Jump to content
The Education Forum

Bernice Moore

JFK
 View Profile  See their activity

  • Posts

    3,556

  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    1

 Content Type 

Posts posted by Bernice Moore

    Barb Junkkarinen's article:A HOLE THROUGH THE WINDSHIELD

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted · Edited by Bernice Moore

    New research comparison of the John Hunt graphic comparison pictures of the cracks in the windshield....FBI 1963 and 1978 by the HSCA....by Martin Hinrichs.....at Duncan McacRae's Forum....

    Do not match, similar to Chris Davison's Gif seen in this thread.......and others input at the Lancer Forum..

    http://www.jfkassassinationforum.com/index...opic,813.0.html

    B......

    Were Other Bullets Found At Parkland?

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted · Edited by Bernice Moore

    Don :

    This is the rest of what I have in the dungeons.... :)

    FBI

    CE2011 (24H412) ......Wright and the bullet:

    "On June 12, 1964, O.P. Wright, Personnel Officer, Parkland

    Hospital, Dallas, Texas, advised Special Agent Bardwell

    D. Odum that Exhibit C1, a rifle slug, shown to him at the

    time of the interview, looks like the slug found at Parkland

    Hospital on November 22, 1963, which he gave to

    Richard Johnsen, Special Agent of the Secret Service.

    He stated he was not present at the time the bullet

    was found, but on the afternoon of November 22, 1963,

    as he entered the Emergency Unit on the ground floor

    of the hospital, Mr. Tomlinson, an employee, called to him

    and pointed out a bullet, which was on a hospital carriage

    at that location. He estimated the time as being within an hour

    of the time President Kennedy and Governor Connally

    were brought to the hospital. He advised he could not

    postiviely identify C1 as being the same bullet which

    was found on November 22, 1963."

    THE GUN THAT DIDN'T SMOKE*

    Copyright © 1994, 1997 by Walter F. Graf and Richard R. Bartholomew

    Part Three

    During an interview conducted on 9/29/92, the author learned that Johnsen did not remember having possession of CE399, the "magic" bullet that tied Oswald to the murder of JFK! In addition, although the bullet was "officially" found on a stretcher in the corridor of Parkland Hospital, the FBI reported that it was found in the emergency room.(CD 7) To compound matters, the same FBI agents bypassed Agent Johnsen and spoke to Agent Behn (who wasn't in Dallas) about "the location of a bullet which had been found on a stretcher at Parkland." (Sibert & O'Neil, 11/27/63) Finally, although two FBI agents initialed the bullet they received, Johnsen did not, breaking the chain of custody. (24 H 412) When we consider further that O.P. Wright, the man who allegedly gave the bullet to Johnsen, does not even mention this very important find in his report, and that Darrell [sic] Tomlinson, the man who found the bullet in the first place, stated that the bullet in government hands is NOT the bullet he actually found, we have serious pause to wonder: is there more to Johnsen's present "amnesia" over this evidence than meets the eye? (Price exhibits, WC Volume XXI; 2 H 412; see also "High Treason, page 102) O.P. Wright told CBS' Eddie Barker: "...I got hold of a Secret Service man and they (sic) didn't seem to be interested in coming and looking at the bullet in the position it was in then. So I went back to the area where Mr. Tomlinson was and picked up the bullet and put it in my pocket, and I carried it some 30 or 40 minutes. [emphasis Graf's and Bartholomew's] And I gave it to a Secret Service man that was guarding the main door into the emergency room..." Who was the first agent Wright spoke to? ("Postmortem," page 46) [emphasis Palamara's except where indicated]153

    http://www.assassinationresearch.com/v1n2/gtds_3.html

    B... B)

    Were Other Bullets Found At Parkland?

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted · Edited by Bernice Moore

    Hi Don :

    Here is some information......

    P: 93 "Murder In Dealey Plaza"....2000.

    "In 1993 Wallace Milam , a highly respected researcher , interviews Elizabeth Goode Wright, the director of nursing at Parkland in 1963, Ms.Wright reveals for the first time that TWO bullets had been found at the hospital on 22 November 1963, both by her husband O.P.Wright,( now deceased ), who was then director of Parkland security. Mr Wright is widely known as one of the handlers of the "Magic Bullet"..prior to it's receipt by the Secret Service. But according to Ms. Wright, her husband also found an unfired whole bullet that same day on a hospital gurney. This one was not turned over to authourities., as Ms.Wright had kept it all these years, and displayed it to Milam. The bullet is an unfired , "whole" .38 with manufacturer's case markings ".38 SP WCC".... the very same markings as 2 of the 4 shell casings allegedly retrieved from the Tippit scene and supposedly matched to the pistol taken from Oswald at the time of his arrest.....

    Short video......repeating said info......

    http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/images/b/b...chers_hires.mov

    EF thread....

    http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=7448

    The Secret Service and CE 399

    by Vincent Michael Palamara

    http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/palamara.htm

    B...... :)

    Barb Junkkarinen's article:A HOLE THROUGH THE WINDSHIELD

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted

    Jerry Logan for.......Josiah ""John Hunt photographed Frazier’s contemporaneous notes of his examination of the windshield while he was doing research in the Archives on the FBI Lab. Were these published anywhere else? ""

    ***************************

    ""Josiah Thompson also wrote:

    Then we published for the first time Frazier's notes when he examined

    the windshield starting a little after 1:00 AM on the morning of

    November 23rd. ""

    Anthony Marsh has stated this information below on the alts..in a thread named.........

    "ETERNAL RETURN: A Hole Through the Windshield? New article up."

    on July 10/09

    ""First time? I have been posting those notes in the newsgroups for

    several years. ""

    Shortcut to: http://groups.google.com/group/alt.assassi...b50498dd26f687f

    B.......

    Barb Junkkarinen's article:A HOLE THROUGH THE WINDSHIELD

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted

    Please also weigh the following information....

    p; 140 MIDP...2000 : Doug Weldon....Interviewed Dr.Evalea Glanges ( her first name is mispelt BTW .in the article that has been posted )......... in January 1999..." She confirmed that she was 100% certain that there was a hole in the windshield in the limousine at Parkland hospital "...She was looking forward to her retirement....Unfortunately she died on 2/ 27/1999.....

    Seen below Vince Palamara, also, just before her death on Feb .27/99...Received this email in her own words,from Dr.Evalea Glanges...written December 2, 1998.....verifying her information given to Weldon in her interview....as well as heard and seen in TMWKK....

    Vince Palamara

    12/1/98

    3) Evalea Glanges, M.D.

    "December 2, 1998

    [received 1/12/99]

    Dear Mr. Palamara,

    In reply to your letter in regard to the events at Parkland Hospital on

    that fateful date November 22, 1963.

    I was present at Parkland Hospital on that date in my role as a 2nd year

    medical student. I observed President Kennedy's limousine outside the

    emergency entrance. Another student and I went closer to observe the

    limousine and the damage to the front windshield. Secret Service agents

    appeared and moved the car to another location.

    There was a bullet hole in the windshield.

    I believe that the entire story has never been told.

    Sincerely,

    Evalea Glanges, M.D. "

    B.....

    Who ordered the bubble top removed in Dallas?

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted · Edited by Bernice Moore

    Photo of Sorrel........or..as Vince put it....

    Most of us have the photo and we don't even know it ........LOL

    see below found on Page 59 of Robert Groden's "The Killing Of A President"..

    along with SS Youngblood & LBJ..

    I checked some photos and believe this is also ........Sorrels..

    seen below, with Robert Oswald & Marina leaving Parkland.....

    For quite some time, some have tried to ID this man with

    Youngblood and LBJ....

    I recall at one time him being compared to a man known as a Gen.Pash or some such..name ..??

    I hope this clarifies the information for us.... Thanks to Vince.....whose work

    within the realms of the SS..is unprecedented..

    B....

    Who ordered the bubble top removed in Dallas?

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted · Edited by Bernice Moore

    SSC U.E.Baughman

    Vincent Palamara Archive - Write to Vince at vmplac@telerama.com

    Potpourri: Chief, SS, DNC, Chicago agents:

    Washington Post 7/25/61-

    "U.E. Baughman, 55, Chief of the United States Secret Service, is

    resigning, it was learned [Monday] night. After 34 years in the SS, 13

    as Chief...He has no plans for private employment at the

    moment."[baughman was "retired" by JFK during the same time period that

    CIA Director Allen Dulles was "retired"!];

    Washington Post 9/2/61-

    " 'Oh, My!' gasped Mrs. Rowley as the ad libbing bystander sidled over

    to greet them with easy effusion. It was obvious that President

    Kennedy's presence at the ceremony was as unexpected as it had been

    unannounced...Kennedy quipped,' He (Rowley) hasn't lost a President in

    all[his time with the Secret Service].On a record like that, he deserves

    a promotion.";

    Washington Post 7/26/61-

    Interview with Baughman: " I WILL SAY EMPHATICALLY THAT THERE IS NO

    MAFIA IN THIS COUNTRY AND NO NATIONAL CRIME SYNDICATE. WHY DON'T THOSE

    WHO TALK ABOUT THE MAFIA NAME ITS LEADER OR LEADERS? THERE HAS BEEN NO

    MAFIA IN THIS COUNTRY FOR AT LEAST FORTY YEARS. NOW ABOUT A NATIONAL

    CRIME SYNDICATE: I SAY THERE IS NO SUCH THING, AND I SAY IT NOT SIMPLY

    AS A PERSONAL JUDGMENT BUT ON THE BASIS OF TALKS WITH OTHER ENFORCEMENT

    OFFICIALS"-!

    No wonder JFK got rid of Baughman- I'm sure the Attorney General (RFK)

    appreciated the Chief's "wisdom", no doubt originating from Hoover. Who

    knows- maybe Carlos Marcello was a mere tomato salesman as FBI agent

    Regis Kennedy declared(!)...

    http://www.acorn.net/jfkplace/03/VP/0025-VP.TXT

    SA IC Dallas.....Sorrels Forrest W/C Testimony 1,2,& Affidavit

    http://jfkassassination.net/russ/wit.htm#s

    He was good friends with Phillip Willis....who took the film.Sorrels telling him after, that shots had come from the knoll.....fence area..

    Thanks Tom much appreciation, for all your efforts......

    B......

    Who ordered the bubble top removed in Dallas?

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted

    Robin,

    Of the photos I have of the SS.....I have never seen one of Sorrels,yet..

    B..

    Now that is interesting!....... By the way, what was the bubble top made of? I'm sure it would have made a shot more difficult to aim and perhaps slowed the bullet from some directions, I don't think it would prevent a fatal shot and certainly not from the front - either from GK or sewer. Given all else that happened one can only draw the conclusion the top was removed so as to FURTHER ensure the pre-planned assassination would go without out a hitch....along with the pre-positioned teams of assassins; removal of MI and Police to protect, watch crowd, close windows, etc.; sharp-turn and less-than-specified speed; position of target car in motorcade; removal of SS agents from on and near car; police sideriders pulled-back, et al. ad nauseum.......

    Peter:

    See below......Yes from what I have studied, it may have diverted a shot...They had been looking into a type of new plastic that would have been used for tests of bullet penetration.......I agree all appeared to be in order...for the conclusion of assassination..

    B......

    Barb Junkkarinen's article:A HOLE THROUGH THE WINDSHIELD

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted · Edited by Bernice Moore

    TMWKK, The Final Chapter, ep.7 The Smoking Guns, seg.1

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNTeQ9ckmD8

    TMWKK, The Final Chapter, ep.7 The Smoking Guns, seg.2

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAW-bxxZfcM...feature=related

    TMWKK, The Final Chapter, ep.7 The Smoking Guns, seg.3

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jmMXfBgjsh0

    Kennedy Assassination Chronicles, Volume 5, Issue 1

    Current Section: A Study of the Presidential Limousine, by Doug Weldon

    http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...mp;relPageId=35

    B.......

    Movies taken of Presidential Motorcade/Dallas Cinema Assoc.

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted · Edited by Bernice Moore

    Robert :

    Here is some further Dallas Cinema information, from a post I made a couple of years back....

    Thanks for the additional link.....and information....

    Ernest Mentesana & the Dallas Cinema Associates Film.

    He was interviewed by Agents E .F. Petrakis and A Raymond Switzer on

    April 23rd/64. Who stated that he had been in the freight yards near

    the TSBD, and had taken film of "the turmoil in and around the Depository

    Building . “

    He was with the Dallas Cinema Associates. He informed the FBI all about

    the Company, the leading figure, Mrs. Irving Gewertz, how many

    photographers had contributed their film footage to such, (18) and other

    information. He was under the impression that the film was presently being

    prepared for marketing on the home-movie market.

    It then took the FBI a month to get around to seeing a Rudolf Viktor Brenk, an

    amateur photographer, who edited the films. The story was that the

    Dallas Cinema Associates had a plan, which was to make a film of the "last

    hour of the President", he was not interested in the assassination scene.

    He was looking for a photographic record of the entire Dallas Trip, beginning at the

    airport, with the happy President and his smiling wife in as many different poses

    and locations as possible. As late as May 20/64 the FBI knew where to get

    every scrap of all the original DCA footage, everything not schmaltzy that

    Brenk had edited out.

    There is no record that they ever did or wanted to.

    The unpublished footage, that was all important, or could have been to the

    investigation, and all that original footage was of no interest to them.

    They finally got around to interviewing Mrs. Gewertz, who was the person

    most responsible for the org. of DCA and the production of its film.

    It was exactly

    6 months after the assassination of President Kennedy.

    She had conceived the idea of assembling the movie and she had located

    others whose footage was used. She telephoned residences along the route

    and the first person with film had agreed to help her locate others.

    She also approached the camera shops, learning that others had the same

    idea, so they had combined to form the Dallas Cinema.

    She told them, as if they, the FBI didn't know that Phil Willis was one of them.

    They approached him 30 days later, June 19/64.

    The FBI finally got to him just at the time of the publication of a dozen of his photos.

    Just as it got to the DCA people as their film was to be made commercially

    available.

    There is no evidence that the FBI obtained a copy of the DCA film, neither for the

    WC nor for itself. It was not the Commission, strange as it may seem that

    decided whether any film contained evidence, but the FBI.

    Mentesana had taken his first film of the motorcade on the median strip

    on Turtle Creek Rd. and was able to obtain approximately ten feet of 8mm

    movie film of the motorcade, using a Wollensak Movie Camera, with a 1.9

    lens and Kodachrome 11 Film. He estimated the time of the passing motorcade

    to have been approximately 12.10 to 12.12pm.

    He then took his employee, Arden Wilson, immediately back to his

    "Mentesana Grocery Store", dropped him off, and continued to the Katy

    Railroad Freight Depot near the TSBD, to pick up some food stuffs.

    He learned of the shooting of the President and started filming and took

    several feet of film of the occurrences in and around the TSBD Building.

    The Fox film company of Dallas processed it.

    Being a member of the” Dallas 8mm Movie Club", as well as Albert Bunnell, who also had film,

    had called him and told him about Mrs. Irving Gewertz .They had all attended a meeting and

    the plan was to exchange copies of each others films. They then formed the group

    totaling 18 in number and incorporated it in March 64, and that a film

    would be prepared for marketing.

    Note:

    Rudolf Brenk, took his film of the motorcade from the northwest corner

    of Harwood and Ross Sts. at approximately 12.20pm. Using a Cames

    Eight- Millimeter movie camera loaded with Dynachrome color film,

    the Dynachrome Co. of Halifax St. in Dallas had developed the film.

    He was the VP of the Cinema Guild of Texas. Albert Bunnell had put

    Mrs. Gewertz in contact with him. They met at the Community Room

    of the Republic Savings and Loan Association along with others, and ran

    their films for the group.

    Some other names were, Mr. Wynn Parr, and Mr. George Shawver.

    The group eventually turned over their original films to Brenk, for editing

    he ultimately combined them, what he felt were the valuable portions

    of the films, into one single film. He subtitled and completed the film.

    He estimated it to be one hundred seventy-five feet, excluding leaders

    and having a running time of approximately twelve minutes at sixteen

    frames a second.

    Brenk then sent the film to the Technicolor Inc. of Burbank California,

    for further processing in an effort to achieve more uniformity in shading

    and coloring. He advised that the cost of the master film from the Company

    amounted to a charge of $13.50 from each of the 18 members. A total of $121.50.

    He received the first answer print from Technicolor approx. May1/64.

    A few changes were made at his request, and the two other answer prints

    were received May 18/64.

    The group had signed a contract with Sanger-Harris Department Stores

    of Dallas, allowing them exclusive rights of sale in the Dallas area only,

    for a one month trial period to allow his group to test the public acceptance.

    They were to be ready for sale about the middle of June 64, the completed

    retail price being set at $24.95.

    The FBI could have learned the names of all the filmers but did not bother to.

    They were not sought out, though they may have been able to tell them of

    other photographers, they were not questioned.

    Eventually Brenk took a list of all to the United States Attorney for Dallas as well

    as a copy of the film.

    Mrs. Irving (Anita) Gewertz, she and her son, Martin had driven to Cedar

    Springs Rd, to see the motorcade, at approximately 11.30pm, they had listened to the

    progress of the motorcade at her husbands place of employment, Roscoe

    Dewitt Architect 2025 Cedar Springs, in the parking lot. She, as well as her husband

    and son, had walked to the road about 12.05pm and waited, on the North side.

    Her son had an 8mm Bell and Howell camera, The camera was not working

    properly and he son was very frustrated, as the motorcade passed at

    about 12.20pm.

    So they then went to the Trade Mart When they arrived at Irving Blvd and the

    service Rd of the Stemmons Freeway, they noticed a group of picketers who

    were awaiting the Presidents arrival. She said about 8 or 10 were carrying various

    signs which were anti Kennedy and his policies, and that they had tape over

    their mouths. Shortly after arriving they heard sirens and saw the lights of

    the motorcade proceeding North on Stemmons, at an unusually high rate of

    speed, which surprised them. As they passed she noticed a SS man lying on

    the back of the President's car pounding his fist on the hull of the car. then

    shortly after they heard the announcement on the car radio of the shooting.

    Hearing this they then drove to Parkland Hospital, where they observed a hearse

    leaving at about 2pm, of which her son took a film, they learned

    later it contained the President's body.

    The next day they visited the TSBD area and took films. They then drove to

    LHO's rooming house on Beckley and took stills. The film was developed at

    Sanger-Harris Dept Store. They complained that the camera had not

    worked properly at the time the motorcade had passed, and the manager

    offered

    that several people had brought in film, and perhaps they would share theirs

    with her by obtaining copies. That is when she got the idea of telephoning

    people along the route. That is when she was in contact with a Mrs. Frances

    Hays who also had film and offered to help her locate others. It was her

    intention to secure and gather a film sequence for her own use and to keep

    as a memorial to President Kennedy.

    However after she had made calls, many were very interested and she

    decided that the films sequences might be put together

    and made available to the general public. Another she learned of was an O.B.

    Ashmore who had taken still photographs, in the vicinity of the Trade Mart.

    On July 16/64 ... the DOJ, Hoover to Rankin…… A film has been examined that was

    furnished by the Wolper Prods Inc. it was found to show very little of the

    President's motorcade during the firing of the assassinations shots. Should

    members wish to view this film, please advice us....... the roll of film you

    furnished is returned herewith....

    July 23/64.... Hoover to Rankin, Reference is made in your letter dated Jul.16/64

    enclosing letter from Martha Joe Stroud, Asst USA, Dallas. and a film referred

    to......This has been reviewed in the FBI Laboratory and found to contain very

    little of the President's motorcade during the firing of the assassination shots.

    "It is noted the portion of the film depicting the motorcade on Elm St.

    at the assassination site is a copy of the same film that was furnished to the Commission

    by the Wolper Prod. The Wolper film was furnished to us with your letter dated

    June 3/64. Was examined and returned to you with a letter dated June 16/64."

    "The film that you submitted with your letter dated July 16/64, is attached."

    July10/64. USDOJ Dallas, Stroud to Howard Willens President's Commission.

    Mr. Rudy Brenk brought the enclosed film into this office today..

    He states there are no other persons that took film at the scene of the assassination

    so far as he knows.

    I am attaching a list of photographers who furnished film for

    "President Kennedy's Final Hour".

    Mr. Brenk wants the film back unless the Commission wants to buy it. It

    costs $24.95.

    List of names associated with the Dallas Cinema..

    Mr. Dick Allen: George Shawver : Wynn Parr: Rudy Brenk: Bryant ..ren?

    Earl Nester ?: Dr. Howard Seigler: Irving Gewertz: Charles Mentesana:

    Larry Thomas:…..next crossed out..again next crossed out……..Allen Rhodes, Albert Benell:

    George Kincaid: Joe Brown: C. W. Gray:

    Mrs. Hazel Randell: but Randell

    has an x through it ? and something unlegible written over it.?

    Mr. Speigle: Mr.John Martin.

    And there it lies, unless there is more info that I have not come across

    perhaps somewhere there is an old copy, of the film in a box or

    in someone’s attic, a researcher's shelf ?somewhere. in Dallas.?

    Information from Harold Weisberg “Photographic Whitewash".1967.

    Mentesana.mpg

    http://www.jfk-online.com/Mentesana.mpg

    Here is some further info, about the Dallas Cinema Film.....Mentesana and the others.

    Two other film clips, but very little..

    from Bart Cop. On their page below as well, if these following links do not work..

    Scroll down.....

    http://www.geocities.com/verisimus101/sbt.htm

    Film clips.

    http://mailafriend.guide.real.com/index.ht...u.edu%2fdca1.rm

    http://mailafriend.guide.real.com/index.ht...u.edu%2fdca1.rm

    Old posts of 1992 & 96 that might be of interest...

    1996 The Dallas Cinema film

    http://www.constitution.org/piml/96060508.txt

    The Assassination scene in Dallas 1992

    http://www.anomalies.net/archive/wiretap/C...ry/jfk-foto.lis

    Inventory of the Records of the Warren Commission

    Entry 18: Films

    1963, 6 inches

    Arranged as follows:

    one 16-mm, reel consisting of a silent WDSU-TV (New Orleans) film taken on August 16, 1963, of Lee Harvey Oswald distributing leaflets on behalf of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and on August 12, 1963, outside the Municipal Court at New Orleans on the day of Oswald's court appearance, and a sound film interview on August 21, 1963, at the WDSU studios shortly after a radio program in which Oswald participated;

    an 8-mm. film entitled "President Kennedy's Final Hour," produced by Dallas Cinema Associates, Inc., from films taken by photographers along the route of the President's motorcade;

    a 16-mm. film of the President's motorcade taken by an unidentified amateur photographer, furnished to the Commission by Wolper Productions, Inc.;

    a 16-mm. film which includes scenes of District Attorney Wade of Dallas speaking in the Dallas Police Department building and some silent film;

    a 16-mm. film of Lee Harvey Oswald speaking in the assembly room of the Dallas Police Department;

    a 16-m. film of unidentified origin, accompanied by an explanatory Secret Service memorandum, showing an aerial view of the site of the assassination and an interview with a gunsmith concerning Oswald's rifle and the mounting of telescopic sights;

    reels 65 and 66 of 16-mm. National Broadcasting Co. film relating to the shooting of Oswald; and

    an 8-mm. United Press International film showing only a title relating to the assassination.

    For the Zapruder film (CE 904), Nix (CE 905), and Muchmore (CE 906) films, see Entry 42. For the Zapruder slides (CD 858), see Entry 8. Entry 19: Radio Tape Recordings

    1963, 12 feet

    http://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warre...?template=print

    Dallas Cinema Associates Documents

    http://jfkmurderphotos.bravehost.com/dca.html

    DCA JFK assassination aftermath

    Some frames from the DCA

    B... B)

    Barb Junkkarinen's article:A HOLE THROUGH THE WINDSHIELD

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted · Edited by Bernice Moore

    ""However, what seems clear from other witness reports and photos is the extreme unlikelihood of Glanges claim to have “leaned against the fender” of the limousine. She claims to have done this shortly before the car was driven away. Although it took a few moments to place a law enforcement cordon around the limousine, law enforcement officers then kept civilians back from the limousine: ""

    Not all by far and not in a few moments.

    B..

    Man in the 6th Floor Window 12:34 pm

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted · Edited by Bernice Moore

    Dave, Bill

    Here are three of William Weston's.....

    B.... :tomatoes

    Dealey Plaza Echo, Volume 10, Issue 1

    Current Section: The Spider's Web: The Texas School Book Depository and the Dallas Conspiracy, by William Weston

    http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...amp;relPageId=7

    The Fourth Decade, Volume 1, Issue 4

    Current Section: 411 Elm Street, by William Weston

    http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...mp;relPageId=24

    The Third Decade, Volume 9, Issue 6

    The Transplantation of the Texas School Book Depository

    http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...mp;relPageId=25

    Question for Forum Members

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted · Edited by Bernice Moore

    New JCS Documents on Cuba and Vietnam

    New documents from the papers of Maxwell Taylor (pictured), Gen. Earl Wheeler, and other Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) files are now online, related to the hotspots in Cuba and Vietnam.

    http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/...uba_and_Vietnam

    Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers

    http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...o?docSetId=1021

    General Maxwell Taylor papers

    http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...o?docSetId=1022

    1,000 U.S. MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM

    RIF#: 202-10002-10092 (10/31/63) JCS#: CM-985-63

    http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...amp;relPageId=2

    LBJ to General Taylor Dec.2.63

    http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...amp;relPageId=3

    CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AFFECTING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, RELATED TO THE VIETNAM CRISIS

    http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/...oc.do?docId=138

    B.......... B)

    Below .......in Washington for JFK's Funeral, Chiefs of Staff...

    Question for Forum Members

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted · Edited by Bernice Moore

    Peter:

    What you mention may be available within.....""The Secret Team"" by Col.Prouty .......the book is available free, on line....

    http://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/ST/ST.html

    The missing pages from the Paper back edition ""JFK, The CIA, Vietnam and the Plot to Assassinate John F.Kennedy ""by ...Col.Prouty...are also downloaded on this site , free access.....

    http://www.prouty.org/books.html

    B........ B)

    Question for Forum Members

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted

    Exit Strategy

    In 1963, JFK ordered a complete withdrawal from Vietnam

    James K. Galbraith

    8 Forty years have passed since November 22, 1963, yet painful mysteries remain. What, at the moment of his death, was John F. Kennedy’s policy toward Vietnam?

    It’s one of the big questions, alternately evaded and disputed over four decades of historical writing. It bears on Kennedy’s reputation, of course, though not in an unambiguous way.

    And today, larger issues are at stake as the United States faces another indefinite military commitment that might have been avoided and that, perhaps, also cannot be won. The story of Vietnam in 1963 illustrates for us the struggle with policy failure. More deeply, appreciating those distant events tests our capacity as a country to look the reality of our own history in the eye.

    One may usefully introduce the issue by recalling the furor over Robert McNamara’s 1995 memoir In Retrospect. Reaction then focused mainly on McNamara’s assumption of personal responsibility for the war, notably his declaration that his own actions as the Secretary of Defense responsible for it were “terribly, terribly wrong.” Reviewers paid little attention to the book’s contribution to history. In an editorial on April 12, 1995, the New York Times delivered a harsh judgment: “Perhaps the only value of “In Retrospect” is to remind us never to forget that these were men who in the full hubristic glow of their power would not listen to logical warning or ethical appeal.” And in the New York Times Book Review four days later, Max Frankel wrote that

    David Halberstam, who applied that ironic phrase [The Best and the Brightest] to his rendering of the tale 23 years ago, told it better in many ways than Mr. McNamara does now. So too, did the Pentagon Papers, that huge trove of documents assembled at Mr. McNamara’s behest when he first recognized a debt to history.

    In view of these criticisms, readers who actually pick up McNamara’s book may experience a shock when they scan the table of contents and sees this summary of Chapter 3, titled “The Fateful Fall of 1963: August 24–November 22, 1963”:

    A pivotal period of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, punctuated by three important events: the overthrow and assassination of South Vietnam’s president Ngo Dinh Diem; President Kennedy’s decision on October 2 to begin the withdrawal of U.S. forces; and his assassination fifty days later. (Emphasis added.)

    Kennedy’s decision on October 2, 1963, to begin the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam? Contrary to Frankel, this is not something you will find in Halberstam. You will not find it in Leslie Gelb’s editorial summary in the Gravel edition of The Pentagon Papers, even though several documents that are important to establishing the case for a Kennedy decision to withdraw were published in that edition. Nor, with just three exceptions prior to last spring’s publication of Howard Jones’s Death of a Generation—a milestone in the search for difficult, ferociously hidden truth—will you find it elsewhere in 30 years of historical writing on Vietnam.

    Did John F. Kennedy give the order to withdraw from Vietnam?

    * * *

    Certainly, most Vietnam historians have said “no”—or would have if they considered the question worth posing. They have asserted continuity between Kennedy’s policy and Lyndon Johnson’s, while usually claiming that neither president liked the war and also that Kennedy especially had expressed to friends his desire to get out sometime after the 1964 election.

    The view that Kennedy would have done what Johnson did—stay in Vietnam and gradually escalate the war in 1964 and 1965—is held by left, center, and right, from Noam Chomsky to Kai Bird to William Gibbons. It was promoted forcefully over the years by the late Walt Rostow, beginning in 1967 with a thick compilation for Johnson himself of Kennedy’s public statements on Vietnam policy and continuing into the 1990s. Gibbons’s three-volume study states it this way: “On November 26 [1963], Johnson approved NSAM [National Security Action Memorandum] 273, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to Vietnam and the continuation of Vietnam programs and policies of the Kennedy administration.”

    Equally, Stanley Karnow writes in his Vietnam: A History (1983) that Johnson’s pledge “essentially signaled a continuation of Kennedy’s policy.” Patrick Lloyd Hatcher, while writing extensively on the Saigon coup, makes no mention at all of the Washington discussions following Johnson’s accession three weeks later. Gary Hess offers summary judgment on the policy that Johnson inherited: “To Kennedy and his fellow New Frontiersmen, it was a doctrine of faith that the problems of Vietnam lent themselves to an American solution.”

    Kai Bird’s 1998 biography of McGeorge and William Bundy briefly reviews the discussions of withdrawal reported to have occurred in late 1963 but accepts the general verdict that Kennedy did not intend to quit. So does Fredrik Logevall, whose substantial 1999 book steadfastly insists that the choices Kennedy faced were either escalation or negotiation and did not include withdrawal without negotiation.

    All this (and more) is in spite of evidence to the contrary, advanced over the years by a tiny handful of authors. In 1972 Peter Dale Scott first made the case that Johnson’s NSAM 273—the document that Gibbons relied on in making the case for continuity—was in fact a departure from Kennedy’s policy; his essay appeared in Gravel’s edition of The Pentagon Papers. Arthur M. Schlesinger’s Robert Kennedy and His Times tells in a few tantalizing pages of the “first application” in October 1963 “of Kennedy’s phased withdrawal plan.”

    A more thorough treatment appeared in 1992, with the publication of John M. Newman’s JFK and Vietnam . 1 Until his retirement in 1994 Newman was a major in the U.S. Army, an intelligence officer last stationed at Fort Meade, headquarters of the National Security Agency. As an historian, his specialty is deciphering declassified records—a talent he later applied to the CIA’s long-hidden archives on Lee Harvey Oswald.

    Newman’s argument was not a case of “counterfactual historical reasoning,” as Larry Berman described it in an early response. 2 It was not about what might have happened had Kennedy lived. Newman’s argument was stronger: Kennedy, he claims, had decided to begin a phased withdrawal from Vietnam, that he had ordered this withdrawal to begin. Here is the chronology, according to Newman:

    (1) On October 2, 1963, Kennedy received the report of a mission to Saigon by McNamara and Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The main recommendations, which appear in Section I(B) of the McNamara-Taylor report, were that a phased withdrawal be completed by the end of 1965 and that the “Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1,000 out of 17,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Vietnam by the end of 1963.” At Kennedy’s instruction, Press Secretary Pierre Salinger made a public announcement that evening of McNamara’s recommended timetable for withdrawal.

    (2) On October 5, Kennedy made his formal decision. Newman quotes the minutes of the meeting that day:

    The President also said that our decision to remove 1,000 U.S. advisors by December of this year should not be raised formally with Diem. Instead the action should be carried out routinely as part of our general posture of withdrawing people when they are no longer needed. (Emphasis added.)

    The passage illustrates two points: (a) that a decision was in fact made on that day, and (B) that despite the earlier announcement of McNamara’s recommendation, the October 5 decision was not a ruse or pressure tactic to win reforms from Diem (as Richard Reeves, among others, has contended 3) but a decision to begin withdrawal irrespective of Diem or his reactions.

    (3) On October 11, the White House issued NSAM 263, which states:

    The President approved the military recommendations contained in section I B (1-3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.

    In other words, the withdrawal recommended by McNamara on October 2 was embraced in secret by Kennedy on October 5 and implemented by his order on October 11, also in secret. Newman argues that the secrecy after October 2 can be explained by a diplomatic reason. Kennedy did not want Diem or anyone else to interpret the withdrawal as part of any pressure tactic (other steps that were pressure tactics had also been approved). There was also a political reason: JFK had not decided whether he could get away with claiming that the withdrawal was a result of progress toward the goal of a self-sufficient South Vietnam.

    The alternative would have been to withdraw the troops while acknowledging failure. And this, Newman argues, Kennedy was prepared to do if it became necessary. He saw no reason, however, to take this step before it became necessary. If the troops could be pulled while the South Vietnamese were still standing, so much the better. 4 But from October 11 onward the CIA’s reporting changed drastically. Official optimism was replaced by a searching and comparatively realistic pessimism. Newman believes this pessimism, which involved rewriting assessments as far back as the previous July, was a response to NSAM 263. It represented an effort by the CIA to undermine the ostensible rationale of withdrawal with success, and therefore to obstruct implementation of the plan for withdrawal. Kennedy, needless to say, did not share his full reasoning with the CIA.

    (4) On November 1 there came the coup in Saigon and the assassination of Diem and Nhu. At a press conference on November 12, Kennedy publicly restated his Vietnam goals. They were “to intensify the struggle” and “to bring Americans out of there.” Victory, which had figured prominently in a similar statement on September 12, was no longer on the list.

    (5) The Honolulu Conference of senior cabinet and military officials on November 20–21 was called to review plans in the wake of the Saigon coup. The military and the CIA, however, planned to use that meeting to pull the rug from under the false optimism which some had used to rationalize NSAM 263. However, Kennedy did not himself believe that we were withdrawing with victory. It follows that the changing image of the military situation would not have changed JFK’s decision.

    (6) In Honolulu, McGeorge Bundy prepared a draft of what would eventually be NSAM 273. The plan was to present it to Kennedy after the meeting ended. Dated November 21, this draft reflected the change in military reporting. It speaks, for example, of a need to “turn the tide not only of battle but of belief.” Plans to intensify the struggle, however, do not go beyond what Kennedy would have approved: A paragraph calling for actions against the North underscores the role of Vietnamese forces:

    7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action. (Emphasis added.)

    (7) At Honolulu, a preliminary plan, known as CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63 and later implemented as OPLAN 34A, was prepared for presentation. This plan called for intensified sabotage raids against the North, employing Vietnamese commandos under U.S. control—a significant escalation. 5 While JCS chief Taylor had approved preparation of this plan, it had not been shown to McNamara. Tab E of the meeting’s briefing book, also approved by Taylor and also not sent in advance to McNamara, showed that the withdrawal ordered by Kennedy in October was already being gutted, by the device of substituting for the withdrawal of full units that of individual soldiers who were being rotated out of Vietnam in any event.

    (8) The final version of NSAM 273, signed by Johnson on November 26, differs from the draft in several respects. Most are minor changes of wording. The main change is that the draft paragraph 7 has been struck in its entirety (there are two pencil slashes on the November 21 draft), and replaced with the following:

    Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there be estimates such factors as: A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam; B. The plausibility denial; C. Vietnamese retaliation; D. Other international reaction. Plans submitted promptly for approval by authority.

    The new language is incomplete. It does not begin by declaring outright that the subject is attacks on the North. But the thrust is unmistakable, and the restrictive reference to “Government of Vietnam resources” is now missing. Newman concludes that this change effectively provided new authority for U.S.–directed combat actions against North Vietnam. Planning for these actions began therewith, and we now know that an OPLAN 34A raid in August 1964 provoked the North Vietnamese retaliation against the destroyer Maddox, which became the first Gulf of Tonkin incident. And this in turn led to the confused incident a few nights later aboard the Turner Joy, to reports that it too had been attacked, and to Johnson’s overnight decision to seek congressional support for “retaliation” against North Vietnam. From this, of course, the larger war then flowed.

    * * *

    A reply to Newman’s book appeared very quickly. It came from Noam Chomsky, hardly an apologist for Lyndon Johnson or the war.

    Chomsky despises the Kennedy apologists: equally the old insiders and the antiwar nostalgics—Arthur Schlesinger and Oliver Stone—and the historical memory of “the fallen leader who had escalated the attack against Vietnam from terror to aggression.” He reviles efforts to portray Kennedy’s foreign policy views as different from Johnson’s. On this point he may well be fundamentally correct, though for reasons quite different from those that he offers.

    Chomsky’s Rethinking Camelot challenges Newman’s main points. First, did Kennedy plan to withdraw without victory? Or, were the plans of NSAM 263 contingent on a continued perception of success in battle? Second, did the change in NSAM 273 between the draft (which was prepared for Kennedy but never seen by him) and the final version (signed by Johnson) represent a change in policy?

    Chomsky is categorical on both issues: “Two weeks before Kennedy’s assassination, there is not a phrase in the voluminous internal record that even hints at withdrawal without victory.” Elsewhere he notes that “[t]he withdrawal-without-victory thesis rests on the assumption that Kennedy realized that the optimistic military reports were incorrect. . . . Not a trace of supporting evidence appears in the internal record, or is suggested [by Newman].” And, as for the changes to NSAM 273: “There is no relevant difference between the two documents [draft and final], except that the LBJ version is weaker and more evasive.”

    Chomsky denies Newman’s claim that the new version of paragraph 7 in the final draft of NSAM 273 signed by Johnson on November 26 opened the way for OPLAN 34A and the use of U.S.–directed forces in covert operations against North Vietnam. Rather, he reads the Johnson version as applying only to Government of Vietnam forces, even though the language restricting action to those forces is no longer there.

    Peter Dale Scott, the former diplomat, professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley, and author of part of the Pentagon Papers, replied to Chomsky on both points almost immediately.

    On the first point, withdrawal without victory, Scott writes:

    Following [Leslie] Gelb, Chomsky alleges that Kennedy’s withdrawal planning was in response to an “optimistic mid-1962 assessment.” . . . But in fact the planning was first ordered by McNamara in May 1962. This was one month after ambassador Kenneth Galbraith, disenchanted after a presidentially ordered visit to Vietnam, had proposed a “political solution” based in part on a proposal to the Soviets entertaining “phased American withdrawal. ”

    Scott goes on to point out that it cannot be proven that Galbraith’s recommendation was responsible for McNamara’s order. But there is good reason to believe they were linked, that both reflected Kennedy’s long-term strategy on Vietnam.6 As for the proposition that no evidence hinting at withdrawal without victory exists, Scott argues that Chomsky’s “ internal planning record”—for the most part the Pentagon Papers—“is in fact an edited version of the primary documents.” Moreover, “the documentary record is conspicuously defective” for November 1963. “n all three editions of the Pentagon Papers there are no complete documents between the five [coup] cables of October 30 and McNamara’s memorandum of December 21; the 600 pages of documents from the Kennedy Administration end on October 30.”

    On the second point, concerning NSAM 273, Scott writes that Chomsky reads “Johnson’s NSAM as if it were as contextless as a Dead Sea Scroll,” dismissing its importance and ignoring “early accounts of it as a ‘major decision,’ a ‘pledge’ that determined ‘all that would follow,’ from journalists as diverse as Tom Wicker, Marvin Kalb, and I. F. Stone.” Scott writes that Chomsky also ignores Taylor’s memo to President Johnson of January 22, 1964, which cites NSAM 273 as authority to “prepare to escalate operations against North Vietnam.”

    In the course of this controversy, the ground had narrowed sharply. After Newman’s book, no one seriously disputed that Kennedy was contemplating withdrawal from Vietnam. Instead, the disagreements focused on four questions: Did the withdrawal plans depend on the perception of victory? Did Kennedy act on his plans? Were actions he may have taken noisy but cosmetic, a pressure tactic aimed at Diem or a ploy for the American public, or were they for real? And were the OPLAN 34A operations that got under way following Kennedy’s death a sharp departure from previous U.S. policy or merely a “Government of Vietnam” activity consonant with intensifying the war in the South?

    * * *

    The publication of McNamara’s In Retrospect sharpened the terms of debate. Some key source materials, including the texts of the McNamara-Taylor report and those of NSAM 263 and 273, have been in the public domain for years. McNamara’s 1995 account of his September 1963 mission to Vietnam makes substantial use of the McNamara-Taylor report and the quotations presented are a study in ambiguity. He quotes General Maxwell Taylor’s apparent conviction that the war could be won by the end of 1965, but then he acknowledges that there were “conflicting reports about military progress and political stability” and describes the impressive doubts of those he spoke with that the South Vietnamese government was capable of the effective actions that military victory required:

    The military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress. . . . There are serious political tensions in Saigon. . . . Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu could change the present favorable military trends. . . . It is not clear that pressures exerted by the U.S. will move Diem and Nhu toward moderation. . . . The prospects that a replacement regime would be an improvement appear to be about 50-50.

    The drift seems clear enough: the Diem government is failing and there is no reason to think a replacement would be better. But the references to “great progress” leave room for doubt. Withdrawal with victory or without it?

    McNamara then reproduces the precise wording of the military recommendations from Section I(B) of the report:

    We recommend that: [1] General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas by the end of 1964, and in the Delta by the end of 1965. [2] A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time. [3] In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.

    The report then went on to make a number of recommendations to “impress upon Diem our disapproval of his political program.” These matters dealt with the repression of the Buddhists and related issues; the recommendation to announce plans to withdraw 1,000 soldiers is not listed under this heading.

    The reason for the ambiguity over the military situation, as well as the vague “it should be possible” wording of the second recommendation, becomes clearer when McNamara describes the National Security Council meeting of October 2, 1963, which revealed a “total lack of consensus” over the battlefield situation:

    One faction believed military progress had been good and training had progressed to the point where we could begin to withdraw. A second faction did not see the war as progressing well and did not see the South Vietnamese showing evidence of successful training. But they, too, agreed that we should begin to withdraw. . . . The third faction, representing the majority, considered the South Vietnamese trainable but believed our training had not been in place long enough to achieve results and, therefore, should continue at current levels.

    As McNamara’s 1986 oral history, on deposit at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, makes clear (but his book does not), he was himself in the second group, who favored withdrawal without victory—not necessarily admitting or even predicting defeat, but accepting uncertainty as to what would follow. The denouement came shortly thereafter:

    After much debate, the president endorsed our recommendation to withdraw 1,000 men by December 31, 1963. He did so, I recall, without indicating his reasoning. In any event, because objections had been so intense and because I suspected others might try to get him to reverse the decision, I urged him to announce it publicly. That would set it in concrete. . . . The president finally agreed, and the announcement was released by Pierre Salinger after the meeting.

    Before a large audience at the LBJ Library on May 1, 1995, McNamara restated his account of this meeting and stressed its importance. He confirmed that President Kennedy’s action had three elements: (1) complete withdrawal “by December 31, 1965,” (2) the first 1,000 out by the end of 1963, and (3) a public announcement, to set these decisions “in concrete,” which was made. McNamara also added the critical information that there exists a tape of this meeting, in the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston, to which he had access and on which his account is based.

    The existence of a taping system in JFK’s oval office had become known over the years, particularly through the release of partial transcripts of the historic meeting of the “ExComm” during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. But the full extent of Kennedy’s taping was not known. And, according to McNamara, access to particular tapes was tightly controlled by representatives of the Kennedy family. When McNamara spoke in Austin, only he and his coauthor, Brian VanDeMark, had been granted the privilege of listening to the actual tape recordings of Kennedy’s White House meetings on Vietnam.

    In 1997, however, this situation changed. The Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), an independent civilian body established under the 1992 JFK Records Act that has already been responsible for the release of millions of pages of official records deemed relevant to Kennedy’s assassination, ruled that his tapes relating to Vietnam decision-making should be released. In July the JFK Library began releasing key tapes, including those of the withdrawal meetings on October 2 and 5, 1963. 7

    A careful review of the October 2 meeting makes clear that McNamara’s account is essentially accurate and even to some degree understated. One can hear McNamara—the voice is unmistakable—arguing for a firm timetable to withdraw all U.S. forces from Vietnam, whether the war can be won in 1964, which he doubts, or not. McNamara is emphatic: “We need a way to get out of Vietnam, and this is a way of doing it.”

    In Retrospect’s discussion of Kennedy’s decision to withdraw ends at this point. McNamara makes no mention of NSAM 263. However, on the tape of the meeting of October 5, 1963, one can clearly hear a voice—it may be Robert McNamara or McGeorge Bundy—asking President John F. Kennedy for “formal approval” of “items one, two, and three” on a paper evidently in front of them. It is clear that one of these items is the recommendation to withdraw 1,000 men by the end of 1963, the rationale being that they are no longer needed. This short exchange is thus unmistakably a request for a formal presidential decision concerning the McNamara-Taylor recommendations. After a short discussion of the possible political effect in Vietnam of announcing this decision, the voice of JFK can be clearly heard: “Let’s go on ahead and do it,” followed by a few words deciphered by historian George Eliades as “without making a public statement about it.”

    Unfortunately, the last White House tape from the Kennedy administration is dated November 7, 1963. The archivists at the JFK Library have no information on why the tapings either ended or are unavailable for later dates. McNamara states that he has “no specific memory” of the Honolulu Conference that he was sent to chair on November 20, 1963.

    The Military Documents

    The President of the United States does not make decisions in a vacuum. Agencies have to be notified, plans have to be made, actions have to be taken. Part of the enduring doubt over Kennedy’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam surely stems from the failure of this decision to cast a shadow in the primary record, and particularly in the Pentagon Papers, on which so many historians have relied for so many years. Furthermore, a persistent skeptic can still point to the “it should be possible” language of the McNamara-Taylor Report with respect to the final date of 1965 as leaving an “out” for the case where the military situation might turn sour. In two years and two months, much can happen, as events would prove.

    But as Scott already pointed out to Chomsky in 1993, the primary record available to date has been heavily edited. Documents from November 1, 1963, through early December are conspicuously missing. So, we now learn, are many others.

    In January 1998, again under the supervision of the ARRB, about 900 pages of new materials were declassified and released from the JCS archives. These include important records from May 1963, from October, and from the period immediately following Kennedy’s death; many had been reviewed for declassification in 1989 but were not declassified at that time. They clarify considerably the nature of the “presently prepared plans” referred to in the McNamara-Taylor third recommendation, and they give the military leadership’s interpretation of the direction they were getting from JFK. Since it is well known that the Pentagon did not favor withdrawal, it is fair to assume that if wiggle room existed in the President’s instructions it would surface in these documents.

    Many of the new documents relate to the Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference, held in Honolulu on May 6, 1963. Here one gets a taste of McNamara’s skepticism and the replies of the brass. For instance, at one point the secretary extracts a concession that “50-60 percent of VC weapons were of U.S. origin.” A bit later, we read: “ GEN HARKINS stated that for effective control the border should be defined, marked and cleared similar to the Greek boundary with Albania and Bulgaria. However, this cannot be done in the foreseeable future.”

    Turning to the development of a “comprehensive plan,” the documents immediately reflect discussions of a phase-down in the U.S. presence. For instance: “ SEC MCNAMARA stated that our efforts should be directed toward turning over equipment now in U.S. units supporting the Vietnamese as rapidly as possible. He added that we must avoid creating a situation that now obtains in Korea where we are presently spending almost half a billion dollars per year in foreign aid.” A little later, we find a decision noted: “1. Draw up training plans for the RVNAF that will permit us to start an earlier withdrawal of U.S. personnel than proposed under the plans presented.” And: “d. Plan to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel from RVN by December 1963.”

    Further discussion of the 1,000 man withdrawal is recorded shortly:

    GEN HARKINS emphasized that he did not want to gather up 1,000 U.S. personnel and have them depart with bands playing, flags flying etc. This would have a bad effect on the Vietnamese, to be pulling out just when it appears they are winning. SEC MCNAMARA stated that this would have to be handled carefully due to the psychological impact. However, there should be an intensive training program of RVNAF to allow removal of U.S. units rather than individuals.

    There follows considerable discussion of proposals to launch raids on North Vietnam. For Geneva convention reasons, it is agreed that these must be covert. Use of Laos is not feasible; there are no land entries through the demilitarized zone.

    As for sea entry, available boats are susceptible to weather and too slow. Sea is the only means of exfiltration. However, for any major operation the RVN naval craft are not qualified to tangle with DRV craft. . . . Build-up in CIA resources by end CY 1963 includes 40 teams in addition to 9 in country. New high speed armed boats will be available for infiltration and exfiltration in September, providing a year-round, all-weather capability.

    Thus emerges an answer to one of the critical questions separating Newman and Scott from Chomsky. OPLAN 34A, when it emerged in November, would be a CIA operation. It could not be otherwise, for the Government of Vietnam did not possess the boats. 8

    Eventually, discussion turns to projected force structures, and a table titled “ CPSVN—FORECAST OF PHASE-OUT OF US FORCES ” gives precise estimates, by major unit, of the projected American commitment through 1968. McNamara’s reaction to this timetable is recorded clearly:

    In connection with this presentation, made by COMUSMACV (attached hereto), the Secretary of Defense stated that the phase-out appears too slow. He directed that training plans be developed for the GVN by CINCPAC which will permit a more rapid phase-out of U.S. forces, stating specifically that we should review our plans for pilot training with the view to accelerating it materially. He made particular point of the desirability of speeding up training of helicopter pilots, so that we may give the Vietnamese our copters and thus be able to move our own forces out. ACTION : Joint Staff (J-3); message directive to CINCPAC, info COMUSMACV. (Emphasis added.)

    The May conference thus fills in the primary record: plans were under development for the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. On October 2, 1963, as we have previously seen, President Kennedy made clear his determination to implement those plans—to withdraw 1,000 troops by the end of 1963, and to get almost all the rest out by the end of 1965. There followed, on October 4, a memorandum titled “South Vietnam Actions” from General Maxwell Taylor to his fellow Joint Chiefs of Staff, Generals May, Wheeler, Shoup, and Admiral McDonald, that reads:

    b. The program currently in progress to train Vietnamese forces will be reviewed and accelerated as necessary to insure that all essential functions visualized to be required for the projected operational environment, to include those now performed by U.S. military units and personnel, can be assumed properly by the Vietnamese by the end of calendar year 1965. All planning will be directed towards preparing RVN forces for the withdrawal of all U.S. special assistance units and personnel by the end of calendar year 1965. (Emphasis added.)

    “All planning” is an unconditional phrase. There is no contingency here, or elsewhere in this memorandum. The next paragraph reads:

    c. Execute the plan to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963 per your DTG 212201Z July, and as approved for planning by JCS DTG 062042Z September. Previous guidance on the public affairs annex is altered to the extent that the action will now be treated in low key, as the initial increment of U.S. forces whose presence is no longer required because (a) Vietnamese forces have been trained to assume the function involved; or (B) the function for which they came to Vietnam has been completed. (Emphasis added.)

    This resolves the question of how the initial withdrawal was to be carried out. It was not to be a noisy or cosmetic affair, designed to please either U.S. opinion or to change policies in Saigon. It was rather to be a low-key, matter-of-fact beginning to a process that would play out over the following two years. The final paragraph of Taylor’s memorandum underlines this point by directing that “specific checkpoints will be established now against which progress can be evaluated on a quarterly basis.” There is much more in the JCS documents to show that Kennedy was well aware of the evidence that South Vietnam was, in fact, losing the war. But it hardly matters. The withdrawal decided on was unconditional, and did not depend on military progress or lack of it.

    The Escalation at Kennedy’s Death

    Four days after Kennedy was killed, NSAM 273 incorporated the new president’s directives into policy. It made clear that the objectives of Johnson’s policy remained the same as Kennedy’s: “to assist the people and government of South Vietnam to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy” through training support and without the application of overt U.S. military force. But Johnson had also approved intensified planning for covert action against North Vietnam by CIA-supported South Vietnamese forces.

    With this, McNamara confirms one of Newman’s central claims: NSAM 273 changed policy. Yes, the “central objectives” remained the same: a Vietnamese war with no “overt U.S. military force.” But covert force is still “U.S. military force.” And that was introduced or at least first approved, as McNamara writes, by NSAM 273 within four days of Kennedy’s assassination.Moreover, McNamara effectively supports Newman on the meaning of NSAM 273’s seventh paragraph, which was inserted in the draft (as we have seen) sometime between November 21 and 26—after the Honolulu meeting had adjourned and probably after Kennedy died.

    A final military document is relevant here. Dated December 11, 1963, it is titled “Department of Defense Actions to Implement NSAM No. 273, 26 November 1963.” This document was prepared by Marine Lieutenant Colonel M. C. Dalby; it is from CINCPAC files and is labeled “Group 1—Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification.” The document begins coldly:

    “After reviewing the recent discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu and after discussing the matter further with Ambassador Lodge, the President directed that certain guidance be issued to various Government Agencies. This was promulgated in the form of National Security Action Memorandum 273, 26 November 1963.”

    There is no reference to the change of commander in chief, which had occurred within the time frame indicated by the opening sentence. The particular importance of this document is its reference to paragraph 7 of NSAM 273.

    Planning for intensified action against North Vietnam was directed following the Honolulu Conference (JCS 3697, 26 Nov 1963) in the form of a 12-month program. . . . A deadline of 20 Dec 63 has been set for completion of the plan.

    There are then notes that these requirements were communicated to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV on December 2, with a reply from COMUSMACV on December 3. CIA station guidance, however, happened even more rapidly than that:

    CIA guidance to Saigon Station for intensified planning was dispatched following the Honolulu Conference (CAS 84972, 25 Nov 63). (Emphasis added.)

    In other words, the CIA began developing intensified plans to implement OPLAN 34A, the program of seaborne raids and sabotage against North Vietnam that would lead to the Gulf of Tonkin incident and eventually to the wider war, one day before President Johnson signed the directive authorizing that action. How this happened, and its precise significance, remains to be determined. 9

    Conclusion

    John F. Kennedy had formally decided to withdraw from Vietnam, whether we were winning or not. Robert McNamara, who did not believe we were winning, supported this decision. 10 The first stage of withdrawal had been ordered. The final date, two years later, had been specified. These decisions were taken, and even placed, in an oblique and carefully limited way, before the public.

    Howard Jones makes two large contributions to this tale. One of them is simply range, depth, and completeness. His recent book Death of a Generation is a full history of how the assassinations of Diem and then of JFK prolonged a war that otherwise might have ended quietly within a few years. Where this essay has presented the story-within-a-story of just a few Washington weeks, Jones goes back to the start of the 1960s, chronicling the struggle for power and policy that marked the whole of Kennedy’s thousand days. And he presents a reasonably complete account of the archival record surrounding the withdrawal decisions of October 1963.

    Equally important, Jones’s reach extends to Saigon. In a long and fascinating section he outlines the intrigues that led to the murders of Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu on November 1, 1963. Here, Kennedy’s White House appears at its worst. It was fractious, disorganized, preoccupied with American politics, ignorant of the forces it faced in Vietnam. Diem’s mistreatment of the Buddhists, which provoked the monk Quang Duc to burn himself on a Saigon street in June 1963, traumatized the White House. And following that incident, Madame Nhu and her remarks about “barbecued bonzes” were an irritant out of proportion to their importance. Thus, in part, the decision to dissociate from Diem.

    In August 1963 it was a faction of subordinates (Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman, Michael Forrestal) who seized the opportunity to foment a Saigon coup, taking advantage of the absence of the most senior officials over a Washington weekend. Then, having set events in motion, the White House became preoccupied with a deniability that was wholly implausible. Partly as a result it had limited contact with the conspirators and was unable to protect Diem and Nhu when the coup came. Diem was indefensible in many ways. But the coup went forward with no alternative in view; and as the French ambassador to Saigon put it at the time: “any other government will be even more dependent on the Americans, will be obedient to them in all things, and so there will be no chance for peace.” Meanwhile, there are tantalizing undercurrents of what might have been. Was Nhu in discussions with intermediaries for Ho Chi Minh, with the possibility that there might have been a deal between North and South to boot the Americans from Vietnam? It appears that he was. And had he succeeded, it would have saved infinite trouble.

    U.S. policy over Vietnam changed again in late November1963. The main change was a decision to authorize OPLAN 34-A—minor but fateful commando raids against targets in the North. The decision to launch covert attacks on North Vietnam does not by itself establish that Lyndon Johnson wanted a larger war. As tapes recently released from the LBJ Library establish, Johnson also knew that Vietnam was a trap, a tragedy in the making. He feared that a catastrophe would follow. In this respect, Johnson and Kennedy were similar.

    And yet, Johnson could not muster Kennedy’s determination, one might say blind determination, to avoid the disaster. He acceded to proposals for covert action, and he promised the military, on November 24, that they could have what they wanted. And so the sequence of events that led to the Tonkin Gulf, to our retaliation, to the North Vietnamese decision to introduce their own main forces in the South, and to our decision to introduce main forces, played out. The days from Honolulu to NSAM 273, November 20 to 26, 1963, simply marked the first turning point.

    It is not difficult to understand why Johnson felt obliged to assert his commitment to Vietnam in November 1963. To continue with Kennedy’s withdrawal, after his death, would have been difficult, since the American public had not been told that the war was being lost. Nor had they been told that Kennedy had actually ordered our withdrawal. To maintain our commitment, therefore, was to maintain the illusion of continuity, and this—in the moment of trauma that followed the assassination—was Johnson’s paramount political objective. Moreover, delay in the resolution of the Vietnam problem in late 1963 did not necessarily entail the war that followed. Our commitment then was still small. Tonkin Gulf and its aftermath lay almost a year into the future. Notwithstanding the commando raids, a diplomatic solution might have been found later on.

    Left in charge, Lyndon Johnson temporized, agonized, and cursed the fates. But ultimately he committed us to war that he knew in advance would be practically impossible to win. Nothing can erase this. And yet meanwhile, alongside McNamara, he too prevented any steps that might lead to an invasion of the North, direct conflict with China, and nuclear confrontation. He bided his time, until the trauma of Tet in January of 1968 and his own departure from politics in March liberated him to do what Kennedy had done over Laos in 1961: send Harriman to end it at the negotiating table.

    * * *

    Why did Johnson do it? He was not misinformed about the prospects for sucess. He was not crazy. His political fate in 1964 did not depend on a show of toughness. But one possibility is that the alternatives, as he saw them, were worse. To appreciate this possibility, one needs to grasp not one but two exceptionally thorny nettles: that of the strategic balance in the early 1960s on the one hand, and that of the assassination of John F. Kennedy on the other. In contemplating Johnson’s dilemma we find ourselves poised between the two black holes of the modern history of the United States.11

    Kennedy’s decision to withdraw from Vietnam was, as Jones writes, “unconditional, for he approved a calendar of events that did not necessitate a victory.” It was also part of a larger strategy, of a sequence that included the Laos and Berlin settlements in 1961, the non-invasion of Cuba in 1962, the Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Kennedy subordinated the timing of these events to politics: he was quite prepared to leave soldiers in harm’s way until after his own reelection. His larger goal after that was to settle the Cold War, without either victory or defeat—a strategic vision laid out in JFK’s commencement speech at American University on June 10, 1963.

    And that was, partly, a question of atomic survival—a subject that can only be said to have obsessed America’s civilian leadership in those days, and for very good reason. The Soviet Union, which had at that time only four intercontinental rockets capable of hitting the U.S. mainland, was not the danger that rational men most feared. The United States held an overwhelming nuclear advantage in late 1963. Accordingly, our nuclear plans were not actually about deterrence. Rather, then as evidently again now, they envisioned preventive war fought over a pretext.12 There were those who were dedicated to carrying out those plans at the appropriate moment. In July 1961, the nuclear planners had specified that the optimal moment for such an attack would come at the end of 1963.

    And yet, standing against them (as Daniel Ellsberg was told at the time), the civilian leaders of the United States were determined never, under any circumstances, to allow U.S. nuclear weapons to be used first—not in Laos or Vietnam, nor against China, not over Cuba or Berlin, nor against the Soviet Union. For political reasons, at a moment when Americans had been propagandized into thinking of the atomic bomb as their best defense, this was the deepest secret of the time.

    Was it also a deadly secret? Did LBJ have reason to fear, on the day he took office, that he was facing a nuclear coup d’etat?13 Similar questions have engendered scorn for 40 years. But they are not illegitimate—no more so, let me venture, than the idea that Kennedy really had decided to quit Vietnam. Perhaps someday a historian will answer them as well as Howard Jones has now resolved the Vietnam puzzle. Meanwhile, let us hope that we might learn something about the need to recognize and cope with policy failure. And as for the truth behind the darkest state secrets, let us also hope that the victims of September 11, 2001, don’t have to wait as long. <

    James K. Galbraith, a 2003 Carnegie Scholar, holds the Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr., Chair of Government/Business Relations at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin.

    Notes

    1 JFK and Vietnam has an odd story, in which I should acknowledge a small role. On release, it received a front-page review by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in the New York Times Book Review. But of some 32,000 copies printed (in two printings, according to Newman) only about 10,000 were sold before Warner Books abruptly ceased selling the hardcover—a fact I discovered on my own in the fall of 1993, when I attempted to assign it to a graduate class. I met Newman in November 1993, partly through the good offices of the LBJ Library. I carried his grievance personally to an honorable high official of Time Warner, whose intervention secured the return of his rights. Still, the hardback was never reissued, and no paperback has appeared.

    2 “Counterfactual Historical Reasoning: NSAM 263 and NSAM 273,” mimeo for a conference at the LBJ Library, 14–15 October 1993, published as “NSAM 263 and 273: Manipulating History” in Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., Vietnam: The Early Decisions (University of Texas Press, 1997).

    3 Reeves, author of President Kennedy: Profile of Power, made this argument in a televised lecture at the LBJ Library in early 1995.

    4 In a contribution to Vietnam: The Early Decisions, Newman adds a further reason: Kennedy had, on October 2, allowed McNamara and Taylor to announce, as their recommended target date, that the withdrawal be completed by 1965. It would have been awkward to follow just three days later with a presidential decision making clear that the timetable was, in fact, a firm one.

    5 The fate of these commandos surfaced in the New York Times of 14 April 1995, where it was reported that after 30 years in prison, many were denied immigration to the United States because of a lack of service records.

    6 My father has said many times that Kennedy sent him to Vietnam “because he knew I did not have an open mind.”

    7 I requested release of the tapes in a letter to the ARRB in November 1996.

    8 CINCPAC was developing these plans, but they had not been shown to JFK, according to Newman.

    9 According to Newman, LBJ took a belligerent tone at his first Vietnam meeting as President on November 24, and McGeorge Bundy attributed the escalatory language in NSAM 273 to this. However, by any standard the CIA moved quickly, and by this account it relied on the discussions at Honolulu—which occurred while JFK was still alive.

    10 I have in this narrative deliberately underplayed the role of my own father, who was repeatedly called upon by Kennedy to deliver arguments in favor of disengagement from Vietnam, and whose 1962 recommendation for phased withdrawal was probably the basis of the 1963 orders. My father did not know that the actual decision was taken in October 1963, but he is in no doubt as to Kennedy’s determination: he recalls Kennedy in 1962 saying to him privately and unmistakably that withdrawal from Vietnam, as that from Laos and the detachment from Cuba, was a matter of political timing.

    11 My father retains a distinct, chilling recollection of LBJ’s words to him, in private, on one of their last meetings before the Vietnam War finally drove them apart: “You may not like what I’m doing in Vietnam, Ken, but you would not believe what would happen if I were not here.”

    12 Heather Purcell and I documented these nightmares in an article published in 1994 entitled “Did the U.S. Military Plan a Nuclear First Strike for 1963?” It is still available on the website of the American Prospect. When once I asked the late Walt Rostow if he knew anything about the National Security Council meeting of July 20, 1961 (at which these plans were presented), he responded with no hesitation: “Do you mean the one where they wanted to blow up the world?”

    13 There is no doubt that the danger of nuclear war was on Johnson’s mind. It also explains important points about his behavior in those days, including his orders to Earl Warren and Richard Russell (the latter in a phone call, a recording of which has long been available on the C-SPAN website) as to how they would conduct their commission. The point to appreciate is that there is only one way a war could have started at that time: by preemptive attack by the United States against the Soviet Union.

    © 1997–2003 by James K. Galbraith. All rights reserved.

    Originally published in the October/November 2003 issue of Boston Review

    Shortcut to: http://bostonreview.net/BR28.5/galbraith.html

    B....

    Question for Forum Members

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted

    Your welcome Robert...

    It did not take me long, lucky this time, the info came up quickly.....as it was within my collections, which I call

    the "dungeons" where I spend much time...

    I will try to stay on top of the Operation Valkyrie thread, for further information.....

    The withdrawl as you comment, was never resolved, that was made positively impossible.....

    and though it has been found that LBJ announced he would be going along with such after the

    assassination, I believe it was by March that had changed....drastically..

    This below is also an older thread on this Forum.....which I find of interest..

    The Vietnam War and the Assassination of JFK

    http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:Tx3CB...lient=firefox-a

    Thanks..

    Take care......

    B.... :)

    Below LBJ Nam 5.31.68

    Question for Forum Members

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted

    Ron, John:

    You may be interested in some of this infomartion....

    B......

    Troop reductions in S. Vietnam. (transcript)..

    Many people seem to be unaware that President Kennedy publicly announced his

    intention to withdraw a thousand men from South Vietnam by the end of 1963.

    This announcement was made in a press conference on October 31, 1963, just

    22

    days before his death. In fact, the very first question asked in that press

    conference was about troop reductions in Vietnam and Korea.

    Here is the entire question and Kennedy’s response:

    "[REPORTER:] Mr. President, back to the question of troop reductions, are

    any

    intended in the far east at the present time – particularly in Korea and is

    there any speedup in the withdrawal from Vietnam intended?

    [PRESIDENT KENNEDY:] Well as you know, when Secretary McNamara and General

    Taylor came back, they announced that we would expect to withdraw a thousand

    men from South Vietnam before the end of the year. And there has been some

    reference to that by General Harkins. If we’re able to do that, that will

    be

    our schedule. I think the first unit, the first contingent, would be 250

    men

    who are not involved in what might be called front-line operations. It

    would

    be our hope to lesson the number of Americans there by a thousand as the

    training intensifies and is carried on in South Vietnam."

    ------ from JFK’s press conference, October 31, 1963

    [An audio cassette tape recording of the referenced press conference was

    provided by the John F. Kennedy Library, audio-visual department, Columbia

    Point, Boston, MA 02125.]

    NOTE: The referenced press conference is widely known and snippets are

    frequently used in documentaries about JFK shown on the major television

    networks; however, Kennedy’s comments about scheduled reduction of personnel

    in

    South Vietnam are ALWAYS deleted from ALL such documentaries. The producers

    of

    these documentaries usually show an interview with Walter Cronkite sometime

    earlier where President Kennedy suggested we should stay in Vietnam.

    Obviously

    Kennedy changed his public position on Vietnam shortly before he was killed,

    but the news media – to this day – is keeping that information from the

    public.

    The question is, WHY?

    Dave Sharp....

    Kennedy Had a Plan for Early Exit in Vietnam

    By TIM WEINER

    Published: Tuesday, December 23, 1997

    http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/23/us/kenne...2fVietnam%20War

    THE SECOND BIGGEST LIE

    by Michael Morrissey

    The biggest lie of our time, after the Warren Report, is the notion that Johnson

    merely continued or expanded Kennedy's policy in Vietnam after the

    assassination.

    1. JFK's policy

    In late 1962, Kennedy was still fully committed to supporting the Diem regime,

    though he had some doubts even then. When Senator Mike Mansfield advised

    withdrawal at that early date:

    The President was too disturbed by the Senator's unexpected argument to reply to

    it. He said to me later when we talked about the discussion, "I got angry with

    Mike for disagreeing with our policy so completely, and I got angry with myself

    because I found myself agreeing with him (Kenneth O'Donnell and Dave Powers,

    Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970, p. 15).

    By the spring of 1963, Kennedy had reversed course completely and agreed with

    Mansfield:

    "The President told Mansfield that he had been having serious second thoughts

    about Mansfield's argument and that he now agreed with the Senator's thinking on

    the need for a complete military withdrawal from Vietnam.

    'But I can't do it until 1965--after I'm reelected,' Kennedy told Mansfield....

    After Mansfield left the office, the President said to me, 'In 1965 I'll become

    one of the most unpopular Presidents in history. I'll be damned everywhere as a

    Communist appeaser. But I don't care. If I tried to pull out completely now from

    Vietnam, we would have another Joe McCarthy red scare on our hands, but I can do

    it after I'm reelected. So we had better make damned sure that I am reelected'

    (O'Donnell, p. 16)."

    Sometime after that Kennedy told O'Donnell again that

    "...he had made up his mind that after his reelection he would take the risk of

    unpopularity and make a complete withdrawal of American military forces from

    Vietnam. He had decided that our military involvement in Vietnam's civil war

    would only grow steadily bigger and more costly without making a dent in the

    larger political problem of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia" (p. 13).

    Just before he was killed he repeated this commitment:

    "'They keep telling me to send combat units over there,' the President said to

    us one day in October [1963]. 'That means sending draftees, along with volunteer

    regular Army advisers, into Vietnam. I'll never send draftees over there to

    fight'." (O'Donnell, p. 383).

    Kennedy's public statements and actions were consistent with his private

    conversations, though more cautiously expressed in order to appease the military

    and right-wing forces that were clamoring for more, not less, involvement in

    Vietnam, and with whom he did not want to risk an open confrontation one year

    before the election. As early as May 22, 1963, he said at a press conference:

    "...we are hopeful that the situation in South Vietnam would permit some

    withdrawal in any case by the end of the year, but we can't possibly make that

    judgement at the present time" (Harold W. Chase and Allen H. Lerman, eds.,

    Kennedy and the Press: The News Conferences, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965,

    p. 447).

    Then came the statement on October 2:

    "President Kennedy asked McNamara to announce to the press after the meeting the

    immediate withdrawal of one thousand soldiers and to say that we would probably

    withdraw all American forces from Vietnam by the end of 1965. When McNamara was

    leaving the meeting to talk to the White House reporters, the President called

    to him, "And tell them that means all of the helicopter pilots, too" (O'Donnell,

    p. 17).

    This decision was not popular with the military, the Cabinet, the

    vice-president, or the CIA, who continued to support Diem, the dictator the US

    had installed in South Vietnam in 1955. Hence the circumspect wording of the

    statement on Oct. 2, which was nevertheless announced as a "statement of United

    States policy":

    Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgement that the major

    part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although

    there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training

    personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for

    training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S.

    military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdrawn (Documents on

    American Foreign Relations 1963, Council on Foreign Relations, New York: Harper

    & Row, 1964, p. 296).

    NSAM 263, signed on Oct. 11, 1963, officially approved and implemented the same

    McNamara-Taylor recommendations that had prompted the press statement of Oct. 2.

    They recommended that:

    "A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now

    performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end

    of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that

    time.

    "In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over

    military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near

    future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the

    end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a

    long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without

    impairment of the war effort" (Pentagon Papers, NY: Bantam, 1971, pp. 211-212).

    The withdrawal policy was confirmed at a news conference on Oct. 31, where

    Kennedy said in response to a reporter's question if there was "any speedup in

    the withdrawal from Vietnam":

    "I think the first unit or first contingent would be 250 men who are not

    involved in what might be called front-line operations. It would be our hope to

    lessen the number of Americans there by 1000, as the training intensifies and is

    carried on in South Vietnam" (Kennedy and the Press, p. 508).

    By this time it had become apparent that Diem was not going to mend his brutal

    ways and provide any sort of government in South Vietnam that the US could

    reasonably support, if indeed any US- supported regime had any hope of popular

    support at that point. The only alternative to a total US military commitment

    was to replace Diem with someone capable of forming a viable coalition

    government, along the lines of the agreement for Laos that had been worked out

    with Krushchev's support in Vienna in June 1962. The point of deposing Diem, in

    other words, was to enable an American withdrawal, as O'Donnell and Powers

    confirm:

    "One day when he [Kennedy] was talking with Dave and me about pulling out of

    Vietnam, we asked him how he could manage a military withdrawal without losing

    American prestige in Southeast Asia.

    'Easy,' he said. 'Put a government in there that will ask us to leave'" (p. 18).

    This decision, too, was not popular with the Cabinet or with Johnson. Secretary

    of State Rusk said at a meeting on Aug. 31, 1963, "that it would be far better

    for us to start on the firm basis of two things--that we will not pull out of

    Vietnam until the war is won, and that we will not run a coup." McNamara agreed,

    and so did Johnson, the latter adding that he "had never really seen a genuine

    alternative to Diem" and that "from both a practical and a political viewpoint,

    it would be a disaster to pull out...and that we should once again go about

    winning the war." (NYT, Pentagon Papers, p. 205).

    Diem and his brother Nhu were both murdered during the coup on Nov. 1, 1963, but

    much as Kennedy's critics might like to imply that he ordered their executions,

    he had nothing to gain from such barbarity. O'Donnell and Powers say the

    killings "shocked and depressed him" and made him "only more sceptical of our

    military advice from Saigon and more determined to pull out of the Vietnam war"

    (p. 17). The US liaison with the anti-Diem generals, Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, a

    long-time CIA operative who had helped Edward Lansdale and the CIA bring Diem to

    power in 1954, later told the press, on President Nixon's suggestion, that

    Kennedy had known about the Diem assassination plot, but this was a pure

    fabrication (Jim Hougan, Spooks, NY: William Morrow, 1978, p. 138). It is more

    likely that Diem and Nhu were killed by the same forces that killed Kennedy

    himself three weeks later.

    Two days before Kennedy was shot, there was a top-level policy conference on

    Vietnam in Honolulu, where the issue was not just withdrawal but accelerated

    withdrawal, along with substantial cuts in military aid. As Peter Scott notes in

    his important but much-ignored essay in the Gravel edition of the Pentagon

    Papers, the Honolulu conference agreed to speed up troop withdrawal by six

    months and reduce aid by $33 million ("Vietnamization and the Drama of the

    Pentagon Papers," Pentagon Papers, Gravel edition, Vol. 5, Boston: Beacon Press,

    p. 224). The New York Times also reported that the conference had "reaffirmed

    the U.S. plan to bring home about 1,000 of its 16,500 troops from South Vietnam

    by January 1" (11/21/63, p. 8, quoted in Scott, p. 224).

    Curiously, because of the Honolulu conference and a coincidental trip by other

    Cabinet members to Japan, the Secretaries of State (Rusk), Defense (McNamara),

    the Treasury (Dillon), Commerce (Hodges), Labor (Wirtz), Agriculture (Freeman),

    and the Interior (Udall), as well as the Director of the CIA (McCone), the

    ambassador to South Vietnam (Lodge), chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

    (Taylor), and head of U.S. forces in Vietnam (Harkins) were all out of the

    country when Kennedy was killed. Only his brother Robert, National Security

    Adviser McGeorge Bundy, who apparently returned to Washington from Honolulu on

    Nov. 21, the HEW Secretary (Celebrezze), and the Postmaster General (Gronouski)

    were in Washington on Nov. 22. Johnson, of course, was with the president in

    Dallas, but this too was curious, since normal security precautions would avoid

    having the president and vice- president away from Washington at the same time,

    and together.

    2. LBJ's policy

    In addition to Kennedy's own private and public statements, and the policy

    directed by NSAM 263, the second paragraph of Johnson's own directive, NSAM 273,

    signed four days after the assassination, explicitly affirms the continuation of

    the withdrawal plan announced on Oct. 2:

    "The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U.S.

    military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of Oct. 2,

    1963" (Pentagon Papers, NYT, p. 233).

    Obviously, Johnson did not continue the withdrawal policy very long. Exactly

    when he reversed it is a matter of controversy, but it is certain that the

    decision was made by March 27, 1964: "Thus ended de jure the policy of phase out

    and withdrawal and all the plans and programs oriented to it (Pentagon Papers,

    Gravel ed., 2:196)." The first indication of this change came the day after the

    assassination: "The only hint that something might be different from on-going

    plans came in a Secretary of Defense memo for the President three days prior to

    this NSC meeting [on Nov. 26]." Johnson "began to have a sense of uneasiness

    about Vietnam" in early December and initiated a "major policy review (2:191)."

    It is not necessary to agree with Peter Scott that the text of NSAM 273 in

    itself reveals Johnson's reversal of Kennedy's policy, thus giving the lie to

    paragraph 2, which purports to continue that policy. The differences between the

    text proposed by McNamara/Taylor, JFK's White House statement, and LBJ's NSAM

    273 are worth noting, however.

    Where McNamara/Taylor refer to the security of South Vietnam as "vital to United

    States security," Kennedy says it is "a major interest of the United States as

    other free nations." The syntax is sloppy here, so that "as other free nations"

    could mean "as is that of other free nations [besides Vietnam]" or "as it is of

    other free nations [besides the US]," but in either case Kennedy is clearly

    attempting to relativize the US commitment to South Vietnam. Further on he

    refers to US policy in South Vietnam "as in other parts of the world," again

    qualifying the commitment. These qualifications are missing in Johnson's

    statement, which refers exclusively to Vietnam.

    McNamara-Taylor refer to the "overriding objective of denying this country

    [south Vietnam] to Communism." Kennedy softens this to "policy of working with

    the people and Government of South Vietnam to deny this country to communism."

    Johnson hardens "overriding objective" again to "central object" (i.e.

    objective), which he defines as "to win their contest" rather than as "to deny

    this country to communism," which was Kennedy's formulation.

    McNamara-Taylor talk about "suppressing the Viet Cong insurgency." Kennedy

    qualifies this as "the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the

    Viet Cong." This is important, since the "Viet Cong" were nothing more than

    Vietnamese nationalists who happened to be living in South Vietnam. They were

    supported by the North, but in 1963 Ho Chi Minh would have been glad to stop the

    "external stimulation and support" he was giving the Viet Cong in exchange for

    nationwide free elections, which had been promised by the 1954 Geneva Accords

    but never took place, because he would have won in a landslide, in the South as

    well as the North. The best the US could have hoped for was a coalition

    government, as in Laos.

    By limiting the US commitment to stopping "external support" of the Viet Cong,

    Kennedy could well have been leaving the way open for a negotiated settlement.

    Johnson drops the term "Viet Cong" altogether and refers to the "externally

    directed and supported communist conspiracy." Kennedy's externally stimulated

    Viet Cong insurgency becomes Johnson's externally directed communist conspiracy.

    The Viet Cong have been completely subsumed under a much larger and familiar

    bugaboo, the international "communist conspiracy."

    In this one sentence, Johnson has greatly widened the war, turning what Kennedy

    was still willing to recognize as an indigenous rebellion into a primal struggle

    between good and evil.

    But again, it is not necessary to agree that these textual differences give the

    lie to paragraph 2 of NSAM 273, where Johnson vows to continue Kennedy's

    withdrawal policy, to agree that Johnson did, at some point, reverse the policy.

    This would seem to be obvious, yet we find most historians bending over backward

    to avoid making this simple observation. In fact, we find just the opposite

    assertion--that there was no change in policy. If we take NSAM 273 at face

    value, we must say that this is correct: Johnson continued Kennedy's withdrawal

    policy.

    But this is not what the historians mean when they say there was no change in

    policy. They mean that Johnson continued Kennedy's policy of escalation. The

    entire matter of withdrawal is ignored or glossed over.

    3. The Establishment perspective

    Let us take some examples, chosen at random (emphasis added):

    "...President Kennedy...began the process of backing up American military aid

    with "advisers." At the time of his murder there were 23,000 [sic] of them in

    South Vietnam. President Johnson took the same view of the importance of

    Vietnam..."(J.M. Roberts, The Pelican History of the World, 2nd ed.,

    Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980, p. 988-989).

    "Although Johnson followed Kennedy's lead in sending more and more troops to

    Vietnam (it peaked at 542,000, in 1969), it was never enough to meet General

    Westmoreland's demands..." (Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,

    NY: Random House, 1987, p. 405).

    "By October 1963, some 16,000 American troops were in Vietnam... Under President

    Johnson, the "advisors" kept increasing... Lyndon Johnson, who had campaigned in

    1964 as a "peace candidate," inherited and expanded the Vietnam policy of his

    predecessor" (Allan Nevins and Henry Steele Commager, A Pocket History of the

    United States, 7th ed., NY: Pocket Books, 1981, p. 565-566).

    These examples are typical of the more general view. As the treatments become

    more specialized, it becomes harder to separate fact from obfuscation, but it

    should be borne in mind that all of the accounts I will review contradict what

    one would think would be considered the most reliable source: the Gravel edition

    of the Pentagon Papers.

    The Gravel account devotes 40 pages to the history of the withdrawal policy

    ("Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces, 1962-1964," Vol. 2, pp. 160-200). It states

    clearly that "the policy of phase out and withdrawal and all the plans and

    programs oriented to it" ended "de jure" in March 1964 (p. 196). It also states

    clearly that the change in the withdrawal policy occurred after the

    assassination:

    "The only hint that something might be different from on-going plans came in a

    Secretary of Defense memo for the President three days prior to this NSC meeting

    [on Nov. 26]....In early December, the President [Johnson] began to have, if not

    second thoughts, at least a sense of uneasiness about Vietnam. In discussions

    with his advisors, he set in motion what he hoped would be a major policy

    review..." (p. 196).

    There can be no question, then, if we stick to the record, that Kennedy had

    decided and planned to pull out, had begun to implement those plans, and that

    Johnson subsequently reversed them.

    This clear account in the Gravel edition, however, is obscured in the more

    widely read New York Times "edition," which is really only a summary of the

    official history by NYT reporters, with some documents added. The Gravel edition

    has the actual text, and is significantly different. The NYT reporters gloss

    over the history of the withdrawal policy in a way that cannot be simply to save

    space. NSAM 263 is not mentioned at all, and Kennedy's authorization of the

    McNamara-Taylor recommendations is mentioned only in passing, and inaccurately:

    "[The McNamara-Taylor report] asserted that the "bulk" of American troops could

    be withdrawn by the end of 1965. The two men proposed and--with the President's

    approval--announced that 1,000 Americans would be pulled out by the end of 1963"

    (p. 176).

    That this "announcement" was in fact a White House foreign policy statement is

    cleverly disguised (McNamara made the announcement, but it was Kennedy speaking

    through him), along with the fact that the president also approved the more

    important recommendation--to withdraw all troops by the end of 1965.

    Earlier, the NYT reporter quotes a Pentagon Papers (PP) reference to the

    1,000-man pullout (again ignoring the more significant total planned withdrawal

    by 1966) as "strange," "absurd," and"Micawberesque" (p. 113). Then he mentions a

    statement by McNamara that

    "...the situation deteriorated so profoundly in the final five months of the

    Kennedy Administration...that the entire phase-out had to be formally dropped in

    early 1964."

    The reporter's conclusion is that the PP account "presents the picture of an

    unbroken chain of decision-making from the final months of the Kennedy

    Administration into the early months of the Johnson Administration, whether in

    terms of the political view of the American stakes in Vietnam, the advisory

    build-up or the hidden growth of covert warfare against North Vietnam" (p. 114).

    This is quite different from the actual (Gravel) account. It implies that the

    change in the withdrawal ("phase-out") policy began well within Kennedy's

    administration; Gravel says the change began in December 1963. The "unbroken

    chain of decision-making" and "advisory build-up" implies that there never was a

    withdrawal plan.

    This has been the pattern followed by virtually all individual historians.

    In his memoir Kennedy (NY: Harper & Row, 1965), Theodore Sorensen, who was one

    of Kennedy's speechwriters, does not mention the withdrawal plan at all. Arthur

    Schlesinger, another Kennedy adviser and a respected historian, has done a

    curious about-face since 1965, but in this early book he buries a brief

    reference to the White House policy statement in a context which makes it seem

    both insignificant and based on a misapprehension of the situation by McNamara,

    who

    "...thought that the political mess [in South Vietnam] had not yet infected the

    military situation and, back in Washington, announced (in spite of a strong

    dissent from William Sullivan of Harriman's staff who accompanied the mission)

    that a thousand American troops could be withdrawn by the end of the year and

    that the major part of the American military task would be completed by the end

    of 1965.

    "This announcement, however, was far less significant than McNamara's acceptance

    of the Lodge pressure program [on Diem]" (A Thousand Days, Boston: Houghton

    Mifflin, 1965, p. 996).

    Schlesinger does not indicate that this "far less significant" announcement was

    a statement of official policy and implemented nine days later by NSAM 263,

    confirmed at the Honolulu conference on Nov. 20, and (supposedly) reaffirmed by

    Johnson in NSAM 273.

    Stanley Karnow, the author of what many consider to be the "definitive" history

    of the Vietnam War (Vietnam: A History, NY: Viking Press, 1983), instead of

    citing the documents themselves, substitutes his own convoluted "analysis":

    "...what Kennedy wanted from McNamara and Taylor was a negative assessment of

    the military situation, so that he could justify the pressures being exerted on

    the Saigon regime. But Taylor and McNamara would only further complicate

    Kennedy's problems" (p. 293).

    This image of a recalcitrant McNamara and Taylor presenting a positive report

    when Kennedy expected a negative one is absurd, first because both McNamara and

    Taylor were in fact opposed to withdrawal, and second because if Kennedy had

    wanted a negative report, he would have had no trouble procuring one. He already

    had plenty, as a matter of fact, most recently that of Joseph Mendenhall, a

    State Department official, who had told Kennedy on Sept. 10 that the Diem

    government was near collapse.

    Karnow goes on to enlighten us as to McNamara and Taylor's true motivation for

    recommending the withdrawal of 1,000 troops by the end of the year: "to placate

    Harkins and the other optimists" (p. 293). Again, this is patently absurd. First

    McNamara and Taylor are presented as defying the president's "true wishes," and

    then as deliberately misrepresenting the situation to "placate" thecommanding

    general (without bothering to explain why troop withdrawals would be

    particularly placating to the general in charge of them). Karnow fails to

    mention NSAM 263, and the reason is clear: he would be hard put to explain, if

    the recommendations were "riddled with contradictions and compromises" and

    contrary to the president's wishes, as Karnow says, why the president

    implemented them with NSAM 263.

    Karnow also tells us why the recommendation to withdraw all US troops by 1965

    was made: it was "a prophecy evidently made for domestic political consumption

    at Kennedy's insistence" (p. 294). This is hard to understand, since there was

    no significant public or "political" opposition to US involvement in Vietnam at

    that time, but plenty of opposition to disengagement. We now have Kennedy, in

    Karnow's view, wanting a negative report, getting a positive one, and insisting

    on announcing it publicly for a political effect that would do him more harm

    than good!

    In an indirect reference to the Oct. 2 White House statement, Karnow begrudges

    us a small bit of truth:

    "Kennedy approved the document [the McNamara-Taylor recommendations] except for

    one nuance. He deleted a phrase calling the U.S. commitment to Vietnam an

    'overriding' American goal, terming it instead a part of his worldwide aim to

    'defeat aggression.' He wanted to preserve his flexibility" (p. 294).

    This confirms the importance of the textual changes in the two documents, as

    discussed above.

    In JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984),

    Herbert Parmet mentions both the White House statement and the McNamara-Taylor

    report, but in a way that makes the two documents seem totally unrelated to each

    other. Of the White House announcement Parmet says only:

    "On October 2 the White House announced that a thousand men would be withdrawn

    by the end of the year" (p. 333).

    The larger plan to withdraw all troops by 1965 is not mentioned at all. This is

    particularly misleading when followed by this statement:

    "[Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell] Gilpatric later stated that McNamara did

    indicate to him that the withdrawal was part of the President's plan to wind

    down the war, but, that was too far in the future" (p. 333).

    Who is the author of the last part of this sentence, Gilpatric or Parmet? In any

    case, the end of 1965 was only two years away-- hardly "far in the future," much

    less "too far," whatever that means.

    Parmet continues:

    "Ken O'Donnell has been the most vigorous advocate of the argument that the

    President was planning to liquidate the American stake right after the

    completion of the 1964 elections would have made it politically possible" (p.

    336).

    This reduces the fact that Kennedy planned to withdraw, documented in the White

    House statement and in NSAM 263 and 273, to the status of an argument

    "advocated" by O'Donnell. This clearly misrepresents O'Donnell's account as well

    as the documentary record. O'Donnell does not argue that Kennedy wanted to pull

    out; he quotes Kennedy's own words, uttered in his presence. It is not a matter

    of interpretation or surmise. Either Kennedy said what O'Donnell says he said,

    or O'Donnell is a xxxx. As for the documentary record, in addition to

    misrepresenting the White House statement, Parmet, like Karnow and Schlesinger,

    completely ignores NSAM 263 and 273.

    Parmet devotes the bulk of his discussion to the purely hypothetical question of

    what Kennedy would have done in Vietnam if he had lived. Parmet's answer: "It is

    probable that not even he was sure." This again flies in the face what we know.

    Kennedy knew what he wanted to do: withdraw. If Parmet's contention is that he

    would have changed his mind, had he lived, and reversed his withdrawal policy

    (as Johnson did), that is another matter. Parmet is trying to make us believe

    that it is not clear that Kennedy wanted to withdraw in the first place, which

    is plainly wrong.

    The hypothetical question is answered by O'Donnell and Powers, who were in a

    much better position to speculate than Parmet or anyone else, as follows:

    "All of us who listened to President Kennedy's repeated expressions of his

    determination to avoid further involvement in Vietnam are sure that if he had

    lived to serve a second term, the numbers of American military advisers and

    technicians in that country would have steadily decreased. He never would have

    committed U.S. Army combat units and draftees to action against the Viet Cong"

    (p. 383).

    Parmet says that for JFK "to have withdrawn at any point short of a clear-cut

    settlement would have been most unlikely" (p. 336). But "a clear-cut settlement"

    could range from Johnson's aim "to win" the war to Kennedy's more vaguely

    expressed aim "to support the efforts of the people of that country [south

    Vietnam] to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society" (White

    House statement, Oct. 2, 1963).

    Parmet cites Sorensen as affirming Kennedy's desire to find a solution "other

    than a retreat or abandonment of our commitment." This was in fact the solution

    that the withdrawal plan offered: our mission is accomplished; it's their war

    now. Parmet quotes from the speech Kennedy was supposed to deliver in Dallas the

    day he was killed, as if empty rhetoric like "we dare not weary of the test" [of

    supplying assistance to other nations] contradicted his withdrawal plan. He also

    cites Dean Rusk, who said in a 1981 interview that "at no time did he [Kennedy]

    even whisper any such thing [about withdrawal] to his own secretary of state."

    If that is true, Rusk knew less than the rest of the nation, who were informed

    by the White House statement on Oct. 2. Finally, Parmet quotes Robert Kennedy as

    saying that his brother "felt that South Vietnam was worth keeping for

    psychological and political reasons 'more than anything else,'" as if this

    supported Parmet's argumentthat JFK was fully committed to defending that

    corrupt dictatorship. But RFK could well have meant that means South Vietnam was

    not worth keeping if it meant the US going to war-- just the opposite of

    Parmet's interpretation.

    Despite Kenneth O'Donnell's clearly expressed opinion in his 1970 memoir, Parmet

    manages to have him saying the opposite in a 1976 interview:

    "When Ken O'Donnell was pressed about whether the President's decision to

    withdraw meant that he would have undertaken the escalation that followed in

    1965, the position became qualified. Kennedy, said O'Donnell, had not faced the

    same level of North Vietnamese infiltration as did President Johnson, thereby

    implying that he, too, would have responded in a similar way under those

    conditions" (p. 336).

    Now--who said what, exactly? If we read carefully, it is clear that it is Parmet

    who is "qualifying" O'Donnell's position, and Parmet who is telling us what

    O'Donnell is "implying"--not O'Donnell.

    John Ranelagh, a British journalist and author of what is widely considered an

    "authoritative" (i.e. sanitized) history of the CIA, describes Kennedy as

    "...a committed cold warrior, absolutely determined to prevent further communist

    expansion and in 1963 still smarting from the Bay of Pigs, the Vienna Summit,

    and the Cuban missile crisis. It was time to go on the offensive, show these

    communists what the United States could do if it put its mind to it, and Vietnam

    seemed the right place. It was an arrogance, born of ignorance of what the world

    really was like, assuming that American energy and power, applied with

    conviction, would change an essentially passive world. At the fateful moment,

    when the United States could have disengaged itself from Vietnam without

    political embarrassment, there was a President in the White House looking for

    opportunities to assert American strength.

    "Kennedy wondered during 1963 whether he was in fact right in deciding that

    Vietnam was the place for the exercise of this strength, and some of his close

    associates subsequently were convinced that he would have pulled out had he

    lived. But his own character and domestic political considerations militated

    against this actually happening. In 1964 the Republican presidential candidate,

    Barry Goldwater, ran on a strong prowar plank, and it would not have suited

    Kennedy--just as it did not suit Johnson--to face the electorate with the

    promise of complete disengagement. In addition, in September 1963 McNamara was

    promising Kennedy that with the proper American effort the war in Vietnam would

    be won by the end of 1965. No one was listening to the CIA or its analysts" (The

    Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, NY: Touchstone, 1987, p. 420; emphasis

    added).

    Ranelagh not only ignores Kennedy's withdrawal decision "at the fateful moment,"

    he transforms it into a desire "to assert strength," and has Kennedy pursuing

    the buildup for "domestic political considerations." (This is precisely opposite

    to Karnow's assumption, discussed above.) In the sentence beginning "In

    addition...", Ranelagh manages to "interpret" McNamara- Taylor's recommendation

    to pull out of Vietnam as an argument for Kennedy to stay in!

    Ranelagh's opinion that "no one was listening to the CIA," implying that the CIA

    was pessimistic about the war in 1963, contradicts what he says a few pages

    earlier: "The Pentagon Papers...showed, apart from the earliest period in

    1963-64, the agency's analysis was consistently pessimistic about U.S.

    involvement..." (p. 417, my emphasis). This is the familiar "lone voice in the

    wilderness" image of the CIA: only they were "intelligent" enough to read the

    writing on the wall. But if that is true, why did the agency try so hard (from

    1954 to 1964) to get us involved in the first place, and why did they continue

    tosupport the war effort in clandestine operations throughout? The CIA's Ray

    Cline says (as quoted by Ranelagh):

    McCone [CIA Director under Kennedy and Johnson] and I talked a lot about the

    U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and we both agreed in advising that intervention

    there would pay only if the United States was prepared to engage in a long,

    difficult process of nation-building in South Vietnam to create the political

    and economic strength to resist a guerrilla war (p. 420).

    Ranelagh intreprets this as evidence that the CIA wanted to withdraw from

    Vietnam in 1963. Nonsense. No one in the top echelons of the CIA, least of all

    Director John McCone, supported Kennedy's withdrawal plan in 1963. Nor does

    Cline's remark imply this. He is saying that the CIA's opinion (i.e. one of

    their opinions) was that to be "successful," the US would have to dig in for the

    long haul. I think the "long haul" is precisely what the CIA wanted, and

    precisely what Kennedy decided he did not want. That is why he decided to

    withdraw. Clearly, more powerful forces than Kennedy himself combined to make

    the intervention "pay" as the Johnson administration proceeded to engage in that

    "long, difficult process of nation-building" that generated hundreds of billions

    of dollars for the warmongers, destroying millions of lives in the process.

    Neil Sheehan, one of the editors of the NYT Pentagon Papers and the author of

    another acclaimed history of the war (A Bright Shining Lie, London: Picador,

    1990), devotes exactly one sentence in 861 pages to the crucial White House

    statement of Oct. 2, and not a single word to NSAM 263 or 273. His view is

    consistent: the generals, except for a few, like John Paul Vann (the

    biographical subject of the book), were incredibly stupid to think the war was

    being won by our side, but Kennedy was even more stupid because he believed

    them. The McNamara-Taylor report is presented as the height of naivety, which,

    Sheehan adds sarcastically,

    "...recommended pulling out 1,000 Americans by the end of 1963 in order to

    demonstrate how well the plans for victory were being implemented. The White

    House announced a forthcoming withdrawal of this first 1,000 men" (p. 366).

    But "The President," Sheehan says, "gained no peace of mind." He was "confused"

    and "angry" at the conflicting reports. In other words, according to Sheehan,

    the withdrawal plan reflects nothing but Kennedy's "confusion" and misjudgement

    of the situation, based on the equally false evaluation of his Secretary of

    State and top military adviser.

    As for the CIA, Sheehan, like Ranelagh, says the "analysts at the CIA told him

    [Kennedy] that Saigon's military position was deteriorating..." (p. 366). But

    Kennedy was too "confused" to understand this, and ordered withdrawal on the

    false assumption that the war was going well.

    All of these studies bend over backward to avoid recognizing the documented fact

    that Kennedy had decided to withdraw from Vietnam by the end of 1965. The

    tactics of avoidance vary from ignoringthe existence of any withdrawal plan at

    all to attributing it to wishful thinking, political expedience, or sheer

    stupidity and naivety.

    At the same time, commentators are quick to remember the two TV interviews JFK

    gave in September 1963 (Documents on American Foreign Relations, pp. 292-295).

    On Sept. 2 he told Walter Cronkite of CBS: "But I don't agree with those who say

    we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake." A week later he said to

    David Brinkley on NBC:

    "What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because

    they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the government in

    Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I

    think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we

    can, but we should not withdraw."

    If any statements of that time frame were designed for political effect, these

    TV interviews were. Presidents are far more likely to play politics in

    television interviews than in official policy statements and Nation Security

    Action Memoranda. These remarks must be seen as coming from a president who was

    up for re-election in one year and who knew he would "be damned everywhere as a

    Communist appeaser" if he withdrew from Vietnam, as he had told Ken O'Donnell a

    few months earlier.

    Those who take the "we should not withdraw" sentence as Kennedy's final word on

    the matter do not point out that it is directly contradicted by the White House

    policy statement and NSAM 263 the following month. Either Kennedy changed his

    mind or -- more likely -- the earlier public statements were meant to appease

    the pro-war forces. He also changed his mind about aid to South Vietnam:

    Mr. Huntley: Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Vietnam now?

    The President: I don't think that would be helpful at this time.

    Whatever Kennedy meant by this in September, he thought and did the opposite in

    October, implementing the McNamara-Taylor recommendations for aid reduction in

    addition to troop reductions.

    Kennedy also said in the Cronkite interview:

    "In the final analysis, it is their [the South Vietnamese] war. They are the

    ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them

    equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win

    it--the people of Vietnam--against the Communists. We are prepared to continue

    to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people

    support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last two months the government

    has gotten out of touch with the people."

    He repeats this, almost verbatim, a few sentences later, obviously intent on

    emphasizing the point:

    "...in the final analysis it is the people and the government [of South Vietnam]

    who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making

    it very clear. But I don't agreewith those who say we should withdraw. That

    would be a great mistake."

    In context, Kennedy may have been using the word "withdraw" here in the sense of

    "abandon." "Abandoning" Vietnam completely would indeed have been bad politics,

    but reducing aid (to force a change in Diem's policy) and withdrawing troops is

    not necessarily the same thing.

    Similarly, in the NBC interview, before Kennedy says "we should not withdraw,"

    he says:

    "We have some influence, and we are attempting to carry it out. I think we

    don't--we can't expect these countries to do everything the way we want to do

    them [sic]. They have their own interest, their own personalities, their own

    tradition. We can't make everyone in our image, and there are a good many people

    who don't want to go in our image....We would like to have Cambodia, Thailand,

    and South Vietnam all in harmony, but there are ancient differences there. We

    can't make the world over, but we can influence the world."

    This does not sound like a strong commitment. As a whole, these remarks are

    perhaps more accurately interpreted as: "We won't abandon them, but we won't do

    their fighting for them either." This is an interpretation, but a plausible one.

    Despite the massive efforts to obscure it, the fact remains, and cannot be

    overemphasized, that Johnson reversed the withdrawal policy. The curious thing

    is that one hardly ever finds this fact plainly stated by those who should (and

    perhaps do) know better. Richard Goodwin, an adviser to both Kennedy and

    Johnson, is a rare exception:

    "In later years Johnson and others in his administration would assert that they

    were merely fulfilling the commitment of previous American presidents. The claim

    was untrue--even though it was made by men, like Bundy and McNamara, who were

    more anxious to serve the wishes of their new master than the memory of their

    dead one. During the first half of 1965 I attended meetings, participated in

    conversations, where the issues of escalation were discussed. Not once did any

    participant claim that we had to bomb or send combat troops because of "previous

    commitments," that these steps were the inevitable extension of past policies.

    They were treated as difficult and serious decisions to be made solely on the

    basis of present conditions and perceptions. The claim of continuity was

    reserved for public justification; intended to conceal the fact that a major

    policy change was being made--that "their" war was becoming "our" war"

    (Remembering America, NY: Harper & Row, 1988, p. 373; emphasis added).

    4. Reactions to Oliver Stone's JFK

    Why do other historians find this observation by Goodwin so difficult to make?

    Because to acknowledge the fact of a major policy change in Vietnam means to

    acknowledge the possibility that the president was killed in order to effect

    this change.

    Since this is precisely the thesis of Oliver Stone's JFK, it is not surprising

    to see that the critics have followed the same avoidance tactics.

    The Wall Street Journal refers to the putative connection with Vietnam

    policy--which is the main point of the film--only obliquely, halfway through the

    review:

    "We further agree that November 1963 was a turning point in the American

    commitment to Vietnam. But the key was not the assassination of JFK but the

    assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem three weeks earlier. Once President Kennedy gave

    the go-ahead for a coup against an allied government in the name of winning the

    war, the U.S. was deeply committed indeed. Lyndon Johnson, who had opposed the

    coup, was left to pick up the pieces" (12/27/91, p. A10).

    The crucial fact presented in the film--that Johnson reversed Kennedy's

    withdrawal plan--is not even mentioned.

    Time refers, also indirectly and buried midway in the article, to the portrayal

    of Kennedy's Vietnam policy as a figment of the imaginations of "the last

    misty-eyed believers in Camelot":

    "They still hold to the primal scenario sketched in Oliver Stone's JFK: a

    Galahad-like John Kennedy gallantly battling the sinister right-wing

    military-industrial complex to bring the troops home, ban the Bomb and ensure

    racial equality on the home front--a Kennedy killed because he was just too good

    to live" (European ed., 1/13/92, p. 39)

    Here the word Vietnam does not even appear, and "bringing the troops home" is

    presented as only one of several equally mythical Kennedy objectives. Whether

    banning the Bomb and ensuring racial equality were on Kennedy's agenda is

    debatable, but his decision to bring the troops home is not, or should not be.

    In an article entitled "Does Stone's JFK Murder the Truth?" (International

    Herald Tribune, 12/17/91, reprinted from the New York Times), Tom Wicker

    writes--also about halfway through--that according to Stone and Garrison Kennedy

    "seemed to question" the goals of those who "wanted the war in Vietnam to be

    fought and the United States to stand tall and tough against the Soviets..."

    This not only reduces Kennedy's withdrawal decision to a"question" but implies

    that even that is not certain: he did not decide, he questioned, that is, he

    seemed to question.

    Iain Johnstone tells readers of the Sunday Times (1/26/91, Sect. 6, pp. 12-13),

    again at mid-point position in his article, that the idea that Kennedy was

    "about to let down the military and munitions men by pulling out of Vietnam" is

    "doubtful." The only thing that is doubtful here is whether Johnstone has

    bothered to read the documents.

    On the last page of a seven-page article in GQ (Jan. 1992, p. 75), Nicholas

    Lemann finally confronts Garrison's and Stone's main thesis by referring not to

    the documents but to a 1964 interview with Robert Kennedy. This is apparently

    the same 1964 interview cited by Herbert Parmet (discussed above). I have not

    been able to consult the original material, which is part of an oral history

    collection at the JFK Library in Boston, but it is interesting that Lehmann cuts

    off the quotation at a strategic point.

    Interviewer: Did the president feel that we would have to go into Vietnam in a

    big way?

    RFK: We certainly considered what would be the result if you abandon Vietnam,

    even Southeast Asia, and whether it was worthwhile trying to keep and hold on

    to.

    Interviewer: What did he say? What did he think?

    RFK: He reached the conclusion that probably it was worthwhile...

    This has to be a deliberate misrepresentation. The ellipsis conceals what we

    know from Parmet's citation:

    "As Bobby Kennedy later said, his brother had reached the point where he felt

    that South Vietnam was worth keeping for psychological and political reasons

    'more than anything else.'" (Parmet, p. 336).

    Piecing these two parts of RFK's remark together, the complete sentence would

    seem to have been:

    "He reached the conclusion that probably it was worthwhile for psychological and

    political reasons more than anything else."

    As I have already mentioned, "it was worthwhile" in this context more likely

    meant "it was not worthwhile" (psychological and political reasons hardly

    justifying a war), especially since we know, just as Robert knew, that President

    Kennedy had decided to terminate US military participation by the end of 1965.

    The German reviews of JFK, though they generally take Stone's thesis more

    seriously than the American ones, are equally evasive on the point of Kennedy's

    Vietnam policy. Several long articles do not mention it at all (Kurt Kister,

    Sddeutsche Zeitung, 1/22/92, p. 8; Verena Lueken, Frankfurter Allgemeine

    Zeitung, 1/24/92, p. 29). Peter Buchka in the Sddeutsche Zeitung (1/23/92, p.

    10) mentions only that "a withdrawal from Vietnam," according to Garrison and

    Stone, would have deprived the weapons industry of gigantic profits. Peter Krte

    in the Frankfurter Rundschau (1/24/92, p. 22) notes that President Kennedy "said

    he would withdraw the troops from Vietnam if he was reelected," which is only

    half the truth. The only German critic who even mentions NSAM 263, Rolf Paasch,

    the American correspondent for the (Berlin) Tageszeitung, questions Stone's

    "interpretation" of it:

    "Whether his [JFK's] hints in 1963 about a withdrawal of US military advisers

    from Vietnam really demonstrated the conversion of a Cold Warrior, as Stone

    interprets on the basis of NSAM 263, cited in the film, or whether it was only

    opportunistic rhetoric aimed at his liberal supporters, is unclear" (1/23/92, p.

    18).

    Here we are presented with two alternatives: NSAM 263 demonstrates either that

    Kennedy was a "converted Cold Warrior" or a xxxx. The possibility that he

    remained a Cold Warrior who just didn't feel like sacrificing thousands of

    American lives in Vietnam is not even considered. Why Paasch feels a clearly

    expressed presidential policy directive can be characterized as a "hint," why it

    requires "interpretation," and why he feels at liberty to question its

    sincerity, he does not say. It is clear that he has done his research by relying

    on the "interpretations" of American scholars like the ones we have discussed

    rather than on the prima facie documentary evidence.

    Der Spiegel mentions Kennedy's Vietnam policy in the form of a rhetorical

    question: "In the weeks preceding the assassination, didn't he think about

    withdrawing the advisers from Vietnam?" (12/16/92, p. 192). If presidents issued

    NSAMs every time they "think about" something, the world would be a good deal

    more confused than it is.

    In a box entitled "Was It [the assassination] a Plot to Keep the U.S. in

    Vietnam?" Time says that in Stone's movie Kennedy had "secret plans to withdraw

    from Vietnam" (2/3/92, European ed., p. 63). There was nothing secret about the

    White House statement on Oct. 2 or the press conference on Oct. 31, and the

    confirmation of the withdrawal plan at the conference in Honolulu was reported

    in the New York Times on Nov. 21, 1963. Certainly the withdrawal plan was not a

    secret within the Kennedy administration.

    Then, magnanimously offering to set the record straight by presenting "the

    evidence," Time says:

    "Kennedy confided to certain antiwar Senators that he planned to withdraw from

    Vietnam if re-elected, but publicly he proclaimed his opposition to withdrawal.

    In October 1963 he signed a National Security Action Memo--NSAM 263--that

    ordered the withdrawal of 1,000 of the 16,000 or so U.S. military "advisers."

    "After the assassination, Lyndon Johnson let the 1,000-man withdrawal proceed,

    but it was diluted so that it involved mainly individuals due for rotation

    rather than entire combat units. A few days after taking office, he signed a new

    action memo--NSAM 273--that was tougher than a version Kennedy had been

    considering; it permitted more extensive covert military actions against North

    Vietnam. No one has come forward, however, with any direct knowledge of a

    military or CIA conspiracy."

    This is a good example of gray propaganda--the half-truth. Kennedy's "opposition

    to withdrawal" is construed -- probably falsely -- from the September television

    interviews. The second half of this truth is that Kennedy publicly proclaimed

    the opposite--his intention to withdraw--in the Oct. 2 White House statement, of

    which Time conveniently omits mention. Similarly, Time tells us only half of

    what is in NSAM 263, leaving out the more important half, which implemented

    Kennedy's plan to remove all US troops--not just 1,000--by the end of 1965.

    What does the reference to Johnson's NSAM 273 as "tougher than a version Kennedy

    had been considering" mean? If the "Kennedy version" was Bundy's Nov. 21 draft

    of 273, this is wrong, because Kennedy never saw that draft, much less approved

    it.

    Time acknowledges that Johnson "permitted more extensive covert military actions

    against North Vietnam," but why not also acknowledge that these commando

    operations later provoked the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which in turned

    served--quite fraudulently, as even establishment commentators now admit--as the

    basis for the congressional resolution that made Vietnam "our war," that is,

    exactly what Kennedy said in the September interviews he wanted to avoid.

    By leaving out the crucial information, Time has Johnson merely "diluting" the

    1,000-man withdrawal and making "tougher" a plan that Kennedy "had been

    considering." In other words, there was no policy reversal, and thus no

    background to a possible conspiracy. But let us substitute the whole truth for

    Time's half-truth, and then see what their conclusion would look like:

    "[Johnson reversed Kennedy's plan to withdraw all US troops by the end of 1965

    and] permitted more extensive covert military actions against North Vietnam. No

    one has come forward, however, with any direct knowledge of a military or CIA

    conspiracy."

    Now the last sentence makes sense, but it is not the sense that Time wanted to

    convey. Time meant to tell us that 1) there was no policy reversal and thus no

    reason to suspect a conspiracy, and 2) that there is no direct evidence of one.

    The whole truth version tells us 1) that there was a policy reversal and thus

    good reason to suspect a conspiracy, but 2) there is no direct evidence of one.

    There is no excusing such obvious abuse of logic and the evidentiary record. It

    has to be deliberate, since the writer obviously knows what is in the documents

    he describes and chooses to omit certain crucial information. What reader who

    bothers to read Time in the first place would suspect this? It is propaganda,

    pure but not simple. It takes skill to write like this.

    5. Fire from the left

    Alexander Cockburn, a talented writer and normally reasonable columnist for The

    Nation, was one of the first to condemn the Stone film. When it comes to the

    assassination, the views of this "radical leftist" fall right in line with those

    of the Establishment.

    In his review of JFK, Cockburn says the question of conspiracy in the

    assassination

    "has as much to do with the subsequent contours of American politics as if he

    had tripped over one of Caroline's dolls and broken his neck in the White House

    nursery" (The Nation, 1/6- 13/92:6-7).

    He doesn't even try to justify this point of view. He rejects the coup theory

    out of hand, along with all conspiracy theories, and then rejects any possible

    political significance of the assassination. The question is insignificant

    because he thinks he knows the answer.

    Cockburn fights dirty. He dismisses Scott's "yearning interpretation" of the

    textual disparities between JFK's White House statement and Johnson's NSAM 273

    but fails to mention the most important part of both of these documents--the

    part referring to the troop withdrawals. The reader cannot know from Cockburn's

    essay that either document mentions troop withdrawals or that this is a crucial

    point in Scott's analysis.

    Since Cockburn makes no mention of JFK's withdrawal decision, it is easy for him

    to say there was "no change in policy" and call Scott's assertion to the

    contrary "fantasizing," but this misrepresents the facts. Cockburn has read

    Scott and he knows what is in the documents--not only in the first paragraphs,

    which he quotes, but also in the third paragraph of the White House statement

    and in the second paragraph of NSAM 273. These paragraphs refer to the

    withdrawal plan. Cockburn omits any mention of them.

    Ignoring this documentary evidence of October and November, Cockburn backtracks

    to the spring of 1963 to argue with John Newman's "frequently repeated claim [in

    his then unpublished book, JFK and Vietnam] that by February or March of 1963

    JFK had decided to pull out of Vietnam once the 1964 election was won," a claim

    for which Cockburn sees "an absence of any substantial evidence":

    Newman's only sources for this are people to whom J.F.K. would, as a matter of

    habitual political opportunism, have spoken in such terms, such as Senators Mike

    Mansfield and Wayne Morse, both of whom, particularly the latter, were critical

    of J.F.K.'sescalation in Vietnam.

    There is no mention of Kenneth O'Donnell and Dave Powers, to whom Kennedy

    repeatedly told the same thing he told Mansfield. Would Kennedy have been being

    politically opportunistic with the most trusted members of his personal staff?

    In a subsequent issue of The Nation (3/9/92:290,317-320), replying to letters

    from Zachary Sklar, Peter Scott, and Michael Parenti, Cockburn repeats his claim

    that there is no evidence to show that Kennedy had planned to withdraw as early

    as the spring of 1963, "aside from some conversations recollected by men such as

    Kennedy's political operative Kenny O'Donnell or Senators Wayne Morse and Mike

    Mansfield." This means that either Kennedy was lying, or O'Donnell et al. were

    lying.

    The counterargument to these "lies" is Kennedy's "numerous statements to the

    contrary. There were plenty of those." Cockburn mentions two--a statement in

    July and his remarks in the Sept. 9 NBC interview. Newman explains these by

    suggesting that "J.F.K. was dissembling, concealing his private thoughts,

    throwing the hawks off track." Cockburn calls this "data-free surmises" and "a

    willful credulity akin to religious mania."

    Why is it "credulous" to suggest that JFK was dissembling? And if this is

    "credulous," why is it less so to assume, as Cockburn does, that JFK was not

    only dissembling, but outright lying, to O'Donnell et al.? JFK was much more

    explicit in his reported remarks to O'Donnell and Powers than he was in the TV

    interviews. Which would be the more likely place for a politician to

    dissemble--in a TV interview or in a private conversation with his most trusted

    personal advisers? Did JFK tell the absolute truth on TV and lie to his

    advisers? Because Newman says the opposite, Cockburn says he is a religious

    maniac. Is this rational?

    The crucial point, however, which Cockburn totally ignores, is that Kennedy did

    not wait for the 64 election as he said he would. He made the withdrawal

    announcement on October 2, 1963, and implemented it with NSAM 263 on October 11.

    Regardless of what he said publicly or privately in July or September, his

    official policy in October was withdrawal.

    Just as he fails to mention the crucial documents--the McNamara- Taylor report

    and NSAM 263--in his article, in his reply to the letters Cockburn, like Time

    magazine, fails to mention the most significant parts of both documents, which

    is not the 1,000-man pullout by the end of 1963 but the total pullout by the end

    of 1965. One cannot know, either from Time or from Cockburn, that Kennedy not

    only wanted 1,000 men out in two months but everybody out in two years.

    Cockburn then says the 1,000-man withdrawal was "proposed" by McNamara and

    Taylor because "at that time they thought the war was going according to plan

    and victory was in sight." He fails to say 1) that this proposal was implemented

    nine days later by NSAM 263, and 2) that plenty of Kennedy's advisers were

    telling him that the war was not going well.

    Cockburn keeps putting the word "victory" in Kennedy's mouth, butthe question

    Kennedy was facing was, Should we fight this war for the South Vietnamese or

    not? If JFK's answer was no, what else could he have done than declare the

    mission accomplished and withdraw? This is not "victory" in Cockburn's sense,

    but most likely a ploy to get out without losing face. The alternative would

    have been immediate, complete withdrawal, making it obvious to the world that

    the US had abandoned an ally. But withdrawal by 1966 on the basis of having

    accomplished a limited military objective (not "victory") would have been

    politically tolerable. What else could he have said? "Sorry folks, I made a

    terrible mistake in trying to support this dictatorial South Vietnamese regime

    against their own people, so we're going home"? No. He had to say: "We've done

    what we can and all we promised to do, but it's their war, so we're going home."

    Kennedy was not an idiot, but he would have to have been an idiot to have been

    deluded by "euphoric reports from the field," as Cockburn says he was. Many of

    the reports Kennedy received were anything but euphoric, and the White House

    statement of October 2 was not euphoric either:

    The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious. The United

    States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in

    South Viet-Nam [by the Diem brothers]. While such actions have not yet

    significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.

    Kennedy would have been a complete fool to have thought that "victory was in

    sight," as Cockburn and others suggest.

    The fact remains that deluded or not deluded, Kennedy decided to withdraw. One

    can't have it both ways. One can't say that Kennedy was deluded into the

    withdrawal decision because he thought we were winning, on the one hand, and

    also say he didn't really mean it, that he was just playing politics. But this

    is exactly what Cockburn says: "There were also domestic political reasons for

    the adoption of such a course." What makes him think the political pressure to

    withdraw was greater than the pressure to escalate? JFK's own Cabinet, the

    Vice-President, the military, the CIA, and right-wing forces in Congress and in

    the general population were against withdrawal. That is why he told O'Donnell et

    al. that he should be re-elected before withdrawing, because he knew there was

    substantial opposition to it. The situation in Vietnam deteriorated so badly in

    the summer and fall, however, that he was forced to announce the withdrawal plan

    probably earlier than he would have liked.

    Cockburn says that when Kennedy discussed withdrawal "a qualifier was always

    there." "Always" turns out to be on two occasions, neither of which supports the

    point. The first is a quote from "one Pentagon official" (who?) as saying

    (when?) that the withdrawal could begin "providing things go well"--as if what

    some anonymous person said sometime somewhere could be taken as a "qualifier" to

    what Kennedy thought or did in October 1963 or any other time. But time, as we

    have already seen, is a minor factor in Cockburn's sense of history, and in the

    next sentence we are taken back to the press conference on May 22, 1963, where

    Kennedy said:

    "We are hopeful that the situation in Vietnam would permit some withdrawal in

    any case by the end of the year, but we can't possibly make that judgement at

    the present time. There is a long hard struggle to go."

    I suppose it is the words "hopeful" and "some" that Cockburn takes as

    qualifiers. He fails to note, however, that October comes after May, or that

    this fact has any significance. In October, McNamara and Taylor expressed

    complete withdrawal not as a "hope" but as a belief:

    "We believe that the U.S. part of the task can be completed by the end of 1965,

    the terminal date which we are taking as the time objective of our

    counterinsurgency programs" (NYT, Pentagon Papers, p. 213).

    The second "qualifier" Cockburn cites is contained in "the minutes to the

    discussion of NSAM 263." He gives no reference, but says these notes "have

    J.F.K. saying the same thing"--that the withdrawal "should be carried out

    routinely as part of our general posture of withdrawing people when they are no

    longer needed." Even if Kennedy actually said this, it does not say the same

    thing he said in May, nor does it "qualify" the withdrawal ordered by NSAM 263.

    It is perfectly compatible with the "mission accomplished" posture. US troops

    were indeed no longer "needed" (as in truth they never were) in Vietnam unless

    they were going to fight the South Vietnamese's war for them, which NSAM 263 is

    clearly intended to prevent.

    "And in implementing the withdrawal order," Cockburn continues, still apparently

    quoting from these anonymous minutes, "J.F.K. directed that 'no further

    reductions in U.S. strength would be made until the requirements of the 1964

    [military] campaign were clear.'" But again, why does this "qualify" the

    withdrawal policy? The withdrawal was to be phased over the next two years and

    obviously would have to be done with consideration for the troops that would

    remain in country in the meantime. Instead of trying to support this foolish

    innuendo, Cockburn jumps back into his time machine to finish the paragraph:

    "Remember that already by the end of 1961 J.F.K. had made the decisive initial

    commitment to military intervention, and that a covert campaign of terror and

    sabotage against the North was similarly launched under his aegis."

    We cannot discuss NSAM 263, in other words, without remembering 1961, but who is

    suggesting that Kennedy's Vietnam policy was the same in 1961 as it was in late

    1963? Mr. Cockburn. The truth is that Kennedy changed his mind and reversed his

    policy--from buildup to withdrawal--and after the assassination Johnson reversed

    it again. Cockburn implies that the "decisive initial commitment" was, though

    only "initial," also "decisive," that is, permanent. But Cockburn himself refers

    to NSAM 263 as "implementing the withdrawal order." How can the initial

    commitment in 1961 have been "decisive" if the opposite decision was implemented

    in October 1963?

    In the following paragraph Cockburn again quotes an Administration official to

    represent what Kennedy supposedly thought, though this time at least the

    official is identified:

    "On November 13, 1963, The New York Times published an interview with Michael

    Forrestal, a senior member of Kennedy's National Security Council, in which he

    said, 'It would be folly...at the present time' to pursue 'a negotiated

    settlement between North and South Vietnam.'"

    To buttress this statement, Cockburn then quotes "J.F.K. himself" in his press

    conference the next day:

    "We do have a new situation there, and a new government, we hope, an increased

    effort in the war....Now, that is our object, to bring Americans home, permit

    the South Vietnamese to maintain themselves as a free and independent country,

    and permit democratic forces within the country to operate--which they can of

    course, much more freely when the assault from the inside, and which is

    manipulated from the North, is ended. So the purpose of the meeting in Honolulu

    is how to pursue these objectives."

    Cockburn's interpretation:

    "Thus, J.F.K. was defining victory--to be followed by withdrawal of U.S.

    "advisers"--as ending the internal Communist assault in the South, itself

    manipulated from the North."

    Again the word "victory," which is Cockburn's. The order of priorities--victory,

    then withdrawal--is also Cockburn's, not Kennedy's. The first objective Kennedy

    mentions is to bring Americans home. The last point is added almost as an

    afterthought: of course it would be better if the support of the North for the

    insurrection in the South could be ended. But it was clear to everyone,

    especially after the Buddhist uprisings in the summer, that the insurrection

    would continue even without support from the North unless post-Diem leadership

    emerged that the South Vietnamese themselves would be willing to fight for. This

    is what Kennedy meant when he said "We do have new situation there." The hope he

    expressed for "an increased effort in the war" was for an increased effort by

    the South Vietnamese!

    Cockburn is implying the opposite--that Kennedy hoped for an increased war

    effort by the US, and that this was to be the topic of the Honolulu conference.

    There is no basis for this assumption. Apparently, there is still no reliable

    record of that conference, which is strange. Scott's conclusion, based on

    contemporary news reports and references to the meeting in the Pentagon Papers,

    is that the Accelerated Withdrawal Plan was confirmed, i.e. the reduction in

    military aid and troop withdrawals implemented by NSAM 263 on Oct. 11. Cockburn

    tells us the opposite:

    As Newman acknowledges, the upshot of the Honolulu meeting was that for "the

    first time" the "shocking deterioration of the war was presented in detail to

    those assembled, along with a plan to widen the war, while the 1,000-man

    withdrawal was turned into a meaningless paper drill.

    The question appears unresolved. What was decided at Honolulu--to continue

    withdrawal or "widen the war"? In fact, Johnson's NSAM 273 did both--continued

    the withdrawal plan and increased covert military operations, but only the first

    of these contradictory policies was included in Kennedy's NSAM 263. That is what

    counts, especially since we do not know what happened at Honolulu, and there is

    no evidence that Kennedy knew either. In any case, he did not change his policy

    between Oct. 11 (NSAM 263) and Nov. 22.

    Cockburn's next argument is based on McGeorge Bundy's draft of NSAM 273:

    "The next day [after the Honolulu conference, i.e. Nov. 21], back in the White

    House, Bundy put the grim conclusions of the meeting into the draft language of

    NSAM 237 [sic; presumably 273], which, as he told Newman in 1991, he 'tried to

    bring...in line with the words that Kennedy might want to say.'"

    Cockburn assumes that Bundy's draft, whose first paragraph is almost identical

    with the first paragraph of Johnson's NSAM 273, proves that Kennedy would have

    said the same thing Johnson did. But there are several obvious questions he

    should be asking.

    First, why has this document, along with the other documents issuing from the

    Honolulu conference, remained classified so long? Second, why would Bundy draft

    the text of an important policy directive based on the results of a meeting

    which he had not yet even discussed yet with the president?

    It is quite wrong to assume that Kennedy would have approved the language of

    this draft just because Bundy thinks he would have. Cockburn forgets that we are

    talking here about the possibility of a coup d'tat. Bundy's motives and

    credibility are at least as suspect as Johnson's. He was a hawk on Vietnam from

    the word go and thus in the same camp as Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, and CIA

    director McCone. He had strong ties with the CIA through his brother William and

    his former professor at Yale, Richard Bissell, the CIA Director of Operations

    Kennedy fired after the Bay of Pigs, and through his job as National Security

    Adviser. As the president's personal liaison with the Director of Central

    Intelligence, who in turn represented the entire intelligence community, Bundy

    was the highest national security official to survive the presidential

    "transition"--the only person in a position under both Kennedy and Johnson to

    know all the nation's secrets. In short, if it was a coup, Bundy must have been

    in on it. If indeed he wrote the draft of NSAM on Nov. 21 (i.e., if it is not a

    falsification to confuse the "record"), he may have written it for Johnson.

    Cockburn doesn't hesitate to call Kennedy a xxxx, but he takes Johnson at his

    word. Johnson said about his first presidential conference on Vietnam on Nov.

    24, 1963, two days after the assassination:

    Most of the advisers agreed that we could begin withdrawing some of our advisers

    by the end of the year and a majority of them by the end of 1965.

    Cockburn thinks this proves that "J.F.K. in the last days of his Administration,

    and L.B.J. in the first days of his, defined victory in the same terms, and both

    were under similar illusions." LBJ, whom O'Donnell, for example, portrays as a

    bald-faced xxxx on several occasions, could not possibly be lying! Again

    Cockburn puts the word "victory" in Kennedy's mouth, and ignores the question

    astutely raised by Scott: If there was no change of policy, why was Vietnam so

    important that it was the first order of business of the new president? If

    Johnson was under "similar illusions" as Kennedy, why did he say in his memoirs

    that he "felt a national security meeting was essential at the earliest possible

    moment" (quoted by Scott, p. 224)? This meeting was held on Sunday, Nov. 24, but

    Scott points out that according to the Pentagon Papers and the New York Times

    there was an even earlier meeting with McNamara, on Saturday morning, where a

    memo was discussed in which

    "Mr. McNamara said that the new South Vietnamese government was confronted by

    serious financial problems, and that the U.S. must be prepared to raise planned

    MAP [Military Assistance Plan] levels" (Scott, p. 225, quoting the Gravel

    edition).

    First, this does not seem to be what was decided in Honolulu, where according to

    the New York Times the Accelerated Withdrawal Plan was finalized. Secondly, if

    this is what was decided in Honolulu, why did McNamara wait two full days

    without discussing it with Kennedy and discuss it with Johnson the morning after

    the assassination? Scott's conclusion that the withdrawal policy was in fact

    reversed immediately after the assassination clarifies both points.

    Johnson's opinion on Vietnam was no different on Nov. 23 or 24 from what it was

    on August 31, 1963, when he said that "it would be a disaster to pull out...we

    should once again go about winning the war" (Pentagon Papers, NYT, p. 205). This

    was also Bundy's, Rusk's, and McNamara's position. Kennedy was practically a

    minority of one in the upper echelons of his own Administration, as Maxwell

    Taylor has written. But as long as he was boss, his view prevailed. The

    McNamara-Taylor report Of Oct. 2, 1963, according to Fletcher Prouty, did not

    represent McNamara's view at all, and was not even written by him. It was

    written at the Pentagon according to Kennedy's wishes and handed over to

    McNamara and Taylor in Honolulu when they stopped there on their way back from

    Saigon, so that they could then hand it to the president in Washington as

    "their" report.

    With Kennedy out of the picture, the hawks took over, reversing the withdrawal

    policy while maintaining the appearance of continuity.

    Noam Chomsky is another radical leftist who is vehemently opposed to what he

    calls the "withdrawal thesis" ("Vain Hopes, False Dreams," Z, Oct. 1992). Like

    Cockburn, Chomsky says there no withdrawal plan, only a "withdrawal on condition

    of victory" plan, and that arguments to the contrary are nothing more than JFK

    "hagiography." His argument is more rigorous than Cockburn's, but equally false.

    First, it is wrong to assume that all biographers and assassination researchers

    are JFK hagiographers. One need not deny that Kennedy was as ruthless a cold

    warrior as any other president to acknowledge that he had decided to withdraw

    from Vietnam. Reagan's decision to withdraw from Lebanon doesn't make him a

    secret dove either.

    Second, the withdrawal "thesis" is not a thesis but a fact, amply documented in

    the Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers, as already discussed. Since Chomsky

    himself co-edited Vol. 5, it is surprising that he finds this fact so difficult

    to acknowledge.

    The thesis which Chomsky, like Cockburn, is actually arguing against is his own

    formulation: that JFK wanted "withdrawal without victory." It is true that

    according to the record, the withdrawal plan was predicated on the assumption of

    military success. Chomsky, however, understands this as a condition. This is

    wrong. There is a substantial difference between saying "The military campaign

    is progressing well, and we should be able to withdraw by the end of 1965,"

    which is how I read the McNamara- Taylor report and Kennedy's confirmation of it

    in NSAM 263, and "If we win the war, we will withdraw," which is how Chomsky

    reads the same documents. We do not know what Kennedy may have secretly wanted

    or what he would have done if he had he lived. Whether he really believed the

    war was going well, as the record states, or privately knew it was not, as

    Newman contends, is also unknowable. What we do know, from the record, Chomsky

    notwithstanding, is that Johnson reversed the withdrawal policy sometime between

    December 1963 and March 1964.

    The point, again, is crucial. If one manages to say, as Chomsky and Cockburn and

    the other authors discussed here do, that in truth there was no change in

    policy, that in fact there never was a withdrawal policy but only a policy of

    escalation and victory (until after Tet), it means that Johnson and Nixon simply

    continued what Kennedy started. This, in turn, means that the question of the

    relation of the policy change (since there wasn't one) to the assassination does

    not arise.

    If, however, one states the facts correctly, the question is unavoidable.

    Exactly when Johnson reversed the policy, and whether he did so because

    conditions changed, or because perceptions of conditions changed, or for

    whatever reason, is beside the point. Why avoid the straightforward formulation,

    which is nothing but a summary of the PP Gravel account: JFK thought we were

    winning, so he planned to withdraw; Johnson decided that we weren't, so he

    killed the plan.

    The reason is clear. Once you admit that there was a radical policy change in

    the months following the assassination, whether that change was a reaction to a

    (presumed) change in conditions or not, you must ask if the change was related

    to the assassination. Then, like it or not, you are into conspiracy theory, and

    conspiracy theory is anathema to the leftist or neo-Marxian tradition

    represented by Cockburn and Chomsky. There are historical reasons for this, of

    course, since conspiracy theories have been notoriously exploited by the fascist

    right. Nevertheless, it is as wrong to identify all conspiracy theories with the

    likes of Hitler and Goebbels as it is to identify Marxist theories with the

    likes of Stalin and Erich Honecker.

    There is an alternative view. In this view, one accepts the fact of the policy

    change, but denies that it had anything to do with the assassination. It was

    mere coincidence that the policy change followed the assassination. This is a

    tenable position, but one that few seem comfortable with, and for a good reason:

    it is ludicrously naive. Nevertheless, it has apparently become Arthur

    Schlesinger's position, who reads Johnson's NSAM 273 as "reversing the Kennedy

    withdrawal policy" ("JFK: Truth and Fiction," Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10,

    1992). But, he adds, to connect the policy reversal with the assassination, as

    Stone and Garrison do, is "reckless, paranoid, really despicable fantasy..."

    Despite Schlesinger's hysterical denials, the policy reversal is the most

    plausible motive for the assassination. Thus the biggest lie--the Lone Nut

    theory of history--requires another one: there was no policy reversal. It is

    astonishing that so many commentators of diverse political stripes have

    succumbed to this imperative.

    -end-

    + Join Us! Support The NY Transfer News Collective + + We deliver uncensored

    information to your mailbox! + + Modem:718-448-2358 Fax:718-448-3423 E-mail:

    nyt@blythe.org +

    **************************

    The following chronology is from The Senator Gravel Edition of

    the Pentagon Papers, Volume II, pages 165-172. It is part of the

    section titled: "Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces, 1962-1964" and

    provides a rough (though incomplete) outline of the genesis and

    evolution of the "1000 man" withdrawal plan.

    This chronology should be examined in conjunction with the

    following sections also found in Vol II of Gravel: "U.S.--GVN

    Relations, 1964-1967" (esp pages 277-325) and "The Advisory

    Buildup, 1961-1967" (esp pages 408-456) in order to obtain a more

    complete picture of events and decisions.

    Anyone interested in further information related to this

    material, please feel free to contact me at 71301,527 Compuserve.

    October 20, 1993. David T. Fuhrmann.

    23 July 62 Geneva Accords on Laos

    14-Nation declaration on the neutrality of Laos.

    23 July 62 Sixth Secretary of Defense Conference, Honolulu.

    Called to examine present and future developments

    in South Vietnam--which looked good. Mr. McNamara

    initiated immediate planning for the phase-out of

    U.S. military involvement by 1965 and development

    of a program to build a GVN military capability

    strong enough to take over full defense

    responsibilities by 1965

    26 July 62 JCS Message to CINCPAC

    CINCPAC was formally instructed to develop a

    "Comprehensive plan for South Vietnam" (CPSVN) in

    line with instructions given at Honolulu.

    14 Aug 62 CINCPAC Message to MACV

    MACV was directed to draw up a CPSVN designed to

    ensure GVN military and para-military strength

    commensurate with its sovereign responsibilities.

    The CPSVN was to assume the insurgency would be

    under control in three years, that extensive US

    support would be available during the three-year

    period; that those items essential to development

    of full RVNAF capability would be (largely)

    available through the military assistance program

    (MAP).

    Oct-Nov. GVN National Campaign Plan developed 1962

    In addition to the CPSVN, MACV prepared an outline

    for an integrated, nationwide offensive military

    campaign to destroy the insurgency and restore GVN

    control in South Vietnam. The concept was adopted

    by the GVN in November.

    26 Nov 62 Military Reorganization Decreed

    Diem ordered realignment of military chain of

    command, reorganization of RVNAF, establishment of

    four CTZ's and a Joint Operations Center to

    centralize control over current military

    operations. (JOC became operational on 20 December

    1962.)

    7 Dec 62 First Draft of CPSVN Completed

    CINCPAC disapproved first draft because of high

    costs and inadequate training provisions.

    19 Jan 63 MACV Letter to CINCPAC, 3010 Ser 0021

    MACV submitted a revised CPSVN. Extended through

    FY 1968 and concurred in by the Ambassador, it

    called for GVN military forces to peak at 458,000

    in FY 1964 (RVNAF strength would be 230,900 in FY

    1964); cost projected over six years would total

    $978 million.

    22 Jan 63 OSD (ISA) Message to CINCPAC

    MAP-Vietnam dollar guide lines issued. Ceilings

    considerably different from and lower than those

    in CPSVN.

    25 Jan 63 CINCPAC Letter to JCS, 1010, Ser 0079

    Approved the CPSVN, supported and justified the

    higher MAP costs projected by it.

    7 Mar 63 JCSM 190-63

    JCS recommended SecDef approve the CPSVN;

    supporting the higher MAP costs, JCS proposed

    CPSVN be the basis for revision of FY 1964 MAP and

    development of FY 1965-69 program

    20 Mar 63 USMACV "Summary of Highlights, 9 Feb 62-7 Feb 63"

    Reported continuing, growing RVNAF effectiveness,

    increased GVN strength economically and

    politically. The strategic hamlet program looked

    especially good. MACV forecast winning the

    military Phase in 1963-barring "greatly increased"

    VC reinforcement and resupply.

    17 Apr 63 NlE 53-63

    Although "fragile," the situation in SVN did not

    appear serious; general progress was reported in

    most areas.

    6 May 63 Seventh SecDef Honolulu Conference

    Called to [word illegible] the CPSVN. Largely

    because of prevailing optimism over Vietnam, Mr.

    McNamara found the CPSVN assistance too costly,

    the planned withdrawal of U.S. forces too slow and

    RVNAF development misdirected.

    8 May 63 Two SecDef Memoranda for ASD/ISA

    First: Directed joint ISA/JCS development of plans

    to replace US forces with GVN troops as soon as

    possible and to plan the withdrawal of 1,000 US

    troops by the end of 1963. Second: Requested the

    Office, Director of Military Assistance, ISA,

    "completely rework" the MAP program recommended in

    the CPSVN and submit new guidelines by 1 Sept. The

    Secretary felt CPSVN totals were too high (e.g.,

    expenditures proposed for FY's 1965-68 could be

    cut by $270 Million in his view).

    9 May 63 Buddhist Crisis Begins

    GVN forces fired on worshipers celebrating

    Buddha's birthday (several killed, more wounded)

    for no good cause. Long standing antipathy toward

    GVN quickly turned into active opposition.

    9 May 63 JCS Message 9820 to CINCPAC

    Directed CINCPAC to revise the CPSVN and program

    the with-drawal of 1,000 men by the end of 1963.

    Force reduction was to be by US units (not

    individuals); units were to be replaced by

    specially trained RVNAF units. Withdrawal plans

    were to be contingent upon continued progress in

    the counterinsurgency campaign.

    1 May 63 CINCPAC Letter to JCS, 3010 Ser 00447-63

    CINCPAC recommended some changes, then approved

    MACV's revision of the CPSVN and the MACV plan for

    withdrawal of 1,000 men. As instructed, those

    1,000 men were drawn from logistic and service

    support slots; actual operations would be

    unaffected by their absence.

    7 May 63 ASD/ISA Memorandum for the Secretary

    ISA's proposed MAP-Vietnam program based on the

    Secretary's instructions was rejected as still too

    high.

    9 May 63 OSD/ISA Message to CINCPAC

    CINCPAC was directed to develop three alternative

    MAP plans for FYs 1965-69 based on these levels:

    $585 M (CPSVN recommendation) $450 M (Compromise)

    $365 M (SecDef goal) MAP for FY 1964 had been set

    at $180 M.

    6 Jun 63 GVN-Buddhist Truce (State Airgram A-781 to Embassy

    Saigon, 10 June)

    Reflected temporary and tenuous abatement of

    GVN-Buddhist hostilities which flared up in May.

    The truce was repudiated almost immediately by

    both sides. Buddhist alienation from the GVN

    polarized; hostilities spread.

    7 Jul 63 DIA Intelligence Summary

    Reported the military situation was unaffected by

    the political crisis; GVN prospects for continued

    counterinsurgency progress were "certainly better"

    than in 1962; VC activity was reduced but VC

    capability essentially unimpaired.

    8 Jul 63 CINCPAC-proposed MAP program submitted to JCS

    CINCPAC suggested military assistance programs at

    the three levels set by the JCS but recommended

    adoption of a fourth Plan developed by CINCPAC.

    "Plan J" totalled $450.9 M over the five year

    period.

    4 Aug 63 DIA lntelligence Bulletin

    Rather suddenly, Viet Cong offensive actions were

    reported high for the third consecutive week; the

    implication was that the VC were capitalizing on

    the political crisis and might step up the

    insurgency.

    14 Aug 63 SACSA Memorandum for the Secretary

    Discounted the importance of increased VC

    activity; the comparative magnitude of attacks was

    low; developments did not yet seem salient or

    lasting.

    20 Aug 63 Diem declared martial law; ordered attacks on

    Buddhism pagodas.

    This decree plus repressive measures against the

    Buddhists shattered hopes of reconciliation, and

    irrevocably isolated the Diem government.

    20 Aug 63 JCSM 629-63

    CINCPAC/MACV proposed plan for l,000-man

    withdrawal in three to four increments for

    planning purposes only; recommended final decision

    on withdrawal be delayed until October.

    21 Aug 63 Director, DIA Memorandum for SecDef

    Estimated that Diem's acts will have "serious

    repercussions throughout SVN: foresaw more coup

    and counter-coup activity But reported military

    operations were so far unaffected by these events.

    27 Aug 63 JCSM 640-63

    JCS added yet a fifth "Model M" Plan to CINCPAC's

    four alternative MAP levels. Providing for higher

    force levels termed necessary by the JCS, the

    Model M total was close to $400 M. JCS recommended

    the Model M Plan be approved.

    30 Aug 63 OSD/ISA Memorandum for the Secretary

    Recommended approval of JCSM 629-63. But noted

    many "units" to be withdrawn were ad hoc creations

    of expendable support personnel, cautioned that

    public reaction to "phony" withdrawal would be

    damaging: suggested actual strength and authorized

    ceiling levels be publicized and monitored.

    3 Sep 63 SecDef Memorandum to CJCS

    Approved JCSM-629-63. Advised JCS against creating

    special units as a means to cut back unnecessary

    personnel; requested the projected US strength

    figures through 1963.

    5 Sep 63 ASD/ISA Memorandum to the Secretary

    Concurred in JCS recommendation with minor

    reservations the Model M Plan for military

    assistance to SVN be approved.

    6 Sep 63 SecDef Memorandum for CJCS

    Approved Model M Plan as the basis for FY 65-69

    MAP planning; advised that US materiel turned over

    to RVNAF must be charged to and absorbed by the

    authorized Model M Plan ceilings.

    11 Sep 63 CJCS Memorandum for SecDef

    Forwarded the military strength figures (August

    thru December) to SecDef; advised that the

    l,000-man withdrawal would be counted against the

    peak October strength (16,732). First increment

    was scheduled for withdrawal in November, the rest

    in December.

    21 Sep 63 Presidential Memorandum for the SecDef

    Directed McNamara and Taylor (CJCS) to personally

    assess the critical situation in SVN--both

    political and military; to determine what GVN

    action was required for change and what the US

    should do to produce such action.

    7 Sep 63 ASD/ISA (ODMA) "MAP Vietnam: Manpower and

    Financial Summary"

    Approved MAP totals reflected the Model M Plan: FY

    1964 = $180.6 M and FY 1965-69 = $211.6 M. TOTAL

    = $392.2 Million

    The GVN force levels proposed were substantially

    below those of the January CPSVN (from a peak

    strength in FY 1964 of 442,500, levels were to

    fall to 120,200 in FY 1969).

    26 Sep- SecDef/CJCS Mission to South Vietnam

    2 Oct 63 Positive detailed evidence presented in numerous

    briefings indicated conditions were good and would

    improve. Hence, the Secretary ordered acceleration

    of the planned U.S. force phase-out.

    3 Oct 63 McNamara-Taylor Briefing for the President, and

    later, the NSC.

    Concluded the military campaign has made great

    progress and continues to progress, but warned

    that further Diem-Nhu repression could change the

    "present favorable military trends."

    3 Oct 63 McNamara-Taylor met with President and NSC

    The President approved the military

    recommendations made by the Secretary and

    Chairman:

    --that MACV and Diem review changes necessary to

    complete the military campaign in I, II, and III

    Corps by the end of 1964, in IV Corps by 1965:

    --that a training program be established to enable

    RVNAF to take over military functions from the US

    by the end of 1965 when the bulk of US personnel

    could be withdrawn:

    --that DOD informally announce plans to withdraw

    1,000 men by the end of 1963.

    no further reductions in US strength would be made

    until requirements of the 1964 campaign were

    clear.

    11 Oct 63 NSAM 263

    Approved the military recommendations contained in

    the McNamara-Taylor Report; directed no formal

    announcement be made of implementation of plans to

    withdraw 1,000 men by the end of 1963.

    11 Oct 63 State Department INR Memo RFE-90

    Assessed trends since July 1963 as evidence of an

    unfavorable shift in military balance. (This was

    one or the first indications that all was not as

    rosy as MACV et al had led McNamara and Taylor to

    believe.)

    1 Nov 63 Diem Government Overthrown

    The feared political chaos, civil war and collapse

    of the war (not materialize immediately; US

    Government was uncertain as what the new

    circumstances meant. General Minh headed the junta

    responsible for the coup.

    20 Nov 63 All-agency Conference on Vietnam, Honolulu

    Ambassador Lodge assessed prospects as hopeful;

    recommended US continue the policy of eventual

    military withdrawal from SVN; said announced

    l,000-man withdrawal was having salutary effects.

    MACV agreed. In this light, officials agreed that

    the Accelerated Plan (speed-up of force withdrawal

    by six months directed by McNamara in October)

    should be maintained. McNamara wanted MAP spending

    held close to OSD's $175.5 million ceiling

    (because of acceleration, a FY 64 MAP of $187.7

    million looked possible).

    22 Nov 63 President Kennedy Assassinated

    One result: US Government policies in general were

    maintained for the sake of continuity, to allow

    the new administration time settle and adjust.

    This tendency to reinforce existing policies

    arbitrarily, just to keep them going, extended the

    phase-out, withdrawal and MAP concepts--probably

    for too long.

    23 Nov 63 SecDef Memorandum for the President

    Calling GVN political stability vital to the war

    and calling attention to GVN financial straits,

    the Secretary said the US must prepared to

    increase aid to Saigon. Funding well above current

    MAP plans was envisaged.

    26 Nov 63 NSAM 273

    President Johnson approved recommendations to

    continue current policy toward Vietnam put forward

    at the 20 November Honolulu meeting: reaffirmed US

    objectives on withdrawal.

    3 Dec 63 [material missing]

    Region/ISA Memorandum for the ASD/ISA [words

    missing] nam developments, for a "fresh new look"

    at the problem, second echelon leaders outlined a

    broad interdepartmental "Review the South Vietnam

    Situation." This systematic effort did not

    culminate in high level national reassessment of

    specific policy re-orientation.

    5 Dec 63 CINCPAC Message to JCS

    Submitted the Accelerated Model Plan version of

    CPSVN. From a total of 15,200 in FY 1964, US

    military strength in Vietnam would drop to 11,500

    in FY 1965 (vs 13,100 recommended by the Model M

    Plan), to about 3,200 in FY 1966 and 2,600 in FY

    1967. GVN force levels were a bit lower but GVN

    force build-up a bit faster than recommended by

    the Model M Plan. MAP costs for FYs 1965-1969

    totalled $399.4 million (vice $392.2 million under

    Model M Plan).

    11 Dec 63 CM 1079-63 for SecDef

    The adjusted year-end strength figure was 15,394.

    Although 1,000 men were technically withdrawn, no

    actual reduction of US strength was achieved. The

    December figure was not 1,000 less than the peak

    October level.

    13 Dec 63 Director, DIA Memorandum for the Secretary

    Reported the VC had improved combat effectiveness

    and force posture during 1963, that VC capability

    was unimpaired. (Quite a different picture had

    been painted by SACSA in late October "An Overview

    of the Vietnam War, 1960-1963," personally

    directed to the Secretary, was a glowing account

    of steady military progress.)

    30 Jan 64 Second Coup in Saigon

    General Minh's military regime was replaced by a

    junta headed by General Khanh.

    10, 11, 14, Dep Director, CIA Memo for SecDef, SecState, etc

    19 Feb 64 Suspicious of progress reports, CIA sent a special

    group to "look at" South Vietnam. Its independent

    evaluation revealed a serious and steadily

    deteriorating GVN situation. Vietcong gains and,

    significantly, the quality and quantity of VC arms

    had increased. The Strategic Hamlet Program was

    "at virtual standstill." The insurgency tide

    seemed to be "going against GVN" in all four

    Corps.

    6 Mar 64 Eighth SecDef Conference on Vietnam, Honolulu

    Participants agreed that the military situation

    was definitely deteriorating, that insurgency

    would probably continue beyond 1965, that the US

    must immediately determine what had to be done to

    make up for the setback(s).

    9-16 MAR 64 McNamara/Taylor Trip to Vietnam

    Personally confirmed the gravity of the Vietnam

    situation.

    16 Mar 64 SecDef Memorandum for the President: "Report on

    Trip to Vietnam"

    Mr. McNamara reported the situation was

    "unquestionably" worse than in September. (RVNAF

    desertion rates were up: GVN military position was

    weak and the Vietcong, with increased NVN support,

    was strong.) Concluding that more US support was

    necessary, the Secretary made twelve

    recommendations. These included:

    --More economic assistance, military training,

    equipment and advisory assistance, as needed.

    --Continued high-level US overflights of GVN

    borders; authorization for "hot pursuit" and

    ground operations in Laos.

    --prepare to initiate--on 72 hours' notice--Laos

    and Cambodia border control operations and

    retaliatory action against North Vietnam.

    --Make plans to initiate--on 30 days' notice--a

    "program of Graduated Overt Military Pressures"

    against North Vietnam.

    Mr. McNamara called the policy of reducing

    existing Us personnel where South Vietnamese could

    assume their functions "still sound" but said no

    major reductions could be expected in the near

    future. He felt US training personnel could be

    substantially reduced before the end of 1965.

    17 Mar 64 NSAM 299

    The President approved the twelve recommendations

    presented by Mr. McNamara and directed all

    agencies concerned to carry them out promptly.

    [material missing]

    forces was superseded by the policy of providing

    South Vietnam assistance and support as long as

    required to bring aggression and terrorism under

    control (as per NSAM 288).

    6 May 64 CINCPAC Message to MACV

    Indicated growing US military commitment: this

    1500-man augmentation raised the total authorized

    level to 17,000.

    1-2 Jun 64 Special Meeting on Southeast Asia, Honolulu

    Called in part to examine the GVN National

    Campaign Plan---which was failing. The conferees

    agreed to increase RVNAF effectiveness by

    extending and intensifying the US advisory efforts

    as MACV recommended.

    25 Jun 64 MACV/ Message 325390 to JCS

    Formal MACV request for 900 additional advisory

    personnel. His justification for advisors at the

    battalion level and for more advisors at district

    and sector levels was included. Also, 80 US

    advisors were requested to establish a Junk Force

    and other maritime counterinsurgency measures.

    4 Jul 64 ClNCPAC Message to JCS

    CINCPAC recommended approval of the MACV proposal

    for intensification of US advisory efforts.

    15 Jul 64 Saigon EMBTEL 108

    Ambassador Taylor reported that revised VC

    strength estimates now put the enemy force between

    28,000 and 34,000. No cause for alarm, he said the

    new estimate did demonstrate the magnitude of the

    problem and the need to raise the level of US-GVN

    efforts. Taylor thought a US strength increase to

    21,000 by the end of the year would be sufficient.

    16 Jul 64 MACV Message 6180 to CINCPAC

    MACV requested 3,200 personnel to support the

    expansion (by 900) of US advisory efforts--or

    4,200 more men over the next nine months.

    17 Ju1 64 EMBTEL

    Ambassador Taylor concurred in MACV's proposed

    increase, recommended prompt approval and action.

    21 Jul 64 State 205 to Saigon

    Reported presidential approval (at the 21 July NSC

    meeting) the MACV deployment package.

    I have no links to these above ,they are from my collection....

    I also have only the one page for NSAM 263......

    B..... B)

    Joyce McDonald(s)

    in JFK Assassination Debate

    Posted

    ANDREW ARMSTRONG, JR....

    HSCA May/73

    http://www.geocities.com/m_j_russ/armstr.htm

    Info re Ian Griggs.......

    Joy Dale (originally Joyce Lee McDonald, now Joyce Gordon) is alive and well and living in the Dallas area.

    *************

    'Joy Dale the little redheaded stripper from Dallas'

    Joyce McDonald

    My Mom is alive and well!

    http://knol.google.com/k/cynthia-ann-mcdon...&locale=en#

    Below Left: Joyce Lee McDonald ( JoyDale) ...Ruby......Right..Karen Bennet Carlin ( Little Lynn )

    B.... B)

×
×
  • Create New...