This Just In: "LBJ didn't want a war in Viet Nam - NSAM 273 a typo"

[Glenn Nall]

i was so very grateful that they posted the transcript along with the video, so i didn't actually have to HEAR the woman's voice, but this is what Rachel Maddow has recently stated (she's such an effin' genius):

MADDOW: Hundreds of thousands of American troops for years and years and years... LBJ didn't want a war in Vietnam. He campaigned against it and said it was a terrible idea. But once he was president... Nixon said he had a 'secret plan' to end the war. He didn't have a secret plan... It started in the 50s and it didn't end until the 70s, and even then it was lost...

she's truly amazing...

[David Josephs]

You may wish to look a little more closely to the author of NSAM 273 - McGeorge Bundy...

This was the man representing the "Sponsors" on the inside and he pushed harder than anyone for this war...

LBJ, like Nixon, was a pawn. If he had been doing what he was supposed to, he would have been assured a 2nd Term. I think the man was simply out of his class when he got what he wanted - the seat in the Oval - and realized he would never be in as much control as he had as Senate Majority leader... that and the Bush's, Harriman, Brown, Root and gang wanted their man Nixon in 1968.

The way was most assuredly cleared for him... Thane Eugene Cesar nods in agreement...

[Glenn Nall]

yes, i can see this... i wonder who's actually NOT out of their class once arriving, to be honest.

it's one thing for us - me - to hear and agree to the idea that the Pres is just a pawn; it's another to find and understand the particulars, the mechanics, the players - sounds like you've got a bit of a grasp of it.

after reading a great 'new' book on the Bay Of Pigs released 2012 and seeing GHWBush's name attached i began accepting that Bush is a player throughout.

Still. LBJ was such a POS. it's hard not to want to blame him for stuff.

[Glenn Nall]

You may wish to look a little more closely to the author of NSAM 273 - McGeorge Bundy...

This was the man representing the "Sponsors" on the inside and he pushed harder than anyone for this war...

LBJ, like Nixon, was a pawn. If he had been doing what he was supposed to, he would have been assured a 2nd Term. I think the man was simply out of his class when he got what he wanted - the seat in the Oval - and realized he would never be in as much control as he had as Senate Majority leader... that and the Bush's, Harriman, Brown, Root and gang wanted their man Nixon in 1968.

The way was most assuredly cleared for him... Thane Eugene Cesar nods in agreement...

and Lansdale...?

[James DiEugenio]

Glenn: Here is the clip

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/06/11/maddow_iraq_mission_creep_an_eerie_echo_of_vietnam.html

It actually was not bad. She is perhaps the first MSM TV host to say that Kennedy would not have expanded the war and his murder allowed LBJ and Nixon to do so.

She also mentions Gordon Goldstein's fine book, Lessons in Disaster. Which is an important book concerning how LBJ turned around Kennedy's policies in Vietnam.

If you don't want to read the book, read my review of it: http://www.ctka.net/reviews/virtual_jfk_3.html

Bundy admitted here that he was wrong and JFK was right about Vietnam. And it was not until later that he saw how misguided LBJ was and then resigned.

Is your quote from her of a different show at a different time?

Edited July 10, 2015 by James DiEugenio

[Glenn Nall]

actually, that's a great point - i didn't think of it in those terms. the MSM have been such knee-biting Fed-humpers nary a one would admit to anything resembling conspiracy; that Maddow did is pretty newsworthy, in reality. maybe if another does so in the next decade we could call it a trend. a "movement," like Arlo incited...

really, that's an important thing.

the fact remains, i'll have nothing to do with any moving pictures of the b***** in my vicinity, much less the sound of her voice.

[Glenn Nall]

Glenn: Here is the clip

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/06/11/maddow_iraq_mission_creep_an_eerie_echo_of_vietnam.html

It actually was not bad. She is perhaps the first MSM TV host to say that Kennedy would not have expanded the war and his murder allowed LBJ and Nixon to do so.

She also mentions Gordon Goldstein's fine book, Lessons in Disaster. Which is an important book concerning how LBJ turned around Kennedy's policies in Vietnam.

If you don't want to read the book, read my review of it: http://www.ctka.net/reviews/virtual_jfk_3.html

Bundy admitted here that he was wrong and JFK was right about Vietnam. And it was not until later that he saw how misguided LBJ was and then resigned.

Is your quote from her of a different show at a different time?

no, that quote was just below the video you sent me in the typed transcript. i'd come across the same webpage (realclearpolitics) an hour ago, looking for something else.

i'll read your review (i'll read the book one day, but there's a line...) - that's how i first saw your name before, a review you wrote of some quack who had at first gained my trust - i thought, "who's this jerk DiEugenio, being so hateful to this guy..." but soon learned you were right, i think. something made me think you were an SBTer, but learned differently.

i like discovering more obscure books, ones that are not so mainstream. easier to tell right off whether they're FOS or not, usually. and they're usually not tempted to follow the crowd's thinking.

peace out

Edited July 10, 2015 by Glenn Nall

[David Josephs]

yes, i can see this... i wonder who's actually NOT out of their class once arriving, to be honest.

it's one thing for us - me - to hear and agree to the idea that the Pres is just a pawn; it's another to find and understand the particulars, the mechanics, the players - sounds like you've got a bit of a grasp of it.

after reading a great 'new' book on the Bay Of Pigs released 2012 and seeing GHWBush's name attached i began accepting that Bush is a player throughout.

Still. LBJ was such a POS. it's hard not to want to blame him for stuff.

I find that reading books about the people yet not about the assassination is very helpful...

As to those who control the presidency: I suggest a copy of THE WISE MEN which I found on Amazon for not very much... It's written by "one of the elite" which winds up making what these men did sound saintly..

some of it was, by most of it was not.

http://www.amazon.com/The-Wise-Men-Friends-World/dp/1476728828

This is a comparison of NSAM263 and 273 highlighting the only changes/deletions - it is claimed this was completed prior to 11/22

---------------------------

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

November 26, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 273

TO: The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Administrator, AID

The Director, USIA

The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned:

1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all U. S. decisions and actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.

2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U. S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963.

3. It is a major interest of the United States Government that the present provisional government of South Vietnam should be assisted in consolidating itself and in holding and developing increased public support. All U.S. officers should conduct themselves width this objective in view.

4. The President expects that all senior officers of the Government will move energetically to insure the full unity of support for established U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Both in Washington and in the field, it is essential that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance that express or implied criticism of officers of other branches be scrupulously avoided in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government and with the press. More specifically, the President approves the following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting, of November 20. The offices of the Government to which central responsibility is assigned are indicated in each case.

5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible we should persuade the Government of South Vietnam to concentrate its efforts, on the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentration should include not only military but political, economic, social, educational and informational effort. We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle but of belief, and we should seek to increase not only the control of hamlets but the productivity of this area, especially where the proceeds can be held for the advantage of anti-Communist forces.

(Action: The whole country team under the direct supervision of the Ambassador.)

6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP account with respect to accounting for ammunition, or any other readjustments which are possible as between MAP and other U. S. defense resources. Special attention should be given to the expansion of the import, distribution, and effective use of fertilizer for the Delta.

(Action: AID and DOD as appropriate. )

7. Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as:

A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam;

B. The plausibility of denial;

C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation;

D. Other international reaction.

Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority.

(Action: State, DOD, and CIA. )

8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be a developed and submitted for approval by higher authority for military operations up to a line up to 50 kilometers inside Laos, together with political plans for minimizing the international hazards of such an enterprise. Since it is agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings should pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should include a redefined method of political guidance for such operations, since their timing and character can have an intimate relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos.

(Action: State, DOD, and CIA.)

9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon that country. In particular a plan should be developed using all available evidence and methods of persuasion for showing the Cambodians that the recent charges against us are groundless.

(Action: State.)

10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired that we should develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels. In short, we need a more contemporary version of the Jorden Report, as powerful and complete as possible.

(Action: Department of State with other agencies as necessary.)

s/ McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

cc:

Mr. Bundy

Mr. Forrestal

Mr. Johnson

NSC Files

(page 3 of 3 pages)

[DECLASSIFIED - was classified TOP SECRET

Auth: EO 11652

Date: 6-8-76

By: Jeanne W. Davis

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ]

11/21/63

DRAFT

TOP SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 263

The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned:

1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all decisions and U. S. actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.

2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U. S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963.

3. It is a major interest of the United States Government that the present provisional government of South Vietnam should be assisted in consolidating itself and in holding and developing increased public support. All U.S. officers should conduct themselves with this objective in view.

4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and in the field.

More specifically, the President approves the following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting of November 20. The office or offices of the Government to which central responsibility is assigned is indicated in each case.

5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible we should persuade the Government of South Vietnam to concentrate its efforts, on the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentration should include not only military but political, economic, social, educational and informational effort. We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle but of belief, and we should seek to increase not only our control of land but the productivity of this area wherever the proceeds can be held for the advantage of anti-Communist forces.

(Action: The whole country team under the direct supervision of the Ambassador.)

6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP account with respect to accounting for ammunition, or any other readjustments which are possible as between MAP and other U. S. defense resources. Special attention should be given to the expansion of the import distribution and effective use of fertilizer for the Delta.

(Action: AID and DOD as appropriate. )

7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action.

(Action: DOD, and CIA. )

8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be a developed for military operations up to a line up to 50 kilometers inside Laos, together with political plans for minimizing the international hazards of such an enter- prise. Since it is agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings should pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should provide an alternative method of political liaison for such operations, since their timing and character can have an intimate relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos.

(Action: State, DOD, and CIA.)

9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon that country. In particular, measures should be undertaken to satisfy ourselves completely that recent charges from Cambodia are groundless, and we should put ourselves in a position to offer to the Cambodian a full opportunity to satisfy themselves on this same point.

(Action: State.)

10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired that we should develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels. In short, we need a more contemporary version of the Jorden Report, as powerful and complete as possible.

(Action: Department of State with other agencies as necessary.)

McGeorge Bundy

TOP SECRET

[DECLASSIFIED - was classified TOP SECRET

Auth: EO 12356, Sec. 3.4

Date: 1/21/91

By: SKF, NARA

[Glenn Nall]

so i can assume that what's stricken through in 263 is what was actually in 263 and was changed in 273? even though it's stricken, it's the original wording?

and even though Lansdale wasn't given his life's desire to "run" viet nam, isn't it safe to say he would have been a mover in this thing before hand?

[James DiEugenio]

Glenn: i'll read your review (i'll read the book one day, but there's a line...) - that's how i first saw your name before, a review you wrote of some quack who had at first gained my trust - i thought, "who's this jerk DiEugenio, being so hateful to this guy..." but soon learned you were right, i think. something made me think you were an SBTer, but learned differently.

Oh no. But see, at CTKA we are as hard on the pro conspiracy books as we are on the anti-conspiracy ones. I mean just read my current review of Prof. Souza's book, or especially my work on Waldron and Hartmann. You don't get a pass just because you don't buy the WC baloney. That's not good enough. Especially today after the ARRB declassification process.

[Glenn Nall]

Glenn: i'll read your review (i'll read the book one day, but there's a line...) - that's how i first saw your name before, a review you wrote of some quack who had at first gained my trust - i thought, "who's this jerk DiEugenio, being so hateful to this guy..." but soon learned you were right, i think. something made me think you were an SBTer, but learned differently.

Oh no. But see, at CTKA we are as hard on the pro conspiracy books as we are on the anti-conspiracy ones. I mean just read my current review of Prof. Souza's book, or especially my work on Waldron and Hartmann. You don't get a pass just because you don't buy the WC baloney. That's not good enough. Especially today after the ARRB declassification process.

as well you should be. WC bs is worse for the cause than LN bs, by far. if a CTer is legitimate, he or she should demand research and publication be as integrous as it can be. the "bad guys" don't need more fodder and ammo. they create enough of their own.

we only hurt ourselves with shoddy work and theory. it's amazing that this even needs to be pointed out, but it does.

[Glenn Nall]

i was so very grateful that they posted the transcript along with the video, so i didn't actually have to HEAR the woman's voice, but this is what Rachel Maddow has recently stated (she's such an effin' genius):

MADDOW: Hundreds of thousands of American troops for years and years and years... LBJ didn't want a war in Vietnam. He campaigned against it and said it was a terrible idea. But once he was president... Nixon said he had a 'secret plan' to end the war. He didn't have a secret plan... It started in the 50s and it didn't end until the 70s, and even then it was lost...

she's truly amazing...

one of the reasons I'm guilty (and others) of jumping to conclusions on this is the quickness with which 273 was presented. I'm not schooled enough to know that Bundy was the driver, but it clearly came from inside as it happened so fast.

It's crucial for me to remember that there are SO many moving parts up there and just because we see one move doesn't mean it wasn't "moved"... this machinery is what appears to be something that eventually takes us back outside of the white house, to other places...

[Brian Schmidt]

and even though Lansdale wasn't given his life's desire to "run" viet nam, isn't it safe to say he would have been a mover in this thing before hand?

Lansdale was out of the picture by this time (he retired November 1, 1963), and didn't agree with the conventional thinking of most military brass about Vietnam at the time. He actually agreed much more with Kennedy on Vietnam and Kennedy was even influenced by Lansdale's thinking on the subject. He sparred with the likes of Krulak and LeMay and as a result, Maxwell Taylor was instrumental in his "early retirement."

[David Josephs]

so i can assume that what's stricken through in 263 is what was actually in 263 and was changed in 273? even though it's stricken, it's the original wording?

and even though Lansdale wasn't given his life's desire to "run" viet nam, isn't it safe to say he would have been a mover in this thing before hand?

Yes Glenn... the crossed out text in red shows what 263 was before the changes...

It really is quite simple.

Anyone offering up anything FROM the WCR or HSCA or the ARRB needs to authenticate it. Period.

If we are asked to take the word of the intelligence agency producing said evidence, don't, they are bound by the same rules of evidence as the rest of us.

---------------

Brian - you've really only just touched on the story if you're ending Landsdale's Vietnam presence with his retirement...

First he's put into the "Food for Peace" program as a consultant and then:

Lansdale continued to advocate a non-military solution to Vietnam and in 1965, under orders from President Lyndon B. Johnson, the new US ambassador in Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, put Lansdale in charge of the "pacification program" in the country. As Newsweek reported: " Lansdale is expected to push hard for a greater effort on the political and economic fronts of the war, while opposing the recent trend bombing and the burning of villages."

In February 1966 Lansdale was removed from his position in control of the pacification program. However, instead of giving the job to a Vietnamese, William Porter, was given the post. Lansdale was now appointed as a senior liaison officer, with no specific responsibilities.

That's CIA speak for "he's working for us but just not officially"...

[Jon G. Tidd]

Nixon spoke publicly about a secret plan to end the Viet Nam War in 1968, during the presidential contest.

In the 1968 election, Americans chose between two old-line politicians: Nixon, a re-tread in some respects but still a good campaigner, and Humphrey, a VP tied to Johnson.

It was hardly a choice. In some respects. Americans chose Nixon over Humphrey (i.e., the Johnson surrogate).