Why didn't JFK fire McGeorge Bundy post-BOP?

[Greg Burnham]

On April 16, 1961 Nino Diaz group failed in a second attempt while landing near Baracoa, following the air strikes. The CIA "planners" had failed to discover the US-supplied T-33 jets been armed with M-3 machine guns. No additional air strikes were planned before April 17, 1961 because the B-26 pilots lack of confidence failed in their success of the April 15th attacks. President Kennedy "ordered" the cancellation of further airfield strikes to attempt deniability of the US involvement. The first person to receive word of the cancellation by radio on the ship was Osvaldo Cello.

Scott, I'm not sure if we're talking about the same thing here or not. While it is true that there was a failed attempt to take out Castro's remaining planes, JFK did NOT order "cancellation of further airstrikes to attempt deniability" because the PRE-dawn D-day airstrikes ORDERED by him were to be flown by anti-Castro Cuban exiles. There was NOTHING to deny! It was perfectly "legal" for the members of Brigade 2506 to "take their best shot" at overthrowing Castro. We had nothing to deny as the mission was being flown by them in aircraft that no longer belonged to the United States. That was NOT in violation of International Law, nor was it in violation of the Eisenhower Administration's NSC Directive 5412.

Colonel Prouty was there. He was OPERATIONALLY involved in this mission. He worked in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Military Liaison in support of ALL U.S. Clandestine Operations GLOBALLY. He knows what happened.

PROUTY: "By April 1961 the invasion plan had been worked out under the leadership of Jack Hawkins. It was all predicated on the fact that the Invasion Force would destroy all of Castro's aircraft BEFORE the invasion took place. This was the plan that was briefed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by them and taken to Kennedy. Kennedy said little about it except on Sunday, April 17th he finally approved the invasion with the strict proviso that all of Castro's jets would be destroyed or the invasion force would not be landed on the beach. We all understood that."

Now, Kennedy did order that airstrikes be terminated immediately after the failure you referenced because we were "caught" red handed the week before when one of the pilots landed in Miami. That caused a great deal of embarrassment to our Ambassador to the United nations, Adelai Stevenson. However, you are mixing apples with oranges, here. JFK had "reserved" his right to cancel the entire operation all the way up until April 17th when he finally approved it--with the stipulation that ALL of Castro's remaining T-33's must be destroyed on the ground.

Edited October 16, 2011 by Greg Burnham

[Scott Kaiser]

On April 16, 1961 Nino Diaz group failed in a second attempt while landing near Baracoa, following the air strikes. The CIA "planners" had failed to discover the US-supplied T-33 jets been armed with M-3 machine guns. No additional air strikes were planned before April 17, 1961 because the B-26 pilots lack of confidence failed in their success of the April 15th attacks. President Kennedy "ordered" the cancellation of further airfield strikes to attempt deniability of the US involvement. The first person to receive word of the cancellation by radio on the ship was Osvaldo Cello.

Sorry, but that is partially incorrect. While it is true that there was a failed attempt to take out Castro's remaining planes, JFK did NOT order "cancellation of further airstrikes to attempt deniability" because the PRE-dawn D-day airstrikes ORDERED by him were to be flown by anti-Castro Cuban exiles. There was NOTHING to deny! It was perfectly "legal" for the members of Brigade 2506 to "take their best shot" at overthrowing Castro. We had nothing to deny as the mission was being flown by them in aircraft that no longer belonged to the United States. That was NOT in violation of International Law, nor was it in violation of the Eisenhower Administration's NSC Directive 5412.

Colonel Prouty was there. He was OPERATIONALLY involved in this mission. He worked in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Military Liaison in support of ALL U.S. Clandestine Operations GLOBALLY. He knows what happened.

PROUTY: "By April 1961 the invasion plan had been worked out under the leadership of Jack Hawkins. It was all predicated on the fact that the Invasion Force would destroy all of Castro's aircraft BEFORE the invasion took place. This was the plan that was briefed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by them and taken to Kennedy. Kennedy said little about it except on Sunday, April 17th he finally approved the invasion with the strict proviso that all of Castro's jets would be destroyed or the invasion force would not be landed on the beach. We all understood that."

Now, Kennedy did order that no unauthorized airstrikes be terminated immediately after the failure you referenced because we were "caught" red handed the week before when one of the pilots landed in Miami. That caused a great deal of embarrassment to our Ambassador to the United nations, Adelai Stevenson. However, you are mixing apples with oranges, here. JFK had "reserved" his right to cancel the entire operation all the way up until April 17th when he finally approved it--with the stipulation that ALL of Castro's remaining T-33's must be destroyed on the ground.

Which day would you like to discuss the 16th, 17th, 18th 19th or 20th? Or the Aftermath?

[Scott Kaiser]

Greg,

Just as I thought we were inching ever so closer you drift off again, we are programmed to not accept it when we are wrong, but in your previous posts you have been proven wrong, shall we just make it easy on ourselves and break it down day by day?

Edited October 16, 2011 by Scott Kaiser

[Scott Kaiser]

On April 16, 1961 Nino Diaz group failed in a second attempt while landing near Baracoa, following the air strikes. The CIA "planners" had failed to discover the US-supplied T-33 jets been armed with M-3 machine guns. No additional air strikes were planned before April 17, 1961 because the B-26 pilots lack of confidence failed in their success of the April 15th attacks. President Kennedy "ordered" the cancellation of further airfield strikes to attempt deniability of the US involvement. The first person to receive word of the cancellation by radio on the ship was Osvaldo Cello.

Scott, I'm not sure if we're talking about the same thing here or not. While it is true that there was a failed attempt to take out Castro's remaining planes, JFK did NOT order "cancellation of further airstrikes to attempt deniability" because the PRE-dawn D-day airstrikes ORDERED by him were to be flown by anti-Castro Cuban exiles. There was NOTHING to deny! It was perfectly "legal" for the members of Brigade 2506 to "take their best shot" at overthrowing Castro. We had nothing to deny as the mission was being flown by them in aircraft that no longer belonged to the United States. That was NOT in violation of International Law, nor was it in violation of the Eisenhower Administration's NSC Directive 5412.

Colonel Prouty was there. He was OPERATIONALLY involved in this mission. He worked in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Military Liaison in support of ALL U.S. Clandestine Operations GLOBALLY. He knows what happened.

PROUTY: "By April 1961 the invasion plan had been worked out under the leadership of Jack Hawkins. It was all predicated on the fact that the Invasion Force would destroy all of Castro's aircraft BEFORE the invasion took place. This was the plan that was briefed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by them and taken to Kennedy. Kennedy said little about it except on Sunday, April 17th he finally approved the invasion with the strict proviso that all of Castro's jets would be destroyed or the invasion force would not be landed on the beach. We all understood that."

Now, Kennedy did order that airstrikes be terminated immediately after the failure you referenced because we were "caught" red handed the week before when one of the pilots landed in Miami. That caused a great deal of embarrassment to our Ambassador to the United nations, Adelai Stevenson. However, you are mixing apples with oranges, here. JFK had "reserved" his right to cancel the entire operation all the way up until April 17th when he finally approved it--with the stipulation that ALL of Castro's remaining T-33's must be destroyed on the ground.

I'm not understanding you and your typing to much making it all to confussing, you first say "JFK did NOT order "cancellation of further airstrikes to attempt deniability" I'm assuming because Colonel Prouty was there. (Here we go again)! Then you say "Now, Kennedy did order that airstrikes be terminated immediately after the failure you referenced because we were "caught" red handed".

Slow down and take a breather, I just want you to understand something else other then what your being told by Prouty that's all.

Edited October 16, 2011 by Scott Kaiser

[Scott Kaiser]

On the night of 15/16 April, the Nino Diaz group failed in a second attempted diversionary landing at a fresh location near Baracoa.[23]

On 16 April, Merardo Leon, Jose Leon, and 14 others staged an armed uprising at Las Delicias Estate in Las Villas, with only four surviving. Leonel Martinez and three others took to the countryside.[15][clarification needed]

Following the air strikes on airfields on 15 April 1961, the FAR managed to prepare for armed action at least four T-33s, four Sea Furies and five or six B-26s. All three types were armed with machine guns for air-to-air combat and for strafing of ships and ground targets. CIA planners had failed to discover that the US-supplied T-33 jets had long been armed with M-3 machine guns. The three types could also carry bombs, for attacks against ships and tanks.[42]

No additional air strikes against Cuban airfields and aircraft were specifically planned before 17 April, because B-26 pilots' exaggerated claims gave the CIA false confidence in the success of the 15 April attacks, until U-2 reconnaissance photos on 16 April showed otherwise. Late on 16 April, President Kennedy ordered cancellation of further airfield strikes planned for dawn on 17 April, to attempt plausible deniability of US direct involvement.[10]

Late on 16 April, the CIA/Brigade 2506 invasion fleet converged on 'Rendezvous Point Zulu', about 65 kilometres (40 mi) south of Cuba, having sailed from Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua where they had been loaded with troops and other materiel, after loading arms and supplies at New Orleans. The US Navy operation was code-named Bumpy Road, having been changed from Crosspatch on 1 April 1961. The fleet, labelled the 'Cuban Expeditionary Force' (CEF), included five 2,400-ton (empty weight) freighter ships chartered by the CIA from the Garcia Line, and subsequently outfitted with anti-aircraft guns. Four of the freighters, Houston (code name Aguja), Río Escondido (code name Ballena), Caribe (code name Sardina), and Atlántico (code-name Tiburón), were planned to transport about 1,400 troops in seven battalions of troops and armaments near to the invasion beaches. The fifth freighter, Lake Charles, was loaded with follow-up supplies and some Operation 40 infiltration personnel. The freighters sailed under Liberian ensigns. Accompanying them were two LCIs (Landing Craft Infantry) 'purchased' from Zapata Corporation then outfitted with heavy armament at Key West, then exercises and training at Vieques Island. The LCIs were Blagar (code-name Marsopa) and Barbara J (code-name Barracuda), sailing under Nicaraguan ensigns. The CEF ships were individually escorted (outside visual range) to Point Zulu by US Navy destroyers USS Bache, USS Beale, USS Conway, USS Cony, USS Eaton, USS Murray, USS Waller. A task force had already assembled off the Cayman Islands, including aircraft carrier USS Essex with task force commander Admiral John A. Clark onboard, helicopter assault carrier USS Boxer, destroyers USS Hank, USS John W. Weeks, USS Purdy, USS Wren, and submarines USS Cobbler and USS Threadfin. Command and control ship USS Northampton and carrier USS Shangri-La were also reportedly active in the Caribbean at the time. USS San Marcos was a Landing Ship Dock that carried three LCUs (Landing Craft Utility) and four LCVPs (Landing Craft, Vehicles, Personnel). San Marcos had sailed from Vieques Island. At Point Zulu, the seven CEF ships sailed north without the USN escorts, except for San Marcos that continued until the seven landing craft were unloaded when just outside the 5 kilometres (3 mi) Cuban territorial limit.

At about 00:00 on 17 April 1961, the two CIA LCIs Blagar and Barbara J, each with a CIA 'operations officer' and an Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) of five frogmen, entered the Bay of Pigs (Bahía de Cochinos) on the southern coast of Cuba. They headed a force of four transport ships (Houston, Río Escondido, Caribe and Atlántico) carrying about 1,400 Cuban exile ground troops of Brigade 2506, plus tanks and other vehicles in the landing craft. At about 01:00, the Blagar, as the battlefield command ship, directed the principal landing at Playa Girón (code-named Blue Beach), led by the frogmen in rubber boats followed by troops from Caribe in small aluminum boats, then LCVPs and LCUs. The Barbara J, leading Houston, similarly landed troops 35 km further northwest at Playa Larga (code-named Red Beach), using small fiberglass boats. Unloading troops at night was delayed, due to engine failures and boats damaged by unseen coral reefs. The few militia in the area succeeded in warning Cuban armed forces via radio soon after the first landing, before the invaders overcame their token resistance.[18]:161,167[23]

At daybreak at about 06:30, three FAR Sea Furies, one B-26 and two T-33 jets started attacking those CEF ships still unloading troops. At about 06:50, and 8 kilometres (5.0 mi) south of Playa Larga, Houston was damaged by several rockets from a Sea Fury and a T-33, and about 2 hours later captain Luis Morse intentionally beached it on the western side of the bay. About 270 troops had been unloaded, but about 180 survivors who struggled ashore were incapable of taking part in further action because of the loss of most of their weapons and equipment. At about 07:00, two invading FAL B-26s attacked and sank the Cuban Navy Patrol Escort ship El Baire at Nueva Gerona on the Isle of Pines.[23][39] They then proceeded to Girón to join two other B-26s to attack Cuban ground troops and provide distraction air cover for the paratroop C-46s and the CEF ships under air attack.

At about 07:30, five C-46 and one C-54 transport aircraft dropped 177 paratroops from the parachute battalion of Brigade 2506 in an action code-named Operation Falcon.[44] About 30 men, plus heavy equipment, were dropped south of Australia sugar mill on the road to Palpite and Playa Larga, but the equipment was lost in the swamps, and the troops failed to block the road. Other troops were dropped at San Blas, at Jocuma between Covadonga and San Blas, and at Horquitas between Yaguaramas and San Blas. Those positions to block the roads were maintained for two days, reinforced by ground troops from Playa Girón.

At about 08:30, a FAR Sea Fury piloted by Carlos Ulloa Arauz crashed in the bay, due to stalling or anti-aircraft fire, after encountering a FAL C-46 returning south after dropping paratroops. By 09:00, Cuban troops and militia from outside the area had started arriving at Australia sugar mill, Covadonga and Yaguaramas. Throughout the day they were reinforced by more troops, heavy armour and T-34 tanks typically carried on flat-bed trucks.[18]:195-196 At about 09:30, FAR Sea Furies and T-33s fired rockets at the Rio Escondido, that 'blew up' and sank about 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) south of Girón.

At about 11:00, Premier Fidel Castro issued a statement over Cuba's nationwide network saying that the invaders, members of the exiled Cuban revolutionary front, have come to destroy the revolution and take away the dignity and rights of men.

At about 11:00, a FAR T-33 attacked a FAL B-26 (serial number 935) piloted by Matias Farias who then survived a crashlanding on the Girón airfield, his navigator Eduardo Gonzales already killed by gunfire. His companion B-26 suffered damage and diverted to Grand Cayman Island; pilot Mario Zúñiga (the 'defector') and navigator Oscar Vega returned to Puerto Cabezas via CIA C-54 on 18 April. By about 11:00, the two remaining freighters Caribe and Atlántico, and the CIA LCIs and LCUs, started retreating south to international waters, but still pursued by FAR aircraft. At about 12:00, a FAR B-26 exploded due to heavy anti-aircraft fire from Blagar, and pilot Luis Silva Tablada (on his second sortie) and his crew of three were lost.

By 12:00, hundreds of militia cadets from Matanzas had secured Palpite, and cautiously advanced on foot south towards Playa Larga, suffering many casualties during attacks by FAL B-26s. By dusk, other Cuban ground forces were gradually advancing southward from Covadonga and southwest from Yaguaramas toward San Blas, and westward along coastal tracks from Cienfuegos towards Girón, all without heavy weapons or armour.

Three FAL B-26s were shot down by FAR T-33s, with the loss of pilots Raúl Vianello, José Crespo, Osvaldo Piedra and navigators Lorenzo Pérez-Lorenzo and José Fernández. Vianello's navigator Demetrio Pérez bailed out and was picked up by USS Murray. Pilot Crispín García Fernández and navigator Juan González Romero, in B-26 serial 940, diverted to Boca Chica, but late that night they attempted to fly back to Puerto Cabezas in B-26 serial 933 that Crespo had flown to Boca Chica on 15 April. In October 1961, the remains of the B-26 and its two crew were found in dense jungle in Nicaragua. One FAL B-26 diverted to Grand Cayman with engine failure. By 16:00, Fidel Castro had arrived at the central Australia sugar mill, joining José Ramón Fernández whom he had appointed as battlefield commander before dawn that day.

On 17 April 1961, Osvaldo Ramírez (leader of the rural resistance to Castro) was captured in Aromas de Velázquez, and immediately executed. The CIA was unaware or unconcerned at such repression's effects on the planned operation.

At about 21:00 on 17 April 1961, a night air strike by three FAL B-26s on San Antonio de Los Baños airfield failed, reportedly due to incompetence and bad weather. Two other B-26s had aborted the mission after take-off. Other sources allege that heavy anti-aircraft fire scared the aircrews, the resultant smoke perhaps a convenient excuse for "poor visibility".

By about 10:30 on 18 April, Cuban troops and militia, supported by tanks, took Playa Larga after Brigade forces had fled towards Girón in the early hours. During the day, Brigade forces retreated to San Blas along the two roads from Covadonga and Yaguaramas. By then, both Fidel Castro and José Ramón Fernández had re-located to that battlefront area.

At about 17:00 on 18 April, FAL B-26s attacked a Cuban column of 12 civilian buses leading trucks carrying tanks and other armour, moving southeast between Playa Larga and Punta Perdiz. The vehicles, loaded with civilians, militia, police and soldiers, were attacked with bombs, napalm and rockets, suffering heavy casualties. The six B-26s were piloted by two CIA contract pilots plus four pilots and six navigators from Brigade 2506 air force. The column later re-formed and advanced to Punta Perdiz, about 11 km northwest of Girón.

During the night of 18 April, a FAL C-46 delivered arms and equipment to the Girón airstrip occupied by Brigade 2506 ground forces, and took off before daybreak on 19 April.[48] The C-46 also evacuated Matias Farias, the pilot of B-26 serial '935' (code-named Chico Two) that had been shot down and crash-landed at Girón on 17 April.

The final air attack mission (code-named Mad Dog Flight) comprised five B-26s, four of which were manned by American CIA contract air crews and pilots from the Alabama Air Guard. One FAR Sea Fury (piloted by Douglas Rudd) and two FAR T-33s (piloted by Rafael del Pino and Alvaro Prendes) shot down two of these B-26s, killing four American airmen.

Combat air patrols were flown by Douglas A4D-2N Skyhawk jets of VA-34 squadron operating from USS Essex, with nationality and other markings removed. Sorties were flown to reassure Brigade soldiers and pilots, and to intimidate Cuban government forces without directly engaging in acts of war.

Without direct air support, and short of ammunition, Brigade 2506 ground forces retreated to the beaches in the face of considerable onslaught from Cuban government artillery, tanks and infantry.

Late on 19 April, destroyers USS Eaton (code-named Santiago) and USS Murray (code-named Tampico) moved into Cochinos Bay to evacuate retreating Brigade soldiers from beaches, before firing from Cuban army tanks caused Commodore Crutchfield to order a withdrawal.

From 19 April until about 22 April, sorties were flown by A4D-2Ns to obtain visual intelligence over combat areas. Reconnaissance flights are also reported of Douglas AD-5Ws of VFP-62 and/or VAW-12 squadron from USS Essex or another carrier, such as USS Shangri-La that was part of the task force assembled off the Cayman Islands.

On 21 April, Eaton and Murray, joined on 22 April by destroyers USS Conway and USS Cony, plus submarine USS Threadfin and a CIA PBY-5A Catalina flying boat, continued to search the coastline, reefs and islands for scattered Brigade survivors, about 24-30 being rescued.

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[Scott Kaiser]

^^Your home work and I'll test you on it tomorrow.

Edited October 16, 2011 by Scott Kaiser

[Greg Burnham]

Scott,

It is a logical fallacy to dismiss the account of Colonel Prouty on the grounds that: "Colonel Prouty was there." You practically "mock" me for citing his account. Why? Your "here we go again" comment is NOT an argument. It has no substance. I am not persuaded by your posting text with voluminous cites to authority. The Warren Commission Report is rife with them. Still, it is a lie.

The reason that I cite him so often is because he was in a UNIQUE position to know what actually happened from a (as you called it) "pre-operational" point.

This is significant. There is no reason to dismiss that perspective. He was directly involved with the planning of the operation, the outfitting of equipment, the selection of airfields from which to launch the PRE-dawn airstrikes, among other things. He was "in the loop" far more than you may know.

I am unsure what we are arguing about here?

Are you suggesting that JFK actually caused the failure by not launching a last ditch effort airstrike from the USS Essex? Or are you simply saying that the rebels were under that impression.

If you are saying the latter, I can't argue against that, as I indicated earlier: It would be quite understandable for the Exiles to believe what they had been told by their CIA contacts.

However, if you still believe that that is true...then are you saying that JFK SHOULD have disregarded a standing National Security Directive (5412) from the Eisenhower Administration and violated International Law, alarming the members of the OAS, and inviting the Soviet Union to attack BERLIN, which is what likely would have happened?

[Scott Kaiser]

Scott,

It is a logical fallacy to dismiss the account of Colonel Prouty on the grounds that: "Colonel Prouty was there." You practically "mock" me for citing his account. Why? Your "here we go again" comment is NOT an argument. It has no substance. I am not persuaded by your posting text with voluminous cites to authority. The Warren Commission Report is rife with them. Still, it is a lie.

The reason that I cite him so often is because he was in a UNIQUE position to know what actually happened from a (as you called it) "pre-operational" point.

This is significant. There is no reason to dismiss that perspective. He was directly involved with the planning of the operation, the outfitting of equipment, the selection of airfields from which to launch the PRE-dawn airstrikes, among other things. He was "in the loop" far more than you may know.

I am unsure what we are arguing about here?

Are you suggesting that JFK actually caused the failure by not launching a last ditch effort airstrike from the USS Essex? Or are you simply saying that the rebels were under that impression.

If you are saying the latter, I can't argue against that, as I indicated earlier: It would be quite understandable for the Exiles to believe what they had been told by their CIA contacts.

However, if you still believe that that is true...then are you saying that JFK SHOULD have disregarded a standing National Security Directive (5412) from the Eisenhower Administration and violated International Law, alarming the members of the OAS, and inviting the Soviet Union to attack BERLIN, which is what likely would have happened?

I'd like to first say that my "here we go again" remark is just me being sarcastic, please accept my apologies, now I'm sure Col. Prouty participated at some level in the Bay of Bigs, but lets not forget he was a Col. perhaps sitting behind a desk <so to say>, and you hit the nail right on the head when you quote "and inviting the Soviet Union to attack BERLIN, which is what likely would have happened?" However, I would think that the 24 ICBM missiles Russia had at the time would have been used towards long range attacks against the United States. Cuba is to Russia, what West Berlin is to the United States a worthless piece of land.

I beleive that Kennedy knew he and his administration already violated NSD 5412 and feared retaliation from Khrushchev and the USSR. Thus pulling the plug so to say, funny how things kinda fall into place (after) following the BOP with a cold war that could have led to something hot.

Edited October 16, 2011 by Scott Kaiser

[Scott Kaiser]

Cliff,

I apologize for getting off topic on your thread and making it a debate sorry!

[Greg Burnham]

Well Scott,

Now that we all know where you stand on JFK... I suppose "the apple doesn't fall far from the tree" after all, does it? I know you don't care who "my daddy" was. Nor do I care who yours was. That said: Watergate is a sad legacy to leave to one's offspring, but we all must accept what we get.

[Scott Kaiser]

Well Scott,

Now that we all know where you stand on JFK... I suppose "the apple doesn't fall far from the tree" after all, does it? I know you don't care who "my daddy" was. Nor do I care who yours was. That said: Watergate is a sad legacy to leave to one's offspring, but we all must accept what we get.

I had no idea that you were Mr. Perfect? I would think that he who is without SIN let him cast the first stone, Kennedy was a good president with good intentions, but if I don't cover up my father's crap with one finger, I'm surely not going to cover up Kennedy's. I guess you think he was Mr Perfect as well, I have no ill well against the man, I just call it like I see it, just as I do with my own father. And for your information I am not he, I am me.

Don't think for one minute Kennedy couldn't make mistakes, the difference between you and I, is that I form my own opinion without jumping onto everyone else's bandwagon whether you like what I have to say or not, but for you to judge me because I speak my own opinion tells me you are quite the follower as I find myself much like Kennedy in many ways, and that's a leader. I call it, like I see it.

Edited October 16, 2011 by Scott Kaiser

[Scott Kaiser]

Tell me? What have you done to help contribute to the case? Besides your 1,262 posts and read a bunch of documents and sit behind a computer and express YOUR opinions? Would you like to know what I've done? Don't you dare ever judge me son, you don't know what I've been through and yes you certainly hit a never, and you have NO idea.

Edited October 16, 2011 by Scott Kaiser

[William Kelly]

Scott, can you tell us some more of what the Cubans had to say?

About the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy Assassination and Watergate?

Did they mention the assassination of the Chilean Ambassador in DC, a murder that included Cubans allegedly including some of the guys you talked to, and which included some of the same crew who were involved in the Dealey Plaza operation?

Thanks,

BK

[Scott Kaiser]

Deleted.

Edited October 16, 2011 by Scott Kaiser

[Greg Burnham]

Scott,

We have obviously wandered far off topic in this thread. I am not "judging" you because I don't have the time required to afford me such a luxury. I feel like I'm "Goose" talking to "Maverick" in the movie TOP GUN when he says:

"I know it's tough. The Academy rejected you because you're Duke Mitchell's kid. You have to live with that reputation. But it's like you're flying against a ghost."

Still, I wonder why JFK kept Bundy after his perfidy during the BOP invasion. I have yet to hear an answer to that inquiry that is adequate to the evidence from anyone. I certainly don't know what the reason was. It is perhaps unknowable at this stage, but it was the central topic under discussion at the beginning.