Michael Clark

Thread Post 22 https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10123-10421.pdf Redact, Germany. 15-13 San Francisco. 16-35 --------------------------------- 15 - 13 Germany 15 - 6 The Hague

Thread post 21 15 - 30 Karlsruhe, Germany https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10113-10069.pdf --------------------------- 15 - 30 and 20 - 30, apparently both used for Karlsruhe???? https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10113-10123.pdf

Thread Post 20 https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10123-10401.pdf Saigon 13-2 Laos 13-7 Redacted 13-5 Miami 16-4 San Francisco 16-35

Thread Post 19 Lucien Conein Travel orders for one year to 13-2, summer of 54. (Orders are tentative) P. 4, travels to 15-20; Frankfurt twice in May and April. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10113-10030.pdf 13 - 2 is Saigon, as per Thread Post 20. Requested reassignment from 15 - -29 to Washington in October of 59. P. 7. Travels via Greece to Frankfurt, as per above., could he have gone to Greece instead of Saigon as an assignment, then requested return to D.C.? Could Athens be 15 - 29? ------------------------- In May of 54, requests transfer from Washingngto desk Job, Albania Section, to Saigon 13 - -2. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10113-10025.pdf ------------------------- In April, 53, request transfer from D.C. Field job, to 15 -- 29 P. 4 travels from Frankfurt to D.C. For March and April then back to Frankfurt. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10113-10038.pdf -------------------------- In 1951, Frankfurt is his official station https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10113-10044.pdf —————————— 21-29 https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=63830&relPageId=2

Thread Post 18 13 - 7 Redacted ( Laos, see post 20) Arthur C. Sheridan to become Chief of Far East Security Operations https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10123-10219.pdf

Thread Post 17 https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10100-10096.pdf Cable relay with 22 locations. 4 are redacted witth codes.. 14--6 14-1 14-3 12-22 WAVE BEIR TAMI MEXI BERN RIOD BARC BONN MELB LISB MILA GORG BUEN OTTA VIEN MONT GNVA SAGO ----------------------------------- https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10063-10211.pdf 14-3 15-4 Paris MHALPHA

Mr. GRIFFIN. Did Jack also eat at the Eatwell? Mr. CRAFARD. He didn't eat there when I was there with him, after I went to work for him. ------------------- I am looking for the date that Crafard met Ruby. It was during the Dallas Fair. It was only days later that Crafard went to live and work at The Carousel.

This question that Michael Walton likes to repeat over and over and over, is largely ignored, for good reason. It assumes too much. Let's say Oswald took a holiday on 11-22. Do you think that the operation would have been called-off? No-way. Likewise, the planners did not chain LHO down on the sixth floor, he was free to roam, and be off-base if it suited him. The cover-uppers worked with the pieces left over, and they were able to fit LHO in the scenario that became the Warren Report.

I don't see any resemblance between Crafard and LHO. Crafard was missing some front teeth. Crafard only knew Ruby for a matter of weeks, I wish I could be more specific, but it was not very long. Point being, I don't see a Crafard as being someone with whom Ruby would be socializing or paling-around. I also don't see the DPD hanging around with Ruby, but our H&L counterpart does fit that scenario. I do recommend reading Crafard's testimony; and read in tandem with George Senator's testimony you get a good picture of Ruby, especially on the weekend of the 22nd. Officer Olson and Kay Olson's testimony should be read in proximity to them as well, these latter two are fairly brief compared with the former two.

There is a lot of speculation and no loss for unflattering characterizations about him, but what do we really know? What is the truth? When I hear Mrs. Tippet speak, I don't see a woman who would marry the lowly man that we often think of when we read the common stories about him. I would like to see a fresh and fair evaluation of him. I think he may have been more intelligent and capable that we are told. I think it would make a good thread.

I started transcribing Wolcott's testimony, it is largely copy-pastable...I didnt want to presume that readers of this thread would appreciate it here, but, I didn't want to chance losing it with a fat thumb, so I clicked save... The subcommittee met at IO:20 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2344 of the Raybum Office Building, the Honorable Richard Preyer (Chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. Present: Representatives Preyer (presiding), Dodd and Sawyer. Also Present: Michael Goldsmith, Counsel, and Gary Cornwell, Counsel. Also Present: Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk, and Charles Berk, Betsy Wolf and James Wolf. Mr. Preyer. Thank you for being here today, and I will call the subcommittee to order at this time. I will ask if you will stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Wilcott. I do. Mr. Preyer. I would like before we begin to read a written statement concerning the subject of the investigation. We are operating under House Resolution 222, which man- dates the Committee to conduct a full and complete investi- gation and study of the circumstances surrounding the assas- sination and death of President John F. Kennedy, including determining whether the existing laws of the United States concerning the protection of the President and the investiga- tory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments are adequate in their provisions and enforcement; and whether there was full disclosure of evidence and information among agencies and department of the United States Government and whether any evidence or information not in the possession of an agency of department would have been of assistance in investigating the assassination and why such information was not provided or collected by that agency or department, and to make recommendations to the House if the Select Committee deems it appropriate for the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation. That is what we are attempting to accomplish, which is quite a big order. We appreciate your being here today, Mr. Wilcott. (Whereupon, a recess was taken while the members of the Committee went to the floor of the House for a vote.) 3 Mr. Preyer. We will come to order. We will resume the session, and I will recognize Counsel to begin his questioning. TESTIMONY OF JAMES B. WtLCOlT, A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, would you please state your name and address and occupation? Mr. Wilcott. My name is James B. Wilcott. My address is 2761 Atlantic Street, in Concord, and my occupation is electronic technician. Mr. Goldsmith. Where is Concord located? Mr. Wilcott. It is a little bit east of Oakland, California. Mr. Goldsmith. Have you received a copy of the Committee’s rules? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. And a copy of the relevant House Resolutions? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. And, Mr. Wilcott, is it true that you are a former employee with the CIA and that you are here today testifying voluntarily without a subpoena? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. During what years did you work for the CIA? Mr. Wilcott. Iworked from the years, May, of 1957 to, April, of 1966. Mr. Goldsmith. And in what general capacity did you work with the CIA? Mr. Wolcott. All in the finance -- in accounting all of the time. Mr. Goldsmith. How did you become employed with the CIA? Mr. Wrlcott. I was recruited from the school in Syracuse New York, where I was taking a course in accounting and busi- ness administration. Mr. Goldsmith. Very generally now, what were your responsibilities as a finance employee with the agency? Mr. Wilcott. Well, from May of 1957 to January of 1960 - Mr. Goldsmith - excuse me, just answer the question very generally, without referring to anything right now, and please describe generally what your responsibilities were as a finance officer. Mr. Wilcott. My. responsibilities were primarily record keeping and disbursing of funds. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, are you here with Counsel today? Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I am. Mr. Goldsmith. Would your Counsel identify himself for the recorder? Mr. Shapp. My name is William Schapp. And I am an Attorney here in Washington. I will give my card to the Committee. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, did I ask you to prepare a list indicating the dates that you were employed with the CIA and where you were stationed? Mr. Wrlcott. Yes, you did. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you prepare such a list? Mr. Alcott. Yes, I did. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have that list with you? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. I do. Mr. Goldsmith. Referring to that list, would you tell the Committee where you were stationed during your period with the CIA? Mr. Wrlcott. Certainly, from May of 1957 to January of 1960, I was in the pre-fab building on the Potomac in finance. During the period, it was unvouchered funds, and my duties were general accounting, and my rate in status was GS-5. From about January of 1960 to about June of 1960, I was transferred to Finance Field Payroll, also, in this same building, on the Potomac. This was making payments and keeping pay records. From June of 1960 to June of 1964, I was stationed at XXXXXXX Station, and my primary duty was finance and cash disbursements. This was all cash payments and record keeping for the station. And during that period, I had been promoted GS-7 and also gained a career status. From June of 1964 to about December of 1964, I was at Roseland. This was just prior to moving to Langley, in finance, and my duties there were policing accounts, and included auditing of special accounts. From January of 1965 to about March of 1965, I was at Langley in the same area, in finance, policing accounts and auditing of special accounts, and I was promoted up to GS 9. From April of 1965 to April of 1966, I was at Miami Station in finance, and I was handling the staff payroll. This was preparing and reconciling payrolls. In April of 1966, I resigned from the CIA. Mr. Goldsmith. I take it, from your testimony, that in November of 1963, you were stationed in XXXXXXXXXXXXX Station, is that correct? Mr. Wilcott. That is right. Mr. Goldsmith. Drawing your attention to the period immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy, at that time, did you come across any information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald’s relationship with the CIA? Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I did. Mr. Goldsnith. And will you tell the Committee what that relationship was? Mr. Wrlcott. Well, it was my understanding that Lee Harvey Oswald was an employee of the agency and was an agent of the agency. Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean by the term “agent”? Mr. Wilcott. That he was a regular employee, receiving a full-time salary for agent work for doing CIA operational work. Mr. Goldsmith. How did this information concerning Oswald first come to your attention? Mr. Wolcott. The first time I heard about Oswald being connected in any way with CIA was the day after the Kennedy assassination. Mr. Goldsmith. And how did that come to your attention? Mr. Wrlcott. Well, I was on day duty for the station. It was a guard-type function at the station, which I worked for overtime. There was a lot of excitement going on at the station after the Kennedy assassination. Towards the end of my tour of duty, I heard certain things about Oswald somehow being connected with the agency, and I didn’t really believe this when I heard it, and I thought it was absurd. Then, as time Went on, I began to hear more things in that line. Mr. Goldsmith. I think we had better go over that one more time. When, exactly, was the very first time that you heard or came across information that Oswald was an agent? Mr. Wilcott. I heard references to it the day after the assassination. . Goldsmith. And who made these references to Oswald being an agent of the CIA? Mr. Wilcott. I can’t remember the exact persons. There was talk about it going on at the station, and several months following at the station. Mr. Goldsmith. How many people made this reference to Oswald being an agent of the CIA? Mr. Wilcott. At least - there was at least six or seven people, specifically, who said that they either knew or believed Oswald to be an agent of the CIA. Mr. Goldsmith. Was Jerry Fox one of the people that made. this allegation? Mr. Wrlcott. To the best of my recollection, yes. Mr. Goldsmith. And who is Jerry Fox? Mr. Wilcott. Jerry Fox was a Case Officer for his branch the Soviet Russia Branch, XXXXXXXXXX Station, who purchased information from the Soviets. Mr. Wilcott. Yes, you did. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you prepare such a list? Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I did. Mr. Goldsmith. Is that list complete and does it have every CIA Case Officer who worked XXXXXXXXXX in 1963? Mr. Wilcott. Oh, no. It doesn’t have every one. It has every one that I can remember. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you bring that list with you today? Mr. Wrlcott. Yes, I did. Mr. Goldsmith. Were any of these people on your list possible subjects who made references to Oswald being a CIA agent? Mr. Wrlcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read the list to the Committee? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Only of Case Officers. Ms. Beming. I think we ought to state that the record shows that Mr. Sawyer is a member of the Kennedy Subcommittee Preyer. We will. Mr. Goldsmith. Upon your memory and the list that your brought with you today, will you tell the Committee the names of the CIA Case Officers who you remember working XXXXXXXXXX in 1963? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. There was XXXXXXXXXXXX Branch, who had XXXXXXXXXXX cover. Jerry Fox, SR Branch, Soviet Russia Branch -- Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me, please proceed very slowly. Mr. Wrlcott. Jerry Fox, SR Branch, Reid Dennis, Chief of Soviet Satellite Branch; and XXXXXXXXXX, China Branch, and he also had a cover. John P. Horton, XXXXXXXXX Section; XXXXXXXXXXXXX Branch; and Chester Ito, XXXXXXXXX Branch; and Kan Takai, XXXXX Branch; and Jim Delaney, China Branch; and Bob Rentner, SR Branch -- and there is some question about that, the branch he was with. Larry Watanabi, XXXXXX Branch, Senior Case Officer; and XXXXXXXXXXX, deep commercial cover agent. There was a person, Dave, who was a Deputy Chief. Dave - I can’t remember his last name, Deputy Chief of the China Branch; and then a person whose last name was XXXXXXXXX in the XXXXXXXXX Branch. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember which of these individuals if any, made the specific allegation or reference that Oswald was an agent? Mr. Wtlcott. It has been 15 years, and I can’t remember specifically who said what, but certainly I am sure that Jerry Fox, for instance, had at least made some mention of it. Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that this allegation first came to your attention, did you discuss it with anyone? Mr. Wilcott. Oh, yes. I discussed it with my friends and the people that I was associating with socially. Mr. Goldsmith. Who were your friends that you discussed this with? Mr. Alcott. XXXXXXXXXXXX George Breen, Ed Luck, and xxxxxxxxxxxxx Mr. Goldsmith. Who was George Breen? Mr. Wrlcott. George Breen was a person in Registry, who was my closest friend while I was in XXXXXXXXXXXXXX. Mr. Goldsmith. Was he a CIA employee? Mr. Wilcott. Yes, he was. Mr. Goldsmith. And would he corroborate your obser- vation that Oswald was an agent? Mr. Wilcott. I don’t know. Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that this allegation first came to your attention, did you learn the name of Oswald’s Case Officer at the CIA? Mr. Wilcott. No. Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any other times during your stay with the CIA at XXXXXXXXXX Station that you came across information that Oswald had been a CIA agent? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. When was that? Mr. Wrlcott. The specific incident was soon after the Kennedy assassination, where an agent, a Case Officer -- I am sure it was a Case Officer - came up to my window to draw money, and he specifically said in the conversation that ensued, he specifically said, “Well, Jim, the money that I drew the last couple of weeks ago or so was money,” either for the Oswald project or for Oswald. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember the name of this Case Officer? Mr. Wilcott. No, I don’t. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember when specifically this conversation took place? Mr. Wrlcott. Not specifically, only generally. Mr. Goldsmith. How many months after the assassination was this? Mr. Wilcott. I think it must have been two or three omths (sic) after the assassination. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember where this conver- sation took place? Mr. Wilcott. It was right at my window, my disbursing cage window. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you discuss this information with anyone? Mr. Wilcott. Oh, yes. Mr. Goldsmith. With whom? Mr. Wtlcott. Certainly with George Breen, XXXXXXXXXXX the circle of social friends that we had. Mr. Goldsmith. How do you spell XXXXXXXXXX last name? Mr. Wilcott. XXXXXXXXXXXXX (spelling). Mr. Schaap. For the record, I have made a list of all of these spellings of the names which have been mentioned, which I will give to the stenographer so that he will have them correctly. Mr. Goldsmith. Did this Case Officer tell you what Oswald’s cryptonym was? Mr. Wilcott. Yes, he mentioned the cryptonym specifically under which the money was drawn. Mr. Goldsmith. And what did he tell you the cryptonym was? Mr. Wrlcott. I cannot remember. Mr. Goldsmith. What was your response to this revelation as to what Oswald’s cryptonym was? Did you write it down or do anything? Mr. Wilcott. No; I think that I looked through my advance book -- and I had a book where the advances on projects were run, and I leafed through them, and I must have at least leafed through them to see if what he said was true. Mr. Goldsmith. And are you saying then that you attempted to investigate this allegation? Mr. Wilcott. No, I am not saying that. It was more of a casual kind of thing, to my way of thinking. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you check your cash disbursement files? Mr. Wrlcott. Not the files, no. Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure I am following, then, what specifically you did check. Mr. Wtlcott. It was a book that I had. At the end of the day we would list all of the advances that were made in an advance book. It was just a three-ring binder, and we would list down the advances by cryptonym and the amounts and then reconcile that with the daily disbursements. Mr. Goldsmith. How long were these records maintained? Mr. Wilcott. They were maintained on a thirty-day basis, and then they were closed off at the end of the month. Mr. Goldsmith. So, does that mean you were able to check back only thirty days from the time that you were given this information? Mr. Wilcott. Yes Mr. Goldsmith. I realize this is testimony 15 years after the fact. However, if you received this information two or three months after the assassination, at a time that Oswald was already dead and had been dead for two or three months, what purpose would have been served by checking records that were only 30 days old? Do you follow the question? Mr. Wilcott. No. Mr. Goldsmith. Well, in other words, if you got the information three months after the assassination, Oswald had already been dead for three months, is that right? Mr. Wrlcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Answer “yes” or “no” for the recorder. Mr. Wtlcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. You testified that your records were only kept for thirty days, is that correct? Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Then, by checking your records, which only went back thirty days, isn’t it true that you wouldn’t have gotten any information concerning Oswald anyway because Oswald had already been dead for one or two months? Mr. Wtlcott. That is true. Mr. Goldsmith. So, then, really, no purpose would have Mr. Wilcott. That is right. Mr. Goldsmith. And did you check any other records? Mr. Wilcott. No. Mr. Preyer. I understand this might be a good place for us to break and go and vote, so that we will take another recess for about ten minutes. I am sorry. Whereupon, a recess was taken while the members of the Committee went to the floor of the House for a v .

Absolutely, And not conversely but inherently in Paul Trejo’s argument, the main players were ALL CIA, but they were on a lunch-break at 12:30 on 11-22-63; i.e, they were rogue CIA conspirators. For Paul Trejo, defining those who were rogue CIA is simply a matter of identifying those CIA agents who were involved. Paul Trejo is a CIA apologist. Figuritively, I am a hare’s breath (or is it a Hair’s breadth) from you guys on our CT’s. You have a Dallas Cop or Minuteman firing from the knoll and being (figuratively) tossed in a trunk and spirited away; while I have an Anti-Castro Cuban firing from the knoll and (figuratively) disposed-of in the same manner. I know you don’t like being pegged as a CTer, Jason, but, you are. You simply raise numerous CT’s as plausible and stand behind none; while Paul Trejo stands behind one, pretending he can make of it whatever he would like it to be, at any turn. In any event, Jason, thanks for the digging; it IS work.

My apologies if this link has already found a place in this thread. http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?absPageId=223425 From this thread

Steve's URL did not work for me... https://www.rawstory.com/2018/05/cuba-regrets-cia-bay-pigs-veteran-died-without-trial/

The above is from this article... https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2017/dec/07/jack-anderson-watergate/

The above document mentions Operation Mongoose. Wikipedia states that it was not given that name until November of 1961, which means, if correct, that our document would have to have penned afterwards. The plan itself was being was being formed under Eisenhower. From Wikipedia... "The Cuban Project, also known as Operation Mongoose, was a covert operation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that was commissioned in March 1960 during the final year of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration. On November 30, 1961, covert operations against Fidel Castro's government in Cuba were officially authorized by President Kennedy and after being given the name Operation Mongoose at a prior White House meeting on November 4, 1961. The operation was led by United States Air Force General Edward Lansdale and went into effect after the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion." Now, that's a classic Wikipedia entry, it leaves you scratching your head. But, it highlights reasons to get Wikipedia updated properly. Also, I find confusing and possibly incorrect information, such as this, a big motivator to dig-in.

Some Wiki-notes On the NSC under JFK. President John F. Kennedy, who was strongly influenced by the report of the Jackson Subcommittee and its severe critique of the Eisenhower NSC system, moved quickly at the beginning of his administration to deconstruct the NSC process and simplify the foreign policy-making process and make it more intimate. In a very short period after taking office, the new President moved to reduce the NSC staff from 74 to 49, limit the substantive officers to 12, and hold NSC meetings much less frequently while sharply curtailing the number of officers attending. The Operation Coordination Board was abolished, and the NSC was, at the President's insistence, pulled back from monitoring the implementation of policies. The coordination of foreign policy decisions was ostensibly left to the State Department (and other agencies as necessary). McGeorge Bundy's appointment as the President's National Security Advisor inaugurated this position as it has essentially continued down to the present. The definition of Bundy's responsibilities and authority unfolded and grew during the Kennedy presidency. Bundy's considerable intellectual and bureaucratic abilities as well as close personal relationship with the new President contributed much to evolution of the National Security Advisor position and the new role of the NSC. In a letter to Senator Jackson in September 1961 Bundy sought to define the early relationship sought with the State Department. The Department of State's apparent failure effectively to coordinate the administration's response to the Bay of Pigs Invasion crisis in early 1961 led to a series of measures aimed at providing the President with better independent advice from the government. It also sparked the NSC process to reenter the arena of monitoring the implementation of policy. The most important step in this direction was the establishment of the Situation Room in the White House in May 1961. The Sit Room, located next to Bundy's office in the basement of the West Wing of the White House, was directly linked to all the communication channels of the State Department and the Department of Defense, as well as to some of the channels of the CIA. The Sit Room allowed the President and his foreign affairs advisers to keep abreast of all the cable traffic from overseas posts. More than anything else, the Sit Room allowed Bundy and his NSC staff to expand their involvement in the international activities of foreign affairs community and become, in essence, "a little State Department."

Right now, I am thinking that this was written by Lyman Lemnitzer. From Wikipedia... "Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (August 29, 1899 – November 12, 1988) was a United States Army general, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962......... ............ In 1975, President Ford appointed Lemnitzer to the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (aka the Rockefeller Commission) to investigate whether the Central Intelligence Agency had committed acts that violated US laws, and allegations that E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis (of Watergate fame) were involved in the assassination of John F. Kennedy."

Bagely was likely a sadistic, myopic torturer. His later claims about Nosenko are very likely clouded by guilt. He was also likely incompetent and dangerously-so. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32359254.pdf Italics are mine... TOP SECRET 13 October 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Subject: BAGELY, Tennant, Harrington #386 38 1) On Wednesday, 7 October 1970 I briefed Colonel L. K. White, Executive Director-Controller on certain reservations I have concerning the proposed promotion of Bagely to a supergrade position.  2) I was very careful to explain to Colonel White at the outset that my reservations had nothing whatsoever to do with Bagely's security status. I explained that it was my conviction that Bagely was almost exclusively responsible for the manner in which the Nosenko case had been handled by our SR division. I said I considered that Bagely lacked objectivity and that he had displayed extremely poor judgment over a two year period in the handling of this case. Specifically as one example of Bagely's extreme prejudice I pointed out that the SR division had neglected to follow up several leads provided by Nosenko which subsequently had been followed up by this office (Bruce Solie) and that this lead us to individuals who have confessed their recruitment and use by the Soviets over an extensive period of time. 3) I explained further that Bagely displayed extremely poor judgment in the actions he took during that time that Nosenko was incarcerated at ISOLATION. On many occasions, as the individual responsible for Nosenko's care, I refuse to condone Bagely's instructions to my people who are guarding him. In one instance Bagely insisted that Nosenko's food ration be reduced to black bread and water three times daily. After I had briefed Colonel White, he indicated that he would refresh the Director's memory on Bagely's role in the Nosenko case at the time he reviews supergrade promotions.   Howard J. Osborn Director of Security Edited May 14 by Michael Clark

Paz, After some more thought I am beginning to see this as a primer for the new administration as to what the CIA and DOD were planning to do. It is an indication that they intended to put immense pressure on the new President, and lay-out a plan, already in motion, that far exceeded the intentions of the prior administration. I have to read it some more, correct some typo's, and pull some contextual clues to see if it can indeed be isolated to the period of planning prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. Two things of interest. - The document speaks of two PT boats in inventory, one without a motor, and one reserved as a Presidantial escape craft. This, I am musing, served as a knurple to the Presidents ego. - Towards the end, the author speaks in the first person, so it will be part of the challenge to see if we can identify that individual through contextual clues.

Paul, On the cover page, in the "Agency Information" section, on the "Agency" line it reads... "NSC". The National Security Council was formed in 1947 and is a White House entity, answering to the President. As to the document heading I am not sure if we can take that to be an indicator of the originating body. Under "Document Information" the lines "Originator" and "From" are left blank, so comparisons of these document header sections with other documents can tell us if we can rely on the "Agency Information" section as an indicator of ownership or originator. This will be something I will be looking at as I dig deeper. It is interesting that it is addressed to the Attorney General rather than the President. I am seeing this as a message to the CIA, DOD and other interested entities that JFK was making it clear that he would be considering the legality of any forthcoming action as a matter of first importance. Indeed, it is a message that these intenties should consider the plan through a legal lense prior to expecting executive action on the subject at hand.

I’ve been trying to figure that out too. It’s not 63, probably 62, maybe 61. I have some reasoning for this that I will share later.

To: Robert Kennedy Title: Briefing for Robert Kennedy Subjects: Program review Plans to Assist Cubans in Overthrowing the Communist Regime. Briefing for Mr. Robert Kennedy Concerning the status of DOD plans and activities to date – our first completed action was to obtain a DOD/JCS position as to the military's stake and proposed role in the ousting of the Castro Communist regime. Basically, the policy reflected in this paper establishes that the military will support State and CIA as necessary during the preparatory phase of Operation Mongoose in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.It also establishes the point that the military believes it continued existence of the Castro Communist regime is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the United States and the entire Western Hemisphere. It further makes the point that the military could intervene overtly in Cuba without serious offense to national or world public opinion If: A: We moved in response to a humanitarian requirement to restore order withinn Cuba; B. If we announced incident to going in; that we were moving in to restore order and hold free elections; and that we would withdraw from Cuba as soon as the new government advised that they had the capability to maintain order without further assistance from OAS nations; C. If the operation was conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take affective counter-measures was reduced to the minimum. D. We feel very strongly that without damage to their international position and simply by making the decision to do so, the Soviets can take a page from our book and establish an overseas military base or bases in Cuba. This would greatly increase our national vulnerability and our defense costs as forces would have to be developed or shifted to meet this threat from the south. It would also provide the Communists with a secure base for espionage, sabotage and subversion throughout the entire Western Hemisphere. The Soviets have an option on which they can foreclose at any time. They can make the decision to establish military bases in Cuba at their will and pleasure, and if they exercise this option, we would likely be unable to remove them without initiating World War III. Consequently we feel that it is mandatory that we face the facts squarely now, and determine as early as possible whether we can rid Cuba of Communism by covert support of Cubans within Cuba; and it is equally mandatory, for logistics and planning purposes, that we have an early decision as to whether we definitely intend to use military force, if covert means fail. We also feel strongly that the United States should intervene to preserve Cuban nationals identified as being essential to the establishment of a friendly Cuban government if they are in danger of being exterminated by a widespread Hungarian type blood purge. In furtherance of the DOD/JCS policy that any military intervention should be conducted as quickly as possible, and with sufficient force to minimize the Communist Bloc's capability to react, we are working with CINCLANT in attempting to reduce the reaction time of his contingency plans for moving into Cuba, but at the same time to beef up his capability so that there will be no doubt as to the US ability to move in and take over rapidly regardless of the opposition we may meet. Our primary plan can be activated from a condition of no warning in 18 days, and provides for confronting Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to induce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of life. A secondary plan can be activated from a condition of no warning in five days although this plan involves a degree of risk by a piecemeal commitment of forces. CINCLANT is planning to reduce these reaction times through pre-positioning of forces and material. This planning effort should soon provide us a basis for decision concerning the extent we wish to go in pre-positioning without endangering security and the element of surprise to an unacceptable degree. We feel that there is an alarming lack of appreciation that time is running out - that we cannot let this operation drag on for an indefinite number of years, hoping to develop a massive resistance capability with in Cuba. We are concerned that the new proposal d-emphasizes the time factor by waiting until July before a decision is made as to what to do next. This would permit the Soviets (Communist regime in Cuba) additional time to foreclose on the options open to them, viz., entry of Cuba into the Warsaw Pact, and/or the establishment of Soviet bases in Cuba. Either one of these actions would add new dimensions to our problems, and introduce considerations which would postpone positive action indefinitely if not preclude for the foreseeable future elimination of the Communist regime. In the event that the coming months may disapprove the feasibility of initiating an internal revolt in Cuba, it is suggested that phase 2 might be sparked with the execution of a Cover and Deception plan. Normal training of US forces would be the primary cover, the deception would be concurrent efforts to convince the Communist Cuban government that we were in fact invading Cuba. This course of action could provide adequate provocation for US intervention depending, of course, on Cuban rashneis in their reaction. If successful, we might not have to engage in the more difficult and dangerous game of developing pretext, although we should include this requirement as a final resort to ensure successful initiation of phase 2. As I previously mentioned, one of our primary responsibilities is supporting CIA. To date, CIA has submitted several request for support. In each case, action was initiated immediately and the request processed expeditiously. These requests included: A. Use of Avon Park, USAF bombing range in Southern Florida, as an exercise area for training agents. (DOD has approved this request provided national policy permitted training of Cubans on US military bases). B. Assignment of the Navy commander experienced in small boat operations to handle their maritime small boat activities. (The following day, the Chief of Naval Operations approved the request and directed the Navy Bureau of Personnel to procure and assign a qualified officer without delay. C. Advice and assistance from BJ Unit No. 2 in testing certain simulation devices. (Direct contact with BJ No. 2 and appropriate CIA personnel was authorized). D. CIA has in formally requested the Navy to obtain 6 PT boats for their use. (staffing today indicates that the Navy does not have six PT boat in their inventory. They have two in mothballs, one designated as a presidential escapeboat, and one hull without a motor. The leadtime required to place mothballed PT boats in operation is 30 days at a minimum, at a cost of $200,000 each. The purchase of additional PT's requires an estimated 3 to 6 months after signing the contract. The cost per unit for new PT boats is estimated at 1 million. The Navy is currently waiting CIA's formal request.) E. CIA submitted a request to DOD for use of certain personnel, supplies, equipment, facilities and bases including but not limited to aircraft, boats, submarines and landing ships dock (LSD's), plus the use of US Armed Forces the furnish air cover for CIA sponsors activities. This request raised several national policy decisions necessary to permit fulfillment of the request. These policy decisions are: 1. Weather, and/or to what extent a policy of non-attribution to the US government will apply to projects in connection with the activities of the CSG. 2. Weather, and/or to what extent US bases and facilities should be utilized for training Cuban refugees. 3. Whether, and/or to what extent US Armed Forces personnel will be employed on CSG projects and if so, whether, and/or to what extent they will be non-attributable. 4. Whether, and/or to what extent US Armed Forces personnel will be employed within the territorial boundaries of Cuba. 5. Whether, and/or to what extent over-flights of Cuba for purposes of leaflet drops, resupply and diversion will be permitted. 6. Whether, and/or to what extent Guantánamo will be used as a base for agents, black flights and black broadcast. 7. Whether, and/or to what extent use of British controlled and other foreign areas for staging areas will be permitted. 8. What is the priority of Operation Mongoose, as compared to other projects and operations. We have also prepared an assessment of the risk involved in air resupply missions over Cuba. We are readying two USAF sanitized aircraft and "sheep-dipped" crews for air resupply missions to agents within Cuba, and we are assisting CIA with its maritime needs, including help in obtaining PT types boats from foreign sources, readying "sheep-dipped" crews and equipment as deemed necessary, and providing operational concepts on disrupting or destroying Cuban capability of maritime coastal patrols. In order to accomplish our assigned tasks, I have a working group with full-time representatives from the joint Chiefs of staff, DIA and the service who serve, as representatives of their respective directors and as points of contact dealing directly with their respective Chiefs. Furrther, I have representatives of each of the services who also served full-time on the working group. They work directly with the people on the service desk; the operations deputy, the deputy for plans, and one action officer. Obviously, my working group cannot staff all the tasks placed upon us, consequently, whenever possible, we sanitize the tasks and have them accomplished by a Joint Staff or the regular Service Staffs.

Some of the observations are of strategic military planning. The document also speaks of the CIA in the third person. I am thinking it is a DOD document. I am also looking for a means to date it squarely. P. 12 definition of CSG? - Questioning of priority of Op. Mongoose (speaks to it being a DOD doc) - mention of USAF "sanitized" aircraft with "sheepdipped" crew. P.13 "We are assisting CIA with it's maritime needs ( speaks to a non CIA doc.)