William Plumlee

<{POST_SNAPBACK}> Shanet. Very good points: I wish I had the time to really get into this. Gary was set up and fed a lot of dis-information in order to cover an "ON-GOING" operation. When he got to close to the "MEXICO THING" as the DEA documents called it, then the dis-information started. We talked about this and for awhile he did not know up from down on the information he was being fed. When the Mexican MDJF Police were murdered, drawn and quartered, he was going to cover that but it was quickly classified Top Secret by the CIA because of their operatives in place at the time of the massacre and it was said that methods and procedures would be compromised if the story got out. A cover story was put in place and the Mexican Police that were killed were said to be drug runners. Nothing was said to the press about the C-130's and weapons bound for Central America flown by American crews... That at the time was the real story..., but he was feed wrong information by other media contacts of the CIA and the story was lost. Later, when the questions about a CIA training base in Mexico at a ranch owned by a Drug Lord, he, as well as others were laughed at. When the Drug Route from Lejtas to the USA was found and uncovered, it too was classified and the story also was lost. Shortly after that Gary was feed the information about "Freeway" and he was set up by his own informants who were working for the CIA in the Media. They knew Gary would run with the story and they were waiting to shoot him down. AND THEY DID. The C-130 story. The Ranch. And the drugs for guns was covered. Another dedicated American, a lawman had also came across similar operations of the CIA . They called him KIKI. KIKI would not stop and he would not compromise. He was murdered.

reply from Tosh Plumlee: Canty and I used to fly the same aircraft at Southwest Airmotive and Red Bird Airport before the assassination. We both had worked for Inter-Mountain Aviation, Tucson and Paragon of Miami and Hollywood Air Park, as well as L.B. Smith Aircraft located at Miami International. [documented, Miami; OMC-235 Sec C Tab B Miami CIA Cuban Desk] The Comanche was the aircraft parked near the fuel dump that we had to move in order to park and tie down our DC-3 on the day Kennedy was assassinated. Canty sometimes used the name "Jay" Tanner an operative name, as I sometimes used 'Buck Pearson'. [documented. U. S. Senate; Congressman Tom Downing, 1975; W.R. Plumlee sworn testimony of 1992] documented SAC Scott Warner Denver FBI, 1964; Classified] Jay and Rojas had also flown in Miami around 1959 on weapons deliveries to Castro's rebels. I had flown with Jack Rylie of Rylie Aviation and Riddle Airlines before going to work as a flight mech. with Inter-Mountain Aviation. I worked for Southwest Airmotive in 1952-56 at Dallas Love Field and I took flight trainning at Red Bird and White Rock Airport on the GI Bill. Tanner (Canty) was one of my flight instructors at North Perry Airport in Florida. Most of this flying by me and 'Jay' was connected to the Dallas Cubans and gun running through Dallas (Alpha-66 and Omega-7 operations) for at least thrree years before the assassination of Kennedy and into the first part of 1964. [ref; #1. Plumlee's U.S. Army DD-214 states employment; Southwest Airmotive. #2. Ref; FBI 62216 &105-74xxx Plumlee/Rosellie; #3. FOIA FBI 105xxx, 1981, ref; places of employment.] note: Portions of this information and documentation has been previously posted on this site. Some of this information is on file and remains "Classified Top Secret, Committee Sensitive", ref; Senator John Kerry's Committee of 1986-87; ref Senator Church's investigative staff of 1974-76

No Steve. I have heard the story. If you have ever been to Dallas and the Trinety River near Industrial (or anywhere along the river between Oak Cliff and Dallas.., 10 miles north or south) you would see, it would take one hell of an airplane and pilot to land there not to mention a take off with a four engine DC-4 (C54) I used to drive along the levee and got stuck many times. And too, it is not wide enough for an airplane to land and takeoff. (to soft and bushy in the river basin) Dallas Love Field is only five miles to the north of this area. A Dc-4 or C-54 landing there would be quite a sight and many people would flock to see the feat..,iincluding the FAA .

Wim: For what its worth. Some years ago I talked with John Grady and he could not remember checking on Files. He said he was going to receive information about Files from a 'Source' but as of that time he had not received anything. He ask me if I knew Files service number. This was in 1994, I think ,or around that time. I ask BV if he had Files service number and he did not, but was going to get it for me. [At the time, he was trying to get me to support the Files story.., ask Jim Marrs about this] I would question the letter from Grady if I were you. It seems I have been down this road before; at least twice. About three years ago I tried to get information about the 82nd history and was directed to another person and they told me I had to have a service number because the name Sutton or Files and the Birthday came up with nothing and was not enough information to go on. Others, told me it (his record) was so secret that it had been destroyed. Later, I found out that that statement had came from Files and passed to me from him by another source. I ask if THEY could get Files to tell me his service number because he would have remembered it and I could work it from that direction. That too, did not happen. I was going to see Files and was told I had been put on his visitors list and I went to see him and when I got there, I was told I was not on his list of visitors. I had planned to ask him about his service number and other matters contained in his story. I was asked to do this by others. However, it did not happen and it was a wasted trip at my cost. On another matter. The 101st and the 82nd keeps records of all personal who completed five jumps or more during basic training and after. These records are kept at Fort Benning and Fort Brag. Files or Sutton is not listed as anyone who completed jump school during the time frame of Files statements. If you could ask Files to give me his Jump certifcate certification dates that too would help pin point his activites. Also if he was assigned as a parachute rigger or tech. could you ask him what type of chutes he was qualified to rig or pack; example T-56, T10, or CA5-89s this too would tell where he received the trainning and the dates. Wim. I am trying hard to help you. I believe you are a good researcher. I believe these questions are important as to the overall credibility of Files and his story. I am not trying to knock you or Files down. I need a foundation to work on concerning the Files story. So far, for whatever reasons these matters should have been investigated long ago. Why these very basic questions have not been asked or answered is beyond me. With what you have put into this project then I think you should demand these answers on pull your pocket book back until you get them. Because somebody says believe me because I say its true is not good enough. Hell, I do not even do that. At least I try to prove what I say I think I know or whatever. I do not say believe me. I try to point the way and if it works fine... if not then I move on to the next set of questions and try to find spacifics and facts that prove what I say I did... sometimes it works , sometimes it does'nt. But at least I try. If you could nail down these questions and they checked out... Then I would be the first to confirm the Files story and say I was sorry for doubting him. So far I do not see this. Thanks Wim for your understanding on these issues. I feel they are important questions and should be answered. Thats from a friend. Tosh

".... reply to previous postings by Shanet ...". Shanet: Damn good research work. I think you should expand upon this history because in order to understand the workings of INTEL you have to know this foundation. Very good. You should teach classes to the new generation on this subject matter. I think it would help them understand better on how to approach this delicate subject matter of USA Intelligent agencies and their previous failures. Again Good Work.... Tosh

Thanks Wim; There are those of us still alive who know what part Lee really played in the assassination of President Kennedy. It is not what the offical record says. I know this first hand, as well as others also know first hand on how Lee was connected to MI. It looks like we will take what we know to our graves... because of the powers that be.....

John. Very good post. I might add the M.O. is the same for those within the fold who turn away from the dirty work and try to right a wrong. Those reformist do not have the cover of the media at first and if the media does try to cover their stories in detail.., then the source and the journalist becomes the targets within the five step program just like you said. <{POST_SNAPBACK}> I think William Plumlee knows from experience exactly of what he speaks! As someone who had at one point reached an advanced 'stage' in this 'game' of pressure, I too concur that the steps and analysis are correct - the pressures mentioned used - and the 'final solution' used when it suits them. Nicely worded John! <{POST_SNAPBACK}> Peter. If I recall rightfully, you also paid a price on your investigations of the early 90's. Am I wrong on this? Did you not hear from the IRS and had your place broken into after you asked for a few documents on some of those blacked out names of the 1981 FOIA Fensterwald documents? Correct me if I am wrong. Its good to have you on this forum. I think you can be of help on a few matters. Do you remember the picture of the South Knoll and Tom Wilson? Would you like to get into that matter on this Forum? THEY ?? did a number on you... Right?

Wim; Can you ask Files what unit within the 82nd he was attatched to? Was it the 506th, 508th, 504th, etc? This would help a lot and would go a long way with his service number and location of his time line before he went to Loas. It would help me locate him. So far, I have been unable to do so. Have you heard back from him on his service numbers? Thanks Tosh P.S Do you still want me to go and see him face to face? I have not been put on his visitor list as yet. (December 1st)

John. Very good post. I might add the M.O. is the same for those within the fold who turn away from the dirty work and try to right a wrong. Those reformist do not have the cover of the media at first and if the media does try to cover their stories in detail.., then the source and the journalist becomes the targets within the five step program just like you said.

Steve. No I did not know him. I knew of him, but that came years later.

Not that I want to in any way defend Files credibility, but Files and Plumlee are not mutually exclusive with regard to Roselli's arrival in Dallas. Plumlee says Roselli departed the plane at 6:30 a.m. and Files claims to have picked Roselli up at the Cabana Motel sometime around 7 a.m. <{POST_SNAPBACK}> This is from Mr. Plumlee's seminar: We arrived in Garland near daybreak. There had been so many threats against the President's life that we didn't have a great sense of urgency about this particular one. While waiting out the bad weather in Garland, and about thirty minutes after landing three of the passengers were picked up by car, including Roselli. (There are three documented corroborations of my presence at Garland airport that morning). After the weather had cleared sufficiently for the plane to continue via VFR flight rules to Redbird Airport in Dallas, we left Garland for the ten minute flight to Red Bird. We landed at Redbird around 9:30 or 10:30 a.m., perhaps as late as 11 a.m. where everybody got off and went their own way. This implies to me that Rosselli was on the flight from Garland to Red Bird and he exited mid-morning from Red Bird (with everyone else). <{POST_SNAPBACK}> Tim; Thanks for the posting. Perhaps I should have been more clear in my paper. Rosellie got off at Garland and was picked up by car at Garland about 7a.m. "...While waiting out the bad weather in Garland, and about thirty minutes after landing three of the passengers were picked up by car, including Roselli...". Perhaps this might also help a little on the time frame. I think these matters should be cleared up as to what I have said and meant in the past. The following complete sworn statement can be found at the following website. http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/arrb/index67.htm Dallas, Texas -- November 18, 1994 Hearing -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "... ...The second participant discovered by Truth is male Caucasian Robert Tosh Plumlee, a CIA pilot. Mr. Plumlee has piloted and co-piloted clandestine CIA flights for over 31 years. He testified before the Church Committee in the 1970s and his CIA escapades have been well chronicled in magazine articles, books and congressional reports. Mr. Plumlee testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 2nd, 1990, and again in May of 1991. His testimony under oath has been classified as Top Secret. Senator John Kerry served as Chairman of the Senate Committee, John Wyner, I believe his name is, and Dick McCall, staff aides to Senator Kerry, questioned Mr. Plumlee in relation to the Contra resupply network behind closed doors. Mr. Plumlee testified to the U.S. Senate Committee and to Truth Truth Truth, Incorporated, that on the morning of November 22nd, 1963, he was a co-pilot on a top secret flight supported by the CIA. Mr. Plumlee's flight left Florida on November 21, 1963, and stopped in New Orleans and Houston before heading into Dallas, Texas, during the early morning hours of November 22nd, 1963. Mr. Plumlee testified that Philippe or Philippo Socko, alias John Roselli, a known Mafia/CIA double operative was onboard the plane to Dallas. Mr. Plumlee stated that Mr. Roselli departed the plane at Dallas Garland Airport shortly after 6:30 a.m. on the morning of November 22nd, 1963. Mr. Plumlee testified that he was informed that the flight was an abort mission, and that their assignment was to stop the assassination attempt on Kennedy's life. Tim. Thanks again for your interest concerning the Dallas Flight. I do hope this clears up some overlooked information contained therein.

Thanks Christy for keeping us up to date. I have been flying my A... off these past few days and not been around many newspapers or TV's. I have to admitt I was shocked when I heard the news. I had talked to Gary a few months ago and he was going to send me information concerning a follow up on his previous Dark Allience project. Although, I did not agree with all that Gary had wrote, he was however on course as to most of it. He was one fine reporter and we had a few laughs together. I really liked the guy. He was dedicated to his work and believed in what he was doing or trying to do. He was right on about the Mexico American (AMSOG) matter and we helped eachother document some hidden details on that subject. [Ref; DEA Susan Baldin and Hector Berliz TS DEA documents posted on my new website ref; Carro Quenterro's Mexico ranch] http://toshplumlee.info/ "...DEA Mexico OPS: These documents make reference to "Guatemalan Guerrillas" training at a ranch owned by Drug Lord CARO- Quintero in Vera Crus, Mexico. It was reported at the time this was a CIA training site where weapons were exchanged for drugs in support of the Contra effort in Nicaragua and Costa Rico. DEA Agent Enrique Camarena (KIKI) and his pilot found out about this operation known as "The CIA Thing" and were killed because of this knowledge. Plumlee and other American undercover pilots had flown into this ranch many times as reported in various sections within these documents and other news media leaks in Mexico and America. The operation was known as "AMSOG" and, as reported to Senator Gary Hart and his Senate investigators in early 1983, was an "illegal" smuggling operation through Mexico into the United States, supported by the US Military, Panama Southern Command...". Gary liked the title on my manuscript "Deep Cover-Shallow Graves" and wanted me to finish it.... Liked I said, I am shocked. I did not know he was at that level with his life and would harm himself. I wish I could have been there for him. I considered him always "Up-Beat" and could roll with the punches and take the heat. I hope this is not like the Miami 'Tom Dunkin" matter of old. Anyway, Thanks again. I'll be back in circulation in a few weeks after I finish baby sitting these new breed of baby Eagles. Tosh P.S. Also kind of sounds like the Lt Col Sabow matter of a few years back. The Flight Commander at El Toro Marine Station in southern California who killed himself with a shot gun and left no fingerprints or notes. He too, had information about drugs and guns. <{POST_SNAPBACK}> I think the following should be of interest to the FORUM in reference to the good work Gary was doing. From: MIKE RUPERT ON THE CIA USE OF FIREFIGHTING PLANES FOR DRUG RUNNING AND GUN RUNNING.. From: "Michael C. Ruppert" <mruppert@c...> Date: Thu Jun 27, 2002 5:42 pm Subject: CIA Diverts Air Tankers From Fire Fighting to Drug Smuggling - Records Show Death of a Hero - The Murder of Jim Sabow "...Marine Col. Jim Sabow was murdered at his home on the El Toro Marine Air Station in January 1991. His death, ruled a suicide by the Navy and the Marine Corps, has left a brave family virtually destroyed. As opposed to the official military account that Sabow, despondent over pending disciplinary actions for minor offenses committed suicide, a lingering and persistent body of evidence indicates that Jim Sabow was murdered because he caught the CIA flying drugs onto a base where he was Chief of Air Operations. Much of the evidence indicates that the cocaine arrived on the same C-130s which had been given to the Forest Service. In a 1993 segment of her news program Eye to Eye, Connie Chung covered the Sabow death in detail and showed evidence of the murder by introducing statements from Sabow's brother, a medical doctor, that Sabow had been unconscious and aspirating blood for minutes before a shotgun was rammed so far down his throat that it sheared off the uvula. In that same segment, veteran Air America and CIA pilot Tosh Plumlee stated that he flew loads of cocaine as large as 2,000 kilos onto El Toro in the years and months prior to Sabow's death - for the CIA. Plumlee stated clearly that he was flying C-130s operated by the Forest Service and their contractors. In later conversations with this writer Plumlee admitted that he routinely flew loads as large as 2,500 kilos onto military installations in California and Arizona for the CIA. Both Eitel and veteran investigator Gene Wheaton, who still works for the Sabow family which has a pending and oft delayed lawsuit pending in San Diego for next year, believe that the C-130s described in this story are the same ones which led to Jim Sabow's murder. Wheaton, a retired Warrant Officer from Army CID, has participated in and led investigations ranging from the Christic Institute lawsuit of 1987 to the very suspicious crash in Gander, Newfoundland of an Arrow Air flight in 1985 which took the lives of more than 250 members of the 101st Airborne Division. Arrow Air was, according to Wheaton, "One of Ollie North's favorite airlines." He was also one of the first investigators to uncover CIA drug smuggling in Mena, AK and is today working with Sabow attorney Daniel Sheehan, formerly of the Christic Institute, on the Sabow case. He has also conducted extensive investigations of the Forest Service C-130s and worked with Eitel on the case. "The Marines were supposed to keep flight refueling records of all non-military flights in transit on through the base at El Toro," said Wheaton. "Those are government records and would have shown that the same Forest Service aircraft passed through the base at the same time that Jim started complaining to his superiors about the drugs. The base is closed now but the records should have been kept. They are government documents." Wheaton added, "They have all been destroyed." Frogmen, Russoniello and… Gary Webb?! In his series of articles for The San Jose Mercury News entitled The Dark Alliance and in his brilliant book of the same name, author Gary Webb described the interference of the CIA in the infamous "Frogman" cocaine case of 1983. The U.S. attorney, a Reagan appointee, who handled the case and ultimately returned more than $36,000 in seized drug money to the CIA connected traffickers arrested in San Francisco, was Joseph Russoniello. As disclosed in Webb's book and documented in Volume I of the CIA Inspector General's report, the CIA had contacted Russoniello in an effort to contain any adverse publicity linking the arrested traffickers to the Agency. In the Agency's own cable traffic CIA stated that Russoniello was, "most deferential to our interests." ..."

Wim: Thanks for the help. I have been away for a few days. I will bring this site up to date for the FORUM. I think I can add a few good tid-bits of info for all. I should be back in circulation in a few weeks. Meanwhile. Look into Congressman Tom Downing and the information he had obtained in 1973-75, before the HSCA was formed. There is a good lead in that stuff. Gonzles had purged most of Downing's early stuff. Also. look intio the M-26-7 for good background information. It will fall into place if you really look. Thanks again. Tosh P.S. I was not the pilot on the MM matter.

Thanks Christy for keeping us up to date. I have been flying my A... off these past few days and not been around many newspapers or TV's. I have to admitt I was shocked when I heard the news. I had talked to Gary a few months ago and he was going to send me information concerning a follow up on his previous Dark Allience project. Although, I did not agree with all that Gary had wrote, he was however on course as to most of it. He was one fine reporter and we had a few laughs together. I really liked the guy. He was dedicated to his work and believed in what he was doing or trying to do. He was right on about the Mexico American (AMSOG) matter and we helped eachother document some hidden details on that subject. [Ref; DEA Susan Baldin and Hector Berliz TS DEA documents posted on my new website ref; Carro Quenterro's Mexico ranch] http://toshplumlee.info/ "...DEA Mexico OPS: These documents make reference to "Guatemalan Guerrillas" training at a ranch owned by Drug Lord CARO- Quintero in Vera Crus, Mexico. It was reported at the time this was a CIA training site where weapons were exchanged for drugs in support of the Contra effort in Nicaragua and Costa Rico. DEA Agent Enrique Camarena (KIKI) and his pilot found out about this operation known as "The CIA Thing" and were killed because of this knowledge. Plumlee and other American undercover pilots had flown into this ranch many times as reported in various sections within these documents and other news media leaks in Mexico and America. The operation was known as "AMSOG" and, as reported to Senator Gary Hart and his Senate investigators in early 1983, was an "illegal" smuggling operation through Mexico into the United States, supported by the US Military, Panama Southern Command...". Gary liked the title on my manuscript "Deep Cover-Shallow Graves" and wanted me to finish it.... Liked I said, I am shocked. I did not know he was at that level with his life and would harm himself. I wish I could have been there for him. I considered him always "Up-Beat" and could roll with the punches and take the heat. I hope this is not like the Miami 'Tom Dunkin" matter of old. Anyway, Thanks again. I'll be back in circulation in a few weeks after I finish baby sitting these new breed of baby Eagles. Tosh P.S. Also kind of sounds like the Lt Col Sabo matter of a few years back. The Flight Commander at El Toro Marine Station in southern California who killed himself with a shot gun and left no fingerprints or notes. He too, had information about drugs and guns.

Shanet: I do hope you understand why I cannot, even if I wanted to, identify these blanks at this time. You seem to me to be very astute in these matters and I am sure you understand why I cannot confirm of deny the blacked out portions of the document. I do not mean to turn to CIA jargon on you but I do not know anyother way to say it for now. Thanks for your understanding

________________________________- Mr Vernon, "..... You say it is truth that you seek, and that if someone misrepresents something about you you are merely seeking to to defend yourself. I do not disagree, in principle, with anyone's right to defend themselves, but from what I read, this does not appear to be what you are doing. To report John Simkin to some British authority smacks of something very mean spirited and not at all truth seeking. I am NOT trying to start a disagreement with you, but making an observation....". Dawn Meredith <{POST_SNAPBACK}> My advise to everyone is to ignore this idiot and let him alone. One thing he cannot stand is to be ignored. This drives him up the wall. If you continue to recognized his ramblings then you have given him the attention he craves and cannot live without. Just let him do and say what he wants. His words go nowhere. He is already known for what he is. Forget this lunatic and get back to work and focus on your peojects. To much time has been lost dealing with this leach. And that is about all there is to that. We all have important work ahead and we do not have time to extend to this malcontent and his destructive influence on truth. We do not have time to lose our focus and goals by giving this corruptor of truth our breath and thoughts. His deceit in time will destroy him. TOSH

Thanks Wim: Good work. I did fly Roselli at this time. Later I was told (or perhaps asked, can't remember) by the FBI that it was for a meeting with Blank and Nixon. This was three weeks or so later. I was also later told that same story by another FBI (SAC Tanner) agent in Miami. They thought that Rosellie went there to meet with Blank and Nixon was also there for this meeting. They asked ME if I knew about this. I did not. Hence the statement... "I learned three weeks later from them, the FBI". This PHX-OO-72-73 file was a clasified document, declassified in 1999 and did not go to the HSCA in 1978 as did the other FBI documents that were later declassified in 1981 [There are two sets of different FBI documents, declassified in 1981 and 1999] As to the blank parts I have to be careful here because this is still classified matters on file as National Security Matters. I know you would like for me to violate that in order for me to help the research community.. but I will not. If I did this WHO would stand behind me? It would be like RATS deserting a sinking ship. Get what you want and then split and write books about it while I go to jail... No ThANKS. I am trying as I write this to get these portions and names declassified...., so far to no avail. Most of these people are still alive. On another point: I did tell some of the Dick Clark people(1992) that the FBI thought I had flown Roselli to Bimini and I was told by them about Nixon. Joe West was there, as well as others. Later I herd about the Files statement.

Thanks Wim: There was an FBI document that had said THEY THOUGHT I had flown Roselli to Bimini...,I don' think there was anything said about Nixion. However, I did challenge that document as not being authenic, because it had not been in the 242 FOIA pages released to Bernard Fensterwald in 1981. [Jim Marrs, Peter Lemkin, and I numbered the released FOIA 1981 pages in 1991, in Texas] I told XXXX that I thought the FBI page and the Flight Plan in New Mwxico had been tampered with and planted by ??? for whatever reasons. These two documents had not been numbered. Any help on this would be apreciated. Thanks again.

Wim: I flew Roselli to Bimini more than once, but I do not recall saying I flew him there to meet with Nixon? Could you show me where I said that, or the source who said I said that? And when? I think you have me confussed with Files. I recall I was told by somebody that Files said Roselli was to meet Nixon in Bimini. I do not know anything about what and who Roselli meet in Bimini, but I doubt it was to meet Nixon. Of course that is only speculation and opinion on my part... the same goes for Files and others who say Rosellie was there to meet with Nixion. Can you be spacific and send me hard copy backup? Thanks

Thanks Al. Yes, I did know about this and also thought, at the time, it was an "insidej ob". You are right about the weapons and the MO. This has long been a way to get arms to these special political groups for a long time. We flew a lot of theseweapons down south. That was never really addressed in any of the hearings. I tried to bring it up at one of the interviews and was stopped from doing this. A whole topic could be started on this. It is part of history. Thanks again

Wim: I have to take exception on this time line. I went into the National Guard when I was 14. (1952) However when they were going to upgrade my MOS to 1795; tank driver. I could not get past the screening and received an honorable minority discharge. I entered the US Army at 16 (1953) and when I was going to ship out to S/E Asia, in (1954) I could not go because I did not have enough credits or time in training to be able to go with the Unit I had trained with. I had to have a total of 16 weeks of training in addition to the eight weeks of basic at Fort Bliss Texas. I wanted to go into a 'Special Airborne school and I would have to have had an additional 24 weeks split in two 12 week TDY stations in the USA. That comes to: 48 weeks min. not counting the two weeks leave required between each duty assignment; add 6 weeks. That is a min. of 54 weeks of training and leave to even meet the min. for overseas duty in a special Army Unit like the White Star and others. In addition to those requirements your training scores had to be above average...in the 85 to 90 percent range and too, you had to be recommended by at least three drill Sgt and a base Commander. Most all those boys in those specialized units had completed at least one tour of active duty in a regular army unit. That is min one year in Reserves or National Guard, or two years in regular. The min. age for most of these boys was 20 years old and there were only a hand full of those; most were much older and had previous combat experience in Korea from the 1950-54 era. (serving in 1954-59) I think this time line should really be looked into. What is files MOS for the White Star Unit. What is Files Service Number. The sequencing of his service number would help a lot as certifying the year he was in the military. If he was in S/E Asia then he would remember those two numbers. "Name Rank S?N". That is drilled into you even while you sleep. Men from WWI and WWII have never forgot these numbers. I hope this helps. I am trying Hard to stay with FACTS. I am not challenging you or Files. I am trying hard to help on establishing facts which can be vertified. Its like my story. I do not expect anyone to believe me because I say it happened. I too, am trying hard to find FACTS and spacifics to support what I say.. When I find what I think is a 'tid bit' of fact or documentation, then I share it with the community. I think that is the professional approach as to establishing truth of what one says. If they do not believe me then I don't get mad. I just walk away and keep looking for spacifics and facts. I want the record to speak for me and I feel Files should also...if he is for real... Thanks for your understanding on this matter. Tosh

Deleted because of double posting: Sorry

REPLY TO JOHN SIMKIN"S POST "BOB VERNON" Reference to Bob Vernon and his previous statements: I think the following should be considered as to how his story changes over time. He was under oath at the time of this Texas Testimony: To following is taken from sworn testimony of Robert G Vernon to a special committee in Dallas, Texas, 1994. This was sworn to by Mr. Vernon under the penalty of perjury. "....The second participant discovered by Truth is male Caucasian Robert Tosh Plumlee, a CIA pilot. Mr. Plumlee has piloted and co-piloted clandestine CIA flights for over 31 years. He testified before the Church Committee in the 1970s and his CIA escapades have been well chronicled in magazine articles, books and congressional reports. Mr. Plumlee testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 2nd, 1990, and again in May of 1991. His testimony under oath has been classified as Top Secret. Senator John Kerry served as Chairman of the Senate Committee, John Wyner, I believe his name is, and Dick McCall, staff aides to Senator Kerry, questioned Mr. Plumlee in relation to the Contra resupply network behind closed doors. Mr. Plumlee testified to the U.S. Senate Committee and to Truth Truth Truth, Incorporated, that on the morning of November 22nd, 1963, he was a co-pilot on a top secret flight supported by the CIA. Mr. Plumlee's flight left Florida on November 21, 1963, and stopped in New Orleans and Houston before heading into Dallas, Texas, during the early morning hours of November 22nd, 1963. Mr. Plumlee testified that Philippe or Philippo Socko, alias John Roselli, a known Mafia/CIA double operative was onboard the plane to Dallas. Mr. Plumlee stated that Mr. Roselli departed the plane at Dallas Garland Airport shortly after 6:30 a.m. on the morning of November 22nd, 1963. [Mr. Vernon has said recently Mr. Plumlee said at the 1992 filmimg that Jonh Rosellie got off at Red Bird Airport.] [At the time of the filming Mr. Plumlee stopped the tape corrected his mis-spoken Red Bird Airport mistake and continued the interview] Mr. Plumlee testified that he was informed that the flight was an abort mission, and that their assignment was to stop the assassination attempt on Kennedy's life. Mr. Plumlee testified that he was told this by his superior officers, and he has identified those officers. Mr. Plumlee testified that he was present in Dealey Plaza on the South Knoll at the time of the assassination. In the spring of 1992, the late George West, the founder of Truth Truth Truth received a call from Beaumont, Texas, FBI agent Zack Shelton. Agent Shelton requested an off-the-record meeting with Mr. West at a location between Houston and Beaumont. Agent Shelton and private investigator West also had a second meeting at which a noted Houston criminal attorney, Don Irving, was present....". The complete sworn statement can be found at the following website. http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/arrb/index67.htm The above should be compared to the following statement made by Mr. Vernon a few weeks ago and posted on this forum for all to see: "....the interview conducted in 1992. Plumlee lied so bad and was shaking from the DT's at 9 AM in the morning we stopped the interview to let the guy calm down. We stopped it when we caught him in his first lie of the day. Plumlee has lied so much since 92 it's not even funny. You have no clue. No clue at all....". Mr. Vernon has now admitted that the Plumlee story was thought by him, at the time of the interview of 1992, to be a fraud from the very beginning. This was even before he continued to promoted Plumlee's story for over ten years as being truthful. Mr Vernon continued to promoted Plumlee's story and sold it, along with the Files story as factual. Mr Vernon personally certified the Plumlee story as trueful and sold it, more than once, for a large sum of money. Mr. Vernon's motivation was greed and money and not truth as he claimed. Mr. Vernon wove Mr. Plumlee's testimoney into the James Files story and promoted both as fact and now admits that he thought, at the time, both, Files and Pllumlee were frauds and hoxas. Mr Plumlee many times over the years is on the record as NOT supporting the Files story. By Mr. Vernons own admission, from the very beginning he considered Plumlee to be lying at the time of the interview in 1992. If this is true, then every dollar Mr. Vernon has made promoting and selling the Plumlee/Files story was fraudulently obtained by him. The above are his own words, with his admission. Mr. Vernon also sent many emails to various researchers with the above statements incorperate therein. "... [b]Plumlee lied so bad and was shaking from the DT's at 9 AM in the morning we stopped the interview to let the guy calm down. We stopped it when we caught him in his first lie of the day. Plumlee has lied so much since 92 it's not even funny. You have no clue. No clue [/b] [Yet Mr. Vernon supported Mr. Plumlee's story for over ten years and received money for his efforts] ...". It is now evident, by the following document Mr. Vernon perjured himself to the Texas authorities in 1994. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dallas, Texas -- November 18, 1994 Hearing MR. MARWELL: I understand that Karen Clem is not here today. I would ask Mr. Robert Vernon if he would like to give us a statement at this time. MR. VERNON: Thank you very much, Mr. Marwell. I appreciate it. There was one other gentleman who I don't believe has arrived yet, when you had mentioned to me on the phone yesterday it may be after lunch, I told him to take his time. He is not here, so you will see his name reflected in this transcription. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Board, my name is Robert G. Vernon. The gentleman who is supposed to be with me now is John R. Stockwell, he is late. I am a television producer, and Mr. Stockwell is a former CIA case officer. He is a noted author and screenwriter. We are here representing, Truth Truth Truth, Incorporated, which is a nonprofit Texas corporation that was founded in 1989. Since their formation, Truth Truth Truth had conducted a private unbiased investigation into the death of John F. Kennedy. Mr. Stockwell and I were hired in early 1992 to write a, produce a television program and book highlighting the findings of Truth Truth Truth. Our findings are scheduled to be released in the immediate future in TV broadcast, home video, CD ROM and book form. The first participant in the JFK assassination discovered by Truth Truth Truth is a male African-American named Q.D. Urdy. Mr. Urdy received immunity from the United States Department of Justice in 1992 in exchange for his testimony. Mr. Urdy testified that he was ordered by Jack Ruby to acquire high-powered rifles with scopes in the early fall of 1963. Mr. Urdy stated that he then stole three rifles from a ranch in West Texas. The theft of these rifles has been verified by the ranch owners. Retired Dallas Police Officer Tom Tilson testified that he and his daughter observed Jack Ruby and three men dressed in suits, ties and hats taking target practice with rifles at a Dallas-Fort Worth firing range approximately five to seven days prior to the assassination. No other part of Mr. Urdy's lengthy testimony has been substantiated, although he does claim to have further information and knowledge of the events surrounding the assassination, both before and after the fact. The second participant discovered by Truth is male Caucasian Robert Tosh Plumlee, a CIA pilot. Mr. Plumlee has piloted and co-piloted clandestine CIA flights for over 31 years. He testified before the Church Committee in the 1970s and his CIA escapades have been well chronicled in magazine articles, books and congressional reports. Mr. Plumlee testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 2nd, 1990, and again in May of 1991. His testimony under oath has been classified as Top Secret. Senator John Kerry served as Chairman of the Senate Committee, John Wyner, I believe his name is, and Dick McCall, staff aides to Senator Kerry, questioned Mr. Plumlee in relation to the Contra resupply network behind closed doors. Mr. Plumlee testified to the U.S. Senate Committee and to Truth Truth Truth, Incorporated, that on the morning of November 22nd, 1963, he was a co-pilot on a top secret flight supported by the CIA. Mr. Plumlee's flight left Florida on November 21, 1963, and stopped in New Orleans and Houston before heading into Dallas, Texas, during the early morning hours of November 22nd, 1963. Mr. Plumlee testified that Philippe or Philippo Socko, alias John Roselli, a known Mafia/CIA double operative was onboard the plane to Dallas. Mr. Plumlee stated that Mr. Roselli departed the plane at Dallas Garland Airport shortly after 6:30 a.m. on the morning of November 22nd, 1963. Mr. Plumlee testified that he was informed that the flight was an abort mission, and that their assignment was to stop the assassination attempt on Kennedy's life. Mr. Plumlee testified that he was told this by his superior officers, and he has identified those officers. Mr. Plumlee testified that he was present in Dealey Plaza on the South Knoll at the time of the assassination. In the spring of 1992, the late George West, the founder of Truth Truth Truth received a call from Beaumont, Texas, FBI agent Zack Shelton. Agent Shelton requested an off-the-record meeting with Mr. West at a location between Houston and Beaumont. Agent Shelton and private investigator West also had a second meeting at which a noted Houston criminal attorney, Don Irving, was present. During the course of these meetings, Agent Shelton, a former member of the organized crime task force in Chicago, provided Mr. West and attorney Irving with a lead on James E. Files, alias James E. Sutton, a male Caucasian from Chicago currently incarcerated in the Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois. Mr. Files is serving a 50-year term for the attempted murder of two police officers. His FBI rap sheet indicates a life filled with violent crimes. Agent Shelton informed investigator West and attorney Irving that the FBI had previously gathered information from an informant that Mr. Files has knowledge of the events that occurred in Dealey Plaza on November 22nd, 1963. Agent Shelton verified that Mr. Files was an associate and driver/bodyguard for one Charles Nicoletti, a known Mafia hitman from Chicago. Agent Shelton further stated that he had long suspected that Chicago mob members Sam Giancana, Charles Nicoletti and John Roselli were involved in the assassination of John F. Kennedy, but that he had no hard evidence to support his beliefs. On August the 16th and 17th, 1992, after an extensive search to locate the prisoner, investigator West spent several hours each day questioning James E. Files. During the August 17th, 1992, meeting, Mr. Files confessed that he was involved in the JFK assassination. Mr. Files confessed that he was present in Dealey Plaza and that Charles Nicoletti and John Roselli were also present in Dealey Plaza. Mr. Files further confessed that he had been recruited and worked for the CIA in the early 1960s, later becoming a driver for Charles Nicoletti of the Chicago Mafia. Investigator West died from complications following open heart surgery in February of 1993 after filing a legal action to exhume the body of John F. Kennedy which was filed in the 160th Judicial District in Dallas in the fall of 1992. On May 3rd, 1993, I visited James E. Files for the first time. Present with me was Mr. Barry Adelman, Vice President in charge of Television Development for Dick Clark Productions in Burbank, California. During our hour visit, James E. Files confessed that he fired the fatal last shot into the right front temple of John F. Kennedy from a firing position located behind the wooden stockade fence on the infamous Grassy Knoll. Mr. Files confessed that he fired a .222 shell at the President and that he left the empty casing on top of the fence. Mr. Files said that he had bitten down on the casing for that was a trait of his. He always placed the spent shells in his mouth after a job, as he called it. Files testified that his teeth marks were in the casing that he left behind in Dealey Plaza. Upon returning to Texas, we contacted a Mr. John Rodamacher, who I might point out is here today, of the Dallas area after we found news clippings about him in the files of Truth Truth Truth, Incorporated. In 1987, Mr. Rodamacher and his stepson were enjoying a father and son outing when they discovered a .222 casing buried in Dealey Plaza approximately four to six feet in front of the wooden stockade fence. The casing contained dents. Dr. Paul Stimpson of the University of Texas at Houston, a noted forensic odontologist who was recommended to us by the Houston Police Department examined the .222 casing in his lab. Dr. Stimpson issued a written medical legal opinion which states that the dents in the casing are teeth marks. We shared the confession of James E. Files with criminal attorney Don Irving, who agreed to visit Files in an effort to cross-examine Mr. Files to ascertain his validity. In June of 1993, Attorney Irving, a veteran of over 25 years of high profile criminal cases, spent almost seven hours with James E. Files at the Joliet Prison. Mr. Irving reported that he found no inconsistencies in Mr. Files confession. Mr. Irving issued a 17-page memo on his cross-examination of James E. Files and that memo has been included in your information packet for your confidential review. Following his visit with Mr. Files, Attorney Irving negotiated a deal with the FBI, the United States Department of Justice, to provide Mr. Files with immunity in order that his testimony could be heard by a special grand jury that was to be called following a nonofficial visit with Mr. Files at which Attorney Irving and the FBI were to be present. On August 3rd, 1993, Attorney Irving informed us that he had received word that the United States Attorney in Chicago had reviewed and approved the immunity agreement for James E. Files. Mr. Irving further stated that the government was to fly him and an FBI agent to the prison for the nonofficial visit with Mr. Files. On August 9th, 1993, two Chicago FBI agents made an unannounced visit to Mr. Files without the knowledge or consent of Attorney Irving or the prison. Mr. Files informed Attorney Irving that he was asked to agree that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin of John F. Kennedy. Shortly there after, Beaumont Agent Shelton was threatened with the loss of his FBI job and government pension. This fact was verified by both Attorney Irving and newly elected Texas District Judge Charles Carver of Beaumont, Texas. Agent Shelton has failed to respond to our numerous phone calls and the FBI has twice refused to allow me to interview Agent Shelton on camera. Following the discovery of James E. Files, Truth Truth Truth, Incorporated, and Dick Clark Productions entered into a production agreement for a special two-hour television program. Our program was sold to a major USA television network and was scheduled to be broadcast on May 18th, 1994. Approximately three weeks before the broadcast, a conservative conspiracy researcher author who has made a full career out of denying any CIA involvement in the JFK assassination and who blames the assassination fully on the KGB and Oswald vigorously challenged the project, and the program was placed on hold by the network. It is the intent of Truth Truth Truth, Incorporated, to provide the Assassination Records Review Board with a complete and accurate accounting of the entire investigation. The accounting will include all evidence we have gathered. We would like to call your special attention to the medical legal report issued by Dr. Randolph Robertson a noted radiologist from Nashville, Tennessee, it is included in your packet in full with Dr. Robertson's permission. Dr. Robertson was granted rare access to the autopsy X-rays and photos of JFK which are in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. During his examination of the skull pictures and X-rays of the President, Dr. Robertson discovered a second bullet wound in the skull. Dr. Robertson's medical legal opinion states that at least one more assassin of President Kennedy remains to be identified. Dr. Robertson further states that the second wound in the skull is consistent with a shot fired from the right front Grassy Knoll area. We ask that the Board review our evidence and Dr. Robertson's report, investigate our findings and release your official opinion of our findings in your final report to the President of the United States and the American public at the end of your term as is designated in your mandate through which your Board was formed. In closing, we ask that you consider recommending to the President and to the American people that a special grand jury be called to hear the testimony of Q.D. Urdy and Robert Tosh Plumlee and most certainly James E. Files. This was the original plan as per the understanding between Truth Truth Truth, Incorporated, Attorney Don Irving, and the United States Department of Justice according to Attorney Irving. [This is an interesting statement to make in view Mr. Vernon thought at the time of the 1992 interview that Mr. Plumlee was a xxxx] I thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have. CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: Thank you, Mr. Vernon. Questions? [No response.] CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: We appreciate all the materials that you have provided. MR. VERNON: It is rather lengthy and there is quite a bit more, and anything else you would like to see, have Mr. Marwell contact me. There is also quite a bit of video that I think you would be extremely interested in. DR. HALL: Mr. Vernon, in the course of carrying out production and investigation here have you come across or has your attention been brought to any records created by any public officials that are held in the hands of those officials that would otherwise be considered to the public documents? MR. VERNON: There are quite a few records that we would be happy to give you, our copies. Some of ours are copies, some of ours are originals. I was glad to see the gentleman from the -- I believe it was Texas Tech earlier with the Waggoner Carr stuff. We had access to some of that earlier Waggoner Carr stuff, and that was very interesting. We would be glad to give you what we have there, and there are lots of transcriptions and there are several other documents. I don't know which you are aware of, but we will be glad to give you them, sir. DR. HALL: Thank you. MR. VERNON: Thank you, sir. CHAIRMAN TUNHEIM: Thank you, Mr. Vernon, we appreciate your being here today. END OF MR VERNON'S STATEMENT TO COMMITTEE

The following chapter 9 (Cuban Insurrection 1952-1958. New Jersey; Transaction Books, 1974) was sent to me recently by a close Cuban researcher and friend. I think this is little known by most of the current researchers of today. I find this information a very important link for those who want a solid foundation on the events that led up to that day in Dallas. It starts in 1956. It is important to keep in mind that the CIA was supplying arms and ammunitions to Fidel Castro, while at the same time still sending arms, aircraft, and tanks to Batista. We were "Arms Merchants" supporting both sides. In order to grasp why some Cubans to this day do not trust the United States is, perhaps, because of these political policies of old. Not much has been written about this M-26-7 to some extend the CIA's involvement is still classified. Most of this information, about the M-26-7 Havana group and the CIA's activities, have been purged from history by the powers that be. I for one think this history should be incorporated into any serious research work. I know of at least three American Pilots who lost their lives while flying weapons which had been stolen from United States National Guard Armories in order to overthrow Batista and bring Castro to power. I know of others who lost their lives while engaged in other secret operations connected to some of the splinter groups of the M-26-7. These brave men lost their lives after the M-26-7 was merged into other operations which were connected with the overthrow of Castro. Congressman Tom Downing was looking into these American MIA's when he died. I hope you find the following read of interest for your research and for the sake of history. This Chapter has been taken from: Ramon L. Bonachea and Marta San Martin. The Cuban Insurrection 1952-1959. New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1974. Chapter 9 A New Strategy pp. 173-186 Fidel Castro had survived with a small force of guerrilla fighters in the Sierra Maestra for over a year. Isolated from the rest of the island, sustaining few casualties and supported by the urban underground of the M-26-7, Fidel was creating a well-disciplined group of guerrillas and gaining the backing of the area's population. His mere presence in the Sierra Maestra contributed to his popularity with the people. Urban underground fighters were unknown precisely because of the secret nature of their activities, and after the deaths of Frank País and José Antonio Echeverría, Fidel was the only important insurrectionary leader, urban or otherwise, left in Cuba. Militarily, he had demonstrated that one could wage guerrilla warfare in the mountains against a regular army; and in so doing he had created a sanctuary for the urban cadres, a place where they could continue the struggle rather than perish in the cities. The DR's insistence upon conducting urban operations in accordance with the theory of' "hitting at the top" did not altogether disappear from the minds of' some of the leaders, especially Faure Chomón. But it was evident by late 1957 that a change in approach was as urgently needed. The organization had probably suffered more than any other in the urban struggle. It was the only movement to have lost all its leaders in a period of one month--the tragic weeks of March and April 1957. The long perparatory period before the attack on the Presidential Palace, the street demonstrations, acts of terrorism and direct confrontations with the police--all of which helped to develop a group of hard-core militants--also damaged the organization. The police had learned many of the cadre members' names and sought them out with pictures after the palace attack. The DR had to initiate a campaign for new recruits and to try to reinstitute the cell structure of the organization. After the attack on the palace and the Humboldt No. 7 killings, the executive council was reorganized. The new group included Primitivo Lima, Andrés Silva, Osmel Francis and Mary Pumpido among the voting professionals. The workers were represented by Pedro Martínez, Orlando Blanco and Jorge Martín, who were leaders of action and sabotage cells and also organizers within the labor movement. The council also included a women's section represented by Fructuoso Rodríguez's widow, Marta Jiménez. Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo--the brother of Carlos, who had led the commando group in the palace attack--was appointed chief of action in Havana. Under Eloy's leadership a new group of' urban cadre members emerged to replace their dead compañeros, among them: Guillermo Jiménez, Angel Quevedo, Julio Fernández, Héctor Terry, Enrique Zamorano, Domingo Pérez, Jorge ("Mago") Robreño, and Mario ("Reguerita") Reguera. In Las Villas province, Ramón Pando, president of the Student Federation of the School of Commerce at Las Villas University, became the provincial secretary general of the DR. With Enrique Villegas and Piro Abreu active throughout the province, the DR movement acquired a new impetus in central Cuba. Meanwhile, in Camagüey other militants emerged as important members of the urban organization, among them: Antonio ("Tony") Bastida, Florencio González, Adolfo Mora and Sergio Valle. The DR recovered rapidly from its defeat and extended its cells into the various sectors of the population reaching even well-to-do students at the Catholic Unversity of Villanova, where Jesús "Paulino" Barreiro represented the DR. Although few of these students were willing to cooperate, those who did help were instrumental in creating the Fourth Guerrilla Front in Pinar del Rio province. West of Havana, in late 1958. The movement also organized overseas. With funds raised among exiles in Miami and other cities in the United States, the DR sent delegates to various Latin American countries. Venezuelan leader, Romulo Betancourt, José Figueres of Costa Rica and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala aided the DR by publicly supporting the insurrection. Results of this support were impressive, opening new contacts throughout the area and helping in the formation of delegations in Chile and in Caracas, Venezuela, following the fall of dictator Pérez Jiménez in early 1958. Delegations also existed in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Montevideo. Uruguay; Lima, Peru; Bogotá, Colombia; San José, Costa Rica: and in Panama, El Salvador and Mexico. In the United States there were delegations in New York, Chicago, New Orleans, Tampa, Jacksonville and Miami. The Nassau delegation was as able to extend its contacts throughout the Bahamas and, through the members of this important delegation. The DR developed its system for infiltrating people into Cuba, for conveying contraband arms, and for receiving information on the activities of the urban underground. One of the important tasks of the delegations was to conduct public campaigns to discredit Batista's regime and to present the case for the insurrection. As the tempo of these activities increased, U.S. authorities began to pay more attention to Cuban exiles in the Florida area. Federal authorities sometimes succeeded in blocking arms shipments to Cuba; more often they were unsuccessful. Under the leadership of Luis Blanca, Héctor Rosales, Carlos "Chino" Figueredo and Armando Fleites, the DR created a chain of' arms depots that extended from New York City to New Orleans and from there to Miami. Arms were never concentrated in a specific place, and sites where arms were gathered were usually outside the Spanish-speaking colonies. When a shipment left, several cars and trucks were used along the route, and deliveries were seldom made at the same place twice. False reports circulated throughout the exile colony to confuse the authorities. However, the general feeling among DR militants was that U.S. authorities were simply looking the other way as much as they possibly could. The DR's Decision to Fight Guerrilla War In September, Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, the DR's chief of action in Havana, arrived in Miami to discuss future strategy with Chomón, Cubela and Armando Fleites. The latter, a young physician and DR leader in Las Villas province, agreed with Gutiérrez Menoyo on the need to adopt a guerrilla strategy counter to the "hit at the top" tactic. Chomón still favored the direct action tactic, but agreed that the DR should change its approach and open a guerrilla front in Cuba. Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo returned to Havana and left the capital for the Escambray Mountains, reaching that area in mid-October. Menoyo's task was to inspect the area and to set up a guerrilla group; establish the necessary contacts with DR leaders in the surrounding towns and cities, and prepare the ground for the arrival of a larger group of' DR militants. On November 10, 1957 the guerrillas issued their first internal order declaring that a second national guerrilla front had been crcated and instructing the guerrillas to be loyal to the country, to keep all secrets of war, never to abandon their weapons, and to denounce deserters and traitors. In January 1958, various small arms shipments arrived in Cuba and were rapidly distributed throughout the various action cells, and some were transported to the Escambray Mountains. César Páez and Juan Figueroa, students who were born in Las Villas province, arrived in Havana and went to their native province to make contacts for future guerrilla actions. Pedro Martínez Brito, veteran of the Radio Reloj operation in 1957, infiltrated to Havana from Miami to acquaint DR cells of forthcoming operations against Batista. Meanwhile, Enrique Villegas, DR leader in the city of Sancti-Spiritus, in Las Villas, was shot to death by the army while he was taking supplies to Menoyo's guerrilla group. The movement rapidly gathered military information on government troops in Las Villas province, and on forces concentrated in posts close to the mountains. On January 28, 1958, José Martí's birthday, the DR held a mass rally at Miami's Bayfront Park, scene of many such gatherings by Cuban exiles. At that meeting, it was announced that Cuba would soon be in flames, and other pledges of future action were issued. Rumors of an impending invasion of Cuba circulated throughout the exile colony. During the first week of February, the DR underground was placed on the alert, and various cells prepared to go into diversionary actions against the government. In the final hours before the expedition, reports circulated in the exile colony about an encounter between an army patrol and guerrillas at Escambray. Fearing that these guerrillas were Menoyo's, and that Batista would mobilize the army to stop another Castro-like invasion, the DR gave the plan for an expedition its final touches. The Expedition In Miami, the students had established contact with an American named Alton Sweeting, captain of a pleasure yacht, the "Thor II," licensed in New York. Captain Sweeting agreed to take the expedition to a point near the northern coast of Cuba. From there a rendezvous ship was to transport the expeditionaries to the mainland, while Captain Sweeting's yacht would be refueled for the trip back to Miami. A few hours before departure, the authorities raided several places where students usually gathered around Miami. They failed to make any arrests, but they did succeed in letting everyone know that they had to move immediately. To confuse the authorities, the expeditionaries selected the most conspicuous place of departure, the Miami River. There, very close to the MacArthur Causeway which links Miami with Miami Beach, the Cubans gathered and boarded the "Thor II." renamed "Escapade." The decision was made to carry five tons of arms, thus reducing the number of expeditionaries to 15 men and one woman (Esther Martín). With its cargo the "Escapade" quietly cruised out of Miami. The expedition was as a complete success, and coordination between the exiles and the urban cadres was excellent. Captain Sweeting's cruiser anchored at Raccoon Cay off the northern coast of Cuba, and the expeditionaries \Acre transported further by a fishing boat, the "San Rafael." From the moment "Escapade" touched Raccoon Cay, Gustavo ("Tavo") Machin'' was responsible for the operation. Close to the coast they boarded a third small craft, the "Yaloven," which carried men and supplies to the fishing village of Santa Rita, close to the port of Nuevitas, in Camaguey province. On February 8, 1958,12 the DR's small expeditionary force landed and rapidly moved inland toward the capital of' Camaguey province where they remained hidden for a day, in groups of two and three at various underground headquarters. The expedition's cargo was at this point divided between arms to he transported to the DR's underground in Havana, and arms suitable for mountain fighting. Antonio ("Tony") Bastida, manager of a transport fleet of' trucks, was in charge of delivering the arms in Havana. The urban underground received 33 Thompsons, a .50 caliber machine gun, two .55 caliber anti-tank rifles, one shotgun, two .30 caliber machine guns, one M-3, two M-1s, a Winchester rifle, one Browning automatic rifle, 300 rounds of ammunition for the anti-tank rifles, 2,000 capsules (30.06mm) and ammunition for .45 caliber pistols, and hand grenades. The would-be guerrilla fighters carried 50 Italian carbines, two "Stern" submachine guns, one Thompson, two M-3s, two Springfield rifles, one Garand rifle, one M-1, five semi-automatic Remington rifles with telescopic sights, and 20,000 rounds of ammunition of various calibers. The route leading from Camaguey to the Banao area in the Escambray Mountains (190 kilometers) had been traced by urban cadres. All along the \Nay cadre members met the expeditionaries to render reports on the area they were still to cover, and to pinpoint army positions. The urban cadre members-among them Ramon Pando and Piro Abreu, student leaders in Las Villas province-took supplies to the expeditionaries and sometimes added men to the group. Dr. Manuel Sori Marin was also very helpful in finding means of transportation for the expeditionaries. On February 13, the expeditionaries reached the Banao area in the subregion of the Trinidad-Sancti-Spiritus mountains, to the southeast of Santa Clara, Las Villas' capital, and the next day the group reached the Cangalito hills- At 7 AM on February 15, they arrived at Cacahual, a small guerrilla camp flanked by two hills, where Gutierrez Menoyo, William Morgan and other guerrillas awaited the group. With Castro's experience at Alegria de Pio in mind, the expeditionaries place two observers on the hills surrounding Cacahual. Two days later, the observers alerted the camp to five army scouts approaching Cacahual~ an ambush disposed of' three of the five soldiers, but the rest escaped. Fearing the arrival of' army reinforceincrits the expeditionarics broke camp. At this point there were 29 guerrillas marching in two separate groups. Fourteen guerrillas followed an old peasant guide named Cadenas, among them \Acre Rolando Cubela, Gustavo ("Tavo") Machin, Dario Pedrosa, Alberto Mora and Efren Mur. The other group included, among others, Eduardo Garcia Lavandero, Rodriguez Loeches, Chomon, Luis Blanca, Armando Fleites, Alberto Blanco, Menoyo, Ivan Rodriguez, Ramon Pando, Oscar Ruiz and William Morgan. The second group of guerrillas marched toward the west and into the mountain chain called Guamuhaya. On February 19, the guerrillas camped at a place where they were to meet the rest of' the expeditionaries. Some of the DR men were to separate from the main group and return to the cities to wage urban guerrilla warfare. Ramon Pando and Alberto Blanco decided not to wait for the rest and were led out of' the mountains by Leonardo Bombino and a guide named Faustinito. They "ere intercepted by an army patrol, and Ramon Pando was captured, but the others managed to escape. Pando was later assassinated by order of army Lieutenant Froilan Perez. I I The two groups reunited at the Michelena forests, and the remaining 27 men tried to escape the area and tile pursuing army. They marched until 4 PM on February 19, when they camped at the forest of' "La Diana." Soon army troops approached along a path in the forest: at 4:45 PM the DR combatants ambushed them, in a 15-minute encounter killing 14 and wounding 16 soldiers." For the next 13 hours the guerrillas, led by Leonardo Bombino, marched along ravines until they managed to escape from the army. On February 24, safe from the army's pursuit, the DR leaders A rote a manifesto which they signed on the 25th. The Manifesto of Escambray The DR's manifesto set forth the objectives of the struggle by announcing that its strategy would be to conduct simultaneous urban and rural guerrilla A warfare against Batista. The DR would fight for the re-establishment of the Constitution of 1940, and to open the way for a social revolution. Revolutionary unity was essential for the victory of the insurrection, and the DR proposed that a "party of the revolution" be organized after Batista's overthrow. That party would gather "the real fighters who daily risk their lives fighting the dictatorship," and would guarantee that the constitution and the laws were fulfilled. The need for violence was reaffirmed, for peace could only come through the waging of war. The pillars of the future revolution were to be education, administrative honesty, agrarian reform and industrialization. Internationally, the DR supported the formation of a federation of' Caribbean republics, an initial step toward the organization of a confederation of American republics. The insurrectionary struggle against Batista, maintained the DR, was but the continuation of the country's historical struggle for independence since the nineteenth century. the DR viewed the insurrection as inspired by Jose Marti's ideas, the nationalism of Antonio ("Tony") Guiteras and the democratic principles of Jose Antonio Echeverria. The DR's fight was not only against Batista's regime, but also against -those who only a few years ago supported the Nazis on conquered land of Europe," a direct reference to the Communists, who -today are playing Batista's game as vulgar puppets." The caste of old and young politicians would be swept away by the insurrection as a fundamental requisite of social therapy. On February 27, the guerrillas reached the mountains to the south of Santa Clara, close to the cities of Placetas, Cabaiguan, Santa Clara and Guayos. At a peak called Tres Cruces, Chomon, Alberto Blanco, Rosendo Yero, Rodriguez Loeches, Garcia Lavandero and Luis Blanca began their journey back into the urban struggle. They were led by the peasant guide Bombino and another peasant named Raul Rosa. Although the DR had suffered severe casualties in the urban struggle, the theory of "hitting at the top" had not been discarded completely. Faure Chomon, Rodriguez Loeches and Eduardo Garcia Lavandero continued to urge the DR to strike at the dictator. These men had been molded in the urban insurrection, men from the cities, whose insurrectionary outlook was directly connected with struggle in the center of power, Havana. Consequently, when Rodriguez Loeches left his companeros to seek help in the cities close to the Escambray Mountains, he felt "a sense of relief and security," since as an urban fighter he felt "secure in my own environment." In Sancti-Spiritus, Loeches established contact with Piro Abreu through a lawyer, Emilio Morata. Abreu provided the insurrectionists with a car and with an experienced driver, Carlos Brunet. On the evening of March 3, the group met at Fomentos with plans to reach the city of Placetas, and then move by bus to Havana. As their car approached the city of' Placetas on the Central Highway, an army jeep and a car from the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) closed the road to check on all cars. The DR militants sped through the SIM's barricade as the army's car sped after them. Suddenly, Brunet stopped the car; as the soldiers stepped out of theirs, Brunet started the car again and the SIM agents opened fire. The men succeeded in escaping Placetas, heading east toward the city of Cabaiguan. Along the way, the driver refused to continue what he viewed as a suicide mission; the car was stopped and Brunet and Rosendo Yero stayed behind while Alberto Blanco took the driver's seat. In minutes, the car approached the city of Cabaiguan where an army patrol was waiting, signaling for them to stop. The soldiers "had all kind of weapons," and as Blanco sped through the army's barricade "shots rang out," and "pieces of glasses flew all over."" Garcia Lavandero fired his M-3 rifle behind the driver while Chomon, fired from the other window as the car went through the army's blockade and into the city. Miraculously, they escaped with Garcia Lavandero suffering only a minor wound in the shoulder. After a daring escape from Cabaiguan and several days of hiding with peasants, the group established contact with the urban underground again and reached Havana. Despite their brush with death they "decidedly felt more secure in the llano (plain)."" Once in Havana, Chomon, met with Faustino P6rez to discuss the feasibility of a general strike. The DR Guerrilla Front As the student manifesto circulated throughout the island, the new guerrilla front gained importance. The Escambray Mountains were an excellent location for guerrilla warfare. The Trinidad-Sancti-Spiritus subregion of the mountain range was the second largest coffee-producing area on the island. The valleys surrounding Escambray produced good crops of rice, beans and vegetables, guaranteeing the guerrillas a constant supply of food. The large coffee plantations and cattle ranches also guaranteed a steady income through revolutionary taxes imposed during the campaign. The central Cuba location guaranteed that many urban fighters could reach the Escambray Mountains and participate in rural guerrilla warfare. To the southwest was the city of Cienfuegos, long a bastion of resistance to Batista. From Cienfuegos many young men joined the guerrillas, and intelligence reports about army movements "ere gathered there and sent to the Escambray. The various sugar mills in the province, the DR's previous involvement with the sugar workers in Las Villas province, and the militancy of DR urban cadres in cities and towns close to the mountains was a factor of great importance in the stabilization of the DR's guerrilla front. The number of DR guerrillas increased steadily. Many experienced urban fighters who had been identified by the regime's forces went to the mountains for the duration of the insurrection. Others went to the mountains but returned to the cities, some because the life of a rural guerrilla was too devoid of "excitement," others because they could not work "ell in groups of 20 or 30 and their individualism was too great a risk to the discipline which must exist in a guerrilla unit. Many of these fighters died in encounters with Batista's police. The DR's chief of action, Eduardo Garcia Lavandero, was killed together with Pedro Martinez Brito during the summer of 1958; Jose Rodriguez Vedo, Raul Gonzalez Sanchez, Ramon Gonzalez Coro and Mario ("Rcguerita") Reguera also died fighting the dictatorship in the cities. In the Escambray Mountains, the students received their baptism of' fire in encounters with the army at Fomento, Saltillo, Hanabanilla, Guinia de Miranda and the two battles of Pedrero, during the spring and summer of 1958. They also learned to walk in jungles, to get their bearings in the area and to prepare ambushes, where their collective effort was paramount. The guerrilla's skills eventually led the army to follow the example of their comrades in the Sierra Maestra. The regular soldiers simply refused to enter the mountains. By the beginning of the summer, the DR controlled the Escambray Mountains. As their power over the area grew, their responsibilities increased and the DR organized a civil administration. A comison campesina led by Juan Miranda, a peasant, was created and enlisted the support of most peasants in the mountains. Under the direction of Pedro Martinez Larrinaga, a sugar worker, a population census was taken in the area for the first time in the country's history. More than 50 schools were built, and all were functioning regularly by the end of the year. An educational unit administered by Professor Gilberto Mediavilla was formed-Unidad Educacional Joe Westbrookwith graduate students in charge of programming and student teachers at all levels of instruction in the system. There was a department of Justice-Division Legal Menelao Mora-under the supervision of Dr. Humberto J. Gomez a criminal lawyer and an officer in the DR guerrilla army. By the end of the insurrection the DR had created a department of public works and was building roads throughout the marginal areas of the Sierra del Escambray. Workers' brigades were organized to help in such endeavors as the maintenance of the three gun factories, and the schools, roads and hospitals. The activities of the committee of the census and that of the campesinos "ere coordinated to create a system of' cattle distribution among the inhabitants of Escambray and adjacent territories under the DR's control. A cattic-breeding center was formed under the direction of' professional veterinarians and students of the veterinary school from Havana University . The insurgents built two peasant homes for the elderly, and named them after Juan Pedro Carbo Servia The Pepe Wanguemert Medical Division at the town of' Guinia de Miranda extended medical aid throughout the mountains. Towards December 1958 the service had 15 field hospitals and ten ambulances, and treated more than 400 cases a month. Special attention was given to children's diseases, from intestinal parasites to leprosy. Cases of malnutrition were common; it was estimated that three out of five infants died before reaching the age of two. Before these rather primitive facilities were established, pregnant women received no prenatal care, but instead went to the local "nurse," who was a sort of witchdoctor. Dentists at field hospitals worked without respite in eight-hour shifts, 24 hours a day. Although many of the peasant families had brothers, cousins and other relatives in the Rural Guards, the location of the guerrilla hospitals were never revealed to the army. There were even times when regular soldiers, dressed in civilian clothes and accompanied by friends of the guerrillas, went to these medical centers for aid. There seems to be no doubt that through these activities the guerrillas established an excellent relationship with the rural population, and that the harsh realization of the poverty of the peasants served to radicalize the students further. There were also problems. The guerrillas tried to organize two agricultural cooperatives, but the plan failed because the peasants refused to abandon their own plots of land or even to discuss collective farming. The DR distributed land to peasants in the marginal areas of the Escambray Mountains, granting immediate title to peasants who requested land and who showed a desire to work. A department of agricultural affairs supervised the DR's agrarian reform and also offered technical advice in an attempt to teach the new proprietors methods of irrigation and the use of fertilizers. However, very seldom did the new owners folio" the suggestions of the technicians, and generally they made fun of those who tried to teach them how to plant certain crops. Some students tried to conduct study groups to improve family relations, in an attempt to decrease the machista attitude of the peasant men towards their women. The project was discarded when no men attended the study groups, and one of the volunteers for the project alertewd his companeros that the peasants were taking their advice as an insult. The new generation of Cuban insurrectionists was learning the social values of the peasants and their religious dogmas; not only were they being confronted with all their problems at once, but also with the realization that the peasants were quite a conservative group. The students learned to differentiate theory from practice, and to understand the complexity of problems involved in a seemingly easy family project which the students conceived as beneficial to the peasants, but which the latter viewed as prejudicial to their own traditions. The DR established a good communication system. It was based upon a telephone network which covered about 20 square kilometers, linking advance posts with headquarters. Maintenance was handled by a group of technicians of the Cuban Telephone Company, who left the urban underground to join the guerrillas in Escambray. The DR had two radio stations, and by the fall of 1958 these were linked with mobile units that reported the campaign leading to the battle of Santa Clara. BY mid-August 1958 the regular army would not even approach the marginal areas of the Escambray Mountains. However, during the fall of 1958, the army made an attempt to cut the guerrilla front in half by advancing simultaneously from the city of Cienfuegos towards the north, and from Santa Clara to the south. The army's sudden decision to fight the guerrillas was probably due to the arrival of Battalion No. 11, whose chief, Colonel Angel Sanchez Mosquera, was transferred from Oriente to Las Villas province. In theory the main objective was to isolate the guerrillas who had been operating in the western sector of the mountains and had attacked various army posts in the area, moving too close to the city of Cienfuegos. However, after two weeks of futile marching the army withdrew, leaving a few dead, some wounded, and plenty of' arms and ammunition. This brief and useless operation allowed the guerrillas to capture dozens of automatic rifles, substantial amounts of ammunition, secret codes and even a tank. In September 1958 approximately 800 guerrillas were operating in Escambray, with about 150 recruits in training and 50 messengers taken from among the youth in the area. As government persecution increased in the cities more urban militants went to the mountains. It was difficult to get to the Sierra Maestra or to the Sierra Cristal, but it "as relatively easy to reach the Escambray Mountains. Some activists of the M-26-7 also took refuge there because the rebel army in the Sierra Maestra would accept only a select number into the ranks of the guerrillas. Tile Escambray forces were larger, but Castro's 300 fighters had the advantage of' being united under one command, his. Castro would not allow any violation of the guerrilla code to threaten the group's unity. His policy was to limit the guerrilla fighters to a manageable number. Internal Division In July 1958 Faure Chomon returned to the Escambray Mountains to find a conflict between Rolando Cubela and Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo over the right of leadership,. Menoyo refused to accept Cubela as head, of' the guerrilla fighters, and he also rejected Chomon's insistence on "hitting at the top," as a useless spilling of blood. Menoyo protested sending arms I to the urban underground, claiming that all the arms were needed by the rural guerrillas. The leadership conflict in the mountains had a number of roots. One was that Menoyo's membership in the DR dated back to 1957, and although he had done a tremendous amount of organizational work as chief of action in Havana, Cubela was a founding member of the organization, and within the DR's tradition he, not Menoyo, had the right to the top position in the Escambray Mountains. Menoyo's claim to leadership was based on the fact that he had been the first DR guerrilla to reach the mountains. The organization found by the DR expeditionaries upon their arrival in central Cuba had been created by Menoyo. The conditions for the establishment of a guerrilla front, the contacts with the peasantry, the selection of sites for guerrilla camps, the knowledge of the terrain, and the contacts with the DR cadres in surrounding urban areas were all the product of Menoyo's dedicated work. Menoyo's claim clashed with Cubela's long standing as a DR leader, and with Chomon's leadership as the secretary general of the movement. But if experience as a guerrilla fighter had been considered as the prerequisite for leadership, then Menoyo, not Chomon, had the right to lead the DR's new phase of struggle. The solution was simple: Faure Chomon, stayed in the mountains as the secretary general of the DR, and I Rolando Cubela was reconized as the military leader of the DR. The executive committee of the DR supported Chomon's position, and Menoyo announced that he was leaving the organization to create his own group of guerrilla fighters. Chomon, then repeated the same charge that had been passed down after the palace attack, when Jorge Valls and Tirso Urdanivia, among others, were expelled as traitors. Chomon charged Menoyo with treason, proclaimed his expulsion from the DR, and settled down to direct the guerrilla campaign with Cubela. The division within the DR guerrilla army reflected the absence of the charismatic leadership of Jose Antonio Echeverria. Echeverria had maintained the control of the organization from its inception to the palace attack and his death: second-level leaders like Chomon and Menoyo appear to have inspired less respect on the part of the militants, and were more subject to criticism. The surviving leaders of the DR appear to have completely lacked the unique qualities which characterized Fidel Castro and made him not only an excellent insurgent, but also an astute politician. The DR had suffered two serious setbacks: the palace attack and the Chomon-Menoyo split. It may be that the palace attack was the product of amateurish planning. but the Chomon-Menoyo split was the result of the mediocrity of the surviving members of the DR. The Second Front of Escambray Because of the conflict between leaders, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo formed the Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray. At this point he attained the rank of major. William Morgan, 11 a former U.S. Marine, was also a commander and close to Gutierrez Menoyo. Also backing the- Second Front was Max Lesnik, a radio commentator and politician who disliked Chomon and Castro. Other guerrilla fighters, most of whom had an Autentico background, joined the Second Front of Escambray. The main financial backing came from former president Prio, whose contact with Gutierrez Menoyo was Lazaro Artola, an Autentico and an admirer of the former president. This guerrilla group was characterized by its lack of bureaucracy and by its highly mobile units. Its general staff included Majors Armando Fleites, William Morgan, Lazaro Artola, Alfredo Pena, Genaro Arroyo, Jesus Carrera and Gutierrez Menoyo as chief." The guerrilla army of the Second Front performed quite well during the remaining months of the insurrection. It had various encounters with the regular army, inflicting 37 casualties at La Diana. At Charco Azul, 30 soldiers were killed, and in the Rio Negro commando raid, 40 Rural Guards were shot to death and over 100 wounded. The encounters of Guanayara, Manantiales, Dos Became Jibacoa, San Blas, Hanabanilla, the second attack against the Rio Negro army post, and the encounters of Soledad, Guaos and La Moza helped to raise the prestige of the organization, and to consolidate its territory 1.39 Towards the end of the insurrection, while "Che" Guevara and the DR encircled Santa Clara, Major Gutierrez Menoyo's army attacked the regular trrops at Topes de Collantes, and fought the regular army at Camanayagua, Manicaragua, Barajagua, San Fernando de los Camarones, Guaos, Hormiguero and El Hoyo until the army sought refuge inside the city of Cienfuegos. But the approximately 300 guerrillas under his command did not have a definite ideology, nor was the group a disciplined political organization. Its sole purpose was to overthrow Batista. The division within the ranks of the DR had come at a critical time. Eight hundred guerrillas united under a single command could have created havoc with the regular army; instead, the divisiveness weakened the DR. The guerrilla movement remained divided in the Escambray Mountains, and was not to unite even after "Che" Guevara's arrival in I-as Villas province in October 1958. Gutierrez Menoyo did not change his position toward Chomon Chomon continued to charge Menoyo with treason; and "Che" took Chomon's side but paid attention to his main task: to defeat the regular army. Castro did not need to worry about internal divisions over military and political strategy. Although the M-26-7 militants complained of' Castro's dictatorial attitude, harsh discipline in its ranks and absolute centralization of command, the M-26-7 was monolithic by the end of 1958. This was the most important factor in the future course of the insurretion; for in insurrections, discipline is of paramount importance.

IN REFERENCE TO D. BOYLAN'S FINE PAPER A League of Their Own: A Look Inside the Christian Defense League By D. Boylan* Reply from Tosh: David: The following chapter 9 (Cuban Insurrection 1952-1958. New Jersey; Transaction Books, 1974) was sent to me recently by a close Cuban researcher and friend. I think this is little known by most of the current researchers of today. I find this information a very important link for those who want a solid foundation on the events that led up to that day in Dallas. It starts in 1956. It is important to keep in mind that the CIA was supplying arms and ammunitions to Fidel Castro, while at the same time still sending arms, aircraft, and tanks to Batista. We were "Arms Merchants" supporting both sides. In order to grasp why some Cubans to this day do not trust the United States is, perhaps, because of these political policies of old. Not much has been written about this M-26-7 to some extend the CIA's involvement is still classified. Most of this information, about the M-26-7 Havana group and the CIA's activities, have been purged from history by the powers that be. I for one think this history should be incorporated into any serious research work. I know of at least three American Pilots who lost their lives while flying weapons which had been stolen from United States National Guard Armories in order to overthrow Batista and bring Castro to power. I know of others who lost their lives while engaged in other secret operations connected to some of the splinter groups of the M-26-7. These brave men lost their lives after the M-26-7 was merged into other operations which were connected with the overthrow of Castro. Congressman Tom Downing was looking into these American MIA's when he died. I hope you find the following read of interest for your research and for the sake of history. This Chapter has been taken from: Ramon L. Bonachea and Marta San Martin. The Cuban Insurrection 1952-1959. New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1974. Chapter 9 A New Strategy pp. 173-186 Fidel Castro had survived with a small force of guerrilla fighters in the Sierra Maestra for over a year. Isolated from the rest of the island, sustaining few casualties and supported by the urban underground of the M-26-7, Fidel was creating a well-disciplined group of guerrillas and gaining the backing of the area's population. His mere presence in the Sierra Maestra contributed to his popularity with the people. Urban underground fighters were unknown precisely because of the secret nature of their activities, and after the deaths of Frank País and José Antonio Echeverría, Fidel was the only important insurrectionary leader, urban or otherwise, left in Cuba. Militarily, he had demonstrated that one could wage guerrilla warfare in the mountains against a regular army; and in so doing he had created a sanctuary for the urban cadres, a place where they could continue the struggle rather than perish in the cities. The DR's insistence upon conducting urban operations in accordance with the theory of' "hitting at the top" did not altogether disappear from the minds of' some of the leaders, especially Faure Chomón. But it was evident by late 1957 that a change in approach was as urgently needed. The organization had probably suffered more than any other in the urban struggle. It was the only movement to have lost all its leaders in a period of one month--the tragic weeks of March and April 1957. The long perparatory period before the attack on the Presidential Palace, the street demonstrations, acts of terrorism and direct confrontations with the police--all of which helped to develop a group of hard-core militants--also damaged the organization. The police had learned many of the cadre members' names and sought them out with pictures after the palace attack. The DR had to initiate a campaign for new recruits and to try to reinstitute the cell structure of the organization. After the attack on the palace and the Humboldt No. 7 killings, the executive council was reorganized. The new group included Primitivo Lima, Andrés Silva, Osmel Francis and Mary Pumpido among the voting professionals. The workers were represented by Pedro Martínez, Orlando Blanco and Jorge Martín, who were leaders of action and sabotage cells and also organizers within the labor movement. The council also included a women's section represented by Fructuoso Rodríguez's widow, Marta Jiménez. Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo--the brother of Carlos, who had led the commando group in the palace attack--was appointed chief of action in Havana. Under Eloy's leadership a new group of' urban cadre members emerged to replace their dead compañeros, among them: Guillermo Jiménez, Angel Quevedo, Julio Fernández, Héctor Terry, Enrique Zamorano, Domingo Pérez, Jorge ("Mago") Robreño, and Mario ("Reguerita") Reguera. In Las Villas province, Ramón Pando, president of the Student Federation of the School of Commerce at Las Villas University, became the provincial secretary general of the DR. With Enrique Villegas and Piro Abreu active throughout the province, the DR movement acquired a new impetus in central Cuba. Meanwhile, in Camagüey other militants emerged as important members of the urban organization, among them: Antonio ("Tony") Bastida, Florencio González, Adolfo Mora and Sergio Valle. The DR recovered rapidly from its defeat and extended its cells into the various sectors of the population reaching even well-to-do students at the Catholic Unversity of Villanova, where Jesús "Paulino" Barreiro represented the DR. Although few of these students were willing to cooperate, those who did help were instrumental in creating the Fourth Guerrilla Front in Pinar del Rio province. West of Havana, in late 1958. The movement also organized overseas. With funds raised among exiles in Miami and other cities in the United States, the DR sent delegates to various Latin American countries. Venezuelan leader, Romulo Betancourt, José Figueres of Costa Rica and Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala aided the DR by publicly supporting the insurrection. Results of this support were impressive, opening new contacts throughout the area and helping in the formation of delegations in Chile and in Caracas, Venezuela, following the fall of dictator Pérez Jiménez in early 1958. Delegations also existed in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Montevideo. Uruguay; Lima, Peru; Bogotá, Colombia; San José, Costa Rica: and in Panama, El Salvador and Mexico. In the United States there were delegations in New York, Chicago, New Orleans, Tampa, Jacksonville and Miami. The Nassau delegation was as able to extend its contacts throughout the Bahamas and, through the members of this important delegation. The DR developed its system for infiltrating people into Cuba, for conveying contraband arms, and for receiving information on the activities of the urban underground. One of the important tasks of the delegations was to conduct public campaigns to discredit Batista's regime and to present the case for the insurrection. As the tempo of these activities increased, U.S. authorities began to pay more attention to Cuban exiles in the Florida area. Federal authorities sometimes succeeded in blocking arms shipments to Cuba; more often they were unsuccessful. Under the leadership of Luis Blanca, Héctor Rosales, Carlos "Chino" Figueredo and Armando Fleites, the DR created a chain of' arms depots that extended from New York City to New Orleans and from there to Miami. Arms were never concentrated in a specific place, and sites where arms were gathered were usually outside the Spanish-speaking colonies. When a shipment left, several cars and trucks were used along the route, and deliveries were seldom made at the same place twice. False reports circulated throughout the exile colony to confuse the authorities. However, the general feeling among DR militants was that U.S. authorities were simply looking the other way as much as they possibly could. The DR's Decision to Fight Guerrilla War In September, Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, the DR's chief of action in Havana, arrived in Miami to discuss future strategy with Chomón, Cubela and Armando Fleites. The latter, a young physician and DR leader in Las Villas province, agreed with Gutiérrez Menoyo on the need to adopt a guerrilla strategy counter to the "hit at the top" tactic. Chomón still favored the direct action tactic, but agreed that the DR should change its approach and open a guerrilla front in Cuba. Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo returned to Havana and left the capital for the Escambray Mountains, reaching that area in mid-October. Menoyo's task was to inspect the area and to set up a guerrilla group; establish the necessary contacts with DR leaders in the surrounding towns and cities, and prepare the ground for the arrival of a larger group of' DR militants. On November 10, 1957 the guerrillas issued their first internal order declaring that a second national guerrilla front had been crcated and instructing the guerrillas to be loyal to the country, to keep all secrets of war, never to abandon their weapons, and to denounce deserters and traitors. In January 1958, various small arms shipments arrived in Cuba and were rapidly distributed throughout the various action cells, and some were transported to the Escambray Mountains. César Páez and Juan Figueroa, students who were born in Las Villas province, arrived in Havana and went to their native province to make contacts for future guerrilla actions. Pedro Martínez Brito, veteran of the Radio Reloj operation in 1957, infiltrated to Havana from Miami to acquaint DR cells of forthcoming operations against Batista. Meanwhile, Enrique Villegas, DR leader in the city of Sancti-Spiritus, in Las Villas, was shot to death by the army while he was taking supplies to Menoyo's guerrilla group. The movement rapidly gathered military information on government troops in Las Villas province, and on forces concentrated in posts close to the mountains. On January 28, 1958, José Martí's birthday, the DR held a mass rally at Miami's Bayfront Park, scene of many such gatherings by Cuban exiles. At that meeting, it was announced that Cuba would soon be in flames, and other pledges of future action were issued. Rumors of an impending invasion of Cuba circulated throughout the exile colony. During the first week of February, the DR underground was placed on the alert, and various cells prepared to go into diversionary actions against the government. In the final hours before the expedition, reports circulated in the exile colony about an encounter between an army patrol and guerrillas at Escambray. Fearing that these guerrillas were Menoyo's, and that Batista would mobilize the army to stop another Castro-like invasion, the DR gave the plan for an expedition its final touches. The Expedition In Miami, the students had established contact with an American named Alton Sweeting, captain of a pleasure yacht, the "Thor II," licensed in New York. Captain Sweeting agreed to take the expedition to a point near the northern coast of Cuba. From there a rendezvous ship was to transport the expeditionaries to the mainland, while Captain Sweeting's yacht would be refueled for the trip back to Miami. A few hours before departure, the authorities raided several places where students usually gathered around Miami. They failed to make any arrests, but they did succeed in letting everyone know that they had to move immediately. To confuse the authorities, the expeditionaries selected the most conspicuous place of departure, the Miami River. There, very close to the MacArthur Causeway which links Miami with Miami Beach, the Cubans gathered and boarded the "Thor II." renamed "Escapade." The decision was made to carry five tons of arms, thus reducing the number of expeditionaries to 15 men and one woman (Esther Martín). With its cargo the "Escapade" quietly cruised out of Miami. The expedition was as a complete success, and coordination between the exiles and the urban cadres was excellent. Captain Sweeting's cruiser anchored at Raccoon Cay off the northern coast of Cuba, and the expeditionaries \Acre transported further by a fishing boat, the "San Rafael." From the moment "Escapade" touched Raccoon Cay, Gustavo ("Tavo") Machin'' was responsible for the operation. Close to the coast they boarded a third small craft, the "Yaloven," which carried men and supplies to the fishing village of Santa Rita, close to the port of Nuevitas, in Camaguey province. On February 8, 1958,12 the DR's small expeditionary force landed and rapidly moved inland toward the capital of' Camaguey province where they remained hidden for a day, in groups of two and three at various underground headquarters. The expedition's cargo was at this point divided between arms to he transported to the DR's underground in Havana, and arms suitable for mountain fighting. Antonio ("Tony") Bastida, manager of a transport fleet of' trucks, was in charge of delivering the arms in Havana. The urban underground received 33 Thompsons, a .50 caliber machine gun, two .55 caliber anti-tank rifles, one shotgun, two .30 caliber machine guns, one M-3, two M-1s, a Winchester rifle, one Browning automatic rifle, 300 rounds of ammunition for the anti-tank rifles, 2,000 capsules (30.06mm) and ammunition for .45 caliber pistols, and hand grenades. The would-be guerrilla fighters carried 50 Italian carbines, two "Stern" submachine guns, one Thompson, two M-3s, two Springfield rifles, one Garand rifle, one M-1, five semi-automatic Remington rifles with telescopic sights, and 20,000 rounds of ammunition of various calibers. The route leading from Camaguey to the Banao area in the Escambray Mountains (190 kilometers) had been traced by urban cadres. All along the \Nay cadre members met the expeditionaries to render reports on the area they were still to cover, and to pinpoint army positions. The urban cadre members-among them Ramon Pando and Piro Abreu, student leaders in Las Villas province-took supplies to the expeditionaries and sometimes added men to the group. Dr. Manuel Sori Marin was also very helpful in finding means of transportation for the expeditionaries. On February 13, the expeditionaries reached the Banao area in the subregion of the Trinidad-Sancti-Spiritus mountains, to the southeast of Santa Clara, Las Villas' capital, and the next day the group reached the Cangalito hills- At 7 AM on February 15, they arrived at Cacahual, a small guerrilla camp flanked by two hills, where Gutierrez Menoyo, William Morgan and other guerrillas awaited the group. With Castro's experience at Alegria de Pio in mind, the expeditionaries place two observers on the hills surrounding Cacahual. Two days later, the observers alerted the camp to five army scouts approaching Cacahual~ an ambush disposed of' three of the five soldiers, but the rest escaped. Fearing the arrival of' army reinforceincrits the expeditionarics broke camp. At this point there were 29 guerrillas marching in two separate groups. Fourteen guerrillas followed an old peasant guide named Cadenas, among them \Acre Rolando Cubela, Gustavo ("Tavo") Machin, Dario Pedrosa, Alberto Mora and Efren Mur. The other group included, among others, Eduardo Garcia Lavandero, Rodriguez Loeches, Chomon, Luis Blanca, Armando Fleites, Alberto Blanco, Menoyo, Ivan Rodriguez, Ramon Pando, Oscar Ruiz and William Morgan. The second group of guerrillas marched toward the west and into the mountain chain called Guamuhaya. On February 19, the guerrillas camped at a place where they were to meet the rest of' the expeditionaries. Some of the DR men were to separate from the main group and return to the cities to wage urban guerrilla warfare. Ramon Pando and Alberto Blanco decided not to wait for the rest and were led out of' the mountains by Leonardo Bombino and a guide named Faustinito. They "ere intercepted by an army patrol, and Ramon Pando was captured, but the others managed to escape. Pando was later assassinated by order of army Lieutenant Froilan Perez. I I The two groups reunited at the Michelena forests, and the remaining 27 men tried to escape the area and tile pursuing army. They marched until 4 PM on February 19, when they camped at the forest of' "La Diana." Soon army troops approached along a path in the forest: at 4:45 PM the DR combatants ambushed them, in a 15-minute encounter killing 14 and wounding 16 soldiers." For the next 13 hours the guerrillas, led by Leonardo Bombino, marched along ravines until they managed to escape from the army. On February 24, safe from the army's pursuit, the DR leaders A rote a manifesto which they signed on the 25th. The Manifesto of Escambray The DR's manifesto set forth the objectives of the struggle by announcing that its strategy would be to conduct simultaneous urban and rural guerrilla A warfare against Batista. The DR would fight for the re-establishment of the Constitution of 1940, and to open the way for a social revolution. Revolutionary unity was essential for the victory of the insurrection, and the DR proposed that a "party of the revolution" be organized after Batista's overthrow. That party would gather "the real fighters who daily risk their lives fighting the dictatorship," and would guarantee that the constitution and the laws were fulfilled. The need for violence was reaffirmed, for peace could only come through the waging of war. The pillars of the future revolution were to be education, administrative honesty, agrarian reform and industrialization. Internationally, the DR supported the formation of a federation of' Caribbean republics, an initial step toward the organization of a confederation of American republics. The insurrectionary struggle against Batista, maintained the DR, was but the continuation of the country's historical struggle for independence since the nineteenth century. the DR viewed the insurrection as inspired by Jose Marti's ideas, the nationalism of Antonio ("Tony") Guiteras and the democratic principles of Jose Antonio Echeverria. The DR's fight was not only against Batista's regime, but also against -those who only a few years ago supported the Nazis on conquered land of Europe," a direct reference to the Communists, who -today are playing Batista's game as vulgar puppets." The caste of old and young politicians would be swept away by the insurrection as a fundamental requisite of social therapy. On February 27, the guerrillas reached the mountains to the south of Santa Clara, close to the cities of Placetas, Cabaiguan, Santa Clara and Guayos. At a peak called Tres Cruces, Chomon, Alberto Blanco, Rosendo Yero, Rodriguez Loeches, Garcia Lavandero and Luis Blanca began their journey back into the urban struggle. They were led by the peasant guide Bombino and another peasant named Raul Rosa. Although the DR had suffered severe casualties in the urban struggle, the theory of "hitting at the top" had not been discarded completely. Faure Chomon, Rodriguez Loeches and Eduardo Garcia Lavandero continued to urge the DR to strike at the dictator. These men had been molded in the urban insurrection, men from the cities, whose insurrectionary outlook was directly connected with struggle in the center of power, Havana. Consequently, when Rodriguez Loeches left his companeros to seek help in the cities close to the Escambray Mountains, he felt "a sense of relief and security," since as an urban fighter he felt "secure in my own environment." In Sancti-Spiritus, Loeches established contact with Piro Abreu through a lawyer, Emilio Morata. Abreu provided the insurrectionists with a car and with an experienced driver, Carlos Brunet. On the evening of March 3, the group met at Fomentos with plans to reach the city of Placetas, and then move by bus to Havana. As their car approached the city of' Placetas on the Central Highway, an army jeep and a car from the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) closed the road to check on all cars. The DR militants sped through the SIM's barricade as the army's car sped after them. Suddenly, Brunet stopped the car; as the soldiers stepped out of theirs, Brunet started the car again and the SIM agents opened fire. The men succeeded in escaping Placetas, heading east toward the city of Cabaiguan. Along the way, the driver refused to continue what he viewed as a suicide mission; the car was stopped and Brunet and Rosendo Yero stayed behind while Alberto Blanco took the driver's seat. In minutes, the car approached the city of Cabaiguan where an army patrol was waiting, signaling for them to stop. The soldiers "had all kind of weapons," and as Blanco sped through the army's barricade "shots rang out," and "pieces of glasses flew all over."" Garcia Lavandero fired his M-3 rifle behind the driver while Chomon, fired from the other window as the car went through the army's blockade and into the city. Miraculously, they escaped with Garcia Lavandero suffering only a minor wound in the shoulder. After a daring escape from Cabaiguan and several days of hiding with peasants, the group established contact with the urban underground again and reached Havana. Despite their brush with death they "decidedly felt more secure in the llano (plain)."" Once in Havana, Chomon, met with Faustino P6rez to discuss the feasibility of a general strike. The DR Guerrilla Front As the student manifesto circulated throughout the island, the new guerrilla front gained importance. The Escambray Mountains were an excellent location for guerrilla warfare. The Trinidad-Sancti-Spiritus subregion of the mountain range was the second largest coffee-producing area on the island. The valleys surrounding Escambray produced good crops of rice, beans and vegetables, guaranteeing the guerrillas a constant supply of food. The large coffee plantations and cattle ranches also guaranteed a steady income through revolutionary taxes imposed during the campaign. The central Cuba location guaranteed that many urban fighters could reach the Escambray Mountains and participate in rural guerrilla warfare. To the southwest was the city of Cienfuegos, long a bastion of resistance to Batista. From Cienfuegos many young men joined the guerrillas, and intelligence reports about army movements "ere gathered there and sent to the Escambray. The various sugar mills in the province, the DR's previous involvement with the sugar workers in Las Villas province, and the militancy of DR urban cadres in cities and towns close to the mountains was a factor of great importance in the stabilization of the DR's guerrilla front. The number of DR guerrillas increased steadily. Many experienced urban fighters who had been identified by the regime's forces went to the mountains for the duration of the insurrection. Others went to the mountains but returned to the cities, some because the life of a rural guerrilla was too devoid of "excitement," others because they could not work "ell in groups of 20 or 30 and their individualism was too great a risk to the discipline which must exist in a guerrilla unit. Many of these fighters died in encounters with Batista's police. The DR's chief of action, Eduardo Garcia Lavandero, was killed together with Pedro Martinez Brito during the summer of 1958; Jose Rodriguez Vedo, Raul Gonzalez Sanchez, Ramon Gonzalez Coro and Mario ("Rcguerita") Reguera also died fighting the dictatorship in the cities. In the Escambray Mountains, the students received their baptism of' fire in encounters with the army at Fomento, Saltillo, Hanabanilla, Guinia de Miranda and the two battles of Pedrero, during the spring and summer of 1958. They also learned to walk in jungles, to get their bearings in the area and to prepare ambushes, where their collective effort was paramount. The guerrilla's skills eventually led the army to follow the example of their comrades in the Sierra Maestra. The regular soldiers simply refused to enter the mountains. By the beginning of the summer, the DR controlled the Escambray Mountains. As their power over the area grew, their responsibilities increased and the DR organized a civil administration. A comison campesina led by Juan Miranda, a peasant, was created and enlisted the support of most peasants in the mountains. Under the direction of Pedro Martinez Larrinaga, a sugar worker, a population census was taken in the area for the first time in the country's history. More than 50 schools were built, and all were functioning regularly by the end of the year. An educational unit administered by Professor Gilberto Mediavilla was formed-Unidad Educacional Joe Westbrookwith graduate students in charge of programming and student teachers at all levels of instruction in the system. There was a department of Justice-Division Legal Menelao Mora-under the supervision of Dr. Humberto J. Gomez a criminal lawyer and an officer in the DR guerrilla army. By the end of the insurrection the DR had created a department of public works and was building roads throughout the marginal areas of the Sierra del Escambray. Workers' brigades were organized to help in such endeavors as the maintenance of the three gun factories, and the schools, roads and hospitals. The activities of the committee of the census and that of the campesinos "ere coordinated to create a system of' cattle distribution among the inhabitants of Escambray and adjacent territories under the DR's control. A cattic-breeding center was formed under the direction of' professional veterinarians and students of the veterinary school from Havana University . The insurgents built two peasant homes for the elderly, and named them after Juan Pedro Carbo Servia The Pepe Wanguemert Medical Division at the town of' Guinia de Miranda extended medical aid throughout the mountains. Towards December 1958 the service had 15 field hospitals and ten ambulances, and treated more than 400 cases a month. Special attention was given to children's diseases, from intestinal parasites to leprosy. Cases of malnutrition were common; it was estimated that three out of five infants died before reaching the age of two. Before these rather primitive facilities were established, pregnant women received no prenatal care, but instead went to the local "nurse," who was a sort of witchdoctor. Dentists at field hospitals worked without respite in eight-hour shifts, 24 hours a day. Although many of the peasant families had brothers, cousins and other relatives in the Rural Guards, the location of the guerrilla hospitals were never revealed to the army. There were even times when regular soldiers, dressed in civilian clothes and accompanied by friends of the guerrillas, went to these medical centers for aid. There seems to be no doubt that through these activities the guerrillas established an excellent relationship with the rural population, and that the harsh realization of the poverty of the peasants served to radicalize the students further. There were also problems. The guerrillas tried to organize two agricultural cooperatives, but the plan failed because the peasants refused to abandon their own plots of land or even to discuss collective farming. The DR distributed land to peasants in the marginal areas of the Escambray Mountains, granting immediate title to peasants who requested land and who showed a desire to work. A department of agricultural affairs supervised the DR's agrarian reform and also offered technical advice in an attempt to teach the new proprietors methods of irrigation and the use of fertilizers. However, very seldom did the new owners folio" the suggestions of the technicians, and generally they made fun of those who tried to teach them how to plant certain crops. Some students tried to conduct study groups to improve family relations, in an attempt to decrease the machista attitude of the peasant men towards their women. The project was discarded when no men attended the study groups, and one of the volunteers for the project alertewd his companeros that the peasants were taking their advice as an insult. The new generation of Cuban insurrectionists was learning the social values of the peasants and their religious dogmas; not only were they being confronted with all their problems at once, but also with the realization that the peasants were quite a conservative group. The students learned to differentiate theory from practice, and to understand the complexity of problems involved in a seemingly easy family project which the students conceived as beneficial to the peasants, but which the latter viewed as prejudicial to their own traditions. The DR established a good communication system. It was based upon a telephone network which covered about 20 square kilometers, linking advance posts with headquarters. Maintenance was handled by a group of technicians of the Cuban Telephone Company, who left the urban underground to join the guerrillas in Escambray. The DR had two radio stations, and by the fall of 1958 these were linked with mobile units that reported the campaign leading to the battle of Santa Clara. BY mid-August 1958 the regular army would not even approach the marginal areas of the Escambray Mountains. However, during the fall of 1958, the army made an attempt to cut the guerrilla front in half by advancing simultaneously from the city of Cienfuegos towards the north, and from Santa Clara to the south. The army's sudden decision to fight the guerrillas was probably due to the arrival of Battalion No. 11, whose chief, Colonel Angel Sanchez Mosquera, was transferred from Oriente to Las Villas province. In theory the main objective was to isolate the guerrillas who had been operating in the western sector of the mountains and had attacked various army posts in the area, moving too close to the city of Cienfuegos. However, after two weeks of futile marching the army withdrew, leaving a few dead, some wounded, and plenty of' arms and ammunition. This brief and useless operation allowed the guerrillas to capture dozens of automatic rifles, substantial amounts of ammunition, secret codes and even a tank. In September 1958 approximately 800 guerrillas were operating in Escambray, with about 150 recruits in training and 50 messengers taken from among the youth in the area. As government persecution increased in the cities more urban militants went to the mountains. It was difficult to get to the Sierra Maestra or to the Sierra Cristal, but it "as relatively easy to reach the Escambray Mountains. Some activists of the M-26-7 also took refuge there because the rebel army in the Sierra Maestra would accept only a select number into the ranks of the guerrillas. Tile Escambray forces were larger, but Castro's 300 fighters had the advantage of' being united under one command, his. Castro would not allow any violation of the guerrilla code to threaten the group's unity. His policy was to limit the guerrilla fighters to a manageable number. Internal Division In July 1958 Faure Chomon returned to the Escambray Mountains to find a conflict between Rolando Cubela and Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo over the right of leadership,. Menoyo refused to accept Cubela as head, of' the guerrilla fighters, and he also rejected Chomon's insistence on "hitting at the top," as a useless spilling of blood. Menoyo protested sending arms I to the urban underground, claiming that all the arms were needed by the rural guerrillas. The leadership conflict in the mountains had a number of roots. One was that Menoyo's membership in the DR dated back to 1957, and although he had done a tremendous amount of organizational work as chief of action in Havana, Cubela was a founding member of the organization, and within the DR's tradition he, not Menoyo, had the right to the top position in the Escambray Mountains. Menoyo's claim to leadership was based on the fact that he had been the first DR guerrilla to reach the mountains. The organization found by the DR expeditionaries upon their arrival in central Cuba had been created by Menoyo. The conditions for the establishment of a guerrilla front, the contacts with the peasantry, the selection of sites for guerrilla camps, the knowledge of the terrain, and the contacts with the DR cadres in surrounding urban areas were all the product of Menoyo's dedicated work. Menoyo's claim clashed with Cubela's long standing as a DR leader, and with Chomon's leadership as the secretary general of the movement. But if experience as a guerrilla fighter had been considered as the prerequisite for leadership, then Menoyo, not Chomon, had the right to lead the DR's new phase of struggle. The solution was simple: Faure Chomon, stayed in the mountains as the secretary general of the DR, and I Rolando Cubela was reconized as the military leader of the DR. The executive committee of the DR supported Chomon's position, and Menoyo announced that he was leaving the organization to create his own group of guerrilla fighters. Chomon, then repeated the same charge that had been passed down after the palace attack, when Jorge Valls and Tirso Urdanivia, among others, were expelled as traitors. Chomon charged Menoyo with treason, proclaimed his expulsion from the DR, and settled down to direct the guerrilla campaign with Cubela. The division within the DR guerrilla army reflected the absence of the charismatic leadership of Jose Antonio Echeverria. Echeverria had maintained the control of the organization from its inception to the palace attack and his death: second-level leaders like Chomon and Menoyo appear to have inspired less respect on the part of the militants, and were more subject to criticism. The surviving leaders of the DR appear to have completely lacked the unique qualities which characterized Fidel Castro and made him not only an excellent insurgent, but also an astute politician. The DR had suffered two serious setbacks: the palace attack and the Chomon-Menoyo split. It may be that the palace attack was the product of amateurish planning. but the Chomon-Menoyo split was the result of the mediocrity of the surviving members of the DR. The Second Front of Escambray Because of the conflict between leaders, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo formed the Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray. At this point he attained the rank of major. William Morgan, 11 a former U.S. Marine, was also a commander and close to Gutierrez Menoyo. Also backing the- Second Front was Max Lesnik, a radio commentator and politician who disliked Chomon and Castro. Other guerrilla fighters, most of whom had an Autentico background, joined the Second Front of Escambray. The main financial backing came from former president Prio, whose contact with Gutierrez Menoyo was Lazaro Artola, an Autentico and an admirer of the former president. This guerrilla group was characterized by its lack of bureaucracy and by its highly mobile units. Its general staff included Majors Armando Fleites, William Morgan, Lazaro Artola, Alfredo Pena, Genaro Arroyo, Jesus Carrera and Gutierrez Menoyo as chief." The guerrilla army of the Second Front performed quite well during the remaining months of the insurrection. It had various encounters with the regular army, inflicting 37 casualties at La Diana. At Charco Azul, 30 soldiers were killed, and in the Rio Negro commando raid, 40 Rural Guards were shot to death and over 100 wounded. The encounters of Guanayara, Manantiales, Dos Became Jibacoa, San Blas, Hanabanilla, the second attack against the Rio Negro army post, and the encounters of Soledad, Guaos and La Moza helped to raise the prestige of the organization, and to consolidate its territory 1.39 Towards the end of the insurrection, while "Che" Guevara and the DR encircled Santa Clara, Major Gutierrez Menoyo's army attacked the regular trrops at Topes de Collantes, and fought the regular army at Camanayagua, Manicaragua, Barajagua, San Fernando de los Camarones, Guaos, Hormiguero and El Hoyo until the army sought refuge inside the city of Cienfuegos. But the approximately 300 guerrillas under his command did not have a definite ideology, nor was the group a disciplined political organization. Its sole purpose was to overthrow Batista. The division within the ranks of the DR had come at a critical time. Eight hundred guerrillas united under a single command could have created havoc with the regular army; instead, the divisiveness weakened the DR. The guerrilla movement remained divided in the Escambray Mountains, and was not to unite even after "Che" Guevara's arrival in I-as Villas province in October 1958. Gutierrez Menoyo did not change his position toward Chomon Chomon continued to charge Menoyo with treason; and "Che" took Chomon's side but paid attention to his main task: to defeat the regular army. Castro did not need to worry about internal divisions over military and political strategy. Although the M-26-7 militants complained of' Castro's dictatorial attitude, harsh discipline in its ranks and absolute centralization of command, the M-26-7 was monolithic by the end of 1958. This was the most important factor in the future course of the insurretion; for in insurrections, discipline is of paramount importance. END OF POST Ref; Cuban Insurrection 1974