James DiEugenio

Nice one George, the Apple TV one is probably the best.

William, that is a good question. But just recall, Jeff's article is from Prouty's words. Prouty sensed out of the box that he and Stone would be assaulted because of the film's thesis on Vietnam. Because it seemed so revolutionary. And in one sense it was. Scott, O'Donnell and Powers and Prouty himself had written about the subject before. But for the first time a mass audience actually saw what really happened. Plus there were new details in the presentation. What the film did was clobber the MSM twice. First on the Warren Report and then saying that hey, not only did they fall for that, but they completely missed the fact that within three months of the releases of the final volumes of the Commission, LBJ was now sending combat troops to Vietnam, something JFK did not do in three years. (I should add, a follower told me he does not think they missed the story, they ignored it.) Consequently, people like Epstein--a huge cover up guy--and Anson--a saliva dripping Garrison hater--decided to go after Prouty. Out of those three persons, I would take Fletcher any day of the week. His information on Vietnam and the San Antonio base was quite valuable for Oliver and everyone else.

Pat Speer is correct. The intent was to get out the newer info, most specifically from the ARRB. Tunheim says in the film that they put out over a hundred press releases, but got very little notice.

I think this was at least partly caused by the success of the Shout Factory version of JFK Revisited. Which, incredibly is still in the top ten for documentary sales at Amazon. You wonder how did Warner Brothers screw up the previous transfer so badly?

No person--like Mike G-- should ever rely on one authority for an event as complex as what happened in Vietnam after Kennedy was killed. I do not care who that authority is. McMaster or anyone else. As James Blight proves in Virtual JFK, Johnson had two estimates on his desk by the JCS in 1965. They both said it would take at least five years and 500,000 combat troops to defeat the Viet Cong and repel the North. So please do not cherry pick any one author, since the field of Indochina studies is quite large today. According to Gordon Goldstein, LBJ also knew that the air war over the North would not be enough to convince Hanoi to withdraw from the south. In other words, he was advised in advance that a combination massive air war and 500,000 combat troops would take five years to get a Korea type settlement. Let us not selectively choose materials that whitewash Johnson's reversal of Kennedy's policy. And this was an utterly conscious decision that was manufactured in secret. Today there are three books on this particular subject--by Moise, Goulden and Logevall-- that all prove beyond doubt that as LBJ was saying one thing in public, he was planning the contrary in private. That is a direct intervention in Indochina by land and air. And he knew where to go to get that planning done: Sullivan and Bill Bundy. If you recall, Sullivan was the guy who wanted to take out the withdrawal plan from the Taylor/McNamara report. But JFK got wind of it and made them put it back. This planning included even allowing for a "causus belli" event that would make a congressional resolution possible. In other words, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was planned two months in advance. LBJ carried it around in his jacket pocket before it was passed. And then every guy who he sent up to the Hill lied his butt off about what really happened. Even though at least two of them, one being Mac Bundy, admitted that it was all a deliberate provocation. VIrtual JFK also proves that Johnson later hired that unmitigated hawk Walt Rostow to write papers to deceive the public into thinking Johnson had not really broken with JFK's policy, which is utter and complete crap. Recall, JFK got so sick of Rostow that he transferred him out of the White House. When even Mac Bundy could not take Johnson's fruity escalations, and retired, Johnson then brought the nutty Rostow back and gave him Mac Bundy's job. Every major Kennedy advisor left over this issue. The Bundy brothers ended up secretly supplying Humphrey with information on how around the bend Johnson was on Vietnam. He did not use it until it was too late. Lyndon Johnson was a classic Cold Warrior, a Truman Democrat all the way. Kennedy was not, and he was a Roosevelt Democrat since 1957. They year of his great Algeria speech. One can call LBJ tragic, but its a MacBeth kind of tragedy, not Hamlet. PS I do consider Vietnam one of the major issues behind Kennedy's murder.

Wow, what a world of difference. And man I have to get rid of my old version. Bob Richardson must be really happy. You can now see why he won an Oscar, and two more since.

I thought this came off pretty well also, thanks for posting it. 14, 000 views in ten hours.

There is some interesting stuff about Ruby foreknowledge in the Fanin book, The Innocence of Oswald. And there is also the Julia Ann Mercer testimony. Ruby was a man for all seasons, and how Stephen King tried to write him off in 11/22/63 was a disgrace.

Well, that is kind of understating it. There was Cooper and the Friar's Club and Rosselli, and how after his disastrous defense he got a slap on the wrist for stealing grand jury transcripts.

Sandy: Has anyone ever heard that tape? If so, I would like to see a real transcript.

Jamey: The HSCA did not inquiry into the RFK case. It was JFK and MLK. And the JFK act did not extend to the King files. Any King files that have been released, and there have been a few, was by accident. IMO, its a disgrace that the HSCA King files have not been declassifed.

I have never seen them in an RFK book. Has anyone else?

It was LBJ and Hoover who clamped down on the commie angle and they did it quickly through the Dallas Police. John Newman told me that by the end of 1962, everyone hated Kennedy, throughout the Pentagon and the CIA. First, he refused for the second time to invade Cuba, and it was pretty clear by this time he was not going into Vietnam. That was made manifest at the May 63 Sec Def meeting, which we showed in JFK Revisited. That was one of the key declassifications of the ARRB. But clearly, LBJ did not want any kind of commie plot that would make him face off against Russia or Cuba. He makes that clear very quickly. And Hoover goes along with it. My only question about this is: did LBJ really buy into this Mexico City scenario? Because Hoover points out to him that there are serious problems with it. And six weeks later Hoover notes in writing that its CIA BS. The net result is that the JCS gets their escalation in Vietnam, one that Kennedy would not give them. This is why I think that Vietnam is one of the major reasons for the plot. How did Burris get the real intel reports that were being disguised in order to deceive Kennedy? But he did and LBJ knew the true situation. And he went to work within days to go ahead and solve the problem. Moise, Logevall and Goulden all describe how Johnson assigned Sullivan and Bill Bundy to map out a secret plan to get the USA into the war. This included NSAM 288 which Fletcher called a milestone toward war, and even how to get congress on board, that is writing the Tonkin Gulf resolution before it happened. And then attacking the north over one bullet to one ship. How any honest historian could say that Kennedy would have done those things--when all the evidence points the other way--is just beyond me.

Dan Brown's work on this case was really interesting. As was the association between Maheu and Angleton. Angleton ended up with the RFK autospy photos in his files, right? I think that is in Morley's book on Angleton.

Thanks for that tip Roger. Now everyone go watch it. AND WE CAN REALLY HAVE A DISCUSSION.

The reason I put that in italics is that it shows how in conflict JFK was with his main advisors on Vietnam. And this was late in 1961. At one of the meetings in the November 1961 debates, it was Bobby Kennedy who stepped forward and stated, "There will be no combat troops in Vietnam." That was clearly on advisement of his brother. That was a line that Kennedy was not going to cross and there is no evidence that he ever wavered on it. All the evidence indicates he was getting out after the 1964 election. That policy was clearly and deliberately altered by Johnson. And he did it within days of Kennedy's death. By late January, he was doing something Kennedy was vigorously opposed to--meeting with the Pentagon on planning for war against the north. In March those plan were complete, NSAM 288. (The tragedy of Robert McNamara is that he did not get out on that day.) For Selverstone to say that Kennedy might have committed 300,000 combat troops in theater is simply one of the wildest, most irresponsible, most bizarre statements one can imagine anyone making about this subject.

More evidence of how agenda driven Selverstone's book is: The third critical point, the November 27, 1961 meeting, is not even noted by Selverstone. Yet this event is of maximum importance. This White House meeting was attended by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Joint Chiefs Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer and Max Taylor among others. Although he called the meeting, Kennedy was the last to arrive. After making a bit of small talk, the president forcefully unloaded on the reason for the meeting. He was clearly frustrated by how hard he had to fight to get NSAM 111 approved, which denied combat troops but raised aid and advisors to Saigon. Kennedy said as clearly as possible, “When policy is decided on, people on the spot must support it or get out.” He demanded whole hearted support for his decisions. He then asked: Who was going to implement his Vietnam policy. McNamara said he would. (Newman, p. 145-46, emphasis added) Why is this so important? And why is it inexplicable that Selverstone left it out? Because, in April, Galbraith would be in Washington again. And what Selverstone does with this trip is once more, just strange. He seems to want to make Galbraith the MC running the whole agenda. But the record does not support that. Galbraith had written another report in early April arguing against any further involvement with the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. He even warned of the possibility of an escalation to a Korean War conflagration. (Letter to Kennedy of April 4, 1962). Kennedy was very taken by this communication. And he read it to diplomat Averill Harriman and NSC assistant Mike Forrestal. Galbraith was then directed by Kennedy to talk to McNamara about the memo. (Newman, p. 235) According to Galbraith McNamara got the message. (James Blight, Virtual JFK, p. 129; Pentagon Papers, Vol. 2, pp 669-671)

From my review of Selverstone's very poor and agenda driven book: "The book moves toward the famous last words of Kennedy to Mike Forrestal before JFK went to Dallas. Forrestal said in 1971 that before the president departed Washington he told him that there would be a review of Indochina policy when he got back, Selverstone writes that, since in an earlier interview Forrestal did not mention that, then somehow Forrestal was embellishing. Since Forrestal had long passed, that is easy to say. He then writes that this typifies the ‘expansion of claims about Kennedy’s intentions” at a time when they seemed most laudable and prophetic. Meaning, by 1971, the war was a mess. When I read that, I realized that this was what the book was really about. But, like any zealot, Selverstone is not aware that he has set himself up to have the plank sawed off beneath him. Because, as Peter Scott has noted, way back in 1967 Charles Bartlett and Edward Weintal wrote a book called Facing the Brink. It has a chapter dealing with the transition between Kennedy and Johnson on Vietnam. They confirmed what Forrestal said: That shortly before he was assassinated, JFK had ordered a complete review of American policy in Southeast Asia. (p. 71). That book was released in 1967, so it was likely being written in 1965-66. Which was before the war had gone south, before the media had altered course, and while Johnson was still rallying public opinion to save South Vietnam. Therefore, far from indicating any “expansion” of Kennedy’s intentions, what Selverstone has shown is his insistence on ignoring what the president was actually doing. That insistence extends much further than Forrestal. In my review of Newman’s 2017 revision of JFK and Vietnam, I listed 19 people who Kennedy had revealed his intent to withdraw from Vietnam. This included senators, generals, ambassadors and journalists. Were all these people being deceitful? Or was Kennedy a pathological xxxx? If you do not deal with this evidence in any real way, then you can simply—and, as we have seen, wrongly—chalk it up as an “expansion of claims about Kennedy’s intentions”."

I thought the reason for 273 was to coalesce a policy after Hawaii in relation to the overthrow of the government in Saigon. And as weird as Bundy's draft is, Johnson made it worse.

Here is another interview we did with Jeff Crudele of JFK: The Enduring Secret. This is the video for You Tube, but it will later go up as audio on his podcast, and that gets literally hundreds of thousands of views. I think this came out well, we talked about a wide variety of topics, the prior plots with Paul Bleau specializes in. e.g. Tampa and Chicago, Kennedy's civil rights program which enraged the rednecks like Milteer in the south, and the incredible negligence of the Secret Service which made the assassination possible in Dallas--and a lot more like no tone but three magic bullets. Andrew Iler knows the JFK Act quite well. Glad he was there. So enjoy and spread around. If you have not read The JFK Assassination Chokeholds, I think it came out fine.

Nice quote by Kilduff, in fact all three are good, thanks Robert.

Jeff: That is ironic that Fletcher should bring up Roosevelt in relation to Kennedy. In my talk at the Wecht Conference that was one of my central themes, how Truman had altered FDR's foreign policy, and Kennedy was trying to get back to Roosevelt: this included detente with USSR, getting out of Vietnam, and trying to change things in Iran. I said that Kennedy began as a Truman Democrat but during the year he spent researching and writing his Algeria speech, he became a Roosevelt Democrat. And I also agree that the Powers That Be were intent on getting rid of him in 1963, he was not getting out of that year alive: Tampa, Chicago, Dallas.

I did not know it was that hard to find Aaron. That is kind of weird since its been in the making for a very long time. Libby Handros did a Black Op Radio interview and she showed parts of it at the Wecht Conference. I know that is not like getting a spot on MSNBC. And yes it will be at least four parts and Aaron Good is the researcher. Please take a look at Amazon.

Lifton always claimed that his family supported him on the writing of his book. But he never claimed that, as far as I know, after his book became a best seller. And that was over four decades ago. Paula and Leslie I agree with both of you, there was more than one; and I think MFF will have a claim on the estate. They might even publish the book.

I think both of the above are correct. Lifton was living off of 'some entity". But I actually think it may have been more than one entity.