The Report that got Allen Dulles Fired

[Ron Bulman]

Isn't Ike the one in a meeting with Dulles and others said words to the effect of Lumumba had to go?

[James DiEugenio]

According to John Newman, that is correct. 

It was Eisenhower who first suggested that Lumumba should be eliminated.

Then Allen Dulles put it into action.

[Ron Bulman]

I know so much less than several out there on this subject.  I've read some of the experts work on "it", the bigger picture but by no means all.  E.G, John Newman, Peter Dale Scott, Jim and Larry Hancock plus a little elsewhere by others.

After reading the book mentioned above, The Brothers by Stephen Kinzer, that John Foster and Allen Dulles were the root cause of the United States involvement in the Vietnam War.  He doesn't say that I conclude it from the information he provides.

Truman first gave the French financial aid to fight Vietnam hoping to gain their support of US involvement in Korea.  John Foster and Allen came in with an agenda, fighting Communism in the name of US interests.  First deposing elected leaders for US controlled dictators in Iran then Guatemala.  Next was to be Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. 

John Foster according to some favored sending US troops to help at Dien Bien Phu.  Ike did say no to this emphatically, though he too wanted Ho gone at any other cost.  This is when John foster made his speech creating the infamous "Domino Theory".  I thought I'd read somewhere he also supported the idea of using tactical nuclear weapons there as well. 

JF went to Geneva with the goal of no concessions to Ho.  Ho was given control over North Vietnam for two years until a national general election.  JF was appalled.  Enter Allen, they got Diem appointed in the South and he sent in Lansdale as Ho's "coach".  He created the Northern Catholics mass exodus to the South.  They ignored the Geneva Accords and created a false election for Diem in the South.  So much more detail.

Kinzer doesn't say this either, just my speculation.  Though Foster died they had the ball teed up for Nixon to send in ground troops in Vietnam after he invaded Cuba.  The Military Industrial Complex Eisenhower warned of wanted these things.  The military was gung-ho and ready to go after no war since Korea.  Wall Street saw $$$.

Then came JFK.  In the way, uncooperative and idealistic.    

[James DiEugenio]

Ron:

Truman and Acheson did something that FDR likely would not have done.

They recognized Bao Dai as the leader in the south.  This enraged Ho Chi Minh.  Because it meant to him that America was going to back the French in their effort to retake the area after the war.. This is what FDR told Cordell Hull that he did not want France to do.

Ho Chi Minh was correct and Truman did give aid to France when the war started. But as most commentators say, once Eisenhower took over, the aid greatly increased by a large factor.  But still the French could not gain a decisive advantage.  And Americans on the scene, like reporter Seymour Topping and diplomat Edmund Gullion, thought this was hopeless; and if America took over, it would be the same. So when Kennedy visited in 1951, both men said this to him: that France could not win the war.  In fact, Topping's declaration might have been even stronger than Gullion's.

When Kennedy returned home, he made some speeches about imperialism vs nationalism in the Third World. A little later he  wrote a letter to Foster Dulles, asking him what America's strategy was in Indochina. About a year after that, it became clear that both Nixon and Foster Dulles  advocated the use of American ground troops if necessary.  In fact Nixon mentioned this in a speech.

But then during the siege of Dien Bien Phu, Foster Dulles planned Operation Vulture, which Fletcher Prouty was one of the first to write about, and John Prados wrote a whole book about.  This was a truly nutty plan to send a huge air armada over the site, accompanied by 135 fighter planes if China intervened. The mission was to drop 3 atomic bombs over the site. This was approved by Foster Dulles and Admiral Radford, but Ike turned it down when the British could not go along with it. But, Dulles then went to the French privately, no one knows if Ike approved this, and offered them the nukes. They declined.

Nixon was the point man in congress for this wacky idea.  Kennedy railed against it.

When DIen Bien Phu fell,  we found out why Dulles never replied to Kennedy's letter.  Because against the advice of Topping and Gullion, America was now going to replace France as the imperial power there. As Ike later confessed, if they stuck to the Geneva agreement for free unification elections, Ho Chi Minh would win in a landslide.  So they broke the agreement, split the country in half, and the CIA propped up this Catholic, English speaking,  suit and tie attired dictator, Ngo DInh DIem, who was being run by Ed Lansdale. It was this choice that led to an epic tragedy.  There were others who would have been much better.  But, in retrospect, the wisest choice was to have just enacted the Accords. And avoided 20 more years of war and 5.8 million deaths in Indochina.

Edited Sunday at 05:27 AM by James DiEugenio

[Ron Bulman]

Did Allen pass on his Laos/ Vietnam projects when he was fired?  JFK inherited this from Eisenhower/ Nixon/the Dulles brothers project(s)?

[James DiEugenio]

Vietnam was at the start a CIA war. 

Lansdale was the main cog in South Vietnam, rigging elections for Diem and forging the whole Catholic exodus south to prop up a backing for Diem. As we know Lansdale was ostensibly an Air Force officer but was really CIA, and very friendly with Dulles. In fact Lansdale wanted to be the ambassador to Saigon. So yes, I would say that Dulles was strongly involved with all this.

Laos was a little different, in that the Pentagon was really pushing for Kennedy to enter into that theater. At first there was not even a CIA station there. Arleigh Burke wanted a 60,000 man contingent to go into the country.  Kennedy dismantled that with some tough questioning and arranged a neutralist solution. 

But as Mike Swanson pointed out in his book Why Vietnam?  this caused a retargeting to Vietnam.

Edited Sunday at 05:36 AM by James DiEugenio

[Paul Rigby]

From our own correspondent [Louis Heren], “Washington Inquiry into CIA Activities in Laos,” The Times, Wednesday, 31 May 1962, p.11

Washington, May 30 – The Administration is conducting an investigation into the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos. Both President Kennedy and Mr Averell Harriman, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, were perturbed by the report published in this correspondence last Thursday, and investigations are now under way.

Your Correspondent reported that CIA agents who helped to bring about the downfall of Prince Souvanna Phouma in 1960 were long suspected of influencing and strengthening the resistance of the right wing to a political solution; that apparently the evidence showed that CIA agents opposed the official American objective of trying to establish a neutral Government, and that it was believed they provided General Phoumi Nosavan with some funds after the suspension in February of the monthly subsidy of $3m. (more than £1m.)

It is understood that the American Embassy in Vientiane has reported there is no evidence of the agency disregarding official policy. The Ambassador is believed to have expressed his confidence that all arms of the United States Government in Laos, including those responsible for military and civil assistance as well as intelligence, are loyally carrying out official policy.

AGENTS NOT WITHDRAWN

It is admitted that officers and agents who were close to General Phoumi when he overthrew Prince Souvanna were not withdrawn, except when their tours of duty expired, and that the decision to leave them in Laos was made because of their usefulness; the point is made that they were perhaps best equipped to deal with the general. The Embassy, however, is convinced that they have not been involved.

All this is reassuring, although in the past American Ambassadors have been unaware of the activities of CIA men placed in their own embassies, but the Administration has received information to the contrary from other foreign missions on Vientiane, including the embassies of Britain and France. There appears to be a disposition, however, to minimize the importance of this information, although it is agreed that both embassies are well informed.

Contrary evidence of a kind is provided by General Phoumi himself. The general apparently was quite outspoken and made it known that he could disregard the American Embassy and the military advisory group because he was in communication with other American agencies.

ENCOURAGING GENERAL

The truth will probably never be fully revealed, although apparently the investigations have yet to be completed. The situation at present is that the American Ambassador in Laos is confident of the loyalty of all American officials; foreign embassies, which are not concerned with the loyalty of the American officials as such, believe that American agents have encouraged General Phoumi in his intransigence, and the general seems to have provided confirmation.

The general’s remarks are perhaps not to be taken entirely at face value, but for many here the danger of employing an agency such as the CIA in a backward Asian country is that American policy can be misunderstood. The danger is enhanced when officials and agents who helped to establish the general and the right wing of the princes in power remain after official American policy has been radically changed.

Here more concern was expressed than in the past because President Kennedy is not an umpire ensuring fair play between his departments and agencies, but a chief executive determined that his policies shall be carried out loyally and efficiently. It can be assumed that this determination will prevail.

POLICY UNCHANGED

The Administration is now anxious that this should be demonstrated. United States policy, it has authoritatively learnt, remains unchanged. As before, the Administration is working for a neutral Laos with a Government of national unity. When General Phoumi is persuaded to return to Laos, the negotiations will continue.

The Administration seems convinced that the Soviet Union is also anxious to stabilize the situation, and the recent speech of Mr Khrushchev was well received. Unfortunately, because of the recent disasters, the Laotian right wing is no longer so well placed and the fear is that the Pathet Lao will increase their demands. Nevertheless, the effort is to be made.

[James DiEugenio]

Harriman did say that there were forces working against a neutralization plan.

[Benjamin Cole]

8 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

Harriman did say that there were forces working against a neutralization plan.

A dark chapter in US history. Vietnam. 

[Benjamin Cole]

8 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

Harriman did say that there were forces working against a neutralization plan.

JD-

With your deep understanding of the JFKA and JFK legacy...

1. In 1964 the D-Party had huge majorities in the House and Senate. Yet in 1964-5 they backed LBJ in his incredibly ill-advised war into Vietnam, and did not launch an independent Congressional investigation into the JFKA. 

2. In fact, the D-Party would eventually bring about a Congressional investigation of the JFKA, the HSCA in 1976, but then almost made it stillborn by the snuff job Richard Sprague as chief counsel, and also gave the HSCA a limited budget and timeline. 

I have never understood these aspects of the D-Party in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, I have written about the HSCA for your website, and I am still puzzled by events.

Is there something going on behind the scenes? 

[Ron Bulman]

10 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

Harriman did say that there were forces working against a neutralization plan.

Wasn't Harriman also involved in at least the cover up of the JFK Assassination.  The creation of the Warren Commission?

[James DiEugenio]

To Ben:

In 1964, Johnson attempted to keep secret his plan to escalate in Vietnam.  This included the fact that he had also planned for a casus belli event for which he would go to congress for a resolution.  That, of course, was the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which he lied about as to where the ships were and that they were not just like patrols as we had all over the Pacific Ocean.

It was not until later that Fulbright realized that he had been duped by the White House, not just on Vietnam but also on Juan Bosch and the invasion of the Dominican Republic, which was also a reversal of Kennedy's policy.  It was when Fulbright began to call for his senate hearings that the Democratic Party began to reconsider what LBJ was doing.  But by then, 1966, it was a bit late.  And the plea was we could not abandon the effort in midstream with hundreds of thousands of men still there.

It was Fulbright who finally began to turn the tide against LBJ.  But the country had by now been polarized as hawks vs doves to such an extent that the facts did not really matter. You were either for the war, thus a patriot, or against the war, a sell out. And I should add, that polarization was magnified by Nixon to the point that it has never left the country.

I should add, back then you had liberal and moderate  Republicans, like Jacob Javits and John Sherman Cooper. They were both on that committee.  They were so critical about what LBJ had done that Johnson called CBS and asked Paley to censor the hearings. Fred Friendly resigned over that request when CBS showed a rerun of I Love Lucy instead.

Edited Tuesday at 01:02 AM by James DiEugenio

[Paul Brancato]

A little trip down my memory lane. In 1962 (maybe ‘61) I played a youth concert in Carnegie Hall, all city JHS orchestra. Javitz was guest speaker, and us kids were made to sit on stage during his presentation at intermission. Mid way through his speech about the glories of American children and education, a voice from the upper balcony interrupted him - ‘what about the kids in Vietnam’? Twice. I knew instantly it was my father. 

[Ron Bulman]

29 minutes ago, Paul Brancato said:

A little trip down my memory lane. In 1962 (maybe ‘61) I played a youth concert in Carnegie Hall, all city JHS orchestra. Javitz was guest speaker, and us kids were made to sit on stage during his presentation at intermission. Mid way through his speech about the glories of American children and education, a voice from the upper balcony interrupted him - ‘what about the kids in Vietnam’? Twice. I knew instantly it was my father. 

That's pretty cool Paul.

[James DiEugenio]

I agree, nice one Paul.

BTW, as per Harriman, I don't think he had much to do with the formation of the Warren Commission.  At least I do not recall him from Don Gibson's definitive essay.

But Jim Douglass does mention him as secretly sandbagging a neutralist solution suggested by Galbraith through India about Vietnam. (pp. 119-21)