Jim Root

Summary of a Speech by Lee Harvey Oswald Jesuit House of Studies, Spring Hill College Mobile, Alabama-July 27, 1963 Source: CE 2649 WC Volume XXV Robert J. Fitzpatrick who spoke to several students who attended the speech prepared the following summary. The summary was prepared after Fitzpatrick learned of Oswald's arrest in connection with the assassination of JFK. On Saturday, July 27, 1963, a relative of Lee Oswald, a member of the community at the Jesuit House of Studies, asked Mr. Oswald if he would address the scholastics on his experiences in Russia. The request was not unusual, for the scholastics try from time to time to have either prominent persons or others who have something interesting to relate speak to the scholastics on their experiences. Because Mr. Oswald was an American who had gone to live in Russia and who had returned, obviously for a reason, it was thought that he might be able to communicate the nature of the Russian people themselves better than any official reports might. Those who went to listen to him expected to hear a man who had been disillusioned with Soviet communism and had chosen America to it. What they heard was only partially this. The major points of Mr. Oswald's address and details from it are given below, probably never in verbatim form, but always true to his intent, at least as he was heard by a number of people. He worked in a factory in Minsk. When he applied for permission to live in the Soviet Union, the Russian authorities had assigned him to a fairly well advanced area, the Minsk area. He said that this was a common practice: showing foreigners those places of which Russians can be proudest. The factory life impressed him with the care it provided for the workers. Dances, social gatherings, sports were all benefits for the factory workers. Mr. Oswald belonged to a factory-sponsored hunting club. He and a group of workers would go into the farm regions around Minsk for hunting trips. They would spend the night in the outlying villages, and thus came to know Russian peasant life too. In general, the peasants were very poor, often close to starvation. When the hunting party was returning to Minsk, it would often leave what it had shot with the village people because of their lack of food. He spoke of having even left the food he had brought with him from town. In connection with the hunting party, he mentioned that they had only shotguns, for pistols and rifles are prohibited by Russian law. Some details of village life: In each hut there was a radio speaker, even in huts where there was no running water or electricity. The speaker was attached to a cord that ran back to a common receiver. Thus the inhabitants of the hut could never change stations or turn off the radio. They had to listen to everything that came through it, day or night. In connection with radios, he said that there was a very large radio-jamming tower that was larger than anything else in Minsk. More about factories: factory meetings were held which all had to attend. Everyone attended willingly and in a good frame of mind. Things came up for discussion and voting, but no one ever voted no. The meetings were, in a sense, formalities. If anyone did not attend, he would lose his job. Mr. Oswald said that he had met his wife at a factory social. The workers, he said, were not against him because he was an American. When the U-2 incident was announced over the factory radio system, the workers were very angry with the United States, but not with him, even though he was an American. He made the point that he disliked capitalism because it's foundation was the exploitation of the poor. He implied, but did not state directly, that he was disappointed in Russia because the full principals of Marxism were not lived up to and the gap between Marxist theory and the Russian practice disillusioned him with Russian communism. He said, "Capitalism doesn't work, communism doesn't work. In the middle is socialism and that doesn't work either". After his talk, a question and answer period followed. Some questions and his answers: Q: How did you come to be interested in Marxism? To go to Russia? A: He had studied Marxism, became convinced of it and wanted to see if it had worked for the Russian people. Q: What does atheism do to morality? How can have morality without God? A: No matter whether people believe in God or not, they will do what they want to. The Russian people don't need God for morality; they are naturally very moral, honest, faithful in marriage. Q: What is the sexual morality in comparison with the United States? A: It is better in Russia than in the United States. Its foundation there is the good of the state. Q: What impressed you most about Russia? What did you like most? A: The care that the state provides for everyone. If a man gets sick, no matter what his status is, how poor he is, the state will take care of him. Q: What impresses you most about the United States? A: The material prosperity. In Russia it is very hard to buy even a suit or a pair of shoes, and even when you can get them, they are very expensive. Q: What do the Russia people think of Khrushchev? Do they like him better than Stalin? A: They like Khrushchev much better. He is a working man, a peasant. An exampleOf the kind of things he does: Once at a party broadcast over the radio, he had a Little too much to drink and he began to swear over the radio. That's the kind of thing he does. Q: What about religion among the young people in Russia? A: Religion is dead among the youth of Russia. Q: Why did you return to the United States? (The question was not asked in exactly this way, but this is its content). A: When he saw that Russia was lacking, he wanted to come back to the United States, which is so much better off materially. (He still held the ideals of the Soviets, was still a Marxist, but did not like the widespread lack of material goods that the Russians had to endure). More points that were contained in the main part of his talk: He lived in Russia from 1959 to 1962. He only implied that the practice in Russia differed from the theory, he never stated it directly. The policy of Russia was important: After death of Stalin, a peace reaction. Then an anti-Stalin reaction. A peace movement leading up to the Paris conference. The U-2 incident and its aftermath. At the factory he had trouble at first meeting the men. They did not accept him at first. He joined a hunting club. He belonged to two or three discussion groups. He praised the Soviets for rebuilding so much and for concentrating on heavy industry. He said at one point that if the Negroes in the United States knew that it was so good in Russia, they'd want to go there. Another question: Q: Why don't the Russians see that they are being indoctrinated and that they are being denied the truth by these jamming stations? A: They are convinced that such contact would harm them and would be dangerous. They are convinced that the state is doing them a favor by denying them access to Western radio broadcasts. I think it is interesting to note that the U-2 incident and the Paris Peace Summit "were contained in the main part of his talk". Were they important to him for a reason? Jim Root

Tim I speculate that Oswald was identified by US intelligence agencies as a person who, in reality, actually wanted to go to the Soviet Union. By assigning him to a radar unit in Astugi, Japan, where U-2's were flying, information could be passed to the Soviets, that could be attributed to Oswald because of the position he held (I like the fact that Posner provides information on this in Case Closed). By providing him with "help" in traveling to the Soviet Union (see Serendipity) the US would be allowing him to be examined by the Soviets. If they, the Soviets, believed he was not a US agent the information that had been gleaned from him becomes believable. A perfect "Orchid Man". Untill..... Two problems arise. Francis Gary Powers lives when his U-2 goes down and Lee Harvey Oswald decides to return to the US. When you look into Nosenko cross reference his contact with the CIA to Oswald's receiving his exit visa from the Soviet Union and departure. A remarkable coincidence in timing. You might also want to cross reference General Edwin Walker's "Pro Blue" program and dimise to the State Departments handling of Oswald's original contact with the US Embassy that begins his process of returning to the United States. Coincidence? Jim Root

Tim You left out #8: Before he left for the Soviet Union, oswald was used by US intellience agencies in a capacity that could be discribed as Angleton's "Orchid" man. He himself not realizing that he was being used to pass information to the Soviets. http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/diary/angleton.htm Jim Root

Tim I will continue to research Maj. Gen. Edwin Walker and all aspects of his life. To me he is a Forrest Gump type of character. To often at the center of 20th Century History......To often to be just coincidence. Jim Root

John I enjoy fishing a great deal and have always noticed that those who wish to put their line in the water the quickest are not always the most successful. An old friend of mine, Bob Motts (who has since passed away), taught me a great deal about the patience necessary to be a good fisherman. He would walk around the area that we had selected to fish in and would observe the insects that were flying, capturing a few of the more prevalent with a small net. He would then go to his tackle box and take out an old book about insects and how to tie particular "flys" to match the "hatch" in the area. While it would take Bob longer to get his line in the water he was always just a little more successful in his endevors than the rest of us young kids. As a college student my mentor, Dr. Berguson, delighted in humbling us with his vast knowledge of history and challenging us to constantly learn more while keeping an open mind to the fact that most people carry their own prejudices into their studies and therfore their writings. He emphasized his point by circulating copies of Civil War era newspapers that would tell the story of a particular battle from various authors differing points of view. Usually, only the title would tip you off to the fact that you were reading about the same battle, the stories being told were so different. Stories do change with time (just as we observe different insects at different times of the day and in the different seasons) but not facts (the fish). If we wish to have a successful fishing expedition, I belive, we need to take alot of time learning about the insects, sudying how to tie the right flys and then being productive with the flys we have chosen to tie.. Jim Root

Tim I personally feel that Oswald had to be silenced because of his backround (ie his trip to Russia involvement with U-2 etc.) I think Antti's comment, "Tim, since you asked: I'd say Ruby's task was to silence Oswald. Recalling statements by the witnesses such as the police officer who attended to Ruby in Jail that evening, said that immediately after the Oswald shooting Ruby was nervous, sweating and seemed to be very restless all together. Moments later the word came out that Oswald had expired in the OR. This cop told Ruby something to the effect of: Well Ruby, looks like you are going to get the chair, Oswald died of his wounds. After this statement, Ruby became calm, cool, collected and seemed very much relaxed compared to his state earlier. My interpretation is that due to his behavior and actions, (including the shooting of Oswald) Ruby was assigned the task of silencing Oswald. Although he wasn't a professional killer (he probably didn't think of shooting him in the head), he was able to carry out the task after all. Whether his motivation was money, threats or whether he "owed someone big time", I don't know. Something, or someone drove him to do it. Furthermore, he had a little help from his friend(s) in the DPD. By this I mean access to the garage and DPD HQ etc." is telling. A few weeks ago I began a Topic about the two "reporters" with Oswald at the DPD the night of the assassination. As of this time I have had no response but thought I would provide this additional information. What are your thoughts about these portions of the Warren Report. I heard a great deal of the newsreel tape was distroyed but I have never seen the two men with "badges," such as are discribed by John Rutledge. "At 9:00 p.m. he (Ruby) telphoned Ralph Paul but was unable to persuade Paul to join him at synagogue services." (WC Report, Pg 338) "From his apartment, Ruby drove to Temple Shearith Israel, arriving near the end of a 2-hour service which had begun at 8 p.m." (WC Report, Pg 339) "Ruby is known to have made his way, by about 11:30 p.m., to the third floor of the Dallas Police Department..." (WC Report, Pg 339) 'I saw Jack and two out-of-state reporters, whom I did not know, leave the elevator door and proceed toward those television cameras, to go around the corner where Captain Fritz's office was. Jack walked between them. these two out-of-state reporters had big press cards pinned on their coats, great big red ones, I think they said "President Kennedy's Visit to Dallas-Press", or something like that. And Jack didn't have one, but the man on either side of him did. and they walked pretty rapidly from the elevator area past the policeman, and Jack was bent over like this-writting on a piece of paper, and talking to one of the reporters, and pointing to something on the peice of paper, he was kind of hynched over." Newsman John Rutledge (WC Report Pg 340) "Detective Augustus M. Eberhardt, who also recalled that he first saw Ruby earlier in the evening, said Ruby carried a note pad and professed to be a translator for the Israeli press." (WC Report Pg. 342) He accompanied the newsmen to the basement to observe Oswald. His presence at the midnight news conference is established by television tapes and by at least 12 witnesses." (WC Report Pg. 342) When questioned about his (Ruby) lie detector test this information is gleaned from the administrator of the test: (Testimony of Bell P. Herndon) Mr. Specter. Will movement or speaking cause a variation in the tracings ordinarily, Mr. Herndon? Mr. Herndon. Yes. Body movements or speaking any phrase or sentence would certainly cause changes in the physiological patterns as displayed on the polygraph. I made notation of that, however, and that explains the changes On question No. 2, Mr. Ruby did show a significant drop in the relative blood pressure. This question pertained to: "Did you go to the Dallas police station at any time on Friday November 22, 1963, before you went to the synagogue? I asked him about this question later when he responded "No," and I noticed a physiological change. He advised that there was some man by the name of John Rutledge, and he made an association with proceedings at the trial which I have reason to believe this gentleman, John Rutledge, differed with what Ruby stated as to when he went to the synagogue.Due to the nature of this change, however, it is possible that it was caused by a body motion that I failed to detect during the actual response. I notice that the cardio pen dropped all the way down and hit what we call the limit screws. This frequently is caused by a sudden rapid shift in his body position, and this change could have been caused by a body movement. With regard to the other relevant questions in this series, question 4, question 6, and question 8, there was no significant deviation from his normal physiological patterns. (Warren Commission Hearings: Vol. XIV - Page 594) It seems Jack Ruby may have been nervous about answering questions that delt with Rutledge's, who identified him with the "two out of state" newsmen, testimony and his trip to the synagogue. This particular question created a "a physiological change" or was it just body motion that Herndon, " failed to detect during the actual response"? Ruby and the part he plays in the death of Oswald are facts. Why and who had influence in his actions is tricky. The two "out of state" reporters are, in my opinion, important to this issue but seldom discussed! Jim Root

Tim I always like to write using "if" and "perhaps." "When it really comes right down to it, what evidence is there to suggest that any one organization or person was involved in the assassination?" Lee Harvey Oswald is one person that was involved. "If" there was a conspiracy, he is the single most important person needed to cover up or protect the actual conspirators. Without Oswald being in Dealy Plaza the assassination story, as we know it, would not exist. The Warren Commission is the "one organization" that must have been involved in either a conspiracy or a coverup of the actual events that occured on November 22, 1963 "if" a coverup or a conspiracy did in fact occure. "Perhaps" their report is the single best piece of evidence that we have while searching for clues of a coverup. It is, you might say, the crime scene, "if" in fact a crime was taking place. "But, other than the foregoing, what other evidence exists to link any other person or group with any conspiracy?" The Warren Report itself does not work without the attempted assassination of Major General Edwin Anderson Walker being attributed to Lee Harvey Oswald. Either this event occured in fact or it was a fabrication that supported the conspiracy. "If" it actually was designed to support the conspiracy the resignation of Walker from the Army in 1961 and his anti-Kennedy stance would have to be suspect as well. This would make the conspiracy plan a multi-year operation that predates Oswald's return to the US from the Soviet Union. In fact Walker's Pro Blue program troubles that led to his resignation is timed to Oswald's application with the State Department to return to the United States (just by coincidence). Walker's involvement with Military Intelligence and Maxwell Taylor is, in my belief, without question. Did Oswald meet Walker on October 9/10, 1959 is, in my belief, a legitimate speculation. Was Walker "nervous" about being tied to the assassination on November 22/23, 1963? I believe so (interview and pulication of article in German Newspaper). Why? A connection to Lee Harvey Oswald? "See Jeff Morley's article "What Jane Roman Said". There is absolute proof the CIA had something going on with LHO right up until 6 weeks prior to the assassination. CIA HQ even lied to their own Mexico City office, saying they had known nothing about Oswald since just after he returned from the Soviet Union. They also obviously withheld information from the Warren Commission and the HSCA." Excellent article! In the article we find that Tom Karamessine came into the CIA as a foot soldier in the Greek Civil War. Not surprizing that Edwin Walker was running the Greek Desk at the Pentagon during that "covert" War. I believe that Oswald's CIA records predate October 1959 and the same names, Angleton, Helms, etc. knew it. We now know it predates what the Warren Commission wanted us to know. Would we all come to different conclusions if the Oswald file did, in fact, predate October 1959? Would an earlier date preempt a Cuban connection that would lead to new or additional speculations? Jim Root PS Since the article gives credence to the belief that "persons higher up" on the food chain were well aware of Oswald as a "person of interest," would those same people have known to run the motorcade past the School Book Depository?

Tim I will take a different position from your comment: "Unless you take the position that LBJ plotted JFK's murder, how, pray tell, did LBJ know, immediately after the assassination, that Castro was not behind it?" If Oswald was an intelligence asset of the US (my thought is that he had been an unknowing agent along the lines of Angleton's "orchid man"), the CIA or others in the government (McCloy and Dulles types) would have known a great deal about Oswald and when he was captured, would have to cover the trail wihtout creating an international conflict. Their greatest fears may have been realized....a person who had been used by the US to penetrate a Soviet intelligence cell....who may in fact be well known to Soviet intelligence....shoots first at his contact (Edwin Walker)....then kills the President. If allowed to speak freely in a trial the Cold War covert methods employed by the US and the Soviets would be exposed to the world. Everyone is involved without being involved. Everyone has motive to cover up the crime because the truth is more unbelivable than the fiction. LBJ was in an unwinable position....especially if the truth was similar to what I suggest. The whole mess could be pinned on Johnson just as easily as anyone else and the public would buy it. The only thing that the CIA types would not want you to believe is that Oswald did it and had a motive. That could unravel everything. Negligence that leads to murder is, I believe, what brings a charge of manslaughter. And there was plenty of guilt to go around in this case. Jim Root

Who influenced Ruby. From the record, begining with Ruby's actions on the night of the 22nd: "At 9:00 p.m. he telphoned Ralph Paul but was unable to persuade Paul to join him at synagogue services." (WC Report, Pg 338) "From his apartment, Ruby drove to Temple Shearith Israel, arriving near the end of a 2-hour service which had began at 8 p.m." (WC Report, Pg 339) "Ruby is known to have made his way, by about 11:30 p.m., to the third floor of the Dallas Police Department..." (WC Report, Pg 339) 'I saw Jack and two out-of-state reporters, whom I did not know, leave the elevator door and proceed toward those television cameras, to go around the corner where Captain Fritz's office was. Jack walked between them. these two out-of-state reporters had big press cards pinned on their coats, great big red ones, I think they said "President Kennedy's Visit to Dallas-Press", or something like that. And Jack didn't have one, but the man on either side of him did. and they walked pretty rapidly from the elevator area past the policeman, and Jack was bent over like this-writting on a piece of paper, and talking to one of the reporters, and pointing to something on the peice of paper, he was kind of hynched over." Newsman John Rutledge (WC Report Pg 340) "Detective Augustus M. Eberhardt, who also recalled that he first saw Ruby earlier in the evening, said Ruby carried a note pad and professed to be a translator for the Israeli press." (WC Report Pg. 342) He accompanied the newsmen to the basement to observe Oswald. His presence at the midnight news conference is established by television tapes and by at least 12 witnesses." (WC Report Pg. 342) When questioned during his lie detector test we find this information: (Testimony of Bell P. Herndon) Mr. Specter. Will movement or speaking cause a variation in the tracings ordinarily, Mr. Herndon? Mr. Herndon. Yes. Body movements or speaking any phrase or sentence would certainly cause changes in the physiological patterns as displayed on the polygraph. I made notation of that, however, and that explains the changes On question No. 2, Mr. Ruby did show a significant drop in the relative blood pressure. This question pertained to: "Did you go to the Dallas police station at any time on Friday November 22, 1963, before you went to the synagogue? I asked him about this question later when he responded "No," and I noticed a physiological change. He advised that there was some man by the name of John Rutledge, and he made an association with proceedings at the trial which I have reason to believe this gentleman, John Rutledge, differed with what Ruby stated as to when he went to the synagogue. Due to the nature of this change, however, it is possible that it was caused by a body motion that I failed to detect during the actual response. I notice that the cardio pen dropped all the way down and hit what we call the limit screws. This frequently is caused by a sudden rapid shift in his body position, and this change could have been caused by a body movement.With regard to the other relevant questions in this series, question 4, question 6, and question 8, there was no significant deviation from his normal physiological patterns. (Warren Commission Hearings: Vol. XIV - Page 594) It seems Jack Ruby may have been nervous about answering questions that dealt with Rutledge's, who identified him with the "two out of state" newsmen testimony and his trip to the synagogue. This particular question created a "a physiological change" or was it just body motion that Herndon, " failed to detect during the actual response"? If not body movement that Herndon "failed to detect during the actual response" then Ruby may have lied about a question that centered on his trip to the synagogue and the identity of the two "out of state" reporters. To my knowledge nobody has ever identified the "two out of state" newsmen who wore "big press cards pinned on their coats, great big red ones, I think they said 'President Kennedy's Visit to Dallas-Press." Seems they might be the key to who may have held influence over Ruby. Jim Root

Excerpts from a piece I did a year or so ago. THE WHITE HOUSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.11130 APPOINTING A COMMISSION TO REPORT UPON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President of the United States, I hereby appoint a commission to ascertain, evaluate and report upon the facts relating to the assassination of the late President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination. The Commission shall consist of – The Chief Justice of the United States, Chairman; Senator Richard B. Russell; Senator John Sherman Cooper; Congressman Hale Boggs; Congressman Gerald R. Ford; The Honorable Allen W. Dulles; The Honorable John J. McCloy. The purposes of the Commission are to examine the evidence developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any additional evidence that may hereafter come to light or be uncovered by federal or state authorities; to make such further investigation as the Commission finds desirable; to evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding such assassination, including the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination, and to report to me its findings and conclusions. The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own procedures and to employ such assistants, as it deems necessary. Necessary expenses of the Commission may be paid from the “Emergency Fund for the President”. All Executive departments and agencies are directed to furnish the Commission with such facilities, services and cooperation as it may request from time to time. LYNDON B. JOHNSON With these few words President Johnson established the Warren Commission on November 29, 1963. At the same time the Commission was being created a story was circulating in Germany suggesting that Lee Harvey Oswald had, seven months before the assassination of John F. Kennedy, shot at Major General Edwin Anderson Walker. As the day progressed the FBI would request that the Dallas Police Department forward to them what was left of a bullet that had been recovered from a wall in the home of General Walker. The same police department that lost control of the investigation of the assassination of the President was soon to lose the evidence from this earlier crime. Was this just a coincidence? Lyndon Johnson was himself, in an eerie position. He had obtained the Presidency he had sought all of his life when a youthful, vigorous John F. Kennedy was cut down by an assassin’s bullet in Johnson’s own Home State of Texas. A cloud of suspicion would forever be attached to the legitimacy of the Johnson Presidency unless and until the public believed he was not involved, in any way with the assassination. Johnson quickly became convinced that if a commission could be formed, whose membership consisted of men with impeccable character, to investigate the assassination it would exonerate him and the government, that he now led, of any wrong doing. A priority of substantial proportion! From the record: “By his order of November 29 establishing the Commission, President Johnson sought to avoid parallel investigations and to concentrate fact finding in a body having the broadest national mandate. As Chairman of the Commission, President Johnson selected Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, former Governor and attorney general of the State of California. From the U.S. Senate, he chose Richard B. Russell, Democratic Senator from Georgia and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, former Governor of, and county attorney in, the State of Georgia, and John Sherman Cooper, Republican Senator from Kentucky, former county and circuit judge, State of Kentucky, and U.S. Ambassador to India. Two members of the Commission were drawn from the U.S. House of Representatives: Hale Boggs, Democratic U.S. Representative from Louisiana and majority whip, and Gerald R. Ford, Republican, U.S. Representative from Michigan and chairman of the House Republican Conference. From private life, President Johnson selected two lawyers by profession, both of whom have served in the administrations of Democratic and Republican Presidents: Allen W. Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence, and John J. McCloy, former President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, former U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, and during World War II, the Assistant Secretary of War.” (Warren Commission Report, Pg. X) It was obviously not a coincidence that these men were selected. When I began to put my research into words I realized that, in retrospect, several key questions were raised, within my minds eye, that related to the appointment of commissioners and the work presented by the Commissioners in the first pages of their summary report. First, the two “private life” members of the Commission seemed to have an unlimited amount of time to spend working with the commission. On the surface this would seem to be a beneficial asset for the group as a whole. Their ability to manipulate their schedule to the task at hand allowed them the opportunity to exercise a great deal of influence on the outcome of the final Report. Allen W. Dulles and John J. McCloy were both attorneys with a great deal of insider influence gained by their years of government service in a variety of influential capacities. They are both considered to have been dominating personalities of their times capable of welding significant power in Washington D.C, upon Wall Street and around the world. Allen Dulles, as former head of the CIA, is a natural focal point of any search for covert government involvement in suppressing information about the assassination of Kennedy. John J. McCloy, on the other hand, was a man whom I knew little about. To be objective in my research I needed to learn a great deal more about John J. McCloy before I could reasonably evaluate his influence upon the commission. The second bit of information that attracted my attention was a statement within Executive Order 11130: “The purposes of the Commission are to examine the evidence developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation…” The commissioners were not tasked with developing leads on their own. Nor would they be challenged to examine leads that could or might have been developed by the CIA or the various organizations within the military intelligence community. Chairman Earl Warren: “Now I think our job here is essentially one for the evaluation of evidence as distinguished from being one of gathering evidence, and I believe that at the outset at least we can start with the premise that we can rely upon the reports of the various agencies that have been engaged in investigating the matter, the F.B.I., the Secret Service, and others that I may not know about at the present time. (From page 1 of the first closed session of the Warren Commission, December 5, 1963, transcribed by Cakie Dyer, Reporter for the Office of the United States Attorney, Washington D.C.) Within the accumulated forty years of independent research that has been collected, we find that there is a lot of speculation that Lee Harvey Oswald was associated with the intelligence community. Is it just a coincidence that the FBI, which was not the agency tasked with engaging in international espionage, was the only agency given the authority to develop leads? For example, while the military was willing to answer the questions posed by the FBI and the commissioners about Oswald’s military career, military intelligence would not be offering leads to be examined: Additional investigative requests, where appropriate “, were handled by Internal Revenue Service, Department of State, and the military intelligence agencies with comparable skill.” (Warren Report forward Page xii) The same was true for the CIA. The CIA had been led by Allen Dulles, now a member of the commission, for over ten years. Could Allen Dulles be expected to be completely objective in investigating what could amount to his former agencies own shortcomings? Semantics, maybe, but with artful attorneys John J. McCloy and Allen Dulles involved within this process and recognizing their historical ability as word smiths, I found myself constantly scrutinizing the language that was used within the Warren Report. My scrutiny would focus upon a search for errors and omissions within the report and the relationship to the events surrounding Lee Harvey Oswald’s life and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Thirdly, with the previous statement in mind, the first line of President Johnson’s directive would haunt me: “Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President of the United States, I hereby appoint a commission to ascertain, evaluate and report upon the facts relating to the assassination of the late President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination.” Could the investigation have been legally manipulated with these words? Is it possible that the security of the United States was more important than revealing the total truth about the assassination of John F. Kennedy? To avoid the potential exposure of some sensitive, or embarrassing, involvement by Lee Harvey Oswald in intelligence operations was the task of the commissioners limited to reporting only: “…upon the facts relating to the assassination of the late President John F. Kennedy..." By changing a few words, President Johnson might have said: “ …I hereby appoint a commission to ascertain, evaluate and report upon the facts relating to the accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald and the subsequent violent death of President John F. Kennedy…” With a simple realignment of the words the direction of the commission, therefore its findings, may have been very different. Were the words used to “scope” the commission’s work, carefully selected to misdirect the investigation away from particular elements about the person accused of committing this crime? Would this be legal? National Security Council 10/2 and NSC 5412 both state, when speaking of covert operations, “…all activities conducted pursuant to this directive which are so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” If Oswald had been an intelligence asset and I believe he was, these “secret laws” would provide the legal cover needed to bury the information. Because of their past involvement within the intelligence community Allen Dulles and John J. McCloy would both be aware of these secrete rules. Yes the deck was stacked before the Warren Commissions Report was dealt.

If the Warren Commissioners were aware of and subjected to the rules established by National Security Council 10/2 and NSC 5412 (because Oswald had been used in a covert operation by the US Government, see information listed under the topic "Shanet"), would these “conspirators” be happy the American public, forty years later, did not believe that Oswald was an involved party? National Security Council 10/2 and NSC 5412 defined "covert operations" as ". . . all activities conducted pursuant to this directive which are so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Jim Root PS Attorneys McCloy and Dulles may very well have played a role in writting NSC 10/2

Al "What does this have to do with the Kennedy Assassination of 18 years earlier, it is to put it into perspective with the evidence that is surfacing and the connections those are making to link non-American Personnel to the hands-on operation in DP." You wonder about what happened 18 years after the assassination and I am intrigued by things that happened years before. One of the successful counter-intelligence operations of WWII was to lead the Germans to believe that an invasion of Norway was imminent. The Germans were producing "heavy water" at a Norwegian hydro electric plant that was needed to process uranium for their atomic bomb. By the end of the War some 300,000 German troops were in Norway, equal to some 20 German Divisions unavailable for the Eastern or Western Fronts. Two of the groups that planners invisioned for an operation into Norway were the 99th Battalion (seperate) and the First Special Services Force. The 99th was made up of Norwegian speaking Americans (William Colby being one of these men) and Norwegian nationals while the FSSF was a joint Canadian American Force. They were both trained to engage in covert operations and, what made them different than most units, they were of mixed nationalities that were united to attain a single goal. Needless to say the experiment worked and became the model for the type of covert training that you speak of above. Why I like looking back at this is because Major General Edwin Walker, the other guy the Warren Commission says Lee Harvey Oswald attempted to assassinate, led both these outfits by the end of the war and continued training or supporting similar groups throughout his career. Just a coincidence? Jim Root

Tim I am perhaps too simple, in my complex way. Taylor perhaps just wanted to assure that he got his Vietnam War. Who knows a successful conclusion and he might become President (Caesar) himself. Just a thought, Jim Root "That really is military thinking, something I've never understood." Let's see: General George Washington General Andrew Jackson General William Henry Harrison General Zachary Taylor Captain Abraham Lincoln (Black Hawk War) General Ulysses S. Grant General Rutherford B. Hayes General James A Garfield Quartermaster General Chester A. Arthur Col. Benjamin Harrison Col. Theodore Roosevelt Sec. of War William Howard Taft General Dwight Eisenhower In the 1960's the thought of a "war hero" becoming president was not out of the question. How about PT 109, Artillery Captain Truman, "Tail Gunner Joe," Fighter pilot Bush (1 and 2 for that matter) or "Swift Boats?" Many believed Colin Powell could have been president. If MacArthur had not "faded away" he may have been elected. The military has been a stepping stone to the presidency since the inception of this country. Taylor was already a World War II war hero and a Korean War Hero. Eisenhower had turned Taylor's dream of being presidential timber into kindling. The successful rise of Kennedy provided Taylor with a new platform and new opportunities. An end to the escalation in Vietnam would distroy any possibility of Max achieving his rightful "triumph." (mens rea) Jim Root

Pamela I may be a simpleton on this so please bare with me. If the rear seat is elevated it changes the height difference between the two, in this case, victims. If the "the jump seats were so much lower than the back seat" doesn't this do the exact same thing (i.e. make a greater height differencial perceived/real)? I guess my real guestion is, and I believe this is part of what you were getting at, does anyone, in fact, know what the actual height differential was at the time of the shooting? Jim Root

Shanet I knew I could count on you. Your ability to locate all that documented information so quickly is greatly appreciated! It supports my senario of Oswald as a shooter who had a motive, not a lone nut. Motive was, to reveal to the American public what was really going on. It explains why Oswald was so adament about having Abt as the one attorney that could argue his case. It also explains why Oswald had to die, to keep plausible deniability plausible. It still leaves the question of who knew where Oswald was working and who put the motorcade past that place. The number of people starts to get very small. Some interesting points: The most thorough critique of the system emerged from the hearings conducted in 1960(1961 by the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, known as the Jackson Subcommittee for its chairman, Senator Henry Jackson. Cutler and NSC Executive Secretary James Lay testified in support of the effectiveness of the system, but their testimony was offset by that of former Truman administration officials such as George Kennan, Paul Nitze, and Robert Lovett. They argued that foreign policy was being made by a passive President influenced by a National Security Council rendered virtually useless by ponderous, bureaucratic machinery. Basically, they argued, the NSC was a huge committee, and suffered from all the weaknesses of committees. Kennan, Nitze and Lovett were all three McCloy friends and/or appointees. they argued for tighter control by a much smaller, I will call them, "power elite." Kennedy went along with these suggestions. President Kennedy, who was strongly influenced by the report of the Jackson Subcommittee and its severe critique of the Eisenhower NSC system, moved quickly at the beginning of his administration to deconstruct the NSC process and simplify the foreign policy-making process and make it more intimate.... Early in 1961 the President appointed General Maxwell Taylor to serve as his military representative and provide liaison with the government agencies and defense and intelligence establishments on military-political issues confronting the administration. Taylor in effect took up the role filled by Admiral Leahy in the Roosevelt White House. General Taylor advised the President on military matters, intelligence, and Cold War planning The man in the know, General Taylor advised the President on military matters, intelligence, and Cold War planning. Within the Kennedy administration he had access to the complete menu of available information and information is power, something Taylor relished! The McCloy men helped to tighten the control and Taylor was the benificiary. Interesting. President Eisenhower also created the position of staff secretary with the responsibility to screen all foreign policy and military documents coming to the President. While Colonel Andrew Goodpaster held this position, he tended to eclipse the Special Assistant for National Security. Goodpaster is the person who got Eisenhower's approval for the doomed Powers U-2 flight. Eisenhower sometimes used trusted NSC staffers to serve as an intermediary to gain information outside the chain of command as he did with Colonel Goodpaster during the Quemoy crisis in 1955. General Edwin Walker was on the scene as well during this Quemoy crisis sent by Army Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor. Thanks again for the supporting information, Jim Root

Shanet If Oswald had been used by the Office of Policy Coordination in 1959 (and/or beyound) would, in your opinion, a cover-up of his (Oswald's) activities within the Warren Report be mandated by a 10/2 type senario? Jim Root

Shanet The 1948 NSC 10/2 created the Office of Policy Co-Ordination headed by Frank Wisner and required that the "Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them." By the way I believe that Edwin Walker, during the Greek Civil War, was acting under the 10/2 provision. What is the date on NSC 5412? Jim Root

Shanet This is what I know..... National Security Council Directive 10/2, "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," dated June 18, 1948, assigned to the CIA the responsibility to "conduct covert operations," including "direct action, including sabotage ... assistance to underground movements ... [and] guerrillas." In 1948, Directive 10-2 formally authorized the CIA to conduct covert operations, which were defined as those "which are so planned and executed that any US [sic] Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US [sic] Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them." See National Security Council Directive 10-2, § 5, June 18, 1948 Oswald in Russia????? Would be interesting to read the exact verbage as an insight to what the framers of the CIA etc. (McCloy) had in mind at the time of the inception of this NSC. Jim Root

Pamela "No. The WC considered the seat height in its lowest position." How does this fit with the Connally testimony? Jim Root

Shanet Do you have a copy of NSC Directive 10/2? If so could you post a copy and any backround info you may have. Thanks, Jim Root

Wim Perhaps more than just "foxes investigating who plundered the henhouse." "World War II witnessed the development of sophisticated electronic psychological operations for the first time, and the production of leaflets on a magnitude many times that of World War I... "It took the personal intervention of Assistant Secretary for War John J. McCloy to establish, in June 1941, the Army Psychological Branch, as it was then called - later changed to Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2." Army Psywarriors A History of U.S. Army Psychological Operations by Stanley Sandler Jim Root

McCloy's role in intelligence dates back to before WWII. Although never a very famous person he is a central figure in the History of the 20th Century. His position on the Warren Commission was, in my humble opinion, no coincidence. The Creation of the Central Intelligence Group Michael Warner Editor's Note: This article is an expanded version of one that appeared under the same title in the fall 1995 edition of Studies in Intelligence. January 1996 marked the 50th anniversary of President Truman's appointment of the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), CIA's institutional predecessor. The office diary of the President's chief military adviser, Flt. Admr. William D. Leahy, records a rather unexpected event on 24 January 1946: At lunch today in the White House, with only members of the Staff present, RAdm. Sidney Souers and I were presented [by President Truman] with black cloaks, black hats, and wooden daggers, and the President read an amusing directive to us outlining some of our duties in the Central Intelligence Agency [sic], "Cloak and Dagger Group of Snoopers."(1) With this whimsical ceremony, President Truman christened Admiral Souers as the first DCI. The humor and symbolism of this inauguration would have been lost on many veterans of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the big intelligence and covert action agency that Truman had suddenly dismantled at the end of World War II, only four months earlier. CIG inevitably suffered (and still suffers) from comparisons with OSS. The Group began its brief existence with a phony cape and a wooden dagger. It was a bureaucratic anomaly with no independent budget, no statutory mandate, and staffers assigned from the permanent departments of the government. Nevertheless, CIG grew rapidly and soon gained a fair measure of organizational autonomy. The Truman administration invested it with the two basic missions of strategic warning and coordination of clandestine activities abroad, although interdepartmental rivalries prevented the Group from performing either mission to the fullest. Strategic warning and clandestine activities are the two basic missions of today's CIA.(2) Historical accounts of Truman's dissolution of OSS and creation of CIG have concentrated on assigning credit to certain actors and blame to their opponents and rivals.(3) The passage of time and the gradually expanding availability of sources, however, promise to foster more holistic approaches to this subject. The problem for the Truman administration that fall of 1945 was that no one, including the President, knew just what he wanted, while each department and intelligence service knew fully what sorts of results it wanted to avoid. With this context in mind, it is informative to view the formation of CIG with an eye toward the way administration officials preserved certain essential functions of OSS and brought them together again in a centralized, peacetime foreign intelligence agency. Those decisions created a permanent intelligence structure that, while still incomplete, preserved some of the most useful capabilities of the old OSS while resting on a firmer institutional foundation. From War to Peace Before World War II, the US Government had not seen fit to centralize either strategic warning or clandestine activities, let alone combine both missions in a single organization. The exigencies of global conflict persuaded Washington to build a formidable intelligence apparatus in Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan's Office of the Coordinator of Information (renamed OSS in 1942), America's first nondepartmental intelligence arm. As such, it encountered resentment from such established services as the FBI and the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff (better known as the G-2). General Donovan advocated the creation of a limited but permanent foreign intelligence service after victory, mentioning the idea at several points during the war.(4) President Roosevelt made no promises, however, and, after Roosevelt's death in April 1945 and the German surrender that May, President Truman felt no compulsion to keep OSS alive. He disliked Donovan (perhaps fearing that Donovan's proposed intelligence establishment might one day be used against Americans).(5) The President and his top military advisers also knew that America's wartime intelligence success had been built on cryptologic successes, in which OSS had played only a supporting role. Signals intelligence was the province of the Army and Navy, two jealous rivals that only barely cooperated; not even General Donovan contemplated centralized, civilian control of this field. Truman could have tried to transform OSS into a central intelligence service conducting clandestine collection, analysis, and operations abroad. He declined the opportunity and dismantled OSS instead. Within three years, however, Truman had overseen the creation of a central intelligence service conducting clandestine collection, analysis, and operations abroad. Several authors have concluded from the juxtaposition of these facts that Truman dissolved OSS out of ignorance, haste, and pique, and that he tacitly admitted his mistake when he endorsed the reassembly of many OSS functions in the new CIA. Even Presidential aide Clark Clifford has complained that Truman "prematurely, abruptly, and unwisely disbanded the OSS."(6) A look at the mood in Washington, however, places Truman's decision in a more favorable light. At the onset of the postwar era, the nation and Congress wanted demobilization--fast. OSS was already marked for huge reductions because so many of its personnel served with guerrilla, commando, and propaganda units considered extraneous in peacetime. Congress regarded OSS as a temporary "war agency," one of many bureaucratic hybrids raised for the national emergency that would have to be weeded out after victory.(7) Indeed, early in 1945 Congress passed a law requiring the White House to seek a specific Congressional appropriation for any new agency operating for longer than 12 months.(8) This obstacle impeded any Presidential wish to preserve OSS or to create a permanent peacetime intelligence agency along the lines of General Donovan's plan--a path made even slicker by innuendo, spread by Donovan's rivals, that the General was urging the creation of an "American Gestapo."(9) Truman had barely moved into the Oval Office when he received a scathing report on OSS. (Indeed, this same report might well have been the primary source for the abovementioned innuendo) A few months before he died, President Roosevelt had asked an aide, Col. Richard Park, Jr., to conduct an informal investigation of OSS and General Donovan. Colonel Park completed his report in March, but apparently Roosevelt never read it. The day after Roosevelt's death, Park attended an Oval Office meeting with President Truman. Although no minutes of their discussion survived, Park probably summarized his findings for the new President; in any event, he sent Truman a copy of his report on OSS at about that time. That document castigated OSS for bumbling and lax security, and complained that Donovan's proposed intelligence reform had ''all the earmarks of a Gestapo system.'' Park recommended abolishing OSS, although he conceded that some of the Office's personnel and activities were worth preserving in other agencies. OSS's Research and Analysis Branch in particular could be ''salvaged'' and given to the State Department.(10) Donovan himself hardly helped his own cause. OSS was attached to the Executive Office of the President but technically drew its orders and pay from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Donovan refused to compromise on his proposals with JCS representatives delegated to study postwar intelligence needs. He insisted that a permanent intelligence arm ought to answer directly to the President and not to his advisers.(11) The Joint Chiefs had already rescued Donovan once, when the G-2 had tried to subsume OSS in 1943. This time the White House did not ask the Joint Chiefs' opinion. The JCS stood aside and let the Office meet its fate. Taking the Initiative The White House evidently concluded that the problem was how to create a new peacetime intelligence organization without Donovan and his Office. Many senior advisers in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations believed that the nation needed some sort of permanent intelligence establishment. The Bureau of the Budget took up this issue shortly before President Roosevelt's death, presenting itself to Roosevelt as a disinterested observer and creating a small team to study the government's intelligence requirements and recommend possible reforms. Soon after he took office, Truman endorsed the Budget Bureau's effort.(12) In August, the Budget Bureau began drafting liquidation plans for OSS and other war agencies, but initially the Bureau assumed that liquidation could be stretched over a period of time sufficient to preserve OSS's most valuable assets while the Office liquidated functions and released personnel no longer needed in peacetime. On 27 or 28 August, however, the President or his principal "reconversion" advisers--Budget Director Harold D. Smith, Special Counsel Samuel Rosenman, and Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion John W. Snyder--suddenly recommended dissolving OSS almost immediately.(13) Bureau staffers had already conceived the idea of giving a part of OSS, the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A), to the State Department as "a going concern." The imminent dissolution of OSS meant that something had to be done fast about the rest of the Office; someone in the Budget Bureau (probably the Assistant Director for Administrative Management, Donald C. Stone) quickly decided that the War Department could receive the remainder of OSS "for salvage and liquidation.''(14) Stone told frustrated OSS officers on 29 August that important functions of the Office might survive: Stone stated that he felt that the secret and counterintelligence activities of OSS should probably be continued at a fairly high level for probably another year. He said he would support such a program.(15) Snyder and Rosenman endorsedthe Budget Bureau's general plan for intelligence reorganization and passed it to Truman on 4 September 1945.(16) Donovan predictably exploded when he learned of the plan, but the President ignored Donovan's protests, telling Harold Smith on 13 September to "recommend the dissolution of Donovan's outfit even if Donovan did not like it."(17) Within a week, the Budget Bureau had the requisite papers ready for the President's signature. Executive Order 9621 on 20 September dissolved OSS as of 1 October 1945, sending R&A to State and everything else to the War Department. The Order also directed the Secretary of War to liquidate OSS activities "whenever he deems it compatible with the national interest."(18) That same day, Truman sent a letter of appreciation (drafted by Donald Stone) to General Donovan.(19) The transfer of OSS's R&A Branch to the State Department, the President told Donovan, marked "the beginning of the development of a coordinated system of foreign intelligence within the permanent framework of the Government." The President also implicitly repeated Stone's earlier assurances to OSS, informing Donovan that the War Department would maintain certain OSS components providing "services of a military nature the need for which will continue for some time."(20) OSS was through, but what would survive the wreck? The President probably gave little thought to those necessary "services of a military nature" that would somehow continue under War Department auspices. Truman shared the widespread feeling that the government needed better intelligence, although he provided little positive guidance on the matter and said even less about intelligence collection (as opposed to its collation). He commented to Budget Director Harold Smith in September 1945 that he had in mind "a different kind of intelligence service from what this country has had in the past," a "broad intelligence service attached to the President's office."(21) Later remarks clarified these comments slightly. Speaking to an audience of CIA employees in 1952, Truman reminisced that, when he first took office, there had been: ...no concentration of information for the benefit of the President. Each Department and each organization had its own information service, and that information service was walled off from every other service.(22) Truman's memoirs subsequently expanded on this point, explaining what was at stake: I have often thought that if there had been something like coordination of information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. In those days [1941] the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew.(23) These comments suggest that Truman viewed strategic warning as the primary mission of his new intelligence establishment, and as a function that had to be handled centrally. His remarks also suggest that he innocently viewed intelligence analysis as largely a matter of collation; the facts would speak for themselves, if only they could only be gathered in one place. That is what he wanted his new intelligence service to do. The Budget Bureau itself had not proposed anything that looked much clearer than the President's vague notions. Bureau staffers wanted the State Department to serve as the President's "principal staff agency" in developing "high-level intelligence," after taking the lead in establishing the "integrated Government-wide Program.''(24) At the same time, however, Budget Bureau officers wanted the departments to continue to conduct their own intelligence functions, rather than relegating this duty to "any single central agency." A small interagency group, "under the leadership of the State Department," could coordinate departmental intelligence operations.(25) This proposed program rested on two assumptions that would soon be tested: that the State Department was ready to take the lead, and that the armed services were willing to follow. In the meantime, Donovan fumed about the President's decision yet again to Budget Bureau staffers who met with him on 22 September to arrange the details of the OSS's dissolution. An oversight in the drafting of EO 9621 had left the originally proposed termination date of 1 October unchanged in the final signed version, and now Donovan had less than two weeks to dismantle his sprawling agency. One official of the Budget Bureau subsequently suggested to Donald Stone that the War Department might ease the transition by keeping its portion of OSS functioning "for the time being," perhaps even with Donovan in charge. Stone preferred someone other than Donovan for this job and promised to discuss the idea with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy on 24 September.(26) Two days later, McCloy stepped into the breach. He glimpsed an opportunity to save OSS components as the nucleus of a peacetime intelligence service. A friend of Donovan's, McCloy had long promoted an improved national intelligence capability.(27) He interpreted the President's directive as broadly as possible by ordering OSS's Deputy Director for Intelligence, Brig. Gen. John Magruder, to preserve his Secret Intelligence (SI) and Counterespionage (X-2) Branches "as a going operation" in a new office that McCloy dubbed the "Strategic Services Unit" (SSU): This assignment of the OSS activities...is a method of carrying out the desire of the President, as indicated by representatives of the Bureau of the Budget, that these facilities of OSS be examined over the next three months with a view to determining their appropriate disposition. Obviously, this will demand close liaison with the Bureau of the Budget, the State Department, and other agencies of the War Department, to insure that the facilities and assets of OSS are preserved for any possible future use....The situation is one in which the facilities of an organization, normally shrinking in size as a result of the end of fighting, must be preserved so far as potentially of future usefulness to the country.(28) The following day, the new Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, confirmed this directive and implicitly endorsed McCloy's interpretation, formally ordering Magruder to "preserve as a unit such of these functions and facilities as are valuable for permanent peacetime purposes" [emphasis added].(29) With this order, Patterson postponed indefinitely any assimilation of OSS's records and personnel into the War Department's G-2. General Magruder soon had to explain this unorthodox arrangement to sharp-eyed Congressmen and staff. Rep. Clarence Cannon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, asked the general on 2 October about the OSS contingents sent to the State and War Departments and the plans for disposing of OSS's unspent funds (roughly $4.5 million). Magruder explained that he did not quite know what State would do with R&A; when Cannon asked about the War Department's contingent, the general read aloud from the Secretary of War's order to preserve OSS's more valuable functions "as a unit."(30) Two weeks later, staffers from the House Military Affairs Committee asked why the War Department suddenly needed both SSU and the G-2: General Magruder explained that he had no orders to liquidate OSS (other than, of course, those functions without any peacetime significance) and that only the Assistant Secretary of War [McCloy] could explain why OSS had been absorbed into the War Department on the basis indicated. He said he felt, however,...that the objective was to retain SSU intact until the Secretary of State had surveyed the intelligence field and made recommendations to the President. Committee staff implicitly conceded that the arrangement made sense, but hinted that both SSU and the remnant of R&A in the State Department ought to be "considerably reduced in size."(31) Reducing SSU is just what was occupying the unit's new Executive Officer, Col. William W. Quinn: The orders that General Magruder received from the Secretary of War were very simple. He was charged with preserving the intelligence assets created and held by OSS during its existence and the disbandment of paramilitary units, which included the 101 Detachment in Burma and Southeast Asia and other forms of intelligence units, like the Jedburgh teams, and morale operations, et cetera. My initial business was primarily liquidation. The main problem was the discharge of literally thousands of people. Consequently, the intelligence collection effort more or less came to a standstill....(32) Magruder did his best to sustain morale in the Unit, keeping his deputies informed about high-level debates over "the holy cause of central intelligence," as he jocularly dubbed it. He suggested optimistically that SSU would survive its current exile: In the meantime I can assure you there is a great deal of serious thinking in high places regarding the solution that will be made for OSS [sSU]. I hope it will prove fruitful. There is a very serious movement under way to reconstruct some of the more fortunate aspects of our work.(33) Despite Magruder's and Quinn's efforts, the House of Representatives on 17 October lopped $2 million from the OSS terminal budget that SSU shared with the Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS), its erstwhile sister branch now set in the Department of State. The cut directly threatened both SSU and IRIS. The Truman administration eventually convinced Congress to drop the House's recision and even increase funding for both pieces of OSS, but not until after several anxious weeks in SSU and the War Department.(34) Institutional enemies closer to hand also seemed to threaten SSU's independence that fall. Just before Thanksgiving, McCloy warned Secretary Patterson that only "close supervision" could prevent the War Department bureaucracy from taking "the course of least resistance by merely putting [sSU] into what I think is a very unimaginative section of G-2 and thus los[ing] a very valuable and necessary military asset."(35) General Magruder told his lieutenants that SSU was quietly winning friends in high places, but repeatedly reminded staffers of the need for discretion, noting that "some people" did not like SSU "and the less said about [the Unit] the better."(36) Controversy and Compromise McCloy (with Stone's help) had precipitated an inspired bureaucratic initiative that would eventually expand the Truman administration's options in creating a new intelligence establishment. Amid all the subsequent interagency debates over the new intelligence establishment that autumn, SSU preserved OSS's foreign intelligence assets for eventual transfer to whichever agency received this responsibility. The Truman administration waged a heated internal argument over which powers to be given to the new central intelligence service. The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, who quickly agreed that they should oversee the proposed office, stood together against rival plans proposed by the Bureau of the Budget and the FBI. The Army and Navy, however, would not accept the State Department's insistence that the new office's director be selected by and accountable to the Secretary of State. The armed services instead preferred a plan outlined by the JCS back in September, which proposed lifting the new intelligence agency outside the Cabinet departments by placing it under a proposed National Intelligence Authority.(37) This was the plan that would soon settle the question of where to place SSU. The JCS had been working on this plan for months, having been spurred to action by Donovan's 1944 campaigning for a permanent peacetime intelligence agency. In September, JCS Chairman William Leahy had transmitted the plan (JCS 1181/5) to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, who sent it on to the State Department, where it languished for several weeks. The plan proposed, among other things, that a new "Central Intelligence Agency" should, among its duties, perform: ...such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished by a common agency, including the direct procurement of intelligence.(38) This artful ambiguity--"services of common concern"--meant espionage and liaison with foreign intelligence services, the core of clandestine foreign intelligence. Everyone involved with the draft knew this, but no one in the administration or the military wanted to say such things out loud; hence, the obfuscation.(39) In any case, here was another function that the drafters of the JCS plan felt had to be performed, or at least coordinated, ''centrally.'' In December 1945, an impatient President Truman asked to see both the State Department and the JCS proposals and decided that the latter looked simpler and more workable. This decision dashed the Budget Bureau's original hope that the State Department would lead the government's foreign intelligence program. Early in the new year, Truman created the CIG, implementing what was in essence a modification of the JCS 1181/5 proposal. He persuaded Capt. (soon to be Rear Admiral) Sidney Souers, the Assistant Chief of Naval Intelligence and a friend of Navy Secretary Forrestal (and Presidential aide Clark Clifford) who had advised the White House on the intelligence debate, to serve for a few months as the first DCI.(40)The CIG formally came into being with the President's directive of 22 January 1946. Cribbing text from JCS 1181/5, the President authorized CIG to: ...perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.(41) Here was the loaded phrase "services of common concern" again, only this time the telltale clause "including the direct procurement of intelligence" had discreetly disappeared. (With minor editing, the phrase would appear yet again in the CIA's enabling legislation, the National Security Act of 1947.) Two days later, on 24 January, Truman invited Admiral Souers to the White House to award him his black cape and wooden dagger. Thanks in part to McCloy's order to preserve OSS's SI and X-2 Branches, the "cloak and dagger" capability--the "services of common concern" mentioned in the President's directive--was waiting in the War Department for transfer to the new CIG. General Magruder quietly applauded Souers's appointment as DCI, explaining to his deputies that SSU might soon be moving: With respect to SSU, we and the War Department are thinking along the same lines: that at such time as the Director [of Central Intelligence] is ready to start operating, this Unit, its activities, personnel, and facilities will become available to the Director, but as you know, the intent of the President's [22 January] directive was to avoid setting up an independent agency. Therefore, the Central Intelligence Group, purposely called the Group, will utilize the facilities of several Departments. This Unit will become something in the way of a contribution furnished by the War Department.(42) Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy had saved the foreign intelligence core of OSS in the SSU; all that was required was for the National Intelligence Authority to approve a method for transferring it. This the NIA did at its third meeting, on 2 April 1946.(43) The actual transfer of SSU personnel began almost as soon as CIG had acquired a new DCI, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, in June 1946. Vandenberg a month later was able to report matter of factly to the National Intelligence Authority that the tiny CIG had begun to take over "all clandestine foreign intelligence activities," meaning the much larger SSU. At that same meeting, Admiral Leahy also reminded participants (in a different context) that "it was always understood that CIG eventually would broaden its scope.(44) From Small Beginnings An eminent historian once remarked that the crowning achievement of historical research is to attain an understanding of how things do not happen. To put it simply, history rarely offers up tidy events and clear motivations. President Truman did not follow a neat plan in founding the CIG. He implicitly imposed two broad requirements on his advisers and departments in the fall of 1945: to create a structure that could collate the best intelligence held by the various departments, and to make that structure operate, at least initially, on funds derived from the established agencies. Indeed, the friction and waste in the process that resulted from this vague guidance prompted complaints that the President had acted rashly in dissolving OSS and ignoring the advice of intelligence professionals like Donovan. In the fall of 1945, the President vaguely wanted a new kind of centralized intelligence service, but his Cabinet departments and existing services knew fairly specifically what kinds of central intelligence they did not want. Between these two realities lay the gray area in which the CIG was founded and grew in 1946. Truman always took credit for assigning CIG the task of providing timely strategic warning and guarding against another Pearl Harbor. CIG acquired its second mission--the conduct of clandestine activities abroad--in large part through the foresight of Donald Stone and John J. McCloy. These two appointees ensured that trained OSS personnel stayed together as a unit ready to join the new peacetime intelligence service. Within months of its creation, CIG had become the nation's primary agency for strategic warning and the management of clandestine activities abroad, and within two years the Group would bequeath both missions to its successor, the CIA. The relationship--and tension--between the two missions (strategic warning and clandestine activities) formed the central dynamic in the unfolding early history of CIA. Many officials thought the two should be handled ''centrally'', although not necessarily by a single agency. That they ultimately were combined under one organization (CIG and then CIA) was due largely to the efforts of McCloy and Magruder. Nevertheless, it is clear from the history of the SSU that high-level Truman administration officials acted with the tacit assent of the White House in preserving OSS's most valuable components to become the nucleus of the nation's foreign intelligence capability. The President's actions do not deserve the charge of incompetence that has been leveled against them, but it does seem justified to conclude that Truman's military advisers deserve most of the credit for the creation of a CIG that could collect as well as collate foreign intelligence. NOTES (1) Diary of William D. Leahy, 24 January 1946, Library of Congress. Admiral Leahy was simultaneously designated the President's representative to the new, four-member National Intelligence Authority (CIG's oversight body). The other members were the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. (2) A recent unclassified statement to CIA employees entitled ''Vision, Mission, and Values of the Central Intelligence Agency'' identified the following as CIA's basic missions:'' We support the President, the National Security Council, and all who make and execute US national security policy by: Providing accurate, evidence-based comprehensive and timely foreign intelligence related to national security; and Conducting counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as directed by the President.'' (3) Several authors describe the founding and institutional arrangements of CIG. Three CIA officers had wide access to the relevant records in writing their accounts; see Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990); Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981); and Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence: October 1950-February 1953 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp. 15-35. See also Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Basic Books, 1983). B. Nelson MacPherson offers thoughtful commentary in "CIA Origins as Viewed from Within," Intelligence and National Security, 10 April 1995, pp. 353-359. (4) Donovan's "Memorandum for the President," 18 November 1944, is reprinted in Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 445-447. (5) Richard Dunlop, Donovan: America's Master Spy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982), pp. 467-468. See also Troy, Donovan and the CIA, p. 267. (6) Clark Clifford, it bears noting, played little if any role in the dissolution of OSS; see Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991, p. 165). William R. Corson calls the affair a "sorry display of presidential bad manners and shortsightedness"; The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (New York: Dial Press, 1977), p. 247. (7) The Bureau of the Budget had warned Donovan in September 1944 that OSS would be treated as a war agency to be liquidated after the end of hostilities. See Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 219-220. (8) The legislation was titled the "Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1945," Public Law 358, 78th Congress, Second Session. (9) For an indication of the mixed Congressional attitudes toward OSS, see Smith, The Shadow Warriors, pp. 404-405. (10) The Park report resides in the Rose A. Conway Files at the Harry S. Truman Library, ''OSS/Donovan'' folder; see especially pp. 1-3 and Appendix III. Thomas F. Troy has pointed to strong similarities between the Park report and Walter Trohan's ''Gestapo'' stories in the Chicago Tribune; see Donovan and the CIA, pp. 267, 282. (11) Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith, pp. 19-21. For more on Donovan's refusal to compromise, see Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 270-271. (12) George F. Schwarzwalder, Division of Administrative Management, Bureau of the Budget, project completion report, "Intelligence and Internal Security Program of the Government" [Project 217], 28 November 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 51 (Bureau of the Budget), Series 39.35, "Progress Reports," Box 181, p. 5. (13) George Schwarzwalder recorded several years later that the Budget Bureau learned on 24 August that OSS would be dissolved; see his 1947 progress report on Project 217, cited above, p. 9. (14) Donald C. Stone, Assistant Director for Administrative Management, Bureau of the Budget, to Harold Smith, Director, "Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and the Transfer of its Activities to the State and War Departments," 27 August 1945, reproduced in C. Thomas Thorne, Jr. and David S. Patterson, editors Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 22-23. Hereinafter cited as FRUS. (15) G.E. Ramsey, Jr., Bureau of the Budget, to Deputy Comptroller McCandless, "Conference on OSS with Don Stone and OSS representatives, Aug. 29," 29 August 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 51 (Bureau of the Budget), Series 39.19, "OSS Organization and Functions," Box 67. (16) Smith, Rosenman, and Snyder to Truman, "Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and the Transfer of its Activities to the State and War Departments," 4 September 1945, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. (17) The quoted phrase comes from Harold Smith's office diary for 13 September 1945, in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York. (18) Executive Order 9621, 20 September 1945, FRUS pp. 44-46 (19) Stone's authorship is noted in Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 246. (20) Harry S. Truman to William J. Donovan, 20 September 1945; Document 4 in Michael Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington, DC: CIA, 1994) p. 15. See also Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 302-303. (21) Harold Smith's office diary entries for 13 and 20 September 1945, Roosevelt Library. (22) Truman's speech is reprinted as Document 81 in Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman, p. 471. (23) Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume II, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 56. (24) Quoted phrases are in Snyder, Rosenman, and Smith to Truman, 4 September 1945. (25) Harold D. Smith to Harry S. Truman, "Transfer of Functions of the Office of Strategic Services," 18 September 1945, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library. (26) G.E. Ramsey, Jr., Bureau of the Budget, to the Assistant Director for Estimates, Bureau of the Budget, "Disposition of OSS," 24 September 1945, FRUS, pp. 51-52. (27) For McCloy's advocacy of a centralized intelligence capability, see Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the American Establishment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 129-130. (28) John J. McCloy to John Magruder, OSS, "Transfer of OSS Personnel and Activities to the War Department and Creation of Strategic Services Unit," 26 September 1945, FRUS, pp 235-236. (29) Robert P. Patterson to John Magruder, 27 September 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 319 (Army Intelligence), Decimal File 1941-48, 334 OSS, box 649, "Strategic Services Unit" folder. (30) US House of Representatives, House Appropriations Committee, "First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Recision Bill, 1946," 79th Cong., First Sess., 1945, pp. 615-625. (31) John R. Schoemer, Jr., Acting General Counsel, Strategic Services Unit, memorandum for the record, "Conference with representatives of House Military Affairs Committee," 19 October 1945, CIA History Staff HS/CSG-1400, item 14, unclassified. (32) William W. Quinn, Buffalo Bill Remembers: Truth and Courage (Fowlerville, MI: Wilderness Adventure Books, 1991), p. 240. (33) SSU Staff Meeting Minutes, 23 October 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 226 (OSS), Entry 190, WASH-DIR-OP-266 (microfilm M1642), Roll 112, folder 1268. General Magruder made his "holy cause" quip at the 29 November meeting. (34) SSU Staff Meeting Minutes for 19 October, 30 October, and 20 December 1945. Harry S. Truman to Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 7 November 1945, reprinted in US House of Representatives, "House Miscellaneous Documents II," 79th Cong., 1st Sess., serial set volume 10970, document 372, with attached letter from Harold D. Smith, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to President Truman, dated 6 November 1945. First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Recession Act, 1946, Public Law 79-301, Title 1, 60 Stat. 6, 7, (1946). (35) McCloy to Patterson, "Central Intelligence Agency," 13 November 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 107 (War Department), Entry 180, Files of the Assistant Secretary of War, box 5, "Intelligence" folder. (36) SSU Staff Meeting Minutes for 1 November, 6 November, and 29 November 1945. (37) Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 297-300, 315, 322. (38) JCS 1181/5 is attached to William D. Leahy, memorandum for the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, "Establishment of a central intelligence service upon liquidation of OSS," 19 September 1945; Document 2 in Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman, p. 5. (39) The term "services of common concern" apparently originated with OSS's General Magruder and was adopted by a JCS study group; Troy, Donovan and the CIA, p. 233. (40) Truman, Memoirs, pp. 55-58. See also William Henhoeffer and James Hanrahan, "Notes on the Early DCIs," Studies in Intelligence (spring 1989), p. 29; also Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 166. (41) President Truman to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 22 January 1946; FRUS, pp. 179-179 (42) SSU Staff Meeting Minutes, 29 January 1946; Magruder praised Souers's appointment at the 24 January meeting. (43) National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIA's third meeting, 2 April 1946, CIA History Staff HS/HC-245, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263 (CIA), History Staff Source Collection. (44) National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIA's fourth meeting, 17 July 1946; Document 13 in Warner, The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 56-59.

Steve "What interests you the most about this case?" The lack of concensus on most things. For example a majority of people believe there was a conspiracy to assassinate John F. Kennedy. A majority of people seem to have a theory that they believe about the assassination. But no one seems to be able to bring a majority to believe in one consistant theory. And no one seems willing to give up on their own theory. The Warren Commissioners did, in my humble opinion, a masterful job of leaving so many unanswered questions open to debate that they successfully hid the forest while putting so many dam trees in the immediate line of sight. Jim Root

Pamela Let me start out by saying I do not believe that Oswald was a “nut.” I also believe there was a conspiracy. With that said I would like to ask some questions of your article and make a few observations. A) “In order to accommodate their thinking that Oswald (LHO) fired all the shots as well as to resolve the issue of there having been no bullet fragments found in either the neck wound of President Kennedy (JFK) or in the back or chest wounds of Governor Connally (JBC) they suggest that the 'magic' bullet found on a stretcher at Parkland Hospital about 2 hours after the assassination, (rather than being planted, as all indications show), created 7 wounds in JFK and JBC and emerged in nearly pristine condition.” “One question I am certain that the doctors must have asked, is simply "where are the bullets"? Only two small fragments were retrieved from JFK's skull, two others from the front of the Presidential Limousine, plus one tiny sliver from the arm of JBC. Only the 'magic bullet' could clearly be connected to the Mannlicher-Carcano (MC) supposedly owned by LHO.” Whoever “planted, as all indications show” the “magic bullet” must have been very happy to find that there were no bullet fragments discovered “in either the neck wound of President Kennedy (JFK) or in the back or chest wounds of Governor Connally (JBC)…” This would suggest that the doctors/nurses etc. that initially worked on Connally were part of the conspiracy. A bullet that would be found in “nearly pristine condition” could only be a part of the cover-up if no bullet fragments were to be found. Since the bullet was discovered before the surgery on Connally was completed, all in attendance in the operating room could be considered suspects in disposing of any unwanted fragments or the “pristine bullet” would never fly as evidence. Conversely if fragments were found the “pristine bullet” could not have been pristine. Do you think fragments were discarded to protect the concept of a “pristine bullet” or that there were no fragments and whoever “planted, as all indications show” the bullet was, some how, sure none would be found? Where did the bullet go that created the “..about an inch, an inch and a quarter long is all…” (Testimony of John Connally) hole in Connally’s left thigh? Once again we have to go to those in the operating room or to the person who “planted, as all indications show” the “magic bullet” to have also removed the left thigh bullet and, as seems logical, to have discarded it. Connally, who was conscious enough to attempt to get out of the limousine at Parkland Hospital does not ever recall someone removing a bullet from his left thigh on the way into surgery. He admittedly was fading in and out of consciousness but how difficult would the removal of a bullet be while he is being wheeled into surgery with his wife at his side? Once again the staff in the operating room are the most likely culprits or the bullet was easily removed by the same person that “planted, as all indications show” it. Logic would seem to indicate that if the “pristine” bullet planter could easily remove the bullet, without being noticed, while Connally is being wheeled into surgery it would be just as easy for that bullet to just fall out on the stretcher and that obviously did not happen because it was “planted, as all indications show.” Do you think the left thigh bullet was easy to remove on the way into the operating room or that it would have required surgery to be removed? So, it would seem possible, we have two distinct groups of conspirators at Parkland Hospital. The bullet planter and the operating room staff that extracted the left thigh bullet and discarded it along with any unwanted bullet fragments. By default they would have to be conspirators because they were acting in concert although independently of each other. Would you agree that those in the Connally operating room could be considered conspirators in this sense? C) “Each scenario of "THE SBT" now, contains the following consistency -- One bullet, CE 399, fired by LHO from the M-C from the 6th floor of the TSBD, caused JFK's back wound and neck wound, as well as all of JBC's wounds to back, chest, wrist and thigh.” “…The HSCA also did a trajectory analysis of the shots. However, when it came to their SB scenario, they only concerned themselves with where the shot had hit JFK, and ignored the subsequent position of JBC.” Taking into account the position of John Connally, in your opinion, from where was the bullet that caused Connally’s left thigh wound fired? Left, right, front or rear? From the right you would have a trajectory analysis that would be very steep because of the side of the limousine and would be inconsistent with the actual wound. From the left you would have Nellie to contend with plus the wound. From the front you have the dashboard and the angle of the wound. From the rear the bullet would have to have traveled through Connally first but that would suggest a single bullet that was “spent” by the time it hit the left thigh. From where did this “magic bullet” come from? D) “In the WC's enthusiasm for truth they had two drawings created of the two limousines -- the Presidential Limousine SS-100-X and SS-679-X that was used in the reenactment. There are numerous measurements shown on them. However, there is one dimension missing -- the height. Of course, that is THE critical dimension for making a comparison between one car and the other.” “…Arlen Specter and Kelley agreed that the clearance from the jump seat to the passenger door was 6 inches. (VH132) They also agreed the difference between the height of the two men was 1 1/2 inches.” “…In addition, the height differential used by the WC was a mere one and 1/2 inches. The HSCA later stated that this difference was 8 cm, or app. 3.5 inches. Quite a difference, don't you think?” The “difference between the height of the two men” is referenced clearly in John Connally’s testimony before the Warren Commission: Mr. SPECTER. What was the relative height of the Jump seats, Governor, with respect to the seat of the President and Mrs. Kennedy immediately to your rear? Governor CONNALLY. They were somewhat lower. The back seat of that particular Lincoln limousine, which is a specially designed and built automobile, as you know, for the President of the United States, has an adjustable back seat. It can be lowered or raised. I would say the back seat was approximately 6 inches higher than the jump seats on which Mrs. Connally and I sat. Mr. SPECTER. Do you know for certain whether or not the movable back seat was elevated at the time? Governor CONNALLY. No; I could not be sure of it, although I know there were---there was a time or two when he did elevate it, and I think beyond question on most of the ride in San Antonio, Forth Worth, Houston, and Dallas, it was elevated. For a while the reason I know is--I sat on the back seat with him during part of the ride, particularly in San Antonio, not in Dallas, but in San Antonio. The wind was blowing, and we were traveling fairly fast, and Mrs. Kennedy preferred to sit on the jump seat, and I was sitting on the back seat part of the time, and the seat was elevated, and I think it was on substantially all the trip. Mr. SPECTER. Was the portion elevated, that where only the President sat? Governor CONNALLY. No: the entire back seat. In reality there was perhaps a six-inch spread of height differences available depending upon how the seat had been adjusted. In other words the seat could have been positioned anywhere up to six inches higher or lower depending on the wishes of the person riding in the rear seat. Did you take the fact that the limousine had an adjustable seat into account when making your conclusions? E) “Therefore, the possibility of a SB scenario that the WC worked so hard to create was based on faulty measurements. We can only agree that whatever conclusions the WC came to were incorrect, because they were based on incorrect data. If the seat was adjustable the measurements of the two different scenarios are not based on faulty measurements but rather incomplete data gathered within moments of the assassination. Any height measurement made after the fact would be subject to question because of the nature of the adjustable seat. The information you have presented together with the Connally testimony seems to indicate that the question of seat height is well within the possible parameters of the adjustable seat. Would you agree? F) “All that matters to the LNTs is that there 'is' 'an SBT'. They 'believe' in 'the SBT'. They do this as a matter of blind faith, as is evidenced by the fact that they continue to spew forth ridiculous garbage only to deceive the naive.” I am not a LNT by any means but I do have the above questions drawn from your comments. Jim Root

As many of you know I am intrigued by the U-2 downing on May 1, 1960, the launching of the Tiros I Satellite on April 1, 1960 and the launching of the Midas Satellite on May 22, 1960. Midas and the U-2 were, of course designed to provide intelligence information and the Tiros was for "weather" purposes (although built by the Army). I was intrigued to find that John J. McCloy (later to be a member of the Warren Commission) was a member of the 1957 Gaither Committee that was establised by President Eisenhower after the successful launch by the Soviets of Sputnik. The Gaither Committee had been tasked to evaluate the feasibility of civil defense during a nuclear attack but had broadened its scope to include survivability of US nuclear forces. The committee's final report pointed out the extreme vulnerability of US forces to nuclear attack due to lack of a fast-reaction bomber force and the means to detect missile attack before the missiles impacted. These obvious problems greatly concerned Congress. The report remained classified until the late 1970's. McCloy's roll in producing a classified report that helped to generate additional funding that would be used for satellite programs using infrared technology to detect missle launchings is of interest, at least to myself, in supporting a theory of why Oswald went to Russia and why the U-2 may have been downed. Jim Root