the 1963 Secret Service

[Thomas H. Purvis]

Tom, thanks. As you are aware, logic is plain and unglamorous. It doesn't negate the possibility of sinister melodrama - just marginalizes it.

Mark;

Having been around considerable "parachuting" in my life span, I am well familiar with the extent of "Emergency Procedures" which we attempted to instill into others who were also foolish enough to engage in such pursuits.

Nevertheless, many a parachutists (military & sport) have "smoked" in with a total malfunction of their main canopy, with no attempt to deploy their reserve, despite this extensive training to do so.

One can train til hell freezes over, yet until such time as it actually happens, to state exactly how one will react is somewhat hypothetical.

One can sit back all day and state how someone "should" react, or how they "should have" reacted, or what they should have done.

Lastly, there are a multitude of military tactics for how to deal with an "ambush", and that is why we have supposedly trained officers.

Who supposedly can judge the instance of the situation and make the appropriate decision.

Which also happens to be a "best guess" scenario.

Greer's actions, as stated, do not exclude him from some hypothetical scenario of conspiracy in the assassination.

They do however demonstrate that not unlike the remainder of us, he was human, and thus susceptible to reaction to instinct along with training, etc.

And, those who attempt to berate Greer and Kellerman, demonstrate their own complete lack of understanding of exactly how human we all are, and how we each react differently under identical stimuli.

Not to mention wanting to "puff" up their own ego's as to how "They" either know exactly how "They" would have reacted or else exactly how all of those SS in the motorcade "should" have reacted.

Personally, I "ducked" when the bullets started to fly. Which I knew to do long before joining the military service.

[Charles Drago]

I have visited the Little Bighorn battlefield on three post-wildfire occasions. I have traveled on horseback from the so-called Crow's Nest to the LBH valley (Lakota name for which translates as Greasy Grass), and I have toured the Last Stand sector in the company of the on-site National Parks historian of the time.

My library of Custer- and LBH-related volumes is extensive (200-plus books, monographs, pamphlets, etc. and climbing), and I have devoted decades of research and study to this monumentally intriguing and troubling incident.

I have published essays on the subject, although not for at least 20 years.

So much for credentials, such as they are.

I carry no water for Custer (or for Reno -- although others did, and had the Congressional Medal of Honor to show for it). In the most flattering of light he is revealed to be a force for imperialism and cultural (if not literal) genocide.

That being stated for the record, perhaps the following may be of some interest.

At first blush, it would seem that a discussion of the action at Little Bighorn on June 25, 1876 is wholly inappropriate for this forum. Yet I submit that, absent the framing of the actions of Custer and certain of his key subordinates that day within a deep political context, all efforts to find meaningful metaphors in the Greasy Grass for contemporary political events are doomed.

For if we choose to view Custer’s strategy, tactics, and motives in evidence on that long-ago Sunday afternoon from a CinemaScope perspective (where a story’s width is more important than its depth), we reveal a terrible weakness in our ability to understand how deep political processes operate — then as well as now.

In short: Custer was betrayed by the officer to whom he sent a direct order to come to his assistance. That man, Captain Frederick Benteen, disobeyed and deserted his commander, refused to ride to the sound of Custer’s guns (including volley fire designed as clear-cut signals for help) when fully capable of doing so, and thus bears direct culpability for the destruction of the five troops comprising the command battalion.

And Benteen was neither a coward nor a fool.

Custer and the men with him died because the commander foolishly expected his subordinates to obey orders — which is to say, because his workable plan of attack was sabotaged by a treasonous Benteen and an incompetent, impaired Major Marcus Reno.

And at the root of this perfidy, one finds political agendas of the darkest order.

Visit the field as I have, and you will understand that the tragedy of the engagement at LBH is yet palpable, the sorrow resonates. Victory celebrations held in the massive Indian encampment that night were, to be kind, premature. For fourteen years later, at Wounded Knee, the destruction of a people that Custer’s demise was designed and memorialized to hasten came to pass.

Mr. Purvis writes, "If one will read up on the history of General Custer, then they will find that there is far more reasons for his defeat than merely charging 'head-on' into the Sioux Nation."

Agreed (although we dishonor the historical record if we let linger the "Custer v. Sioux" canard. Other tribes were represented, including Cheyenne clans, and those warriors performed heroically and at great sacrifice.)

Mr. Purvis continues, "The smaller elements of Custer's forces were isolated, and Custer had again (see Battle of Waxxxxa) run off and left his rear guard forces as well as supplies ..."

Such an "analysis" is Bugliosi-esque in its selectivity and for the sophistic reasoning it promotes. Yes, Custer rode ahead of the his pack train. But he most assuredly did not "run off" insofar as that terminology implies criminal negligence if not cowardice. In point of fact Custer's plan of attack might very well have succeeded -- had not Major Reno and Captain Benteen exhibited cowardice and disobedience of direct orders respectively.

In a nutshell: Custer divided his force into three columns: Benteen to scout for escaping "Indians" (I'll use the term reluctantly and for the sake of brevity), and Reno to cross the LBH and charge the huge village from its southern flank while Custer's command force rode north to ford the river and close the circle.

Upon noting the size of the village, Custer sent written and verbal orders to Benteen to rejoin his command after first returning to the supply caravan: "Benteen. Come on. Big village. Bring pacs [sic] PS Bring pacs." The original message, written and signed by Custer's adjutant, W.W. Cooke, today is preserved at West Point.

Benteen received the message, and within the sound of Custer's guns and perfectly capable of obeying his orders, Benteen did nothing.

A nexus of political and business interests had much to gain by Custer's defeat. From elimination of a whipped -- or, better yet, dead -- Custer from the field of 1876 presidential candidates, to the ultimate demonization of the killers of Custer that would make palatable their final, brutal subjugation and the opening of their lands to railroad, mining, and other business interests, the Boy General faced an array of enemies that, to readers of this forum, may seem all too familiar.

And Benteen, who loathed Custer, might very well have been the paid agent of the latter's demise.

Months after the battle, the only officer under Benteen's command who attempted to obey Custer's order to "come on" wrote to his friend, the widow Elizabeth Custer, that he knew terrible truths about why her husband was left to die. I speak of Captain Thomas Weir, after whom the Weir Point battlefield landmark is named.

(There's a lot more to this "friendship," but such is another story.)

Soon after he sent that communication, Weir was dead.

Custer was a son of a bitch. But compared to the forces that destroyed him — forces all too similar to those that took out the Kennedys — he was the Son of the Morning Star.

So ... was there a Greasy Knoll?

Charles

[Paul Rigby]

A nexus of political and business interests had much to gain by Custer's defeat. From elimination of a whipped -- or, better yet, dead -- Custer from the field of 1876 presidential candidates, to the ultimate demonization of the killers of Custer that would make palatable their final, brutal subjugation and the opening of their lands to railroad, mining, and other business interests, the Boy General faced an array of enemies that, to readers of this forum, may seem all too familiar.

And Benteen, who loathed Custer, might very well have been the paid agent of the latter's demise.

Months after the battle, the only officer under Benteen's command who attempted to obey Custer's order to "come on" wrote to his friend, the widow Elizabeth Custer, that he knew terrible truths about why her husband was left to die. I speak of Captain Thomas Weir, after whom the Weir Point battlefield landmark is named.

(There's a lot more to this "friendship," but such is another story.)

Soon after he sent that communication, Weir was dead.

Custer was a son of a bitch. But compared to the forces that destroyed him — forces all too similar to those that took out the Kennedys — he was the Son of the Morning Star.

All new to me, and fascinating, so thanks. I've often wondered - chiefly with regard to the Lincoln assassination - if we're not collectively missing a trick or two by not having a thread dedicated to 19th century US and UK parapolitics.

Paul

[Thomas H. Purvis]

I have visited the Little Bighorn battlefield on three post-wildfire occasions. I have traveled on horseback from the so-called Crow's Nest to the LBH valley (Lakota name for which translates as Greasy Grass), and I have toured the Last Stand sector in the company of the on-site National Parks historian of the time.

My library of Custer- and LBH-related volumes is extensive (200-plus books, monographs, pamphlets, etc. and climbing), and I have devoted decades of research and study to this monumentally intriguing and troubling incident.

I have published essays on the subject, although not for at least 20 years.

So much for credentials, such as they are.

I carry no water for Custer (or for Reno -- although others did, and had the Congressional Medal of Honor to show for it). In the most flattering of light he is revealed to be a force for imperialism and cultural (if not literal) genocide.

That being stated for the record, perhaps the following may be of some interest.

At first blush, it would seem that a discussion of the action at Little Bighorn on June 25, 1876 is wholly inappropriate for this forum. Yet I submit that, absent the framing of the actions of Custer and certain of his key subordinates that day within a deep political context, all efforts to find meaningful metaphors in the Greasy Grass for contemporary political events are doomed.

For if we choose to view Custer’s strategy, tactics, and motives in evidence on that long-ago Sunday afternoon from a CinemaScope perspective (where a story’s width is more important than its depth), we reveal a terrible weakness in our ability to understand how deep political processes operate — then as well as now.

In short: Custer was betrayed by the officer to whom he sent a direct order to come to his assistance. That man, Captain Frederick Benteen, disobeyed and deserted his commander, refused to ride to the sound of Custer’s guns (including volley fire designed as clear-cut signals for help) when fully capable of doing so, and thus bears direct culpability for the destruction of the five troops comprising the command battalion.

And Benteen was neither a coward nor a fool.

Custer and the men with him died because the commander foolishly expected his subordinates to obey orders — which is to say, because his workable plan of attack was sabotaged by a treasonous Benteen and an incompetent, impaired Major Marcus Reno.

And at the root of this perfidy, one finds political agendas of the darkest order.

Visit the field as I have, and you will understand that the tragedy of the engagement at LBH is yet palpable, the sorrow resonates. Victory celebrations held in the massive Indian encampment that night were, to be kind, premature. For fourteen years later, at Wounded Knee, the destruction of a people that Custer’s demise was designed and memorialized to hasten came to pass.

Mr. Purvis writes, "If one will read up on the history of General Custer, then they will find that there is far more reasons for his defeat than merely charging 'head-on' into the Sioux Nation."

Agreed (although we dishonor the historical record if we let linger the "Custer v. Sioux" canard. Other tribes were represented, including Cheyenne clans, and those warriors performed heroically and at great sacrifice.)

Mr. Purvis continues, "The smaller elements of Custer's forces were isolated, and Custer had again (see Battle of Waxxxxa) run off and left his rear guard forces as well as supplies ..."

Such an "analysis" is Bugliosi-esque in its selectivity and for the sophistic reasoning it promotes. Yes, Custer rode ahead of the his pack train. But he most assuredly did not "run off" insofar as that terminology implies criminal negligence if not cowardice. In point of fact Custer's plan of attack might very well have succeeded -- had not Major Reno and Captain Benteen exhibited cowardice and disobedience of direct orders respectively.

In a nutshell: Custer divided his force into three columns: Benteen to scout for escaping "Indians" (I'll use the term reluctantly and for the sake of brevity), and Reno to cross the LBH and charge the huge village from its southern flank while Custer's command force rode north to ford the river and close the circle.

Upon noting the size of the village, Custer sent written and verbal orders to Benteen to rejoin his command after first returning to the supply caravan: "Benteen. Come on. Big village. Bring pacs [sic] PS Bring pacs." The original message, written and signed by Custer's adjutant, W.W. Cooke, today is preserved at West Point.

Benteen received the message, and within the sound of Custer's guns and perfectly capable of obeying his orders, Benteen did nothing.

A nexus of political and business interests had much to gain by Custer's defeat. From elimination of a whipped -- or, better yet, dead -- Custer from the field of 1876 presidential candidates, to the ultimate demonization of the killers of Custer that would make palatable their final, brutal subjugation and the opening of their lands to railroad, mining, and other business interests, the Boy General faced an array of enemies that, to readers of this forum, may seem all too familiar.

And Benteen, who loathed Custer, might very well have been the paid agent of the latter's demise.

Months after the battle, the only officer under Benteen's command who attempted to obey Custer's order to "come on" wrote to his friend, the widow Elizabeth Custer, that he knew terrible truths about why her husband was left to die. I speak of Captain Thomas Weir, after whom the Weir Point battlefield landmark is named.

(There's a lot more to this "friendship," but such is another story.)

Soon after he sent that communication, Weir was dead.

Custer was a son of a bitch. But compared to the forces that destroyed him — forces all too similar to those that took out the Kennedys — he was the Son of the Morning Star.

So ... was there a Greasy Knoll?

Charles

And I too have walked the grounds of the Battle of the Little Big Horn, as well as the grounds of the Battle of the Waxxxxa.

One of the first basics of learning military tactics is to study the actions of others.

It one will merely "not do" what those who failed miserably did, then they are already far ahead of the pack in learning.

Learning "what not" to do is as critical as is learning "what exactly" to do.

Mr. Purvis continues, "The smaller elements of Custer's forces were isolated, and Custer had again (see Battle of Waxxxxa) run off and left his rear guard forces as well as supplies ..."

Such an "analysis" is Bugliosi-esque in its selectivity and for the sophistic reasoning it promotes. Yes, Custer rode ahead of the his pack train. But he most assuredly did not "run off"

http://www.history-magazine.com/bighorn.html

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He gave Lt. Col. Custer explicit instructions to lead the Seventh Cavalry up the nearby Rosebud River to arrive no sooner than 26 June to allow Gibbon’s troops, slowed by the Gatling Gun Division, time to take up their positions.

Custer paid little heed to General Terry’s instructions and soon after departing up the Rosebud, headed directly for the valley of the Little Big Horn making forced marches late into the night and starting again before dawn. With his Seventh Cavalry troopers trail-weary and his horses exhausted, Custer reached the valley early in the afternoon of 25 June and made plans to attack the Indians immediately. Custer’s Indian scouts warned him that Sitting Bull’s camp was too large for him to take on with his small troop but Custer thought that his Seventh Cavalry could whip any Indian war party. Custer divided his troops into three separate commands placing 125 men under Captain Benteen with instructions to move towards the foothills and fight any Indians that he found. A second battalion under Major Marcus Reno was sent to engage the Indians in the village across the Little Big Horn with Custer to follow up with his battalion and provide whatever support was needed.

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Custer "Charged" ahead of his supplys and capability for the rear echelon force to assist him. Exactly the same as at the Battle of the Washia.

If you will check, you will find that Custer had the "Gatlin Gun" with these rear echelon elements, which in effect means that he totally ran ahead of his firepower support, as well as running off and totally ignoring the potential need for additional supplies and ammunition.

Just as he did at the Battle of the Waxxxxa.

Not to mention the fact that he totally disobeyed orders, and even though fully aware of a larger force, nevertheless split his smaller force.

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Fortunately, military tacticians no longer "cover" for the errors of Custer, as to do so is to continue to promote errors which will ultimately lead to failure.

Unfortunately, few persons (as a whole) have taken the time and effort to factual research "Custer's Last Stand", and not unlike the JFK assassination, continue to promote the myth and BS which has been handed down over the years.

Same old "Don't confuse me with the facts, my mind is made up" attitude!

Now it seems, we have some "Giant Conspiracy" to eliminate George Armstrong Custer.

Personally, I prefer to accept that he was a complete failure as a military tactician, as well as an "ego-maniac" who had survived one stupid blunder as well as coverup of the facts (at the Battle of the Waxxxxa), and thus repeated the exact same mistake.

[Charles Drago]

Mr. Purvis writes, "Unfortunately, few persons (as a whole) have taken the time and effort to factual research 'Custer's Last Stand, and not unlike the JFK assassination, continue to promote the myth and BS which has been handed down over the years.

"Same old 'Don't confuse me with the facts, my mind is made up' attitude!

"Now it seems, we have some Giant Conspiracy to eliminate George Armstrong Custer."

You would be well advised, sir, to redirect your condescension and tsk tsk's toward yourself. They neither intimidate nor impress me, as they seem to do with others on this forum.

Oh, if only we knew what you know ...

Tell it someone who gives a good ....

In point of fact it is you, sir, who mindlessly parrots and promotes conventional myth when you reject well-informed, well-reasoned analysis in favor of the tired, no longer defensible "Custer was an egomaniac" canard. Your failure to demonstrate a grasp of the political context of Custer's demise is most telling as it speaks to the superficiality of your "argument."

Mr. Purvis writes, "If you will check, you will find that Custer had the 'Gatlin Gun' [sic] with these rear echelon elements, which in effect means that he totally ran ahead of his firepower support, as well as running off and totally ignoring the potential need for additional supplies and ammunition.

"Just as he did at the Battle of the Waxxxxa."

Nonsense! Custer rejected the Gatling Guns for what was to be his final campaign because of the inability to transport such cumbersome weaponry cross country at the pace he accurately predicted would be required. This decision proved wise; these primitive heavy machine guns would have been useless and indeed counterproductive throughout the march of the Montana column.

Given that Custer divided his command into four battalions at the earlier engagement, his actions at the Waxxxxa have ZERO substantive relevance to LBH tactics; the fact that it was widely accepted among the officer corps that Custer had abandoned Major Joel Elliot's contingent at Waxxxxa in the face of a post-cavalry"victory" counterattack by Indians encamped nearby is cited to account for Benteen's hatred of his commader at LBH. Your conflation of the facts of the battle and the opinions of it formed afterward is born either of ignorance or intentional misdirection.

Mr. Purvis cites, "[General Terry] gave Lt. Col. Custer explicit instructions to lead the Seventh Cavalry up the nearby Rosebud River to arrive no sooner than 26 June to allow Gibbon’s troops, slowed by the Gatling Gun Division, time to take up their positions.

"Custer paid little heed to General Terry’s instructions and soon after departing up the Rosebud, headed directly for the valley of the Little Big Horn making forced marches late into the night and starting again before dawn.

"Not to mention the fact that he totally disobeyed orders, and even though fully aware of a larger force, nevertheless split his smaller force."

Again, the Purvis/Bugliosi phenomenon rears its ugly head. Permit me to quote, verbatim, the most relevant portion of those instructions:

"It is impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them." (emphasis added)

Thus Custer hardly "totally disobeyed orders." Mr. Purvis again chooses crass simple-mindedness (as opposed to elegant simplicity) to direct his "analysis" -- and in so doing, by the way, he demonstrates his contempt for the intellects of his readers on this forum.

If, Mr. Purvis, your grasp of the battle at LBH and its relevant antecedents and consequences, in tandem with your inability and/or unwillingness to offer fair and full analysis of those events, are utilized as a litmus test for the value of your treatments of the JFK assassination ...

Well, I've made my judgment, and I invite others here to make their own.

Charles

Edited June 17, 2007 by Charles Drago

[Ron Ecker]

Charles,

I'm not familiar with the details of Custer's Last Stand, but based on what you have said, I wonder how Benteen could have been someone's "paid agent." That would imply some plan to be carried out by Benteen, a preconceived way to do Custer in. But Benteen's betrayal of Custer seems to have been by fortuitous circumstance, a consequence of Custer's own tactical decisions, rather than conspiratorial planning.

Ron

[Bernice Moore]

Four days before Dallas, in Tampa, this is what the SS was doing during the motorcade.

Two men riding the bumper AND there is a 3rd man sitting in the front seat.

Any shot through the windshield would have nailed this guy and JFK would not have been a viable target.

The photo won't upload right now. I will try to edit it in later.

Any luck with that photo, Chuck? I believe it DOES matter what the arrangement was on other days.

And I would like to take this opportunity to welcome Vince to the forum. I really appreciate your groundbreaking work on the Secret Service's actions that day. Their actions are a bitter pill to swallow. I believe that is why they got away with it for so long. Who could believe they would do such a thing?

But Vince, take it easy on Ms. Baker , ok? Her story does not make or break this case and it would only serve to exonerate Oswald.

************************

In case you could not find the photos Chuck, ...Peter.....

Here are a couple from Tampa, Florida, taken 4 days before Dallas....

Full protection......

And Vince as always, you are the SS extraordinaire....

B....

Edited June 17, 2007 by Bernice Moore

[Charles Drago]

Charles,

I'm not familiar with the details of Custer's Last Stand, but based on what you have said, I wonder how Benteen could have been someone's "paid agent." That would imply some plan to be carried out by Benteen, a preconceived way to do Custer in. But Benteen's betrayal of Custer seems to have been by fortuitous circumstance, a consequence of Custer's own tactical decisions, rather than conspiratorial planning.

Ron

Ron,

Legitimate question.

The situation is complex. All we can say with certainty is that Benteen received Custer's order to "come on" and was in a position to do so. He instead chose to linger at what is known now as The Morass. When he joined Reno's whipped battalion some 4 to 5 miles southwest of what would come to be known as Last Stand Hill, Benteen's column was fresh and unbloodied.

The Reno/Benteen position was not being pressured. Captain Weir stood dumbfounded at Benteen's refusal to move. Custer was vollying, almost certainly in an effort to pinpoint his position and underscore the urgent need for reinforcement.

At the peak of his frustration, Weir disobeyed a direct order to stand down, mounted his company, and began a movement toward Custer which ultimately amounted to too little, too late. The high hillock that today bears his name marks the Weir sally's farthest progress. Strong forces to his front and flank, sufficient to threaten a single company, drove him back to Benteen.

In retrospect, Benteen came up with all sorts of nonsense to justify his disobedience of a direct order in the face of the enemy. Today, we remain at a loss to explain his decision; the common worst-cast scenario holds that his hatred of Custer clouded his judgment.

We also know that in June of 1876 the American public's sympathy for the plight of the noble savage was impacting political will to come up with and execute a final solution to the "Indian problem." The defeat -- if not massacre -- of the Boy General by bloodthirsty savages, it could have been argued, would help move public opinion in an anti-Indian direction.

Further, Ulysses Grant harbored great hatred for Custer insofar as the latter had been a prime mover in the legal action taken against Orville Grant, the president's brother, related to stealing materials intended for delivery to reservations.

Would Custer have won the day had Reno pressed his attack on the village? Indian combatants later said as much. His cowardly "retreat" stands as one of the keys to the sealing of Custer's fate; Benteen's disobedience is the other.

Would Custer's battle plan, under optimum conditions, have prevailed? Impossible to say with certainty. But if, as the most recent scholarship indicates, his plan had evolved on the battlefiled to focus on the capture of women and children to be used to force the warriors to stand down, and if Benteen had moved forward to bedevil the camp as Custer made that move ...

My point: Mr. Purvis's tired and wholly discredited views of the events, and his eagerness to see them in a vacuum, would be easily dismissable as just so much armchair commanding were it not for the context of their presentation in this forum.

Was there a high-level, deep political plot against Custer? Did Benteen, under instructions to do so, see an opportunity to insure Custer's defeat by making excuses not to obey his commander's order -- even if Benteen did not envision the wholesale slaughter that would be the result of his perfidy, but expected only a sound thrashing of his blood enemy?

What did Weir know about these events? Was his death at a tender age due to natural causes related to alcoholism, or was his an assisted passing?

Alas, we can but speculate. It's the stuff of grand drama.

Charles

[Ron Ecker]

And what later became of Benteen?

[Thomas H. Purvis]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Armstrong_Custer

Custer graduated from West Point, last of a class of 34 cadets, in 1861, just after the start of the Civil War.

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Comment: Not unlike most other wars, to include Vietnam, "cannon fodder" was needed.

In addition! Anyone who has done a little follow-up, is aware of exactly how poorly in "Tactics" Cadet Custer did in schooling.

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Promoted at an early age to brigadier general, and later demoted to Lt. Colonel.

Three days prior to the Battle of Gettysburg, General Meade promoted Custer from first lieutenant to brevet brigadier general (temporary rank) of volunteers. Despite having no direct command experience, he became one of the youngest generals in the Union Army at age 23.

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Most historians are aware of the fact that Custer's rapid promotion during the Civil War was initially the result of an administrative error which "jumped" him to the rank of Brevet General.

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Custer's style of battle sometimes bordered on reckless or foolhardy. He often impulsively gathered up whatever cavalrymen he could find in his vicinity and led them personally in bold assaults directly into enemy positions. One of his greatest attributes during the Civil War was luck and he needed it to survive some of these charges.

Custer led a mounted charge of the 1st Michigan Cavalry, breaking the back of the Confederate assault, foiling Lee's plan. Custer's brigade lost 257 men at Gettysburg, the highest loss of any Union cavalry brigade.[4]

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In 1866, Custer was mustered out of the volunteer service, reduced to the rank of captain in the regular army.

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At the request of Maj. Gen. Phillip H. Sheridan, a bill was introduced into congress to promote Custer to major general, but the bill failed miserably. Custer was offered command of the 10th U.S. Cavalry (otherwise known as the Buffalo Soldiers) with the rank of full colonel, but turned the command down in favor of a lieutenant colonelcy of the 7th U.S. Cavalry and was assigned to that unit at Fort Riley, Kansas. His career took a brief detour in 1867 when he was court-martialed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for being AWOL. Abandoning post to return to his wife, along with 10 other soldiers and suspended for one year

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Most historians are also aware of the fact that were it not for Custer's wife (& her efforts), he most probably would have never been allowed to continue with military service.

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Which brings us to the 7th Cavalry.

And, for those who may have interest in such things, the 7th operated out of Ft. Sill, OK and one can go to Snow Hall into the Historical Files and find much that is written about Custer & the 7th, to include much of the facts of the Battle of the Waxxxxa.

For which Custer should have also been Court Martialed.

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Waxxxxa_River

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Although Custer's abilities have little to do with the assassination of JFK, historicaly, studying Custer in many ways mirrors the study of the JFK assassination.

Even in this supposedly "enlightened" age of the internet, there remain many who for whatever reason, can neither see nor accept the simple facts.

Last time that I checked, Custer was made a "Hero" !

The Battle of the Waxxxxa did this, as well as the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

Neither of which have been completely and factually demonstrated.

Last time that I checked, JFK was made a "Hero" due to PT 109, when in fact, as the Commander of the boat, he most probably should have been court martialed.

Now, in addition to some mythological giant conspiracy to assassinate JFK on the part of the US Government, we now have a somewhat similiar claim as regards to Custer and his demise.

I would suppose that the Souix (including others) were the designated scapegoats in this matter as well, and actually had nothing to do with the death of Custer.

George Armstrong Custer was what is referred to as a "Hot Dog"!

Survive, and one becomes famous.

Get killed in some foolish charge and/or attack and one still becomes famous.

The prime problem being that a considerable number of others also get killed either way.

The "Fix Bayonet & Charge" mentality still existed among many of those Commanders during the Vietnam era. They had to demonstrate their abilities (at the cost of many good lives I might add), in order to move on up the ladder.

In Custer's case, the Civil War was over and all that was left was the "Indian Wars". And, not unlike the comments of many Commanders in Vietnam:

"It may not be much of a war but it's the only one we've got"!

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One can fool all of the people some of the time and some of the people all of the time, but one can not fool all of the people all of the time.

Custer actually fooled no one! He merely made a tactical fool of himself and got a considerable number of others killed in doing so.

However! Since the Indians could not read or write, in this case, the "loser" got to write the history, aided considerably by the Wife of General Custer.

[Thomas H. Purvis]

Charles,

I'm not familiar with the details of Custer's Last Stand, but based on what you have said, I wonder how Benteen could have been someone's "paid agent." That would imply some plan to be carried out by Benteen, a preconceived way to do Custer in. But Benteen's betrayal of Custer seems to have been by fortuitous circumstance, a consequence of Custer's own tactical decisions, rather than conspiratorial planning.

Ron

Ron,

Legitimate question.

The situation is complex. All we can say with certainty is that Benteen received Custer's order to "come on" and was in a position to do so. He instead chose to linger at what is known now as The Morass. When he joined Reno's whipped battalion some 4 to 5 miles southwest of what would come to be known as Last Stand Hill, Benteen's column was fresh and unbloodied.

The Reno/Benteen position was not being pressured. Captain Weir stood dumbfounded at Benteen's refusal to move. Custer was vollying, almost certainly in an effort to pinpoint his position and underscore the urgent need for reinforcement.

At the peak of his frustration, Weir disobeyed a direct order to stand down, mounted his company, and began a movement toward Custer which ultimately amounted to too little, too late. The high hillock that today bears his name marks the Weir sally's farthest progress. Strong forces to his front and flank, sufficient to threaten a single company, drove him back to Benteen.

In retrospect, Benteen came up with all sorts of nonsense to justify his disobedience of a direct order in the face of the enemy. Today, we remain at a loss to explain his decision; the common worst-cast scenario holds that his hatred of Custer clouded his judgment.

We also know that in June of 1876 the American public's sympathy for the plight of the noble savage was impacting political will to come up with and execute a final solution to the "Indian problem." The defeat -- if not massacre -- of the Boy General by bloodthirsty savages, it could have been argued, would help move public opinion in an anti-Indian direction.

Further, Ulysses Grant harbored great hatred for Custer insofar as the latter had been a prime mover in the legal action taken against Orville Grant, the president's brother, related to stealing materials intended for delivery to reservations.

Would Custer have won the day had Reno pressed his attack on the village? Indian combatants later said as much. His cowardly "retreat" stands as one of the keys to the sealing of Custer's fate; Benteen's disobedience is the other.

Would Custer's battle plan, under optimum conditions, have prevailed? Impossible to say with certainty. But if, as the most recent scholarship indicates, his plan had evolved on the battlefiled to focus on the capture of women and children to be used to force the warriors to stand down, and if Benteen had moved forward to bedevil the camp as Custer made that move ...

My point: Mr. Purvis's tired and wholly discredited views of the events, and his eagerness to see them in a vacuum, would be easily dismissable as just so much armchair commanding were it not for the context of their presentation in this forum.

Was there a high-level, deep political plot against Custer? Did Benteen, under instructions to do so, see an opportunity to insure Custer's defeat by making excuses not to obey his commander's order -- even if Benteen did not envision the wholesale slaughter that would be the result of his perfidy, but expected only a sound thrashing of his blood enemy?

What did Weir know about these events? Was his death at a tender age due to natural causes related to alcoholism, or was his an assisted passing?

Alas, we can but speculate. It's the stuff of grand drama.

Charles

But if, as the most recent scholarship indicates, his plan had evolved on the battlefiled to focus on the capture of women and children to be used to force the warriors to stand down,

Just perhaps you might take the time to read up on "The Rules of Land Warfare" and how these rules came into being.

One of the principal items deals with the usage of "non-combatants" as hostages and as a "shield" between oneself and the enemy.

Like what Custer did at the Battle of the Waxxxxa.

The native americans/indians had never dealt with such an individual with this type lack of moral warfare tactics, and was one of the primary reasons for such hate of "Yellow Hair".

To them, a "Warrior" who hid behind women and children, had no honor or bravery.

[Charles Drago]

I remain most uncomfortable with being cast in the role of "defender" of George Armstrong Custer. Again, and for the record, in my opinion he was a tool of imperialsim and got what he deserved.

But the back story, if you will, of Custer's demise defies simplistic telling.

Apologies to those who find this exchange tedious or otherwise off point for the forum. I'll make this my final word on the subject for now -- but I reserve the right to return fire at a later date.

To take the more cogent of Mr. Purvis's points as he offers them:

First the wikipedia material: All well and good. I would not dream of minimizing the value of studying personal and professional histories in the effort to understand an individual's performance -- especially under pressure. I would submit, though, that to base one's analyses of that performance solely on the quantifiable record and without taking into account exigencies of the moment under scrutiny -- let alone the X-factors of human behavior and intellectual/psychic growth -- inevitably leads to miscalculation and misunderstanding.

Mr. Purvis writes, "Last time that I checked, Custer was made a 'Hero' !

"The Battle of the Waxxxxa did this, as well as the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

"Last time that I checked, JFK was made a 'Hero' due to PT 109, when in fact, as the Commander of the boat, he most probably should have been court martialed."

Indeed, Custer was America's first modern public relations creation, a master at self-promotion and the beneficiary of his widow's impassioned maintenance of her husband's mythic proportions. Libby C. and Jackie K. were nothing if not devoted to their husbands' respective historiographies -- even hagiographies.

Which has WHAT to do exactly, in the case of Custer, with impartial analysis of the facts of LBH?

As for Mr. Purvis's description of the PT 109 episode: That was "out loud," sir.

Mr. Purvis writes, "The 'Fix Bayonet & Charge' mentality still existed among many of those Commanders during the Vietnam era. They had to demonstrate their abilities (at the cost of many good lives I might add), in order to move on up the ladder.

"In Custer's case, the Civil War was over and all that was left was the 'Indian Wars'. And, not unlike the comments of many Commanders in Vietnam:

'It may not be much of a war but it's the only one we've got!'"

Beyond noting that I respect Mr. Purvis's service to his country, I cannot help but conclude that, at least in terms of this Custer exchange and perhaps extending to his JFK work, it apparently negatively impacts his ability to bring fairness and reason to his perspectives.

Mr. Purvis writes, "Since the Indians could not read or write, in this case, the 'loser' got to write the history, aided considerably by the Wife of General Custer."

Agreed. But others helped his story along -- most significantly, those who colored events and misrepresented personalities in order to take full advantage of Custer's fall.

Mr. Purvis writes, "Just perhaps you might take the time to read up on 'The Rules of Land Warfare' and how these rules came into being.

"One of the principal items deals with the usage of 'non-combatants' as hostages and as a 'shield' between oneself and the enemy.

"Like what Custer did at the Battle of the Waxxxxa.

"The native americans/indians had never dealt with such an individual with this type lack of moral warfare tactics, and was one of the primary reasons for such hate of 'Yellow Hair'.

"To them, a 'Warrior' who hid behind women and children, had no honor or bravery."

Now what exactly does this tell us about the deep political context of LBH and Custer's tactics there? Not nearly as much as it tells us about Mr. Purvis's inability to insulate appropriately his scholarship from his feelings.

There are indeed meaningful parallels between the deaths of Custer and Kennedy. And yes, included among them are the countless bone-headed interpretations of these complex events as offered by the ignorati, if such a term may be coined.

For me at least, this subject is exhausted. I cannot claim to have unearthed any but the most circumstantial "evidence" for a Custer conspiracy. But I stand by my guns in terms of my analyses of Custer's tactics at LBH and Benteen's perfidy that day.

And the Waxxxxa doesn't tell us a DAMN thing about what happened in the high plains country of Montana on Sunday, June 25, 1876.

Charles

Edited June 18, 2007 by Charles Drago

[Charles Drago]

And what later became of Benteen?

Honorably discharged. Lived to a ripe old age.

I don't know if his lifestyle was upgraded significantly post-LBH.

Charles

[Thomas H. Purvis]

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/history/custer.asp

AWOL & ordering his own soldiers shot!

Certainly the makings of a good officer and leader here!

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http://law.jrank.org/pages/2594/George-Arm...rtial-1867.html

On the other hand, Custer's treatment of the deserters seems highly questionable, and in retrospect his actions portend the rash behavior that led to the disaster at Little Bighorn in 1876.

http://law.jrank.org/pages/2592/George-Arm...rt-Martial.html

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http://www.goodlandnet.com/history/kidder.htm

Died in the Performance of their duty on or about July 2, 1867, in combat with Sioux and Cheyenne Indians.

Lt. Kidder’s father, a judge living in Dakota Territory, arrived at Ft. Wallace in February of 1868 to recover and claim his son’s body.

Ironically, the dispatch to Custer from General Sherman Chastised Custer for disobeying orders.

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I am without doubt that Lt. Kidder as well as the family members of those other's killed, and all concerned can rest in peace knowing exactly how the essential information which Lt. Kidder and party were carrying actually was.

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Although Custer could see smoke signals during the day and flaming arrows at night, he failed to engage the hostiles because of his large force.

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And one can only guess exactly what this lead to!

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http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa39...207/ai_n9145595

Custer, not unlike many others, was graduated early from the USMA at West Point.

He should not have graduated until 1862. However, due to the Civil War having started, a class of "Junior's" was graduated immediately behind the original 1861 Class of Seniors.

With his outstanding record, no doubt a good thing for Custer, as even with a war going, with his record at the academy he may not have lasted the next year which he should have spent at the Point.

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http://www.lbha.org/Research/terryord.htm

TERRY'S WRITTEN ORDERS TO CUSTER

June 22, 1876

"Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank."

Anyone see anything here that says "proceed up the Little Big Horn River and attack"?

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http://www.linecamp.com/museums/americanwe...last_stand.html

Custer's Last Stand Battle of the Little Big Horn

Historians generally agree that Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer disobeyed General Alfred Terry's orders and split his command of the 7th Regiment of the U. S. Cavalry which numbered over 650 men total into three battalions: A, M, and G were commanded by Major Reno, D, H, and K were under Captain Benteen's command and C, E, F, I and L Cavalry were under Custer's leadership

Lieutenant Colonel Custer chose to ignore his scouts' reports about the size of the Indian encampment

Located on the banks of the Little Big Horn River was the largest concentration of Indians from six tribes that history has ever recorded

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Tom may not be a true "Historian", but neither is he a two-bit wannabe historian either. Especially one who can not seem to get what is documented history, even close to correct.

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http://www.lbha.org/Research/renorep.htm

Previous to this, no division of the regiment had been made since the order had been issued on the Yellowstone annuling wing and battalion organizations, but Custer informed me that he would assign commands on the march.

I assumed command of the companies assigned to me, and, without any definite orders, moved forward with the rest of the column, and well to its left.

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How about that for a well laid out and organized plan?

http://nj.essortment.com/battleofwaxxxx_rfcn.htm

As a start for anyone who may care about what actual & factual history actually is in regards to the American West and the Indian Campaigns.

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You can fool some of the people all of the time and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time.

Edited June 18, 2007 by Thomas H. Purvis

[Don Jeffries]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Armstrong_Custer

Last time that I checked, JFK was made a "Hero" due to PT 109, when in fact, as the Commander of the boat, he most probably should have been court martialed.

Now, in addition to some mythological giant conspiracy to assassinate JFK on the part of the US Government, we now have a somewhat similiar claim as regards to Custer and his demise.

I have no real knowledge of General Custer and his career. However, considering that Tom Purvis seems to be smitten with his own long-winded posts that are often incomprehensible, and Charles Drago seems to a be reasonable, well-informed researcher that I respect, I think I'll just assume Charles is right on this one. As for your comment about JFK and Pt 109, you're just echoing the anti-Kennedy party line. JFK was a more legitimate war hero than any politician of the twentieth century. Even if you blame him for causing his boat to be torpedoed, no one can deny his incredible bravery afterwards. Tugging an injured man by holding the string from his life jacket in his mouth, as he swam for miles, was a fantastic act of heroism. JFK unquestionably SAVED that man's life. How many people can say that?