CONFIRMATION of USAF COL. Prouty's Military "Focal-Point" Network: "PROJECT *REDACTED*" & GEN. Goodpaster's DJS report...

[David Boylan]

Prouty was not thought well of by many in the Cuba Project. He and Jake Esterline often butted heads. Project CROSSPATCH was the DOD's ident for the Cuba Project (JMATE).

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=146516#relPageId=70

 

Edited August 24, 2023 by David Boylan

[Robert Montenegro]

19 minutes ago, David Boylan said:

Prouty was not thought well of by many in the Cuba Project. He and Jake Esterline often butted heads. Project CROSSPATCH was the DOD's ident for the Cuba Project (JMATE).

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=146516#relPageId=70

 

It's pretty well documented that COL. Jack L. Hawkins (CIA Chief of Paramilitary Operations, Cuban Branch) and Jacob Donald 'Jake' Esterline (CIA Chief of Western Hemisphere, Cuban Branch), both actually quit the plans committees surrounding the Bay of Pigs Invasion, because they both came to the conclusion that the entire operation was doomed for failure.

 

Of course, it took the maneuvering of Richard Mervin Bissell Jr., CIA Director of the Directorate of Plans and COL. Richard Dale Drain (Chief of Western Hemisphere, Cuban Operations Branch), to get COL. Hawkins and Jake Esterline to fall back into ranks, and be good little soldiers.

 

Remember, COL. Prouty was shill for Allen Welsh Dulles, by his own admission—quoting once again, COL. Prouty admits this much, that between 1955 to 31 December 1963, he was tasked as, "Focal Point Officer" for the CIA within the Department of Defense, reporting directly to Director, Central Intelligence, Allen Welsh Dulles, which can be found in the Preface pg. vii, of COL. Prouty's first addition of his 1973 book:

 

QUOTE—

 

"...I had the unique assignment of being the Focal Point officer for contacts between the CIA and the Department of Defense on matters pertaining to the military support of the Special Operations* of that Agency. In that capacity I worked with Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles..."

 

—END QUOTE.

 

COL. Prouty also had no problem deflecting blame when it came to the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs Invasion—quoting once again, COL. Prouty, that United States Army Gen. Maxwell Davenport Taylor, Chairman of the JCS, was a CIA focal point officer reporting directly DCI to Allen Welsh Dulles—once again from COL. Leroy Fletcher Prouty's "The Secret Team: The CIA, and It's Allies In Control of the United States and the World," this time from pgs. 405 & 409, we find the following inflammatory statements COL. Prouty makes about maneuvering blame from CIA to the military when it came to the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion:

 

QUOTE—

 

"...Dulles again showed that uncanny ability of his and of the Agency’s to rise above each fiasco on to new heights. During the Bay of Pigs inquiry he ingratiated Maxwell Taylor to the Kennedys so firmly that Jack Kennedy assigned General Taylor to the position of Military Adviser to the President. This was a good cover assignment for General Taylor. For those who thought he might be interfering with the duties and prerogatives of the chairman of the JCS, this assignment caused a few raised eyebrows. Dulles and Maxwell Taylor were content to let those rumors and fantasies spread because they did much to help transfer some of the blame for the Bay of Pigs from the CIA to the military..."

 

—END QUOTE.

 

 

Once again, COL. Prouty's words, not mine...

 

 

 

Edited July 24, 2023 by Robert Montenegro

[Larry Hancock]

Thanks Robert,  of course I do dearly love new documents too..grin...so I appreciate the ones you are posting.   Personally I've always made use of Prouty's book on Understanding Special Operations,  it was an early educational text for me.   And he along with a handful of former CIA operations officers were key in disclosing the details of how the CIA's covert operations infrastructure worked - or often didn't.  

As with many of the other people I've studied, the challenge is always to try and walk the tightrope between what they knew first hand as compared to what they heard though their connections..or simply inferred.  Almost all our sources have such issues, the real work (and I do mean work) is getting past the tendency to deal with them on an all or none basis.

A good example of that is what you mentioned in regard to the CIA effort to move the blame for the Bay of Pigs to the military - the real work with what we have documented now shows that the hurried JCS staff study (hurried because the CIA had not even put its plan in writing until JFK called them on it) on the landing plans called out each of the major problems that defeated the landing in advance, and put it in writing....the CIA just ignored what were being called out as fatal assumptions. 

Edited July 24, 2023 by Larry Hancock

[W. Niederhut]

Robert, Larry, David, et.al.,

     Isn't it fair to say that, ultimately, Prouty proved to be a rare "inside" critic of the CIA-- viewing Dulles & Co. as a rogue black ops organization operating beyond the purview-- and, at times, in opposition to-- the policies of the U.S. President and Congress?

     And he was, certainly, in a position to understand that important problem.

     His involvement in the CIA's Trujillo op underscores his explicit opinion that it would not have been difficult for the CIA's assassination ops experts (including external sub-contractors) to re-direct their efforts toward Dallas.

Edited July 24, 2023 by W. Niederhut

[Robert Montenegro]

16 minutes ago, Larry Hancock said:

Almost all our sources have such issues, the real work (and I do mean work) is getting past the tendency to deal with them on an all or none basis.

 

Exactly, you hit the nail on the head, when it comes to researching para-politics and the history of Cold-War covert operations!

 

The moment we refuse to use all of the resources at our disposal, is the moment you are protecting an ideological slant—at that point, you are engaging in religion, not critical thinking.

 

Those who choose to protect COL. Prouty's claims—in lieu of conflicting historical fact—they are engaged in cult-like mentality...

 

 

[Robert Montenegro]

17 minutes ago, W. Niederhut said:

Robert, Larry, David, et.al.,

     Isn't it fair to say that, ultimately, Prouty proved to be a rare "inside" critic of the CIA-- viewing Dulles & Co. as a rogue black ops organization operating beyond the purview-- and, at times, in opposition to-- the policies of the U.S. President and Congress?

     And he was, certainly, in a position to understand that important problem.

     His involvement in the CIA's Trujillo op underscores his explicit opinion that it would not have been difficult for the CIA's assassination ops experts (including external sub-contractors) to re-direct their efforts toward Dallas.

 

Once again, I cannot argue those statements.

 

I would stress once again—I am not an agent of some anti-Prouty crusade—I am simply trying to put an end to the thirty years plus of placing the guy on a pedestal as some purveyor of righteous intent, when the fact of the matter is, he did not tell the complete facts surrounding his military service, or the capabilities at his disposal—case in point, COL. Prouty's intimate knowledge of Operation BLOODSTONE and his responsibilities supporting CIA covert operations as a focal-point officer... 

 

 

Edited July 24, 2023 by Robert Montenegro

[W. Niederhut]

10 minutes ago, Robert Montenegro said:

 

Once again, I cannot argue those statements.

 

I would stress once again—I am not an agent of some anti-Prouty crusade—I am simply trying to put an end to the thirty years plus of placing the guy on a pedestal as some purveyor of righteous intent, when the fact of the matter is, he did not tell the complete facts surrounding his military service, or the capabilities at his disposal—case in point, COL. Prouty's intimate knowledge of Operation BLOODSTONE and his responsibilities supporting CIA covert operations as a focal-point officer... 

 

 

Robert,

      Isn't it fair to say that Prouty was very careful to avoid disclosing classified U.S. intelligence, while trying to tell the public that the CIA and Dulles' "secret team" were operating beyond the purview of our elected government officials and national ideals?

     For example, Prouty revised his initial draft of The Secret Team to include previously classified material relating to the newly published Pentagon Papers (some of which he, himself had written.)

      I don't think it's "cult like" to try to accurately characterize Prouty's writings and motives.  My take is that he was deeply troubled by his suspicion that Dulles and his CIA black ops people (and sub-contractors?) had murdered the President of the United States.

[Robert Montenegro]

12 hours ago, W. Niederhut said:

Robert,

      Isn't it fair to say that Prouty was very careful to avoid disclosing classified U.S. intelligence, while trying to tell the public that the CIA and Dulles' "secret team" were operating beyond the purview of our elected government officials and national ideals?

     For example, Prouty revised his initial draft of The Secret Team to include previously classified material relating to the newly published Pentagon Papers (some of which he, himself had written.)

      I don't think it's "cult like" to try to accurately characterize Prouty's writings and motives.  My

is that he was deeply troubled by his suspicion that Dulles and his CIA black ops people (and sub-contractors?) had murdered the President of the United States.

 

No doubt.

 

However, to rely solely on COL. Prouty's thesis as if it is gospel, despite forty-plus years of new information—then not having to nerve to question the old information for obvious gaps—that is religious.

 

Plus, COL. Prouty had three contemporaries—Central Intelligence Agency analyst Samuel Alexander Adams, and case officers Philip Burnett Franklin Agee & Ralph Walter McGehee Jr.—true whistleblowers, who put everything on the line, and were practically destroyed for what they revealed.

 

That is where I draw the historical comparison and state that COL. Prouty was involved in a limited hangout of sorts—COL. Prouty talks and very little blowback occurs—Sam Adams, Phil Agee, & Ralph McGehee talk, & they're put thru the ringer.

 

Something doesn't add up...

 

 

Edited July 24, 2023 by Robert Montenegro

[Jonathan Cohen]

23 minutes ago, Robert Montenegro said:

Plus, COL. Prouty had three contemporaries—Central Intelligence Agency analyst Samuel Alexander Adams, and case officers Philip Burnett Franklin Agee & Ralph Walter McGehee Jr.—true whistleblowers, who put everything on the line, and were practically destroyed for what they revealed.

That is where I draw the historical comparison and state that COL. Prouty was involved in a limited hangout of sorts—COL. Prouty talks and very little blowback occurs—Sam Adams, Phil Agee, & Ralph McGehee talk, & they're put thru the ringer.

Something doesn't add up...

So you believe that because Prouty did not experience the exact same "destruction" as Adams, Agee, and McGehee Jr., then he must have somehow been involved in the Kennedy assassination, even if it was just via a "limited hangout" ?

[Robert Montenegro]

10 minutes ago, Jonathan Cohen said:

So you believe that because Prouty did not experience the exact same "destruction" as Adams, Agee, and McGehee Jr., then he must have somehow been involved in the Kennedy assassination, even if it was just via a "limited hangout" ?

 

That is just one angle of the multi-angled tetrahedra of oddities that surround factual scrutiny of COL. Prouty's service record. 

 

Once again, as researchers, these are legitimate questions that need to be asked, and I have only ever utilized direct quotes from COL. Prouty.

 

And please, do not try to down play what happened to Adams, Agee & McGehee by placing the word destruction in quotations—they went thru Hell—for Pete's sake, Mr. Agee's children were kidnapped from his house in Mexico City, and CIA agents called his wife and made it seem like he did it, fracturing his marriage into a thousand pieces!

 

Like I said, whistleblowers like Agee talk, flaming elephant turds hit the fan—COL. Prouty talks, platforms with film director Oliver Stone...

 

 

Edited July 24, 2023 by Robert Montenegro

[Jim Hargrove]

On 7/23/2023 at 5:24 AM, Robert Montenegro said:

Clearly, the nature of Project *REDACTED* is not passive—instead, it's stated goals are active, "...cross-fertilization...," between Department of Defense & CIA, when it comes to the final target-specific result of this course.

Evidence of this is massive "...cross-fertilization...," between Department of Defense & CIA for Project *REDACTED* is indicated in point eighteen of the document:

 

Many here undoubtedly know that the integration of Agency and U.S. military personnel was pointed out publicly in the weeks prior to the Kennedy assassination. The article by Richard Starnes shown below prompted the infamous Arthur Krock piece in the NY Times called “The Inter-Agency War in Vietnam.” I’ve highlighted two paragraphs, but the whole thing is fascinating if you haven't seen it. Thanks to Paul Rigby for pointing me to this  article many years ago.

# # #

The Washington Daily News, Wednesday, October 2, 1963, p.3

'SPOOKS' MAKE LIFE MISERABLE FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

'Arrogant' CIA Disobeys Orders in Viet Nam

By Richard T. Starnes

 

SAIGON, Oct.2 - The story of the Central Intelligence Agency's role in South Viet Nam is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and unrestrained thirst for power.

Twice the CIA flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, according to a high United States source here.

In one of these instances the CIA frustrated a plan of action Mr. Lodge brought with him from Washington because the agency disagreed with it.

This led to a dramatic confrontation between Mr. Lodge and John Richardson, chief of the huge CIA apparatus here. Mr. Lodge failed to move Mr. Richardson, and the dispute was bucked back to Washington. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA Chief John A. McCone were unable to resolve the conflict, and the matter is now reported to be awaiting settlement by President Kennedy.

It is one of the developments expected to be covered in Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's report to Mr. Kennedy.

Others Critical, Too

Other American agencies here are incredibly bitter about the CIA.

"If the United States ever experiences a 'Seven Days in May' it will come from the CIA, and not from the Pentagon," one U.S. official commented caustically.

("Seven Days in May" is a fictional account of an attempted military coup to take over the U.S. Government.)

CIA "spooks" (a universal term for secret agents here) have penetrated every branch of the American community in Saigon, until non-spook Americans here almost seem to be suffering a CIA psychosis.

An American field officer with a distinguished combat career speaks angrily about "that man at headquarters in Saigon wearing a colonel's uniform." He means the man is a CIA agent, and he can't understand what he is doing at U.S. military headquarters here, unless it is spying on other Americans.

Another American officer, talking about the CIA, acidly commented: "You'd think they'd have learned something from Cuba but apparently they didn't."

Few Know CIA Strength

Few people other than Mr. Richardson and his close aides know the actual CIA strength here, but a widely used figure is 600. Many are clandestine agents known only to a few of their fellow spooks.

Even Mr. Richardson is a man about whom it is difficult to learn much in Saigon. He is said to be a former OSS officer, and to have served with distinction in the CIA in the Philippines.

A surprising number of the spooks are known to be involved in their ghostly trade and some make no secret of it.

"There are a number of spooks in the U.S. Information Service, in the U.S. Operations mission, in every aspect of American official and commercial life here, " one official - presumably a non-spook - said.

"They represent a tremendous power and total unaccountability to anyone," he added.

Coupled with the ubiquitous secret police of Ngo Dinh Nhu, a surfeit of spooks has given Saigon an oppressive police state atmosphere.

The Nhu-Richardson relationship is a subject of lively speculation. The CIA continues to pay the special forces which conducted brutal raids on Buddhist temples last Aug. 21, altho in fairness it should be pointed out that the CIA is paying these goons for the war against communist guerillas, not Buddhist bonzes (priests).

Hand Over Millions

Nevertheless, on the first of every month, the CIA dutifully hands over a quarter million American dollars to pay these special forces.

Whatever else it buys, it doesn't buy any solid information on what the special forces are up to. The Aug. 21 raids caught top U.S. officials here and in Washington flat-footed.

Nhu ordered the special forces to crush the Buddhist priests, but the CIA wasn't let in on the secret. (Some CIA button men now say they warned their superiors what was coming up, but in any event the warning of harsh repression was never passed to top officials here or in Washington.)

Consequently, Washington reacted unsurely to the crisis. Top officials here and at home were outraged at the news the CIA was paying the temple raiders, but the CIA continued the payments.

It may not be a direct subsidy for a religious war against the country's Buddhist majority, but it comes close to that.

And for every State Department aide here who will tell you, "Dammit, the CIA is supposed to gather information, not make policy, but policy-making is what they're doing here," there are military officers who scream over the way the spooks dabble in military operations.

A Typical Example

For example, highly trained trail watchers are an important part of the effort to end Viet Cong infiltration from across the Laos and Cambodia borders. But if the trailer watchers spot incoming Viet Congs, they report it to the CIA in Saigon, and in the fullness of time, the spooks may tell the military.

One very high American official here, a man who has spent much of his life in the service of democracy, likened the CIA's growth to a malignancy, and added he was not sure even the White House could control it any longer.

Unquestionably Mr. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell Taylor both got an earful from people who are beginning to fear the CIA is becoming a Third Force co-equal with President Diem's regime and the U.S. Government - and answerable to neither.

There is naturally the highest interest here as to whether Mr. McNamara will persuade Mr. Kennedy something ought to be done about it.

# # #

[Robert Montenegro]

12 minutes ago, Jim Hargrove said:

 

Many here undoubtedly know that the integration of Agency and U.S. military personnel was pointed out publicly in the weeks prior to the Kennedy assassination. The article by Richard Starnes shown below prompted the infamous Arthur Krock piece in the NY Times called “The Inter-Agency War in Vietnam.” I’ve highlighted two paragraphs, but the whole thing is fascinating if you haven't seen it. Thanks to Paul Rigby for pointing me to this  article many years ago.

# # #

The Washington Daily News, Wednesday, October 2, 1963, p.3

'SPOOKS' MAKE LIFE MISERABLE FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

'Arrogant' CIA Disobeys Orders in Viet Nam

By Richard T. Starnes

 

SAIGON, Oct.2 - The story of the Central Intelligence Agency's role in South Viet Nam is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and unrestrained thirst for power.

Twice the CIA flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, according to a high United States source here.

In one of these instances the CIA frustrated a plan of action Mr. Lodge brought with him from Washington because the agency disagreed with it.

This led to a dramatic confrontation between Mr. Lodge and John Richardson, chief of the huge CIA apparatus here. Mr. Lodge failed to move Mr. Richardson, and the dispute was bucked back to Washington. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA Chief John A. McCone were unable to resolve the conflict, and the matter is now reported to be awaiting settlement by President Kennedy.

It is one of the developments expected to be covered in Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's report to Mr. Kennedy.

Others Critical, Too

Other American agencies here are incredibly bitter about the CIA.

"If the United States ever experiences a 'Seven Days in May' it will come from the CIA, and not from the Pentagon," one U.S. official commented caustically.

("Seven Days in May" is a fictional account of an attempted military coup to take over the U.S. Government.)

CIA "spooks" (a universal term for secret agents here) have penetrated every branch of the American community in Saigon, until non-spook Americans here almost seem to be suffering a CIA psychosis.

An American field officer with a distinguished combat career speaks angrily about "that man at headquarters in Saigon wearing a colonel's uniform." He means the man is a CIA agent, and he can't understand what he is doing at U.S. military headquarters here, unless it is spying on other Americans.

Another American officer, talking about the CIA, acidly commented: "You'd think they'd have learned something from Cuba but apparently they didn't."

Few Know CIA Strength

Few people other than Mr. Richardson and his close aides know the actual CIA strength here, but a widely used figure is 600. Many are clandestine agents known only to a few of their fellow spooks.

Even Mr. Richardson is a man about whom it is difficult to learn much in Saigon. He is said to be a former OSS officer, and to have served with distinction in the CIA in the Philippines.

A surprising number of the spooks are known to be involved in their ghostly trade and some make no secret of it.

"There are a number of spooks in the U.S. Information Service, in the U.S. Operations mission, in every aspect of American official and commercial life here, " one official - presumably a non-spook - said.

"They represent a tremendous power and total unaccountability to anyone," he added.

Coupled with the ubiquitous secret police of Ngo Dinh Nhu, a surfeit of spooks has given Saigon an oppressive police state atmosphere.

The Nhu-Richardson relationship is a subject of lively speculation. The CIA continues to pay the special forces which conducted brutal raids on Buddhist temples last Aug. 21, altho in fairness it should be pointed out that the CIA is paying these goons for the war against communist guerillas, not Buddhist bonzes (priests).

Hand Over Millions

Nevertheless, on the first of every month, the CIA dutifully hands over a quarter million American dollars to pay these special forces.

Whatever else it buys, it doesn't buy any solid information on what the special forces are up to. The Aug. 21 raids caught top U.S. officials here and in Washington flat-footed.

Nhu ordered the special forces to crush the Buddhist priests, but the CIA wasn't let in on the secret. (Some CIA button men now say they warned their superiors what was coming up, but in any event the warning of harsh repression was never passed to top officials here or in Washington.)

Consequently, Washington reacted unsurely to the crisis. Top officials here and at home were outraged at the news the CIA was paying the temple raiders, but the CIA continued the payments.

It may not be a direct subsidy for a religious war against the country's Buddhist majority, but it comes close to that.

And for every State Department aide here who will tell you, "Dammit, the CIA is supposed to gather information, not make policy, but policy-making is what they're doing here," there are military officers who scream over the way the spooks dabble in military operations.

A Typical Example

For example, highly trained trail watchers are an important part of the effort to end Viet Cong infiltration from across the Laos and Cambodia borders. But if the trailer watchers spot incoming Viet Congs, they report it to the CIA in Saigon, and in the fullness of time, the spooks may tell the military.

One very high American official here, a man who has spent much of his life in the service of democracy, likened the CIA's growth to a malignancy, and added he was not sure even the White House could control it any longer.

Unquestionably Mr. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell Taylor both got an earful from people who are beginning to fear the CIA is becoming a Third Force co-equal with President Diem's regime and the U.S. Government - and answerable to neither.

There is naturally the highest interest here as to whether Mr. McNamara will persuade Mr. Kennedy something ought to be done about it.

# # #

 

 

I have seen this article before—the line that always hits me square in the gut is, "...Another American officer, talking about the CIA, acidly commented: 'You'd think they'd have learned something from Cuba but apparently they didn't.'..."

 

That line screams to the heart of what once was the ingrained common sense & basic decency of the United States citizenry that has all but perished in the post-Watergate and Iran-Contra world.

 

One lie from a neo-fascist element of our intelligence community after another has made it so that we can't even make up our minds to say our biosphere is collapsing, even as the planet literally burns.

 

An Orwellian state of double-speak and group-think blanketed the United States after the murder of President Kennedy.

 

  

Edited July 24, 2023 by Robert Montenegro

[Jonathan Cohen]

3 hours ago, Robert Montenegro said:

And please, do not try to down play what happened to Adams, Agee & McGehee by placing the word destruction in quotations—they went thru Hell—for Pete's sake, Mr. Agee's children were kidnapped from his house in Mexico City, and CIA agents called his wife and made it seem like he did it, fracturing his marriage into a thousand pieces!

My goodness, you are touchy. I'm not trying to "downplay" anything. In fact, I used your own words to describe what had happened to those three men.

[Robert Montenegro]

22 minutes ago, Jonathan Cohen said:

My goodness, you are touchy. I'm not trying to "downplay" anything. In fact, I used your own words to describe what had happened to those three men.

 

My apologies—if you see the other threads I started since my reinstatement, I have been hit by a phalanx of provocateurs that have nothing better to do than enter into non-sequitur or strawman arguments—at the expense of sounding paranoid, some of the attacks I've received appear to be coordinated.

 

Once again my sincere apologies, but if I appear touchy, it's the astronomical amount of malarkey I've dealt with in the past week or so on this purportedly enlightened forum.

 

Touchy does not rate the myriad of human emotion I've felt in the past few days.

 

A person can only take so much.

 

And all I've done is present facts. 

 

 

  

[Bill Simpich]

Robert, great material!

Do you have any idea what Project REDACTED might have been?   The late 1965 memo you quote begins by stating:

"Project REDACTED had its inception, in 1954, following the acceptance of the idea that a closer relationship and better understanding between CIA and the military was essential to accomplishing effective coordination in the field in time of war...

"This project has offered ten annual two-week courses for officers of all services selected from the continental and overseas commands and various service colleges, plus four special two-day courses for officers drawn from the JCS and DIA..."  

Could this project include these counter-insurgency courses described in the Wheeler Papers?   They would train fifty colonels and lieutenant colonels at a time.