The Myth that JFK Was Killed Over the Vietnam War

[James DiEugenio]

Its an interesting story about how that order came about.

Kennedy picked up a newspaper in, I think, the spring of 1963--don't hold me to that--and saw that some general was going to visit Saigon.

He called up the undersecretary for that area, Roger Hilsman.  He said why are you allowing these guys to visit Saigon?

Hilsman said that he had no authority to stop them.

Kennedy said, "oh" and hung up.

That afternoon, he issued an order to that effect.

[Karl Kinaski]

@Michael Griffith This thread should be renamed to: The Myth that JFK Was Killed Over the Vietnam War only. 😉

Edited November 7, 2023 by Karl Kinaski

[Michael Griffith]

On 11/6/2023 at 2:42 PM, James DiEugenio said:

BTW, I think that this was the major reason that Stone's 1991 feature was attacked so bitterly.

Because it incorporated this thesis through the work of Newman and Prouty.

It was saying: not only did the MSM screw up on the JFK assassination, it missed the story about how that paved the way for the Vietnam War.

Let us not forget, the first combat troops arrived at DaNang about 3 1/2 months after the Commission volumes were released.

And everyone missed that connection.

At least I have not seen anyone who did so at the time.    

This is your answer to the facts that Chomsky presented showing that JFK had no intention of unconditionally withdrawing from Vietnam??? At least Chomsky is an honest radical. He would love to believe that JFK had turned against the war and was going to withdraw no matter what, but he looked at the evidence and found that it shows the opposite.

Stone's 1991 movie was attacked because it peddled the unconditional-withdrawal myth, and because it peddled reckless and baseless claims about Edward Lansdale, about Mr. X's/Prouty's trip to the South Pole, about Mr. X's/Prouty's alleged role in presidential protection (he had none), about the fictional "stand-down order" given to the 112th MI Group, about the supposed phone blackout in DC right after the shooting, etc., etc.

The first combat troops arrived in Da Nang "about 3 1/2 months" after the WC volumes were released because the situation had drastically changed from what it had been before Diem was assassinated in early November 1963. As I've pointed out to you many times, and as you keep ignoring, JFK never faced the kind of massive Communist escalation and the degree of South Vietnamese government instability that LBJ faced in early 1965. 

As H. R. McMaster profusely documents in Dereliction of Duty, LBJ was not at all anxious to send large numbers of combat troops to South Vietnam and only did so reluctantly in the face of (1) North Vietnam's massive escalation in early 1965 and (2) continuing instability in South Vietnam's government following Diem's death. 

Edited November 8, 2023 by Michael Griffith

[Jeff Carter]

50 minutes ago, Michael Griffith said:

This is your answer to the facts that Chomsky presented showing that JFK had no intention of unconditionally withdrawing from Vietnam??? At least Chomsky is an honest radical. He would love to believe that JFK had turned against the war and was going to withdraw no matter what, but he looked at the evidence and found that it shows the opposite.

Stone's 1991 movie was attacked because it peddled the unconditional-withdrawal myth, and because it peddled reckless and baseless claims about Edward Lansdale, about Mr. X's/Prouty's trip to the South Pole, about Mr. X's/Prouty's alleged role in presidential protection (he had none), about the fictional "stand-down order" given to the 112th MI Group, about the supposed phone blackout in DC right after the shooting, etc., etc.

The first combat troops arrived in Da Nang "about 3 1/2 months" after the WC volumes were released because the situation had drastically changed from what it had been before Diem was assassinated in early November 1963. As I've pointed out to you many times, and as you keep ignoring, JFK never faced the kind of massive Communist escalation and the degree of South Vietnamese government instability that LBJ faced in early 1965. 

As H. R. McMaster profusely documents in Dereliction of Duty, LBJ was not at all anxious to send large numbers of combat troops to South Vietnam and only did so reluctantly in the face of (1) North Vietnam's massive escalation in early 1965 and (2) continuing instability in South Vietnam's government following Diem's death. 

Chomsky believed Kennedy to be a committed “cold warrior”, and his analysis skews to conclusions supportive of that position.  Chomsky’s argument that NSAM 263 was laden with qualifying language is simply not correct.

The large majority of criticism directed against Stone’s JFK movie had to do with the proposition of a conspiracy tied to the assassination rather than specific Vietnam issues.

Chicken-egg comparisons regarding Vietnam circa 1964/65 are hypothetical and work from narrow presumptions. It could be argued JFK would not have had to face a “massive escalation” from the North because JFK would not have initiated the same provocative and aggressive escalations LBJ did in 1964.

[James DiEugenio]

Whew, I have Mike Griffith, blocked. But man, he is quoting Chomsky now?

Chomsky has done next to nothing on this issue since way back when the feature film came out.

Which means, the 800 pages of documents that the ARRB declassified in 1997 are somehow not important. He may have said that the withdrawal was McNamara's idea. Which, I noted above, Howard Jones proved was false.  Ros Gilpatric said the withdrawal was Kennedy's idea transmitted to McNamara through Galbraith.

The next step was the withdrawal schedules being requested.  As Jim Douglass wrote, McNamara said to Harkins, we are going to turn the war over to the ARVN.  And that was it. He then got the withdrawal schedules in May 1963 at the Sec/Def meeting.  Once they were all on his desk he turned around and said to everyone, this is  too slow. No mention of getting back in if defeat is on the horizon.  In fact, Wheeler actual noted that any kind of response like that  would result in a presidential disapproval. 

The memoranda from this meeting had been classified. When it was declassified in 1997, both the NY Times and Philadelphia Inquirer ran feature stories on how JFK was getting out of Vietnam at the time of his death. That is how convincing this evidence was, the MSM now revised their verdict contra Stone.

If one then goes to the debates over NSAM 263, best described by Newman, its pretty clear that its Kennedy pushing that wagon up the hill. Some people, like Sullivan, wanted NSAM 263 taken out of the report. Kennedy insisted it be placed back in.  In those debates, as described by John, there is no mention of putting back the withdrawn troops in case ARVN is losing. And as Gordon Goldstein noted in his book, there is no speech in which Kennedy said anything like that after NSAM 263 was signed.  As Newman noted, the only question about it was how fast the withdrawal could proceed.  Since JFK was worried that Saigon would fall before the election.

The clincher of course was John listening to the McNamara debriefs.  There he said that it did not matter if our side was winning or losing in 1964-65.  Ours was only an advisory and training role. He and Kennedy had agreed that America could not fight the war for Saigon.

America was getting out of Vietnam at Kennedy's death.  Johnson knew that was the policy and he disagreed with it.  He started to alter that policy within 48 hours of Kennedy's murder.  

 

Edited November 8, 2023 by James DiEugenio

[Michael Griffith]

38 minutes ago, James DiEugenio said:

Whew, I have Mike Griffith, blocked. But man, he is quoting Chomsky now?

Chomsky has done next to nothing on this issue since way back when the feature film came out.

Which means, the 800 pages of documents that the ARRB declassified in 1997 are somehow not important. He may have said that the withdrawal was McNamara's idea. Which, I noted above, Howard Jones proved was false.  Ros Gilpatric said the withdrawal was Kennedy's idea transmitted to McNamara through Galbraith.

The next step was the withdrawal schedules being requested.  As Jim Douglass wrote, McNamara said to Harkins, we are going to turn the war over to the ARVN.  And that was it. He then got the withdrawal schedules in May 1963 at the Sec/Def meeting.  Once they were all on his desk he turned around and said to everyone, this is  too slow. No mention of getting back in if defeat is on the horizon.  In fact, Wheeler actual noted that any kind of response like that  would result in a presidential disapproval. 

The memoranda from this meeting had been classified. When it was declassified in 1997, both the NY Times and Philadelphia Inquirer ran feature stories on how JFK was getting out of Vietnam at the time of his death. That is how convincing this evidence was, the MSM now revised their verdict contra Stone.

If one then goes to the debates over NSAM 263, best described by Newman, its pretty clear that its Kennedy pushing that wagon up the hill. Some people, like Sullivan, wanted NSAM 263 taken out of the report. Kennedy insisted it be placed back in.  In those debates, as described by John, there is no mention of putting back the withdrawn troops in case ARVN is losing. And as Gordon Goldstein noted in his book, there is no speech in which Kennedy said anything like that after NSAM 263 was signed.  As Newman noted, the only question about it was how fast the withdrawal could proceed.  Since JFK was worried that Saigon would fall before the election.

The clincher of course was John listening to the McNamara debriefs.  There he said that it did not matter if our side was winning or losing in 1964-65.  Ours was only an advisory and training role. He and Kennedy had agreed that America could not fight the war for Saigon.

America was getting out of Vietnam at Kennedy's death.  Johnson knew that was the policy and he disagreed with it.  He started to alter that policy within 48 hours of Kennedy's murder.  

Oh, you have me blocked??? Are we in high school or something? This is juvenile conduct.

Anyway, let's first deal with your inexcusably erroneous claim about Kennedy's comments on Vietnam after NSAM 263 was signed:

And as Gordon Goldstein noted in his book, there is no speech in which Kennedy said anything like that after NSAM 263 was signed.  

H. O. G. W. A. S. H. Total hogwash. I have personally quoted to you JFK's comments on Vietnam in his 11/22/63 speech in Fort Worth that morning and in the speech he was going to give at the Trade Mart after the motorcade. In both speeches, he called for staying the course and stressed the importance of the effort to block communism in Southeast Asia. 

And I notice that you once again repeat your fringe spin on NSAM 263 and ignore the evidence from the NSAM itself and from the supporting documents, which evidence clearly shows that the withdrawal was conditional, and that the ultimate objective remained the defeat of the Viet Cong and the maintenance of South Vietnam's independence. The same is true of the first draft of NSAM 273, which JFK was going to sign. You might actually break down and read Chomsky's critique wherein he documents these facts. It is simply amazing that you keep ignoring these readily available facts.

FYI, Chomsky wrote his critique in November 2003, in response to Galbraith's September-October 2003 article "Exit Strategy," in which Galbraith used info from the ARRB releases. I take it you did not read Chomsky's critique. Otherwise, you would have known better than to imply that Chomsky knew nothing about the ARRB material. 

I repeat to you, yet again, that in 2013 Galbraith modified his position on the withdrawal compared to his 2003 position in "Exit Strategy." As I have quoted for you, Galbraith admitted in 2013 that the withdrawal plan allowed for over 1,000 support troops to remain in country and called for continued aid to South Vietnam. 

The basic problem here is that you are demonstrably wrong about JFK's Vietnam intentions, but you cannot bring yourself to admit it. Even most ultra-liberal scholars say you're obviously wrong. JFK was determined to win the war. His withdrawal plan was conditional and gradual, and reversible, and he never, ever wavered on the ultimate objective of victory over the Communists and the preservation of South Vietnam's independence. Again, you might read Chomsky's critique of Galbraith's 2003 article.

[James DiEugenio]

 

1.) Kennedy makes one reference to South Vietnam in the Trade Mart speech, and that is about assistance and training.   In the Fort Worth speech, that is much more general, about SEATO and CENTO and NATO. 

No rational person can interpret these as being contra to the Newman/Scott/Prouty conclusions.

2.) I read the exchange between Chomsky and Galbraith.  And anyone can find it via Google.  If you can show me any reference in Chomsky's reply to the declassified documents by the ARRB in 1997, please do because I could not locate a thing.

What Chomsky does in large part is to rely on his same old arguments from 1992-93, and to isolate Galbraith as some kind of fringe author.  As if it was 1992 all over.  

Yet, at this time you had David Kaiser's book American Tragedy, and McNamara's book In Retrospect. 

You also had Vietnam: The Early Decisions, an anthology in which Newman talked about the McNamara debriefs.

Later you had Gordon Goldstein, Jim Douglass, Howard Jones and James Blight.  In other words, Newman's book had been effective in altering academia. And you also had the scholarly debate in VIrtual JFK which James Blight won.

This whole argument about a skeleton crew left behind is a non sequitir that I have already dealt with.  The idea that somehow this would hold off an assault from Hanoi and the Viet Cong after 15,000 advisors had been moved out is utterly ridiculous.  Howard Jones, for example, does not even consider it.

This is why I have Mike blocked.   I think he just likes to argue.

Edited November 8, 2023 by James DiEugenio

[Cory Santos]

According to the description of this new book by an associate of David Lifton, the assassination had nothing to do with JFK’s presidency and was in the planning prior to him being elected.   
Anyone know more about this?

 

https://www.morningstar.com/news/pr-newswire/20231107ph60528/jfk-assassination-linked-to-usaf-historian

[Michael Griffith]

18 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

 

1.) Kennedy makes one reference to South Vietnam in the Trade Mart speech, and that is about assistance and training.   In the Fort Worth speech, that is much more general, about SEATO and CENTO and NATO. 

No rational person can interpret these as being contra to the Newman/Scott/Prouty conclusions.

2.) I read the exchange between Chomsky and Galbraith.  And anyone can find it via Google.  If you can show me any reference in Chomsky's reply to the declassified documents by the ARRB in 1997, please do because I could not locate a thing.

What Chomsky does in large part is to rely on his same old arguments from 1992-93, and to isolate Galbraith as some kind of fringe author.  As if it was 1992 all over.  

Yet, at this time you had David Kaiser's book American Tragedy, and McNamara's book In Retrospect. 

You also had Vietnam: The Early Decisions, an anthology in which Newman talked about the McNamara debriefs.

Later you had Gordon Goldstein, Jim Douglass, Howard Jones and James Blight.  In other words, Newman's book had been effective in altering academia. And you also had the scholarly debate in VIrtual JFK which James Blight won.

This whole argument about a skeleton crew left behind is a non sequitir that I have already dealt with.  The idea that somehow this would hold off an assault from Hanoi and the Viet Cong after 15,000 advisors had been moved out is utterly ridiculous.  Howard Jones, for example, does not even consider it.

This is why I have Mike blocked.   I think he just likes to argue.

You are using the juvenile option of "blocking" me because you've never been challenged on your JFK and Vietnam myths the way I've challenged you. You once again prove that you are not to be taken seriously on this issue, and that you are on the extreme and discredited fringe on this issue.

You surely know that you are misrepresenting what JFK said regarding South Vietnam and the fight against communism in SE Asia in his Fort Worth and Trade Mart speeches. From his Fort Worth speech:

          This is not an easy effort. This requires sacrifice by the people of the United States. But this is a very dangerous and uncertain world. 

          No one expects that our life will be easy, certainly not in this decade, and perhaps not in this century. But we should realize what a burden and responsibility the people of the United States have borne for so many years. . . .

          Without the United States, South Viet-Nam would collapse overnight. Without the United States, the SEATO alliance would collapse overnight. . . . .

          I don't think we are fatigued or tired. 

Now that surely doesn't sound like someone who was planning on unconditionally abandoning South Vietnam after the election, does it?

From JFK's Trade Mart speech:

          About 70 percent of our military assistance goes to nine key countries located on or near the borders of the Communist bloc – nine countries confronted directly or indirectly with the threat of Communist aggression – Viet-Nam, Free China, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. No one of these countries possesses on its own the resources to maintain the forces which our own Chiefs of Staff think needed in the common interest. 

          Reducing our efforts to train, equip, and assist their armies can only encourage Communist penetration and require in time the increased overseas deployment of American combat forces. And reducing the economic help needed to bolster these nations that undertake to help defend freedom can have the same disastrous result. 

Only a diehard Prouty apologist who can't face facts will deny that JFK was expressing strong opposition to reducing our aid and training to South Vietnam. And, once again, he certainly did not sound like he had any intention of unconditionally abandoning South Vietnam after the election. 

This whole argument about a skeleton crew left behind is a non sequitir that I have already dealt with.  The idea that somehow this would hold off an assault from Hanoi and the Viet Cong after 15,000 advisors had been moved out is utterly ridiculous. 

This is more nonsense. Who said that the residual force of 1,500 support troops would be expected to hold off a North Vietnamese assault? Who? Who has even implied such a thing? No one. This is a sophomoric strawman argument.

As the primary sources prove, the 1,500 support troops would only be left in country after conditions on the ground had permitted the completion of the withdrawal of the "bulk" of U.S. forces, and this would happen only if JFK were satisfied that the Communists had been defeated or that South Vietnam was strong enough to finish the job without U.S. forces (but with continued U.S. aid). The support troops would be for logistical purposes only, not as combat advisors. 

As Francis Bator, LBJ's Deputy National Security Adviser, pointed out in 2007:

          But as the “Record of Action No. 2472 Taken” at the October 2 NSC meeting and the October 11 National Security Action Memorandum 263 make clear, that plan was explicitly conditioned on Secretary McNamara’s and General Taylor’s “judgment that the major part of the US military task can be completed by the end of 1965…,” that “the long term program to replace US personnel with trained Vietnamese [could go forward] without impairment of the war effort.”

Let's read what NSAM 263 itself said on the issue of JFK's Vietnam intentions:

          1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all decisions and U.S. actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contributions to this purpose.

You and a handful of other Prouty devotees have taken JFK's conditional withdrawal plan, a plan that called for continued aid to South Vietnam after the withdrawal, and a plan whose central objective and governing criterion was victory over the Communists in South Vietnam--you have taken this plan and grossly twisted it into a fictional determination to totally and unconditionally abandon South Vietnam after the election. 

Edited November 9, 2023 by Michael Griffith

[Jeff Carter]

4 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

you have taken this plan and grossly twisted it into a fictional determination to totally and unconditionally abandon South Vietnam after the election. 

"a fictional determination to totally and unconditionally abandon South Vietnam after the election.” 

Look at all the straw!

5 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

As Francis Bator, LBJ's Deputy National Security Adviser, pointed out in 2007:

          But as the “Record of Action No. 2472 Taken” at the October 2 NSC meeting and the October 11 National Security Action Memorandum 263 make clear, that plan was explicitly conditioned on Secretary McNamara’s and General Taylor’s “judgment that the major part of the US military task can be completed by the end of 1965…,” that “the long term program to replace US personnel with trained Vietnamese [could go forward] without impairment of the war effort.”

Record of Action 2472 is simply a brief summary of discussion held at an NSC meeting. It is not the expression of a “plan”. NSAM 263 is the expression of a plan, but Bator’s insistence such plan was “explicitly conditioned” on future “judgments” is clearly a misreading. The “plan” is based on judgments already rendered.

[Michael Griffith]

43 minutes ago, Jeff Carter said:

"a fictional determination to totally and unconditionally abandon South Vietnam after the election.” 

Look at all the straw!

Record of Action 2472 is simply a brief summary of discussion held at an NSC meeting. It is not the expression of a “plan”. NSAM 263 is the expression of a plan, but Bator’s insistence such plan was “explicitly conditioned” on future “judgments” is clearly a misreading. The “plan” is based on judgments already rendered.

Your willingness to ignore contrary evidence is discrediting.

One, according to Newman, Jim, and Prouty, and few other like-minded authors, by late 1963 JFK had decided to pull out of Vietnam after the election, even if this allowed the Communists to take over South Vietnam. This claim is expressly made in JFK Revisited.

Two, you are once again repeating your fringe spin on NSAM 263 and on Kennedy's Vietnam intentions while ignoring the wording of the NSAM itself and ignoring the supporting documentation, not to mention the JFK White House tapes, JFK's own statements on Vietnam in the last few months of his life (including two he made on the day he died), and Bobby Kennedy's emphatic denial that JFK intended to pull out even if doing so meant a Communist victory in South Vietnam. 

[Jeff Carter]

30 minutes ago, Michael Griffith said:

Your willingness to ignore contrary evidence is discrediting.

One, according to Newman, Jim, and Prouty, and few other like-minded authors, by late 1963 JFK had decided to pull out of Vietnam after the election, even if this allowed the Communists to take over South Vietnam. This claim is expressly made in JFK Revisited.

Two, you are once again repeating your fringe spin on NSAM 263 and on Kennedy's Vietnam intentions while ignoring the wording of the NSAM itself and ignoring the supporting documentation, not to mention the JFK White House tapes, JFK's own statements on Vietnam in the last few months of his life (including two he made on the day he died), and Bobby Kennedy's emphatic denial that JFK intended to pull out even if doing so meant a Communist victory in South Vietnam. 

Criticism of a “Kennedy withdrawal” seems to split into two camps. One is based on denial: i.e. the denial that NSAM 263 says what it says or that it means what it means. The second camp accepts the veracity of NSAM 263 and its stated policy, but argues its intentions would surely have been overrun by events.

The second camp finds initial expression in a Leslie Gelb op-ed in the New York Times (January 6, 1992). The first camp - which obviously you endorse - is notable for a stubborn refusal to acknowledge or accept the plain language of 263, choosing instead to highlight unrelated utterances or add unstated qualification.

[John Cotter]

9 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

  Reducing our efforts to train, equip, and assist their armies can only encourage Communist penetration and require in time the increased overseas deployment of American combat forces. And reducing the economic help needed to bolster these nations that undertake to help defend freedom can have the same disastrous result. 

You don't seem to have read this extract carefully enough, Michael.

What JFK is saying here is that there will be no reduction of US "efforts to train, equip, and assist" the South Vietnamese military.

This is clearly not the same as saying there will be no reduction of US combat forces in Vietnam.

Edited November 9, 2023 by John Cotter

[Michael Griffith]

On 11/9/2023 at 2:38 PM, Jeff Carter said:

Criticism of a “Kennedy withdrawal” seems to split into two camps. One is based on denial: i.e. the denial that NSAM 263 says what it says or that it means what it means. The second camp accepts the veracity of NSAM 263 and its stated policy, but argues its intentions would surely have been overrun by events.

The second camp finds initial expression in a Leslie Gelb op-ed in the New York Times (January 6, 1992). The first camp - which obviously you endorse - is notable for a stubborn refusal to acknowledge or accept the plain language of 263, choosing instead to highlight unrelated utterances or add unstated qualification.

You keep cherry-picking a small part of NSAM 263 and ignoring the parts that contradict your fringe spin. You also ignore the background documents on which the NSAM was based. 

"Unrelated utterances"??? You mean firsthand statements by JFK himself and by Bobby? "Unrelated"???

NSAM 263 and its background docs unmistakably describe a conditional, gradual withdrawal whose chief objective was victory in South Vietnam. The NSAM actually states that all actions should be judged on whether they support this objective:

          It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all decisions and U.S. actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contributions to this purpose.

I mean, I don't know how much clearer language could be.

But you guys ignore this and cherry-pick a small part of the NSAM to support the myth that JFK was going to completely withdraw from South Vietnam after the election, even if this enabled the Communists to win. You can't get more unconditional than that.

How many years did Galbraith repeatedly make the claim that the withdrawal was to be "complete" and was "unconditional, and did not depend on military progress or lack of it"? Huh? In JFK Revisited, Newman, inexcusably relying on McNamara's fraudulent "secret debrief," says JFK was determined to pull out of Vietnam even if this led to a Communist victory. Again, you can't get more unconditional than that. 

There's a reason that even the vast majority of liberal historians reject your fringe spin on JFK's withdrawal. Like Chomsky, they've looked at all the same evidence that you have, and they realize that it does not say what you claim it says.

On 11/9/2023 at 5:47 PM, John Cotter said:

You don't seem to have read this extract carefully enough, Michael.

What JFK is saying here is that there will be no reduction of US "efforts to train, equip, and assist" the South Vietnamese military.

This is clearly not the same as saying there will be no reduction of US combat forces in Vietnam.

Huh??? I'm almost tempted to ask if you meant to reply to a different Michael, because I have never argued that JFK did not intend to reduce our military forces in South Vietnam. My point, which I think I've made as clearly as something can be stated, is that JFK intended to proceed with the gradual withdrawal plan only if it did not harm the war effort, only if conditions on the ground were favorable enough that the withdrawal would not endanger the goal of defeating the Communist assault on South Vietnam. 

I suggest you read my opening post and my last four or five replies.

Edited November 15, 2023 by Michael Griffith