say, you always have to deal with who is assigned a crypt and in some instances they may be reused over time, then you have the actual security files on the individual which have to have a true name somewhere as to the personnel files. And then you have the operational crypts, normally made up for specific projects. But when people like Harvey and Angleton get really sneaky they hide new projects within old ones and under other covers...like putting ZR/RIFLE under Staff D. Harvey's notes even comment that the people that really know how to hide things are Angleton and the Office of Security. Wish I could be of more help, I'll continue trying to find out more information from Newman.
  4. Other documents suggest that Roselli actually used the QJ/WIN crypt/account to pay Roselli...up to the point where Roselli was taken out of the Castro assassination project in 1963. The crypt appears to have been used for multiple people over time, just one more layer of cover, more in terms of accounting than payment than operational in the case of Roselli. And operationally it was hidden under ZR/RIFLE
  5. Both the FBI and the CIA had difficulties with the more complex Latin names...you find different spellings and name breaks all over the place. As I recall I used the actual CIA organization chart for my source but there are no doubt different versions - same guy though. In the SWHT index I find him listed as Jose Sanjenis, and also Joachim Panderao San Jenis. Among the Anglo CIA types he was called Sam Jenis. And we do know a good bit about him, probably more now than when I was writing but if you have SWHT 2010 you will find a good bit on him.
  6. One of the many things we do know about Skorzeny is that he was very active in raising money, funding and helping support the SS ratlines out of Germany (especially for SS officers) - and those ratlines went through Madrid and Rome...no doubt he could have been a valuable source for contacts and sources in Latin America. The question would be his ability to play all sides in the interest of his fellow countrymen. Putting him in Madrid was no doubt thought of as a good idea at the time.
  7. Paul, just as a side note I think you will find that post-war, the CIA was very much interested in and in contact with a number of Germans of his ilk (often designated as German patriots simply to clear them as sources - of course the Catholic Church in Italy did something similar in aiding German expatriation), including former military officers and especially SS in terms of what was going on with German expats in Latin America and particular with the networks that were being set up through Italy and Spain to get them down there. Skorzeny was a major player in raising some of the funds to the SS officers. If you would like some related reading just message me - but most of it is quite "dense" and covers not just him but the much broader picture of what was going on. There are references here and there as to how the CIA was clearing people as sources on certain Latin American governments and also a speculation on how they were in turn played as part of the process.
  8. I would agree with David that its likely a pseudo. About the only thing we know for sure is that KUCLUB was the CIA office of communications and it appears they were sending in a communications team under cover, most likely to do with the Congo given the Brussels connections. We also know that the US Ambassador to the Congo had effectively gone rogue in March, 1961 requesting support missions from various US agencies and sources with no approval from the President. He even directed the Navy to send a force into Congolese waters and JFK was irate when he learned about it after the fact. For anyone who has Shadow Warfare, check pages Chapter 13 Holding the line in the Congo for some context and what was happening in 1961. Sorry Paul, it does not help with your question but is useful in the background for some of the documents David is linking in....
  9. Paul, I'm sort of lost in this thread and the name is not familiar to me. The CIA station chief in the Congo was Larry Devlin. Point me in the direction of where James Rabney is mentioned in the thread and I might be able to at least make a guess.
  10. Thanks Bart, that's it. I don't have any recollection of his being interviewed further but comments about he, Truly and the officer going into the building and seeing Oswald in the area of a storeroom on the ground floor, only later noticing that he was gone from that location always struck me as pretty interesting.
  11. Ron, my apologies...I'm not talking about Truly but by another TSBD executive who was quoted in the newspaper the following day on Oswald and having seen him near a storage closet near the front entrance. I'm sure someone else will come up with the name and probably a link to the article...after that one article he just seems to fade away. This isjust not nearly as fresh in my memory as it once was...
  12. Disclaimer - my scenario/hypothesis was simply something that made sense to me. It would involve both women seeing Oswald outside the second floor lunchroom, not in it. and it would involve his having gotten a soda in the lunchroom to take downstairs to eat with his lunch. It would also be consistent with multiple people seeing him downstairs in the area of the lunchroom and the front entrance area (not discussing inside vs. outside) as the motorcade was arriving. My supposition would be that knowing Oswald was not upstairs on the sixth floor waiting calmly since noon to take his shot would have been pretty disturbing for those who had seen such things so what they said about it (or didn't) once they thought about it is something I can't second guess. As with all such things its just something that makes sense to me and after talking about it with Bart I thought I'd share it...can't make any claims to offer absolute proof for it.
  13. That's not what I was saying Jim, my thought is that they both saw him with a soda, that he had gotten it to take down to eat with his lunch on the first floor, some time in advance of the appearance of the motorcade. Then one of them, Arnold, saw him near the doorway at the time the motorcade was approaching. She stated that to the FBI so that was not obfuscation. The TSBD superintendent made a similar remark to the press about seeing him in that area. I don't know that the FBI intentionally obfuscated any of their stories, they actually put Arnold's remarks in their report. I don't recall of the superintendent was interviewed by the FBI or not; someone would have to check that.
  14. What seems very possible to me is that Arnold went of her office into the corridor to the water cooler and coming or going saw Oswald in the open area outside the lunchroom which services the corridors, the back stairway which Oswald might well use , the entrance to the lunchroom and of course to the office area. That would have been well before before the motorcade arrived. Later, downstairs she saw him again in the area of the TSBD doorway just as the motorcade arrived...as she told the FBI. That would be essentially the same statement the Supt of the TSBD made to the newspapers the next morning...before he exited the picture. This would make Stanton's remarks about seeing Oswald with a soda, taking it down to the break room where he was going to eat - and where he and the TSBD employees normally ate - very consistent - along with the remarks of the black employees who recalled him there but obviously became afraid to say so and his own description of seeing them there while he was eating. All of this would put Oswald on the first floor and certainly not up on the sixth with his rifle preparing for the arrival of the motorcade. As Bart notes, there will be objections to that, I can't prove it but there are a number of consistencies that suggest it and which also suggest why Arnold, and Stanton might not have wanted to push the issue as the implications of what they had seen became clear.
  15. This feels like a distraction but to answer Steve's question (check SWHT 2010 p. 366-368) Mertz was both actively involved in heroin networks through Canada into the US and at the same time working for SDECE against OAS plots and specifically against Souetre. It appears that his OAS counter intelligence work (which aborted a bomb attack in July, 1961) made him valuable enough for his drug dealing to be ignored (sounds very familiar somehow) inside French intelligence and he was given a pass for a period of time. One of the best books dealing all this is The Heroin Trail: https://www.amazon.com/Heroin-Trail-Newsday-Editors/dp/0451062817/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1528832743&sr=1-1&keywords=the+heroin+trail In contrast Souetre was actively approaching both the CIA and other US agencies in 1963, presenting himself as the "OAS Coordinator for External Affairs". In May of 1963 he offered the CIA a list of Communist penetrations within the French government and was granted special travel access so he could present those claims. There is a good bit more detail on this and sources in SWHT but that's the gist of a very complex relationship where a long time Frency intelligence asset works both CI against OAS and heroin networking while his opponent is engaging in bomb plots and trying to sway the U.S. to support the OAS opposition to Degaulle. The make it even worse, it appears that on occasion that on occasion, with both men being very familiar with each other, Mertz may actually used the name Souetre as an alias.
  16. Steve, I need to revisit SWHT myself so as not to give mis-informaiton from memory but as I recall, they were working at opposites with one actively involved into setting up distribution through Canada into New York and the other actually working on busting that business relationship. As I recall the two men were definite antagonists in several areas at that point in time. I'm off for a few hours now but will look it up an get back on it this afternoon.
  17. Since my remark was only on sources I don't think I was making an argument at all, straw-man or not, so I'll just leave it at that.
  18. I understand Steve but I've been running into so many excerpts from sources which have clear political agendas that I've become sort of obsessive about balance (heck, I even got into an online joust about Tilapia last night). Its sort of humorous that anyone could assert that the DIA, which was only legally created in October 1961, could have had its act together well enough plus have foreign assets in place to control NATO in assassination plots against DeGaulle in 62/63. Your more balanced take on the OAS is certainly one I support, it was more of an anti regime, pro-colonial social network than a unified operational body. There are some great sources on the OAS and its activities in Algeria as well as its abortive military activities. Anyone who has SWHT 2010 might want to check out what I did find on Soutre and Mertz and OAS contacts with the CIA in 1963 as well as what the context of heroin smuggling into Canada - which was part of the picture for both men.
  19. Paul, I would indeed agree that OAS was factionalized. It is a matter of record that one of the main elements of OAS outreach in 1963 was to the CIA and to Angleton in order to promote the view that the regime in Paris was so thoroughly infiltrated by Soviet and communist influence that it was totally untrustworthy. Certainly that was a view that Angleton was eager to accept. That faction of the OAS was interested in gaining legitimacy and traction with the American government, focused on increasing a distance from DeGaulle. My concern was with the much more sweeping long term views in the article Steve posted, not in the specifics you mentioned.
  20. I would respectfully suggest that anything quoted from Global Research be reviewed in terms of their rather obvious political agenda. You an see it on their web site and even in their Wiki overview. https://www.globalresearch.ca/ On the other hand I know some folks love this particular worldview so all I can do is extend a caution on using them as a source...
  21. David, it goes back well before the CIA when Pawley was picked for a very top level national intelligence review committee, that was under Eisenhower. That committee did a full review of the entire intelligence community and wrote up extensive organizational recommendations which were classified at the very highest levels. Pawley also served as the messenger from Eisenhower to Batista in a last ditch effort to get him to make changes before the Castro revolution. Which all makes it insane that he actually was allowed to go into Cuba on the TILT mission. Years ago I found that document relating the CIA sending technical support to fix a hidden tape recorder at his house, no doubt used in meetings with various exile leaders and factions. I guess it was their equipment so they were the obvious tech support...grin.
  22. Thanks DAvid, that would have been my speculation on Silver - strictly connected to the early days of Harvey's prospecting for candidates in Europe and having noting to do with the executive action that got hidden under ZR/RIFLE or with its application to the new phases of the Castro assassination effort. I very much doubt that Silver was told that at some point the Staff D project had morphed into executive action but then again he must have known about the Lumumba effort so I don't suppose it would have shocked him. That certainly did shock the station chief in the Congo who thought it was political action only until the poison showed up...
  23. In addition, reserve DPD officers were assigned to stations on Houston and DPD officers did traffic control at the Houston/Elm intersection. The motorcade pilot car was driven that route in advance but as Steve said, it was largely in respect to traffic control. DPD was treating the motorcade as a traffic/crowd control problem and its internal security efforts were primarily focused on the Trade Mart because that is were they anticipated potentially violent demonstrations and confrontations.
  24. From the CIA's web site: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-59-no-4/death-in-congo-murdering-patrice-lumumba.html
  25. Paul, not sure about your CYA list but there are a number of CIA documents and officers statements that very specifically talk about efforts to assassinate Lumumba. There are similar documents that very clearly specify that ZRRIFLE was being used as a cover for a Castro assassination effort. And of course since it was a cover, you will find a number of documents relating to Staff D and Harvey's recruiting which focus on burglars, safe crackers etc. With all the information we have and have had for some time now these CIA activities are historically clear (they are discussed in a number of history books outside the JFK literature) - certainly they were known as far back as the Church committee. David's recently posted documents illustrate that. Having said that, I'm not sure that the Church committee actually got everything exactly right or even that the information given them was always chronologically accurate...for example I can't figure out how Arnold Silver fits into ZRRIFLE since it was not set up as a project or crypt until well after the Lumumba activities were done and there is certainly no sign of Arnold in the Castro assassination projects.
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