Michael Clark

Thread Post 19

Lucien Conein Travel orders for one year to 13-2, summer of 54. (Orders are tentative)

P. 4, travels to 15-20; Frankfurt twice in May and April.

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10113-10030.pdf

13 - 2 is Saigon, as per Thread Post 20.

Requested reassignment from 15 - -29 to Washington in October of 59.

P. 7. Travels via Greece to Frankfurt, as per above., could he have gone to Greece instead of Saigon as an assignment, then requested return to D.C.? Could Athens be 15  - 29?

-------------------------

In May of 54, requests transfer from Washingngto desk Job, Albania Section, to Saigon 13 - -2.

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10113-10025.pdf

-------------------------

In April, 53, request transfer from D.C. Field job, to 15 -- 29

P. 4 travels from Frankfurt to D.C. For March and April then back to Frankfurt.

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10113-10038.pdf

--------------------------

In 1951, Frankfurt is his official station

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10113-10044.pdf

——————————

21-29

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=63830&relPageId=2

Thread Post 18

13 - 7    Redacted  ( Laos, see post 20)  Arthur C. Sheridan to become Chief of Far East Security Operations

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10123-10219.pdf

Thread Post 17

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10100-10096.pdf

Cable relay with 22 locations. 4 are redacted witth codes..

14--6

14-1

14-3

12-22

WAVE

BEIR

TAMI

MEXI

BERN

RIOD

BARC

BONN

MELB

LISB

MILA

GORG

BUEN

OTTA

VIEN

MONT

GNVA

SAGO

-----------------------------------

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10063-10211.pdf

14-3

15-4    Paris

MHALPHA

26 minutes ago, Michael Clark said:

I don't see any resemblance between Crafard and LHO. Crafard was missing some front teeth. Crafard only knew Ruby for a matter of weeks, I wish I could be more specific, but it was not very long. Point being, I don't see a Crafard as being someone with whom Ruby would be socializing or paling-around. I also don't see the DPD hanging around with Ruby, but our H&L counterpart does fit that scenario.

I do recommend reading Crafard's testimony; and read in tandem with George Senator's testimony you get a good picture of Ruby, especially on the weekend of the 22nd. Officer Olson and Kay Olson's testimony should be read in proximity to them as well, these latter two are fairly brief compared with the former two.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did Jack also eat at the Eatwell?

Mr. CRAFARD. He didn't eat there when I was there with him, after I went to work for him.

-------------------

I am looking for the date that Crafard met Ruby. It was during the Dallas Fair. It was only days later that Crafard went to live and work at The Carousel.

17 hours ago, John Butler said:

 

Michael’s notion is seemingly plausible. 

This question that Michael Walton likes to repeat over and over and over, is largely ignored, for good reason. It assumes too much. Let's say Oswald took a holiday on 11-22. Do you think that the operation would have been  called-off? No-way. Likewise, the planners did not chain LHO down on the sixth floor, he was free to roam, and be off-base if it suited him. The cover-uppers worked with the pieces left over, and they were able to fit LHO in the scenario that became the Warren Report.

17 hours ago, Paul Brancato said:

I think the Oswald at those breakfasts might have been Crafard. 

I don't see any resemblance between Crafard and LHO. Crafard was missing some front teeth. Crafard only knew Ruby for a matter of weeks, I wish I could be more specific, but it was not very long. Point being, I don't see a Crafard as being someone with whom Ruby would be socializing or paling-around. I also don't see the DPD hanging around with Ruby, but our H&L counterpart does fit that scenario.

I do recommend reading Crafard's testimony; and read in tandem with George Senator's testimony you get a good picture of Ruby, especially on the weekend of the 22nd. Officer Olson and Kay Olson's testimony should be read in proximity to them as well, these latter two are fairly brief compared with the former two.

2 minutes ago, Ron Bulman said:

That's a loaded question Paul.  He was dirty, dense, useful, and expendable for starters.  Sold pills at a local drug store booth.  Good chance he was involved in "overlooking" prostitution involving Ruby as well as gun running.

There is a lot of speculation and no loss for unflattering characterizations about him, but what do we really know? What is the truth? When I hear Mrs. Tippet speak, I don't see a woman who would marry the lowly man that we often think of when we read the common stories about him. I would like to see a fresh and fair evaluation of him. I think he may have been more intelligent and capable that we are told. I think it would make a good thread.

1 minute ago, Michael Clark said:

I started transcribing Walcotts testimony, it is largely copy-pastable...

http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/hsca/secclass/pdf/Wilcott_3-22-78.pdf

 

 

The subcommittee met at IO:20 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2344 of the Raybum Office Building, the Honorable Richard Preyer (Chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Representatives Preyer (presiding), Dodd and Sawyer.

Also Present: Michael Goldsmith, Counsel, and Gary Cornwell, Counsel.

Also Present: Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk, and Charles Berk, Betsy Wolf and James Wolf.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you for being here today, and I will call the subcommittee to order at this time.

I will ask if you will stand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Wilcott. I do. 

Mr. Preyer. I would like before we begin to read a
written statement concerning the subject of the investigation.

We are operating under House Resolution 222, which man- dates the Committee to conduct a full and complete investi- gation and study of the circumstances surrounding the assas- sination and death of President John F. Kennedy, including determining whether the existing laws of the United States concerning the protection of the President and the investiga- tory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments

are adequate in their provisions and enforcement; and whether there was full disclosure of evidence and information among agencies and department of the United States Government and whether any evidence or information not in the possession of an agency of department would have been of assistance in investigating the assassination and why such information was not provided or collected by that agency or department, and

to make recommendations to the House if the Select Committee deems it appropriate for the amendment of existing legislation
or the enactment of new legislation. 

 

That is what we are attempting to accomplish, which is quite a big order.

We appreciate your being here today, Mr. Wilcott.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken while the members of the Committee went to the floor of the House for a vote.)

3 

 

Mr. Preyer. We will come to order.

We will resume the session, and I will recognize Counsel to begin his questioning.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES B. WtLCOlT, A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, would you please state your name and address and occupation?

Mr. Wilcott. My name is James B. Wilcott. My address
is 2761 Atlantic Street, in Concord, and my occupation is electronic technician.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where is Concord located?

Mr. Wilcott. It is a little bit east of Oakland, California.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you received a copy of the Committee’s rules?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes. 

 

Mr. Goldsmith. And a copy of the relevant House Resolutions?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And, Mr. Wilcott, is it true that you
are a former employee with the CIA and that you are here today testifying voluntarily without a subpoena?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes. 

Mr. Goldsmith. During what years did you work for the CIA? 

 

Mr. Wilcott. Iworked from the years, May, of 1957 to, April, of 1966.

Mr. Goldsmith. And in what general capacity did you work with the CIA?

Mr. Wolcott. All in the finance -- in accounting all of the time.

Mr. Goldsmith. How did you become employed with the CIA?

Mr. Wrlcott. I was recruited from the school in Syracuse
New York, where I was taking a course in accounting and busi- ness administration.

Mr. Goldsmith. Very generally now, what were your responsibilities as a finance employee with the agency? 

 

Mr. Wilcott. Well, from May of 1957 to January of 1960 -

Mr. Goldsmith - excuse me, just answer the question
very generally, without referring to anything right now, and please describe generally what your responsibilities were as a finance officer.

Mr. Wilcott. My. responsibilities were primarily record keeping and disbursing of funds.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, are you here with Counsel today?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I am.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would your Counsel identify himself for the recorder?

Mr. Shapp.  My name is William Schapp. And I am an Attorney here in Washington.

I will give my card to the Committee.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, did I ask you to prepare
a list indicating the dates that you were employed with the CIA and where you were stationed?

Mr. Wrlcott. Yes, you did.
Mr. Goldsmith. Did you prepare such a list? Mr. Alcott. Yes, I did.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have that list with you? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Referring to that list, would you tell
the Committee where you were stationed during your period with the CIA? 

Mr. Wrlcott. Certainly, from May of 1957 to January of
1960, I was in the pre-fab building on the Potomac in finance. During the period, it was unvouchered funds, and my duties

were general accounting, and my rate in status was GS-5.

From about January of 1960 to about June of 1960, I
was transferred to Finance Field Payroll, also, in this same building, on the Potomac. This was making payments and keeping pay records.

From June of 1960 to June of 1964, I was stationed at
XXXXXXX Station, and my primary duty was finance and cash disbursements. This was all cash payments and record keeping for the station. And during that period, I had been promoted GS-7 and also gained a career status.

From June of 1964 to about December of 1964, I was at Roseland. This was just prior to moving to Langley, in

finance, and my duties there were policing accounts, and included auditing of special accounts.

From January of 1965 to about March of 1965, I was at Langley in the same area, in finance, policing accounts and 

auditing of special accounts, and I was promoted up to GS 9.

 

From April of 1965 to April of 1966, I was at Miami Station in finance, and I was handling the staff payroll. This was preparing and reconciling payrolls.

In April of 1966, I resigned from the CIA.

Mr. Goldsmith. I take it, from your testimony, that
in November of 1963, you were stationed in XXXXXXXXXXXXX Station, is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Drawing your attention to the period immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy,
at that time, did you come across any information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald’s relationship with the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I did.

Mr. Goldsnith. And will you tell the Committee what that relationship was? 

 

Mr. Wrlcott. Well, it was my understanding that Lee
Harvey Oswald was an employee of the agency and was an agent of the agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean by the term “agent”?

Mr. Wilcott. That he was a regular employee, receiving a full-time salary for agent work for doing CIA operational work.

Mr. Goldsmith. How did this information concerning Oswald first come to your attention?

Mr. Wolcott. The first time I heard about Oswald being connected in any way with CIA was the day after the Kennedy assassination. 

Mr. Goldsmith.  And how did that come to your attention?

 

Mr. Wrlcott. Well, I was on day duty for the station.
It was a guard-type function at the station, which I worked

for overtime. There was a lot of excitement going on at the station after the Kennedy assassination.

Towards the end of my tour of duty, I heard certain
things about Oswald somehow being connected with the agency, and I didn’t really believe this when I heard it, and I
thought it was absurd. Then, as time Went on, I began to
hear more things in that line.

Mr. Goldsmith. I think we had better go over that one more time.

When, exactly, was the very first time that you heard
or came across information that Oswald was an agent?

Mr. Wilcott. I heard references to it the day after the assassination.

 

. Goldsmith. And who made these references to Oswald being an agent of the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. I can’t remember the exact persons. There
was talk about it going on at the station, and several months following at the station.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many people made this reference to Oswald being an agent of the CIA? 

Mr. Wilcott. At least - there was at least six or
seven people, specifically, who said that they either knew or believed Oswald to be an agent of the CIA.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Jerry Fox one of the people that made. this allegation?

Mr. Wrlcott. To the best of my recollection, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And who is Jerry Fox? 

Mr. Wilcott. Jerry Fox was a Case Officer for his branch
the Soviet Russia Branch, XXXXXXXXXX Station,  who purchased information from the Soviets.

 

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, you did.
Mr. Goldsmith. Did you prepare such a list?
Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I did.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is that list complete and does it have 

every CIA Case Officer who worked XXXXXXXXXX in 1963?

Mr. Wilcott. Oh, no. It doesn’t have every one. It has every one that I can remember. 

 

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you bring that list with you today?

Mr. Wrlcott. Yes, I did. 

 

Mr. Goldsmith. Were any of these people on your list
possible subjects who made references to Oswald being a CIA agent? 

 

Mr. Wrlcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read the list to the Committee?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Only of Case Officers.

Ms. Beming. I think we ought to state that the record
shows that Mr. Sawyer is a member of the Kennedy Subcommittee

Preyer. We will.

Mr. Goldsmith. Upon your memory and the list that your
brought with you today, will you tell the Committee the names
of the CIA Case Officers who you remember working XXXXXXXXXX in 1963? 

 

Mr. Wilcott. Yes. There was XXXXXXXXXXXX Branch, who had XXXXXXXXXXX cover. 

 

Jerry Fox, SR Branch, Soviet Russia Branch --

 

Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me, please proceed very slowly.

Mr. Wrlcott. Jerry Fox, SR Branch, Reid Dennis, Chief
of Soviet Satellite Branch; and XXXXXXXXXX, China Branch, 

and he also had a cover.

John P. Horton, XXXXXXXXX Section; XXXXXXXXXXXXX
Branch; and Chester Ito, XXXXXXXXX Branch; and Kan Takai, XXXXX Branch; and Jim Delaney, China Branch; and Bob Rentner, SR Branch -- and there is some question about that, the branch
he was with.

Larry Watanabi, XXXXXX Branch, Senior Case Officer; and XXXXXXXXXXX, deep commercial cover agent.
There was a person, Dave, who was a Deputy Chief.

Dave - I can’t remember his last name, Deputy Chief of the
China Branch; and then a person whose last name was XXXXXXXXX in the XXXXXXXXX Branch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember which of these individuals if any, made the specific allegation or reference that Oswald was an agent? 

 

Mr. Wtlcott. It has been 15 years, and I can’t remember specifically who said what, but certainly I am sure that Jerry Fox, for instance, had at least made some mention of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that this allegation first came to your attention, did you discuss it with anyone?

Mr. Wilcott. Oh, yes. I discussed it with my friends and the people that I was associating with socially.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who were your friends that you discussed this with? 

 

Mr. Alcott. XXXXXXXXXXXX George Breen, Ed Luck, and xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was George Breen?

Mr. Wrlcott. George Breen was a person in Registry,
who was my closest friend while I was in XXXXXXXXXXXXXX.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was he a CIA employee? Mr. Wilcott. Yes, he was.

Mr. Goldsmith. And would he corroborate your obser- vation that Oswald was an agent?

Mr. Wilcott. I don’t know.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that this allegation first
came to your attention, did you learn the name of Oswald’s Case Officer at the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. No. 

 

Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any other times during your
stay with the CIA at XXXXXXXXXX Station that you came across information that Oswald had been a CIA agent?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. When was that?

Mr. Wrlcott. The specific incident was soon after the
Kennedy assassination, where an agent, a Case Officer -- I am sure it was a Case Officer - came up to my window to draw money, and he specifically said in the conversation that
ensued, he specifically said, “Well, Jim, the money that I
drew the last couple of weeks ago or so was money,” either

for the Oswald project or for Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember the name of this Case Officer? 

Mr. Wilcott. No, I don’t. 

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember when specifically this conversation took place?

 

Mr. Wrlcott. Not specifically, only generally.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many months after the assassination was this?

Mr. Wilcott. I think it must have been two or three omths (sic) after the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember where this conver- sation took place?

Mr. Wilcott. It was right at my window, my disbursing cage window.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you discuss this information with anyone?

Mr. Wilcott. Oh, yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. With whom? 

 

Mr. Wtlcott. Certainly with George Breen, XXXXXXXXXXX the circle of social friends that we had.

Mr. Goldsmith. How do you spell XXXXXXXXXX last name? Mr. Wilcott. XXXXXXXXXXXXX (spelling).

Mr. Schaap. For the record, I have made a list of all
of these spellings of the names which have been mentioned, which I will give to the stenographer so that he will have them correctly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did this Case Officer tell you what Oswald’s cryptonym was?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, he mentioned the cryptonym specifically under which the money was drawn.

Mr. Goldsmith. And what did he tell you the cryptonym was?

 

Mr. Wrlcott. I cannot remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was your response to this revelation
as to what Oswald’s cryptonym was? Did you write it down or do anything?

Mr. Wilcott. No; I think that I looked through my
advance book -- and I had a book where the advances on projects were run, and I leafed through them, and I must have at least leafed through them to see if what he said was true.

Mr. Goldsmith. And are you saying then that you attempted to investigate this allegation?

Mr. Wilcott. No, I am not saying that. It was more of a casual kind of thing, to my way of thinking.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you check your cash disbursement files?

Mr. Wrlcott. Not the files, no. 

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure I am following, then, what specifically you did check.

Mr. Wtlcott. It was a book that I had. At the end of the day we would list all of the advances that were made in an advance book. It was just a three-ring binder, and we would list down the advances by cryptonym and the amounts and then reconcile that with the daily disbursements.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long were these records maintained?

Mr. Wilcott. They were maintained on a thirty-day
basis, and then they were closed off at the end of the month.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, does that mean you were able to check back only thirty days from the time that you were given this information? 

Mr. Wilcott. Yes 

 

Mr. Goldsmith. I realize this is testimony 15 years
after the fact. However, if you received this information
two or three months after the assassination, at a time that Oswald was already dead and had been dead for two or three months, what purpose would have been served by checking records that were only 30 days old?

Do you follow the question? Mr. Wilcott. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, in other words, if you got the
information three months after the assassination, Oswald had already been dead for three months, is that right?

Mr. Wrlcott. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. Answer “yes” or “no” for the recorder. Mr. Wtlcott. Yes. 

 

Mr. Goldsmith. You testified that your records were only kept for thirty days, is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Then, by checking your records, which
only went back thirty days, isn’t it true that you wouldn’t
have gotten any information concerning Oswald anyway because Oswald had already been dead for one or two months?

Mr. Wtlcott. That is true.
Mr. Goldsmith. So, then, really, no purpose would have Mr. Wilcott. That is right.
Mr. Goldsmith. And did you check any other records? Mr. Wilcott. No.

 

Mr. Preyer. I understand this might be a good place 

for us to break and go and vote, so that we will take another recess for about ten minutes. I am sorry. 

 

Whereupon, a recess was taken while the members of the Committee went to the floor of the House for a v 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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16 hours ago, Jason Ward said:

Hi Paul,

I think some of those who have the CIA running the assassination likewise incorporate some rogue Radical Right players as an admitted possibility.   The problem in all theories is in connecting an identifiable leader with the ground crew in Dallas.

 

Jason

Absolutely,

And  not conversely but inherently in Paul Trejo’s argument, the main players were ALL CIA, but they were on a lunch-break at 12:30 on 11-22-63; i.e, they were rogue CIA conspirators. For Paul Trejo, defining those who were rogue CIA is simply a matter of identifying those CIA agents who were involved. Paul Trejo is a CIA apologist. 

Figuritively, I am a hare’s breath (or is it a Hair’s breadth) from you guys on our CT’s. You have a Dallas Cop or Minuteman firing from the knoll and being (figuratively) tossed in a trunk and spirited away; while I have an Anti-Castro Cuban firing from the knoll and (figuratively) disposed-of in the same manner.

I know you don’t like being pegged as a CTer, Jason, but, you are. You simply raise numerous CT’s as plausible and stand behind none; while Paul Trejo stands behind one, pretending he can make of it whatever he would like it to be, at any turn.

In any event, Jason, thanks for the digging; it IS work. 

My apologies if this link has already found a place in this thread.

http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?absPageId=223425

From this thread

Steve's URL did not work for me...

https://www.rawstory.com/2018/05/cuba-regrets-cia-bay-pigs-veteran-died-without-trial/

The above is from this article...

https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2017/dec/07/jack-anderson-watergate/

The above document mentions Operation Mongoose. Wikipedia states that it was not given that name until November of 1961, which means, if correct, that our document would have to have penned afterwards. The plan itself was being was being formed under Eisenhower. 

From Wikipedia...

"The Cuban Project, also known as Operation Mongoose, was a covert operation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that was commissioned in March 1960 during the final year of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration. On November 30, 1961, covert operations against Fidel Castro's government in Cuba were officially authorized by President Kennedy and after being given the name Operation Mongoose at a prior White House meeting on November 4, 1961. The operation was led by United States Air Force General Edward Lansdale and went into effect after the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion."

Now, that's a classic Wikipedia entry, it leaves you scratching your head. But, it highlights reasons to get Wikipedia updated properly. Also, I find confusing and possibly incorrect information, such as this, a big motivator to dig-in.

Some Wiki-notes On the NSC under JFK.

President John F. Kennedy, who was strongly influenced by the report of the Jackson Subcommittee and its severe critique of the Eisenhower NSC system, moved quickly at the beginning of his administration to deconstruct the NSC process and simplify the foreign policy-making process and make it more intimate. In a very short period after taking office, the new President moved to reduce the NSC staff from 74 to 49, limit the substantive officers to 12, and hold NSC meetings much less frequently while sharply curtailing the number of officers attending. The Operation Coordination Board was abolished, and the NSC was, at the President's insistence, pulled back from monitoring the implementation of policies. The coordination of foreign policy decisions was ostensibly left to the State Department (and other agencies as necessary).

McGeorge Bundy's appointment as the President's National Security Advisor inaugurated this position as it has essentially continued down to the present. The definition of Bundy's responsibilities and authority unfolded and grew during the Kennedy presidency. Bundy's considerable intellectual and bureaucratic abilities as well as close personal relationship with the new President contributed much to evolution of the National Security Advisor position and the new role of the NSC. In a letter to Senator Jackson in September 1961 Bundy sought to define the early relationship sought with the State Department.

. . . the President has made it very clear that he does not want a large, separate organization between him and his Secretary of State. Neither does he wish any question to arise as to the clear authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State, not only in his own Department, and not only in such large-scale related areas as foreign aid and information policy, but also as the agent of coordination in all our major policies toward other nations.

The Department of State's apparent failure effectively to coordinate the administration's response to the Bay of Pigs Invasion crisis in early 1961 led to a series of measures aimed at providing the President with better independent advice from the government. It also sparked the NSC process to reenter the arena of monitoring the implementation of policy. The most important step in this direction was the establishment of the Situation Room in the White House in May 1961. The Sit Room, located next to Bundy's office in the basement of the West Wing of the White House, was directly linked to all the communication channels of the State Department and the Department of Defense, as well as to some of the channels of the CIA. The Sit Room allowed the President and his foreign affairs advisers to keep abreast of all the cable traffic from overseas posts. More than anything else, the Sit Room allowed Bundy and his NSC staff to expand their involvement in the international activities of foreign affairs community and become, in essence, "a little State Department."

Right now, I am thinking that this was written by Lyman Lemnitzer.

From Wikipedia...

"Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (August 29, 1899 – November 12, 1988) was a United States Army general, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962.........

............

In 1975, President Ford appointed Lemnitzer to the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (aka the Rockefeller Commission) to investigate whether the Central Intelligence Agency had committed acts that violated US laws, and allegations that E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis (of Watergate fame) were involved in the assassination of John F. Kennedy."

5 hours ago, Paz Marverde said:

Can't wait

Paz, 

After some more thought I am beginning to see this as a primer for the new administration as to what the CIA and DOD were planning to do. It is an indication that they intended to put immense pressure on the new President, and lay-out a plan, already in motion, that far exceeded the intentions of the prior administration. 

I have to read it some more, correct some typo's, and pull some contextual clues to see if it can indeed be isolated to the period of planning prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Two things of interest.

- The document speaks of two PT boats in inventory, one without a motor, and one reserved as a Presidantial escape craft. This, I am musing, served as a knurple to the Presidents ego. 

- Towards the end, the author speaks in the first person, so it will be part of the challenge to see if we can identify that individual through contextual clues.

8 hours ago, Paul Brancato said:

Is there a date anywhere? If not are there clues as to when? 

Paul, On the cover page, in the "Agency Information" section, on the "Agency" line it reads... "NSC". The National Security Council was formed in 1947 and is a White House entity, answering to the President. As to the document heading I am not sure if we can take that to be an indicator of the originating body. Under "Document Information"  the lines "Originator" and "From" are left blank, so comparisons of these document header sections with other documents can tell us if we can rely on the "Agency Information" section as an indicator of ownership or originator. This will be something I will be looking at as I dig deeper.

It is interesting that it is addressed to the Attorney General rather than the President. I am seeing this as a message to the CIA, DOD and other interested entities that JFK was making it clear that he would be considering the legality of any forthcoming action as a matter of first importance. Indeed, it is a message that these intenties should consider the plan through a legal lense prior to expecting executive action on the subject at hand.

I’ve been trying to figure that out too. It’s not 63, probably 62, maybe 61. I have some reasoning for this that I will share later.

To: Robert Kennedy

Title: Briefing for Robert Kennedy

Subjects: Program review

Plans to Assist Cubans in Overthrowing the Communist Regime.

Briefing for Mr. Robert Kennedy

Concerning the status of DOD plans and activities to date – our first completed action was to obtain a DOD/JCS position as to the military's stake and proposed role in the ousting of the Castro Communist regime. Basically, the policy reflected in this paper establishes that the military will support State and CIA as necessary during the preparatory phase of Operation Mongoose in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.It also establishes the point that the military believes it continued existence of the Castro Communist regime is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the United States and the entire Western Hemisphere. It further makes the point that the military could intervene overtly in Cuba without serious offense to national or world public opinion If:

A: We moved in response to a humanitarian requirement to restore order withinn Cuba;

B. If we announced incident to going in; that we were moving in to restore order and hold free elections; and that we would withdraw from Cuba as soon as the new government advised that they had the capability to maintain order without further assistance from OAS nations;

C. If the operation was conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take affective counter-measures was reduced to the minimum.

D. We feel very strongly that without damage to their international position and simply by making the decision to do so, the Soviets can take a page from our book and establish an overseas military base or bases in Cuba. This would greatly increase our national vulnerability and our defense costs as forces would have to be developed or shifted to meet this threat from the south. It would also provide the Communists with a secure base for espionage, sabotage and subversion throughout the entire Western Hemisphere.

 The Soviets have an option on which they can foreclose at any time. They can make the decision to establish military bases in Cuba at their will and pleasure, and if they exercise this option, we would likely be unable to remove them without initiating World War III. Consequently we feel that it is mandatory that we face the facts squarely now, and determine as early as possible whether we can rid Cuba of Communism by covert support of Cubans within Cuba; and it is equally mandatory, for logistics and planning purposes, that we have an early decision as to whether we definitely intend to use military force, if covert means fail.

We also feel strongly that the United States should intervene to preserve Cuban nationals identified as being essential to the establishment of a friendly Cuban government if they are in danger of being exterminated by a widespread Hungarian type blood purge.

In furtherance of the DOD/JCS  policy that any military intervention should be conducted as quickly as possible, and with sufficient force to minimize the Communist Bloc's capability to react, we are working with CINCLANT in attempting to reduce the reaction time of his contingency plans for moving into Cuba, but at the same time to beef up his capability so that there will be no doubt as to the US ability to move in and take over rapidly regardless of the opposition we may meet.

Our primary plan can be activated from a condition of no warning in 18 days, and provides for confronting Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to induce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of life.

A secondary plan can be activated from a condition of no warning in five days although this plan involves a degree of risk by a piecemeal commitment of forces.

CINCLANT  is planning to reduce these reaction times through pre-positioning of forces and material. This planning effort should soon provide us a basis for decision concerning the extent we wish to go in pre-positioning without endangering security and the element of surprise to an unacceptable degree. 

We feel that there is an alarming lack of appreciation that time is running out - that we cannot let this operation drag on for an indefinite number of years, hoping to develop a massive resistance capability with in Cuba. We are concerned that the new proposal d-emphasizes the time factor by waiting until July before a decision is made as to what to do next. This would permit the Soviets (Communist regime in Cuba) additional time to foreclose on the options open to them, viz., entry of Cuba into the Warsaw Pact, and/or the establishment of Soviet bases in Cuba. Either one of these actions would add new dimensions to our problems, and introduce considerations which would postpone positive action indefinitely if not preclude for the foreseeable future elimination of the Communist regime.

 In the event that the coming months may disapprove the feasibility of initiating an internal revolt in Cuba, it is suggested that phase 2 might be sparked with the execution of a Cover and Deception plan. Normal training of US forces would be the primary cover, the deception would be concurrent efforts to convince the Communist Cuban government that we were in fact invading Cuba. This course of action could provide adequate provocation for US intervention depending, of course, on Cuban rashneis in their reaction. If successful, we might not have to engage in the more difficult and dangerous game of developing pretext, although we should include this requirement as a final resort to ensure successful initiation of phase 2.

As I previously mentioned, one of our primary responsibilities is supporting CIA. To date, CIA has submitted several request for support. In each case, action was initiated immediately and the request processed expeditiously. These requests included: 

A. Use of Avon Park, USAF bombing range in Southern Florida, as an exercise area for training agents. (DOD has approved this request provided national policy permitted training of Cubans on US military bases).

B. Assignment of the Navy commander experienced in small boat operations to handle their maritime small boat activities. (The following day, the Chief of Naval Operations approved the request and directed the Navy Bureau of Personnel to procure and assign a qualified officer without delay.

C. Advice and assistance from BJ Unit No. 2 in testing certain simulation devices. (Direct contact with BJ No. 2 and appropriate CIA personnel was authorized).

D. CIA has in formally requested the Navy to obtain 6 PT boats for their use. (staffing today indicates that the Navy does not have six PT boat in their inventory. They have two in mothballs, one designated as a presidential escapeboat, and one hull without a motor. The leadtime required to place mothballed PT boats in operation is 30 days at a minimum, at a cost of $200,000 each. The purchase of additional PT's requires an estimated 3 to 6 months after signing the contract. The cost per unit for new PT boats is estimated at 1 million. The Navy is currently waiting CIA's formal request.)

E. CIA submitted a request to DOD for use of certain personnel, supplies, equipment, facilities and bases including but not limited to aircraft, boats, submarines and landing ships dock (LSD's), plus the use of US Armed Forces the furnish air cover for CIA sponsors activities. This request raised several national policy decisions necessary to permit  fulfillment of the request. These policy decisions are:

1. Weather, and/or to what extent a policy of non-attribution to the US government will apply to projects in connection with the activities of the CSG.

2. Weather, and/or to what extent US bases and facilities should be utilized for training Cuban refugees.

3. Whether, and/or to what extent US Armed Forces personnel will be employed on CSG projects and if so, whether, and/or to what extent they will be non-attributable.

4. Whether, and/or to what extent US Armed Forces personnel will be employed within the territorial boundaries of Cuba.

5. Whether, and/or to what extent over-flights of Cuba for purposes of leaflet drops, resupply and diversion will be permitted.

6. Whether, and/or to what extent Guantánamo will be used as a base for agents, black flights and black broadcast.

7. Whether, and/or to what extent use of British controlled and other foreign areas for staging areas will be permitted.

8. What is the priority of Operation Mongoose, as compared to other projects and operations.

We have also prepared an assessment of the risk involved in air resupply missions over Cuba. We are readying two USAF sanitized aircraft and "sheep-dipped" crews for air resupply missions to agents within Cuba, and we are assisting CIA with its maritime needs, including help in obtaining PT types boats from foreign sources, readying "sheep-dipped" crews and equipment as deemed necessary, and providing operational concepts on disrupting or destroying Cuban capability of maritime coastal patrols.

In order to accomplish our assigned tasks, I have a working group with full-time representatives from the joint Chiefs of staff,  DIA and the service who serve, as representatives of their respective directors and as points of contact dealing directly with their respective Chiefs.

Furrther, I have representatives of each of the services who also served full-time on the working group. They work directly with the people on the service desk; the operations deputy, the deputy for plans, and one action officer.

Obviously, my working group cannot staff all the tasks placed upon us, consequently, whenever possible, we sanitize the tasks and have them accomplished by a Joint Staff or the regular Service Staffs. 

5 hours ago, David Boylan said:

Doesn't say who authored this. I assume it came from CIA.

http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/docid-32977068.pdf

Some of the observations are of strategic military planning. The document also speaks of the CIA in the third person. I am thinking it is a DOD document. I am also looking for a means to date it squarely.

P. 12 definition of CSG?

          - Questioning of priority of Op. Mongoose (speaks to it being a DOD doc)

          - mention of USAF "sanitized" aircraft with "sheepdipped" crew.

P.13 "We are assisting CIA with it's maritime needs ( speaks to a non CIA doc.)

An interesting analysis would be one which looks at what the Commission did with Liebler's recommendations, line by line.

For example, this quote seems critical, and damning, although I have not yet looked to see how the Report finally read on this issue....

"3. The paragraph dealing with the number of shots fired and the manufacture of the cases and the slugs seems to me to be an exercise in pedantry, and possibly subject to error. Is it not possible that a Winchester-Western slug could have been fired from a Remington-Peter's case? Even if not, why leave ourselves open to question when it does not really matter how many shots were fired, as between four or five."

21 hours ago, Mike Kilroy said:

And thank you Michael Clark for transcribing!  Looks even more damning when the words are clear and digital.

Thanks Mike. It was a worthwhile exercise for me. It is well worth becoming intimate with such a document.

I transcribed the above linked document and pasted it below. It will have some mistakes. So as to not disrupt this thread any suggested edits or corrections can be made on a thread I will link below. I will come back to this post and make those corrections.

Bart, thank you for sharing the link. 

Wesley J. Liebler

September 6, 1964

Memorandum re the galley proofs of chapter 4 of the report.

I set forth below comments on the galley proofs of chapter 4 of the report, a report of which I obtained from Mr. Reidlich on September 4, 1964. Other comments and suggestions are set forth in the margin of the galley itself.

Purchase of the rifle by Oswald

1. On galley page 30, query if the name Hidell was stamped on the membership application blanks of the New Orleans branch, FPCC.

2. The text near the top of page 30 gives the impression that the name Hidell was stamped on all of the New Orleans chapter's printed literature. It was not. Oswald stamped his own name on some of it.

Oswald palm print on the rifle barrel

1. Query if the palm print provides additional evidence of ownership of the rifle as is stated. The most it does is show that Oswald had possession of the rifle at some time. It does not show that he owned it.

2. Second paragraph states that Lieutenant Day determined the wooden stock was too rough to take prints "from visual examination." Day does not say that in his testimony. While it is a minor point, he just said that he noted it was too rough.  For all I know he may have reached that conclusion by feeling the stock. 

3.  It may be noted here that the conclusion for the section on rifle ownership, that appears on galley page 32, states that the presence of the palm print on the rifle shows is that Oswald "had disassembled it". That conclusion is not warranted from the existence of the palm print on the rifle. The conclusion that Oswald handled the rifle while it was disassembled is justified.

4. The palm print section must be changed to reflect the latest findings of the FBI that the palmprint had to have been lifted from the barrel because of the marks that appear on the lift that correspond to those on the rifle barrel itself.

 Fibers on the rifle 

1.I think this section is written a little too strongly considering the record. For example, there is no footnote after the statement that the commission found no credible evidence that Oswald used the rifle between  September 23 and the assassination. Furthermore, even if he did not "use" it, he might very well have handled it at some time during that period. Also, Stombaugh was not able to estimate the period of time within which the fibers were placed on the rifle, but much of the language in the section is designed to bring one to the conclusion that they were put there on the day of the assassination, even though that is not said.

2.  In the last sentence of the section, it is not the Commission's conclusion that provides proof, it is the fact that the fibers most probably came from Oswald's shirt. Also, does that show that he "owned" the rifle, or just that he or someone that wore the shirt had handled the rifle at sometime? 

Photograph of Oswald with rifle

1.  It is interesting to note that the conclusion to the ownership section, on page 32, states that "a photograph taken in the yard of Oswald's apartment showed him holding this rifle". That statement appears in the conclusion in spite of the fact that Shaneyfelt specifically testified that he could not make a positive identification of the rifle that Oswald was holding in the picture and in spite of the fact that the Commission was not able to conclude, In the discussion of this subject on page 31, that Oswald was holding the assassination weapon in the picture.

Rifle among Oswald's possessions

1.  I do not believe there is any real authority for the proposition that Oswald sighted through the telescope sight on the porch in New Orleans. Marina Oswald first said she did not know what he did with the rifle out on the porch and then was led into a statement which might be thought to support the instant proposition. It is not very convincing.

2.  On the top of page 32 it is stated that Ruth and Michael Paine "both noticed the rolled up blanket in the garage throughout the time that marina Oswald was living in their home". I am sure the record will not support that statement, a rather important one, too. I recall that there was a period of time before the assassination that neither of them saw the blanket. I have always had the opinion that there was a gap in the proof as to the rifle being continuously in the garage, one that probably could not be filled. It cannot be filled by ignoring it. The conclusion is even worse when it states that "The rifle was being kept among Oswald's possessions from the time of its purchase until the day of the assassination." I do not think the record provides any real evidence to support that broad statement. The fact is that not one person alive today ever saw that rifle in the Paine garage in such a way that it could be identified as that rifle.

The curtain rod story

1. The report states that Frazier was surprised when Oswald asked for a ride on November 21, 1963. I am not able to find anything in the record to support that statement.

2. The last paragraph of this section is misleading when it at times to show the falsity of the curtain rod story by stating that Oswald's room at 1026 N. Beckley had curtains, and does not take account of the fact that Fraser specifically testified that Oswald said he wanted the curtain rods to put in an apartment. This takes an added significance when we remember that Oswald was talking about renting an apartment so that his family could live in Dallas with him. That aspect of the problem should be specifically treated if we are going to mention the fact that his rooming house had curtains.

The long and bulky package

1. The last sentence states: "Frazier could easily have been mistaken when he stated that Oswald held the bottom of the bag cupped in his hand, or when he stated that the upper end was tucked under the armpit." On the very next page of the galleys, in the discussion of the prints that appear on the paper bag, it is stated that the palm print was "found on the closed and of the bag. It was from Oswald's right hand in which he carried the long package as he walked from Frazier's car to the building."

I am advised that the palm print is right on the end of the bag, just where it would be if Oswald had carried it cupped in his hand. If we say in the discussion of prints that that print was put on the bag when he carried it into the TSBD (which we don't quite do)'and if the print is where it would be if he carried it cupped in his hand, then we must face up on the preceding page and admit that Frazier was right when he said that that is the way Oswald carried it. If the print story is right and the implication left there as to when the print was put on the bag is valid, Frazier could not have been mistaken when he said Oswald carried the bottom of the bag cupped in his hand.

Scientific evidence linking rifle and Oswald to the paper bag

1. The section on fibers in the bag is very thin. The most that can be said is that there was a possibility that the fibers came from the blanket. The FBI expert would not even state that such was possible.

Conclusion

1. I am at a loss to know why the fact that Oswald apparently failed to turn out Ruth Paine's garage light is mentioned in the conclusion.

Palm prints and fingerprints on cartons and paper bag

1. The problem of all the identified prints has already been discussed. The FBI has been requested to conduct additional investigation to attempt to identify those prints. The results of that investigation must be incorporated in the report.

2.  This section emphasized the freshness of one palmprint on one carton. That palmprint was the only one of 28 prints that could be developed by powder as opposed to a chemical process. As a result it was held to have been placed on the carton recently, within from 1 to 3 days prior to the time it was developed. The inference may be drawn from the present language of this section that all of the other prints, which could be developed only through a chemical process because the cartons had already absorbed them, must have been older than the palmprint. Thus, it could be argued that Oswald's other prints had to have been placed on the cartons at least a day before they were developed and perhaps as much is three days before. While there may be some reason within the realm of fingerprint technology why that is not so, it does not appear in the report.

Under those circumstances the presence of Oswald's other prints, which must be treated pari passu with the prints of others on these cartons, seems to have very little significance indeed. This relates to the prints on one of the Rolling Readers cartons  near the window, the existence of which is emphasized by stating that they "take on added significance" because of the work being done on the six floor. The report also states that the Commission placed "great weight on the fingerprint and palm print identifications." I don't think we should say that in any event. We certainly should not until we deal with the problem of the apparent age of Oswald's other prints and the presence of all those unidentified prints.

3.  The report states that it is "significant that none of the prints on the cartons should be identified as the prints of a warehouse employee." It also states that those employees "like Oswald, might have handled the cartons" presumably in the ordinary course of business. It is significant. But not necessarily to the point that the report tries to make. The fact that only Oswald's prints appear on the cartons could show that he was the sole warehouse employee that handled them in the ordinary course of business. The fact that Oswald was the only employee whose prints appeared on the cartons does not help to convince me that he moved them in connection with the assassination. It shows the opposite just as well.

4.  It is also difficult to tell just what happened to all of the cartons or who developed what prints. While it appears that all four cartons were forwarded to the FBI, some confusion is created by the later statement that the right palm print on the box on the floor next to the three near the window was also sent to the FBI. Why was that necessary if the carton had already been sent? The use of the passive voice in the second sentence of the second full paragraph on page 35 of the galleys leaves open the question of who developed the prints.

Eyewitness identification of assassin.

1. There is a duplication of a long quote from Brennon's testimony that also appears at page 15 of the galleys, the first page of chapter 3. It does not seem to be needed in both places. If left the way it is, the form as to omitted material should be standardized.

2. Following that "it says that Brennon's description most probably lead to the radio alert sent out to Police in which the assassin was described. Can't this be more definite?  One of the questions that has been raised is the speed with which the assassin was described, the implication being that Oswald had been picked out as a patsy before the event. The Dallas police must know what led to the radio alert in the description. If they do we should be able to find out. If they do not know, the circumstances of their not knowing should be discussed briefly. 

3.  On page 36 it says that at 1:29 PM the police radio reported that the description of the suspect in the Tippit shooting was similar to the description which had been given by Brennan in connection with the assassination. On page 46 it is stated that it was unlikely that any officer said anything like "kill the president, will you?" The reason given is that the officers did not know "that Oswald was a suspect in the killing of the President". But they very likely had heard the police radio note that the description of the two were similar and may have been drawn their own conclusions.  The statement on page 46 should be taken out or qualified .

4. There should be a picture of the inside of the TSBD 6th floor showing the low windows sills and a reference to that picture in connection with the discussion of Brennan's testimony that he saw the man standing.

5. Query if we need such a long paragraph on Eunis' testimony merely to conclude that it is inconclusive as to the identity of the man in the window.

6. In the last sentence of the second to the last paragraph in the section it says that Altgen's picture was taken about two seconds "after the shot which entered the back of the presidents neck". We should say after that shot was fired or heard or something. The sentence is not a good one as it now stands.

Oswald's actions in building after assassination.

1.  I do not think the description of the Baker-Oswald sequence is sufficiently clear. I am confused as to how many entrance doors there are to the vestibule, even though after a close reading there appeared to be only two, the one connecting to the second floor landing and the one connecting to the lunch room. It is also not clear whether Baker saw Oswald through the window in the vestibule / landing door, or whether that door was still open as is implied by Baker's testimony. Mention of the window previously, however, implies Baker saw Oswald through the window. It does not seem likely that Oswald would still have been visible through the window if the door had already closed, although that depends on how far the door closes, which is something I would like to know. What kind of a stairway is it that someone coming up can see nothing at the top of the landing? Truly may in fact have seen Oswald if the latter had just come down the stairs from the third floor as Truly was coming up on the second.

I think additional effort should be made with the writing and a picture of the view coming up to the second floor and a diagram or other pictures of the landing and vestibule area would be a good idea.

2. The first sentence in the third from the last paragraph on galley page 38 leaves a false inference concerning Oswald's presence on the sixth floor. It should be rewritten along the following lines: "The fact that Oswald could not have come down in the elevators, the only other possible means of decent, is shown by their movements after the time Baker and Truly tried to use them to go up in the building."

3. In the same paragraph, the statement that both elevators occupy the same shaft is not clear. It would be better to say: "both elevators, which operate adjacently in the same shaft,"

4.  Last paragraph on page 38 (galley): The testimony of the employees as set forth in that paragraph is also consistent with Oswald having been in Ethiopia at the time of the assassination or with his having used the elevators to get down from the six floor. Since those employees did not see either Oswald or Dougherty, their testimony says nothing on the point under discussion. The whole paragraph should be cut.

5.  The next two paragraphs, the first two on galley page 39, or a complete mystery to me. When I left the bottom of page 38 I was looking for additional testimony showing that Oswald came down the stairs and not the elevator. After two paragraphs of excellent analysis I am convinced that Victoria Adams either came down the stairs before or after Oswald did and it is clear that that is so because we know that Oswald came down the stairs and not the elevators. I still do not understand, however, how the fact that Victoria Adams came down the stairs before or after Oswald did shows that Oswald came down the stairs. If the idea is to show that Adams was not on the stairway when Oswald was, I am not convinced by the analysis or speculation in these two paragraphs.  Furthermore, if that is the idea it is not clearly set forth. How about a first sentence like: "Victoria Adams testified that she came down the stairway, within about one minute after the shots, from the fourth floor to the first floor where she encountered two depository employees Bill Shelly and Bill Lovelady. If Miss Adams was on the stairway at that time,  the question is raised as to why she did not see Oswald......"

6.  In the conclusion: I do not see how the Commission can possibly stay that "Fingerprint and palmprint evidence establishes that Oswald arranged the cartons in the window." That evidence establishes that at some time Oswald handled one of the three cartons in the window, as suggested above, probably prior to the assassination by at least 1 to 3 days. That evidence establishes with equal validity that perhaps about 20 other persons "arranged the curtains in the window."

Oswald's movements after leaving the depository building

1.  The description of Oswald's bus ride sequence is very confusing and wholly unable to stand by itself without a map. Even if we include a map, which I assume we will, the text should be clear enough to stand by itself. The basic problem is that there is no indication of the relationship of various intersections to each other. It should be simple enough to set forth the relationships between St. Paul and Elm, Field and Elm and Poydras and Lamar.

2. There also seems to be a mistake in description of directions. I don't see how Oswald could walk west on Elm and board a bus heading back in the direction of the Depository and which was also traveling west. Somebody had to have gone east. (Oswald)

3. The second to the last full paragraph on galley page 40 is not very clear as to what all those buses actually do and what they are supposed to do. I have set forth suggested clarifying changes in the margin of the galley.

4. On galley page 41 the terms lineup and showup are used interchangeably. It should be one or the other throughout. I have always thought it was lineup.

5. There are direct quotes in the first paragraph on galley page 42 for which there are no footnotes. It is my understanding that there are to be footnotes for each direct quote and that there is to be uniformity on this point throughout the report.

Description of the shooting

1.  References here to what the Dallas police radio ordered Tippit to do should be qualified to indicate that a transcript of the recording of the radio communications indicates the material being set forth. This should be done at least until we have cleared up the problems with the transcript and recordings, if we have not already done so. 

2. There are no footnotes at all in the last paragraph of this section.

Eyewitnisses

1. There is more confusion between lineups and showups at the top of galley page 43.

2. As to any attempt to explain Mrs. Markham's description (so called) of Oswald as having bushy hair by showing the world a picture of Oswald "taken at the time of the arrest:" I suggest that even the slowest of readers would imagine that their hair might be in an uncombed state – which is the suggested explanation of the bushy condition – after they had fought with a dozen policeman in an attempt to resist arrest. In fact Pizzo Exhibit 453 – C, the evidence for this proposition, shows Oswald with cuts and bruises on his face. I don't think Mrs. Markham's testimony needs much comment and neither does her statement to Lane. Any attempt such as is presently in the Report will merely play into Lane's hands and make the Commission look naïve.

3. Query statement that Markhams identification was mostly from his face. I think she was all over the lot on that one.

Murder weapon

1. Why don't we take a sentence or two and explain why the bullets fired from the revolver were smaller than the barrel. There is no way to tell from the Report now and an obvious question is raised as to why.

2. There is an unclear sentence in the middle of the third paragraph of this heading which states: "Also, the bullets were mutilated." Which ones?

3. The paragraph dealing with the number of shots fired and the manufacture of the cases and the slugs seems to me to be an exercise in pedantry, and possibly subject to error. Is it not possible that a Winchester-Western slug could have been fired from a Remington-Peter's case? Even if not, why leave ourselves open to question when it does not really matter how many shots were fired, as between four or five.

4. The last paragraph of this heading needs some footnotes, either in or out.

Ownership of the revolver

1. The first sentence refers to "this type of revolver." I think it would be better to say the "type of revolver that was used to kill Patrolman Tippit."

Oswald's jacket

1. The second paragraph of this heading needs some footnotes.

2. There are inconsistencies in the description of Commission Exhibit 162. The same problem occurred above, when an exhibit was described sometimes as "Exhibit ______." and at others as "Comission Exhibit ______." A little thing, but why not do it right?

3.  The conclusion to this heading reaches the crushing result that "Oswald disposed of his jacket as he fled from the scene of the Tippet killing. I submit that that is really not the conclusion we worked toward. Why not: "Those facts strongly support the finding that it was Lee Harvey Oswald who killed Patrolman Tippit and then fled through the parking lot adjoining Jefferson Boulevard, disposing of his jacket as he did so."

Oswald's arrest

1. At first I was surprised to learn that Johnny Calvin Brewer knew that a patrolman had been shot when Oswald walked by his place of business, less than eight blocks from the point of the Tippet killing which Oswald apparently left as fast as he could.

2.  Then I was surprised to learn that the police radio did not send out information about the suspect being in the Texas theater until 1:45, about 30 minutes after the police first learned of the Tippet killing from Benevides over Tippet's radio. What were Oswald and Brewer doing during this 30 minutes? Oswald was strangely inactive during this period, considering all that he had done in the 45 minutes following the assassination.

3.  While I know that I will be thought mad to suggest that some editing be done on this chapter, consider the following sentence that appears on galley page 46: "As Oswald, handcuffed, was lead from the theater, he was, according to McDonald, "cursing a little bit and hollering police brutality." There are only five commas in that sentence.  How about: "McDonald testified that Oswald was "cursing a little bit and hollering police brutality" as he was led handcuffed from the theater."

4. Here compare the note above concerning page 36 that the police radio had noted the similarity of the descriptions between the man wanted for the assassination and the man wanted for the Tippet killing, by the time Oswald was arrested at the theater. It could be, therefore, that some of the officers suspected that the man they were arresting was wanted in connection with the assassination.

Statements of Oswald during detention

1. There are entirely too many subheadings under this general heading. None are really necessary. We reach the sublime when we have one whole heading for one short, four sentence paragraph. They should all be cut out and the whole discussion comprehended under the above general title.

2. In the paragraph on denial of rifle ownership appears the statement "small bore .22 rifle." That is redundant, since I presume we do not mean to distinguish from large bore .22 rifles. It should probably just read ".22 caliber rifle."

3. The second to last sentence in that paragraph needs a footnote.

Shooting of Major General Edwin A. Walker

1. There is no footnote after the sentence concerning the 15-year-old boy who saw two men leave the area.

2. Same after the statement that a friend of Walker gave information to the police about the two men snooping around. Also that statement is not correct. Walker gave the information to the police.

3. No footnote after statement re results of private investigation.

4. No footnote after statement that the note was in the "Book of Useful Advice."

5. The second full paragraph on page 48 assumes a lot of knowledge about Oswald's movements and about the Paines that the reader had not gotten anywhere yet, except in the first chapter narrative. A few extra words as suggested in the margin of the galley might improve things considerably. Furthermore, the first sentence needs a footnote, as does the entire next paragraph, which has not one footnote to its name.

6.  In the paragraph on photographs, a footnote is needed after the first sentence. The second sentence must be changed because at present it implies that Oswald told Marina about the notebook or rather showed it to her when he returned the night after the attack. She stated in her testimony in July and she did not see what was in the notebook until three days after the attack and there is nothing in her early testimony that I know about to support the proposition now in the report.

7. Statement that Oswald apparently destroyed the notebook should be changed in order to reflect fact that he did destroy it, and at the suggestion of his wife.

8. Second to last sentence in photographs section must be changed to indicate that Oswald did not bury his rifle in some bushes, but rather that he may have hidden it there.

9. Query usage of "ballistics" in first paragraph of "firearms identification" section. Same as to last paragraph thereof.

10. Under "Corroboration by Marina Oswald" we learn for the first time about a postponement of the attempt to kill Walker. There is no mention of from when, what the circumstances of the postponement were, what happened to the rifle in the meantime, etc. It should be set forth, since there is no mention of it above, as I recall.

Oswald's rifle capability

1. The purpose of this section is to determine Oswald's ability to fire a rifle. The third word at the top of page 50 of the galleys, which is apparently meant to describe Oswald, is "marksman." A marksman is one skilled at shooting at a Mark; one who shoots well. Not only do we beg the question a little, but the sentence is inexact in that the shot, which it describes, would be the same for a marksman as it would be for one who is not a marksman. How about: "The assassin's shots from the easternmost window of the southside of the Texas School Book Depository were at a slow-moving target proceeding on a downgrade virtually straight away from the assassin, at a range of 177 to 266 feet."

2. The last sentence in the first paragraph on galley page 50 should indicate that the slope of Elm Street is downward.

3. The section on the nature of the shots deals basically with the range and the effect of a telescopic site. Several experts conclude that the shots were easy. There is, however, no consideration given here to the time allowed for the shots. I do not see how someone can conclude that a shot is easy or hard unless he knows something about how long the firer has to shoot, i.e., how much time is allotted for the shots.

4. On nature of the shots – Frazier testified that one would have no difficulty in hitting a target with a telescopic site, since all you have to do is put the crosshairs on the target. On page 51 of the galleys, however, he testified that shots  fired by FBI agents with the assassination weapon were "a few inches high and to the right of the target because of a defect in the scope." Apparently no one knows when that defect appeared, or if it was in the scope at the time of the assassination. If it was, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary one may assume that it was, putting the crosshairs on the target would clearly have resulted in a miss, or very likely would, in any event.  I have raised this question before. There is a great deal of testimony in the record that a telescopic sight is a sensitive proposition. You can't leave a rifle and scope lying around in a garage under foot for almost 3 months, just having brought it back from New Orleans in the back of the station wagon, and expect to hit anything with it, unless you take the trouble to fire it and sight the scope in. This would have been a problem that should have been dealt with in any event, and now that it turns out that there actually was a defect in the scope, it is perfectly clear that the question must be considered. The present draft leaves the Commission open to severe criticism. Furthermore, to the extent that it leaves testimony suggesting that the shots might not have been so easy out of the discussion, thereby giving only a part of the story, it is simply dishonest. 

5. Why do we have a statement concerning the fact that Oswald's Marine records show that he was familiar with the Browning Automatic Rifle, .45 caliber pistol and 12 gauge riot gun? That is completely irrelevant to the question of his ability to fire a rifle, unless there is evidence that the same skills are involved. It is, furthermore, prejudicial to some extent.

6.  Under the heading "Oswald's Rifle Practice Outside the Marines" we have a statement concerning his hunting activities in Russia. It says that he joined a hunting club; obtained a license and went hunting about six times. It does not say what kind of weapon he used. While I am not completely familiar with the record on this point, I do know for a fact that there is some indication that he used a shotgun. Under what theory do we include activities concerning a shotgun under a heading related to rifle practice, and then presume not to advise the reader of that fact?

7. The statements concerning Oswald's practice with the assassination weapon are misleading. They tend to give the impression that he did more practicing than the record suggests that he did. My recollection is that there is only one specific time when he might have practiced. We should be more precise in this area, because the Commission is going to have it's work in this area examined very closely.

8.  On the top of galley page 51 we have that statement about Oswald sighting the telescope sight at night on the porch in New Orleans. I think the support for that proposition is then indeed. Marina Oswald first testified that she did not know what he was doing out there and then she was clearly led into the only answer that gives any support to this proposition.

9. I think the level of reaching that is going on in this whole discussion of rifle capability is nicely shown by the fact that under the heading of rifle practice outside the Marine Corps  appears the damning statement that "Oswald showed an interest in rifles by discussing that subject with others (in fact only one person as I remember it) and reading gun magazines."

10. I do not think the record will support the statement that Oswald did not leave his Beckley Avenue rooming house on one of the weekends that he was supposedly seen at the Sports Dome rifle range.

11. There is a misstatement in the third paragraph under Rapid Fire tests when it says "Four of the firers missed the second shot." The preceding paragraph states that there were only three firers.

12. There are no footnotes whatsoever in the fifth paragraph under rapid fire tests and some rather important statements are made which require some support from someplace.

13. A minor point as to the next paragraph – bullets are better said to strike rather than land.

14.  As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that 15 different sets of three shots were fired by supposedly expert rifleman of the FBI and other places. According to my calculations those 15 sets of shots took a total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The average of all 15 is a little over 6.2 seconds. Assuming that time is calculated commencing with the firing of the first shot, that means the average time it took to fire the two remaining shots was about 6.2 seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much. I recall that chapter 3 said that the minimum time that had to elapse between shots was 2.25  seconds, which is pretty close to the one set of fast shots fired by Fraser of the FBI. 

The conclusion indicates that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with two hirs in from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Of the 15 sets of three shots described above, only three were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets, including the three just mentioned, were fired within a total of 5.6 seconds.  The conclusion at its most extreme states that Oswald could fire faster than the Commission experts fired in 12 of their 15 tries and that in any event he could fire faster than the experts did in ten of their 15 tries. If we are going to set forth material such as this, I think we should set forth some information on how much training and how much shooting the experts had and did as a whole. The readers could then have something on which to base their judgments concerning the relative abilities of the apparently slow firing experts used by the Commission and the ability of Lee Harvey Oswald.

15.  The problem raised by the above analyses should be met at some point in the text of the Report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum firing time for each shot is used throughout chapter 3. The present discussion of rifle capability shows the expert rifleman could not fire the assassination weapon that fast. Only one of the experts managed to do so, and his shots, like those of other FBI experts, we're high and to the right of the target. The fact is that most of the experts were much more proficient with a rifle then Oswald could ever be expected to be, and the record indicates that fact, according to my recollection of the response of one of the experts to a question by Mr. McCloy asking for a comparison of the NRA master marksman to a Marine Corps sharpshooter.

16.  The present section on rifle capability fails to set forth material in the record tending to indicate that Oswald was not a good shot and that he was not interested in his rifle while in the Marine Corps. It does not set forth material indicating that a telescopic sight must be tested and sighted-in after a period of non-usee before it can be expected to be accurate.  That problem is emphasized by the fact that the FBI actually found that there was a defect in the scope which cause the rifle to fire high and to the right. In spite of the above the present section takes only part of the material in the record to show that Oswald was a good shot and that he was interested in rifles. I submit that the testimony of Delgade that Oswald was not interested in his rifle while in the Marines is at least as probative as Alba's testimony that Oswald came into his garage to read rifle (and hunting) magazines.

To put it bluntly that sort of selection from the record could seriously affect the integrity and credibility of the entire report.

17.  It seems to me that the most honest and the most sensible thing to do given the present state of the record on Oswald's rifle capability would be to write a very short section indicating that there is testimony on both sides of several issues. The Commission could then conclude that the best evidence that Oswald could fire his rifle as fast as he did and hit the target is the fact that he did so. It may have been pure luck. It probably was to a very great extent. But it happened. He would have had to have been lucky to hit as he did if he had only 4.8 seconds to fire the shots. Why don't we admit that instead of reaching and using only part of the record to support the propositions presently set forth in the galleys. These conclusions will never be accepted by critical person's anyway.

General comment.

1. The above was written without having the footnotes to the chapter, a considerable disadvantage when one would like to check this accuracy and precision of statements made in the text.

2. The placement of footnotes is not consistent within the chapter, nor with in the general rule that there are to be footnotes after all direct quotes. Many times there are no footnotes where it appears to me that there should be.

3. Form as to omitted material should be checked. The form of citations to the appendix is not consistent with chapter 3 or internally.

4. I forgot to mention that some question might be raised when the public discovers that there was only one eye eyewitness to the Tippit killing, i.e., one person who saw Oswald kill him. All the rest only saw subsequent events. Mrs. Markham is nicely buried there, but I predict not for long.