Fascinating I'view With Specter/1966/USNWR

[Benjamin Cole]

USNWR asks some tough questions about a topic again in the news---the shallow JFK back wound, as repeatedly reported by the FBI--even after the FBI was made aware of small hole in JFK's throat. USNWR highlights the interview with that very question. (I highlight in red) 

Back when magazines, even conservative magazines, actually delved into topics at length. 

BTW, if Arlen Specter's dissembling was water, you would have needed Noah's Ark after this interview... 

Overwhelming Evidence Oswald Was the Assassin'

A 1966 U.S. News & World Report interview with Arlen Specter, assistant counsel for the Warren Commission.

 

Nov. 14, 2013, at 12:45 p.m.

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'Overwhelming Evidence Oswald Was Assassin'

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(AP)

Is there more to the assassination story than appears in the mass of testimony and findings made public by the Warren Commission? In this exclusive interview with Arlen Specter, the lawyer who investigated the physical facts, you get in precise detail what the evidence proves about that fateful day in Dallas three years ago.

[READ MORE: JFK: 50 Years Later]

 

Q: Mr. Specter, were you the Warren Commission's chief investigator on the facts about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy -- how many shots, where the shots came from, other facts?

A: I would not describe my role at all beyond what appears in the work of the Warren Commission. It is possible from the notes of testimony to observe that I was responsible for taking the testimony of Governor Connally, Mrs. Connally, the autopsy surgeons, the doctors from Dallas, the wound-ballistics experts — so that is apparent from the area what my role was. But I think, as an assistant counsel for the Commission, it would be presumptuous of me to characterize my role as that of "chief investigator" on a key part of the assassination investigation.

Q: You indicated you were responsible for the evidence concerning the autopsy. Is it your understanding that the Federal Bureau of Investigation did get a copy of the final, official autopsy report?

A: I would have no way of being able to state categorically what distribution there was on the autopsy report. I do know that the autopsy report from Dr. Humes and Dr. Boswell and Dr. Finck was in the hands of the Commission early in January when I joined the Commission, so that the Commission had it at that point. I would presume the FBI had it. [Comdr. James J. Humes, Comdr. J. Thornton Boswell, and Lieut. Col. Pierre A. Finck were the pathologists from the armed forces who performed the detailed autopsy of President Kennedy. Dr. Humes was chief autopsy surgeon.]

Q: You have no certain knowledge that the FBI had it?

A: Oh, absolutely not — I had no way of knowing precisely when the FBI got which documents which were not under their general investigative ken.

Q: How do you explain the difference between the autopsy report and the FBI's report of December 9 on President Kennedy's wounds — the FBI having reported that one bullet went in only to a finger's length, whereas the autopsy report said it went through the President's neck?

A: The FBI's report in early December reflected the doctors' comments overheard by FBI agents who were present at the autopsy. Those comments were based on factors which were originally thought to be true on the night of the autopsy, when there was relatively limited information available to the doctors actually performing the autopsy.

At that time, the autopsy surgeons did not know that there had been a bullet hole on the front of the President's neck. The bullet hole on the front of the President's neck had been obliterated by the tracheotomy performed by the Parkland [Hospital] doctors in Dallas. [Parkland doctors cut a hole in the President's windpipe in an effort to help him breathe.]

 

The autopsy surgeons, on the night of November 22, had very limited information. For example, when they started their autopsy, they knew that there was a hole at the base of the back of the neck and a finger could probe between two large strap muscles and penetrate to a very slight extent.

The autopsy surgeons in Washington also knew that there had been external heart massage applied at Dallas. They also had the fragment of information that a whole bullet had been found on a Dallas stretcher. So it was a preliminary observation, or a very tentative theory, which was advanced in the early stage of the autopsy, that the bullet might have penetrated a short distance into the back of the President's neck and been forced out by external heart massage, and that the bullet might have been the whole bullet which was found on the stretcher in Dallas.

When we first reviewed the FBI reports, we were very much concerned with that tentative autopsy conclusion which had been formulated. But, when we later took testimony from the autopsy surgeons and had the whole picture, knowing more — for example, the evidence of the path of the bullet through the President's neck, showing that it entered between two large strap muscles and then went over the top of the pleural cavity and sliced the trachea and exited in a hole in the front of the neck, or at least showing that there was a bullet path through the President's neck, without getting at this juncture into the question of whether the bullet entered or exited in the front of the neck — when this whole picture was presented later, it was apparent that the preliminary conversations reported in the FBI document were only tentative.

In fact, Dr. Humes had formulated a different conclusion, tentative as it might have been, the very next day when he had a chance to talk to Dr. Perry by telephone in Dallas [Dr. Malcolm O. Perry of Parkland Hospital, one of the doctors attending to President Kennedy]. That was when he found that there had been a bullet hole in the front of the neck, before the tracheotomy was performed.

As the autopsy had gone along, Dr. Humes had found the bullet path through the body, and that led to the phone call to Dr. Perry for more information.

Q: If the FBI had received a copy of the final autopsy report, completed on November 24, why did it write into its December 9 report the tentative conclusion that a bullet entered the upper back for a short distance — and then repeat that same theory in a later report dated January 13?

A: That is a question which would be best directed to the FBI. The only responses that I could give you would be my inferences. The Federal Bureau of Investigation may not have had the autopsy report when its report, dated December 9, was originally prepared. [An unimpeachable source told U.S. News & World Report the autopsy report was delivered to the FBI on December 23.] As to the January report containing the same information, some data from the earlier report may have been repeated without carefully focusing on it — as such later reports frequently are repetitious without any special reason, except perhaps to give the reader the information if he missed it earlier.

I do know that the FBI itself came to the same conclusions that the Commission did. My. Hoover testified to this, and nobody in the Bureau placed any substantial credence in the preliminary thoughts as reflected in the early reports.

THE AUTOPSY REPORT

Q: Mr. Specter, can we get a little more on the picture of the autopsy itself? How long did the autopsy surgeons have with the President's body? Did they have sufficient time to make a thorough autopsy or were they being pressed to deliver his body to the undertaker?

 

A: In response to a specific question like that, I would refer to the autopsy report. My general recollection is that they were not pressed at all, that they started on it in the early evening on November 22 and they worked on the body through the night, and the body was not prepared for burial until the morning of November 23, and that it was taken to the White House to lie in state somewhere in the 4-to-5 a.m. area on November 23.

Q: So they had only a few hours in the night of the 22nd?

A: That is correct, but, to the best of my information, that is an adequate opportunity to perform a comprehensive autopsy report subject to supplemental studies, as, for example, were done on the brain. There was a supplemental autopsy report from trained, skilled experts.

Q: Were there preliminary autopsy reports or memoranda of any kind that were destroyed?

A: Yes, the record is plain that there had been a series of notes taken by Dr. Humes at the time of the actual performance of the autopsy [on the night of Friday, November 22] which had been destroyed when he made a written — handwritten — autopsy report on Sunday, November 24.

Bear in mind, on that point, that, when Dr. Humes was called upon to conduct an autopsy of the President and then retired to his home on Sunday to make a formal report which he knew was important, he did not quite have the perspective of a historian who is culling the premises with a fine-tooth comb.

He had never performed an autopsy on a President, and he was using his best judgment under the circumstances, never dreaming that loose, handwritten notes would become a subject of some concern.

That matter was of concern immediately to his superiors, and he was questioned on it. He made a formal report on it, and he explained his reasons fully before the Commission.

Q: Is his testimony in the open record — for the public to read?

A: It is — absolutely.

 

Q: Mr. Specter — going now to the crucial point of whether the wound in the neck was caused by a bullet coming from the front or rear — can you saw how it was determined that the exit point for the bullet was in the front, rather than in the rear?

A: Yes, I can tell you how the evidence was analyzed to determine which conclusion was accurate.

The President was found with a series of bullet wounds when examined both at Parkland Hospital and by the autopsy surgeons. At each place, they had only limited access.

First, at Parkland, the President's body was not turned over, for a number of reasons — most specifically because they dealt with the very grave problems of trying to restore his breathing, which was impaired by a hole in his throat, and secondarily, to try to get circulation through his body, which was impaired by a massive head wound.

So he was gone before they could cope with the problems on his front side.

The autopsy surgeons were limited, to some extent, because they did not see the original hole in front of the neck, to make observations on what it might have been.

The hole on the front of the neck was visible only for a relatively short period of time by the doctors at Dallas — from the time they removed his shirt and cut away his tie until the time Dr. Perry performed the tracheotomy.

The hole on the back of the President's neck was visible for a protracted period of time by the autopsy surgeons who worked on him at the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

The autopsy surgeons described, in detail, the characteristics of the wound on the back of the President's neck, and there was no doubt but what those characteristics showed it to be a wound of entry — a round, regular hole, which showed it to be the point of entry.

PATH OF THE BULLET

Q: Were pictures taken of those wounds?

 

A: Yes, they were. But, before we get into that, I want to develop this business of exit and entry wounds. The question is a very complex one, so let me continue to tell you what the characteristics were which indicated what was on the back and what was on the front of the President.

Besides the characteristics of the wound on the back of the President's neck, as testified to under oath by the autopsy surgeons, indicating it to be a point of entry, the fibers of the shirt on the back of the President and the fibers of the suit jacket on the back of the President were both pushed inward, and both indicated that the hole in the back of the President's neck was an entry hole.

The fiber on the front of the shirt was inconclusive — it was a slit. You could not determine in which direction the fiber was pushed, nor could the nick on the tie be used to determine what was the direction of the shot.

The hole on the front of the President's neck was such that, by its physical characteristics alone, it could have been either a wound of entry or a wound of exit.

The reason that such a hole would be inconclusive turns on the consideration that the bullet which passed through the President's neck met virtually no resistance in the President's body—it struck no bone, it struck no substantial muscle. It passed, in fact, between two large strap muscles. It did cut the trachea, and it passed over the pleural cavity. It exited through the soft tissue — or it passed trough, without showing whether it entered or exited — the soft tissue on the front of the throat.

Tests were performed by would-ballistics experts and Edgewood, Md., where the composition of the President's neck was duplicated, though a gelatinous solution in one sample, through a goat-meat mixture in another, and through a third of, I believe, horse-meat composition. And goatskin was placed on each side of the substance made to duplicate the President's neck.

The Manlicher-Carcano rifle, which was found on the sixth floor of the Texas Schoolbook Depository Building, was used in the experiments, as was the same type of bullet found on the stretcher in Parkland Hospital. The distance of approximately 180 feet was used, so as to set the stage as closely approximating the actual conditions as possible.

The characteristics of the entry and exit marks on the goatskin show that it is not possible to tell conclusively whether the point of exit on the goatskin, from a bullet that had traveled through the simulated neck, would be a wound of entry or a wound of exit, because of the factors involved in a high-powered missile which is stable when it passes through a relatively porous material.

Now, when Dr. Perry answered questions at a news conference called in Dallas on the afternoon of November 22, as reported in the Commission work and as referred to in a New York Herald Tribune report of the same day, he was asked a series of hypothetical questions based on what was known at that time — for example, the fact that there was a wound on the front of the throat and a big wound in the top of the head.

And Dr. Perry said that those wounds could have been accounted for by having a bullet come in through the neck, strike the vertebrae in back, and glance up through the top of the head — which would be an extraordinary combination, but one which was conceivable in the light of the limited information available to the Dallas doctors at that time.

 

But, when all the factors I have described were studied in the context of the "overlay" — that is, all the things we had good reason to believe occurred — when they were all put together, the Commission concluded that the wound in the front of the neck, whose characteristics were not determinative, was actually a wound of exit.

Q: When Dr. Humes called from the Bethesda Naval Hospital to Parkland Hospital in Dallas, in connection with the autopsy, were the doctors in Dallas able to shed any light on the wound, in the front of the throat, that had been obscured by the tracheotomy?

A: As I recollect it, the best information that could be provided by the Dallas doctors involved the location of the wound and its general characteristics, without any definite statement as to entry or exit.

You must bear in mind that as each individual, in many contexts in this investigation, saw the evidence, he saw only a limited amount of the evidence.

And the overlay, as the Commission saw it, with literally thousands of pieces of information, is something quite different from the way any individual saw one incident or parts of the evidence.

THE AUTOPSY PICTURES

Q: Could we get to this matter of the pictures of the President's body? Have you seen the pictures?

A: The complete set of pictures taken at the autopsy was not made available to me or to the Commission. I was shown one picture of the back of a body which was represented to be the back of the President, although it was not technically authenticated. It showed a hole in the position identified in the autopsy report. To the best of my knowledge, the Commission did not see any photographs or X-rays.

Q: Why were all the pictures not shown?

A: Because the Commission decided that it would not press for those photographs, as a matter of deference to the memory of the late President and because the Commission concluded that the photographs and X-rays were not indispensable.

The photographs and X-rays would, in the thinking of the Commission, not have been crucial, because they would have served only to corroborate what the autopsy surgeons had testified to under oath, as opposed to adding any new facts for the Commission.

 

Q: Right now, in view of the fact that within the last couple of years many doubts have arisen, do you or do you not think that these photographs might allay some of those doubts?

A: It is my view now, and it has always been my view as a general proposition, that the greater the quantity of relevant evidence on any subject, the better off the fact finder is in knowing all of the material factors.

So, from that generalization, it would follow that, even as corroborative information, photographs and X-rays would always be helpful.

But that is a different question from passing on the propriety of the Commission's exercise of its discretion in deciding, as a matter of taste, not to insist upon the photographs and X-rays at that time.

Q: Who ordered these photographs to be sequestered?

A: That is a question that I could not answer, because the limitation of my role as a Commission assistant counsel imposed upon me the obligation to search for evidence, including requests, and to sift for evidence that was obtained. An answer to the question you just posed is not one within my personal knowledge.

WHAT THE SURGEONS SAID

Q: Mr. Specter, would not those photographs, if they were available, clear up, beyond all doubt, the question of whether the hole in the back of the neck was higher or lower than the hole in the front of the throat?

A: They would corroborate that which is already known, which, in my opinion, has cleared up that question once and for all.

To follow the theory propounded by E. J. Epstein, for example [that the hole in the back was lower than the hole in the front, thus indicating the President could have been shot from the front] — is to say that the autopsy surgeons were perjurers, because the autopsy surgeons placed their hands on the Bible and swore to the truth of an official report where they had measured to a minute extent the precise location of the hole in the back of the President's neck, as measured from other specific points of the body of the President. So I believe that those factors are well established on the basis of the existing record.

The photographs would, however, corroborate that which the autopsy surgeons testified to.

 

Let me add one thought at this point, and that is that at the time the autopsy surgeons testified, in March of 1964, they had no way of knowing whether the photographs and X-rays would later be available to the Commission, to corroborate or to impeach their testimony.

As a matter of fact, Chief Justice Warren directed a question to Dr. Humes as to whether he would change any of his testimony if the photographs and X-rays were available — and the record of hearings would speak on that — and Dr. Humes said that he would not.

Q: Where are these photographs now?

A: I do not know. I have only heard speculation on that subject. Since I never had possession of them and have not talked to anyone who has, I would not at all be able to answer that question.

Q: Just to make sure that we understand: You feel the autopsy report itself, coupled with the sworn testimony of the surgeon, was adequate to establish the location of wounds and the probable exit and entry points of bullets, and that the photos and X-rays would merely have been corroborative evidence?

A: The statement which you have made I think is accurate, with the possible limitation of what may have been conceived to be "adequate." Any lawyer or any investigator likes to have every conceivable piece of information available to him.

I do not think, as an assistant council on the Commission, that it is within any appropriate range of my authority to disagree with the exercise of discretion of the Commission in deciding not to press for some evidence which they felt was only corroborative and which they felt should be excluded for other reasons of taste.

Q: Mr. Specter, is there any doubt in your mind now that the assassin of President Kennedy was Lee Harvey Oswald?

A: The evidence is overwhelming that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of President Kennedy.

There can be no real doubt on that subject, based on the factors of ownership of the weapon which was found on the sixth floor of the Texas Schoolbook Depository Building, the handwriting links to Oswald's having ordered that weapon, the fact that it is scientifically, ballistically proved beyond question that the whole bullet found on the stretcher in Parkland Hospital came from that weapon, that the two major fragments found in the front seat of the presidential limousine came from that weapon.

 

Further indications of Oswald's guilt are his rapid exit, fleeing from the site of the Texas Schoolbook Depository Building and the later killing of Officer [J.D.] Tippit, which was witnessed by several people, plus photographs showing Oswald holding a rifle identified as being the Manlicher-Carcano which was used.

In conjunction with a whole host of other evidence, those were just highlights which, I think, answer conclusively and far beyond that which we normally proven criminal cases that Oswald was the assassin.

Q: Do you recall any evidence that indicated or suggested that more than one assassin might have been involved? Are you just as certain that only one assassin was involved as you are that Oswald killed President Kennedy?

A: The converse question is much more difficult because it involves the proof of a negative, and it is much more difficult to prove conclusively that something did not happen than it is to prove that something did happen.

To take the simplest illustration: If you wish to prove that John Jones was at Broad and Chestnut on January 1, you need only a witness or two who saw John Jones at Broad and Chestnut on January 1. If, on the other hand, you want to prove that John Jones was not at Broad and Chestnut on January 1, you must have, over a 24-hour period, sufficient witnesses who are looking for John Jones at that spot to prove that he was not there. So it is substantially more difficult to prove a negative.

The very most that can be said, and the most that was said by the Commission, was that no evidence came to its attention which in anyway supported a conclusion that there was a conspirator with Oswald.

Q: Could you tell us your own personal feeling about this, having delved into it so deeply? What is your own hunch about it? Would you go beyond what the Commission said?

A: I would certainly stand foursquare behind the Commission's conclusion that there was absolutely no evidence called to the Commission's attention which would indicate a coconspirator on the case.

The Commission did an exhaustive job, in conjunction with using research facilities from the many federal agencies, to see if there was any connection, for example, between [Jack] Ruby and Oswald, since that with the thought that came first to mind in terms of the possibility of a coconspiracy.

The Commission left no stone unturned to track down Oswald's background to the maximum extent possible, to see if you dealings with anyone else who might have been a coconspirator.

And also the same thoroughness was used with Ruby's background, to make the same determination.

 

And I am confident that the Commission did the very best job that could have been done under the circumstances.

Q: Did you have enough time, when you went to Dallas, to investigate thoroughly the evidence on such points as whether a shot could have come from the grassy knoll?

A: It is my view that the Commission used ample time in finishing its investigation and coming to its conclusion. The Commission was flexible in its timetable.

It started out with the thought that the investigation could be in the three-to-six month range. When the investigation required more time, more time was taken.

It was hoped the preliminary reports and drafts would be submitted in early June. They were submitted in only a couple of cases in early June. And the completion date for the report move back into early July, and then to mid-July and early August, and then mid-September, and then late September.

You must bear in mind, as we review the matter more than two years after the Commission's report has been published, that there was great concern all around the United States -- and around the world, for that matter -- on what were the facts in connection with the President's assassination.

Some doubting Thomases, who have evidenced themselves in prolific fashion in recent months, were also writing and talking before the Commission's report came out. Some of those men who are now authors were spokesman at that time.

And the Commission felt under a duty to publish its report with reasonable promptness.

The area of responsibility which I worked on, as shown by the notes of testimony, was such that I was able to complete the drafts of reports and submit them by early June. The testimony of the autopsy surgeons and the Dallas doctors and the key participants around the scene of the incident had all been taken, and the on-site tests had been completed — and I was available in the months of June, July and August, as the reports show, to help in other areas.

I was asked to go to Dallas for the Ruby polygraph in mid-July and go to the West Coast to track down some matters relating to Ruby on some individuals we hadn't been able to locate earlier. So that, if I had wanted to perform any further investigation, there was ample time for me to do so.

Q: Could we take up specific points that are raised by critics of the investigation? One is the statement that 58 of 90 witnesses at the scene of the assassination believe, or testified, that shots came from the grassy knoll in front of the President's car. Why did you reject their testimony?

 

A: Because auditory response on the origin of shots is totally unreliable in so many situations, especially where you have the acoustical situation present at Dealey PIaza in Dallas, where tall buildings were present on three sides.

The witnesses in the vortex of the assassination event thought the contrary to what those farther away thought. They testified in terms of shots coming overhead and to the right and rear, as the witnesses in the presidential caravan itself said.

There were officers on the overpass who had a good view of the grassy knoll, and they saw no shooting from the knoll. Digesting the evidence as a whole, there simply was no credible evidence that any shot came from the grassy knoll.

Q: Was there any evidence at all that conflicted with the theory that the President was shot from above and behind?

A: There was no credible evidence, by which the Commission meant believable evidence. There were people who ran off in the direction of the grassy knoll, but there was no one who saw anyone on the grassy knoll with a weapon, as, for example, eyewitnesses did see a rifle protruding from the sixth floor of the Texas Schoolbook Depository Building.

There were no ballistic marks of any shot having come from the area of the grassy knoll, as there were indications that shots came above and to the rear — for example, the wound on Governor Connally's back and the wound on the back of the President's head, and the mark on the windshield of the presidential limousine, which indicated that at least a fragment of a bullet had struck the windshield from the rear.

Q: Was that mark on the inside of the windshield?

A: Yes.

Bear this in mind: While some may speculate on the characteristics of the President's wounds because of the absence of the pictures, none can speculate with any just cause on the wounds of Governor Connally. He took his shirt off in front of the Commission, and we took a look at his back in the presence of the thoracic surgeon who operated on him. And it was perfectly plain as to the fact that the bullet had struck the Governor in the back and had exited below the right nipple at a lower angle on the front of his body.

Q: Yet the Governor is in opposition to the theory that that's the same bullet that went through the President —

 

A: Not precisely. The Governor is of the opinion that he was shuck by the second shot — by a shot subsequent to the first shot which he heard — which conclusion was based on the factors of the speed of sound from a shot, as opposed to the speed of a bullet.

But the Governor's testimony was weighed with great care, as was the testimony of every single witness, and the Commission concluded that the overlay of the evidence was such that the Governor's opinions were not followed. But every one of his opinions was fully published and set forth for every reading American to see.

Q: And you talked to the Governor, as counsel for the Commission — is that correct?

A: Better than talk; I questioned him in front of a court reporter, where every syllable that he uttered was taken down and preserved for everyone to read — after a very brief preliminary discussion as to Commission procedure and a brief session where the Governor witnessed the Zapruder films [a tourist's movie of the assassination]. But the details of his testimony were stenographically transcribed.

 

Q: How did you determine how many shots there were?

A: The best that can be said on the number of shots is what the evidence indicates. And here we're not dealing in terms of mathematics; we're doing in terms of probabilities, to put it realistically.

As to the number of shots, the witnesses testified from two to six, so you could take a wide range of choice.

They were three spent cartridges found on the sixth floor of the Texas Schoolbook Depository Building. There were three young men on the fifth floor at the time the President was assassinated, and those young men testified that they heard a sound which was later concluded to have been the dropping of a bullet casing to the floor.

There's a record of a test, which was repeated for all seven Commissioners on three different occasions at the Texas Schoolbook Depository Building, where Chief Justice Warren and every other one of the Commissioners stood on the fifth floor where the three young men stood — and the location of those men was pinpointed by a photograph taken at the time of the assassination by photographer in a car in the presidential motorcade. In that context, all the Commissioners heard a sound which they later concluded, and which the Commission as a whole later concluded, was the sound of a shell which had fallen to the floor.

Based on the presence of three spent shells on the sixth floor the Texas Schoolbook Depository Building, the Commission concluded that most probably three shots were fired.

The metal recovered from the stretcher and the presidential car indicated one whole bullet and fragments of another bullet, which indicated that there would have to have been at least two bullets fired.

 

The conclusion that three shots were fired then led to the inference that one shot might have missed or that one shot might have disappeared totally. If there had been other shots, which is highly doubtful, in the wake of all we know -- there is no remnant or trace of evidence to indicate that there were such other shots.

Q: No spectator was struck that day in Dallas?

A: There were reports that objects did strike in other parts of Dealey Plaza, which would be consistent with a third shot missing or even with a fragment from the shot that hit the President's head striking in that area.

Q: What about the mark on the curbstone, Mr. Specter? Was there not a mark on a Dallas curb that indicated either a bullet or a fragment of a bullet struck the curbstone?

A: There was such an indication, and the best thinking was that it might well have been caused by a bullet.

But, there again, it could not be ascertained with precision that it was caused by an event at the specific time of the assassination.

As in so many things, the most it could be said about the tangible physical evidence was that it was consistent with consequences which the Commission found to have occurred.

Q: What about the charge that the pieces found from one bullet add up to more than the bullet would have weighed originally?

A: It is not correct that there were pieces which would be in excess of what the bullet weighed. If you are referring to fragments which were found of what probably was the bullet which hit the President's head — there were two substantial fragments found in the front seat of the car, one weighing 40-some grains and one weighing 20-some grains. A whole bullet weighed between 160 and 161 grains.

Q: But what about the other bullet, the one that was found in the stretcher at Parkland Hospital, which presumably passed through the President's body and the Governor's body? That bullet, plus the pieces found in Governor Connally, is said by critics of the Commission to add up to more than 160 or 161 grains —

 

A: The mathematics does not support that criticism even though the whole bullet which was found on the stretcher had lost relatively little substance.

The substance which was deposited principally in the Governor's wrist was so light that it could not even be weighed. It was described by Dr. Gregory, the orthopedic surgeon, as being in the postage-stamp-weight category. So that by taking the best estimates of the weight of the metallic fragments deposited in the parts of the bodies, there was still a sufficient weight differential so that those small deposits would be consistent with having come from the bullet on the stretcher.

Q: Where did the bullet that was found on the stretcher come from?

A: It was a bullet found on a stretcher in Parkland Hospital on the day of the assassination, as the Warren Report points out and as testimony shows. The bullet was identified as most probably coming from Governor Connally's stretcher.

Here again, the hospital attendants were not cognizant of the fact that a bullet was about to drop off a stretcher, and they didn't maintain a chain of evidence such as would be highly desirable if we were to introduce matters in a Philadelphia criminal case.

But the bedclothes from President Kennedy's stretcher were wrapped up, and other definite evidence indicated that this bullet was not from President Kennedy's stretcher and that it was from a stretcher that was in an area where a stretcher was located which had been used for Governor Connally.

Q: Is this the bullet, identified as exhibit 399, that is thought to have passed through President Kennedy's body and then to Governor Connally's body and subsequently dropped out of the Governor's body on the stretcher?

A: The most probable conclusion is that it did just that. But I think it is important to note that the conclusion that one bullet went through the President's neck and inflicted all the wounds on the Governor was not a prerequisite to the Commission's conclusion that Oswald was the sole assassin.

The point is often made that such a conclusion is indispensable to a single-assassin finding, but that is not so.

As a matter of fact, the original thought, before the Commission conducted its extensive investigation, was — or the preliminary thinking was — that a single bullet passed through the President's neck, a second bullet struck the Governor, and a third bullet hit the President's head.

During the course of investigation, the Commission concluded the probabilities were that the same bullet that passed through the President's back also struck the Governor, but the finding is not a sine qua non for the conclusion that Oswald was the sole assassin.

 

Q: Does it disturb the conclusion at all that Oswald — and Oswald alone — was the assassin?

A: It does not, because it was sufficient time for three shots to have been fired even if one bullet did not strike both the President and the Governor.

Q: You say there was time for three shots within the time sequence established by the Zapruder films of the shooting and the time required for working the bolt action of the rifle?

A: That is correct. The time span ran between 4.8 and 5.6 seconds, from the instant of the neck wound, assuming the President responded immediately, to the impact of the head wound.

And it cannot be ascertained with any more precision, because approximately .8 of a second was consumed while the President's car went behind the road sign and out of view of the Zapruder film.

The rifle could be fired as rapidly as 2.3 seconds between shots. But bear this in mind: When you fire three times, the first shot is not taken into account in the timing sequence. This point is missed repeatedly by the would-be critics of the Commission report.

For example, aim is taken: Bang! — at least 2.3 seconds must pass while the bolt action is worked and aim is taken again: bang! — 2.3 seconds again for bolt action and aim; bang! So that three shots can be fired within a 4.6-second range of time.

Q: But didn't the film show that the President was hit and then 1.8 seconds later Governor Connally showed signs of having been hit?

A: The film, in my opinion, does not lend to such precision as to pin down exactly in which frame of the film it was that Governor Connally was struck.

The film is two-dimensional, and it was viewed by many of us on hundreds of occasions, but you simply cannot be so precise as to tell exactly where it was that Governor Connally was struck. And if you think you can establish the frame — as the Governor himself indicated in his opinion — you still do not know precisely where President Kennedy was when President Kennedy was struck on the first occasion.

So that the events of the assassination just cannot be reduced to mathematical certainty by use of a stop watch and the Zapruder film, notwithstanding all of our efforts to recreate it with minute precision through the on-site tests which we made late in May.

 

Q: What do you say to the critics who build an entire case of doubt in this area on these figures of time, indicating that the theory of a single shot hitting President Kennedy and Governor Connally is vital to the whole finding of the Commission?

A: I think that some critics have chosen to seize on the single-shot theory as a way of charging that there was a rationale of the assassination constructed for ulterior purposes. Actually, the single-shot theory is not an indispensable factor for the Commission's conclusion.

In fact, it was a theory reached after exhaustive study and analysis, largely because of the factor that when the car was lined up, as we lined it up in Dallas, and you looked through the Oswald rifle, as the assassin must have stood, based on all the other independent evidence, the bullet which went through the President's neck would most certainly — or perhaps I should say only most probably — have had to strike either some occupant in the car or something else in the car.

And the car was subjected to a minute examination hours after the assassination and nothing was struck in the car which would account for a major impact caused by a high-velocity bullet having lost so little impact by going through the President's neck.

Q: In this same general area of questions, what about the clean bullet? How could this bullet — exhibit 399 — pass through two bodies, hitting at least some bones in Governor Connally, without being distorted or dirtied?

A: The Commission had an extensive series of tests conducted by the wound-ballistics experts, at Edgewood, Md., of the United States Army. In these tests, an anesthetized goat was shot to simulate — to the greatest extent possible — the impact of a bullet on a rib with a glancing blow such as was given to Governor Connally, as shown by the X-ray.

Quite a number of tests were made until one was achieved with just the sort of a glancing blow on a rib that was given to the Governor. Naturally we couldn't reproduce a human body of the same girth, but the difference in dimension was taken into account.

Then cadaver wrists were used to test the wound of the Governor's wrist. And, as a matter of fact, reconstructed skulls were used to test the head shot on the President.

All of this, when put together, showed that it was entirely possible for a bullet to have gone through the President's neck, lost little velocity, then to have gone through the Governor's chest, grazing a rib, but again not striking anything in a smashing fashion.

It would have come out wobbling, as indicated by the large wound on the front of the Governor, and then it would have tumbled through the Governor's wrist.

 

And there was much independent evidence as to why the wrist wound was caused by a tumbling bullet — for example, the damage done to a nerve and the taking of the clothing into the wound, and a whole host of factors were analyzed by the orthopedic surgeon to indicate that it was not a pristine bullet — which means a bullet which had struck nothing else — that went through the wrist.

And the tumbling bullet would have explained the wound on the volar aspect of the Governor's wrist, and the bullet, which would have lost so much velocity, would account for the slight wound on the Governor's thigh.

The Governor himself thought it likely that the same bullet inflicted all of his wounds, and all of the doctors who attended the Governor thought so.

All of the experts from Edgewood, Md. — the Army wound ballistics people — came to the same conclusion.

Also, there was no other bullet that was found anywhere in the car, which would have accounted for the bullet which inflicted the Governor's wounds. And we do know that his leg, to say nothing of his wrist, was substantially lower than the level of the top of the doors; that, if a bullet had hit his leg, it would have been a curious twist of physics for it to have ended up outside of the car completely.

Q: How do you explain the apparent conflict between Oswald's record as a poor marksman and the extraordinarily excellent marksmanship that he displayed on the day of Mr. Kennedy's assassination?

A: It is not true that Oswald was a poor marksman.

The Commission examined the details of his record as a marksman with the Marine Corps, going over the original documents of his training, which I believe were published as part of the Commission's report.

The experts at Marine training appeared before the Commission — it was a deposition, but it was available to the Commission — who characterized his ability as a marksman, and they said that he was a reasonably good shot and, compared to civilian standards, would be classified as a very good shot, perhaps even better.

What must be borne in mind on that subject is the nature of the shot which was presented by the situation. Bear in mind that as the assassin stood in the sixth-floor window, with the rifle pointing out, as described by several eyewitnesses at the scene — the angle of pointing — that it was practically a straight line with Elm Street, as Elm Street proceeds on a slight decline, so that there was no necessity for any abrupt shifting of the line of aim of the marksman as he fired multiple shots.

 

It was only a matter of working the bolt action and keeping it in the same line. And, any shot under 100 yards with a four-power scope, the experts concluded that it was not an extraordinarily difficult shot.

Q: With the rifle telescopic sight accurate or inaccurate, under examination by the experts? It has been alleged that he had a defective site —

A: Yes.

But, here again, what we are dealing with is the evidence after the fact. The weapon was found a good distance from the point of the place with the assassin stood, and it was, in fact, found over near the stairs leading down and out of the building.

This leads to a very reasonable inference that, initiating was completed, then took the rifle with him to see what he encountered, and, as he got near the steps to exit from the building, he most assuredly didn't place it on the ground with great care to preserve it for its next use; he gave a pretty good toss, by all standards which are reasonable, that could have damaged the site.

It would be hard to think otherwise, under the circumstances -- which goes to point up the great difficulty of examining evidence, even after one event has transpired, and drawing finite conclusions about its condition before that event.

Q: Much is also made, Mr. Specter, of the report that the first police officer identified a different rifle — a Mauser — as compared to —

A: Well, the Manlicher-Carcano, which it was identified as being, apparently had a reboring of the hole, and you're dealing with a rifle which had many characteristics of the Mauser.

 

That is the type of error which could have easily been made.

That type of error and identification on a fast glance is relatively unimpressive in the light of the more detailed evidence which ballistically proved that the Manlicher-Carcano fired the bullet found on Connally's stretcher, and the fragments in the front seat of the presidential limousine — and in that area we deal with the precise science —o r with the evidence showing the purchase of that weapon from Klein's mail-order house, or with the photographs which show Oswald holding a weapon like that one and with the identification by Oswald's widow — all of which ought to be reviewed by the critical reader at the same time they hear that a police officer made a contrary tentative identification.

Q: There is no doubt in your mind that this was the murder weapon — the Manlicher-Carcano rifle that Oswald had the time on six floor of the Schoolbook Depository —

 

A: None whatsoever.

Q: Is it possible that there were any other weapons or that there could have been any switch of weapons?

A: All that can be said on the subject of whether there were any other weapons or any switch of weapons is that the painstaking investigation showed no evidence of any other weapon, or any switch.

Q: What about the discrepancies in witnesses' testimony with respect to the length of the paper bag that was said to have been used by Oswald to bring the rifle into the building?

A: The commission concluded that the general description of the paper bag was such that it fitted the weapon which Oswald used.

The background on that situation with that Oswald had said that he was bringing in curtain rods for his room. Later it was determined that his room had curtains and rods. The weapon was placed at the house that Oswald came from on the Friday morning.

So all of the evidence tied together to indicate that as well in fact brought the weapon into the Texas Schoolbook Depository Building under the pretext of having curtain rods.

Q: Were you at all disappointed or handicapped by the fact that the Dallas police did not keep a record of their interrogation of Oswald?

A: Well, there again, I believe that the more comprehensive the evidence is, the better it would have been. But I do not believe that the absence was a major obstacle or hindrance.

Q: There have been charges that there is a plot afoot to conceal evidence. If some high officials, say, had been in the business of deliberately concealing evidence, do you think it would have been possible to do it?

A: I think it would have been absolutely impossible for the autopsy surgeons to perjure themselves. They would have to be in league with numerous other people who were present in the room where the autopsy was conducted, including Secret Service agents and FBI agents and a whole host of people.

 

When the Commission was formed, President Johnson took great pains to select Commissioners who had high standing in who were independent of the Government or the so-called bureaucracy in Washington. When the Commission went out to organize its staff, it did not select people who had ties or allegiances to Government who might have been beholden to some department or another for their jobs, but, instead, chose men of outstanding reputation, like Joe Ball from California, a leader of the California bar for many years and a professor there noted for his work in criminal defense.

Similar selections were made on an independent basis from New York and Chicago and Des Moines and New Orleans and Philadelphia and in Washington—so that every conceivable pain was taken to select people who were totally independent, which is hardly the way he set out to organize a truth-concealing commission.

Q: Oswald did some pretty fast traveling the first 45 or 46 minutes after the assassination. Are you completely satisfied that he would have been physically able to get all these places at the times he is said to have appeared?

A: Yes. By way of collaboration, Chief Justice Warren himself carried a stop watch from the window of the sixth floor in the Texas Schoolbook Depository Building and made the long walk down one corridor and up another and over to the dimly lighted steps what he descended four flights to the second floor to see if he could get to the Coke machine within the time allotted to Oswald. I saw him click the second hand off, and he made it.

Q: Did he go the whole route, to the bus, to the taxicab, over to the Oak Cliff section of Dallas?

A: He didn't take the whole route, but I think the toughest lap was from the window to the Coke room.

Q: Was the rest of it timed by somebody else?

A: Oh, absolutely.

Q: Did you ever find where Oswald got his ammunition for that rifle?

A: That is not squarely within my area of investigation. But to the best of my knowledge the source was pinpointed, because we did obtain other ammunition for the tests which were made by the wound-ballistics experts.

Q: Did the Commission ever have anyone except Oswald under suspicion as the possible perpetrator of this crime?

 

A: The evidence at no time indicated that there was any other perpetrator of the offense. But I think it should be noted that the Commission. contrary to some assertions, did not start with the preconceived notion that Oswald was the assassin. The Commission, I think, did its utmost, and in fact, did maintain an open mind on that subject and surveyed the evidence before coming to its conclusion.

Q: Did Oswald have any connection with the FBI or any other Government agency?

A: To the best of my knowledge, no.

Q: Mr. Specter, here is a specific statement from one of the books about the Warren Commission that has attracted wide attention: "The fact that the autopsy surgeons were not able to find a path for the bullet is further evidence that the bullet did not pass completely through the President's body." What is your answer?

A: Dr. Humes traced the path of the bullet through the President's body, and I can give you a citation to his testimony on the point.

Q: Is that statement from the book false?

A: Inter alia — among others. I don't know the word for "many" in Latin, or I would say: "Among many others."

Q: What do you think of the "two Oswalds" theory — the presumption that Oswald might have had accomplices, that persons resembling Oswald or giving his name were seen at times and places when Oswald was somewhere else?

A: Oh, well, why not make it three Oswalds? Why stop with two?

I believe that that is the type of speculation which will be engaged in for centuries where there is an event of such magnitude and of such interest as the assassination of a great President like John F. Kennedy.

Within the past few years, there have been books appearing on the Lincoln assassination, advancing new theories as to who the criminals were. And I think that there will be this type of speculation on the Kennedy assassination during my lifetime, and beyond.

 

Q: Have you seen, in any of the critical comments on the investigation, any new evidence, beyond what was developed by the Commission?

A: There has not been a scintilla of new evidence disclosed in any of the books, to the best of my knowledge — certainly nothing that I have read, although I have not read every line of each of the books which have been written.

In the books I have seen, they are basically a taking of the Commission evidence, which was set forth bountifully, and a reconstruction in accordance with what the authors or others may have formulated to be their views on the events.

It's important to emphasize that point: that the Commission made available all this evidence because it welcomed the free rein of inquiry and expression on this point. It's a free country, and people may formulate their own conclusions. But the evidence — sifted carefully and taken as a whole — I think, forcefully supports the Warren Commission's findings and conclusions.

Q: As the district attorney of a big city, do you feel you could have successfully prosecuted the case against Oswald on the basis of evidence dug up by the Warren Commission?

A: That would have been a hard one to lose.

Q: If you had been on a jury hearing the case, would you have voted for hanging?

A: Well, now, you ask a question about penalty. I think that, on the question of innocence or guilt, realistically viewed, there was no area of doubt as to Oswald's being the assassin.

When you move beyond that into the proofs of negatives, you involve the complex matters we have already discussed.

I would say that, in my years of experience as an assistant district attorney and as district attorney of Philadelphia, I have never seen a case presented in a courtroom that is as convincing as is the case against Oswald where there are not numerous eyewitnesses to the crime.

 

I would add that I have never seen the resources devoted to the determination of the truth as were the resources of the United States of America devoted in this case. We simply cannot investigate a matter which arises from a killing in Philadelphia County with the kind of thoroughness that was used on the Kennedy-assassination investigation. There has been no equal of this kind of inquiry, not only in Philadelphia, but anywhere, to my knowledge.

Q: To put it another way: If Oswald had lived and had a good criminal lawyer working vigorously with all the elements in this case, could reasonable doubt have been created in the minds of a judge or a jury?

A: On the basis of the evidence which I have reviewed, I think it is as certain as the presentation of any case can be in court that Oswald would have been convicted.

Q: Here is another statement from a book on this subject: "The case of the stretcher bullet illustrates the limits of the investigation. In 10 days or even in 10 weeks, a single lawyer could not exhaust all the facts and possibilities in such a broad area as the basic facts of the assassination. Arlen Specter spent only about 10 days on his investigation in Dallas. Quite obviously, he had to concentrate on major problems and neglect some of the more minor ones."

A: The author is sweeping in his criticism, but not specific at all in pointing up what "minor problems" as he theorizes them to be, were overlooked.

The fact of the matter is that I spent more than 10 days in Dallas, that the actual time I was in Dallas accounted for only a minor part of the investigation work which was done for my areas of inquiry — most of which were performed, obviously, by federal investigative agencies, since the Commission lawyers could not do all of the investigation.

On the quotation you just read relating to the bullet on the stretcher, there are other references to a preconceived notion, which, says the author, the Commission lawyer had. But what he is not experienced enough to have understood, when he read my questioning of those witnesses where the timing was set forth, is this:

I went to Parkland Hospital in Dallas, for example, and I interviewed everybody at Parkland Hospital in the course of a relatively few hours, some 20-odd witnesses. But I did not go there with a tabula rosa to work on, to start gathering names and information likely to be needed.

I appeared at Parkland Hospital having reviewed files of materials as to what preliminary investigation had shown.

So I sent ahead a list of witnesses whom I wanted to see, so I could get to the heart of the matter and question under oath and in more detail perhaps than the previous interviews had been conducted and for the public to read at a later date.

The preliminary information had already been given to me, and I could move in a relatively straight line to the information I sought, because there had already been extensive investigations conducted.

 

This is virtually always done in any matter where an attorney comes in to look over the evidence — this spade work has been done. Otherwise, he would have to sift through hundreds of witnesses to come to the point where we begin that line of questioning on those specific witnesses at Parkland Hospital.

Q: Did the Commission deny any witnesses the right to be heard or refuse to hear anyone claiming to have pertinent information?

A: Absolutely not. In fact, the converse was true. The Commission went far and wide to solicit information from every conceivable source whatsoever.

Q: It has been reported that some members of the Commission did not attend all the meetings. And the presumption is that this affects the credibility, or reliability, of the Commission report. Was it, in fact, necessary for every member of the Commission to be present at all times?

A: It certainly could not be characterized as a necessity. Obviously, the more everyone knows, the better would be the position for making judgments and conclusions. But, even though a commissioner was not present at a hearing, the transcript, or notes of testimony, was available and was circulated for all the commissioners.

But, as a preliminary to evaluating a matter of that sort, it must be remembered that, when the President asked Chief Justice Earl Warren to serve as chairman of this Commission, he did so with the full knowledge that the Chief Justice had very heavy responsibilities on the Supreme Court.

The same applied to Senator Russell, who had very heavy duties in his senatorial committees, and as well as Senator Cooper. And, in selecting representatives Ford and Boggs, the President picked two of the busiest members on the Hill.

The same would apply to Allen Dulles and John McCloy, who had other responsibilities. So it had to be known in advance that a great deal of work would have to be performed by staff, with the commissioners themselves exercising the normal executive functions of supervision, review and decision-making.

Q: One critic has written this: "The Commission did not do an adequate investigative job, did not weigh all the data carefully, rushed through its work, had no investigative staff of its own, and a few overworked lawyers, who, in a very short time, had to interview and check hundreds of witnesses. And the report was written and rewritten in haste to make a lawyer's brief for the official theory." What is your answer?

A: The sweeping generalization of that statement is notable only for its melodramatic conclusion that nothing was done right at all. I think that the earmark of that kind of generalization indicates the motivation of the author.

 

The facts are quite the contrary.

Taken in individual steps: The lawyers for the Commission worked hard, but, in my opinion, were not overworked. We were under pressure, as is any man who does any responsible job in this country. But we did have sufficient time to do a responsible and thorough job. Where necessary, the times were extended. The commissioners themselves paid close attention to the work of the Commission. The Chief Justice was a dominant figure moving throughout the entire investigation, and so were the other commissioners in terms of knowing and understanding and participating in the scope and depth of the Commission's work.

I believe the Commission's work was exhaustive; it was painstaking, and it compiled the most complete report that was possible under the circumstances — and, I think, clearly an adequate report.

Q: Does the fact that you used the Federal Government's own investigative agencies impair the impartiality or effectiveness of the investigation?

A: In choosing the ideal tools available, it would have been highly desirable to have a totally independent investigative force from some other land, coupled with commissioners who could work full time on the project at hand, coupled further with unlimited lawyers to do every conceivable job possible.

But, even with the might of the United States Government at one's disposal, it is not possible to organize an investigative team from thin air. So it was a very reasonable choice to have basic material sifted by federal agencies of one sort or another.

Where the Commission chose not to rely upon a particular federal agency, it had many others to choose from. When that work was done, there was a substantial staff left to cull through the material and make an independent analysis.

I think the independence of the Commission is demonstrated by its candid criticism of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service.

Where criticism was appropriate, the Chief Justice and the other commissioners did not shirk their responsibility to set it forth.

Q: Did you also use any private and independent means of investigation?

A: Absolutely. When it came to the question of double-check on ballistic material, there were independent experts brought in who had no Federal Government connections. When it came to the question of the depth of some of the tests — such as those made by the wound-ballistics people — they were from the Army, but they were the best experts available. So there was a wide scope of federal talent used, and substantial nonfederal talent used as well.

 

Q: If you had this to do over again, are there any changes in methods or procedure that you would recommend?

A: Inevitably in the course of a lengthy investigation, there are procedures which would be improved upon. But I do not believe that the ultimate conclusions of the Commission would be affected in any way by any change in methods or procedures.

Q: Would you say that any cover-up of evidence in this case would mean, in effect, that a large number of reputable people were in collusion?

A: Well, I think that is the precise thrust of some of the material which has been written — that a conspiracy of deceit goes into the upper echelons of the Commission itself, permeates its ranks, and is widespread throughout everything the Commission has done.

I think it is preposterous to suggest that the Chief Justice or any other commissioner would conceal the truth from the American people, or that reputable federal officers would perjure themselves.

IF INQUIRY WERE REOPENED

Q: Do you think anything new could be brought out by a reopening of this investigation?

A: I do not believe that a reopening of the investigation would disclose any additional evidence, based on all that which is known at the present time.

But I would not make any statement which would be in opposition to any such reopening of an investigation, just as I would not make any statement that would suggest a limitation on any scholar's work in reviewing, analyzing or disagreeing with anything the Commission has said. It's a free country.

TO SHED LIGHT

In the following statement, Arlen Specter explains why he granted the interview on these pages:

 

"When I was asked if I would agree to talk to U. S. News and World Report on the subject of the Warren Commission's investigation of the Kennedy assassination, I decided, after considerable thought, that my answer would be 'Yes' — in view of the public concern that has arisen in the wake of books on the Commission.

"I am willing to answer questions which may shed light on the subject and clear up areas of misunderstanding that may exist in the public mind as a result of what has been written and widely published.

"In this regard, I believe that the Commission Report itself, and certainly the 26 volumes of evidence, contain within their covers the comprehensive answers to all substantive questions. However, it is not easy for those answers to be available to the average person, who may have read the buckshot attacks which have been forthcoming against the Commission Report.

"To put some of the criticism into proper focus, I am willing to respond to questions and point out parts of the Report and areas of evidence which I consider complete answers to the so-called critics."

 

This article originally appeared in the Oct. 10, 1966, issue of U.S. News & World Report. For more about John F. Kennedy, visit JFK: 50 Years Later.

 

Edited November 3, 2023 by Benjamin Cole

[Dan Rice]

Well, that settles it...

Seriously, thanks for posting.

Edited November 3, 2023 by Dan Rice

[Pat Speer]

From Chapter 10 at patspeer.com"

When one reads Specter's post-Warren Commission comments on its investigation, unfortunately, his slipperiness becomes readily apparent.

Let's start with an article on Specter by Gaeton Fonzi published in the August 1966 edition of Greater Philadelphia Magazine. Here, Specter aggressively defended his work for the Warren Commission. Fonzi maintained throughout the article, however, that many of the questions regarding Kennedy's autopsy could have been cleared up if Specter had viewed the autopsy photographs. When asked about this, and why he hadn't been more aggressive about viewing the photographs, for that matter, Specter is reported to have "appeared visibly disturbed" and to have stammered for awhile before responding "The commission decided not to press for the x-rays and photographs." According to Fonzi, Specter then became apologetic, and said "Have I dodged your question?...Yes' Ive dodged your question." He then gave a more detailed response: "The Commission considered whether the x-rays and photographs should be put into the record and should be examined by the Commission's staff and the Commission reached the conclusion that it was not necessary..."

Specter had thereby concealed that he had in fact been shown a photo of Kennedy's back wound by a member of the Secret Service, and that he'd opted not to report this to the commission.

His silence served another purpose as well. At another point in the article, after discussing Warren Commission Exhibit 385, a Rydberg drawing depicting the path of the bullet through Kennedy's neck, in which the bullet enters at the base of Kennedy's neck, Fonzi asked Specter to explain why so many witnesses, including the FBI agents present at the autopsy, claimed this wound was in the shoulder. He then wrote "Specter says it's possible that the whole thing is just a matter of semantics. 'It's a question of whether you call this point shoulder, base of neck, or back. I would say it sure isn't the shoulder, though I can see how somebody might call it the shoulder.'"

Now, admittedly, it's not crystal clear that when Specter said "this point" he was pointing to the entrance location depicted in CE 385, but the implication seems clear. If this is so, moreover, it seems equally clear that Specter was blowing smoke, trying to convince Fonzi that the confusion over the wound's location could be purely semantics, when he knew for certain--from sneaking a peek at an autopsy photo--that the wound depicted at the base of the neck on CE 385 was really inches below on the shoulder.

In late 2012, after the passing of both Fonzi and Specter, Fonzi's wife, Marie, made the tapes of their interviews available to the public via the Mary Ferrell Foundation website. These tapes confirm Specter's dishonesty. In three separate interviews--in over two hours of discussion--Specter never once admits that he'd been shown a photo of Kennedy's back wound, or even that the wound was on Kennedy's back. When interviewed on 6-28-66, he told Fonzi "The bullet entered the back of the neck between two strap muscles." This, as we've seen, was baloney. But he goes further, embarking on the discussion of semantics Fonzi mentioned in his article, and then proceeding to describe it as a neck wound whenever possible, at least five times by my count.

Specter's deceptiveness, in fact, becomes even more apparent in the second of these interviews. On 6-29-66, when discussing the single-bullet theory, the holes on the President's clothes, and the strange fact that Governor Connally's clothes were cleaned and pressed before being made available to the Commission, Specter asserted "The real question on the holes are the direction." He then injected "We didn't see the President; we didn't see the pictures." Fonzi hadn't asked the question, but Specter was volunteering that "we" didn't see the autopsy photos of the President, perhaps to conceal that "he" had, in fact, seen the one picture needed to determine the location of the President's back wound.

And that's not the most revealing of Specter's deceptions. Fonzi's tapes offer real insight into Specter's mindset--not only that he was lying, but why he was lying. In his 6-29-66 interview with Fonzi, when discussing Edward Epstein's book Inquest, in which Epstein suggested the Warren Commission investigation had been a whitewash performed in the name of the national interest, the politician in Specter came out, and he played to the grandstands. He told Fonzi: "It was not my function to decide the national interest. It was not Lyndon Johnson's function to decide the national interest. The national interest is decided in a democratic society by the free flow of facts into the truth. And any time any individual sets himself up to decide what is justice or what is the national interest, he's kidding himself. I'm not about to follow anybody's orders on that. They want to run their Commission. tell a bunch of lies, let them go ahead and run their Commission. They can't ask me to work for them." Specter, to his mind, was independent, and beyond the corrupting influence of Washington.

Now compare that to what Specter told Fonzi in their final interview on 7-8-66. When discussing the Commission's decision not to inspect the autopsy photographs, Specter at first said "As assistant counsel for the Commission, I do not think that it is appropriate for me to make a public statement disagreeing with the conclusion of the Commission on this question." Then, when asked if he'd thought of resigning when the autopsy photos and x-rays were withheld, he responded: "The decision of the Commission that the photographs and x-rays were not necessary in order for the Commission to arrive at a conclusion was not an egregious abuse of their discretion in light of the fact that they had substantial evidence on this question from eyewitness reports, from the highly qualified autopsy surgeons who had personally observed the President's body, a detailed report of the characteristics of the wounds, and there were important countervailing considerations which led the Commission to its conclusion that the films were not necessary in the light of the question of taste and the stature of the young American president whose memory will be regarded in the light of a smiling, handsome, erect, president, as opposed to a mutilated corpse with half his head shot off." Specter was pretending, of course, that everything the Commission looked at would automatically become available to the public, which he knew to be untrue.

But he continued from there, and ultimately revealed more of himself than he possibly could have intended. He insisted "The President of the United States didn't want Arlen Specter to conduct the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, the President of the United States appointed the Commission to do that job..." So there it was--what in retrospect reads like a confession that he'd chickened out--that he'd had the opportunity to make a difference but was overwhelmed by the feeling he'd be out of line in doing so. He then continued "...and if the Commission had done anything improper or made any effort to suppress material evidence or to mislead the American public in any way, that is the area where any honest public servant would be called upon to search his conscience for his resignation, not on discretionary questions as to whether the Commission ought to have additional evidence on the same point."

Well, my God. Feel free to read that again. Specter suggested that it would have been wrong for him to help the Commission if he felt it was making a deliberate effort to mislead the public, but that it wasn't his place to raise a ruckus if the Commission was simply ignoring important evidence, as long as it was ADDITIONAL evidence, that they were free to ignore at their discretion. In other words, he was thinking like a junior partner, unwilling to argue with a senior partner. He knew the autopsy photo showed a bullet wound on Kennedy's back, not neck, but thought this photo but one piece of evidence, which the Commission would feel free to ignore. Fate looked him in the face and he blinked. He'd lawyered his way out of doing the right thing.

That Specter was worried about Fonzi's article and had chosen to deceive him is further supported, moreover, by a far-friendlier article about the Warren Commission and the medical evidence published a few weeks later, by Joseph Daughen in the 8-28-66 Philadelphia Bulletin. Here, almost as an aside, Daughen asserted "in Dallas, a staff member who had expressed concern over the absence of the evidence was shown by a Secret Service agent a photograph purportedly representing the upper back of the President." Hmmm... Specter was interviewed for this article. Clearly, then, he had told Daughen of his viewing the photo in Dallas. Well, why hadn't he told this to Fonzi, when the commission's failure to view the photos was central to Fonzi's article?

Well, the thought occurs that that's it, right there. The viewing of the photos was central to Fonzi's article. If then-District Attorney Specter had told Fonzi he'd seen the photo then Fonzi would have insisted he describe what he saw. And Specter, presumably, was hoping to avoid that. (Notice how the compliant Daughen not only fails to name Specter as the staff member who'd viewed the photo of Kennedy's upper back, but fails to describe where the wound was in this photo.)

In any event, in the 10-10-66 edition of U.S. News & World Report, Specter finally admitted he'd been shown one of Kennedy's autopsy photos. He didn't exactly come clean, however. Nope, true to form, he side-stepped the fact the photo shown him by Kelley didn’t match the Rydberg drawings by claiming “It showed a hole in the position identified in the autopsy report” but that it had not been "technically authenticated." Well, of course it showed a hole in the position identified in the autopsy report. The autopsy report described a wound on Kennedy's back, and not at the base of his neck, where Specter had taken to pretending it had been. In the article, Specter then moaned that, should this wound have been on Kennedy's back below the level of his throat wound, as proposed by conspiracy theorist Edward J. Epstein, it would mean "the autopsy surgeons were perjurers, because the autopsy surgeons placed their hands on the Bible and swore to the truth of an official report where they had measured to a minute extent the precise location of the hole on the back of the President's neck, as measured from other specific points on the body of the President."

Well, once again, the Specter shift was in place. He defended the integrity of the doctors by claiming they'd be perjurers if the autopsy report was in error, when he almost certainly knew the problem was not with the autopsy report, but with the schematic drawings of Kennedy he--Arlen Specter--had asked them to create. To reiterate, the measurements taken by the "autopsy surgeons" suggested the wound to have been on Kennedy's back, at or below the level of the throat wound, and not on the "back of the President's neck," where both Specter and the "surgeons" had taken to saying it had been. The autopsy report, moreover, said nothing about the relative locations of the back wound and throat wound.

So why was Specter suggesting otherwise? Was he playing a sneaky lawyer trick, and leading his readers to assume something he knew to be untrue?

I'd bet the farm on it. He then insisted that "The photographs would, however, corroborate that which the autopsy surgeons testified to." Well, notice the language... If he meant to say that the autopsy photo he'd been shown depicted a wound at the base of Kennedy's neck, in the location suggested by the Rydberg drawings, then why didn't he just say so? And why, instead, did he claim that the autopsy surgeons testified to the accuracy of their measurements, and that the photographs corroborated these measurements? Was he trying to avoid saying that the Rydberg drawings were accurate--because he knew full well they were not?

Specter also discussed the strap muscles in this interview. He claimed that at the beginning of the autopsy the doctors found that "a finger could probe between two large strap muscles and penetrate to a very slight extent" a "hole at the base of the back of the neck." He then pushed what clearly wasn't true--that he got this information from somewhere other than his own fertile imagination. He related that the Warren Commission testimony of the "autopsy surgeons" had established "the path of the bullet through the President's neck, showing that it entered between two large strap muscles..."

His statements in the 11-25-66 issue of Life Magazine were equally curious. He said "Given the trajectory from the Book Depository window, the autopsy, about which I have no doubts, and the FBI report on the limousine; where, if it didn't hit Connally, did that bullet go?" Yes, you read that right. Specter claimed he had no doubts about the autopsy. Well, maybe he didn't. But his version of the autopsy--the one where the doctors found a path between two muscles on the back of Kennedy's neck--was not the real autopsy.

I'm being facetious, of course, which sounds a lot like the substance Specter was spreading. The autopsy photo he'd been shown--the one on the slide above--depicted a wound in Kennedy's upper back, at or below the level of his throat wound. The "trajectory from the Book Depository window," therefore, necessitated that either 1) Kennedy was leaning sharply forward when hit, or 2) the bullet creating this wound had curled upwards upon entry. The "autopsy" about which Specter had no doubts, however, had ruled out that the bullet had struck anything upon entry. The films of the assassination studied by Specter, furthermore, proved Kennedy wasn't leaning sharply forward when hit. So what was there to have doubts about? What, Specter, worry?

Let's recall here that in his 4-30-64 memo to J. Lee Rankin, Specter urged that the Rydberg drawings be compared to the autopsy photos, and specified:

"2. THE COMMISSION SHOULD DETERMINE WITH CERTAINTY WHETHER THE SHOTS CAME FROM ABOVE. It is essential for the Commission to know precisely the location of the bullet wound on the President's back so that the angle may be calculated. The artist's drawing prepared at Bethesda (Commission Exhibit #385) shows a slight angle of declination. It is hard, if not impossible, to explain such a slight angle of decline unless the President was farther down Elm Street than we have heretofore believed. Before coming to any conclusion on this, the angles will have to be calculated at the scene; and for this, the exact point of entry should be known."

Now let's do a quick replay. On 4-30-64, Specter admitted that he'd thought the trajectory in Rydberg drawing CE 385 too shallow to support the shooting scenario he'd proposed. Well, this is the same as his saying he thought the neck wound too low to support Kennedy and Connally being hit by the same bullet at the time he'd assumed they'd been hit. On 5-24-64, however, he was shown a photo of Kennedy's back, in which the wound was revealed to have been approximately two inches lower on Kennedy's back than in Rydberg drawing CE 385. This meant it was far too low to support the shooting scenario he'd proposed. So how did Specter respond to this challenge? Did he change his scenario? Nope. On 6-4-64 he took testimony from FBI agent Lyndal Shaneyfelt in which Shaneyfelt purported that the trajectory from the sniper's nest approximated the trajectory through Kennedy's neck in CE 385--the drawing which Specter now knew to be inaccurate. Specter then pushed this nonsense in the Warren Report. He then defended his work by telling Life Magazine he had no doubts about the autopsy, and that the trajectory from the sniper's nest--the trajectory he'd thought incompatible with CE 385, and would have to have thought thoroughly incompatible with the photo he'd been shown--contributed to his faith in his scenario.

Well, hello! Do I have to spell it out? Specter was L-Y-I-N-G!

[Cliff Varnell]

Pat, you left out the best part of Fonzi’s interviews with Specter.

The WarrenCommission, The Truth, & Arlen Specter

by Gaeton Fonzi

https://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/GaetonFonzi/WCTandAS.pdf

<quote, italic emphasis in the original, bold added>

The Warren Commission Report says the entrance wound caused by the bullet which came out Kennedy’s throat was “approximately 5-1⁄2 inches” below the back of the right ear. Yet photographs of the President’s jacket and shirt, which were part of the FbI supplemental report of January 13th, make it difficult to believe that is the truth.

These photographs were not part of the Warren Commission Report and were left out of the 26 volumes of supporting evidence. Although a description of Kennedy’s clothing was in the Report, the discrepancy between the location of the bullet holes in them and the reported location of the wounds was never discussed or explained.                             

And there was a very obvious discrepancy: the hole in the back of the jacket was 5-3/8 inches below the top of the collar and 1-3⁄4 inches to the right of the center back seam of the coat. traces of copper were found in the margins of the hole and the cloth fibers were pushed inward. “Although the precise size of the bullet could not be determined from the hole, it was consistent with having been made by a 6.5-millimeter bullet,” said the Report.

The shirt worn by the President also contained a hole in the back about 5 3⁄4 inches below the top of the collar and 1-1/8 inches to the right of the middle. It, too, had the characteristics of a bullet entrance hole.

Both these holes are in locations that seem obviously inconsistent with the wound described in the Commission’s autopsy report — placed below the back of the right ear — and illustrated in exhibit 385, which dr. Humes had prepared.

“Well,” said Specter, when asked about this in his City Hall office last month, “that difference is accounted for because the President was waving his arm.” He got up from his desk and attempted to have his explanation demonstrated. “Wave your arm a few times,” he said, “wave at the crowd. Well, see if the bullet goes in here, the jacket gets hunched up. If you take this point right here and then you strip the coat down, it comes out at a lower point. Well, not too much lower on your example, but the jacket rides up.”

If the jacket were “hunched up,” wouldn’t there have been two holes as a result of the doubling over of the cloth?

“No, not necessarily. It ... it wouldn’t be doubled over. When you sit in the car it could be doubled over at most any point, but the probabilities are that ... aaah ... that it gets ... that ... aaah ... this ... this is about the way a jacket rides up. You sit back ... sit back now ... all right now ... if ... usually, as your jacket lies there, the doubling up is right here, but if ... but if you have a bullet hit you right about here, which is where I had it, where your jacket sits ... it’s not ... it’s not ... it ordinarily doesn’t crease that far back.”

What about the shirt?

“Same thing.”

There is no real inconsistency between the Commission’s location of the wound and the holes in the clothing?

“No, not at all.  That gave us a lot of concern. First time we lined up the shirt ... after all, we lined up the shirt ... and the hole in the shirt is right about, right about the knot of the tie, came right about here in a slit in the front ...”

But where did it go in the back?

“Well, the back hole, when the shirt is laid down, comes . . . aaah ... well, I forget exactly where it came, but it certainly wasn’t higher, enough higher to ... aaah ... understand the ... aah ... the angle of decline which ...”

Was it lower? Was it lower than the slit in the front?

“Well, I think that ... that if you took the shirt without allowing for it’s being pulled up, that it would either have been in line or somewhat lower.”

Somewhat lower?

“Perhaps. I ... I don’t want to say because I don’t really remember. I got to take a look at that shirt.”

</q>

 

[Roger Odisio]

2 hours ago, Cliff Varnell said:

Pat, you left out the best part of Fonzi’s interviews with Specter.

The WarrenCommission, The Truth, & Arlen Specter

by Gaeton Fonzi

https://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/GaetonFonzi/WCTandAS.pdf

<quote, italic emphasis in the original, bold added>

The Warren Commission Report says the entrance wound caused by the bullet which came out Kennedy’s throat was “approximately 5-1⁄2 inches” below the back of the right ear. Yet photographs of the President’s jacket and shirt, which were part of the FbI supplemental report of January 13th, make it difficult to believe that is the truth.

These photographs were not part of the Warren Commission Report and were left out of the 26 volumes of supporting evidence. Although a description of Kennedy’s clothing was in the Report, the discrepancy between the location of the bullet holes in them and the reported location of the wounds was never discussed or explained.                             

And there was a very obvious discrepancy: the hole in the back of the jacket was 5-3/8 inches below the top of the collar and 1-3⁄4 inches to the right of the center back seam of the coat. traces of copper were found in the margins of the hole and the cloth fibers were pushed inward. “Although the precise size of the bullet could not be determined from the hole, it was consistent with having been made by a 6.5-millimeter bullet,” said the Report.

The shirt worn by the President also contained a hole in the back about 5 3⁄4 inches below the top of the collar and 1-1/8 inches to the right of the middle. It, too, had the characteristics of a bullet entrance hole.

Both these holes are in locations that seem obviously inconsistent with the wound described in the Commission’s autopsy report — placed below the back of the right ear — and illustrated in exhibit 385, which dr. Humes had prepared.

“Well,” said Specter, when asked about this in his City Hall office last month, “that difference is accounted for because the President was waving his arm.” He got up from his desk and attempted to have his explanation demonstrated. “Wave your arm a few times,” he said, “wave at the crowd. Well, see if the bullet goes in here, the jacket gets hunched up. If you take this point right here and then you strip the coat down, it comes out at a lower point. Well, not too much lower on your example, but the jacket rides up.”

If the jacket were “hunched up,” wouldn’t there have been two holes as a result of the doubling over of the cloth?

“No, not necessarily. It ... it wouldn’t be doubled over. When you sit in the car it could be doubled over at most any point, but the probabilities are that ... aaah ... that it gets ... that ... aaah ... this ... this is about the way a jacket rides up. You sit back ... sit back now ... all right now ... if ... usually, as your jacket lies there, the doubling up is right here, but if ... but if you have a bullet hit you right about here, which is where I had it, where your jacket sits ... it’s not ... it’s not ... it ordinarily doesn’t crease that far back.”

What about the shirt?

“Same thing.”

There is no real inconsistency between the Commission’s location of the wound and the holes in the clothing?

“No, not at all.  That gave us a lot of concern. First time we lined up the shirt ... after all, we lined up the shirt ... and the hole in the shirt is right about, right about the knot of the tie, came right about here in a slit in the front ...”

But where did it go in the back?

“Well, the back hole, when the shirt is laid down, comes . . . aaah ... well, I forget exactly where it came, but it certainly wasn’t higher, enough higher to ... aaah ... understand the ... aah ... the angle of decline which ...”

Was it lower? Was it lower than the slit in the front?

“Well, I think that ... that if you took the shirt without allowing for it’s being pulled up, that it would either have been in line or somewhat lower.”

Somewhat lower?

“Perhaps. I ... I don’t want to say because I don’t really remember. I got to take a look at that shirt.”

</q>

 

Right, Cllff.   It's my recollection the Spector's dissembling about the basic facts of his single bullet theory--his inability to answer the most basic questions--really shook up Fonzi. And sent him on a decades long journey to find out what really happened.

 

[Eddy Bainbridge]

I am quoting from two of Spector's answers below:

"The reason that such a hole would be inconclusive turns on the consideration that the bullet which passed through the President's neck met virtually no resistance in the President's body—it struck no bone,"

"And Dr. Perry said that those wounds could have been accounted for by having a bullet come in through the neck, strike the vertebrae in back, and glance up through the top of the head — which would be an extraordinary combination, but one which was conceivable in the light of the limited information available to the Dallas doctors at that time."

The reason Dr Perry came up with the suggestion in the second quote is twofold ; He knew the bullet came from the front, and he knew, from its location it would have to strike neck bone on its path. The second point applies whichever direction the bullet was travelling. Spector's statement 'it struck no bone' is impossible.

[David Von Pein]

1967 Arlen Specter Interview (Video):

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0KFei3W7bGObExqcU9YWEVlSHM/view

 

Edited November 4, 2023 by David Von Pein

[Cliff Varnell]

On 11/3/2023 at 11:55 AM, Roger Odisio said:

Right, Cllff.   It's my recollection the Spector's dissembling about the basic facts of his single bullet theory--his inability to answer the most basic questions--really shook up Fonzi. And sent him on a decades long journey to find out what really happened.

 

Fonzi and Salandria provided the template for a positive assertion of conspiracy — the bullet holes in the clothes too low.

The “problem” with this is it counterfeits the Answer the Question of Conspiracy Parlor Game.  Game players commonly ignore/dispute the clothing holes/T3 back wound to keep their pet theories relevant.