Oswald as designated patsy; from Bart Kamp's new book

[Cliff Varnell]

2 hours ago, Pat Speer said:

FWIW, Ben. I listened to a number of the LBJ Tapes while reading along in Max's book, and his transcripts are reasonably accurate--more accurate than the transcripts to the HSCA hearings by far. There was one curious exception as I recall but for the most part they were dead on. 

Thanks Pat.  Maybe Audrey Meadows could explain it to Ben.

[Benjamin Cole]

1 hour ago, Pat Speer said:

FWIW, Ben. I listened to a number of the LBJ Tapes while reading along in Max's book, and his transcripts are reasonably accurate--more accurate than the transcripts to the HSCA hearings by far. There was one curious exception as I recall but for the most part they were dead on. 

PS--

I am not sure what we are arguing about anymore, if we are. 

Holland's quotes may be accurate, but likely they are but an effort to invest some gravitas into the snuff-job done on the JFKA. 

My take: Sure, some people in the State Department (then run by Dean Rusk) may have called LBJ, or people close to LBJ, and said, "We have to assure foreign governments this was not a coup, we are not a banana republic." 

One can imagine the striped-pants crowd worried about faces made at the next state dinner. 

But that is not what motivated LBJ and Katzenbach to put the kibosh on a true investigation of the JFKA. That was the "WWIII" virus planted by the CIA (re John Newman). 

IMHO, the CIA (cut outs) sent LHO to Mexico City and triggered a meeting with Kostikov. (Probably leaked to Kostikov info LHO was a CIA asset, prompting the meeting.) 

OK, that done, LHO is brought home, and plot hatched to conduct a false flag JFKA failed attempt (my pet theory). 

The purpose was to provoke a US invasion of Cuba, or just keep hostilities high. 

The plot was piggy-backed on, and someone fired on JFKA for real. 

In any event, the one thing the CIA would kill to prevent leaking was that LHO was a ONI or CIA asset, and whoever else worked Dallas on 11/22 was too (there were thousands of such assets in the US at the time, due to the Cuban situation).

And in fact, LHO ends up dead in two days. 

People often cite high-minded or Olympian reasons for skullduggery. 

The CIA scared LBJ into believing a nuke war could result, if LHO was linked to Russians. Better to define LHO as a lone nut. LBJ may have believed he was avoiding a nuke war. 

As for Katzenbach, I am suspicious. Not that he knew details about LHO, but that Katzenbach moved too quickly to kill a true investigation. 

And besides all that, how would obviously railroading LHO, and a kangaroos-court declaration that LHO was the lone nut gunman...mere hours after the JFKA...convince foreign governments we are not a banana republic?

"Yes, we have no bananas, and LHO acted alone in the JFKA"---11/24 in the afternoon.

Really? That sells? 

Would Ed Norton believe that? 

 

 

 

 

Edited October 4, 2023 by Benjamin Cole

[Benjamin Cole]

5 minutes ago, Cliff Varnell said:

Thanks Pat.  Maybe Audrey Meadows could explain it to Ben.

There's a table waiting at the Raccoon Lodge. Invite Dean Rusk. 

I actually met Rusk in 1979 or so. I failed to ask him why he put the kibosh on a true JFKA investigation.

(Rusk was Secy of State 1961-69, back when Cabinet appointees actually would serve through entire administrations). 

So it goes. 

[Cliff Varnell]

1 hour ago, Benjamin Cole said:

PS--

I am not sure what we are arguing about anymore, if we are. 

Your contentless dismissal of anything contrary to your pet theories.

1 hour ago, Benjamin Cole said:

Holland's quotes may be accurate, but likely they are but an effort to invest some gravitas into the snuff-job done on the JFKA. 

More contentless dismissal.  For someone who constantly lectures others about keeping an open mind, yours is so closed it’s hermetically sealed.

1 hour ago, Benjamin Cole said:

My take: Sure, some people in the State Department (then run by Dean Rusk) may have called LBJ, or people close to LBJ, and said, "We have to assure foreign governments this was not a coup, we are not a banana republic." 

But that’s not what happened.  Why do you insist on making stuff up?

1 hour ago, Benjamin Cole said:

One can imagine the striped-pants crowd worried about faces made at the next state dinner. 

But that is not what motivated LBJ and Katzenbach to put the kibosh on a true investigation of the JFKA. That was the "WWIII" virus planted by the CIA (re John Newman). 

That’s not what the record shows.  

Someone Would Have Talked, Larry Hancock, pg 289.

<quote on>

On Friday night the White House placed telephone calls to Dallas DA Henry Wade, to Texas State Attorney General Carr and Police Chief Curry requesting that they avoid any official statements, charges, or discussion relating to conspiracy.  Johnson’s aide Cliff Carter was making the calls and if the individual in question raised objections, President Johnson was used as the authority for the message.  </q>

1 hour ago, Benjamin Cole said:

IMHO, the CIA (cut outs) sent LHO to Mexico City and triggered a meeting with Kostikov. (Probably leaked to Kostikov info LHO was a CIA asset, prompting the meeting.) 

OK, that done, LHO is brought home, and plot hatched to conduct a false flag JFKA failed attempt (my pet theory). 

The purpose was to provoke a US invasion of Cuba, or just keep hostilities high. 

The plot was piggy-backed on, and someone fired on JFKA for real. 

In any event, the one thing the CIA would kill to prevent leaking was that LHO was a ONI or CIA asset, and whoever else worked Dallas on 11/22 was too (there were thousands of such assets in the US at the time, due to the Cuban situation).

And in fact, LHO ends up dead in two days. 

People often cite high-minded or Olympian reasons for skullduggery. 

The CIA scared LBJ into believing a nuke war could result, if LHO was linked to Russians.

You’re making up the CIA-scared-LBJ bit.

1 hour ago, Benjamin Cole said:

 

Better to define LHO as a lone nut. LBJ may have believed he was avoiding a nuke war. 

As for Katzenbach, I am suspicious. Not that he knew details about LHO, but that Katzenbach moved too quickly to kill a true investigation. 

Your inability to absorb information outside your pet theories is remarkable.

[James DiEugenio]

Roger O.

Read some Vince Salandria about this.

That has been my take on what Vince meant also.

The idea that this would have something to do with what Hoover was on to, I mean really?

In addition to pronouncing Oswald the sole killer within two hours, J. Edgar Hoover was running the investigation from the night of the murder when he demanded the DPD turn over the crucial evidence.  And as many have noted, including the excellent Carol Hewett, that evidence was not returned intact.

This is why there are two different versions of the original Dallas evidence.  Before Hoover and after Hoover. So in addition to insisting Oswald was the killer within two hours of the murder,  Hoover then was allowed to actually make the case against him.  Because even though the Commission decided to not use the FBI report--one reason being Hoover did not buy the Magic Bullet--he was by far their chief investigator on the case. The CIA, and the Secret Service did not come close.

And those in the FBI knew what he was doing.  For instance, Bill Turner told me that once he  saw the reports he knew the fix was in.  There were three steps to an FBI inquiry: collection of all relevant leads, following those leads to their viable end, collating the material into a report which did not make a conclusion. Turner said, it was obvious that step two had not been done.  But yet the FBI had come to a conclusion anyway.

Bill said, look I know the routine since i lived it for ten years.  FBI agents do not act like that unless they know what the top guys want, meaning Tolson and Hoover and Belmont. That investigation had to be rigged from the start.

 

Edited October 4, 2023 by James DiEugenio

[Benjamin Cole]

Gerald McKnight devoted a whole chapter to the formation of the WC, and his version was the instigator of the WC was Eugene Rostow (brother to Walt, and that is big name and story all in itself).

Katzenbach, is turns out, was a protege of E. Rostow's. 

I just don't see the State Department striped-pants state-dinner crowd as influential in the direction of the WC, or the LN narrative. 

The WC sure looks like a CIA-arranged snuff job on the JFKA. 

Hoover was for Hoover first of all, and making sure the FBI and Hoover came out clean in the JFKA. Truth was secondary. Hoover disliked the CIA.

 

 

 

 

[Cliff Varnell]

1 hour ago, Benjamin Cole said:

Gerald McKnight devoted a whole chapter to the formation of the WC, and his version was the instigator of the WC was Eugene Rostow (brother to Walt, and that is big name and story all in itself).

Katzenbach, is turns out, was a protege of E. Rostow's. 

I just don't see the State Department striped-pants state-dinner crowd as influential in the direction of the WC, or the LN narrative. 

Even though Katzenbach said he was pressured by the State Department.

Way to approach the subject with an open mind, Ben.  You’re an inspiration to us all.

[James DiEugenio]

Ben:

McKnight did a nice job on that issue largely based on Don Gibson's  milestone work.

Gibson also noted that by 12:55 PM, Hoover had been in contact with the Dallas Office three times already.  (Gibson, The Kennedy Assassination Cover Up, p. 22). This is amazing since Oswald had not been apprehended yet.  Or even been accused of shooting Tippit.

In fact the name of Oswald does not become available until about 2 PM when Fritz returns from the TSBD.  But the name Hidell is in the wallet at the Tippit scene. By 2:30 PM Hoover is trying to convince RFK that Oswald was not just the killer but a Red. Not realizing that RFK is not buying that false paradigm. Gibson notes that by about 3:15 a deluge beings to overwhelm the media about Oswald from more than one source: The FBi and Hal Hendrix and The  Christchurch Star.

When AF One lands and the Cabinet plane lands, they get two sources one form the SItuation Room another based on wire services. (p. 26)

[Cliff Varnell]

1 hour ago, James DiEugenio said:

Roger O.

Read some Vince Salandria about this.

That has been my take on what Vince meant also.

Salandria noted Bundy’s role in pushing the LN very early on.  Why is his meaning mysterious?

1 hour ago, James DiEugenio said:

The idea that this would have something to do with what Hoover was on to, I mean really?

Someone Would Have Talked, pg 288:

<quote on>

4:19 PM, Hoover memo related that he had told RFK that the killer has “Communist leanings” and is a “very mean-minded individual.”  Hoover also related and confirmed again in a 5:15 PM memo that the subject Oswald “went to Cuba on several occasions but would not tell us what he went to Cuba for.” </q>

So while Bundy was telling LBJ there was no evidence of conspiracy, Hoover was telling RFK that Oswald was a big Commie.

[Cliff Varnell]

1 hour ago, James DiEugenio said:

When AF One lands and the Cabinet plane lands, they get two sources one form the SItuation Room another based on wire services. (p. 26)

The Situation Room said no evidence of conspiracy, the wire services were hammering Oswald-the-Commie.  This created a “melange of confusion” amidst LBJ’s staff.  Harriman cleared up the confusion and the US government closed ranks behind no-conspiracy.

[Benjamin Cole]

A letter from Averell Harriman to Allen Dulles, c 1960. 

Body: 

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070018-9 !~ DC(., 40 December 7, 1960

 

Dear Allen: I would like to talk over with you the implications of the attached. Also I'd like to talk over the new Moscow Communist Manifesto. It looks to me as though Mr. Khrushchev had made some real concessions to Peiping. This may lead to a tougher stand in the Congo, as well as in other troubled spots in the world. This seems in conflict with what appeared to be his desire to start afresh with the new Administra- tion. Needless to say, I am delighted that you are continuing in your vitally important job. With my congratulations to you and our country, and my warm regards. Sincerely, Thy Honorable Allen W. Dulles Washington, D. C. Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070018-9 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070018-9 CONFIDENTIAL Nvanber 15, 1960 Dear Jack t I called on the Soviet Ambassador yesterday at his request. (I happened to be In Washington as I was speaking at the Women's National Democratic Club luncheon.) He translated to me verbally a message which he had received from Mr. Khrushchev to be delivered to me personally. In this message the Ambassador was instructed to give me Mr. Khrushchev's greetings and congratulations on his behalf over the victory of the Democratic Party. The message then continued as follows: ,,As ter. Harrigan could see for himself Mr. Khrushchev had criticized Mr. Kennedy as well Mr. Nixon, in accordance with the suggestion Mr. Harriman had made." (This undoubtedly refers to an oral message I had sent to him, that if he wanted to elect Nixon, the surest way to do so was to criticize Nixon and express approval of Kennedy.) "Some of the statements of both candidates were unfavorably commented on in the Soviet Press, though the criticisms of Nixon were a stronger rebuff. Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues in the Soviet government understood the need for anti-Soviet statements during the campaign, and for that reason they had shown restraint in overlooking them. "Mr. Khrushchev knows that Mr. Harriman has always paid attention to Soviet-American relations, and Mr. Khrushchev believes there may now be a better chance of improving them. "The task of today is that there must be some realistic way found to improve our mutual relations. Also, solutions must be found to the pressing international issues, such as strengthening CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/08121 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070018-9 4 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070018-9 4 41 November 15, 1960 Page Two peace in Europe, disarmament, and others. o far as our (Soviet) side is concerned, theme will be no lack of attempt and desire to reach a positive result. If the leading people of both countries could unite to act in the same direction to achieve mutual goals, then we (Soviets) can say with all confidence that things will proceed 'not too badly.' (Ilia is a Russian colloquialism). "Mr. Khrushchev hopes that Harriman agrees with this. Of course he may ask what is meant by 'not too badly.' What criteria should be chosen"? Mr. Khrushchev tried to convey the thought in his message to Senator Kennedy by saying he hoped we could follow the line of relations that existed during President Roosevelt's time, when Harriman was Ambassador. Mr. Krushchev has been thinking over the question of whether under present conditions this can be achieved. He has come to the conclusion than it is not only desirable but possible. With a return to the spirit of Soviet-American cooperation which we had during the war, not only would the people of both countries gain, but so would the people of other countries and no one would lose.,'' As this is such a rough translation, I have asked the Soviet Ambassador to send me one in writing. The essence however i.s clear; and it's style shows that it was written by Khrushchev himself. It is further indication that Khrushchev wants to make a fresh start. I said to the Ambassador that if Khrushchev was in earnest, I hoped he would think about things he could do to pave the way for improved relations. I said it would be well for qtr. Khrushchev not to refer to the U-2 incident again, and on the positive side, to make some gesture such as the release of the RB>47 crew. 14enshikov accused me of trying to trade with his. I denied that, and pointed out that Mr. Khrushchev should realize that after the kind of Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070018-9 a 4 ~ , Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070018-9 CONFIDENTIAL November 15, 1960 Page Three things he had been saying publicly, some act on his part to show the American people that he vas having a change of heart would be helpful. Menshikov expressed the hope that we could come to some agreement on disarmament and nuclear control, as without such control China and other countries would obtain nuclear weapons in a few years, with attendant increase in danger of nuclear war. When I asked Menshikov how things were going with China, he shied away from the question, maintain- ing there were no fundamental differences. However, he said that he thought it would not be difficUtt to get China to agree to disarmament proposals$ if we had reached an agreement. I asked him what Mr. Khrushchev meant by a return to the relations we had during the time of President Roosevelt, but he obviously was not instructed and he wouldn't commit himself. I repeated what I had said to Mr. Korneichuk ( my letter to you of November 12) that you would undoubtedly develop a 'good neighbor' policy towards the underdeveloped countries t which would make more difficult the realization of qtr. Khrushchev's ambitions to communize them: also, that I believed you would want, if possible, to come to an understanding with Mr. Khrushchev for our mutual benefit, but that you would not appease nor make any compromises of principle. This message is intriguing in that it was obviously written by Khrushchev himself, During the war I found that I couldn't get anywhere on matters of importance without getting to Stalin himself. Undoubtedly the same situation exists today with Khrushchev. He is a realist. He came to my house when he was in New York h year ago even though he knew that in my articles I had been blunt in my etiticismas of Soviet policies as well as of him. Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070018-9 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS INITIALS DATE 1 3 4 5 6 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks : Mr. Dulles elected not to have the CIWS article shown to Governor Harriman. The DCI expects to talk with Harriman soon and will want to have at hand the best available piece on the Communist Manifesto. HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER E, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE O/DCI 1/4/61 pr ved Fo[~r~ ~2 FORM NO. 237 which Replaces may be Form 30-4 I APR 55 / U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-0342531 used. 8-9

 

(TYPOS in original) 

---

Source URL: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80b01676r003600070018-9

---30---

In 1960 Averell Harriman had lost the NY Governorship to Rockefeller, and but was then appointed Asst. Secy of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs by JFK in 1961. 

This Dulles letter strikes me as the sort of Olympian high-minded globalist conversation Harriman had. Harriman was not the sort who gets grubby and does a snuff job on the JFKA investigation. 

The new Moscow Communist Manifesto from Khruschev! 

Then, there is this comical story (this one is a real laugher, and comes from the CIA, 2020):

"60 years ago today, at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and in front of a captivated global audience, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. unveiled a shocking piece of Soviet subversion – one that confirmed for the public a spy vs. spy game that would come to define intelligence for the next three decades.

Ambassador Lodge explained to the other members that the United States had discovered a Soviet listening device planted in the office of the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union’s residence in Moscow. In what can only be described as a late 1940s Trojan Horse, the listening device – commonly referred to as a ‘bug’ – was disguised in a wooden carving of the Great Seal of the United States and in 1945 was presented to then-U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman, as a gift to their one-time WWII ally.

---30---

Hoo-haw. Harriman, it might be politely stated, was hardly one for the cloak-and-dagger world. 

 

 

 

[Cliff Varnell]

2 hours ago, Benjamin Cole said:

A letter from Averell Harriman to Allen Dulles, c 1960. 

Body: 

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070018-9 !~ DC(., 40 December 7, 1960

 

Dear Allen: I would like to talk over with you the implications of the attached. Also I'd like to talk over the new Moscow Communist Manifesto. It looks to me as though Mr. Khrushchev had made some real concessions to Peiping. This may lead to a tougher stand in the Congo, as well as in other troubled spots in the world. This seems in conflict with what appeared to be his desire to start afresh with the new Administra- tion. Needless to say, I am delighted that you are continuing in your vitally important job. With my congratulations to you and our country, and my warm regards. Sincerely, Thy Honorable Allen W. Dulles Washington, D. C. Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070018-9 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070018-9 CONFIDENTIAL Nvanber 15, 1960 Dear Jack t I called on the Soviet Ambassador yesterday at his request. (I happened to be In Washington as I was speaking at the Women's National Democratic Club luncheon.) He translated to me verbally a message which he had received from Mr. Khrushchev to be delivered to me personally. In this message the Ambassador was instructed to give me Mr. Khrushchev's greetings and congratulations on his behalf over the victory of the Democratic Party. The message then continued as follows: ,,As ter. Harrigan could see for himself Mr. Khrushchev had criticized Mr. Kennedy as well Mr. Nixon, in accordance with the suggestion Mr. Harriman had made." (This undoubtedly refers to an oral message I had sent to him, that if he wanted to elect Nixon, the surest way to do so was to criticize Nixon and express approval of Kennedy.) "Some of the statements of both candidates were unfavorably commented on in the Soviet Press, though the criticisms of Nixon were a stronger rebuff. Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues in the Soviet government understood the need for anti-Soviet statements during the campaign, and for that reason they had shown restraint in overlooking them. "Mr. Khrushchev knows that Mr. Harriman has always paid attention to Soviet-American relations, and Mr. Khrushchev believes there may now be a better chance of improving them. "The task of today is that there must be some realistic way found to improve our mutual relations. Also, solutions must be found to the pressing international issues, such as strengthening CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/08121 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070018-9 4 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070018-9 4 41 November 15, 1960 Page Two peace in Europe, disarmament, and others. o far as our (Soviet) side is concerned, theme will be no lack of attempt and desire to reach a positive result. If the leading people of both countries could unite to act in the same direction to achieve mutual goals, then we (Soviets) can say with all confidence that things will proceed 'not too badly.' (Ilia is a Russian colloquialism). "Mr. Khrushchev hopes that Harriman agrees with this. Of course he may ask what is meant by 'not too badly.' What criteria should be chosen"? Mr. Khrushchev tried to convey the thought in his message to Senator Kennedy by saying he hoped we could follow the line of relations that existed during President Roosevelt's time, when Harriman was Ambassador. Mr. Krushchev has been thinking over the question of whether under present conditions this can be achieved. He has come to the conclusion than it is not only desirable but possible. With a return to the spirit of Soviet-American cooperation which we had during the war, not only would the people of both countries gain, but so would the people of other countries and no one would lose.,'' As this is such a rough translation, I have asked the Soviet Ambassador to send me one in writing. The essence however i.s clear; and it's style shows that it was written by Khrushchev himself. It is further indication that Khrushchev wants to make a fresh start. I said to the Ambassador that if Khrushchev was in earnest, I hoped he would think about things he could do to pave the way for improved relations. I said it would be well for qtr. Khrushchev not to refer to the U-2 incident again, and on the positive side, to make some gesture such as the release of the RB>47 crew. 14enshikov accused me of trying to trade with his. I denied that, and pointed out that Mr. Khrushchev should realize that after the kind of Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R003600070018-9 a 4 ~ , Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070018-9 CONFIDENTIAL November 15, 1960 Page Three things he had been saying publicly, some act on his part to show the American people that he vas having a change of heart would be helpful. Menshikov expressed the hope that we could come to some agreement on disarmament and nuclear control, as without such control China and other countries would obtain nuclear weapons in a few years, with attendant increase in danger of nuclear war. When I asked Menshikov how things were going with China, he shied away from the question, maintain- ing there were no fundamental differences. However, he said that he thought it would not be difficUtt to get China to agree to disarmament proposals$ if we had reached an agreement. I asked him what Mr. Khrushchev meant by a return to the relations we had during the time of President Roosevelt, but he obviously was not instructed and he wouldn't commit himself. I repeated what I had said to Mr. Korneichuk ( my letter to you of November 12) that you would undoubtedly develop a 'good neighbor' policy towards the underdeveloped countries t which would make more difficult the realization of qtr. Khrushchev's ambitions to communize them: also, that I believed you would want, if possible, to come to an understanding with Mr. Khrushchev for our mutual benefit, but that you would not appease nor make any compromises of principle. This message is intriguing in that it was obviously written by Khrushchev himself, During the war I found that I couldn't get anywhere on matters of importance without getting to Stalin himself. Undoubtedly the same situation exists today with Khrushchev. He is a realist. He came to my house when he was in New York h year ago even though he knew that in my articles I had been blunt in my etiticismas of Soviet policies as well as of him. Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003600070018-9 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS INITIALS DATE 1 3 4 5 6 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks : Mr. Dulles elected not to have the CIWS article shown to Governor Harriman. The DCI expects to talk with Harriman soon and will want to have at hand the best available piece on the Communist Manifesto. HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER E, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE O/DCI 1/4/61 pr ved Fo[~r~ ~2 FORM NO. 237 which Replaces may be Form 30-4 I APR 55 / U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-0342531 used. 8-9

 

(TYPOS in original) 

---

Source URL: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80b01676r003600070018-9

---30---

In 1960 Averell Harriman had lost the NY Governorship to Rockefeller, and but was then appointed Asst. Secy of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs by JFK in 1961. 

As usual, Ben, your challenge is not knowing what you’re talking about.

The Harriman-Rockefeller race was in 1958.

2 hours ago, Benjamin Cole said:

This Dulles letter strikes me as the sort of Olympian high-minded globalist conversation Harriman had. Harriman was not the sort who gets grubby and does a snuff job on the JFKA investigation. 

He got grubby and did a snuff job on Diem.

Joseph Trento, The Secret History of the CIA, pgs 334-5

<quote on, emphasis added>

Who changed the coup [overthrow of Ngo Brothers in South Vietnam 11/01/63] into the murder of Diem, Nhu and a Catholic priest accompanying them? To this day, nothing has been found in government archives tying the killings to either John or Robert Kennedy. So how did the tools and talents developed by Bill Harvey for ZR/RIFLE and Operation MONGOOSE get exported to Vietnam? Kennedy immediately ordered (William R.) Corson to find out what had happened and who was responsible. The answer he came up with: “On instructions from Averell Harriman…. The orders that ended in the deaths of Diem and his brother originated with Harriman and were carried out by Henry Cabot Lodge’s own military assistant.”

Having served as ambassador to Moscow and governor of New York, W. Averell Harriman was in the middle of a long public career. In 1960, President-elect Kennedy appointed him ambassador-at-large, to operate “with the full confidence of the president and an intimate knowledge of all aspects of United States policy.” By 1963, according to Corson, Harriman was running “Vietnam without consulting the president or the attorney general.”

The president had begun to suspect that not everyone on his national security team was loyal. As Corson put it, “Kenny O’Donnell (JFK’s appointments secretary) was convinced that McGeorge Bundy, the national security advisor, was taking orders from Ambassador Averell Harriman and not the president. He was especially worried about Michael Forrestal, a young man on the White House staff who handled liaison on Vietnam with Harriman.”

At the heart of the murders was the sudden and strange recall of Sagon Station Chief Jocko Richardson and his replacement by a no-name team barely known to history. The key member was a Special Operations Army officer, John Michael Dunn, who took his orders, not from the normal CIA hierarchy but from Harriman and Forrestal. According to Corson, “John Michael Dunn was known to be in touch with the coup plotters,” although Dunn’s role has never been made public. Corson believes that Richardson was removed so that Dunn, assigned to Ambassador Lodge for “special operations,” could act without hindrance.

<quote off>

2 hours ago, Benjamin Cole said:

The new Moscow Communist Manifesto from Khruschev! 

Then, there is this comical story (this one is a real laugher, and comes from the CIA, 2020):

"60 years ago today, at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and in front of a captivated global audience, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. unveiled a shocking piece of Soviet subversion – one that confirmed for the public a spy vs. spy game that would come to define intelligence for the next three decades.

Ambassador Lodge explained to the other members that the United States had discovered a Soviet listening device planted in the office of the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union’s residence in Moscow. In what can only be described as a late 1940s Trojan Horse, the listening device – commonly referred to as a ‘bug’ – was disguised in a wooden carving of the Great Seal of the United States and in 1945 was presented to then-U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman, as a gift to their one-time WWII ally.

---30---

Hoo-haw. Harriman, it might be politely stated, was hardly one for the cloak-and-dagger world. 

Which is why Truman put Harriman in charge of the Mutual Security Agency.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_Security_Agency

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_Security_Act

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000400060005-3

In Harriman’s biography, Allen and John Foster Dulles were described as “his lawyers.”

In the cloak and dagger world Harriman was a Boss.

 

Edited October 4, 2023 by Cliff Varnell

[Cliff Varnell]

2 hours ago, Benjamin Cole said:

During the war I found that I couldn't get anywhere on matters of importance without getting to Stalin himself. Undoubtedly the same situation exists today with Khrushchev. He is a realist. He came to my house when he was in New York a year ago even though he knew that in my articles I had been blunt in my criticisms of Soviet policies as well as of him.

 

So Khrushchev visited Harriman’s pad in NYC.  It must have been an intimate affair, wearing their striped pants and sipping tea with extended pinkies...right, Ben?

On September 15, 1959, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev landed in Washington DC on the first stop of a two week tour
of the States.

The next day he showed up at W. Averell Harriman's place in Manhattan.

From Spanning the Century The Life of W. Averell Harriman, by Rudy Abramson, pg. 575

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In his second-floor drawing room, Harriman gathered leaders from mining, manufacturing, oil, chemicals, banking,
and insurance industries, including John D. Rockefeller III; General David Sarnoff, chairman of RCA; Frank Pace,
chairman of General Dynamics Corporation; W. Alton Jones, chairman of Cities Service Corporation; and John J. McCloy,
chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank. By his estimate, scribbled on a yellow legal pad before Khrushchev arrived, they
represented assets of some $38 billion. Among them, as witnesses to history, were a few men of ordinary means, former ambassadors, educators, and, notably, Rockefeller Foundation president Dean Rusk, and Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith, the latter having invited himself as a "representative of the proletariat."

Surround by Picassos and Derains, their voices muffled by Persian carpets, the capitalist Titans greeted the Communist
chieftain one by one, then sat in a semi-circle savoring caviar and sipping champagne and New York wine as Averell
conducted his exposition of capitalism, war profits, and American politics. No one present, nor any of their friends, he and the others assured the guest of honor, favored world tensions. The assembled war profiteers, said the host, were men who'd champion disarmament the moment it became safe for the United States. There was not a hint, however, that mingling with the millionaires did anything except reinforce Khrushchev's belief that he was then in the presence of the men who controlled America far more than Eisenhower and the members of Congress he had met in Washington.

One testimonial to free enterprise followed another. And when the Soviet leader reasserted his stubborn belief that the
men present composed the country's ruling circle, Galbraith later tattled, "Somebody demurred, but in perfunctory fashion."
After it was over, Harriman insisted that the Soviet leader had gained insights of "real importance."

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[Cliff Varnell]

A real lightweight, that Ave.

Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, by Rudy Abramson, pgs 624-5, 630 emphasis added:

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Some of Averell's friends, including [Roger] Hilsman, who had heard Bob Kennedy muse about the possibility of Harriman as secretary of state, thought there was still a chance that Averell might yet get the Foggy Bottom job he long coveted.  But that had been before the notorious coup cable [243 authorizing Diem coup 8/24/63].

    Though the President had avoided criticism of Averell in the episode, Harriman knew Kennedy's confidence in him was shaken.  After working his way to the seventh floor, he was suddenly viewed as a problem.  Almost overnight, he looked ten years older.  Privately, the President and the attorney general talked of finding a way to rehabilitate him, to find a job that would get him out of the Vietnam business.  There was a need to put more emphasis on hemispheric matters, and the President thought that one way to solve two problems might be to create a new post of undersecretary for Latin American affairs for him.

As deeply as the administration had involved itself in the machinations against Diem, Kennedy still appeared stunned when the long-anticipatred coup ended with the assassination of Diem and Nhu on November 1.  The United States could technically claim that it had been a Vietnamese affair; but the administration had conditioned the atmosphere, beginning with the Harriman-Hilsman cable to Lodge.

By that time, Averell was already turning more attention to hemispheric problems.  The afternoon of November 22 was set a side for a meeting with oil company executives about the future of their contracts with the government in Argentina.  Beforehand, he went to a Hilsman luncheon for a delegation of politicians from the Phillipines.  He was finishing his dessert and talking with Senator Frank Church about extremism in American politics when Church was called to the telephone.  A minute later, the senator rushed back into the room, his face ashen.  The President had been shot, and was feared dead.  There was a momen of silence, and then turmoil, shouted questions, and people getting up from the table to head for telephones.  Averell hadn't heard, and when Church repeated the news, his reaction was that it couldn't be true.  "No, sir, I'm not joking," said Church.

Averell heard the shattering confirmation of Kennedy's death in George Ball's office moment later.  So undone that he could only think of nothing else to do, he convened his oil meeting, but it lasted only a few minutes.  When an executive tastelessly suggested an urgent approach to the new President to write the government of Argentina in behalf of American oil interests, he adjourned in disgust.

He spent the afternoon helping Ball, who was, if anyone truly was, running the United States government, since Rusk and several other Cabinet members were airborne, coming home after turning back from a flight to the Far East.  As darkness fell, Averell drove out to Andrews Air Force Base with Ball and Alexis Johnson, joining the official mourning party standing silently on the floodlit ramp as the President's casket was lowered from the rear door of Air Force One.

The following days were a blur of meetings and trips to airports to greet delegations arriving from all over the world for the state funeral.  While Rusk and Ball attended to ceremonial duties, Harriman sat down with visitors who brought urgent diplomatic problems with them--an insurgency developing against the government in the Dominican Republic, intelligence warnings of political upheaval in Brazil, and signs of new trouble between India and Pakistan over Kashmir...

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Edited October 4, 2023 by Cliff Varnell

[Cliff Varnell]

And where did Jackie and the kids spend the night 11/22/63?  Not the White House...

At Harriman’s pad in Georgetown.

The ultimate ruthless big time operator, that Ave.