John Bevilaqua

The more recent dates would indicate that these guys were about 21 to 22 years old and just pledging into Skull and Bones, but check out Morehead Patterson who was also Yale Skull and Bones. He was involved in the 1958-59 plot to kill JFK discovered by Richard Condon but those guys were such incompetent klutzes that Ray S. Cline took over and led the 1963 plot against JFK with almost the same crew. Patterson died in 1962 and he never lived to find out if AMF was going to enjoy a financial resurgence. Their customers were involved with Tobacco, Textiles, Tomahawk Missiles and Transportation in the North Carolina nexus of characters... mostly all losing industries in those days. See Troubling Trends in Textiles, Tobacco, Transportation and Tomahawks... in another posting. I think you will enjoy it. But remember this is the first plot against JFK the Senator and its cover was blown by Condon.

Oral History Interview with General William H. Draper Jr. Chief, Economics Division, Control Council for Germany, 1945-46; Military Government Adviser to the Secretary of State, Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1947; Under Secretary of War, 1947; Under Secretary of the Army, 1947-49; and United States Special Representative in Europe, with rank of Ambassador, January 1952 - June 1953. Washington, D.C. January 11, 1972 by Jerry N. Hess [Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NOTICE This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word. Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview. RESTRICTIONS This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library. Opened May, 1974 Harry S. Truman Library Independence, Missouri [Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Oral History Interview with General William H. Draper Jr. Washington, D.C. January 11, 1972 by Jerry N. Hess [1] HESS: General, for the record, will you relate a little of your personal background: Where were you born, where were you educated, and what are a few of the positions that you have held both before and since your service in the Truman administration. DRAPER: My name is William H. Draper, Jr. I was born in New York City in Harlem, August 10, 1894. I went to school there and to NYU to college, where I got both a B.A. and a M.A. in economics. My work first was in the Army, shortly after I got out of college, although even before that I had been a member of the Ford Peace Expedition to Europe which tried to stop the war at the end of 1915. I was chairman of the student delegation. There were sixty regular delegates and thirty student delegates. The expedition, with Mr. Ford aboard, went to all the neutral countries [2] and set up a peace congress at The Hague at the Peace Palace, which lasted about six months. Contrary to the public impression at the time the peace congress came fairly close to settling the war. However, it did not. Within six months or a year, I saw a number of the student delegates in the Army. After the First World War, I went first with the National City Bank, then with the Bankers' Trust Company and then Dillon, Read and Company. I stayed in the Army Reserves. In 1939 and 1940 I was Chief of Staff of the 77th Division, a Reserve Division, and probably because of that I came in contact with General [George C.] Marshall. In 1940 he invited me to go on active duty in Washington on the general staff, G-1, where I stayed for about a year and a half before Pearl Harbor. During that period I worked largely with then Major [Lewis B.] Hershey, later General Hershey, in writing the Selective Service Act and putting together the administration of Selective Service. After Pearl Harbor, General Marshall agreed that I should leave staff work and get a regiment. After a regimental commander's refresher course at Fort Benning, I commanded the 136th Infantry, part of the 33rd Division, a National Guard Division from Illinois. I joined them [3] in Tennessee, then for training near Seattle, Washington, then to the California desert, then to the Pacific Theatre. I was called back after about a year out there to head up contract termination for the War Department. Then I was asked by the Secretary of War Mr. [Henry M.] Stimson and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. [James V.J Forrestal at that time, along with Admiral Lewis Strauss, to try to put the purchasing arrangements for the Army and Navy together with a common purchasing policy an action which did put some of the purchasing for both services together. Then I went to Germany, going to France first, while the war was still on, with General [Lucius] Clay, preliminary to the occupation which he was expecting to take over in Germany under General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower. I was asked by General Clay to take on the responsibility for the economic side of the occupation. Then General Eisenhower left for the United States where he became Chief of Staff of the Army. General Clay eventually became Commander in Chief for the European Theater in addition to handling occupied Germany. After about two years in Berlin dealing with the German economy, its agriculture, industry, trade and general administration of its economy the German [4] government had simply disappeared, and the occupation forces of Great Britain, Russia and the United States and eventually of France, became the German government for some period -- in July of '47 I returned to the United States for a coal conference with the British about the Ruhr -- the need for more coal production. While there, Secretary of War [Robert] Patterson resigned; General Kenneth Royall was made Secretary and he asked me to become Under Secretary, which after consulting General Clay for obvious reasons, I accepted. My duties for the next two years were primarily supervision of the three occupations: Germany, Japan and Austria, although I became Acting Secretary when Mr. Royall was away from Washington. After I retired in early '49 and married again (my first wife had died early in the war), I returned briefly to Dillon, Read and Company and then was invited by Governor [Thomas E.] Dewey of New York State, where I was living, to take over the Trusteeship of the Long Island Railroad after several very serious rear end collisions on that railroad, as a result of which the public had lost confidence in the safety of the road and in the management. I discharged this responsibility for [5] about a year. We were able to find electronic safety devices that were installed over a period of about a year, and which automatically and electronically, through the rails, put the brakes on the following train if two trains got too close together. There have been no rear and collisions on the Long Island Railroad since. About that time the Truman administration invited me to become the United States' member of the NATO Council in Paris. The Council was moving from London to Paris and being upgraded, as it became evident that it would be necessary, with the Korean war on and the threat to Western Europe from Russia, to build up the Western world's mutual defenses. The NATO Alliance had been formed on paper about a year and a half before, but it became very clear that it would be necessary to have a large and active defense force in being. Before accepting I asked for the opportunity to visit Europe briefly and talk with General Eisenhower who was there in command of NATO's military forces, such as they were, to make sure that he and I would be working in close harmony, he being the top military man in NATO, and I to be the top civilian on the U.S. side on the NATO Council. We met in Paris. He introduced me to Winston Churchill [6] who happened to be there at the time. We talked about my possible appointment and he not only agreed that I should take it but welcomed my appointment. I returned to the United States and suggested that since I would be dealing with the defense of Europe, and since I would also be representing the Mutual Security Administration under Mr. [Averell] Harriman and dealing with the economic problems of the European countries as well at a time when France and Great Britain were practically bankrupt, and when our Mutual Security arrangements and our Marshall Plan follow up were beginning to bear fruit, but still required a great many adjustments and continued assistance, that I would need deputies with the proper authority and rank in the defense field, in the economic field, and in the political field; plus an overall deputy, since we were dealing with twenty European countries, and I would be traveling a great deal in Europe and back and forth to Washington. He would be my alter ego. These arrangements were all agreed to and the deputies appointed. I went to Paris about the end of '51, spent a few weeks in close collaboration with Jean Monnet, and a prominent Britisher, whose name slips me, and who later became head of the British atomic energy commission. [7] The three of us, known correctly or not as the three wise men planned the recommendations that would be made to the Lisbon Conference, to which came Secretary of State [Dean] Acheson; Secretary of Defense, Robert Lovett; John Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury, and Averell Harriman. The Lisbon Conference was held in February 1952. It laid the groundwork on a very constructive basis for the military buildup of NATO. The French were asked for twelve divisions, as I recall. The United States had to agree to a great deal of economic support to make that possible. There were political questions involved. The French Prime Minister, Mr. [Maurice] Faure, I believe it was at that time, at the last minute in a private conference, held in the basement of the British Embassy, in Lisbon, told us that he agreed with the principle, that he was going to agree, he thought, to what we were asking, namely twelve French divisions, for the common defense. But he said, "This is going to cost me my political head." We adjourned this private meeting, we went into the final Lisbon Conference meeting, the agreement generally was reached, and the agreement signed. Three days later M. Faure did lose his job as Prime Minister, but the agreement held. After about a year and a half the various agreements made at Lisbon were pretty well coming into force. [8] General Eisenhower was elected President. He asked me to return to the United States before he took over as President to meet with him and with his future Cabinet members to acquaint them with the developments in NATO. He himself, of course, was quite familiar with what had gone on there. As was customary, I gave the incoming President my resignation. He asked me not to insist. I pointed out that including the war years I had been about ten years in Government service, or more perhaps, and he agreed that I could retire about the middle of '53, which I did. Shortly after that I went to Mexico for six years to head the Mexican Light and Power Company, a most enjoyable and constructive business assignment. In 1959 I decided it was time to return to the United States. I persuaded General Maxwell Taylor, who was then retiring as Chief of Staff of the Army, to take over my job in Mexico, which he did. Mrs. Draper and I moved to California, and I formed a financing firm with General [Frederick L.] Anderson who had been my general deputy in NATO. And six or seven years later I retired from that firm, moved to Washington, and became Chairman of Combustion Engineering in New York for a few years. In 1965 I retired as Chairman, and since then I have been devoting my entire time to trying to do something about finding [9] solutions for the population problem of the world -- the so-called population explosion. That's very lengthy, much more so than I anticipated making it. HESS: That's quite all right. What is the name of the particular organization that you are with now? DRAPER: I wear several hats: I am Honorary Chairman of the Population Crisis Committee here in Washington; I'm on the Governing Body of the International Planned Parenthood Federation; and am Honorary Vice-Chairman of the Planned Parenthood movement in this country; also by President Nixon's appointment. I represent the United States each two years, or whenever meetings are held, of the United Nations Population Commission. Our last meeting was in November 1971 in Geneva, the first two weeks of November. In general, my work with the Population Crisis Committee, means dealing with our own Government, and other governments, and with private and international organizations interested and involved in the population problem. I travel a great deal. In addition to the above, for the last few years I have been assisting Mr. Paul Hoffman, who has been in charge of the Development Program of the United Nations, [10] to raise the funds from governments for the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, about thirty million dollars this past year from forty six governments. HESS: What are your earliest recollections of Mr. Truman? DRAPER: I don't believe that I had ever met Mr. Truman personally until after he became President. At the time of President Roosevelt's death I was in Washington, on the General Staff of the Army. Shortly after that I went to Europe, on General Eisenhower's staff under General Clay. HESS: What were your impressions upon the death of President Roosevelt? You mentioned that you were here in town, but what came to mind? DRAPER: We were still at war. President Roosevelt had been a great war President. I'm a Republican; he was a Democrat. I hadn't voted for him. I disagreed with many of his domestic policies, but I certainly recognized and do today that he foresaw our participation in the war, our necessary involvement, and that prepared for it in a way that the American people accepted. While it took some time it did help greatly to bolster the British during their year of fighting it out alone, under the lend-lease [11] agreements that he made with Mr. Churchill. He began building up the forces preliminary to Pearl Harbor so that when that blow struck it was, I think, very largely due to Mr. Roosevelt's forethought and foresight, that we were able to quickly mobilize and go to war effectively. When he died, to get to your direct question, I had known that he was not in good health, but I had no idea that he was near death. It was almost -- here in Washington -- almost a physical shock to the entire community, that permeated the atmosphere in a way that I've never known before or since. Even the declaration of war didn't compare, the shock waves, that seemed to be going around us everywhere with our war leader suddenly dead. HESS: As you know, several historians have said that President Roosevelt had prior information that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked, and he did not notify the commanders so that the Japanese would attack and get us into the war in that manner. What do you think of that? DRAPER: I don't believe it. I don't know, but I don't believe it. I can't believe that if there was any prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor that General Marshall would have been riding horseback that Sunday morning when it happened. HESS: What kind of a job did you think Mr. Truman would do [12] as President of the United States, and just what did you know about him on April 12, 1945? DRAPER: I had a favorable picture of Mr. Truman without knowing him personally. His work as Committee Chairman in the Senate, and his investigation of war activities which had gone on for some time before he became Vice President, had favorably impressed everyone, including myself. As Vice President he was not prominent in current goings-on, so that I didn't know too much about him; and like everyone else, I wondered what kind of a President he was going to make. I was tremendously impressed with his modesty and the way in which he took over the Presidency, indicating that he thought the size of the job was such that he only hoped he could live up to its requirements. HESS: And before moving on, as you were with Dillon, Read for a good number of years, what are your recollections of Mr. James Forrestal? When did you first meet Mr. Forrestal? DRAPER: When I first joined Dillon Read which was in 1926. He was already one of the senior members of the firm. I guess he was the senior member of the firm, probably, next to Mr. Clarence Dillon, the top man, and a very able [13] financial genius, I would put it almost. He worked in a way like -- by himself to some degree, but he had tremendous influence in bringing financial arrangements to fruition. He was a very fine person in every way. I knew him well, intimately, worked under him for years, so that in 1940 I went to Washington before he did, but when he was invited to Washington he was one of the so-called nine anonymous young men in the White House. He impressed everyone that he worked with here in Washington and moved up to Under Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy, and finally the first Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Navy when he came to Washington was Secretary [Frank] Knox. One of the smartest things that President Roosevelt ever did was to bring two Republicans into the Cabinet, and the timing was perfect. There had been a lot of bickering going on in the War Department between Secretary [Harry H.] Woodring and Assistant Secretary [Louis] Johnson. Nobody knew who was boss or what the policies were. When the President decided that the time had come to have the other party represented in the Cabinet in order to attract national support he appointed Mr. Stimson as Secretary of War and Mr. Knox as Secretary of the Navy. In effect he turned over our national defense to the Republicans, and so far [14] as the individuals he selected were concerned, he made a ten strike with each. Mr. Forrestal had been invited to serve generally in and around the White House, but settled down in the Navy. Mr. Knox must have known him or came to know him, and pretty soon he was Under Secretary of the Navy, and then became Secretary later on. During the period after Pearl Harbor the man who was responsible for the rebuilding of our Navy after the attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed so much of it, and who built it to levels we'd never dreamed of before, and which made it possible to fight in two oceans, and gradually to move across the Pacific, island after island, until we had conquered the Japanese, was James Forrestal. HESS: In your opinion, what was his view of the unification of the services? DRAPER: My impression of Jim Forrestal's views on unification are that he was resisting a great deal of pressure from the admirals who were almost all opposed to the idea, while himself believing that it was the right solution for American defense organization. His thinking was probably affected by his close association with Bob Patterson, the then Secretary of War, and probably also by President Truman's own views. [15] HESS: In your opinion, why was he selected to be the first Secretary of Defense? DRAPER: Simply for that reason. I don't say it was to bribe the Navy admirals but his appointment did certainly take into account their point of view. The Navy had always been on its own. The Captain was supreme on his ship. The Navy had that overall point of view -- a good one indeed for fighting battles on the sea. I'm sure the President said to himself, "We'll just take the Navy along by putting him in charge." And it worked. HESS: What is your general opinion of his effectiveness both as the Secretary of the Navy, which you've fairly well covered, but as Secretary of Defense, too? Just how effective was he in the job? DRAPER: The first Secretary of Defense had a hard job, obviously. He had to bring together the War Department, which became the Department of the Army, and the new Air Force, which had been a part of the Army, and the Navy as well. For the Air Force it meant a greater degree of autonomy. But both the Navy and the Army and the War Department had been supreme and independent in their own right, and it was not an easy thing to knock their heads together and for both to have a single boss. I [16] think he did that job very well indeed. I worked very closely with him for about three months. He asked Secretary Royall to let me spend a few months directly with the Secretary of Defense to build up and put forward the first defense budget for the three services. So I worked day in and day out on that job and saw a great deal of him during that period. It really meant that I was dealing back and forth and compromising with the three services to try to find a budget that the President would approve and that still took care of each of the three services to the extent possible within that limit. HESS: In his Memoirs Mr. Truman makes the comment that in working on military budgets, sometimes the Navy was the most difficult to satisfy and to get along with. What would be your view? DRAPER: I found that true, too. HESS: Why would that be true? Why was that true? DRAPER: Their tradition had always been one of independent action and the Navy considered it simply had to have what it needed. The admirals were good proponents and didn't take no for an answer easily. A lot of my good [17] Navy friends were in there fighting all the way. They are still good friends of mine, those that are still living. But when they're arguing the question of the Navy's rights, they're very strong protagonists. Actually, to get back to that first budget for just a minute, I'm afraid that I would consider that first budget one of President Truman's real mistakes. At that time -- what year would that have been, 1948, I guess -- the three budgets were put together at three levels: One, if I remember the figures, the minimum budget of thirteen and a half billion dollars for the three services, which sounds picayune today; the middle budget was about seventeen billion and the third was what the three services asked for, and which was the way we first started to put the figures together, it was about twenty-one billion dollars. Mr. Forrestal felt very strongly, as did I, that while he could justify reducing the twenty-one billion, he felt strongly that the middle ground of seventeen billion was the irreducible minimum from the point of view of the national defense of this country. I prepared these three budgets. The thirteen and a half budget was only made because the President had set that as the figure, although it wasn't supposedly the final figure. But that was the figure he hoped to reach. [18] So we had to make a budget there, but to get the three services to agree on the figures for that, just meant they had to be rammed down their throats. But the seventeen billion budget took care reasonably at least, of what each of the three felt their really irreducible requirements actually were, although they all three badly wanted the twenty-one billion budget. I sat in the meeting when Mr. Forrestal presented the three budgets to the President, and Mr. Forrestal was more concerned than I had ever seen him in my life. He was very, very seriously troubled. After the presentation the President said very little except to ask a few questions. Then the President said, "I'll let you know, Jim." And a day or two later he did let him know that it was thirteen and a half billion -- the President's original budget. I think that may have helped to bring on the Korean war. I think that may have helped to bring on Jim's death. That's something I'd like to put off the record until after the President dies. HESS: Now, a further question on this same matter: Was Frank Pace the Director of the Bureau of the Budget at this time? Harold Smith, of course, was the first director and he was replaced by James Webb. I believe at this time Frank Pace was Director of the Bureau of [19] the Budget. In drawing up these very important budgets, the most important -- the budgets that take most of the money -- are the military budgets. In drawing these up, did you work with the Bureau of the Budget? DRAPER: I must have. I guess it was Frank Pace, but whoever it was I certainly must have worked with him, but not nearly as closely as I did with the three services. My job, really, was -- as outlined to me by Mr. Forrestal -- although I guess I evolved the idea of the three budgets, was to take into account the three requests from the services and then to get a reasonable budget together -- one that he could recommend. This turned out to be the seventeen billion one. And then he also asked me, against his better judgment, to prepare a budget at the lower level, set by the President, and when the lower level was approved, I know that it was a great shock. It meant to him that his country was not going to get what it needed for its defense for that period. HESS: 1948 was a very important year, that was a political year, the year Mr. Truman ran and was elected, to many peoples' surprise. In your opinion, do you think he had political considerations in mind when he wanted a balanced budget that year? Was that his reason for the [20] lower budget? DRAPER: I wouldn't want to express an opinion on that. He felt that a balanced budget, now that we were out of the war, was the necessity, the need for the country, I'm sure. Whether there were political overtones, too, I can't say. HESS: All right. As you have mentioned, the cutting back of the armed forces at this time left us somewhat unprepared at the advent of the Korean war. We were unprepared to meet the situation that arose. Where should the blame lie? DRAPER: Those decisions are a matter of judgment. The President has to make the final decisions. He doesn't have anybody to lay the blame on. I think one of the great tributes to Mr. Truman, and I would be the first to make it, was his power of decision. Throughout the time that I was Under Secretary, and sometimes acting as Secretary, I would go to the President from time to time, with particular problems of the Department of the Army that had taken us weeks or months in some cases to evaluate and decide what we should recommend or what course we thought the country should pursue. I have never been impressed by anyone more in my life than by [21] the way in which he would receive the problem; I would describe it briefly, for five or ten minutes; he would ask a few questions; I would give him the two or possibly three alternative decisions that could be made; he would make one of them, and that would be that. He would go on to something else. That's the way he ran the Presidency. He constantly carried out the little motto on his desk, "The Buck Stops Here." Now, to get back to your question. He had to decide on whether a balanced budget at that time was more important to the country than a little more money from his point of view in defense, and he made the decision. I wouldn't criticize it. HESS: How often did you meet with the President during the time that you were Under Secretary of the Army, approximately? DRAPER: I suppose twenty times, I don't know. I was there about two years -- twenty or thirty times. HESS: Did you work with any of the White House staff members at the time? DRAPER: Yes, yes. HESS: Who comes to mind? Did you work with Clark Clifford? [22] Clifford was Special Counsel at that time. DRAPER: Yes, yes, very often with Clark Clifford. HESS: Did he provide you with any particular help? Anything that you and he worked on that might help illustrate his functions in this field? Is there anything that comes to mind? DRAPER: No, we talked about the problems as they came along and he'd give me the President's answers. As a rule, of course, Secretary Royall had these conversations. It was when either he delegated me to do something in particular or when he'd be away on a trip that I would have the direct contact. HESS: Did you have any contact with the Military Aide, General Harry Vaughan? DRAPER: I certainly met him a few times, but remember nothing in particular. HESS: You have mentioned a meeting at the White House in which Mr. Forrestal presented the budget and mentioned his attitude at that time. What are the earliest signs that you can recall of the unfortunate mental breakdown that overtook Mr. Forrestal? Was this the first time [23] that you noticed that something might be wrong? DRAPER: Well, I didn't notice any mental breakdown or anything of that kind. He was simply greatly shocked that the President's decision was so low. No, I think that was much later on I retired. I saw Jim several times before that. I retired, around March of '49. I had been wanting to return to private life before that but Jim had persuaded me to stay just as the President had persuaded him to stay over the election into the new year. He and Mr. Royall and the President permitted me to go in March of '49. HESS: The same month that Mr. Forrestal left. DRAPER: He left after I did. I saw him before I left to say goodbye, and I noticed then that he was very distraught. I returned to Washington about ten days later, after my wedding and a short honeymoon, and had breakfast with Jim, and then I could hardly get his attention on anything. He was obviously worried, distraught . . . HESS: Early in April. DRAPER: No, this was still in March, I think. He was soon going to leave -- I knew then he was going to leave. He was going to leave and I ascribed his distraught condition [24] to the fact that he was leaving, and perhaps to not being happy about his successor going to take over. HESS: In March Louis Johnson replaced him. DRAPER: That's correct. HESS: Why was that change made? You mentioned that Mr. Forrestal had wanted to leave. DRAPER: He had wanted to leave, but this was in the fall or winter before, but the President persuaded him that he needed him and wanted him to stay, and he agreed to stay, and then apparently very suddenly the President decided to appoint Mr. Johnson. My information at the time, which was rumor largely, was that Mr. Johnson had raised the money for the election and was told that he could have any job he wanted after the election, if the President were elected, which you can understand. Then Mr. Johnson asked for the Defense job, and the President gave it to him. I was present when Johnson was sworn in at the Pentagon. They had a full dress affair in the encircled area inside the Pentagon Square or Pentagon, and the President pinned a medal on Jim, and then swore in Johnson. Everybody from the Pentagon had been invited [25] to flock inside the enclosure and see the show. Jim went back to his office and a friend of his from New York took him by plane to Hobe Sound where he stayed at Douglas Dillon's house. That's where the tragedy started. HESS: Do you think that Mr. Forrestal had changed his mind in March and would liked to have remained? DRAPER: I don't know, but my guess is at that time he didn't like to be suddenly replaced. He perhaps would voluntarily have offered to go in another month or two, but I don't think he felt happy at all about the President, after urging him so hard to stay, deciding that somebody else should take the job. That's a personal impression only. HESS: Some people say that Mr. Forrestal's lack of support of the President in the election might have influenced that. Would he reasonably have expected support from Mr. Forrestal? DRAPER: It's been a pretty regular rule in our Government that people involved in defense should not get into politics. I certainly agree with that rule personally, and I think that was Jim's point of view, and I wouldn't expect that the President thought anything else. No, I think it was just because Johnson had put the President [26] under a real obligation and he was paying his debt. HESS: We discussed the reduced budget, and not too long after Mr. Johnson came in, I believe one of his first actions was to stop work on the super carrier, the U.S.S. United States, and that was when Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan resigned, shortly after you left. DRAPER: That's right, but I'm not familiar with that incident. HESS: Back on General Marshall. You had mentioned that General Marshall asked you to come back into the Army in 1940. What were your early associations with General Marshall? When did you first meet him? DRAPER: As Chief of Staff of the 77th Division, which was then a part-time job, that was when I was in the Reserves. We could see war looming ahead. I had for some months, maybe for a year, been working with other officers of the Division, and with General Vanderbilt who was the commanding general at that time, preparing war plans so far as the Division was concerned, and looking forward at the right time to calling in the enlisted men and also piecing out the training of the officers. We had had occasion two or three times to take some of these [27] plans to Washington for consultation. And General Marshall had sat in on some of these consultations. I had met with him to discuss these plans and problems with him on behalf of our Division. One day I got a personal phone call from him asking if I'd come down and go on active duty for six months -- it turned out to be nine years -- but I can't blame General Marshall for that. I really think that he wanted to have some Reserve officer down there to give him whatever benefit there might be in the Reserve thinking, and also to reflect perhaps, through that Reserve officer, to some of the Reserve Divisions, the War Department thinking about the future of the Reserves. But it didn't turn out that way. I became almost immediately involved in the Selective Service and in the G-1 operation and was absorbed with that, working with General -- then Major -- Lewis Hershey. The President appointed me -- President Roosevelt -- to the Army and Navy Recreation Board and some of the other boards and committees that dealt with the enlargement of the strength of the Army and the Navy. HESS: You were with General Marshall at the Moscow conference, but that was in 1947, so we have another subject before we come to that. We will come back to General Marshall. [28] But we should cover your experiences in Germany at the end of World War II. I believe that you were Chief of the Economics Division of the Control Council for Germany from '45 to '47. Just what were your general impressions at that time and what were your duties? DRAPER: As I've said before, the occupation became the actual Government of Germany. When we moved up from Versailles, our offices were first in Frankfurt, and then in July of 1945 we moved to Berlin. First the tripartite Control Council, then when the French joined us, the quadripartite Control Council was the Government of Germany. It was simply that. Each of our national army organizations in our own zones of Germany were supreme, subject only to the quadripartite policy decisions. So my job, under those general policies and in line with the Morgenthau doctrine that had been directed to us from Washington as the U.S. economic policy for Germany, was to run the economy of our zone of Germany. That meant the agriculture, the industry, and the trade (in or out of Germany although there was no trade outside of Germany at that time), and to try to keep the country from starving and from going berserk. The crops that year were quite good, and there was [29] also considerable food we found that the Wehrmacht had stored, which we took over. So there was no immediate danger of starvation that particular fall or even that winter. The winter was not too cold, but there was great concern whether the crop could be gathered that summer and fall. There were some eight million Germans in prison camps. The crop had to be brought in by the old men and the boys and the women, but they did it. Industry was at a complete standstill; the coalmines in the Ruhr had been flooded before the Germans gave up that area; there was no coal production; and no coal on hand; no factory was turning a wheel hardly anywhere in Germany. The destruction of the air bombing had made all of the factories or most of them look as if they never would run again. It turned out a year later that after the debris was cleared away, there was more of the machinery and the going parts of the factories able to be revived than we had expected. But at the beginning there was no production of coal or of anything else, except food on the farms, and the factories and the industrial production of the country was practically nil. So, except for what food was being grown, Germany had to start from a standing start to again make its way. We found after a few months that we were going to [30] have to import food. Western Germany, the part where we were, had not been the breadbasket; that had been Eastern Germany largely, and we were getting no supplies of food or anything else from the Russian zone, so that we had to look the situation in the face and come to a decision. General Clay first had to be persuaded and then he had to help me persuade them back in Washington that we in this country -- even though we had conquered Germany -- that we were going to have to help feed them. That was an idea that no one at that time had even envisaged. We had to get appropriations; I had to come back to appear before the Congress, and . . . HESS: Was it difficult putting that view over? DRAPER: Very. And I think probably it was only made possible because the crisis was delayed about a year. Actually we managed to wiggle through during the first eight or ten months because our own Army had been bringing with it a food reserve to avoid feeding troubles for our allies or our enemies during the fighting, and we had as well as the food that we found in the warehouses that the Germans had husbanded as their stock and their reserve. Those things helped that first six or eight or ten months. But as those months went by, we could see that in [31] our area of Germany we had to have more food, and the British concluded similarly, particularly in the Ruhr. The one thing that saved the day, in my judgment, was the action taken by one who is now a very close friend of mine, Mr. Tracy Voorhees. He was the adviser to the President on food. I don't know at what stage that appointment was made, but that's how it turned out. He clearly saw these problems, both for Japan and Germany, and he had the great good fortune, and the imagination, to suggest to President Truman that the one man in this country who could help solve this problem and help persuade the Republican Congress that action should be taken, was former President Hoover. He first suggested this to the President, then he went to see Mr. Hoover, and the President then talked to Mr. Hoover. As you recall, after the First World War, Mr. Hoover had made his famous journey to Belgium and to Europe. He still found alive and was able to collect, half a dozen of the top people who had gone with him in 1919 on that first relief mission, when President Truman asked him to repeat, on a much more serious scale, his visit to Belgium after the First World War that had prevented that country from starving. So, I guess it was early in '46, or the winter of [32] '45-‘46, that General Clay and I got word from Washington that the former President was coming with Mr. Voorhees and a group of those that he had collected together, to make a survey, not only of Germany but of the food situation in our allies' territory as well; France, Belgium, and so on. So they came first to Germany, and I remember the occasion very well, when they came in by train. General Clay and I met them, Mr. Hoover and Tracy Voorhees and the others. Mr. Hoover understood the situation very quickly because of his past experiences, and he came to realize that if the Germans weren't fed (I don't care who fed them), but if they weren't fed, we couldn't stay there even with bayonets, that that was not a tolerable situation in modern times, and that if we wanted a peaceful occupation, if we wanted to bring the Germans back into the community of nations, first they had to be fed, not too much, but they had to have enough to live. The ration in Berlin was 1560 calories a day, just about half of what you and I eat now, or then, as well. They got along on it. It wasn't a good solid three meals by any means. One of the first steps we had to take was because we needed coal worse than anything else, except food, and [33] we didn't have any coal. The Ruhr mines had to be mined if we were going to get the factories started, and we found that the miners couldn't mine coal on 1560 calories or even 1800, so one of the first steps we took was to raise the calorie level for the miners to 4000 calories, against great protest, obviously. Then the next step we had to take was to search the miners when they went home every night, because they were dividing their 4000 calories with their families. Well, from the humanitarian point of view that's fine, but it couldn't work, and so we had to strip them of food and they had to eat it themselves. So it was that kind of decisions we had to face. So Mr. Hoover made his survey, went over the findings with me, and then he went to three or four of these other countries which were pleading that they wanted the food. The worst thing in the world from their point of view was to feed their former enemies. And so the decision had to be made, and was made, that the allies, most of them, while not well off with food, weren't starving. We did furnish some food to them, and certainly later under the Marshall plan they got food, but the basic decision was made that we had to feed the Germans, that they were the worst off, and we had to send food to them. And it was Mr. Hoover and his influence with the Republican Congress [34] and his report to them, privately as well as his published report, that did the trick. He and I saw the head of the appropriations committee, and things like that, and he appeared before them, I believe; I certainly did. And that was the one part of the appropriation, as I remember it, that the Senator from New Hampshire, who was chairman of the appropriations committee, accepted in its entirety, with Mr. Hoover's word for it -- and then it was appropriated by the House of Representatives, too, and we got every dollar of the request we made. Then the food had to be bought. It turned out in '46-'47, that year, worldwide, including the United States, that the crops were very poor, and Tracy Voorhees did the buying for the Government for the food, or directed it, and had great difficulty to find the food, to find wheat and corn and the other basic things, and he finally shipped one crop which was in surplus, potatoes, and we got a good many shiploads of potatoes. Those you had to get over in a hurry and use in a hurry or they'd spoil. But I give Mr. Hoover and Tracy Voorhees very high marks -- and Mr. Truman the President, who backed us to the limit -- for the fact that we were able to prevent most of the threatened starvation, although there were plenty of deaths from hunger and cold because there was no coal for [35] heating, and comparatively little food, so that disease took the old people off pretty easily. So while there were many deaths that undoubtedly had to do with lack of food, there wasn't rampant starvation. The fact that they got fed reasonably, small rations, but reasonably; and then the fact that we took their part in Berlin, against the Russians' willingness to starve them out at the time of the airlift, and at the time of the blockade, those two things together, in my judgment have now made the Germans among our most trusted allies. HESS: What was the nature of the experiences that you had at that time working with the Soviet representatives that were in Germany? Were they difficult people to work with? Did they live up to agreements that were made? DRAPER: They were difficult people to work with, they didn't always live up to their agreements, but I greatly admired those that I worked with during the first year, particularly General Shabalin, who was my opposite member as the Russian member of the economic directorate. He had been a schoolteacher before World War I, had joined the army in World War I, stayed in the Army, became a general but was still a schoolteacher and a peasant at heart, and with it all, a fine person. I met him first about ten [36] days after we got to Berlin. I was in General Clay's staff meeting -- Saturday morning was our staff meeting -- and he came to my office, I learned later, storming around because the day before he had had a pass to go to Frankfurt on one of our planes to see the city, and he had gone back this Saturday morning because the weather had been bad Friday, and they told him the pass had been rescinded by my order, which didn't happen to be true, but that's what they told him. And he came storming into my office to complain and to give me hell. When I came out of the staff meeting, he'd gone, but I learned all about his visit. So after I had lunch I got my jeep and my Russian interpreter and went over to his headquarters. He wasn't there but I found his house, and I called there. At first he wouldn't let me in, he was so mad, but finally my interpreter made him understand that he could go to Frankfurt every day of the week as far as I was concerned, and I would see that he got there. So then he went a hundred percent the other way and said, "Kamerad," put his arms around me, and said we had to celebrate this meeting of the two armies by my staying and having lunch with him. Well, I'd just finished a big lunch, but I figured in the interest of international camaraderie, [37] I had to eat another lunch. I never suffered so much in my life for my country. Lunch started with a great big bowl of cabbage soup, and I thought maybe that was the lunch, but the next course was a big steak with four eggs on it. Anyway, we made up, and we were good friends ever since. We didn't always agree, obviously. He'd get instructions one way and I'd get them another, but we always remained friends and I'm sure that he, and I think all of the other Russian generals that I dealt with, including even Marshal Zhukov and General (later Marshal) Sokolovsky, were looking forward to a peaceful solution, just as we were, and hoping to build a permanent peace, in contrast to the two world wars in thirty years, which we had just experienced. But as our system of rapidly bringing the troops back home went on, the Russian attitude in Moscow, hardened steadily. Our so-called point system meant that the oldest ones in service, whether officers or enlisted men, unless they volunteered to stay, were railroaded home first. HESS: We lost our most experienced men first? DRAPER: Yes. As a result of that policy we were losing [38] them pretty fast, and our equipment was being loaded and taken out and driven out, and taken out on ships, as fast as it could go. When the war ended I suppose that our military strength in Europe and Germany was greater than any similar military strength that had ever been concentrated in one spot before in the history of the world. Within six or eight or ten months as this point system operated, our military strength was -- I won't say nil -- but certainly not very great. HESS: Greatly reduced. DRAPER: Tremendously reduced, and the Russians could see that as well as we could. HESS: Could you see a change in their attitude? DRAPER: Without any question. After about a year, instead of being fairly reasonable -- they never were truly reasonable, but at least you could get along with them -- but then it became nyet instead of saglasin, no instead of yes, almost invariably. They undoubtedly thought back in Moscow at that time that they were going to conquer Europe, move across the rest of Europe to the channel. And I think that when the Korean war started [39] that's what they had in mind doing as soon as they could. A map had been put out by our State Department that showed the perimeter that we were going to defend, and it did not include Korea. I think we fooled the Russians as well as ourselves. And when Truman made perhaps the greatest decision of his life, to go back and fight in Korea, which he did within twenty-four hours of their attack, the United Nations soon endorsed his decision and our Congress came along later. But it was President Truman personally that made that decision. He acted, and fooled the Russians. We weren't too ready for it ourselves, but we prevented Europe being taken over -- or rather he did -- by that action. HESS: You have mentioned the Morgenthau plan. I also understand there was a Draper plan, and it was your belief that the German economy could not be restored under the agriculture and light industry plan of Henry Morgenthau. Tell me about your plan. DRAPER: I never heard of a Draper plan in Germany. Later on there was one that was called that in Japan. The Morgenthau plan was unfortunate; it was based on vengeance plus the theory that the Germans had started World War I; perhaps they had, but they were paying for [40] it anyway, and they had certainly started World War II. And Mr. Morgenthau was of the opinion that Germany should be prevented from having the where withal to ever start another war, and he persuaded President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill to agree to his proposals. He believed that if the Germans were limited to growing food and to light industry and were not permitted any substantial amount of steel production or other basic industrial production, and not permitted to build ships or any of the other things that are required for war, even when on a peacetime basis, that they would be kept perpetually and forever in a condition impossible for them to wage war. That also would be in a condition which would become impossible for the Germans to exist unless somebody helped them and provided the necessities of life. It became evident to us very quickly that this was the case, and that if we carried out literally the terms of the very famous Morgenthau directive, the United States would have to support Germany for the rest of time or as long as that policy stayed in effect. And so, we had to wiggle here and waggle there and do the best we could without openly breaking our directive to permit the German economy to begin to function. We argued with [41] this one and argued with that one here in Washington and in Germany, wherever we had the chance, and bit by bit, we recouped or revised the situation so that it became possible. A Dr. Calvin Hoover from Duke University came over. He was a very fine international economist, who is still alive. Although he only had a limited period of service, a few months, we asked him under the directive to draft up a potential possible level of industry plan. He did that very effectively, but from the point of view of the directive, and so under duress, under pressure. And it was his plan that with some modifications was finally adopted by the quadripartite government for Germany. The levels were changed some. We were more hardboiled than anybody except the Russians. The British were the most sensible. The French were even better than we were, although they were pretty severe, too. The Russians went even beyond the Morgenthau plan. They were basing their tough attitude on the fact that their whole country had been ravaged and millions of their people killed. They had been invaded, and you have a certain point of view when that happens. They were there to take it out on Germany, I guess, and we were pretty near as bad, although we hadn't been invaded. [42] Anyway, the level of industry was finally determined on a level that didn't last long; it wasn't realistic. It took about two years to change. It was after I was back in Washington as Under Secretary before that directive was finally officially revoked. In the meantime, we didn't pay as much attention to it as perhaps we should from the point of view of military discipline. There were several efforts to pull me back and have me charged with not carrying out the directive. General Clay always defended me. He knew perfectly well that such a policy couldn't last just as well as I did. We fought it out and finally persuaded Washington. General Marshall himself defended me in testimony before a Congressional Committee. So, it finally worked out. The real turning point came when the currency was devalued or revalued in 1948. At that time we gave the Russians the opportunity to do the same to revalue the mark in their sector, in their zone; they refused. I was back in Washington before this -- when they walked out of the four power council meeting -- the Kommanditura. A few days later they declared the blockade of Berlin. HESS: Which we will get to in just a minute. Did you ever discuss the Morgenthau plan with its author, with Henry Morgenthau? [43] DRAPER: Yes, I had a session with him before I went to Germany and he gave me his views. At that time I didn't have any very clear cut views myself, one way or the other. I hadn't been in Germany except on that Ford Peace Expedition I spoke of many years before. I had gone through Germany from Sweden to Holland in a locked car with all the other peace seeking delegates, guarded by German bayonets and with signs saying that we were spies and the soldiers shouldn't talk to us. So that was my only former visit to Germany. So I didn't, at that time, do anything but listen. I don't think I ever talked to him about it during the period of the occupation, but I did since, before his death, and he and I didn't agree. HESS: What did he say? Did he realize that you were there in Germany and not really going along with his plan? DRAPER: Oh, I'm sure he did. HESS: Did he say anything of that nature when you spoke to him later? DRAPER: Yes, in a more or less friendly fashion we agreed that we had been in complete disagreement. By that time the whole situation had changed, of course. He was no longer in office either. [44] HESS: That's right. What were his views? Did he think his plans should have been adhered to, that things would have been better off if Germany had been turned into an agricultural nation? DRAPER: I would think probably so. He certainly wasn't giving any ground, but it was a friendly conversation. But it was past history by that time. HESS: Anything else before we move on to the period of time that you were military government adviser to General Marshall in Moscow? DRAPER: No, that was while I was still in Germany. I think we went to Moscow in December 1946 and were there about eight weeks. The conference ended earlier than this memo would indicate. HESS: Oh, I see. I had the wrong dates down here. DRAPER: I figure the conference ended in February. HESS: December through February. DRAPER: February, maybe March. HESS: Tell me about the conference. What comes to mind when you look back on that conference, and the Russians' attitude? [45] DRAPER: It was one of the most interesting experiences of my life. We were there in Moscow for seven or eight weeks. We expected it to be much shorter, and it dragged out. They were most hospitable as far as the physical facilities went. They cleaned all their top people out of a hotel before we came and repainted it and, in effect, turned the hotel over to us. Nobody in Russia owned an automobile, of course, but they had assigned automobiles to all their top people, generals and government officials, but they took them away from many of them for us. Each one of us had a car and a driver assigned to us. Food was scarce for the population but not for us. We had everything we could ask for including very scarce fresh eggs. They did everything they could to be hospitable. General Marshall was our representative. Molotov was usually speaking for the Russian. [Aneurin] Bevin, the British coalminer who became Foreign Secretary, was British representative and the star performer, I would say, of the whole show. The Frenchman was good, too. It was a battle of wits and a battle of nations for several weeks. The basic differences, of course, were obvious between the Russians and the other three. Bevin told [46] them off several times. He was the only one, he said, of all of them, in spite of what the Russians were saying, that ever really worked at a job such as the mines. He knew what the working man's needs were better than they did, and yet he saw it from a democratic point of view and not a dictator's -- but he was absolutely frank. The differences of opinion were very, very real, and not very much agreement was reached. In spite of putting out statements from time to time that looked reasonably favorable, there wasn't much really accomplished. About half way through the conference, the question of our supporting the Greeks and the Turks came up when it was announced by President Truman. General Marshall, of course, was our Secretary of State and was there with us. He was involved very definitely in the new Truman Doctrine and the Russians were supporting the other side. So it was a very open split. General Marshall handled himself beautifully. I often got to see Averell Harriman who was our Ambassador in Moscow then. He had also been our Ambassador in 1945, when I had gone to Moscow the first time in the fall of '45 as Acting Chairman of the Reparations Commission. At that time I really had the chance to really know Mr. Harriman. I had met him a few times before. He had the picture of the Russians' real ambition and real lack [47] of desire to come to friendly terms, of peaceful friendly relations with the United States. Earlier, I think, than any other of our diplomats or officials. I had certainly gotten from him in September of 1945, a picture of Russia as it's turned out to really be, far better than from anyone else. At that time, General Clay and I had tended to discount his point of view, because in Germany we both were hoping and thinking and wishing that we were going to reach a peaceful solution between our two countries. I don't think Harriman thought that at all, because he had seen the Russians operating from behind the scenes through a good part of the war. To go back to the foreign ministers' meeting, we discussed the whole future of Europe, and indirectly how the United States and Russia would be living together after the war. We didn't get very far, in fact it was at the Moscow Conference that the Cold War really started. So the foreign ministers had to have another meeting in Paris a year later, as I remember, to try to patch things up. So we just went on, each side going their own way more and more. HESS: Not too long after General Marshall's return was the date of his speech at Harvard University. It was on June 5th, the famous Marshall Plan speech. At the [48] time that the foreign ministers' meeting was going on, was there very much discussion about the necessity for a massive aid plan in all of Europe, such as the Marshall Plan came to be? DRAPER: No, there were some off-the-record backroom discussions, many of those, as to what was going to happen in Western Europe including Germany. But I was surprised when the Marshall Plan was announced. I remember being at a garden party on a Sunday in Germany when someone came and handed me the press release that had just come off the wire of General Marshall's speech at Harvard. It was something that I knew very little about until that happened. Later on, of course I participated a great deal as the Plan developed. HESS: Which we will get to. I believe your last duty as a military government official was in connection with the British-American conference on the Ruhr coal production which was held here in town in August of 1947. We've mentioned that earlier this morning, but could you expand on that? What do you recall about that particular conference? Why was it called, what was its importance, and what was its outcome? DRAPER: There were over the months many discussions of what [49] should happen to the Ruhr coal. There were claims on it from almost every one of our allies. The need for more coal was very evident, and there was more coal there than anywhere else in Europe. Why the meeting was called in Washington rather than in Germany I didn't know at the time, and don't know now. I suppose our own Government officials including the Under Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, wanted to find out why the coal production wasn't rising quicker, and why we weren't able to meet the requests of our allies. One of the things that we had a specific directive on in the early days, and I think it was signed by Churchill and Roosevelt personally, was that a very large part of the coal in the Ruhr (and this was before much was being mined) had to go to Belgium and France, and we couldn't carry it out. Germany simply couldn't have existed if some of that coal, or even the bulk of that coal, which was very little, very much less than the requirements, didn't go into German industry. We fought that battle out with Washington and finally won it. But at the time of the coal conference this was still simmering and still a problem, and I presume that's why this meeting was held in Washington. The meeting was going very well. We had settled all the various issues, and just about the time we were coming to a conclusion, Mr. Royall called me one morning [50] and said that Mr. Robert Patterson, the Secretary of War, had just called him to tell him that he had just resigned, and was leaving Washington that day. His money had run out completely, he had borrowed all he could on his life insurance policies, and he had to go back to work in order to be able to support his family. He didn't put it that way publicly, obviously. Judge Patterson had come to this conclusion that very morning when his secretary brought in the figures. He called the President and said, "I'd like to come over and see you." And when he dial he told him that he was retiring, resigning, and leaving Washington the same day. Before he saw the President, he told Mr. Royall about this, who was his Under Secretary. He also had told him that if the President asked him for a recommendation he was going to recommend Mr. Royall as Secretary. Kenneth Royall called me to tell me this and to say that if this happened that same day, he was going to have to move over to the Secretary's office, and would I be good enough for three or four days to just cover his desk and handle what papers I could and those that I couldn't, come and see him about. I said I shouldn't really do this because I was in uniform and this was a civilian job. "Well," he said, "you'll be just doing this on my [51] behalf, so don't worry about that." This all did happen, and he became Secretary. Three or four days later he asked me to stay at the desk and take over and become Under Secretary, provided the President approved, and if I was confirmed by the Senate. I said I would have to talk to General Clay first, who was my commander. I was reporting to him, and this was going to twist the relationship all the way around. So I did talk to General Clay on the long distance telephone and he said, "Sure, go ahead." So I did become Under Secretary. HESS: This was in August of 1947? DRAPER: I guess so. I don't remember the exact date. HESS: As a Republican, what are your views on Mr. Truman's understanding of the political importance of having members of the opposition party represented in high Government office? DRAPER: I don't think I ever discussed the question with him. He certainly knew what benefit President Roosevelt had derived from appointing Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox. But I wasn't appointed as a Republican, I'm sure, as far as Mr. Truman was concerned, nor General Royall [52] either. General Royall and I had worked closely together when he and I were serving together, during the year or more that I had been in Washington before I went to Germany, working on contract termination, and when he was working on various matters on the staff. So we had gotten to be rather close friends. I was back there and working under his jurisdiction on this coal conference. He was participating in that, and he simply thought, "Here is a fellow that I have confidence in; he knows the situation in Germany; he hasn't been to Japan, but those are our two big occupation problems, and why wouldn't he be the right fellow to have here." It had nothing to do with whether I was a Republican or a Socialist or a Democrat. HESS: And I understand that shortly after your appointment you went over to Japan, is that correct? DRAPER: That's right. I had never met General MacArthur, but I had heard fantastic tales about him, and I figured that he would think, "Here's this fellow who's been in Germany and Germany's going to get a good deal of the favors if he's going to be the Under Secretary." I thought the best thing for me to do if I was going to [53] be evenhanded and have any influence in Japan on the occupation there, was to go to Japan right away. Mr. Royall had delegated to me under his basic responsibility, the operation of the three occupations. So I felt I'd better get right over there and come to terms with General MacArthur and let him know that I was ready to assist in any reasonable way to make the Japanese occupation a success. I think it was the right thing to have done. I arrived there. I informed him that I was coming. He was at the airport to meet me, which I believe was the first time he'd met any official from Washington. He took me right to lunch and I said, "What can I do to help?" Almost the first question he asked me was, "Could you find me somebody that knows something about running the economy of Japan, because I don't. And my military officers who are responsible for it don't either," which was obvious and natural. So my quest back here was to find such a man, and it took some months. Before I was able to solve that one, I took Paul Hoffman who was then president of Studebaker this was before the Marshall Plan -- and Percy Johnston, the head of the Chemical Bank in New York, and three or four other businessmen as a group to Japan to make a report on just the kind of thing that I'd been up against [54] in Germany. While it wasn't called the Morgenthau Plan, the economic order to MacArthur very closely paralleled those that went to Germany. There was one big exception, a difference, and that was that contrary to the situation in Germany, there was a Japanese government. The fact that the Emperor had been permitted to stay and that the Japanese government continued in office, made it easier in many ways in Japan than in Germany to bring about a stable situation. But of course, General MacArthur was Emperor No. 1 and the other one was Emperor No. 2, actually General justified that position and that confidence in the eyes of the Japanese people, who had expected a cutthroat dictator; and instead they found a great administrator who fed them when there was no food, who was just but severe, and who merited and received their adulation. I guess that is the right word, and certainly he gained their great respect. Every morning when he, at a certain minute, would appear in his car to enter the Dai-Ichi Building where his headquarters were, there were hundreds of people gathered there. This went on for months and months, just to see him come in; and it was the same at night when he left. I took this group of businessmen over, because I [55] had become convinced from what I'd known in Germany and what I had learned in Japan in two or three visits, that the orders concerning the economy of Japan had to be changed. I took this group of businessmen there to buttress my own recommendations to the President and the Secretary of State and the Congress to change the instructions to MacArthur in Japan. There wasn't a wheel turning, they didn't have a pound of cotton to spin in their textile mills, arid while they had coal of a poor quality and water power, those were about their two assets. There are very few resources in Japan, natural resources, except the people themselves. Their whole economy is based on taking in raw materials and fashioning them and then selling them to the world. They do it pretty well, as you know. But then they had no raw material. They had no credit; they had no money; they had no way to buy raw materials, unless we provided them, and we weren't providing them. The place was, so far as industry was concerned, a morgue. The orders were that General MacArthur was not responsible for the economy, that he had the authority, of course, but the real responsibility was that of the Japanese government, but they had no authority; they had no assets, no capital; so the thing was just falling [56] between two stools. The Japanese yen was depreciating six or seven percent a month. The whole country was being fed and largely fed by us, but that's all you could say. You spoke of the Draper plan, this plan, or this report that we made, that Paul Hoffman and Percy Johnston and the rest of the businessmen made after we spent had a month in Japan. The report we made resulted in the President changing the policy, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State. Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder was the first one to understand it, and the President also soon understood it fully. And it was then that I recommended to the President that Joe [Joseph M.] Dodge, who had been in charge of the finance division in Germany, and who had then had gone back to his Detroit bank, and became president of the American Banker's Association, be invited to go to Japan as a kind of economic czar. I had asked him but he wouldn't go before. Now the rules were changed, there was a chance to win, for the economy to recover but it took somebody with a lot of knowledge and a lot of guts to do it. General MacArthur had promised his complete support, which he always gave. So the President invited Dodge to come to Washington. He told me that morning before seeing [57] the President that he wasn't going to take the job. The President saw him and Dodge had lunch with me and by that time he had taken the job. The same thing was almost true with Paul Hoffman whose wife recommended against his taking the Marshall plan job. He was offered the job while we were on the way back from Japan in Hawaii. He was on my plane and we got off in Honolulu and there was a phone call from the White House for Paul Hoffman. They got on the phone with him and said that the Congress had just passed the Economic Cooperation Plan for Europe, and the President wanted to sign it the next day, and at the same time to announce the new administrator was Paul Hoffman. So whoever it was in the White House said, "We'd like your answer on the telephone, please." Paul said, "Well, you have my answer on the telephone. It's no!" And then they got me on the phone and said, "How soon can you get this fellow to Washington." We flew to Los Angeles. I had dinner with him, stayed with his family that night, and his wife said, "No Paul, you can't take it." He called his associates in South Bend at Studebaker and they said, "No, you and we are working together to pull this company out of trouble." So we went to Washington together the next day. On [58] the plane he said, "You see I can't do it." So I said, "Well, we’ll have lunch after you have seen the President." At lunch he said, "Well, the President's asked me to reconsider, so I'm going to talk again with my family." So while we were still having lunch at the Army-Navy Club they brought in a report from the ticker tape saying the President had just announced the appointment of Hoffman as Administrator of the European Cooperation Program. HESS: What did he say? DRAPER: He was shocked, but he took it, and he told me no later than two weeks ago that that was the best thing that ever happened to him in his life. That was the kind of thing the President could get away with, and did, and it was part of his strength. He didn't have to do quite the same with Dodge. Dodge did take the job, although somewhat reluctantly. Joe Dodge went out there to Japan and in six or eight months he had done the job. We adopted a new policy which was sent by cable to General MacArthur, which made it possible for the economy to be revised, but it had to involve the farmers, [59] the farm prices, agricultural production, the industrial production, and raw materials. It required a loan from the Export -- Import Bank to provide them with cotton, which worked out very quickly. And it required Dodge to take care of the price relationships to increase taxes, and to put that economy back on a paying, balanced basis. And from a tremendous governmental deficit situation when Dodge went over, within six months to nine months he had balanced the Japanese budget, or rather he forced the Japanese government to balance its budget, but under his instructions. HESS: General, will you tell me a little about your interest in population control? DRAPER: Population control may be the wrong word. It's a population problem and a population explosion and the question is what to do about it. I got interested in this question of population when President Eisenhower appointed me in 1958 as Chairman of his Committee on Foreign Aid, Military Aid and Economic Aid. We found, the committee of ten, that in most of the developing countries their rate of population growth was such that it was interfering seriously with their economic development, particularly with any [60] improvement in their per capita income. The whole purpose of economic foreign aid was to improve the lot of the individual members of society, especially down at the bottom and to improve per capita income. So if the population increase was offsetting any gain in a particular economy, and dividing it into that many more pieces, the only way to help was to cut down on the growth rate of the population, on a voluntary basis. Eventually, we recommended to President Eisenhower that our country through its aid program give help to population programs of foreign governments, on their request. To our surprise he turned down that request, because it was an election year and he thought that Senator Kennedy was going to be running for President. With the Catholic Bishops attacking this particular recommendation, President Eisenhower feared that if he approved our recommendation and if Kennedy, as a Catholic, attacked it this might split the American people on a religious issue in a national political campaign; and he thought this would be bad for the American people. Later on he changed his mind, after he was no longer President, and published articles saying that not only private organizations but governments, and particularly our own Government, had to take an interest in this [61] problem, if it was to be solved which it has been doing since. It was President Kennedy, a Catholic, who really started that program, and then President Johnson expanded it, and President Nixon has gone even farther in sending the Congress a special message on population. A special law was passed a year or more ago which is to take care of our own population problem here. It proposes to give birth control information and services to the five million women that are estimated to be too poor to afford family planning facilities themselves. Anyway, during this period, after President Eisenhower had changed his mind and was favorable, I asked him whether he would head up an honorary Council for the Planned Parenthood movement. He still was dubious about this, I guess for political reasons. Finally I asked him whether if President Truman -- and I had no idea what Harry Truman thought about this problem, I had never discussed it with him -- if President Truman, as the only other living ex-President, were willing to be an honorary co-chairman with him of Planned Parenthood, would that make a difference, would he then be willing to accept. He said, "If Harry will, I will." So I trotted off to Independence, Missouri, where [62] President Truman had already invited me to come sometime to see his Library. I gave him President Eisenhower's regards and best wishes, and told him that President Eisenhower would only take on this honorary chairmanship if he would also do so. He said, "Well, if President Eisenhower is willing to, I don't know why I shouldn't." And he did. And the two of their names and their influence and their later statements, from time to time, were of tremendous help in raising the whole level of the Planned Parenthood and world population movement to a much higher level. HESS: General, one of the important things you had to deal with at the time that you were Under Secretary of the Army was the Berlin blockade. What was your involvement in that, and when did you first think that a blockade was probable? DRAPER: We knew for some weeks that this situation was rising, that trouble was brewing. We were having constant arguments in the quadripartite council in Berlin. I was in Washington. I stayed up several nights all night long as we followed these negotiations, partly because of the difference in time. Instructions had to be given almost momentarily, sometimes by scramble telephone or [63] by cable. And we watched the rising emotion and the rising level of argument with the realization that we were perhaps moving even toward war with Russia. When finally the revaluation of the currency, of the German mark, was decided on by the three powers in order to put the economy back on a money basis rather than a ration basis -- because up to that time, people had pockets full of paper money but unless they had a ration ticket to buy an overcoat or to get food (unless it was through the black market), they had no way to buy. The purpose was to squeeze the juice out of the overvalued currency and put it down to its real value. The result turned out later to be the right thing to have done. The goods came out of hiding and the economy began to get back on its feet. But at the moment, the Russians refused to go along. We invited them and they refused. They walked out of the council one night, broke up the meeting, and trouble was obviously ahead. I had planned at that time to make an inspection visit in Berlin and in Vienna, and had set up a trip and had my plane waiting. I left early one morning, with General [Albert C.] Wedemeyer, my chief planning officer at that time. We took off without knowing that the [64] blockade was already on. We had our cables with us, that had accumulated during the night, and after we had breakfast on the plane, we read our cables and learned that the blockade was on. We were on our way to London. On the way over we planned the airlift. General Wedemeyer had had charge of the airlift over the hump in India earlier during the war, so he had a pretty good idea of what the different types of planes would carry in the way of tonnage, and how often a plane could land at an airport, through actual experience. I had negotiated in Berlin with the Russians for the feeding of Berlin some years before, for the British and American sectors, and later these included the French, so I knew the tonnage of food necessary on a ration level to feed the two and a half million people in those sectors of the city. We both knew the number of planes we had in Europe. They were DC-3s, the old DC-3, or C-47 in Army parlance, the workhorse of the war. We had about a hundred of them. They would each carry about two and a half tons of food on a trip, and you had to allow about a two minute leeway for a landing during the day, and a little more at night, quite a little more at night. So we figured whether or not it was a physical possibility to feed that many people with that many planes, if we had the [65] pilots and the airfields, and all the necessary organization was set up. We came to the conclusion that it was a possibility but not a sure thing, and that it was worth trying. So when we got to London, Lewis Douglas who was our Ambassador there, met us and we arranged through him and he went with us to see Bevin, who was the Foreign Minister still, in London. We told him our plan, and he said, "All right, we'll add twenty-five planes." All they had that were available. "We're all for it," he said. "You never can make it work; you never can feed two or three million people from the air, but we'll make a great psychological impression. The Russians are trying to starve the Germans and we're trying to feed them. I'd suggest you take milk powder and chocolate and things of that kind for the women and children and make it as much of a psychological show as you can, and it will give us a little more time for negotiations. But it will never succeed." We loaded up that plane at our Embassy with about two tons of food, and I guess I signed for it. They've never come back to ask me to pay yet. Then we went on to Paris. We didn't know what the French government's attitude would be. We found them just as much for it as [66] we were, or as were the British. They had no planes to offer, but they would be backing it, and they had an airfield in Berlin and that would be at our disposal. It was [Georges] Bidault and [Robert] Schumann (one Prime Minister and the other Foreign Minister) that I talked to. So we had their blessing. In the meantime, I had talked to General Clay on the scramble telephone and had given him our figures and our conclusions. He had been doing similar figuring and he'd come to the same conclusion, that it was worth trying. So we got to Berlin the next day, and General Clay called in his people and we exchanged thoughts and ideas and figures and he called in his Air Force commander and the airlift started a day or two later. Then I flew down to Vienna. In Berlin the war clouds were everywhere. It was a question of what hour or day the war might break out. We didn't know. We got to Vienna and it was just as peaceful as Washington is today. It was the Fourth of July and our commanding general there was giving the usual Fourth of July garden party, and the Russians came and were toasting the Fourth of July just as much as we were. Anyway, the airlift got started that way, and we nearly lost, actually. We were very close to defeat. [67] After about two or three months we almost ran out of food. We had about ninety days' supply of coal, and about thirty days' supply of food when this started. We should have stocked up more before. We really didn't visualize that this blockade was going to happen. We should have taken action earlier and stocked food, but we hadn't, at least not very much. We had about thirty days' of food and some 90 days of coal. Se we didn't have to worry about the coal right away. This started in early July. I would guess that it was about the end of August, when we were really running downhill. We weren't keeping even. We got down to three or four or five days' stock of food. So we had to face a strategic decision in Washington. There was one way we could save this situation if we were willing to take the risk, and that was to take all the DC-4s that we had around the world, Army planes and private airline planes, and substitute them for the DC-3s. The DC-4 will carry ten tons where the DC-3 carries two and a half. But it meant stripping our Army in Japan, it meant stripping our Army in Europe, and the airlines in the United States, of the only really available and useful carriage for troops if we were going to war. It would have meant a very real difference whether we had those [68] planes immediately available or had to find a way to get them together again. But the decision was finally made to substitute, and we quietly stripped everywhere of these planes, and took them away from the airlines and the Army and sent them to Europe, substituted them, and put the DC-3s back in their place. They of course couldn't do the job of troop carrying that the others were capable of doing. So immediately the level of food shipments by air went up. And by that time, the coal was also running out, and so some of these were then made coal wagons, the most expensive coal wagons the world ever saw. We tried dropping the coal in chutes, or as it was into big nets, or on the ground. By the time it got near the ground it was powder and blew away and it didn't work at all, so we had to land the planes and unload them just like the food. I rode one of those coal wagons one day from Berlin to Frankfurt and it was quite an experience. But it began to work. Everything worked fine. The stocks were built up, the stockpiles of both food and coal. Then in November we had an early winter, and early fog; the fog's bad in Berlin, anyway; but this year it was worse than they had ever seen, I guess, and it came down about the first of November and it just stuck. It [69] meant that you had to go on GCA, on instruments entirely. In the meantime, the Russians were buzzing the planes. They didn't shoot any down, but they came right near us. It's a wonder there weren't any accidents, and so starting a war, because that would have probably done it. Anyway, this fog came down and it meant that you had to land every five or six or ten minutes instead of every two, and the stockpiles ran down again. It ran right through December and by the third or fourth or fifth of January we were down to two days again. And it looked like curtains. If that fog had stayed another three weeks we probably would have had to run up the white flag. We probably couldn't have gone on. You can't have people starving, and keep on with the occupation. But the weather lifted about the fifth of January, it was fine, and immediately we restored the situation. The Russians knew they were licked right away, but it was May before they finally gave up. In Berlin at that time -- I went back and forth a number of times from Washington -- at almost any point in Berlin, you could see three planes in the air, two on their way in and one or two on the way out, depending on where you were standing, and it was that continual bridge of planes that the Berliners (and the other Germans knew about it all over Germany), kept seeing day after day. [70] There were forty of our pilots killed in accidents. They knew that, too. HESS: A very visible sign of support. DRAPER: That was what brought the Germans into our camp, in my opinion. HESS: During that period of time, were you ever in any meeting with President Truman where he might have expressed his views on the handling of the blockade? DRAPER: No, we knew perfectly well his views. They were very clear cut. I don't think I met personally with him during this period -- well, I probably did as Under Secretary, but I don't recall -- I undoubtedly did. HESS: During the period of time that you served, the armed services were organized into the National Military Establishment. DRAPER: Right. HESS: That law came into being, it was the National Security Act of '47, passed on July 25th. What is your general evaluation of that particular setup, and why was it found necessary two years later to change it and set up a Department of Defense? What was deficient? [71] DRAPER: Was the first one by law or by regulation -- whichever it was, it was intended to put the three departments into a coordinated whole. And probably (and I'm not too sure about this, it was a long time ago, and I was out of the Department before that second law, I guess, was passed), but the first step was taken in 1949. HESS: That was when the Department of Defense was established, but it was 1947 when the National Military Establishment was formed. DRAPER: It was 1947, that's right. Well, that was put together as a first effort, and on the basis of a couple of years of experience I suppose that the law which fashioned it on a more permanent basis was passed. I don't think there were any great changes, were there? HESS: I think about the only changes that I can recall, were that the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Army did not sit in on the Cabinet meetings. They weren't considered Cabinet level under the Department of Defense, whereas they sat in on Cabinet meetings during the days of the National Military Establishment. DRAPER: That's true. That's normal. It meant that the [72] Cabinet was a little too bulky. HESS: That's right, and it gave the Secretary of Defense more authority under the present setup. DRAPER: I think the whole thing has worked out just the way it should, a logical development, and most other countries have adopted much that same form of defense establishment, indicating that others think that we have the right method now. HESS: Earlier this morning I asked your opinion of Secretary Forrestal's view on unification, and as you know, the Navy expressed a good deal of fear about the effects of unification. They thought they would lose the Air Wing to the Air Force; they thought they would lose the Marines to the Army. Do you think the Army would have liked to have taken over the Marine Corps at this time? DRAPER: I have no doubt it would have loved to have done it, but nobody ever took that as a practical possibility that I ever heard of. HESS: Did you ever hear any of the generals discussing that subject? DRAPER: I guess I heard the Navy's fears about it, but [73] I don't think we in the Army had any illusions. HESS: More on the Navy's side than on the Army's side. DRAPER: And as far as Navy Air is concerned, that's certainly going strong still. In Vietnam you get planes off the ships right along, off the carriers. And I guess the Army with its little planes, has actually as many or more planes than the Air Force. Of course it doesn't have the fighting ships. HESS: Just a word or two about some of the gentlemen you served with. Kenneth Royall, of course, we've mentioned him several times. DRAPER: He passed away a year or so ago. HESS: Not too long ago. How effective was he? DRAPER: He was a wonderful leader. He had great self-confidence; he had great ability; he had great experience and background. He was the one that first integrated the blacks and whites in the Army; he was a southerner and he could do that better than a northerner could have done. He had real vision. He had the great confidence of President Truman, I know, and every impression I have and recollection is that he gave the country a splendid [74] administration for the Department of the Army. HESS: On the problem of integration of blacks into the armed forces: Did your duties touch upon that? DRAPER: Not particularly. I incidentally only know it was Secretary Royall's thinking, and he was the first one to take action in that direction. And I think it was his personal initiative. HESS: John L. Sullivan was Secretary of the Navy at that time. DRAPER: A splendid person, too. He's still living here in Washington. And John Kenney was his Under Secretary. John Kenney and I worked very closely together. And so I did with Mr. Sullivan. HESS: Stuart Symington was Secretary of the Air Force. DRAPER: Now he's in the Senate, and taking quite a different point of view than he did then about military matters, and about the war in Vietnam, particularly. HESS: Mr. Gordon Gray, who was later Secretary of the Army was Assistant Secretary at the time you were Under Secretary. DRAPER: He was Assistant Secretary and so was Tracy Voorhees, [75] the one I mentioned before. There were two Assistant Secretaries. And Gordon Gray later became Secretary of the Army, both of them fine people. Gordon Gray was a young captain who came to the Department after I was Under Secretary, and Tracy Voorhees had charge of food problems for the Army, and then he became Assistant Secretary. We had a fine family of officials there, all working very closely together under Mr. Royall. HESS: What other problems did you have to deal with as Under Secretary? What other areas of the job have we not touched upon? DRAPER: Well, there was the whole question of budget; there was the whole question of strength of the Army. I really had a full-time job running the several Army occupations. It included four (I said three before; it included Korea and Austria also). But whenever the Secretary, Mr. Royall, was on a trip or away, I was Acting Secretary and had to deal with the whole range of whatever came up at that time. HESS: Did you see at that time that there was any likelihood of trouble in Korea as it erupted in 1950? DRAPER: No, no. I went to Korea, went out to the dividing line between North and South Korea and checked on our [76] situation there, but at that time we were still there, we hadn't pulled out. So it changed completely after I had left when it was decided to pull our troops back to Japan. That, I suppose, acted as an invitation, or at least it didn't prevent the possibility, of an invasion from the North. HESS: Do you recall the views of the Department of the Army at the time the Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the talk, and drew the defense perimeter down the western area of the Pacific, leaving Korea out? DRAPER: No, I was already out of the Department, and I read about it in the newspapers just like you would have done, and thought it was unfortunate, but I had no particular knowledge or comment about it at that time. HESS: We earlier have mentioned your appointment as United States Special Representative in Europe in 1953, and you mentioned about . . . DRAPER: '51 it was, '51 to '53. HESS: . . . '51, and you mentioned about taking the trip to see General Eisenhower. Just what were your duties as Special Representative in Europe? [77] DRAPER: NATO had been formed a short time -- two or three years before that or less. The NATO Alliance was a direct result of the Korean war in its requirement, as Dean Acheson and the rest of us saw as the need, and the other countries as well, to band together to keep the Russians from moving to the Channel; it was just as simple as that. My duties as the U.S. member of the Council were to deal first with the defense aspects and help to build up the strength of NATO from all of the countries concerned, including our own; to embark on a program of ammunition production and arms production in Europe, which had practically disappeared from Europe; to provide the European countries with planes and ammunition and artillery to the extent necessary until their own production got underway. That was on the defense side. On the mutual assistance side: The need was for economic assistance to permit them to carry this military burden, and to extend the recovery they were already beginning to make from the ravages of war. On the political side, it was of vital importance to discuss not only European problems with our NATO allies, but worldwide problems, such as we had to deal with in the Pacific and with, of course, the Russians, [78] and the Koreans, the United Nations' problems, because the United Nations was involved in the Korean war as well. So there were those three: The defense, the political and the economic. And Ambassador Livingston Merchant was my Ambassador on the political side; General Luke Finley was my deputy on the military side; and Paul Porter was my economic deputy. General [Frederick L.] Anderson was my overall general deputy. The responsibilities required me to deal with twenty countries that were in Europe, and also including Canada, also a member of NATO. HESS: Just briefly, what are your views of the current state of NATO? DRAPER: I'm delighted that the President has now appointed a new Ambassador, the former Secretary of the Treasury, David Kennedy, and has again broadened out the duties and responsibilities of our NATO Ambassador. After I left the job was downgraded very considerably, and has been on a much lower level ever since. I'm glad to see it reviving. He's going to, in fact, have a little higher status than I had. He'll be a member of the Cabinet as well as Ambassador and he's a Roving Ambassador as well, so he will combine trade functions, [79] which I had too, but on a broader scale throughout the world. He will need, I believe, equally strong deputies if he's going to cover this wide ground. The NATO Alliance has, in my judgment, prevented World War III. We have been losing strength on a comparative basis with the Russians in Europe and in the rest of the world. I noticed just today or yesterday that it's been reported that our aerial defenses are weak too, by the Armed Services sub-committee, but that's a tendency that is obvious from the fact that we've been involved in the Vietnam war. The Russians have gone merrily along to increase their missile strength. They're way ahead of us in missiles now. I'm told that we are building five nuclear Submarines a year and the Russians twenty. They've thrown a missile defense around Moscow. We have it only around some of our missile bases and none around Washington or around any of our other big cities, and I think the next big problem myself -- this is a personal view -- the next big problem that our President faces is to evaluate, and I'm not in any position to do that, whether or not the Russians are, as the Secretary of Defense has recently indicated, about to pass us strategically. If that is the judgment of those who know best, then we have to change direction on our defense budgets, and our research and development [80] of the whole missile and defensive posture of this country. That involves NATO as well as the world. Obviously you are familiar with the fact that these recent discussions that have been going on in NATO have gotten a certain amount of agreement from the Germans to take over more of the costs and from the other NATO partners to take over some more of the defense costs, because of our big imbalance of trade. HESS: At the time that you were in Europe as Ambassador, near the end of the Truman administration, what do you recall about the success of the Marshall plan at this point? DRAPER: Oh, tremendous. I suppose that we have never, as a nation, done anything that at comparatively small cost was of such great benefit to the world, to Europe, and incidentally and indirectly to ourselves. It was the groundwork for their recovery. They had to do the work themselves to recover from the war. We couldn't do that, but we gave them the resources to rebuild their economy, but the result of that has so greatly increased their ability to trade with us and to produce that between us we've risen to heights that we never would have done without that fillip that came just at the right time. [81] That was a great, imaginative, well-timed, and well-directed operation in the international field. One of the best this country's ever done. HESS: Were there any other major problems that you had to handle in Europe at this time? DRAPER: The Marshall plan didn't come . . . HESS: That's right. DRAPER: The Marshall plan was at the time I was in Germany, and the German picture was not directly involved in the Marshall plan except as a parallel operation, but we had to work very closely together, Mr. Harriman and Paul Hoffman and General Clay and myself, under the President's direction. HESS: What I had reference to was any major problems, any major duties, as Special Representative in Europe that we haven't mentioned. DRAPER: No, I was dealing with the governments of all the Western European countries, and we were having sessions and meetings and problems continuously, but it was a time of building strength and a time of great interest on the part of all governments including our own. I [82] got every cooperation from Washington. I had to come back to explain things and get directions and get help regularly, either I or General Anderson. It was one of the greatest experiences of my life, that two-year period. HESS: You held that position until June of '53. DRAPER: That's right. HESS: In your opinion, what were President Truman's major accomplishments during his career, and what were his major failings? What went right and what went wrong? DRAPER: I would think that he was one of our greatest Presidents, My wife thinks he's the last great American. She's a Democrat. He really was great for one whose experience had been what it had been, haberdashery salesman, I guess originally, and then part of the machine in Missouri, the political machine, and then a Senator from Missouri. The ability that he displayed when he was faced with the responsibility of leading this country in war and then in peace, was unbelievable, and I think that historians are going to look back on President Truman as one of the greatest men we've ever had in that office. The right [83] man at the right time, and one from whom the country could hardly have expected the great degree of high quality service and integrity that he displayed. His great accomplishments: He recognized, as President Roosevelt had not, very quickly, the Russian threat, thanks probably to Ambassador Harriman and others, but he not only recognized it but then began to do something about it. He had the courage, in the face of what many would have quailed under, to take on the assistance to Greece and Turkey and flaunt the Russians, and got away with it. He had the statesmanship to see the need, under Secretary Acheson's recommendations, and General Marshall's, for both the Marshall Plan itself and later the NATO Alliance, and those are two national efforts that were very successful. The NATO Alliance was initiated by him and is still in force, and is the keystone in our whole foreign policy. If I were to be bold enough to suggest one of his mistakes, and there were very few, I would think it was the decision not to win the Korean war. It's my own belief that the risks that we would have had to take, and they were real, possibilities that China and/or Russia would come in, as China did, were risks that could have been taken if the planning had been different, if the [84] planning and the authority given to General MacArthur had included the decision to win the war, which I'm afraid was not taken, and then if the planning had been along the lines necessary to accomplish that. I was, as a Reserve officer, a Reserve retired major general, in close touch with the General Staff in Washington during the Korean war. I was available if they needed me at any time, and I used to spend a good deal of voluntary time here, particularly with G-3, or operations. We weren't on a war footing basis. We were more so than we have been during the Vietnam war, but we were not on the kind of war footing basis that you go on if you're going to win a war. If you decide to go to war at all the only way, in my opinion, is to do everything you can to win it and as quickly as possible. Now, General MacArthur cannot be condoned however, for what was really his failure to obey orders later. I think his recommendations were correct, and the President should have perhaps accepted them, or more of them. I know that he was at times asking for four more divisions than he got, and things like that. The ammunition was running awful short at times, and we just didn't have it, and we weren't turning our industry throughout the country over to the wartime job, which we could have done, [85] and had done during the World War. So, I believe -- and there can be differences of opinion -- that the British and perhaps the Secretary of State and others, advised him that the risks were too great, and the President took those seriously and so we fought the Korean war with one hand behind our backs. He certainly did the right thing to treat General MacArthur the way he did when the chips were down. No President can have a commander in his Army defy his instructions. That's almost what General MacArthur did, and as much as I admire General MacArthur, and I do, because what I saw him do in Japan was tremendous, and what he did in the Korean war by insisting on that outflanking action . . . HESS: The Inchon landing. DRAPER: Yes, and which Washington was very cold to and only acceded to because of his strong recommendations as I understand it, that was the thing that gave us a chance to win the war, but then we failed to go on. It was too bad that General MacArthur went to the Chinese border. If he had stayed fifty miles or a hundred miles away we probably wouldn't have had the Chinese come in and we would have had a better ending to the whole thing, but we weren't really trying to carry it through. [86] I'm afraid that that very fact, that we didn't win in the Korean war, led to the Vietnam war eventually, and to some of the many problems we've had since. But no one can rewrite history. HESS: Once it's done, it's done. DRAPER: It's done. President Truman performed a service to this country that no one can exaggerate. It's very real and he should be very happy, he and Mrs. Truman, at the tremendous service that he was able to render to his country and to the world. HESS: General, do you have anything else to add on Mr. Truman or your service in the Truman administration? DRAPER: I just have the greatest possible admiration and friendly feelings toward both President and Mrs. Truman. They were both always hospitable and courteous to me. The fact that I happened to be a Republican was never even mentioned. I don't know whether he even -- I guess he knew it all right -- but that had nothing to do with our relationship. There was nothing political about it. He gave me every support and backing; so did Secretary Royall. I enjoyed my service during his administration tremendously, and I have the greatest admiration. I hope [87] you'll be good enough to give him my best regards and my best wishes for health for both of them. HESS: We'll see that that is conveyed. Thank you very much, sir. DRAPER: Thank you, sir. [Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- List of Subjects Discussed Anderson, General Frederick L., 8 Berlin airlift, planning of, 63-70 Berlin blockade, 62-63 Bevin, Ernest, 65 Clay, General Lucius, 3, 66 Clifford, Clark, 22 Coal production, postwar Germany, 48-49 Cold war, beginning of (Moscow Conference), 47 Combustion Engineering Company, 8 Defense budget of 1948, 17-21 Dodge, Joseph M., 56-58 "Draper plan" for Japan, 56 Draper, William H., Jr.: Berlin airlift, planning of, 63-70 and Ford peace expedition of 1915, 1-2 Long Island Railroad Company, director of, 4-5 and Marshall, General George C., 26-27 Mexican Light and Power Company, director of, 8 and Selective Service Act, 2 and Soviet officials in Germany, 35-38 and Truman, Harry S., 10, 12, 21 Under Secretary of the Army, appointment as, 50-52 Eisenhower, Dwight D., and population policy, 59-62 Faure, Premiere Maurice, 7 Ford peace expedition of 1915, 1-2 Foreign Ministers Conference, Moscow (1946-47), 44-47 Forrestal, James, 12-16, 18, 23 Germany, postwar food policy in, 28-35 Germany, postwar, and Soviet policy, 37-41 Harriman, W. Averell, 46-47 Hoffman, Paul, appointment as Director of ECA, 57-58 Hoover, Calvin, 41 Hoover, Herbert, and European food relief, 31-34 Japan, U.S. postwar economic policy toward, 53-59 Johnson, Louis, 24-25 Knox, Frank, 13 Korean war, strategy of, 83-84 Korean war, U.S. decision to enter, 39 Lisbon Conference of 1952, 7 Long Island Railroad Company, 4-5 MacArthur, General Douglas, 52-54 MacArthur, General Douglas, dismissal of, 84-85 Marshall, General George C., 26-27 Marshall plan, 48, 80-82 Morgenthau plan, 39-44 Moscow Conference of 1946-47, 44-47 Mutual Security Administration, 6 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council, 5, 77-80 NATO, and Lisbon Conference of 1952, 7 Patterson, Robert, 50 Planned Parenthood Federation, 61-62 Population Crisis Committee, 9 Population "explosion," problem of, 59-62 Purchasing policy, joint Army-Navy (World War II), 3 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 10-11 Royall, Kenneth, 49-51, 52, 73-74 Symington, Stuart, 74 "Three wise men," 7 Truman, Harry S.: and decision-making ability, 20-21 evaluation of, by General William Draper, 82-83, 86-87 and Planned Parenthood Federation, 61 Unification of Armed Forces, 14-17, 71-73 U.N. Population Commission, 9 Voorhees, Tracy, 31, 34, 74, 75 Wedemeyer, General Albert C.., 62-63 [Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For questions, e-mail truman.reference@nara.gov. Return to Truman Library Oral History Finding Aid Return to Archival Reference at the Truman Library Return to Truman Library home page Return to Truman Library home page The Harry S. Truman Library and Museum is one of twelve Presidential Libraries administered by the National Archives and Records Administration. 500 W. US Hwy. 24. Independence MO 64050 truman.library@nara.gov; Phone: 816-268-8200 or 1-800-833-1225; Fax: 816-268-8295.

General William H. Draper Jr. Oral History Interview Chief, Economics Division, Control Council for Germany, 1945-46; Military Government Adviser to the Secretary of State, Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1947; Under Secretary of War, 1947; Under Secretary of the Army, 1947-49; and United States Special Representative in Europe, with rank of Ambassador, January 1952 - June 1953. Washington, D.C. January 11, 1972 by Jerry N. Hess -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NOTICE This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word. Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview. RESTRICTIONS This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library. Opened May, 1974 Harry S. Truman Library Independence, Missouri Oral History Interview with General William H. Draper Jr. Washington, D.C. January 11, 1972 by Jerry N. Hess [1] HESS: General, for the record, will you relate a little of your personal background: Where were you born, where were you educated, and what are a few of the positions that you have held both before and since your service in the Truman administration. DRAPER: My name is William H. Draper, Jr. I was born in New York City in Harlem, August 10, 1894. I went to school there and to NYU to college, where I got both a B.A. and a M.A. in economics. My work first was in the Army, shortly after I got out of college, although even before that I had been a member of the Ford Peace Expedition to Europe which tried to stop the war at the end of 1915. I was chairman of the student delegation. There were sixty regular delegates and thirty student delegates. The expedition, with Mr. Ford aboard, went to all the neutral countries [2] and set up a peace congress at The Hague at the Peace Palace, which lasted about six months. Contrary to the public impression at the time the peace congress came fairly close to settling the war. However, it did not. Within six months or a year, I saw a number of the student delegates in the Army. After the First World War, I went first with the National City Bank, then with the Bankers' Trust Company and then Dillon, Read and Company. I stayed in the Army Reserves. In 1939 and 1940 I was Chief of Staff of the 77th Division, a Reserve Division, and probably because of that I came in contact with General [George C.] Marshall. In 1940 he invited me to go on active duty in Washington on the general staff, G-1, where I stayed for about a year and a half before Pearl Harbor. During that period I worked largely with then Major [Lewis B.] Hershey, later General Hershey, in writing the Selective Service Act and putting together the administration of Selective Service. After Pearl Harbor, General Marshall agreed that I should leave staff work and get a regiment. After a regimental commander's refresher course at Fort Benning, I commanded the 136th Infantry, part of the 33rd Division, a National Guard Division from Illinois. I joined them [3] in Tennessee, then for training near Seattle, Washington, then to the California desert, then to the Pacific Theatre. I was called back after about a year out there to head up contract termination for the War Department. Then I was asked by the Secretary of War Mr. [Henry M.] Stimson and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. [James V.J Forrestal at that time, along with Admiral Lewis Strauss, to try to put the purchasing arrangements for the Army and Navy together with a common purchasing policy an action which did put some of the purchasing for both services together. Then I went to Germany, going to France first, while the war was still on, with General [Lucius] Clay, preliminary to the occupation which he was expecting to take over in Germany under General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower. I was asked by General Clay to take on the responsibility for the economic side of the occupation. Then General Eisenhower left for the United States where he became Chief of Staff of the Army. General Clay eventually became Commander in Chief for the European Theater in addition to handling occupied Germany. After about two years in Berlin dealing with the German economy, its agriculture, industry, trade and general administration of its economy the German [4] government had simply disappeared, and the occupation forces of Great Britain, Russia and the United States and eventually of France, became the German government for some period -- in July of '47 I returned to the United States for a coal conference with the British about the Ruhr -- the need for more coal production. While there, Secretary of War [Robert] Patterson resigned; General Kenneth Royall was made Secretary and he asked me to become Under Secretary, which after consulting General Clay for obvious reasons, I accepted. My duties for the next two years were primarily supervision of the three occupations: Germany, Japan and Austria, although I became Acting Secretary when Mr. Royall was away from Washington. After I retired in early '49 and married again (my first wife had died early in the war), I returned briefly to Dillon, Read and Company and then was invited by Governor [Thomas E.] Dewey of New York State, where I was living, to take over the Trusteeship of the Long Island Railroad after several very serious rear end collisions on that railroad, as a result of which the public had lost confidence in the safety of the road and in the management. I discharged this responsibility for [5] about a year. We were able to find electronic safety devices that were installed over a period of about a year, and which automatically and electronically, through the rails, put the brakes on the following train if two trains got too close together. There have been no rear and collisions on the Long Island Railroad since. About that time the Truman administration invited me to become the United States' member of the NATO Council in Paris. The Council was moving from London to Paris and being upgraded, as it became evident that it would be necessary, with the Korean war on and the threat to Western Europe from Russia, to build up the Western world's mutual defenses. The NATO Alliance had been formed on paper about a year and a half before, but it became very clear that it would be necessary to have a large and active defense force in being. Before accepting I asked for the opportunity to visit Europe briefly and talk with General Eisenhower who was there in command of NATO's military forces, such as they were, to make sure that he and I would be working in close harmony, he being the top military man in NATO, and I to be the top civilian on the U.S. side on the NATO Council. We met in Paris. He introduced me to Winston Churchill [6] who happened to be there at the time. We talked about my possible appointment and he not only agreed that I should take it but welcomed my appointment. I returned to the United States and suggested that since I would be dealing with the defense of Europe, and since I would also be representing the Mutual Security Administration under Mr. [Averell] Harriman and dealing with the economic problems of the European countries as well at a time when France and Great Britain were practically bankrupt, and when our Mutual Security arrangements and our Marshall Plan follow up were beginning to bear fruit, but still required a great many adjustments and continued assistance, that I would need deputies with the proper authority and rank in the defense field, in the economic field, and in the political field; plus an overall deputy, since we were dealing with twenty European countries, and I would be traveling a great deal in Europe and back and forth to Washington. He would be my alter ego. These arrangements were all agreed to and the deputies appointed. I went to Paris about the end of '51, spent a few weeks in close collaboration with Jean Monnet, and a prominent Britisher, whose name slips me, and who later became head of the British atomic energy commission. [7] The three of us, known correctly or not as the three wise men planned the recommendations that would be made to the Lisbon Conference, to which came Secretary of State [Dean] Acheson; Secretary of Defense, Robert Lovett; John Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury, and Averell Harriman. The Lisbon Conference was held in February 1952. It laid the groundwork on a very constructive basis for the military buildup of NATO. The French were asked for twelve divisions, as I recall. The United States had to agree to a great deal of economic support to make that possible. There were political questions involved. The French Prime Minister, Mr. [Maurice] Faure, I believe it was at that time, at the last minute in a private conference, held in the basement of the British Embassy, in Lisbon, told us that he agreed with the principle, that he was going to agree, he thought, to what we were asking, namely twelve French divisions, for the common defense. But he said, "This is going to cost me my political head." We adjourned this private meeting, we went into the final Lisbon Conference meeting, the agreement generally was reached, and the agreement signed. Three days later M. Faure did lose his job as Prime Minister, but the agreement held. After about a year and a half the various agreements made at Lisbon were pretty well coming into force. [8] General Eisenhower was elected President. He asked me to return to the United States before he took over as President to meet with him and with his future Cabinet members to acquaint them with the developments in NATO. He himself, of course, was quite familiar with what had gone on there. As was customary, I gave the incoming President my resignation. He asked me not to insist. I pointed out that including the war years I had been about ten years in Government service, or more perhaps, and he agreed that I could retire about the middle of '53, which I did. Shortly after that I went to Mexico for six years to head the Mexican Light and Power Company, a most enjoyable and constructive business assignment. In 1959 I decided it was time to return to the United States. I persuaded General Maxwell Taylor, who was then retiring as Chief of Staff of the Army, to take over my job in Mexico, which he did. Mrs. Draper and I moved to California, and I formed a financing firm with General [Frederick L.] Anderson who had been my general deputy in NATO. And six or seven years later I retired from that firm, moved to Washington, and became Chairman of Combustion Engineering in New York for a few years. In 1965 I retired as Chairman, and since then I have been devoting my entire time to trying to do something about finding [9] solutions for the population problem of the world -- the so-called population explosion. That's very lengthy, much more so than I anticipated making it. HESS: That's quite all right. What is the name of the particular organization that you are with now? DRAPER: I wear several hats: I am Honorary Chairman of the Population Crisis Committee here in Washington; I'm on the Governing Body of the International Planned Parenthood Federation; and am Honorary Vice-Chairman of the Planned Parenthood movement in this country; also by President Nixon's appointment. I represent the United States each two years, or whenever meetings are held, of the United Nations Population Commission. Our last meeting was in November 1971 in Geneva, the first two weeks of November. In general, my work with the Population Crisis Committee, means dealing with our own Government, and other governments, and with private and international organizations interested and involved in the population problem. I travel a great deal. In addition to the above, for the last few years I have been assisting Mr. Paul Hoffman, who has been in charge of the Development Program of the United Nations, [10] to raise the funds from governments for the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, about thirty million dollars this past year from forty six governments. HESS: What are your earliest recollections of Mr. Truman? DRAPER: I don't believe that I had ever met Mr. Truman personally until after he became President. At the time of President Roosevelt's death I was in Washington, on the General Staff of the Army. Shortly after that I went to Europe, on General Eisenhower's staff under General Clay. HESS: What were your impressions upon the death of President Roosevelt? You mentioned that you were here in town, but what came to mind? DRAPER: We were still at war. President Roosevelt had been a great war President. I'm a Republican; he was a Democrat. I hadn't voted for him. I disagreed with many of his domestic policies, but I certainly recognized and do today that he foresaw our participation in the war, our necessary involvement, and that prepared for it in a way that the American people accepted. While it took some time it did help greatly to bolster the British during their year of fighting it out alone, under the lend-lease [11] agreements that he made with Mr. Churchill. He began building up the forces preliminary to Pearl Harbor so that when that blow struck it was, I think, very largely due to Mr. Roosevelt's forethought and foresight, that we were able to quickly mobilize and go to war effectively. When he died, to get to your direct question, I had known that he was not in good health, but I had no idea that he was near death. It was almost -- here in Washington -- almost a physical shock to the entire community, that permeated the atmosphere in a way that I've never known before or since. Even the declaration of war didn't compare, the shock waves, that seemed to be going around us everywhere with our war leader suddenly dead. HESS: As you know, several historians have said that President Roosevelt had prior information that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked, and he did not notify the commanders so that the Japanese would attack and get us into the war in that manner. What do you think of that? DRAPER: I don't believe it. I don't know, but I don't believe it. I can't believe that if there was any prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor that General Marshall would have been riding horseback that Sunday morning when it happened. HESS: What kind of a job did you think Mr. Truman would do [12] as President of the United States, and just what did you know about him on April 12, 1945? DRAPER: I had a favorable picture of Mr. Truman without knowing him personally. His work as Committee Chairman in the Senate, and his investigation of war activities which had gone on for some time before he became Vice President, had favorably impressed everyone, including myself. As Vice President he was not prominent in current goings-on, so that I didn't know too much about him; and like everyone else, I wondered what kind of a President he was going to make. I was tremendously impressed with his modesty and the way in which he took over the Presidency, indicating that he thought the size of the job was such that he only hoped he could live up to its requirements. HESS: And before moving on, as you were with Dillon, Read for a good number of years, what are your recollections of Mr. James Forrestal? When did you first meet Mr. Forrestal? DRAPER: When I first joined Dillon Read which was in 1926. He was already one of the senior members of the firm. I guess he was the senior member of the firm, probably, next to Mr. Clarence Dillon, the top man, and a very able [13] financial genius, I would put it almost. He worked in a way like -- by himself to some degree, but he had tremendous influence in bringing financial arrangements to fruition. He was a very fine person in every way. I knew him well, intimately, worked under him for years, so that in 1940 I went to Washington before he did, but when he was invited to Washington he was one of the so-called nine anonymous young men in the White House. He impressed everyone that he worked with here in Washington and moved up to Under Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy, and finally the first Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Navy when he came to Washington was Secretary [Frank] Knox. One of the smartest things that President Roosevelt ever did was to bring two Republicans into the Cabinet, and the timing was perfect. There had been a lot of bickering going on in the War Department between Secretary [Harry H.] Woodring and Assistant Secretary [Louis] Johnson. Nobody knew who was boss or what the policies were. When the President decided that the time had come to have the other party represented in the Cabinet in order to attract national support he appointed Mr. Stimson as Secretary of War and Mr. Knox as Secretary of the Navy. In effect he turned over our national defense to the Republicans, and so far [14] as the individuals he selected were concerned, he made a ten strike with each. Mr. Forrestal had been invited to serve generally in and around the White House, but settled down in the Navy. Mr. Knox must have known him or came to know him, and pretty soon he was Under Secretary of the Navy, and then became Secretary later on. During the period after Pearl Harbor the man who was responsible for the rebuilding of our Navy after the attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed so much of it, and who built it to levels we'd never dreamed of before, and which made it possible to fight in two oceans, and gradually to move across the Pacific, island after island, until we had conquered the Japanese, was James Forrestal. HESS: In your opinion, what was his view of the unification of the services? DRAPER: My impression of Jim Forrestal's views on unification are that he was resisting a great deal of pressure from the admirals who were almost all opposed to the idea, while himself believing that it was the right solution for American defense organization. His thinking was probably affected by his close association with Bob Patterson, the then Secretary of War, and probably also by President Truman's own views. [15] HESS: In your opinion, why was he selected to be the first Secretary of Defense? DRAPER: Simply for that reason. I don't say it was to bribe the Navy admirals but his appointment did certainly take into account their point of view. The Navy had always been on its own. The Captain was supreme on his ship. The Navy had that overall point of view -- a good one indeed for fighting battles on the sea. I'm sure the President said to himself, "We'll just take the Navy along by putting him in charge." And it worked. HESS: What is your general opinion of his effectiveness both as the Secretary of the Navy, which you've fairly well covered, but as Secretary of Defense, too? Just how effective was he in the job? DRAPER: The first Secretary of Defense had a hard job, obviously. He had to bring together the War Department, which became the Department of the Army, and the new Air Force, which had been a part of the Army, and the Navy as well. For the Air Force it meant a greater degree of autonomy. But both the Navy and the Army and the War Department had been supreme and independent in their own right, and it was not an easy thing to knock their heads together and for both to have a single boss. I [16] think he did that job very well indeed. I worked very closely with him for about three months. He asked Secretary Royall to let me spend a few months directly with the Secretary of Defense to build up and put forward the first defense budget for the three services. So I worked day in and day out on that job and saw a great deal of him during that period. It really meant that I was dealing back and forth and compromising with the three services to try to find a budget that the President would approve and that still took care of each of the three services to the extent possible within that limit. HESS: In his Memoirs Mr. Truman makes the comment that in working on military budgets, sometimes the Navy was the most difficult to satisfy and to get along with. What would be your view? DRAPER: I found that true, too. HESS: Why would that be true? Why was that true? DRAPER: Their tradition had always been one of independent action and the Navy considered it simply had to have what it needed. The admirals were good proponents and didn't take no for an answer easily. A lot of my good [17] Navy friends were in there fighting all the way. They are still good friends of mine, those that are still living. But when they're arguing the question of the Navy's rights, they're very strong protagonists. Actually, to get back to that first budget for just a minute, I'm afraid that I would consider that first budget one of President Truman's real mistakes. At that time -- what year would that have been, 1948, I guess -- the three budgets were put together at three levels: One, if I remember the figures, the minimum budget of thirteen and a half billion dollars for the three services, which sounds picayune today; the middle budget was about seventeen billion and the third was what the three services asked for, and which was the way we first started to put the figures together, it was about twenty-one billion dollars. Mr. Forrestal felt very strongly, as did I, that while he could justify reducing the twenty-one billion, he felt strongly that the middle ground of seventeen billion was the irreducible minimum from the point of view of the national defense of this country. I prepared these three budgets. The thirteen and a half budget was only made because the President had set that as the figure, although it wasn't supposedly the final figure. But that was the figure he hoped to reach. [18] So we had to make a budget there, but to get the three services to agree on the figures for that, just meant they had to be rammed down their throats. But the seventeen billion budget took care reasonably at least, of what each of the three felt their really irreducible requirements actually were, although they all three badly wanted the twenty-one billion budget. I sat in the meeting when Mr. Forrestal presented the three budgets to the President, and Mr. Forrestal was more concerned than I had ever seen him in my life. He was very, very seriously troubled. After the presentation the President said very little except to ask a few questions. Then the President said, "I'll let you know, Jim." And a day or two later he did let him know that it was thirteen and a half billion -- the President's original budget. I think that may have helped to bring on the Korean war. I think that may have helped to bring on Jim's death. That's something I'd like to put off the record until after the President dies. HESS: Now, a further question on this same matter: Was Frank Pace the Director of the Bureau of the Budget at this time? Harold Smith, of course, was the first director and he was replaced by James Webb. I believe at this time Frank Pace was Director of the Bureau of [19] the Budget. In drawing up these very important budgets, the most important -- the budgets that take most of the money -- are the military budgets. In drawing these up, did you work with the Bureau of the Budget? DRAPER: I must have. I guess it was Frank Pace, but whoever it was I certainly must have worked with him, but not nearly as closely as I did with the three services. My job, really, was -- as outlined to me by Mr. Forrestal -- although I guess I evolved the idea of the three budgets, was to take into account the three requests from the services and then to get a reasonable budget together -- one that he could recommend. This turned out to be the seventeen billion one. And then he also asked me, against his better judgment, to prepare a budget at the lower level, set by the President, and when the lower level was approved, I know that it was a great shock. It meant to him that his country was not going to get what it needed for its defense for that period. HESS: 1948 was a very important year, that was a political year, the year Mr. Truman ran and was elected, to many peoples' surprise. In your opinion, do you think he had political considerations in mind when he wanted a balanced budget that year? Was that his reason for the [20] lower budget? DRAPER: I wouldn't want to express an opinion on that. He felt that a balanced budget, now that we were out of the war, was the necessity, the need for the country, I'm sure. Whether there were political overtones, too, I can't say. HESS: All right. As you have mentioned, the cutting back of the armed forces at this time left us somewhat unprepared at the advent of the Korean war. We were unprepared to meet the situation that arose. Where should the blame lie? DRAPER: Those decisions are a matter of judgment. The President has to make the final decisions. He doesn't have anybody to lay the blame on. I think one of the great tributes to Mr. Truman, and I would be the first to make it, was his power of decision. Throughout the time that I was Under Secretary, and sometimes acting as Secretary, I would go to the President from time to time, with particular problems of the Department of the Army that had taken us weeks or months in some cases to evaluate and decide what we should recommend or what course we thought the country should pursue. I have never been impressed by anyone more in my life than by [21] the way in which he would receive the problem; I would describe it briefly, for five or ten minutes; he would ask a few questions; I would give him the two or possibly three alternative decisions that could be made; he would make one of them, and that would be that. He would go on to something else. That's the way he ran the Presidency. He constantly carried out the little motto on his desk, "The Buck Stops Here." Now, to get back to your question. He had to decide on whether a balanced budget at that time was more important to the country than a little more money from his point of view in defense, and he made the decision. I wouldn't criticize it. HESS: How often did you meet with the President during the time that you were Under Secretary of the Army, approximately? DRAPER: I suppose twenty times, I don't know. I was there about two years -- twenty or thirty times. HESS: Did you work with any of the White House staff members at the time? DRAPER: Yes, yes. HESS: Who comes to mind? Did you work with Clark Clifford? [22] Clifford was Special Counsel at that time. DRAPER: Yes, yes, very often with Clark Clifford. HESS: Did he provide you with any particular help? Anything that you and he worked on that might help illustrate his functions in this field? Is there anything that comes to mind? DRAPER: No, we talked about the problems as they came along and he'd give me the President's answers. As a rule, of course, Secretary Royall had these conversations. It was when either he delegated me to do something in particular or when he'd be away on a trip that I would have the direct contact. HESS: Did you have any contact with the Military Aide, General Harry Vaughan? DRAPER: I certainly met him a few times, but remember nothing in particular. HESS: You have mentioned a meeting at the White House in which Mr. Forrestal presented the budget and mentioned his attitude at that time. What are the earliest signs that you can recall of the unfortunate mental breakdown that overtook Mr. Forrestal? Was this the first time [23] that you noticed that something might be wrong? DRAPER: Well, I didn't notice any mental breakdown or anything of that kind. He was simply greatly shocked that the President's decision was so low. No, I think that was much later on I retired. I saw Jim several times before that. I retired, around March of '49. I had been wanting to return to private life before that but Jim had persuaded me to stay just as the President had persuaded him to stay over the election into the new year. He and Mr. Royall and the President permitted me to go in March of '49. HESS: The same month that Mr. Forrestal left. DRAPER: He left after I did. I saw him before I left to say goodbye, and I noticed then that he was very distraught. I returned to Washington about ten days later, after my wedding and a short honeymoon, and had breakfast with Jim, and then I could hardly get his attention on anything. He was obviously worried, distraught . . . HESS: Early in April. DRAPER: No, this was still in March, I think. He was soon going to leave -- I knew then he was going to leave. He was going to leave and I ascribed his distraught condition [24] to the fact that he was leaving, and perhaps to not being happy about his successor going to take over. HESS: In March Louis Johnson replaced him. DRAPER: That's correct. HESS: Why was that change made? You mentioned that Mr. Forrestal had wanted to leave. DRAPER: He had wanted to leave, but this was in the fall or winter before, but the President persuaded him that he needed him and wanted him to stay, and he agreed to stay, and then apparently very suddenly the President decided to appoint Mr. Johnson. My information at the time, which was rumor largely, was that Mr. Johnson had raised the money for the election and was told that he could have any job he wanted after the election, if the President were elected, which you can understand. Then Mr. Johnson asked for the Defense job, and the President gave it to him. I was present when Johnson was sworn in at the Pentagon. They had a full dress affair in the encircled area inside the Pentagon Square or Pentagon, and the President pinned a medal on Jim, and then swore in Johnson. Everybody from the Pentagon had been invited [25] to flock inside the enclosure and see the show. Jim went back to his office and a friend of his from New York took him by plane to Hobe Sound where he stayed at Douglas Dillon's house. That's where the tragedy started. HESS: Do you think that Mr. Forrestal had changed his mind in March and would liked to have remained? DRAPER: I don't know, but my guess is at that time he didn't like to be suddenly replaced. He perhaps would voluntarily have offered to go in another month or two, but I don't think he felt happy at all about the President, after urging him so hard to stay, deciding that somebody else should take the job. That's a personal impression only. HESS: Some people say that Mr. Forrestal's lack of support of the President in the election might have influenced that. Would he reasonably have expected support from Mr. Forrestal? DRAPER: It's been a pretty regular rule in our Government that people involved in defense should not get into politics. I certainly agree with that rule personally, and I think that was Jim's point of view, and I wouldn't expect that the President thought anything else. No, I think it was just because Johnson had put the President [26] under a real obligation and he was paying his debt. HESS: We discussed the reduced budget, and not too long after Mr. Johnson came in, I believe one of his first actions was to stop work on the super carrier, the U.S.S. United States, and that was when Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan resigned, shortly after you left. DRAPER: That's right, but I'm not familiar with that incident. HESS: Back on General Marshall. You had mentioned that General Marshall asked you to come back into the Army in 1940. What were your early associations with General Marshall? When did you first meet him? DRAPER: As Chief of Staff of the 77th Division, which was then a part-time job, that was when I was in the Reserves. We could see war looming ahead. I had for some months, maybe for a year, been working with other officers of the Division, and with General Vanderbilt who was the commanding general at that time, preparing war plans so far as the Division was concerned, and looking forward at the right time to calling in the enlisted men and also piecing out the training of the officers. We had had occasion two or three times to take some of these [27] plans to Washington for consultation. And General Marshall had sat in on some of these consultations. I had met with him to discuss these plans and problems with him on behalf of our Division. One day I got a personal phone call from him asking if I'd come down and go on active duty for six months -- it turned out to be nine years -- but I can't blame General Marshall for that. I really think that he wanted to have some Reserve officer down there to give him whatever benefit there might be in the Reserve thinking, and also to reflect perhaps, through that Reserve officer, to some of the Reserve Divisions, the War Department thinking about the future of the Reserves. But it didn't turn out that way. I became almost immediately involved in the Selective Service and in the G-1 operation and was absorbed with that, working with General -- then Major -- Lewis Hershey. The President appointed me -- President Roosevelt -- to the Army and Navy Recreation Board and some of the other boards and committees that dealt with the enlargement of the strength of the Army and the Navy. HESS: You were with General Marshall at the Moscow conference, but that was in 1947, so we have another subject before we come to that. We will come back to General Marshall. [28] But we should cover your experiences in Germany at the end of World War II. I believe that you were Chief of the Economics Division of the Control Council for Germany from '45 to '47. Just what were your general impressions at that time and what were your duties? DRAPER: As I've said before, the occupation became the actual Government of Germany. When we moved up from Versailles, our offices were first in Frankfurt, and then in July of 1945 we moved to Berlin. First the tripartite Control Council, then when the French joined us, the quadripartite Control Council was the Government of Germany. It was simply that. Each of our national army organizations in our own zones of Germany were supreme, subject only to the quadripartite policy decisions. So my job, under those general policies and in line with the Morgenthau doctrine that had been directed to us from Washington as the U.S. economic policy for Germany, was to run the economy of our zone of Germany. That meant the agriculture, the industry, and the trade (in or out of Germany although there was no trade outside of Germany at that time), and to try to keep the country from starving and from going berserk. The crops that year were quite good, and there was [29] also considerable food we found that the Wehrmacht had stored, which we took over. So there was no immediate danger of starvation that particular fall or even that winter. The winter was not too cold, but there was great concern whether the crop could be gathered that summer and fall. There were some eight million Germans in prison camps. The crop had to be brought in by the old men and the boys and the women, but they did it. Industry was at a complete standstill; the coalmines in the Ruhr had been flooded before the Germans gave up that area; there was no coal production; and no coal on hand; no factory was turning a wheel hardly anywhere in Germany. The destruction of the air bombing had made all of the factories or most of them look as if they never would run again. It turned out a year later that after the debris was cleared away, there was more of the machinery and the going parts of the factories able to be revived than we had expected. But at the beginning there was no production of coal or of anything else, except food on the farms, and the factories and the industrial production of the country was practically nil. So, except for what food was being grown, Germany had to start from a standing start to again make its way. We found after a few months that we were going to [30] have to import food. Western Germany, the part where we were, had not been the breadbasket; that had been Eastern Germany largely, and we were getting no supplies of food or anything else from the Russian zone, so that we had to look the situation in the face and come to a decision. General Clay first had to be persuaded and then he had to help me persuade them back in Washington that we in this country -- even though we had conquered Germany -- that we were going to have to help feed them. That was an idea that no one at that time had even envisaged. We had to get appropriations; I had to come back to appear before the Congress, and . . . HESS: Was it difficult putting that view over? DRAPER: Very. And I think probably it was only made possible because the crisis was delayed about a year. Actually we managed to wiggle through during the first eight or ten months because our own Army had been bringing with it a food reserve to avoid feeding troubles for our allies or our enemies during the fighting, and we had as well as the food that we found in the warehouses that the Germans had husbanded as their stock and their reserve. Those things helped that first six or eight or ten months. But as those months went by, we could see that in [31] our area of Germany we had to have more food, and the British concluded similarly, particularly in the Ruhr. The one thing that saved the day, in my judgment, was the action taken by one who is now a very close friend of mine, Mr. Tracy Voorhees. He was the adviser to the President on food. I don't know at what stage that appointment was made, but that's how it turned out. He clearly saw these problems, both for Japan and Germany, and he had the great good fortune, and the imagination, to suggest to President Truman that the one man in this country who could help solve this problem and help persuade the Republican Congress that action should be taken, was former President Hoover. He first suggested this to the President, then he went to see Mr. Hoover, and the President then talked to Mr. Hoover. As you recall, after the First World War, Mr. Hoover had made his famous journey to Belgium and to Europe. He still found alive and was able to collect, half a dozen of the top people who had gone with him in 1919 on that first relief mission, when President Truman asked him to repeat, on a much more serious scale, his visit to Belgium after the First World War that had prevented that country from starving. So, I guess it was early in '46, or the winter of [32] '45-‘46, that General Clay and I got word from Washington that the former President was coming with Mr. Voorhees and a group of those that he had collected together, to make a survey, not only of Germany but of the food situation in our allies' territory as well; France, Belgium, and so on. So they came first to Germany, and I remember the occasion very well, when they came in by train. General Clay and I met them, Mr. Hoover and Tracy Voorhees and the others. Mr. Hoover understood the situation very quickly because of his past experiences, and he came to realize that if the Germans weren't fed (I don't care who fed them), but if they weren't fed, we couldn't stay there even with bayonets, that that was not a tolerable situation in modern times, and that if we wanted a peaceful occupation, if we wanted to bring the Germans back into the community of nations, first they had to be fed, not too much, but they had to have enough to live. The ration in Berlin was 1560 calories a day, just about half of what you and I eat now, or then, as well. They got along on it. It wasn't a good solid three meals by any means. One of the first steps we had to take was because we needed coal worse than anything else, except food, and [33] we didn't have any coal. The Ruhr mines had to be mined if we were going to get the factories started, and we found that the miners couldn't mine coal on 1560 calories or even 1800, so one of the first steps we took was to raise the calorie level for the miners to 4000 calories, against great protest, obviously. Then the next step we had to take was to search the miners when they went home every night, because they were dividing their 4000 calories with their families. Well, from the humanitarian point of view that's fine, but it couldn't work, and so we had to strip them of food and they had to eat it themselves. So it was that kind of decisions we had to face. So Mr. Hoover made his survey, went over the findings with me, and then he went to three or four of these other countries which were pleading that they wanted the food. The worst thing in the world from their point of view was to feed their former enemies. And so the decision had to be made, and was made, that the allies, most of them, while not well off with food, weren't starving. We did furnish some food to them, and certainly later under the Marshall plan they got food, but the basic decision was made that we had to feed the Germans, that they were the worst off, and we had to send food to them. And it was Mr. Hoover and his influence with the Republican Congress [34] and his report to them, privately as well as his published report, that did the trick. He and I saw the head of the appropriations committee, and things like that, and he appeared before them, I believe; I certainly did. And that was the one part of the appropriation, as I remember it, that the Senator from New Hampshire, who was chairman of the appropriations committee, accepted in its entirety, with Mr. Hoover's word for it -- and then it was appropriated by the House of Representatives, too, and we got every dollar of the request we made. Then the food had to be bought. It turned out in '46-'47, that year, worldwide, including the United States, that the crops were very poor, and Tracy Voorhees did the buying for the Government for the food, or directed it, and had great difficulty to find the food, to find wheat and corn and the other basic things, and he finally shipped one crop which was in surplus, potatoes, and we got a good many shiploads of potatoes. Those you had to get over in a hurry and use in a hurry or they'd spoil. But I give Mr. Hoover and Tracy Voorhees very high marks -- and Mr. Truman the President, who backed us to the limit -- for the fact that we were able to prevent most of the threatened starvation, although there were plenty of deaths from hunger and cold because there was no coal for [35] heating, and comparatively little food, so that disease took the old people off pretty easily. So while there were many deaths that undoubtedly had to do with lack of food, there wasn't rampant starvation. The fact that they got fed reasonably, small rations, but reasonably; and then the fact that we took their part in Berlin, against the Russians' willingness to starve them out at the time of the airlift, and at the time of the blockade, those two things together, in my judgment have now made the Germans among our most trusted allies. HESS: What was the nature of the experiences that you had at that time working with the Soviet representatives that were in Germany? Were they difficult people to work with? Did they live up to agreements that were made? DRAPER: They were difficult people to work with, they didn't always live up to their agreements, but I greatly admired those that I worked with during the first year, particularly General Shabalin, who was my opposite member as the Russian member of the economic directorate. He had been a schoolteacher before World War I, had joined the army in World War I, stayed in the Army, became a general but was still a schoolteacher and a peasant at heart, and with it all, a fine person. I met him first about ten [36] days after we got to Berlin. I was in General Clay's staff meeting -- Saturday morning was our staff meeting -- and he came to my office, I learned later, storming around because the day before he had had a pass to go to Frankfurt on one of our planes to see the city, and he had gone back this Saturday morning because the weather had been bad Friday, and they told him the pass had been rescinded by my order, which didn't happen to be true, but that's what they told him. And he came storming into my office to complain and to give me hell. When I came out of the staff meeting, he'd gone, but I learned all about his visit. So after I had lunch I got my jeep and my Russian interpreter and went over to his headquarters. He wasn't there but I found his house, and I called there. At first he wouldn't let me in, he was so mad, but finally my interpreter made him understand that he could go to Frankfurt every day of the week as far as I was concerned, and I would see that he got there. So then he went a hundred percent the other way and said, "Kamerad," put his arms around me, and said we had to celebrate this meeting of the two armies by my staying and having lunch with him. Well, I'd just finished a big lunch, but I figured in the interest of international camaraderie, [37] I had to eat another lunch. I never suffered so much in my life for my country. Lunch started with a great big bowl of cabbage soup, and I thought maybe that was the lunch, but the next course was a big steak with four eggs on it. Anyway, we made up, and we were good friends ever since. We didn't always agree, obviously. He'd get instructions one way and I'd get them another, but we always remained friends and I'm sure that he, and I think all of the other Russian generals that I dealt with, including even Marshal Zhukov and General (later Marshal) Sokolovsky, were looking forward to a peaceful solution, just as we were, and hoping to build a permanent peace, in contrast to the two world wars in thirty years, which we had just experienced. But as our system of rapidly bringing the troops back home went on, the Russian attitude in Moscow, hardened steadily. Our so-called point system meant that the oldest ones in service, whether officers or enlisted men, unless they volunteered to stay, were railroaded home first. HESS: We lost our most experienced men first? DRAPER: Yes. As a result of that policy we were losing [38] them pretty fast, and our equipment was being loaded and taken out and driven out, and taken out on ships, as fast as it could go. When the war ended I suppose that our military strength in Europe and Germany was greater than any similar military strength that had ever been concentrated in one spot before in the history of the world. Within six or eight or ten months as this point system operated, our military strength was -- I won't say nil -- but certainly not very great. HESS: Greatly reduced. DRAPER: Tremendously reduced, and the Russians could see that as well as we could. HESS: Could you see a change in their attitude? DRAPER: Without any question. After about a year, instead of being fairly reasonable -- they never were truly reasonable, but at least you could get along with them -- but then it became nyet instead of saglasin, no instead of yes, almost invariably. They undoubtedly thought back in Moscow at that time that they were going to conquer Europe, move across the rest of Europe to the channel. And I think that when the Korean war started [39] that's what they had in mind doing as soon as they could. A map had been put out by our State Department that showed the perimeter that we were going to defend, and it did not include Korea. I think we fooled the Russians as well as ourselves. And when Truman made perhaps the greatest decision of his life, to go back and fight in Korea, which he did within twenty-four hours of their attack, the United Nations soon endorsed his decision and our Congress came along later. But it was President Truman personally that made that decision. He acted, and fooled the Russians. We weren't too ready for it ourselves, but we prevented Europe being taken over -- or rather he did -- by that action. HESS: You have mentioned the Morgenthau plan. I also understand there was a Draper plan, and it was your belief that the German economy could not be restored under the agriculture and light industry plan of Henry Morgenthau. Tell me about your plan. DRAPER: I never heard of a Draper plan in Germany. Later on there was one that was called that in Japan. The Morgenthau plan was unfortunate; it was based on vengeance plus the theory that the Germans had started World War I; perhaps they had, but they were paying for [40] it anyway, and they had certainly started World War II. And Mr. Morgenthau was of the opinion that Germany should be prevented from having the where withal to ever start another war, and he persuaded President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill to agree to his proposals. He believed that if the Germans were limited to growing food and to light industry and were not permitted any substantial amount of steel production or other basic industrial production, and not permitted to build ships or any of the other things that are required for war, even when on a peacetime basis, that they would be kept perpetually and forever in a condition impossible for them to wage war. That also would be in a condition which would become impossible for the Germans to exist unless somebody helped them and provided the necessities of life. It became evident to us very quickly that this was the case, and that if we carried out literally the terms of the very famous Morgenthau directive, the United States would have to support Germany for the rest of time or as long as that policy stayed in effect. And so, we had to wiggle here and waggle there and do the best we could without openly breaking our directive to permit the German economy to begin to function. We argued with [41] this one and argued with that one here in Washington and in Germany, wherever we had the chance, and bit by bit, we recouped or revised the situation so that it became possible. A Dr. Calvin Hoover from Duke University came over. He was a very fine international economist, who is still alive. Although he only had a limited period of service, a few months, we asked him under the directive to draft up a potential possible level of industry plan. He did that very effectively, but from the point of view of the directive, and so under duress, under pressure. And it was his plan that with some modifications was finally adopted by the quadripartite government for Germany. The levels were changed some. We were more hardboiled than anybody except the Russians. The British were the most sensible. The French were even better than we were, although they were pretty severe, too. The Russians went even beyond the Morgenthau plan. They were basing their tough attitude on the fact that their whole country had been ravaged and millions of their people killed. They had been invaded, and you have a certain point of view when that happens. They were there to take it out on Germany, I guess, and we were pretty near as bad, although we hadn't been invaded. [42] Anyway, the level of industry was finally determined on a level that didn't last long; it wasn't realistic. It took about two years to change. It was after I was back in Washington as Under Secretary before that directive was finally officially revoked. In the meantime, we didn't pay as much attention to it as perhaps we should from the point of view of military discipline. There were several efforts to pull me back and have me charged with not carrying out the directive. General Clay always defended me. He knew perfectly well that such a policy couldn't last just as well as I did. We fought it out and finally persuaded Washington. General Marshall himself defended me in testimony before a Congressional Committee. So, it finally worked out. The real turning point came when the currency was devalued or revalued in 1948. At that time we gave the Russians the opportunity to do the same to revalue the mark in their sector, in their zone; they refused. I was back in Washington before this -- when they walked out of the four power council meeting -- the Kommanditura. A few days later they declared the blockade of Berlin. HESS: Which we will get to in just a minute. Did you ever discuss the Morgenthau plan with its author, with Henry Morgenthau? [43] DRAPER: Yes, I had a session with him before I went to Germany and he gave me his views. At that time I didn't have any very clear cut views myself, one way or the other. I hadn't been in Germany except on that Ford Peace Expedition I spoke of many years before. I had gone through Germany from Sweden to Holland in a locked car with all the other peace seeking delegates, guarded by German bayonets and with signs saying that we were spies and the soldiers shouldn't talk to us. So that was my only former visit to Germany. So I didn't, at that time, do anything but listen. I don't think I ever talked to him about it during the period of the occupation, but I did since, before his death, and he and I didn't agree. HESS: What did he say? Did he realize that you were there in Germany and not really going along with his plan? DRAPER: Oh, I'm sure he did. HESS: Did he say anything of that nature when you spoke to him later? DRAPER: Yes, in a more or less friendly fashion we agreed that we had been in complete disagreement. By that time the whole situation had changed, of course. He was no longer in office either. [44] HESS: That's right. What were his views? Did he think his plans should have been adhered to, that things would have been better off if Germany had been turned into an agricultural nation? DRAPER: I would think probably so. He certainly wasn't giving any ground, but it was a friendly conversation. But it was past history by that time. HESS: Anything else before we move on to the period of time that you were military government adviser to General Marshall in Moscow? DRAPER: No, that was while I was still in Germany. I think we went to Moscow in December 1946 and were there about eight weeks. The conference ended earlier than this memo would indicate. HESS: Oh, I see. I had the wrong dates down here. DRAPER: I figure the conference ended in February. HESS: December through February. DRAPER: February, maybe March. HESS: Tell me about the conference. What comes to mind when you look back on that conference, and the Russians' attitude? [45] DRAPER: It was one of the most interesting experiences of my life. We were there in Moscow for seven or eight weeks. We expected it to be much shorter, and it dragged out. They were most hospitable as far as the physical facilities went. They cleaned all their top people out of a hotel before we came and repainted it and, in effect, turned the hotel over to us. Nobody in Russia owned an automobile, of course, but they had assigned automobiles to all their top people, generals and government officials, but they took them away from many of them for us. Each one of us had a car and a driver assigned to us. Food was scarce for the population but not for us. We had everything we could ask for including very scarce fresh eggs. They did everything they could to be hospitable. General Marshall was our representative. Molotov was usually speaking for the Russian. [Aneurin] Bevin, the British coalminer who became Foreign Secretary, was British representative and the star performer, I would say, of the whole show. The Frenchman was good, too. It was a battle of wits and a battle of nations for several weeks. The basic differences, of course, were obvious between the Russians and the other three. Bevin told [46] them off several times. He was the only one, he said, of all of them, in spite of what the Russians were saying, that ever really worked at a job such as the mines. He knew what the working man's needs were better than they did, and yet he saw it from a democratic point of view and not a dictator's -- but he was absolutely frank. The differences of opinion were very, very real, and not very much agreement was reached. In spite of putting out statements from time to time that looked reasonably favorable, there wasn't much really accomplished. About half way through the conference, the question of our supporting the Greeks and the Turks came up when it was announced by President Truman. General Marshall, of course, was our Secretary of State and was there with us. He was involved very definitely in the new Truman Doctrine and the Russians were supporting the other side. So it was a very open split. General Marshall handled himself beautifully. I often got to see Averell Harriman who was our Ambassador in Moscow then. He had also been our Ambassador in 1945, when I had gone to Moscow the first time in the fall of '45 as Acting Chairman of the Reparations Commission. At that time I really had the chance to really know Mr. Harriman. I had met him a few times before. He had the picture of the Russians' real ambition and real lack [47] of desire to come to friendly terms, of peaceful friendly relations with the United States. Earlier, I think, than any other of our diplomats or officials. I had certainly gotten from him in September of 1945, a picture of Russia as it's turned out to really be, far better than from anyone else. At that time, General Clay and I had tended to discount his point of view, because in Germany we both were hoping and thinking and wishing that we were going to reach a peaceful solution between our two countries. I don't think Harriman thought that at all, because he had seen the Russians operating from behind the scenes through a good part of the war. To go back to the foreign ministers' meeting, we discussed the whole future of Europe, and indirectly how the United States and Russia would be living together after the war. We didn't get very far, in fact it was at the Moscow Conference that the Cold War really started. So the foreign ministers had to have another meeting in Paris a year later, as I remember, to try to patch things up. So we just went on, each side going their own way more and more. HESS: Not too long after General Marshall's return was the date of his speech at Harvard University. It was on June 5th, the famous Marshall Plan speech. At the [48] time that the foreign ministers' meeting was going on, was there very much discussion about the necessity for a massive aid plan in all of Europe, such as the Marshall Plan came to be? DRAPER: No, there were some off-the-record backroom discussions, many of those, as to what was going to happen in Western Europe including Germany. But I was surprised when the Marshall Plan was announced. I remember being at a garden party on a Sunday in Germany when someone came and handed me the press release that had just come off the wire of General Marshall's speech at Harvard. It was something that I knew very little about until that happened. Later on, of course I participated a great deal as the Plan developed. HESS: Which we will get to. I believe your last duty as a military government official was in connection with the British-American conference on the Ruhr coal production which was held here in town in August of 1947. We've mentioned that earlier this morning, but could you expand on that? What do you recall about that particular conference? Why was it called, what was its importance, and what was its outcome? DRAPER: There were over the months many discussions of what [49] should happen to the Ruhr coal. There were claims on it from almost every one of our allies. The need for more coal was very evident, and there was more coal there than anywhere else in Europe. Why the meeting was called in Washington rather than in Germany I didn't know at the time, and don't know now. I suppose our own Government officials including the Under Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, wanted to find out why the coal production wasn't rising quicker, and why we weren't able to meet the requests of our allies. One of the things that we had a specific directive on in the early days, and I think it was signed by Churchill and Roosevelt personally, was that a very large part of the coal in the Ruhr (and this was before much was being mined) had to go to Belgium and France, and we couldn't carry it out. Germany simply couldn't have existed if some of that coal, or even the bulk of that coal, which was very little, very much less than the requirements, didn't go into German industry. We fought that battle out with Washington and finally won it. But at the time of the coal conference this was still simmering and still a problem, and I presume that's why this meeting was held in Washington. The meeting was going very well. We had settled all the various issues, and just about the time we were coming to a conclusion, Mr. Royall called me one morning [50] and said that Mr. Robert Patterson, the Secretary of War, had just called him to tell him that he had just resigned, and was leaving Washington that day. His money had run out completely, he had borrowed all he could on his life insurance policies, and he had to go back to work in order to be able to support his family. He didn't put it that way publicly, obviously. Judge Patterson had come to this conclusion that very morning when his secretary brought in the figures. He called the President and said, "I'd like to come over and see you." And when he dial he told him that he was retiring, resigning, and leaving Washington the same day. Before he saw the President, he told Mr. Royall about this, who was his Under Secretary. He also had told him that if the President asked him for a recommendation he was going to recommend Mr. Royall as Secretary. Kenneth Royall called me to tell me this and to say that if this happened that same day, he was going to have to move over to the Secretary's office, and would I be good enough for three or four days to just cover his desk and handle what papers I could and those that I couldn't, come and see him about. I said I shouldn't really do this because I was in uniform and this was a civilian job. "Well," he said, "you'll be just doing this on my [51] behalf, so don't worry about that." This all did happen, and he became Secretary. Three or four days later he asked me to stay at the desk and take over and become Under Secretary, provided the President approved, and if I was confirmed by the Senate. I said I would have to talk to General Clay first, who was my commander. I was reporting to him, and this was going to twist the relationship all the way around. So I did talk to General Clay on the long distance telephone and he said, "Sure, go ahead." So I did become Under Secretary. HESS: This was in August of 1947? DRAPER: I guess so. I don't remember the exact date. HESS: As a Republican, what are your views on Mr. Truman's understanding of the political importance of having members of the opposition party represented in high Government office? DRAPER: I don't think I ever discussed the question with him. He certainly knew what benefit President Roosevelt had derived from appointing Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox. But I wasn't appointed as a Republican, I'm sure, as far as Mr. Truman was concerned, nor General Royall [52] either. General Royall and I had worked closely together when he and I were serving together, during the year or more that I had been in Washington before I went to Germany, working on contract termination, and when he was working on various matters on the staff. So we had gotten to be rather close friends. I was back there and working under his jurisdiction on this coal conference. He was participating in that, and he simply thought, "Here is a fellow that I have confidence in; he knows the situation in Germany; he hasn't been to Japan, but those are our two big occupation problems, and why wouldn't he be the right fellow to have here." It had nothing to do with whether I was a Republican or a Socialist or a Democrat. HESS: And I understand that shortly after your appointment you went over to Japan, is that correct? DRAPER: That's right. I had never met General MacArthur, but I had heard fantastic tales about him, and I figured that he would think, "Here's this fellow who's been in Germany and Germany's going to get a good deal of the favors if he's going to be the Under Secretary." I thought the best thing for me to do if I was going to [53] be evenhanded and have any influence in Japan on the occupation there, was to go to Japan right away. Mr. Royall had delegated to me under his basic responsibility, the operation of the three occupations. So I felt I'd better get right over there and come to terms with General MacArthur and let him know that I was ready to assist in any reasonable way to make the Japanese occupation a success. I think it was the right thing to have done. I arrived there. I informed him that I was coming. He was at the airport to meet me, which I believe was the first time he'd met any official from Washington. He took me right to lunch and I said, "What can I do to help?" Almost the first question he asked me was, "Could you find me somebody that knows something about running the economy of Japan, because I don't. And my military officers who are responsible for it don't either," which was obvious and natural. So my quest back here was to find such a man, and it took some months. Before I was able to solve that one, I took Paul Hoffman who was then president of Studebaker this was before the Marshall Plan -- and Percy Johnston, the head of the Chemical Bank in New York, and three or four other businessmen as a group to Japan to make a report on just the kind of thing that I'd been up against [54] in Germany. While it wasn't called the Morgenthau Plan, the economic order to MacArthur very closely paralleled those that went to Germany. There was one big exception, a difference, and that was that contrary to the situation in Germany, there was a Japanese government. The fact that the Emperor had been permitted to stay and that the Japanese government continued in office, made it easier in many ways in Japan than in Germany to bring about a stable situation. But of course, General MacArthur was Emperor No. 1 and the other one was Emperor No. 2, actually General justified that position and that confidence in the eyes of the Japanese people, who had expected a cutthroat dictator; and instead they found a great administrator who fed them when there was no food, who was just but severe, and who merited and received their adulation. I guess that is the right word, and certainly he gained their great respect. Every morning when he, at a certain minute, would appear in his car to enter the Dai-Ichi Building where his headquarters were, there were hundreds of people gathered there. This went on for months and months, just to see him come in; and it was the same at night when he left. I took this group of businessmen over, because I [55] had become convinced from what I'd known in Germany and what I had learned in Japan in two or three visits, that the orders concerning the economy of Japan had to be changed. I took this group of businessmen there to buttress my own recommendations to the President and the Secretary of State and the Congress to change the instructions to MacArthur in Japan. There wasn't a wheel turning, they didn't have a pound of cotton to spin in their textile mills, arid while they had coal of a poor quality and water power, those were about their two assets. There are very few resources in Japan, natural resources, except the people themselves. Their whole economy is based on taking in raw materials and fashioning them and then selling them to the world. They do it pretty well, as you know. But then they had no raw material. They had no credit; they had no money; they had no way to buy raw materials, unless we provided them, and we weren't providing them. The place was, so far as industry was concerned, a morgue. The orders were that General MacArthur was not responsible for the economy, that he had the authority, of course, but the real responsibility was that of the Japanese government, but they had no authority; they had no assets, no capital; so the thing was just falling [56] between two stools. The Japanese yen was depreciating six or seven percent a month. The whole country was being fed and largely fed by us, but that's all you could say. You spoke of the Draper plan, this plan, or this report that we made, that Paul Hoffman and Percy Johnston and the rest of the businessmen made after we spent had a month in Japan. The report we made resulted in the President changing the policy, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State. Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder was the first one to understand it, and the President also soon understood it fully. And it was then that I recommended to the President that Joe [Joseph M.] Dodge, who had been in charge of the finance division in Germany, and who had then had gone back to his Detroit bank, and became president of the American Banker's Association, be invited to go to Japan as a kind of economic czar. I had asked him but he wouldn't go before. Now the rules were changed, there was a chance to win, for the economy to recover but it took somebody with a lot of knowledge and a lot of guts to do it. General MacArthur had promised his complete support, which he always gave. So the President invited Dodge to come to Washington. He told me that morning before seeing [57] the President that he wasn't going to take the job. The President saw him and Dodge had lunch with me and by that time he had taken the job. The same thing was almost true with Paul Hoffman whose wife recommended against his taking the Marshall plan job. He was offered the job while we were on the way back from Japan in Hawaii. He was on my plane and we got off in Honolulu and there was a phone call from the White House for Paul Hoffman. They got on the phone with him and said that the Congress had just passed the Economic Cooperation Plan for Europe, and the President wanted to sign it the next day, and at the same time to announce the new administrator was Paul Hoffman. So whoever it was in the White House said, "We'd like your answer on the telephone, please." Paul said, "Well, you have my answer on the telephone. It's no!" And then they got me on the phone and said, "How soon can you get this fellow to Washington." We flew to Los Angeles. I had dinner with him, stayed with his family that night, and his wife said, "No Paul, you can't take it." He called his associates in South Bend at Studebaker and they said, "No, you and we are working together to pull this company out of trouble." So we went to Washington together the next day. On [58] the plane he said, "You see I can't do it." So I said, "Well, we’ll have lunch after you have seen the President." At lunch he said, "Well, the President's asked me to reconsider, so I'm going to talk again with my family." So while we were still having lunch at the Army-Navy Club they brought in a report from the ticker tape saying the President had just announced the appointment of Hoffman as Administrator of the European Cooperation Program. HESS: What did he say? DRAPER: He was shocked, but he took it, and he told me no later than two weeks ago that that was the best thing that ever happened to him in his life. That was the kind of thing the President could get away with, and did, and it was part of his strength. He didn't have to do quite the same with Dodge. Dodge did take the job, although somewhat reluctantly. Joe Dodge went out there to Japan and in six or eight months he had done the job. We adopted a new policy which was sent by cable to General MacArthur, which made it possible for the economy to be revised, but it had to involve the farmers, [59] the farm prices, agricultural production, the industrial production, and raw materials. It required a loan from the Export -- Import Bank to provide them with cotton, which worked out very quickly. And it required Dodge to take care of the price relationships to increase taxes, and to put that economy back on a paying, balanced basis. And from a tremendous governmental deficit situation when Dodge went over, within six months to nine months he had balanced the Japanese budget, or rather he forced the Japanese government to balance its budget, but under his instructions. HESS: General, will you tell me a little about your interest in population control? DRAPER: Population control may be the wrong word. It's a population problem and a population explosion and the question is what to do about it. I got interested in this question of population when President Eisenhower appointed me in 1958 as Chairman of his Committee on Foreign Aid, Military Aid and Economic Aid. We found, the committee of ten, that in most of the developing countries their rate of population growth was such that it was interfering seriously with their economic development, particularly with any [60] improvement in their per capita income. The whole purpose of economic foreign aid was to improve the lot of the individual members of society, especially down at the bottom and to improve per capita income. So if the population increase was offsetting any gain in a particular economy, and dividing it into that many more pieces, the only way to help was to cut down on the growth rate of the population, on a voluntary basis. Eventually, we recommended to President Eisenhower that our country through its aid program give help to population programs of foreign governments, on their request. To our surprise he turned down that request, because it was an election year and he thought that Senator Kennedy was going to be running for President. With the Catholic Bishops attacking this particular recommendation, President Eisenhower feared that if he approved our recommendation and if Kennedy, as a Catholic, attacked it this might split the American people on a religious issue in a national political campaign; and he thought this would be bad for the American people. Later on he changed his mind, after he was no longer President, and published articles saying that not only private organizations but governments, and particularly our own Government, had to take an interest in this [61] problem, if it was to be solved which it has been doing since. It was President Kennedy, a Catholic, who really started that program, and then President Johnson expanded it, and President Nixon has gone even farther in sending the Congress a special message on population. A special law was passed a year or more ago which is to take care of our own population problem here. It proposes to give birth control information and services to the five million women that are estimated to be too poor to afford family planning facilities themselves. Anyway, during this period, after President Eisenhower had changed his mind and was favorable, I asked him whether he would head up an honorary Council for the Planned Parenthood movement. He still was dubious about this, I guess for political reasons. Finally I asked him whether if President Truman -- and I had no idea what Harry Truman thought about this problem, I had never discussed it with him -- if President Truman, as the only other living ex-President, were willing to be an honorary co-chairman with him of Planned Parenthood, would that make a difference, would he then be willing to accept. He said, "If Harry will, I will." So I trotted off to Independence, Missouri, where [62] President Truman had already invited me to come sometime to see his Library. I gave him President Eisenhower's regards and best wishes, and told him that President Eisenhower would only take on this honorary chairmanship if he would also do so. He said, "Well, if President Eisenhower is willing to, I don't know why I shouldn't." And he did. And the two of their names and their influence and their later statements, from time to time, were of tremendous help in raising the whole level of the Planned Parenthood and world population movement to a much higher level. HESS: General, one of the important things you had to deal with at the time that you were Under Secretary of the Army was the Berlin blockade. What was your involvement in that, and when did you first think that a blockade was probable? DRAPER: We knew for some weeks that this situation was rising, that trouble was brewing. We were having constant arguments in the quadripartite council in Berlin. I was in Washington. I stayed up several nights all night long as we followed these negotiations, partly because of the difference in time. Instructions had to be given almost momentarily, sometimes by scramble telephone or [63] by cable. And we watched the rising emotion and the rising level of argument with the realization that we were perhaps moving even toward war with Russia. When finally the revaluation of the currency, of the German mark, was decided on by the three powers in order to put the economy back on a money basis rather than a ration basis -- because up to that time, people had pockets full of paper money but unless they had a ration ticket to buy an overcoat or to get food (unless it was through the black market), they had no way to buy. The purpose was to squeeze the juice out of the overvalued currency and put it down to its real value. The result turned out later to be the right thing to have done. The goods came out of hiding and the economy began to get back on its feet. But at the moment, the Russians refused to go along. We invited them and they refused. They walked out of the council one night, broke up the meeting, and trouble was obviously ahead. I had planned at that time to make an inspection visit in Berlin and in Vienna, and had set up a trip and had my plane waiting. I left early one morning, with General [Albert C.] Wedemeyer, my chief planning officer at that time. We took off without knowing that the [64] blockade was already on. We had our cables with us, that had accumulated during the night, and after we had breakfast on the plane, we read our cables and learned that the blockade was on. We were on our way to London. On the way over we planned the airlift. General Wedemeyer had had charge of the airlift over the hump in India earlier during the war, so he had a pretty good idea of what the different types of planes would carry in the way of tonnage, and how often a plane could land at an airport, through actual experience. I had negotiated in Berlin with the Russians for the feeding of Berlin some years before, for the British and American sectors, and later these included the French, so I knew the tonnage of food necessary on a ration level to feed the two and a half million people in those sectors of the city. We both knew the number of planes we had in Europe. They were DC-3s, the old DC-3, or C-47 in Army parlance, the workhorse of the war. We had about a hundred of them. They would each carry about two and a half tons of food on a trip, and you had to allow about a two minute leeway for a landing during the day, and a little more at night, quite a little more at night. So we figured whether or not it was a physical possibility to feed that many people with that many planes, if we had the [65] pilots and the airfields, and all the necessary organization was set up. We came to the conclusion that it was a possibility but not a sure thing, and that it was worth trying. So when we got to London, Lewis Douglas who was our Ambassador there, met us and we arranged through him and he went with us to see Bevin, who was the Foreign Minister still, in London. We told him our plan, and he said, "All right, we'll add twenty-five planes." All they had that were available. "We're all for it," he said. "You never can make it work; you never can feed two or three million people from the air, but we'll make a great psychological impression. The Russians are trying to starve the Germans and we're trying to feed them. I'd suggest you take milk powder and chocolate and things of that kind for the women and children and make it as much of a psychological show as you can, and it will give us a little more time for negotiations. But it will never succeed." We loaded up that plane at our Embassy with about two tons of food, and I guess I signed for it. They've never come back to ask me to pay yet. Then we went on to Paris. We didn't know what the French government's attitude would be. We found them just as much for it as [66] we were, or as were the British. They had no planes to offer, but they would be backing it, and they had an airfield in Berlin and that would be at our disposal. It was [Georges] Bidault and [Robert] Schumann (one Prime Minister and the other Foreign Minister) that I talked to. So we had their blessing. In the meantime, I had talked to General Clay on the scramble telephone and had given him our figures and our conclusions. He had been doing similar figuring and he'd come to the same conclusion, that it was worth trying. So we got to Berlin the next day, and General Clay called in his people and we exchanged thoughts and ideas and figures and he called in his Air Force commander and the airlift started a day or two later. Then I flew down to Vienna. In Berlin the war clouds were everywhere. It was a question of what hour or day the war might break out. We didn't know. We got to Vienna and it was just as peaceful as Washington is today. It was the Fourth of July and our commanding general there was giving the usual Fourth of July garden party, and the Russians came and were toasting the Fourth of July just as much as we were. Anyway, the airlift got started that way, and we nearly lost, actually. We were very close to defeat. [67] After about two or three months we almost ran out of food. We had about ninety days' supply of coal, and about thirty days' supply of food when this started. We should have stocked up more before. We really didn't visualize that this blockade was going to happen. We should have taken action earlier and stocked food, but we hadn't, at least not very much. We had about thirty days' of food and some 90 days of coal. Se we didn't have to worry about the coal right away. This started in early July. I would guess that it was about the end of August, when we were really running downhill. We weren't keeping even. We got down to three or four or five days' stock of food. So we had to face a strategic decision in Washington. There was one way we could save this situation if we were willing to take the risk, and that was to take all the DC-4s that we had around the world, Army planes and private airline planes, and substitute them for the DC-3s. The DC-4 will carry ten tons where the DC-3 carries two and a half. But it meant stripping our Army in Japan, it meant stripping our Army in Europe, and the airlines in the United States, of the only really available and useful carriage for troops if we were going to war. It would have meant a very real difference whether we had those [68] planes immediately available or had to find a way to get them together again. But the decision was finally made to substitute, and we quietly stripped everywhere of these planes, and took them away from the airlines and the Army and sent them to Europe, substituted them, and put the DC-3s back in their place. They of course couldn't do the job of troop carrying that the others were capable of doing. So immediately the level of food shipments by air went up. And by that time, the coal was also running out, and so some of these were then made coal wagons, the most expensive coal wagons the world ever saw. We tried dropping the coal in chutes, or as it was into big nets, or on the ground. By the time it got near the ground it was powder and blew away and it didn't work at all, so we had to land the planes and unload them just like the food. I rode one of those coal wagons one day from Berlin to Frankfurt and it was quite an experience. But it began to work. Everything worked fine. The stocks were built up, the stockpiles of both food and coal. Then in November we had an early winter, and early fog; the fog's bad in Berlin, anyway; but this year it was worse than they had ever seen, I guess, and it came down about the first of November and it just stuck. It [69] meant that you had to go on GCA, on instruments entirely. In the meantime, the Russians were buzzing the planes. They didn't shoot any down, but they came right near us. It's a wonder there weren't any accidents, and so starting a war, because that would have probably done it. Anyway, this fog came down and it meant that you had to land every five or six or ten minutes instead of every two, and the stockpiles ran down again. It ran right through December and by the third or fourth or fifth of January we were down to two days again. And it looked like curtains. If that fog had stayed another three weeks we probably would have had to run up the white flag. We probably couldn't have gone on. You can't have people starving, and keep on with the occupation. But the weather lifted about the fifth of January, it was fine, and immediately we restored the situation. The Russians knew they were licked right away, but it was May before they finally gave up. In Berlin at that time -- I went back and forth a number of times from Washington -- at almost any point in Berlin, you could see three planes in the air, two on their way in and one or two on the way out, depending on where you were standing, and it was that continual bridge of planes that the Berliners (and the other Germans knew about it all over Germany), kept seeing day after day. [70] There were forty of our pilots killed in accidents. They knew that, too. HESS: A very visible sign of support. DRAPER: That was what brought the Germans into our camp, in my opinion. HESS: During that period of time, were you ever in any meeting with President Truman where he might have expressed his views on the handling of the blockade? DRAPER: No, we knew perfectly well his views. They were very clear cut. I don't think I met personally with him during this period -- well, I probably did as Under Secretary, but I don't recall -- I undoubtedly did. HESS: During the period of time that you served, the armed services were organized into the National Military Establishment. DRAPER: Right. HESS: That law came into being, it was the National Security Act of '47, passed on July 25th. What is your general evaluation of that particular setup, and why was it found necessary two years later to change it and set up a Department of Defense? What was deficient? [71] DRAPER: Was the first one by law or by regulation -- whichever it was, it was intended to put the three departments into a coordinated whole. And probably (and I'm not too sure about this, it was a long time ago, and I was out of the Department before that second law, I guess, was passed), but the first step was taken in 1949. HESS: That was when the Department of Defense was established, but it was 1947 when the National Military Establishment was formed. DRAPER: It was 1947, that's right. Well, that was put together as a first effort, and on the basis of a couple of years of experience I suppose that the law which fashioned it on a more permanent basis was passed. I don't think there were any great changes, were there? HESS: I think about the only changes that I can recall, were that the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Army did not sit in on the Cabinet meetings. They weren't considered Cabinet level under the Department of Defense, whereas they sat in on Cabinet meetings during the days of the National Military Establishment. DRAPER: That's true. That's normal. It meant that the [72] Cabinet was a little too bulky. HESS: That's right, and it gave the Secretary of Defense more authority under the present setup. DRAPER: I think the whole thing has worked out just the way it should, a logical development, and most other countries have adopted much that same form of defense establishment, indicating that others think that we have the right method now. HESS: Earlier this morning I asked your opinion of Secretary Forrestal's view on unification, and as you know, the Navy expressed a good deal of fear about the effects of unification. They thought they would lose the Air Wing to the Air Force; they thought they would lose the Marines to the Army. Do you think the Army would have liked to have taken over the Marine Corps at this time? DRAPER: I have no doubt it would have loved to have done it, but nobody ever took that as a practical possibility that I ever heard of. HESS: Did you ever hear any of the generals discussing that subject? DRAPER: I guess I heard the Navy's fears about it, but [73] I don't think we in the Army had any illusions. HESS: More on the Navy's side than on the Army's side. DRAPER: And as far as Navy Air is concerned, that's certainly going strong still. In Vietnam you get planes off the ships right along, off the carriers. And I guess the Army with its little planes, has actually as many or more planes than the Air Force. Of course it doesn't have the fighting ships. HESS: Just a word or two about some of the gentlemen you served with. Kenneth Royall, of course, we've mentioned him several times. DRAPER: He passed away a year or so ago. HESS: Not too long ago. How effective was he? DRAPER: He was a wonderful leader. He had great self-confidence; he had great ability; he had great experience and background. He was the one that first integrated the blacks and whites in the Army; he was a southerner and he could do that better than a northerner could have done. He had real vision. He had the great confidence of President Truman, I know, and every impression I have and recollection is that he gave the country a splendid [74] administration for the Department of the Army. HESS: On the problem of integration of blacks into the armed forces: Did your duties touch upon that? DRAPER: Not particularly. I incidentally only know it was Secretary Royall's thinking, and he was the first one to take action in that direction. And I think it was his personal initiative. HESS: John L. Sullivan was Secretary of the Navy at that time. DRAPER: A splendid person, too. He's still living here in Washington. And John Kenney was his Under Secretary. John Kenney and I worked very closely together. And so I did with Mr. Sullivan. HESS: Stuart Symington was Secretary of the Air Force. DRAPER: Now he's in the Senate, and taking quite a different point of view than he did then about military matters, and about the war in Vietnam, particularly. HESS: Mr. Gordon Gray, who was later Secretary of the Army was Assistant Secretary at the time you were Under Secretary. DRAPER: He was Assistant Secretary and so was Tracy Voorhees, [75] the one I mentioned before. There were two Assistant Secretaries. And Gordon Gray later became Secretary of the Army, both of them fine people. Gordon Gray was a young captain who came to the Department after I was Under Secretary, and Tracy Voorhees had charge of food problems for the Army, and then he became Assistant Secretary. We had a fine family of officials there, all working very closely together under Mr. Royall. HESS: What other problems did you have to deal with as Under Secretary? What other areas of the job have we not touched upon? DRAPER: Well, there was the whole question of budget; there was the whole question of strength of the Army. I really had a full-time job running the several Army occupations. It included four (I said three before; it included Korea and Austria also). But whenever the Secretary, Mr. Royall, was on a trip or away, I was Acting Secretary and had to deal with the whole range of whatever came up at that time. HESS: Did you see at that time that there was any likelihood of trouble in Korea as it erupted in 1950? DRAPER: No, no. I went to Korea, went out to the dividing line between North and South Korea and checked on our [76] situation there, but at that time we were still there, we hadn't pulled out. So it changed completely after I had left when it was decided to pull our troops back to Japan. That, I suppose, acted as an invitation, or at least it didn't prevent the possibility, of an invasion from the North. HESS: Do you recall the views of the Department of the Army at the time the Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the talk, and drew the defense perimeter down the western area of the Pacific, leaving Korea out? DRAPER: No, I was already out of the Department, and I read about it in the newspapers just like you would have done, and thought it was unfortunate, but I had no particular knowledge or comment about it at that time. HESS: We earlier have mentioned your appointment as United States Special Representative in Europe in 1953, and you mentioned about . . . DRAPER: '51 it was, '51 to '53. HESS: . . . '51, and you mentioned about taking the trip to see General Eisenhower. Just what were your duties as Special Representative in Europe? [77] DRAPER: NATO had been formed a short time -- two or three years before that or less. The NATO Alliance was a direct result of the Korean war in its requirement, as Dean Acheson and the rest of us saw as the need, and the other countries as well, to band together to keep the Russians from moving to the Channel; it was just as simple as that. My duties as the U.S. member of the Council were to deal first with the defense aspects and help to build up the strength of NATO from all of the countries concerned, including our own; to embark on a program of ammunition production and arms production in Europe, which had practically disappeared from Europe; to provide the European countries with planes and ammunition and artillery to the extent necessary until their own production got underway. That was on the defense side. On the mutual assistance side: The need was for economic assistance to permit them to carry this military burden, and to extend the recovery they were already beginning to make from the ravages of war. On the political side, it was of vital importance to discuss not only European problems with our NATO allies, but worldwide problems, such as we had to deal with in the Pacific and with, of course, the Russians, [78] and the Koreans, the United Nations' problems, because the United Nations was involved in the Korean war as well. So there were those three: The defense, the political and the economic. And Ambassador Livingston Merchant was my Ambassador on the political side; General Luke Finley was my deputy on the military side; and Paul Porter was my economic deputy. General [Frederick L.] Anderson was my overall general deputy. The responsibilities required me to deal with twenty countries that were in Europe, and also including Canada, also a member of NATO. HESS: Just briefly, what are your views of the current state of NATO? DRAPER: I'm delighted that the President has now appointed a new Ambassador, the former Secretary of the Treasury, David Kennedy, and has again broadened out the duties and responsibilities of our NATO Ambassador. After I left the job was downgraded very considerably, and has been on a much lower level ever since. I'm glad to see it reviving. He's going to, in fact, have a little higher status than I had. He'll be a member of the Cabinet as well as Ambassador and he's a Roving Ambassador as well, so he will combine trade functions, [79] which I had too, but on a broader scale throughout the world. He will need, I believe, equally strong deputies if he's going to cover this wide ground. The NATO Alliance has, in my judgment, prevented World War III. We have been losing strength on a comparative basis with the Russians in Europe and in the rest of the world. I noticed just today or yesterday that it's been reported that our aerial defenses are weak too, by the Armed Services sub-committee, but that's a tendency that is obvious from the fact that we've been involved in the Vietnam war. The Russians have gone merrily along to increase their missile strength. They're way ahead of us in missiles now. I'm told that we are building five nuclear Submarines a year and the Russians twenty. They've thrown a missile defense around Moscow. We have it only around some of our missile bases and none around Washington or around any of our other big cities, and I think the next big problem myself -- this is a personal view -- the next big problem that our President faces is to evaluate, and I'm not in any position to do that, whether or not the Russians are, as the Secretary of Defense has recently indicated, about to pass us strategically. If that is the judgment of those who know best, then we have to change direction on our defense budgets, and our research and development [80] of the whole missile and defensive posture of this country. That involves NATO as well as the world. Obviously you are familiar with the fact that these recent discussions that have been going on in NATO have gotten a certain amount of agreement from the Germans to take over more of the costs and from the other NATO partners to take over some more of the defense costs, because of our big imbalance of trade. HESS: At the time that you were in Europe as Ambassador, near the end of the Truman administration, what do you recall about the success of the Marshall plan at this point? DRAPER: Oh, tremendous. I suppose that we have never, as a nation, done anything that at comparatively small cost was of such great benefit to the world, to Europe, and incidentally and indirectly to ourselves. It was the groundwork for their recovery. They had to do the work themselves to recover from the war. We couldn't do that, but we gave them the resources to rebuild their economy, but the result of that has so greatly increased their ability to trade with us and to produce that between us we've risen to heights that we never would have done without that fillip that came just at the right time. [81] That was a great, imaginative, well-timed, and well-directed operation in the international field. One of the best this country's ever done. HESS: Were there any other major problems that you had to handle in Europe at this time? DRAPER: The Marshall plan didn't come . . . HESS: That's right. DRAPER: The Marshall plan was at the time I was in Germany, and the German picture was not directly involved in the Marshall plan except as a parallel operation, but we had to work very closely together, Mr. Harriman and Paul Hoffman and General Clay and myself, under the President's direction. HESS: What I had reference to was any major problems, any major duties, as Special Representative in Europe that we haven't mentioned. DRAPER: No, I was dealing with the governments of all the Western European countries, and we were having sessions and meetings and problems continuously, but it was a time of building strength and a time of great interest on the part of all governments including our own. I [82] got every cooperation from Washington. I had to come back to explain things and get directions and get help regularly, either I or General Anderson. It was one of the greatest experiences of my life, that two-year period. HESS: You held that position until June of '53. DRAPER: That's right. HESS: In your opinion, what were President Truman's major accomplishments during his career, and what were his major failings? What went right and what went wrong? DRAPER: I would think that he was one of our greatest Presidents, My wife thinks he's the last great American. She's a Democrat. He really was great for one whose experience had been what it had been, haberdashery salesman, I guess originally, and then part of the machine in Missouri, the political machine, and then a Senator from Missouri. The ability that he displayed when he was faced with the responsibility of leading this country in war and then in peace, was unbelievable, and I think that historians are going to look back on President Truman as one of the greatest men we've ever had in that office. The right [83] man at the right time, and one from whom the country could hardly have expected the great degree of high quality service and integrity that he displayed. His great accomplishments: He recognized, as President Roosevelt had not, very quickly, the Russian threat, thanks probably to Ambassador Harriman and others, but he not only recognized it but then began to do something about it. He had the courage, in the face of what many would have quailed under, to take on the assistance to Greece and Turkey and flaunt the Russians, and got away with it. He had the statesmanship to see the need, under Secretary Acheson's recommendations, and General Marshall's, for both the Marshall Plan itself and later the NATO Alliance, and those are two national efforts that were very successful. The NATO Alliance was initiated by him and is still in force, and is the keystone in our whole foreign policy. If I were to be bold enough to suggest one of his mistakes, and there were very few, I would think it was the decision not to win the Korean war. It's my own belief that the risks that we would have had to take, and they were real, possibilities that China and/or Russia would come in, as China did, were risks that could have been taken if the planning had been different, if the [84] planning and the authority given to General MacArthur had included the decision to win the war, which I'm afraid was not taken, and then if the planning had been along the lines necessary to accomplish that. I was, as a Reserve officer, a Reserve retired major general, in close touch with the General Staff in Washington during the Korean war. I was available if they needed me at any time, and I used to spend a good deal of voluntary time here, particularly with G-3, or operations. We weren't on a war footing basis. We were more so than we have been during the Vietnam war, but we were not on the kind of war footing basis that you go on if you're going to win a war. If you decide to go to war at all the only way, in my opinion, is to do everything you can to win it and as quickly as possible. Now, General MacArthur cannot be condoned however, for what was really his failure to obey orders later. I think his recommendations were correct, and the President should have perhaps accepted them, or more of them. I know that he was at times asking for four more divisions than he got, and things like that. The ammunition was running awful short at times, and we just didn't have it, and we weren't turning our industry throughout the country over to the wartime job, which we could have done, [85] and had done during the World War. So, I believe -- and there can be differences of opinion -- that the British and perhaps the Secretary of State and others, advised him that the risks were too great, and the President took those seriously and so we fought the Korean war with one hand behind our backs. He certainly did the right thing to treat General MacArthur the way he did when the chips were down. No President can have a commander in his Army defy his instructions. That's almost what General MacArthur did, and as much as I admire General MacArthur, and I do, because what I saw him do in Japan was tremendous, and what he did in the Korean war by insisting on that outflanking action . . . HESS: The Inchon landing. DRAPER: Yes, and which Washington was very cold to and only acceded to because of his strong recommendations as I understand it, that was the thing that gave us a chance to win the war, but then we failed to go on. It was too bad that General MacArthur went to the Chinese border. If he had stayed fifty miles or a hundred miles away we probably wouldn't have had the Chinese come in and we would have had a better ending to the whole thing, but we weren't really trying to carry it through. [86] I'm afraid that that very fact, that we didn't win in the Korean war, led to the Vietnam war eventually, and to some of the many problems we've had since. But no one can rewrite history. HESS: Once it's done, it's done. DRAPER: It's done. President Truman performed a service to this country that no one can exaggerate. It's very real and he should be very happy, he and Mrs. Truman, at the tremendous service that he was able to render to his country and to the world. HESS: General, do you have anything else to add on Mr. Truman or your service in the Truman administration? DRAPER: I just have the greatest possible admiration and friendly feelings toward both President and Mrs. Truman. They were both always hospitable and courteous to me. The fact that I happened to be a Republican was never even mentioned. I don't know whether he even -- I guess he knew it all right -- but that had nothing to do with our relationship. There was nothing political about it. He gave me every support and backing; so did Secretary Royall. I enjoyed my service during his administration tremendously, and I have the greatest admiration. I hope [87] you'll be good enough to give him my best regards and my best wishes for health for both of them. HESS: We'll see that that is conveyed. Thank you very much, sir. DRAPER: Thank you, sir. [Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- List of Subjects Discussed Anderson, General Frederick L., 8 Berlin airlift, planning of, 63-70 Berlin blockade, 62-63 Bevin, Ernest, 65 Clay, General Lucius, 3, 66 Clifford, Clark, 22 Coal production, postwar Germany, 48-49 Cold war, beginning of (Moscow Conference), 47 Combustion Engineering Company, 8 Defense budget of 1948, 17-21 Dodge, Joseph M., 56-58 "Draper plan" for Japan, 56 Draper, William H., Jr.: Berlin airlift, planning of, 63-70 and Ford peace expedition of 1915, 1-2 Long Island Railroad Company, director of, 4-5 and Marshall, General George C., 26-27 Mexican Light and Power Company, director of, 8 and Selective Service Act, 2 and Soviet officials in Germany, 35-38 and Truman, Harry S., 10, 12, 21 Under Secretary of the Army, appointment as, 50-52 Eisenhower, Dwight D., and population policy, 59-62 Faure, Premiere Maurice, 7 Ford peace expedition of 1915, 1-2 Foreign Ministers Conference, Moscow (1946-47), 44-47 Forrestal, James, 12-16, 18, 23 Germany, postwar food policy in, 28-35 Germany, postwar, and Soviet policy, 37-41 Harriman, W. Averell, 46-47 Hoffman, Paul, appointment as Director of ECA, 57-58 Hoover, Calvin, 41 Hoover, Herbert, and European food relief, 31-34 Japan, U.S. postwar economic policy toward, 53-59 Johnson, Louis, 24-25 Knox, Frank, 13 Korean war, strategy of, 83-84 Korean war, U.S. decision to enter, 39 Lisbon Conference of 1952, 7 Long Island Railroad Company, 4-5 MacArthur, General Douglas, 52-54 MacArthur, General Douglas, dismissal of, 84-85 Marshall, General George C., 26-27 Marshall plan, 48, 80-82 Morgenthau plan, 39-44 Moscow Conference of 1946-47, 44-47 Mutual Security Administration, 6 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council, 5, 77-80 NATO, and Lisbon Conference of 1952, 7 Patterson, Robert, 50 Planned Parenthood Federation, 61-62 Population Crisis Committee, 9 Population "explosion," problem of, 59-62 Purchasing policy, joint Army-Navy (World War II), 3 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 10-11 Royall, Kenneth, 49-51, 52, 73-74 Symington, Stuart, 74 "Three wise men," 7 Truman, Harry S.: and decision-making ability, 20-21 evaluation of, by General William Draper, 82-83, 86-87 and Planned Parenthood Federation, 61 Unification of Armed Forces, 14-17, 71-73 U.N. Population Commission, 9 Voorhees, Tracy, 31, 34, 74, 75 Wedemeyer, General Albert C.., 62-63 [Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For questions, e-mail truman.reference@nara.gov. Return to Truman Library Oral History Finding Aid Return to Archival Reference at the Truman Library Return to Truman Library home page Return to Truman Library home page The Harry S. Truman Library and Museum is one of twelve Presidential Libraries administered by the National Archives and Records Administration. 500 W. US Hwy. 24. Independence MO 64050 truman.library@nara.gov; Phone: 816-268-8200 or 1-800-833-1225; Fax: 816-268-8295.

Draper in The Splendid Blond Beast (Excerpt, pp 262-268) See For The Record Reading List for more about The Splendid Blond Beast. Friday, October 21, 2005 By December 1945, the publicly mandated denazification program sharply collided with the unofficial (but actual) political and economic objectives of the U.S. occupation government. That month, the U.S. Denazification Policy Board confidentially recommended that existing policies and practices be shifted to better fit the "longer term" goals of the occupation. Publicly, the orientation of the denazification program was to remain the same as it had been under JCS 1067. "Every person who exercised leadership and power in support of the Nazi regime should be deprived of influence or power," the board recommended, "whether or not he was formally affiliated with the Party or any other Nazi organization." At the same time, however, the board introduced a new consideration that would fundamentally alter the program in the U.S. zone of Germany: "Denazification . . . should not be carried so far as to prevent the building of a stable democratic society in Germany. . . we must avoid the creation of a huge mass of outcasts who will provide fertile soil for agitators and a source of social instability."18 This turned an important corner. Up to then, the continuation of Nazi influence within German social structures—business, education, the arts, etc.—had been seen as the most dangerous source of potential instability in Germany. But at least as early as December 1945, the opposite formulation came to the fore, even in official documents. Now, it was the denazification effort that was seen as the source of disaffection. Opposition within the U.S. to denazification and decartelization in Germany was led almost exclusively by the corporate and foreign policy elite that had been most active in U.S.-German financial relations during the 1920s and 1930s. The disproportionate political leverage of this group, its ability to shape media coverage of foreign policy issues, to influence government policy, and eventually to shift public opinion was dramatically manifested in the realignment of U.S. policy concerning denazification and decartelization in the brief period between 1945 and 1947. One of this group's most effective lobbying tactics was sponsorship of junkets to Europe by American politicians and businessmen, financed by U.S. multinationals, to "study the problem of German recovery." Draper paid close attention to these visits, staging elaborate briefings intended to shape public opinion at home concerning the professed realities of business in Europe. These events were almost ceremonial: The attendees and the briefers had selected one another largely through their existing social networks based in powerful U.S. companies with investments in Europe. The men on both sides of Draper's briefing table were receptive to his message and usually knew pretty well what it would be. A stream of U.S. experts visited the headquarters of the Economics Division during the first two years after the war, and Draper provided them with privileged access to the inside thinking on U.S. policy concerning German business. "The reports of these visitors echoed the conclusion that German recovery demanded greatly increased emphasis on heavy industries," decartelization chief James S. Martin (a Draper rival) remembered later. "In their reports the visitors frequently referred to the 'proven impossibility' of something that no one had yet tried to do [i.e., actually break up German banking and industrial oligopolies]. With equal frequency they reported the 'mounting chaos' that was supposed to have resulted from the ruthless 'Morgenthau Plan of deindustrialization.'" Similar problems were alleged to have been caused by drastic reforms that had not actually been carried out. "It became customary to refer to the urgent necessity for 'reversing the former policy of destroying German industries,' " Martin wrote, and of reversing a decartelization policy that in fact had not yet been implemented.19 A popular example of Martin's point can be found in Lewis H. Brown's A Report on Germany, a 1947 bestseller that had substantial influence in Washington at the time and remains quoted to this day.20 Brown was chairman of the Johns-Manville Corporation, a major military contractor and international mining company that held a near-monopoly on the U.S. market for asbestos. The company has frequently been accused in U.S. courts of corporate crimes, including antitrust violations.21 Brown toured Germany during 1946 and 1947 and returned to the U.S. with detailed arguments against economic reform in Germany that had been prepared mainly by Draper's staff. Brown's preconceptions clearly shaped the conclusions he drew from the visits. He wrote quite frankly that he approached Germany "from the standpoint of an industrialist's attempt to analyze the problem of a bankrupt company [seeking] to determine the simple common-sense fundamentals necessary to get the wheels of production turning."22 His acknowledgments of the experts he consulted concerning Germany read like the guest list of a dinner sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations: AT&T's Frederick Devereux, Sullivan & Cromwell's John Foster Dulles, former president Herbert Hoover (who had been enlisted by Truman to cement Republican party support for his administration's emerging policy on Germany), General Lucius Clay, William Draper, Sears, Roebuck president A. S. Barrows (who was then serving as U.S. Comptroller in Germany), British and Swiss banking and industry officials, and twenty-five unnamed German industrialists. In more than five pages of Brown's detailed acknowledgments of those he interviewed, there appears no speaker for German labor, no small businessman of any nationality, no female, none of the then-well-known public advocates of denazification and decartelization of German industry (including those still in government posts inside Germany), no Social Democrats, and no known veterans of European Resistance movements of any political persuasion.23 Brown's argument was simple and in some ways convincing. He said that the Morgenthau Plan had shaped JCS 1067—as was true enough—and that JCS 1067 was a disaster. The economic and denazification commitments that the U.S. made at Potsdam should be unilaterally disavowed as quickly as possible, Brown contended. The U.S. should block further German reparations to the USSR, because German uncertainty over which equipment might be shipped to the Soviets had "helped destroy the incentive to put plants in Germany back into operation." The postwar punishment of Nazis by France and the USSR had been indiscriminate and brutal, Brown said. The U.S. and British system of trying accused criminals before courts and administrative commissions was better, he argued, but "many of the industrial and technical leaders of the economic life of Germany, who had climbed on the Nazi bandwagon much as people climb on any new and apparently successful bandwagon, were permitted to do only common labor pending the years required to go through the denazification courts." The Potsdam agreements had "deprived the economic machine of Germany of the very leadership necessary for its revival . . . [and was now] fatally slowing down the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the industrial machine of Germany and Western Europe."24 Brown said he expected no support for his proposals from '(the enemies of the American Way of Life." But "from our friends who abhor all forms of totalitarianism . . . I hope for tolerance and ultimate understanding of the imperative need for getting together on a plan of action under which we may minimize the [soviet] threat to Western civilization . . ,"25 Brown's lobbying trips to Germany were underwritten mainly by General Electric's chairman Philip D. Reed, who was one of the single most influential U.S. corporate leaders on postwar U.S.-German issues. In addition to his role in Brown's project, Reed and the business organizations he led organized a series of similar conferences in 1946 and 1947. Typical U.S. delegations included the chairman of the executive committee of the National Association of Manufacturers, the chairman of the (U.S.) National Foreign Trade Council, and senior executives of the National City Bank of New York and the Chase Bank, among others. On some occasions, Reed traveled as a representative of General Electric; on others, he came as head of the U.S. delegation to the International Chamber of Commerce; or as the personal envoy of Secretary of Commerce Averell Harriman.26 Like Brown's book, Reed's report to Harriman lambasted the denazification and decartelization policy the U.S. had approved at Potsdam as the work of FDR-era "extremists" (Reed's term) at the Department of Justice. The U.S. policy was harmful and unnecessary, he said, and was interfering with Germany's economic recovery. 27 Reed's company was not an entirely disinterested party. General Electric was among the most important U.S. investors in Germany, owning about 25 percent of its German counterpart, the electrical giant AEG, plus factories and dozens of smaller interests.28 At the time Reed was lobbying the U.S. government against antitrust policy in Germany, GE was facing no fewer than thirteen criminal antitrust prosecutions in U.S. courts for price fixing, gouging consumers and the U.S. government through its monopoly on electrical equipment manufacturing, conspiracy, Sherman Act violations, and similar corporate crimes. (GE settled most of these cases out of court in 1949, then went on to a series of remarkably similar abuses that in time led to still another round of criminal convictions for senior General Electric executives about a decade later.)29 As Morgenthau, Pell, James S. Martin, and other reformers saw things, the arguments of General Electric and Johns-Manville had become the dominant point of view in Western policy circles and in the media. They had become "standard fare" in US. newspapers within a year after the occupation began, Martin commented,30 even though in reality only two steps had been undertaken to implement U.S. antitrust efforts in Germany by the time Brown's denunciation of the program appeared: the seizure of plants and assets of IG Farben; and the appointment of a trustee to administer coal wholesaling firms in the U.S. zone. The Allies and the Germans both kpew that German manufacturing, including war production, had survived the war surprisingly intact, despite the massive Allied bombing campaign. Senator Kilgore publicized a congressional study based mainly on U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey data that concluded that Germany's production of armored cars, fighter bombers, and several categories of strategic supplies had actually increased under U.S. and British bombing, in some cases expanding eightfold over 1942 production figures. True, the air attacks had crippled the German transportation network and oil production during the final months of the war—a telling blow. But that damage was repaired relatively easily once the fighting stopped. From the point of view of production, at least, Germany was already "better prepared for war than it was at the end of World War I," Kilgore contended.31 Kilgore stressed that a distinct drift toward postwar accommodation with German business had already set in. "There is a natural inclination on the part of many of our [u.S.] administrators to take over in order to get things running again, and there is a natural inclination on the part of many Germans to lie back and let them do it. . . . [in] the desire for efficiency our military administrators may keep in positions of power the Nazi plant managers," Kilgore said. "In Italy, I heard certain American Army officers deplore the fact that Italian partisans had killed many of the Fascist plant managers, which made more difficult the reorganization of Italian productive capacity. In Germany there has been no such [partisan] revolt. The Nazi industrial hierarchy remains intact."32 The reports of Brown and Reed were in reality briefs for the European Recovery Program-the Marshall Plan. They illustrate the extent to which that enormously popular and respected program became entangled with the revival of German businessmen who had participated in Nazi crimes. Particularly important in this effort was the "Committee for the Marshall Plan," founded in September 1947. It labeled itself a citizens' organization but was in reality funded and administered by the same economic and foreign policy elite that has been discussed thus far. Its initial sponsors included Averell Harriman and Robert Lovett (who will be remembered from the Brown Brothers, Harriman bank). Allen Dulles, Dean Acheson, Winthrop Aldrich (chairman of the Chase Bank), Philip Reed (of GE), and others of similar stature, most of whom had been active in U.S.-German finance since the 1920s. Labor was represented by hard-line anti-Communists active in the CIA-sponsored penetration of European trade unions, such as James Carey and David Dubinsky.33 This Marshall Plan lobby operated as a "distinguished propaganda committee," as AT&T executive Arthur Page described it.34 Its goal was never described as the revitalization of the German business elite but, rather, as "saving Europe" and "providing American jobs" through implementation of the Marshall Plan. But whatever one may think of the plan, the restoration of much of the prewar German corporate elite was an integral part of the package. General Clay used the case of Deutsche Bank director Hermann Abs to explain this concept. "We were never able to make Hermann Abs the financial minister [of Germany] as we would have," Clay remembered in the same interview quoted earlier, because of the German and American public's refusal to accept a man who had been so deeply compromised during the Hitler years. But not to worry, Clay continued. "We were able to finally put him in charge of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which was somewhat outside of government," and which was instrumental in distribution of Marshall Plan funds for Germany.35 Sponsors of the Committee for the Marshall Plan were simultaneously at the cutting edge of renewed efforts to invest in German industry. "If you have been trying unsuccessfully to get to Germany to reestablish prewar business contacts, don't be discouraged," Business Week told its readers early in 1947. "YOU can expect [a] program for reviving business in western Germany to be pushed by all U.S. factions.. . Republican backing was assured when John Foster Dulles, Republican spokesman, recently called for the revival of business in Germany and western Europe whatever the price. German goods are already trickling into the U.S. market. Anticipating some consumer resistance [in the U.S.], Military Government authorities have shrewdly met customs requirements by marking them: 'Made in Germany, U.S.. Zone.' . . . Before large-scale arrivals of German goods begin, Washington is likely to release a press barrage explaining that German exports help pay [u.S.] occupation costs in Germany."36 Shortly after its founding, the Committee for the Marshall Plan placed full-page advertisements in the most influential U.S. newspapers; sent thousands of personally addressed telegrams signed by the former secretary of war, Henry L. Stimson, to businessmen asking for their donations and political support; and made a mass mailing to hundreds of thousands of U.S. "opinion leaders" in the upper strata of business, media, labor, and social organizations. The group chartered Marshall Plan clubs in a dozen cities, opened business offices in New York and Washington, and initiated a series of heavily publicized meetings between President Truman and business leaders designed to convey the impression of broad popular support for the Marshall Plan. As Congressman Charles Plumley (a Republican from Vermont) put it, "There has never been so much propaganda in the whole history of the nation as there has been for the Marshall Plan." The campaign created an "overwhelming conviction among the American people and among members of Congress that we must have the Marshall Plan right now," he continued.37 The claim of "overwhelming support" was, in fact, overblown. Public opinion polls of the period indicate that about 65 percent of the U.S. population either opposed the Marshall Plan or did not know what it was.38 Even so, the Marshall Plan passed the Congress by a large margin. The plan's sponsors used the relatively broad, popular support for doing something constructive about Europe as a means of putting through the distinctly unpopular idea of reestablishing the German economic elite. These factors—insiders' opposition to reform, the passive resistance of German business, Allied suppression of indigenous Antifa radicals, the sheer magnitude of the task of denazification, the self-mobilization of U.S. and international business elites, and an often paranoid geopolitical competition with the USSR—combined with other factors to stall denazification and reform of the German business structure by the summer of 1945. Within three years they had shut it down altogether. posted by FTR Summary at 12:52 PM

William H. Draper and The Splendid Blond Beast Google links... For The Record SupplementalSee For The Record Reading List for more about The Splendid Blond Beast. ... The men on both sides of Draper's briefing table were receptive to his message ... ftrsupplemental.blogspot.com/2005/10/splendid-blond-beast-excerpt-pp-262-268.html - 50k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this DRAPER WILLIAM H JR - 2 visits - Oct 31DRAPER WILLIAM H JR. Click on a name for a new proximity search: ... Simpson,C. The Splendid Blond Beast. 1993 (249 252 264). DILLON CLARENCE (B.1882) ... www.namebase.org/main4/William-H-jr-Draper.html - Similar pages - Note this Simpson,C. The Splendid Blond Beast. 1993The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law, and Genocide in the Twentieth Century. ... DONOVAN WILLIAM JOSEPH (229); DRAPER WILLIAM H JR (48, 64, 248-53, 263-4, ... www.namebase.org/sources/ZZ.html - Similar pages - Note this [ More results from www.namebase.org ] savethemales.ca - Be Afraid: The New World 0rder's Fascist PedigreeAfter the war, Dillon Read banker General William Draper was put in charge ... Christopher Simpson's "The Splendid Blond Beast"(1993) and "Blowback" (1988) ... www.savethemales.ca/130402.html - 13k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this Wickliffe Draper and Anastase Vonsiatsky - The Education ForumWilliam H. Draper, Jr. (Christopher Simpson - The Splendid Blond Beast), the Hollywood Seven, the creation of the American Eugenics Movement via The Pioneer ... educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=11238&mode=threaded&pid=122561 - 90k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this Gray Brechin Article 2The contention is largely based on Christopher Simpson's The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law, and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, New York: Grove Press, ... www.graybrechin.com/GBrechinArticle2.html - 68k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this International Socialist ReviewHis name was William Draper and the U.S. military government quickly installed him as the ..... 8 Christopher Simpson, The Splendid Blonde Beast: Money, ... www.isreview.org/issues/46/germany.shtml - 61k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this CONSERVING THE RACE: NATURAL ARISTOCRACIES, EUGENICS, AND THE U.S. ...1937 by textile magnate Wickliffe Draper, which lavishly financed eugenics .... novels promoted the splendid blond beast of his and Nietzsche's fantasies. ... www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-8330.1996.tb00461.x - Similar pages - Note this The First NeoconservativeIn the pre-war years Draper had served as vice-president of Dillon Reed, .... The Splendid Blond Beast (New York: Grove Press, 1993), 59-74. return ... www.wpunj.edu/newpol/issue39/Brodkin39.htm - 35k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this RatlinesThe Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, ... The Splendid Blonde Beast, p68. 20. The Splendid Blonde Beast, p 169-272. ... www.spiritone.com/~gdy52150/ratlines.htm - 193k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this

In a nutshell, it has been my impression - based upon very limited digging and reading, that the rise of the Third Reich was made possible by a number of forces, including some of the Bavarian religious organizations, but also with significant support from US racists and World Population control freaks over here in the US - among them would be Ford and Rockefeller, along with a lot of other affluent and powerful individuals, who preached Eugenics, had many similar beliefs as those of Hitler and his supporters, and went on to support the Reich before [directly], during [collaboration and protection of collaborators], and after [ratlines etc]? Is that on the money for Dulles? - lee Here are some Trading With the Enemy Links as well... http://books.google.com/books?ei=919ER9HvJ...nG=Search+Books From memory, some of this was in The Men Who Financed Hitler... including Dillon, Read and Sullivan and Cromwell via Dulles by using something called the German Investment Credit Corp. perhaps it was. Brown Brothers Harriman as in Averill Harriman was allegedly involved, too. Have to do my Googles again to refresh my memory. And even Prescott Bush had to give back some illicit gains from maybe Union Investment Bank when he continued to deal with Nazi Germay. Again my memory is weak here, try Google. There was a film or photo company connection like GAF maybe as well for Nazi finances as well as Sun Oil company and J. Howard Pew. Let me know what you find there. Also George Michael Evica has some URLs in A Certain Arrogance from Christopher Simpson in The Splendid Blond Beast which I will add very soon regarding his distinct opposition to de Nazification as well which I thought everyone knew about. More later... Evica cites this person about William H. Draper's family in Rhode Island but I can find nothing on her site about Draper. Try books.Google.com for Splendid Blond Beast as well. From: Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> Subject: History of Providence (part 29) Date: Fri, 09 Jul 2004 23:50:53 -0400 from History of the State of Rhode Island with Illustrations Albert J. Wright, Printer No. 79 Mille Street, corner of Federal, Boston. Hong, Wade & Co., Philadelphia 1878. pp. 253 - 267... (part 29) "American Enamel Company. This company was organized in 1866, with ample capital for the enameling in all branches of what is known as Patent Wrought-Iron Enamel Water-Pipe. The business also extends to the ornamentation of almost every description of work. The original factory, built of brick, is one hundred feet long, and two stories in height, with other buildings attached. These buildings are located on Warren Street. The branch works are at Mashapaug Lake, and cover about two acres of ground. Officers: John L. Draper, President; Charles A. Gamwell, Secretary and Treasurer. S. W. Baker Manufacturing Company, office 73 Weybosset Street. This company was organized in 1875, with a capital of $200,000, for the manufacture of double woven fabrics for various uses. The mills of the company are located at Olneyville. Barstow Stove Company, located at Point, corner of Chestnut Street. Among the many varied industries of Providence, none enjoys a greater commercial reputation than the Barstow Stove Company, whose vast works cover a space of 90,000 square feet. The business of this corporation was first established by Mr. A. C. Barsow, in 1836. The present company was organized June, 1858, and the present officers are: A. C. Barstow, President; A. C. Barstow, Jr., Treasurer. The company employ about 200 hands. E. A. Stevens is the Boston agent, at 56 and 58 Union Street, and E. W. Anthony, corner of Beckman and Water streets, in the city of New York. Browne & Sharpe Manufacturing Company. This business was established in 1833, by David Browne and his son, Joseph R., and has been conducted since under the firm-style of David Browne & Son, until the organization of the present company. In 1866, the rule and gauge making branch of J. R. Browne and Sharpe's business combined with Samuel Darling, adding the business formerly known as Darling & Schwartz of Bangor, Me. The new firm adopted the style of Darling, Browne & Sharpe, and have since carried on the manufacture of United States standard rules, Ames's universal squares, patent hardened cast-steel try-squares, the American standard wire gauge, bevel protractor, hardened T squares and bevels, and a great variety of steel and box-wood rules and also scales, and other small tools for machinists, draughtsmen, and wood-workers' use. The building is located on Promenade, near Park Street, and is, in all respects, fire-proof." continued in part 30. This thread: Re: [RIGENWEB] History of Providence (part 6) byDisplayMail('aol.com','CDCARGILL'); CDCARGILL@aol.com History of Providence byDisplayMail('aol.com','CDCARGILL'); CDCARGILL@aol.com Re: [RIGENWEB] History of Providence by "Kay Stanton" <DisplayMail('cfl.rr.com','kay-stanton'); kay-stanton@cfl.rr.com> History of Providence (part 7) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 8) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 9) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 10) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 11) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 12) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 13) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 14) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 15) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 16) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 17) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 19) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 18) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 20) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 21) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 22) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 24) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 23) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 25) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 27) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 26) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 29) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 28) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 30) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 31) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 32) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 33) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 34) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 35) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 36) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 37) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 38) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 39) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 40) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 41) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 42) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 43) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 44) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 45) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 46) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 47) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> Re: [RIGENWEB] History of Providence (part 47) by "Anna LeBlanc" <DisplayMail('qwest.net','Anna_Leblanc'); Anna_Leblanc@qwest.net> History of Providence (part 48) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 49) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 50) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 51) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 53) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> Re: [RIGENWEB] History of Providence (part 53) by "Sue VanCleave" <DisplayMail('comcast.net','suzannevancleave'); suzannevancleave@comcast.net> Re: [RIGENWEB] History of Providence (part 53) by "Lisa Lepore" <DisplayMail('comcast.net','llepore'); llepore@comcast.net> History of Providence (part 54) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 55) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 56) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 57) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 58) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 59) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 60) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 61) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 62) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 63) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 64) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 52) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 65) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 66) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 67) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 68) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 69) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 70) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> Re: [RIGENWEB] History of Providence (part 70) by mvi18th <DisplayMail('naisp.net','mvi18th'); mvi18th@naisp.net> History of Providence (part 73) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 72) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 71) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 74) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 75) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 76) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 77) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 78) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> History of Providence (part 79) by Beth Hurd <DisplayMail('cox.net','beth.hurd'); beth.hurd@cox.net> writeFooter();

Brig. Gen. William Henry Draper Jr. U.S. army officer, banker, and diplomat BornAugust 10, 1894(1894-08-10) Harlem, United States Died December 26, 1974 (aged 80) He was actually born in Columbia Presbyterian Hospital in Harlem but like to say he was born in Harlem as a little inside joke for those who knew him best. He was the consummate Wasp elitist and actually admired Hitler's policies of Master Racism. He and cousin Wickliffe Draper sponsored the first Eugenics Conference in 1932. He worked closely with James Forrestal and Allen Dulles in bringing Hitler to power and then opposing de Nazification of Germany. A Draper nephew, Floyd Draper was on the 1936 Olympic team along with Frank Wisner. Both of them were pushed back onto just the sprint relay teams by Jesse Owens and Ralph Metcalf otherwise Draper and Wisner would have walked off with more Olympic Gold than anyone else and perhaps The Pioneer Fund would never have been started. As it is, Wickliffe Draper, began The Pioneer Fund a year later and the entire history of the 20th Century was altered forever according to Paul Weyrich. It was Robert ("Railroad") Young who asked him to serve on the Board of the Long Island Railroad. And it was James Forrestal of the nefarious MJ-12 Majesty Group, Clendenin J. Ryan's commanding officer, who worked with all the other Manchurian Candiate Mind Controllers and Eugenicists on that Committee who were close to another Eugenicist, Gordon Gray of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco and Wick Draper's childhood chum, C. D. Jackson on the Psychological Strategy Board. Joining them on MJ-12 were others like Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, whose 2nd in command, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brererton was also on the INFORM masthead along with Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers and Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby. Hoyt S. Vandenberg of the 9th Air Force in Northern Africa, was the commanding officer of both Pete Amoss and Eugenicist and Anthropologist Carleton Coon who once proposed creating a "United States of the World" using selective assassinations against those who did not comply with World Peace. Ulius L. "Pete" Amoss and Coon were both at the Cairo OSS station when Coon's pistol was used to murder Admiral Jean Darlan a Vichy Nazi sympathizer. Amoss admitted running a pool of thugs, assassins and spies for the OSS and later for ISIF, Inc. Both Ray S. Cline and Bonner Fellers plus Wick Draper and Charles Willoughby and Robert Morris, among others appeared in Condon's Manchurian Candidate novel. There is some brand new evidence, just this week, that even Pete Amoss via his Baltimore and Ohio Railroad connections where he once worked as a "freight checker" according to his obituary and Clendenin J. Ryan via James Forrestal his commanding officer and Ryan's millionaire friend and owner of F. W. Woolworth's Allan Ryan, were indirectly referred to in The Manchurian Candidate using "the Forrestal Carrier class" and "a jar of F. W. Woolworth's vanishing cream" as an arcane connection by indirect reference intended to leave a trail back to more of Condon's suspects in a 1958 plot against JFK which eventually succeeded. Putting together Eugenicists with the technology of programmed assassinations and Manchurian Candidate mind control is a very dangerous and lethal combination to say the least especially when they all have military and intelligence connections at the highest levels. How Condon put this all together is a monument of impeccable intelligence gathering and how he managed to conceal it in a novel using anagrams, word plays and arcane references is just amazing. I will leave it to others to determine just exactly how difficult it was to EXTRACT all of this from the novel over a period of 10 years on a part time basis, item by item. To me it represents one of my crowning achievements in the JFK conundrum and I hope you all appreciate this. One of the major remaining Manchurian Candidate unsolved references includes a Nils Jorgensen. Ever hear of him? Or is this some sort of anagram as well? People like Robert Morris, Wick Draper, Ray Cline, Bonner Fellers and Charles Willoughby and the MJ-12 Majesties turned ISIF, Inc. and the assassination teams after Amoss died, into a pro-Nazi Murder, Inc. to be run against Communists instead especially when Cline was President of the World Anti Communist League during its most Fascist dominated periods in the 1980's and thereafter when WACL killed Archbishop Romero and Benigno Aquino in the Phillipines. Firing Willoughby and MacArthur left them no choice but to find another source of income. Willoughby made a fortune in Korean soybeans conincident with the outbreak of the Korean War, but a man has to eat you know. Even Amoss had to make a buck working first for Joe McCarthy and Robert J. Morris then later on his own at ISIF, Inc. It appears that Amoss maybe even ran the kill teams involved with E. H. Hunt and Frank Wisner in Guatamala against the Commies after he was most likely involved with Coon in snuffing the Vichy French Admiral Jean Darlan some 10 years earlier in North Africa. Coon was the paradigm for "Indiana Jones" according to Jim Hougan. The Amoss and Coon special protege, Robert Emmett Johnson, also switched sides as an equal opportunity hit man based on whomever had the most money available. This is why the issue of patriotic anti communists got swept under the Rug. This was only a ruse to get someone to pony up the cash to finance the hit teams. Whoever used to own the Copper mines or the Sugar Cane fields or the oil fields or the Banana plantations and whoever was the next owner was totally irrelevant to these contract for hire killers. William Henry Draper Jr. (August 10, 1894 - December 26, 1974) was a U.S. army officer, banker, and diplomat. Draper was born in Harlem, Manhattan and received a B.A. and M.A. in economics at New York University. He joined the United States Army soon after finishing college and served during World War I as a Major in the Infantry. After the war he stayed in the Army Reserves working his way up to Chief of Staff of the 77th Division (1936–1940), while going to work in New York City for National City Bank (1919–1921), Bankers Trust Company (1923–1927), and then Dillon, Read and Company (1927–1953) becoming Vice President in 1937. A supporter of eugenics, Major William Draper sponsored the third "International Conference on Eugenics" was held in New York's American Museum of Natural History under the supervision of the International Federation of Eugenics Societies.[1] At the invitation of George Marshall he moved to Washington, DC to serve on the President's Advisory Committee for Selective Service receiving a promotion to Colonel (May 15, 1940). At the start of World War II he took command of the 136th Infantry, 33rd Division, National Guard (1942–1944). With the end of the war, a promotion to Brigadier-General (January 1, 1945) and a move to Berlin to serve as Chief of the Economics Division, Allied Control Council for Germany (1945–1947). After a promotion to Major-General, Draper was asked by the new Secretary of War Kenneth C. Royall to become his Under Secretary of War (August 29, 1947). With the transition of the Department of War to the Department of the Army, Draper became the first Under Secretary of the Army (September 18, 1947-February 28, 1949) After retiring in 1949, he served as Long Island Rail Road trustee from 1950 to 1951. He was asked to return to public service by the Truman administration, moving to Paris to serve as the first U.S. Ambassador to NATO (December 1951 and June 1953). After retiring from public service a second time he travelled to Mexico to serve as the Chairman of Mexican Light and Power Company (1954–1959). Returning to the US in 1959 he formed the first west coast venture capital firm Draper, Gaither and Anderson in California with the man who served as his deputy and replacement at NATO, Frederick L. Anderson. In 1967 he retired from Draper, Gaither and Anderson, moved to Washington, DC and joined Combustion Engineering in New York as Chairman, retiring a few years later to become the U.S. member of the United Nations Population Commission (1969–1971). He also co-founded the Population Crisis Committee in 1965 and chaired the Draper Committee. [edit] References ^ http://www.spiritone.com/~gdy52150/betraylp9.htm [edit] External links Oral History Interview with General William H. Draper Jr. Time Magazine Topside Teammates Jan. 28, 1952 Preceded by David E. Smucker and H.L. DelatourPresident of Long Island Rail Road 1950 – 1951Succeeded by William Wyer

Then came Draper and The Pioneer Fund and they said... Let There Be Death. The Pioneer Fund is a U.S. non-profit foundation established in 1937. It is currently headed by psychology professor J. Philippe Rushton. Its stated purpose is "to advance the scientific study of heredity and human differences." The fund focuses on projects it perceives will not be easily funded due to controversial subject matter. Two of the Pioneer Fund's most notable recipients are the Minnesota Twin Family Study and the Texas Adoption Project, which studied the similarities and differences of identical twins and other children adopted into non-biological families. The Pioneer Fund has been one of the main sources of funding for the partly-genetic hypothesis of IQ variation among races. Their funding and publications have generated controversy since the 1994 publication of The Bell Curve, which drew heavily from Pioneer-funded research. The fund has also received criticism for its perceived stance on eugenics.[1] The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), a civil rights advocacy organization, has characterized the Pioneer Fund as a hate group.[2] The SPLC cites the Pioneer Fund's funding of some organizations and individuals the SPLC considers racist.[3] It has also been criticized by some scientists and journalists, and in various peer-reviewed academic articles.[4] . Ulric Neisser, who was the chairman of the American Psychological Association's (APA) 1995 taskforce on intelligence research, has said, "Pioneer has sometimes sponsored useful research - research that otherwise might not have been done at all. By that reckoning, I would give it a weak plus."[5] Contents [hide] <LI class=toclevel-1>1 Early history <LI class=toclevel-1>2 Current funding <LI class=toclevel-2>2.1 Scientific research 2.2 Political and legal funding <LI class=toclevel-1>3 Controversy <LI class=toclevel-2>3.1 Criticism 3.2 Responses to criticisms <LI class=toclevel-1>4 Notes <LI class=toclevel-1>5 References <LI class=toclevel-1>6 See also <LI class=toclevel-1>7 External links <LI class=toclevel-2>7.1 Critical 7.1.1 Opinion pieces 7.1.2 Scholarly studies [*]7.2 Pro <script type=text/javascript> // [edit] Early history http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:John_Ma...l_Harlan_II.gif John Marshall Harlan II, one of the first five Pioneer Fund directors, later became a U.S. Supreme Court justice.The Pioneer Fund was incorporated on March 11, 1937. The first five directors were: Wickliffe Preston Draper, heir to a large fortune and the fund's de facto final authority, served on the Board of Directors from 1937 until 1972. During World War I, he served in the British army and fought in the battles of Neuve-Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, Messines and Ypres. He was awarded the British Star Medal (1914-1915) and the Belgian Croix de Guerre for his service. Later, he joined the American army where he was eventually promoted to lieutenant colonel in the cavalry. [6] The Pioneer Fund describes him as someone who dedicated "his life to intellectual pursuits and philanthropy." [7] Pioneer Fund critic William H. Tucker, however, describes Draper as someone who "aside from his brief periods of military service ... never pursued a profession or held a job of any kind." [8] According to a 1960 article in The Nation, an unnamed geneticist said Draper told him he "wished to prove simply that Negroes were inferior."[9] He is said to have funded advocates of repatriation of blacks to Africa and anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi advocates such as Willis Carto. Draper allegedly made large financial contributions to efforts to oppose the American Civil Rights Movement and the racial desegregation mandated by Brown v. Board of Education, such as $215,000 to the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission in 1963.[8] Harry Laughlin was the director of the Eugenics Record Office at the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory on Long Island, New York, funded by the Carnegie Institute of Washington. He served as the president of the Pioneer Fund from its inception until 1941. He was one of the eugenics movement's most energetic legislative activists. He worried about miscegenation and had proposed a research agenda to assist in the enforcement of Southern "race integrity laws" by developing techniques for identifying the "pass-for-white" person who might "successfully hide all of his black blood". He singled out Jews as a group "slow to assimilate," a problem related to his doubts that their loyalty was directed primarily to "American institutions and people" rather than to "Jews scattered through other nations." Eleven months after the Nuremberg Laws, Laughlin wrote to an official at the University of Heidelberg, which had awarded him an honorary doctorate, arguing that the United States and the Third Reich shared "a common understanding of ... the practical application" of eugenic principles to "racial endowments and... racial health."[8] Frederick Osborn wrote in 1937 that the Nazi Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring was "the most exciting experiment that had ever been tried".[10][11] Osborn was the secretary of the American Eugenics Society, which was part of an accepted and active field at the time, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Selective Service during World War II and later the Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. Malcolm Donald was the Draper family lawyer, trustee of the Draper estate. He was a former editor of the Harvard Law Review and a brigadier general during World War II. John Marshall Harlan II. Harlan's firm had done legal work for the Pioneer Fund. He was the only director whose name did not appear on the incorporation papers. He was director of operational analysis for the Eighth Air Force in World War II, and was appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his confirmation process, he voiced support for the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, but on the bench limited civil rights in Swain v. Alabama and dissented on Miranda v. Arizona. The 1937 incorporation documents of the Pioneer Fund list two purposes. The first, modeled on the Nazi Lebensborn breeding program,[12] was aimed at encouraging the propagation of those "descended predominantly from white persons who settled in the original thirteen states prior to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States and/or from related stocks, or to classes of children, the majority of whom are deemed to be so descended". Its second purpose was to support academic research and the "dissemination of information, into the 'problem of heredity and eugenics'" and "the problems of race betterment".[11] The Pioneer Fund argues the "race betterment" has always referred to the "human race" referred to earlier in the sentence, and critics argue it referred to racial groups. The document was amended in 1985 and the phrase changed to "human race betterment." The Pioneer Fund supported the distribution of a eugenics film titled Erbkrank ("Hereditary Defective" or "Hereditary Illness") which was published by the pre-war 1930s Nazi Party. William Draper obtained the film from the predecessor to the Nazi Office of Racial Policy (Rassenpolitisches Amt) prior to the founding of the Pioneer Fund.[8] According to the Pioneer Fund site, all founders capable of doing so participated in the war against the Nazis.[13] Draper secretly met Dr. C. Nash Herndon of Bowman Gray School of Medicine at Wake Forest University in 1949. Little is known about their meetings, but Herndon was playing a major role in the expansion of the compulsory sterilization program in North Carolina.[14] In the 1950s and 1960s Draper supported two government committees that gave grants for genetics research. Harry F. Weyher, Jr. was his lawyer. The committee members included Representative Francis E. Walter (chair of the House Un-American Activities Committee), Henry E. Garrett (an educator known for his belief in the genetic inferiority of blacks), and Senator James O. Eastland of Mississippi.[15] Subsequent directors included:[13] John M. Woolsey, Jr., a staff attorney at the Nuremberg Trials Henry E. Garrett (1972-1973), the former president of the American Psychological Association James P. Kranz, Jr. (1948) Henry Rice Guild (1948-1974) Charles Codman Cabot (1950-1973) Harry F. Weyher, Jr. (1958-2002) John B. Trevor, Jr. (1959-2000) John F. Walsh, Jr. (1971-1973) Marion A. Parrott (1973-2000) Thomas F. Ellis (1973-1977) Eugenie Mary Ladenburg Davie (Mrs. Preston) (1974-1975) Randolph L. Speight (1975-1999) William Dawes Miller (1983-1993) Karl Schakel (1993-2002) Edwin D. Morgan (2000-2001) R. Travis Osborne (2000-present) [edit] Current funding Most of the Pioneer Fund's grants go to scientific research, including to researchers at 38 universities, and a smaller amount has gone to political or legal organizations, mostly to immigration reform/reduction organizations. This section's figures are from 1971-1996 and are adjusted to 1997 USD.[16] [edit] Scientific research Many of the researchers whose findings support the hereditarian hypothesis of racial IQ disparity have received grants of varying sizes from the Pioneer Fund.[17] Large grantees, in order of amount received, are Thomas J. Bouchard at the University of Minnesota. As compiled in 1997, the recipient of the largest amount of funding ($2.3 million USD) was Thomas J. Bouchard's landmark twin study, the Minnesota Study of Identical Twins Reared Apart (MISTRA), better known as the Minnesota Twins Project. The Minnesota Twins Project compared identical and fraternal twins who had been brought up in different families. Another notable twin study that was partially funded by the fund is the Texas Adoption Project, which compared adopted children to their birth and adopted families. The studies, along with similar studies, have demonstrated that as much as half of intelligence and personality are inherited (See Intelligence quotient#Genetics vs environment). Arthur Jensen at the Institute for the Study of Educational Differences J. Philippe Rushton at the University of Western Ontario is the current head of the fund since 2002. In 1999, Rushton used some of his grant money from the Pioneer fund to send out tens of thousands of copies of an abridged version of his book Race, Evolution and Behavior to social scientists in anthropology, psychology, and sociology, causing a controversy.[18] The book describes Rushton's differential K theory. Tax records from 2000 show that his Charles Darwin Institute received $473,835 — 73% of that year's grants.[2] Roger Pearson at the Institute for the Study of Man. Eugenicist and anthropologist, founder of the Journal of Indo-European Studies,[19] received over a million dollars in grants in the eighties and the nineties.[8][17] Using the pseudonym of Stephan Langton, Pearson was the editor of The New Patriot, a short-lived magazine published in 1966-67 to conduct "a responsible but penetrating inquiry into every aspect of the Jewish Question," which included articles such as "Zionists and the Plot Against South Africa," "Early Jews and the Rise of Jewish Money Power," and "Swindlers of the Crematoria.".[17] The Northern League, an organization founded in England in 1958 by Pearson, supported Nazi ideologies and included former members of the Nazi Party.[8] Richard Lynn at Ulster Institute for Social Research (also on Mankind Quarterly editorial board) Linda Gottfredson at the University of Delaware. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:MRI_brain.jpg The Pioneer Fund funds research on the basis and correlates of human ability and diversity. Notable topics in this research are the heredity and neuroscience of intelligence.Other notable recipients of funding include: Hans Eysenck, the most-cited living psychologist at the time of his death (1997) Lloyd Humphreys Joseph M. Horn Robert A. Gordon Garrett Hardin, author of the phrase the "tragedy of the commons" R. Travis Osborne Audrey M. Shuey Philip A. Vernon William Shockley, winner of the Nobel prize in physics in 1956, received a series of grants in the 1970s. Shockley became famous in his later career for supporting the controversial genetic hypothesis of race and intelligence research and for being a proponent of eugenics. Note that the fund has only funded some of their research, not necessarily their most important contributions. [edit] Political and legal funding The Fund has given support to immigration reductionist organizations, primarily to the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), but also to the American Immigration Control Foundation (AICF), and ProjectUSA. During the campaign over California's Proposition 187 critics claimed that the Pioneer Fund was channeling money in favor of the initiative through contributions to the FAIR.[20] A minor grantee is the paleoconservative and white nationalist journalist Jared Taylor, the editor of American Renaissance and a member the advisory board of the white nationalist publication the Occidental Quarterly.[3] Many of the key academic white nationalists in both Right Now! and American Renaissance have been funded by the Pioneer Fund, which was also directly involved in funding the parent organization of American Renaissance, the New Century Foundation.[17] [edit] Controversy [edit] Criticism In addition to the funding and the connections to persons and organizations mentioned above, there are reported links between various past contributors to the science journal receiving funding from Pioneer Mankind Quarterly and Nazism. Italian biologist and Mankind Quarterly associate editor Corrado Gini authored an article titled "The Scientific Basis of Fascism" and was once a scientific advisor to Mussolini. The editorial board member Otmar Freiherr von Verschuer was Josef Mengele's mentor before and during the Holocaust and is suspected of being his collaborator.[21][22][23] The already mentioned Roger Pearson was a former editor. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Otmar_von_Verschuer.jpg Otmar Freiherr von Verschuer, circa 1920s-1940s, measures twin girls as part of an anthropometric study of heredity.The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), a nonprofit organization, lists the Pioneer Fund as a hate group citing the fund's history, its funding of race and intelligence research, and its connections with some individuals they feel are racist.[24] They also state: "Race science has potentially frightening consequences, as is evident not only from the horrors of Nazi Germany, but also from the troubled racial history of the United States. If white supremacist groups had their way, the United States would return to its dark days. In publication after publication, hate groups are using this "science" to legitimize racial hatred. In Calling Our Nation, the neo-Nazi Aryan Nations publishes a piece by a New York psychologist surveying the work of Jensen, Garrett and numerous others. National Vanguard, the publication of former physics professor William Pierce (see The Alliance and its Allies) and his neo-Nazi National Alliance, runs a similar piece that concludes that "it is the Negro's deficiency ... which kept him in a state of savagery in his African environment and is now undermining the civilization of a racially mixed America."[25] In accord with the tax regulations governing nonprofit corporations, Pioneer does not fund individuals; under the law only other nonprofit organizations are appropriate grantees. As a consequence, many of the fund's awards go not to the researchers themselves but to the universities that employ them, a standard procedure for supporting work by academically based scientists. In addition to these awards to the universities where its grantees are based, Pioneer has made a number of grants to other nonprofit organizations, corporations some feel have been created to channel resources to a particular academic recipient while circumventing the institution where the researcher is employed.[26][27] In 2002, William H. Tucker criticized the Pioneer's grant-funding techniques: "Pioneer's administrative procedures are as unusual as its charter. Although the fund typically gives away more than half a million dollars per year, there is no application form or set of guidelines. Instead, according to Weyher, an applicant merely submits 'a letter containing a brief description of the nature of the research and the amount of the grant requested.' There is no requirement for peer review of any kind; Pioneer's board of directors—two attorneys, two engineers, and an investment broker—decides, sometimes within a day, whether a particular research proposal merits funding. Once the grant has been made, there is no requirement for an interim or final report or even for an acknowledgment by a grantee that Pioneer has been the source of support, all atypical practices in comparison to other organizations that support scientific research."[28] Rushton, the current head, has spoken at conferences of the American Renaissance magazine, in which he has also published articles.[3] Anti-racist Searchlight Magazine described one of these as a "veritable 'who's who' of American white supremacy."[4]. The Pioneer Fund was described by the London Sunday Telegraph (3/12/89) as a "neo-Nazi organization closely integrated with the far right in American politics." [edit] Responses to criticisms The Pioneer Fund's history after its 1937 incorporation focused on improving hereditary characteristics, which at the time was pursued through the scholarly field eugenics. The scientific community had enthusiasm for what they saw as the promise of eugenics, and most developed nations employed some form of it, most commonly compulsory sterilization of those considered to have incurable hereditary diseases. High school and college textbooks from the 1920s through the 40s often had chapters touting the scientific progress to be had from applying eugenic principles to the population. Following World War II, however, eugenics became associated with the brutal policies of the Nazis and fell out of favour. In addition to this historical focus of the Pioneer Fund, some of the fund's previous members and grantees, including its main founder Wickliffe Preston Draper, have supported ideas such as racial segregation. The fund's administrators state that any criticism should be directed at these past individuals, not the entire organization, which funds much notable scientific work. The fund claims that it holds no political position or any inappropriate bias in choosing grantees. Pioneer supports research some consider controversial; for example, the study of the disparity between racial groups in average cognitive ability test scores (race and intelligence). Such studies examine the genetic and environmental factors underlying these group differences. The Pioneer Fund has stated that it rejects racism, and has claimed that it is the victim of smear campaigns waged by those who consider a discussion of race to be taboo. In addition, it has asserted that the majority of the criticism directed at the Fund falls into such categories as to make it more-appropriately directed at individuals than at an organization as a whole. [citation needed] The Fund writes on their website that one should consider the historical context surrounding such beliefs, as many mainstream scientists of the first half the twentieth century supported racialist views seen by some as politically incorrect today. They say that Wickliffe Draper's views on race do not influence decisions made by the Fund today. Charles Murray, co-author of the Bell Curve, addressed the fund's history in response to criticism of it: "[T]he relationship between the founder of the Pioneer Fund and today's Pioneer Fund is roughly analogous to the relationship between Henry Ford and today's Ford Foundation."[29] In the 1920s, Henry Ford authored anti-Semitic literature. A response to this comparison is that unlike the Pioneer Fund, the Ford Foundation is not still funding researchers who have a systematic tendency to make claims asserting the genetic basis of a given group's intellectual inferiority.[citation needed] Behavioral geneticist David T. Lykken wrote "If you can find me some rich villains that want to contribute to my research - Qaddafi, the Mafia, whoever - the worse they are, the better I'll like it. I'm doing a social good by taking their money... Any money of theirs that I spend in a legitimate and honorable way, they can't spend in a dishonorable way"[30] Science writer Morton Hunt received Pioneer funding for his book and wrote: "One could spend hundreds of pages on the pros and cons of the case of the Pioneer Fund, but what matters to me—and should matter to my readers—is that I have been totally free to research and write as I chose. I alerted Pioneer to my political views when making the grant proposal for this book but its directors never blinked."[31] [edit] Notes <LI id=_note-0>^ Lombardo, Paul A. (2002). "The American Breed": Nazi Eugenics and the Origins of the Pioneer Fund. Albany Law Review, vol. 65, p. 743 Rushton, J. Philippe (2002). The Pioneer Fund and the Scientific Study of Human Differences. Albany Law Review 66:209. Lombardo, Paul A. (2002). Pioneer's Big Lie. Albany Law Review, vol. 66, p. 207 <LI id=_note-1>^ Southern Poverty Law Center Map of Hate Organizatons. Retrieved July 16, 2006. <LI id=_note-Berlet>^ a b Berlet, Chip. Into the Mainstream: An array of right-wing foundations and think tanks support efforts to make bigoted and discredited ideas respectable. Intelligence Report, Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved July 16, 2006. <LI id=_note-2>^ [1] Critics of the fund include the SPLC, IQ critic William H. Tucker, and historian Barry Mehler and his Institute for the Study of Academic Racism. Researchers who have been the subject of criticism for accepting grants from the fund have long argued the public debates have been disconnected from the expert debates. Robert A. Gordon, for example, replied to media criticisms of grant-recipients: "Politically correct disinformation about science appears to spread like wildfire among literary intellectuals and other nonspecialists, who have few disciplinary constraints on what they say about science and about particular scientists and on what they allow themselves to believe,"(Gordon 1997, p.35) <LI id=_note-3>^ According to critic Ulric Neisser, who was the chairman of the APA's 1995 taskforce on intelligence research. Neisser gave support for Richard Lynn's argument in a review of Lynn's history and defense of the fund, The Science of Human Diversity: A History of the Pioneer Fund (2004). Neisser stated that "Lynn's claim is exaggerated but not entirely without merit: 'Over those 60 years, the research funded by Pioneer has helped change the face of social science.'" Neisser concludes, in agreement with Lynn and against William Tucker's critical 2002 book The Funding of Scientific Racism, that the world was ultimately better off having had the Pioneer Fund: "Lynn reminds us that Pioneer has sometimes sponsored useful research - research that otherwise might not have been done at all. By that reckoning, I would give it a weak plus." <LI id=_note-4>^ The Science of Human Diversity: A History of the Pioneer Fund, Richard Lynn, Rowman & Littlefield 2001, ISBN 0-7618-2041-8 pp. 3–19.) <LI id=_note-Pioneer_Fund_Founders>^ Pioneer Fund FoundersRetrieved April 11, 2007. <LI id=_note-Tucker>^ a b c d e f Tucker, William H (2002). The Funding of Scientific Racism: Wickliffe Draper and the Pioneer Fund. University of Illinois Press. ISBN 0-252-02762-0 <LI id=_note-May>^ May, R. W. (May 14, 1960). "Genetics and Subversion." The Nation 190:421. <LI id=_note-5>^ Osborn, Frederick (24 February 1937). 'Summary of the proceedings' of the Conference on Eugenics in Relation to Nursing. American Eugenics Society Archives. <LI id=_note-Mehler-fascism>^ Cite error 8; No text given. <LI id=_note-crawford>^ Crawford, James (1993). Hold Your Tongue: Bilingualism and the Politics of "English Only." Addison Wesley Publishing Company, ISBN 978-0201624793 <LI id=_note-pioneer-founders>^ a b Pioneer Fund. Founders and Former Directors. Retrieved July 16, 2006. <LI id=_note-begos>^ Begos, Kevin (December 11, 2002). Benefactor With a Racist Bent: Wealthy recluse apparently liked the looks and potential of Bowman Gray's new medical-genetics department. Winston-Salem Journal <LI id=_note-lichtenstein>^ Lichtenstein, Grace (December 11, 1977). Fund Backs Controversial Study of "Racial Betterment." New York Times <LI id=_note-Mehler-grantlist>^ Mehler, Barry. Pioneer Fund Grant Totals, 1971-1996. Retrieved July 16, 2006. <LI id=_note-Mehler-funding>^ a b c d Mehler, Barry (July 7, 1998). Race Science and the Pioneer Fund Originally published as "The Funding of the Science" in Searchlight, No. 277. <LI id=_note-Tucker-Conclusion>^ Tucker, William H. [http://www.press.uillinois.edu/epub/books/tucker/concl.html Conclusion: Pioneer or Pamphleteer] The Funding of Scientific Racism: Wickliffe Draper and the Pioneer Fund. <LI id=_note-jies>^ The Journal of Indo-European Studies via A. Richard Diebold Center for Indo-European Language and Culture. <LI id=_note-Shearer>^ Shearer, SR. The Pioneer Fund: The Nazi Connection. Retrieved July 16, 2006. <LI id=_note-6>^ http://www.eugenics-watch.com/intro.html <LI id=_note-7>^ http://bethuneinstitute.org/documents/naziconnection.html <LI id=_note-8>^ http://www.crimelibrary.com/serial_killers...i_3.html?sect=6 <LI id=_note-9>^ http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport....jsp?pid=106#14 <LI id=_note-10>^ http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport...cle.jsp?pid=625 <LI id=_note-11>^ http://www.press.uillinois.edu/epub/books/tucker/intro.html <LI id=_note-12>^ http://www.ferris.edu/isar/Institut/pionee...spread/pfp6.htm <LI id=_note-13>^ http://www.press.uillinois.edu/epub/books/tucker/intro.html <LI id=_note-Murray-critics>^ Murray, Charles (May 1995). "The Bell Curve" and its critics. Commentary, v99 n5 p23(8). <LI id=_note-ohman>^ Patricia Ohman (7 March 1984). Do they get what they Pay for? Minneapolis City Pages, p. 8. ^ Hunt, Morton (1998). The New Know-Nothings: The Political Foes of the Scientific Study of Human Nature Transaction Publishers: ISBN 0-7658-0497-2 [edit] References The Science of Human Diversity: A History of the Pioneer Fund, Richard Lynn, Rowman & Littlefield 2001, ISBN 0-7618-2041-8 Bouchard, T. J., Jr., Lykken, D. T., McGue, M., Segal, N. L., & Tellegen, A. (1990). Sources of human psychological difference: The Minnesota study of twins reared apart. Science, 250, 223-228. ^ Joseph L. Graves, "What a tangled web he weaves: Race, reproductive strategies and Rushton's life history theory," Anthropological Theory 2, no. 2 (2002): 131–54; Leonard Lieberman et al., "How 'Caucasoids' Got Such Big Crania and Why They Shrank,"; Current Anthropology 42 (2001): 69–95; Zack Cernovsky, "On the similarities of American blacks and whites: A reply to J.P. Rushton," Journal of Black Studies 25 (1995): 672. Neisser, U. (2004). Serious scientists or disgusting racists? Contemporary Psychology, 49, 5-7. [edit] See also Nature versus nurture Intelligence quotient#Practical importance Intelligence quotient#Genetics vs environment [edit] External links The Pioneer Fund Official website "Controversies:Setting the Record Straight", the Pioneer Fund "The Pioneer Fund and the scientific study of human differences", J. Phillipe Rushton (2002) A reply to Lombardo's article "The American Breed". "How Smart We Are About What We Broadcast: An Open Letter to ABC News" - Robert Gordon (1997) Preface to the Science of Human Diversity, Harry F. Weyher (2001) [*]"Big Brother in Deleware", National Review, Thomas Short (1991) [edit] Critical [edit] Opinion pieces The New York Times: Fund Backs Controversial Study of "Racial Betterment [12/11/77] "Racial Scientist Rushton Takes Over Pioneer Fund" by David Lethbridge. The Bethune Institute for Anti-Fascist Studies, January 2003. NY Review of Books: 'The Bell Curve' and its Sources Eugenics, racism, and conservative ideology (pt. 1) The Pioneer Fund: The Nazi Connection The Bell Curve and the Pioneer Fund A special report by ABC World News Tonight. November 22, 1994 (Criticized by Gordon 1997 above) "Weird Science" Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania) Post-Gazette, January 30, 2005. [edit] Scholarly studies Pioneer Fund readings from the Institute for the Study of Academic Racism Foundation for Fascism: the New Eugenics Movement in the United States, Patterns of Prejudice Race Science and the Pioneer Fund [*]The Funding of Scientific Racism Online book [*]"The American Breed": Nazi eugenics and the origins of the Pioneer Fund [*]Toward a racial abyss: eugenics, Wickliffe Draper, and the origins of The Pioneer Fund [edit] Pro The Science of Human Diversity: A History of the Pioneer Fund, Richard Lynn (2001) ISBN 0-7618-2040-X "Pioneer Fundophobia", Steve Sailer (2001) "The Pioneer Fund, the Behavioral Sciences, and the Media's False Stories," (3rd party reprint) Harry F. Weyher (1999), Intelligence. Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pioneer_Fund"

Bush Family Eugenics should start at home... with the Grays and Drapers. http://ecosyn.us/Bush-Hitler/Bush_Eugenics.html

Bush, Draper and Gray families all worked together for Eugenics... and to snuff JFK, too, who was anti Eugenics. Eugenics, a brief history eu·gen·ics Pronunciation: yu-'je-niks Function: noun Date: 1883 : a science that deals with the improvement by control of human mating, of hereditary qualities of a race or breed Eugenics began as a breeding science for horses in the late 19th century in the US. In the early 1900s No. Carolina and Virginia used it to control the population of humans that were deemed inferior though mental; retardation and handicapped. Hitler's Nazi Germany showe an interest in eugenics and expanded its use to control the population of those deemed unfit or unnecessary people: handicapped, gypsies, indigents, slavs, and Jews. This is the core of the Master Race way of thinking and it is alive and well in our world today. One can understand the need for birth control in today's world but who gets sterilized and who doesn't is not always a voluntary decision. The survivors make up the master race; the characteristics of which are highly defined by race purists. Here is a brief history. General Draper was an advocate of eugenics. In 1932, William Draper financed the International Eugenics Congress and helped select Ernst Ruaudin as chief of the world eugenics movement. They promoted what he called Adolf Hitler's "holy, national and international racial hygienic mission." They worked closely with Prescott Bush who shared the same views on eugenics. In Prescott’s first run for office in 1950 he was exposed as an activist in the fascist eugenics movement. Due to the exposure, Prescott lost his first bid for office. Meanwhile, General Draper founded the Population Crisis Committee, joining with the Rockefeller and Du Pont families to promote eugenics for population control. The administration of President Lyndon Johnson, advised by General Draper on the subject, began financing birth control in the tropical countries through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). General Draper was George Bush's guru on the population question. But there was also Draper's money--from that uniquely horrible source--and Draper's connections on Wall Street and abroad. Draper's son and heir, William H. Draper III, was co-chairman for finance (chief of fundraising) of the Bush-for-President national campaign organization in 1980. With George Bush in the White House, the younger Draper heads up the depopulation activities of the United Nations throughout the world. On Eugenics ---- "The [government] must put the most modern medical means in the service of this knowledge.... Those who are physically and mentally unhealthy and unworthy must not perpetuate their suffering in the body of their children.... The prevention of the faculty and opportunity to procreate on the part of the physically degenerate and mentally sick, over a period of only 600 years, would ... free humanity from an immeasurable misfortune." -- Adolph Hitler "The per capita income gap between the developed and the developing countries is increasing, in large part the result of higher birth rates in the poorer countries.... Famine in India, unwanted babies in the United States, poverty that seemed to form an unbreakable chain for millions of people--how should we tackle these problems?.... It is quite clear that one of the major challenges of the 1970s ... will be to curb the world's fertility." -- George Bush Sr. These two quotations are alike in their mock show of concern for human suffering, and in their cynical remedy for it: Big Brother must prevent the 'unworthy' or 'unwanted' people from living. Because of Geroge Bush 250 million brown skinned people have been sterilized at the US taxpayer's expense - $300 million a year. Sterilization: The U.S. Agency for International Development says that surgical sterilization is the Bush administration's "first choice" method of population reduction in the Third World. The United Nations Population Fund claims that 37 percent of contraception users in Ibero-America and the Caribbean have already been surgically sterilized. In a 1991 report, William H. Draper III's agency asserts that 254 million couples will be surgically sterilized over the course of the 1990s; and that if present trends continue, 80 percent of the women in Puerto Rico and Panama will be surgically sterilized. The U.S. government pays directly for these sterilizations. Mexico is first among targeted nations, on a list which was drawn up in July 1991, at a USAID strategy session. India and Brazil are second and third priorities, respectively. On contract with the Bush administration, U.S. personnel are working from bases in Mexico to perform surgery on millions of Mexican men and women. The acknowledged strategy in this program is to sterilize those young adults who have not already completed their families. The spending for birth control in the non-white countries is one of the few items that headed upwards in the Bush I administration budget. In 1992 USAID said its Population Account would receive $300 million, a 20 percent increase over the previous year. Within this project, a significant sum is spent on political and psychological manipulations of target nations, and rather blatant subversion of their religions and governments. In 946-47 Gordon Gray and Dr. Claude Nash Herndon conducted experiments in "medical genetics" at Bowman Gray Medical School. Dr. Clarence Gamble, heir to the Proctor and Gamble soap fortune, was the sterilizers national field operations chief. The experiment worked as follows. All children enrolled in the school district of Winston-Salem, N.C., were given a special intelligence test. Those children who scored below a certain arbitrary low mark were then cut open and surgically sterilized. These are quotes from the official story of the project: In Winston-Salem and in [nearby] Orange County, North Carolina, the Sterilization League's field committee had participated in testing projects to identify school age children who should be considered for sterilization. The project in Orange County was conducted by the University of North Carolina and was financed by a Mr. Hanes, a friend of Clarence Gamble and supporter of the field work project in North Carolina. The Winston-Salem project was also financed by Hanes. Hanes was underwear mogul James Gordon Hanes, a trustee of Bowman Gray Medical School. The medical school had a long history of interest in eugenics and had compiled extensive histories of families carrying inheritable disease. In 1946, Dr. C. Nash Herndon ... made a statement to the press on the use of sterilization to prevent the spread of inheritable diseases.... The first step after giving the mental tests to grade school children was to interpret and make public the results. In Orange County the results indicated that three percent of the school age children were either insane or feebleminded. Then the field committee hired a social worker to review each case and to present any cases in which sterilization was indicated to the State Eugenics Board, which under North Carolina law had the authority to order sterilization. Race science experimenter Dr. Herndon provided more details in an interview in 1990. Alice Gray was the general supervisor of the project. She and Hanes sent out letters promoting the program to the commissioners of all 100 counties in North Carolina. "What did I do? Nothing besides riding herd on the whole thing! The social workers operated out of my office. I was at the time also director of outpatient services at North Carolina Baptist Hospital. We would see the targeted parents and children there. I.Q. tests were run on all the children in the Winston-Salem public school system. Only the ones who scored really low were targeted for sterilization, the real bottom of the barrel, like below 70." I can see that Forest Gumpf somehow slipped through their net. Herndon went on to say, "did we do sterilizations on young children? Yes. This was a relatively minor operation. It was usually not until the child was eight or ten years old. For the boys, you just make an incision and tie the tube. We more often performed the operation on girls than with boys. Of course, you have to cut open the abdomen, but again, it is relatively minor." In 1950 and 1951, John Foster Dulles, then chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation, led John D. Rockefeller III on a series of world tours, focusing on the need to stop the expansion of the non-white populations. In November 1952, Dulles and Rockefeller set up the Population Council, with tens of millions of dollars from the Rockefeller family. At that point, the American Eugenics Society, still cautious from the recent bad publicity vis-a-vis Hitler, left its old headquarters at Yale University. The Society moved its headquarters into the office of the Population Council, and the two groups melded together. The long-time secretary of the American Eugenics Society, Frederick Osborne, became the first president of the Population Council. The Gray family's child-sterilizer, Dr. Herndon, became president of the American Eugenics Society in 1953, as its work expanded under Rockefeller patronage. Meanwhile, the International Planned Parenthood Federation was founded in London, in the offices of the British Eugenics Society. The undead enemy from World War II, renamed "Population Control", had now been revived. George Bush was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 1972, when with prodding from Bush and his friends, the U.S. Agency for International Development first made an official contract with the old Sterilization League of America. The League had changed its name twice again, and was now called the "Association for Voluntary Surgical Contraception." The U.S. government began paying the old fascist group to sterilize non-whites in foreign countries. The Gray family experiment had succeeded. In 1988, the U.S. Agency for International Development signed its latest contract with the old Sterilization League (a.k.a. Association for Voluntary Surgical Contraception), committing the U.S. government to spend $80 million over five years. Having gotten away with sterilizing several hundred North Carolina school children, the identical group was then authorized by President Bush to do it to 58 countries in Asia, Africa and Ibero-America. The group modestly claims it has directly sterilized only two million people, with 87 percent of the bill paid by U.S. taxpayers. Meanwhile, Dr. Clarence Gamble, Boyden Gray's favorite soap manufacturer, formed his own "Pathfinder Fund" as a split-off from the Sterilization League. Gamble's Pathfinder Fund, with additional millions from USAID, concentrates on penetration of local social groups in the non-white countries, to break down psychological resistance to the surgical sterilization teams. The Association for Voluntary Surgical Contraception has changed its name to Engender Health. In the end we can see the long term goal of creating a master race is behind the mission statement. Will they all have blonde hair and blue eyes and an IQ of 140? Meanwhile the Bush regime is responsible for sterilizing hundreds of millions brown skinned people across the globe.

Bowman Gray, Sr. From SourceWatch This article is part of the Tobacco portal on Sourcewatch, sponsored by the American Legacy Foundation. Join our team of citizen journalists researching and exposing tobacco industry secrets. Bowman Gray, Sr. "was the benefactor whose bequest made possible the medical school's (Wake Forest University School of Medicine) move from the town of Wake Forest to Winston-Salem and its expansion to a four-year program."[1] Biography "Gray was born May 1, 1874 in Forsyth County. He began working with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company in 1895 at a salary of $5.75 per week. In 1931, he became chairman of the company and remained in that position until his death in 1935."[2] "Gray, Bowman (1 May 1874-7 July 1935), tobacco executive, was born in Winston, the son of James Alexander Gray and Aurelia Bowman. He attended local schools and was enrolled in The University of North Carolina for the year 1890-91. Withdrawing, he became a clerk in the Wachovia National Bank of which his father was cashier and one of the founders. He joined the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company as a salesman in 1895 and covered the state of Georgia where he was remarkably successful. After two years he was promoted to eastern sales manager and stationed in Baltimore, Md., where his two sons were born. Further promotion came in 1912, when he was made vice-president and director of the company with offices in Winston. In 1924 he became president, succeeding William Neal Reynolds, and in 1931 he became chairman of the board, the post he held at the time of his death. "Much credit has been ascribed to Gray for the rise of the Reynolds company from fourth to first place in size among tobacco manufacturing plants. Gray, a Methodist, donated the property on which Centenary Methodist Church was built in Winston-Salem. He also contributed generously to orphanages and hospitals. At the time of his death, Gray's holdings in the Reynolds company alone were valued at $12 million. A benevolent fund that he created made possible the establishment of the Bowman Gray School of Medicine of Wake Forest College in Winston-Salem. "In Baltimore on 1 Oct. 1902, he married Nathalie Fontaine Lyons, daughter of Hyman Hart and Ann Elizabeth Maffit Lyons of Asheville. They were the parents of two sons, Bowman Gray, Jr., and Gordon Gray. Gray died of a heart attack on a cruise ship off the coast of Norway and was buried at sea off North Cape above the Arctic Circle." From the Dictionary of North Carolina Biography (Cache File). Other Related SourceWatch Resources C. Boyden Gray Gordon Gray, Sr. James Alexander Gray, father Lyons Gray This article may include information from Tobacco Documents Online.

My interest in Gordon Gray is through his father Bowman Gray who donated enough money to have the Wake Forest Medical School named after him. Then Bowman Gray and others there allowed none other than Wickliffe P. Draper and his Pioneer Fund an inside track to start his infamous programs to promote Involuntary Sterilization at that school for over 2 decades. To their credit the Winston Salem Journal owned by these R J Reynolds Tobacco heirs published the expose and an apology of sorts for letting this happen on their watch. But Gordon and Bowman Gray will forever be linked into The Pioneer Fund and the fact that over 75,000 individuals were sterilized against their will. You all know that I am convinced that Wickliffe Draper was the person who advanced the cash to finance the JFK hit. Then a few years later after Rockwell Intl made millions on the Viet Nam War they bought out his failing Draper Corp. for $100,000,000.00 in Tax Pfd stock which was <A href="mailto:85@#$%"]85%[/email">85% tax free to corporate holders of this issue to avoid double taxation. <A href="http://againsttheirwill.journalnow.com"'>http://againsttheirwill.journalnow.com" target=_blank>http://againsttheirwill.journalnow.com The Gray family was also from Baltimore, MD which would explain his inclusion in this MJ-12 group which included the commanding officers of such Baltimore based stalwarts as Clendenin J. Ryan who reported to Admiral James Forrestal and Ulius L. Amoss who reported to Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenburg in the 9th Air Force in North Africa. Amoss once worked for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad according to his obituary and Richard Condon made an oblique reference to this in ManCand. Bowman and/or Gordon Gray may be the mysterious missing Baltimore based Eugenicists in the Draper mold, who I have been seeking for several years now, it just occurred to me. And the Baltimore based Metals Processing Company involved in funneling cash to Nellie's Boys in South Florida certainly seems to be the right money laundering conduit for the CIA to be involved with Cuban and other Latin American Affairs including Iran Contra via Maryland National Bank. Does it not? Ask Robert Maxwell of the MNB he knows and he blew the whistle to no avail. Gordon Gray (May 30, 1909 – November 26, 1982) was an official in the government of the United States during the administrations of Harry Truman (1945-53) and Dwight Eisenhower (1953-61) associated with defense and national security. Gordon Gray was born in Baltimore, Maryland, the son of Bowman Gray, Sr. and Nathalie Lyons Gray. He was married in 1938 to the former Jane Boyden Craige, and they had four sons: Gordon Gray, Jr., Burton Gray, C. Boyden Gray and Bernard Gray. After Jane's death, Gray married the former Nancy Maguire Beebe. His father and later his brother, Bowman Gray, Jr., both were heads of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Gordon graduated from the University of North Carolina in 1930, where he was a member of Delta Kappa Epsilon fraternity. The University presented Gray with an honorary law degree in 1949. He would later serve as president of the University of North Carolina System from 1950-1955. He began his public life as a lawyer and was elected to the North Carolina General Assembly. Gray's service to the federal government began with his appointment as President Harry S. Truman's assistant secretary of war in 1947; two years later, he was appointed Secretary of the Army. He served in this post from 1949 until 1950. The following year he became director of the newly formed Psychological Strategy Board which planned for and coordinated government psychological operations; he remained in the post until May 1952, all the while continuing to lead the University of North Carolina. [1] In 1954 Gray chaired a committee appointed by AEC chairman Lewis Strauss which recommended revoking Robert Oppenheimer's security clearance.[citation needed] President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed him to head the Office of Defense Mobilization in 1957, where he served until the office's consolidation in 1958. Eisenhower then appointed Gray his National Security Advisor from 1958 until 1961. He served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. In 1976, he was awarded the United States Military Academy's Sylvanus Thayer Award. Gray was also publisher of the Winston-Salem Journal, chairman of the board of Piedmont Publishing Company and chairman of the National Trust for Historic Preservation. His son, C. Boyden Gray, served as White House counsel for President George Herbert Walker Bush. His nephew, Lyons Gray, is chief financial officer for the Environmental Protection Agency It is alleged that Gordon Gray was a member of the UFO Conspiracy group known as Majestic 12. And anyone who can figure this one out, about MJ12, gets a Gold Medal. Even Lt. Colonel Philip J. Corso ended his career claiming he had witnessed Alien Autopsies in Area 51. This is the same Corso who worked for Strom Thurmond and once appeared before Sen. John McCain of Arizona claiming that he personally knew of thousands of Korean POWs MIA after the war who were deliberately abandoned by Eisenhower. McCain just shook his head, looked down and bit his tongue while he quietly chastised Corso for having the audacity to even utter such a statement about Eisenhower. This Corso is the same guy who was cited by John Armstrong as a credible witness in the JFK conundrum. Oh well, he said as he just looked down and shook his head. I really can not figure out why these 12 were such avid UFO event followers. Maybe they were just using this topic as an experiment in just how far they could carry out Mind Control and Brainwashing in order to push the Big Lie onto the unsuspecting public. Sort of like setting up a reason for justifying the equivalent of an Orson Welles rebroadcast of The War of the Worlds radio program. Except now Wolf Blitzer and Peter Jennings are cast in the role of Orson Welles and they are teleprompted to broadcast the Welles radio or TV show every night to infinity filling our brains with the concept that we are actually fighting a massively powerful alien or Muslim force armed to the teeth and capable of destroying the American way of life right on our very soil. When in fact there might only be a few thousand fanatics who have in fact been brainwashed using Manchurian Candidate style programming techniques to believe that the USA is a massively powerful alien Christian force armed to the teeth and capable of destroying the Muslim way of life right on their very soil. And in this fashion the Pentagon gets Billions of dollars every year and we get a Welles broadcast 24/7 to shake our boots and make us sh** bricks, and get all the grannies to cringe in fear and keep financing the Pentagon efforts at wiping out this Muslim threat. And it all started with the Japanese Kamikaze pilots in Harbin, Manchuria who eventually became Muslim Kamikaze pilots on 9/11 about 55 years after the fact. We should just have left this technology alone and let it die after Willoughby went through Harbin in 1945 and discovered these programs. The Manchurian Candidate himself, Anastase Vonsiatsky, must be laughing in his Jack Boots right now at what he has created.

I even hesitate to offer this clandestine MJ12 group as being creditable... but I have little choice. The fact is that Clendenin J. Ryan reported directly to Admiral James Forrestal and Ulius L. Amoss reported directly to Hoyt S. Vandenburg and Gordon Gray's father Bowman Gray, had the Wake Forest Medical School named after him and was a true Eugenicist in the mold of Wickliffe Draper who started his campaign for involuntary sterilization at that school. And Richard Condon in The Manchurian Candidate knew all about all of these horrendous characters in 1958 when he wrote his novel about Eugenicists who used programmed assassins to carry out The Will of the Wasps to destroy the upstart mud races as they called them. Stay tuned. http://againsttheirwill.journalnow.com All the alleged original members of MJ-12 were notable for their military, government, and/or scientific achievements, and all were deceased when the documents first surfaced (the last to die was Jerome Hunsaker, only a few months before the MJ-12 papers first appeared). The original composition was six civilians (mostly scientists), and six high-ranking military officers, two from each major military service. Three (Souers, Vandenberg, and Hillenkoetter) had been the first three heads of central intelligence. Can anyone add any background info about these guys.... The named members of MJ-12 from this website http://www.thewhyfiles.net/majestic12.htm were: (This is not my research, but rather a citation into a rather questionable and nefarious group. This topic has been picked up and disseminated by various questionable and sometimes over zealous websites...with an emphasis on UFO quacks and miscellaneous unexplained phenomena so Caveat Lector on this one. Later I will point out who from this group had ties back into the Wicklffe Draper Eugenics crowds and Brig. Gen. William H. Draper, Jr. pro-Nazi nexus of characters.) For instance William H. Draper, Jr. and eventual Admiral James Forrestal worked together at Dillon, Read and with Allen Dulles on the German Investment Finance operations which helped to solidify Hitler's financial backing even before the war and then Christopher Simpson documented William H. Draper, Jr.'s opposition to the de-Nazification of Germany and the breaking up of the cartels like I. G. Farben. And General Hoyt Vandenberg of the 9th Air Force, had another Wickliffe Draper crony in Eugenics and fellow Harvard grad, Major Carleton "Indiana Jones" Coon, reporting to him through Ulius L. "Pete" Amoss, in Cairo, Egypt along with Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers who appeared in The Manchurian Candiate as Fighting Frank Bollinger. And of course, Gordon Gray's father, Bowman Gray allowed Wickliffe Draper to use the Wake Forest Medical School facilities named The Bowman Gray Medical School to carry out his program of Involuntary Sterilizations. Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter: first CIA director Dr. Vannevar Bush: chaired wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development and predecessor National Defense Research Committee; set up and chaired postwar Joint Research and Development Board (JRDB) and then the Research and Development Board (RDB); chaired NACA; President of Carnegie Institute, Washington D.C. James Forrestal: Secretary of the Navy; first Secretary of Defense (replaced after his death on MJ-12 by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, 2nd CIA director) Gen. Nathan Twining: headed Air Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson AFB; Air Force Chief of Staff (1953-1957); Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (1957-1961) Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg: Directed Central Intelligence Group (1946-1947); Air Force Chief of Staff (1948-1953) Gen. Robert M. Montague: Guided missile expert; 1947 commander of Fort Bliss; headed nuclear Armed Forces Special Weapons Center, Sandia Base Dr. Jerome Hunsaker: Aeronautical engineer, MIT; chaired NACA after Bush Rear Adm. Sidney Souers: first director of Central Intelligence Group, first executive secretary of National Security Council (NSC) Gordon Gray: Secretary of the Army; intelligence and national security expert; CIA psychological strategy board (1951-1953); Chairman of NSC 5412 committee (1954-1958); National Security Advisor (1958-1961) Dr. Donald Menzel: Astronomer, Harvard; cryptologist during war; security consultant to CIA and NSA Dr. Detlev Bronk: Medical physicist; aviation physiologist; chair, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council; president Johns Hopkins & Rockefeller University Dr. Lloyd Berkner: Physicist; radio expert; executive secretary of Bush's JRDB According to other sources[citation needed] and MJ-12 papers to emerge later[citation needed], famous scientists like Robert Oppenheimer, Albert Einstein, Karl Compton, Edward Teller, John von Neumann, and Wernher von Braun were also involved with MJ-12.

"Dominic, go frisk 'em", said the priest....and so he did. My distinct impression is that Ryan placed 7 of his cohorts on the Board of ITT for a reason, to protect his family's Copper mining interests throughout the world including Chile where ITT had a major presence as I understand it. Later when Orlando Letellier was murdered in Washington, DC in 1976 by the Novo brothers and some of the other South Florida Cuban exiles, the Chilean DINA and perhaps other Soldiers of Fortune via Nellie's Boys it sealed forever the hopes of the Marxist forces in Chile, saving not only the Ryan family Copper fortunes but everyone else's Copper and other miscellaneous interests in Chile from the Commies. One of Ryan's Boys on the ITT Board was later involved with Phelps, Dodge which also held vast Chilean Copper mining interests as well. President Salvador Allende was killed in 1973 and August Pinonchet took over in a military coup then but Letellier was always a threat to overthrow Pinonchet until his death in Washington, DC. When I post some of the anti-Communist rants from Amoss' INFORM publication which I just received, you will see just how vitriolic and flamboyant his cohorts could be in their denunciations of the Red Menace. Bottom line was that they all joined together to protect their personal or family foreign holdings from Communist appropriation. Whether it was United Fruit in Guatamala where Frank Wisner and Allen Dulles and E. H. Hunt led the revolts to protect American interests or Chile or Nicaragua or wherever in the Latin American hemisphere, you can be sure that Gen. Smedley Butler was correct in his assessment that he fought wars only to protect American corporate financial interests, nothing more nothing less. And the Catholic Church joined the battle to save not only their Church properties but their God given monopolistic right to pass the basket every week in front of the peasantry. "Dominic, go frisk 'em!", said the priest. And then the basket was passed around and the proceeds were stored in the Church coffers pending settlement of litgation for any future pedophile inspired lawsuits. Seems to me there was another Kirby oil man involved with the Asheville Conference held by the Silver Shirts and their leaders like Rev Gerald L K Smith and William Dudley Pelley. Even the name John Raskob from Chase was part of The Plot to Take the White House according to Jules Archer which involved Gen Smedley Butler. Funny how each generation has to watch as these Fascist Bastidges try to take down a President or actually succeed in killing a President who will not let them have their way with the American and International war based economies, and we learn nothing from those object lessons. Nothing. Well Hal Hendrix must have been very much younger then because by the early 1960's he looked totally different.

John, My interest in Ryan was his financial contributions which supported aspects of the intelligence community. And yes, some of this money helped Amoss and what was going on in Baltimore. When Clendenin Ryan allegedly committed suicide in 1957, he was 52 years old. His grandfather was Thomas Fortune Ryan. His father was Clendenin Ryan Sr. who himself committed suicide by gas in 1939. His cousin was Joseph Ryan who owned a ski lodge at Mont Tremblant in Quebec. Joseph jumped from the 22nd floor of a New York hotel in 1950. To get from this to the Kennedy assassination, one must look into New Yorker John Broady and his vast array of connections. That conduit ultimately leads to Robert E. Johnson and Arturo Espaillat. In my opinion of course. James Can you share any of these Broady links publicly on this forum? To what extent did Ryan's efforts at controlling the Board of ITT in a proxy battle with Sosthenes Behn, play into the JFK conundrum? ITT had a major Latin American presence and always seemed to be involved with any CIA operations there, correct? And there was a Texas oil man put on the Board of ITT by Ryan as well. That person was on John Simkin's list of JFK suspects, too. And that reporter for The Miami News where I once worked as a copy boy and intern reporter, Hal Hendrix, had some sort of ITT connections as well, no? By the way that picture on John Simkin's web page for Hal Hendrix does not look anything like the Hal Hendrix I knew in the early 1960's. He had dark, black wavy hair and a very small head with what we used to call oversized Latin American style black horn rimmed glasses making his eyes look very large in his small head because of his very strong prescription. He always wore those glasses and looked sort of like a preying mantis with that combination of a small head and the giant goggles he wore. Any chance you have a more accurate picture of Hal Hendrix around? Not that it matters now, but just for the historical record it might be helpful.

Could Gratz and Mauro be onto something worthwhile here? Nah... just kidding. They could be on something though.

Revolt in I.T. & T. Time Magazine Monday, Jun. 07, 1954 As founder and ironfisted boss of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., Cosmopolite Colonel Sosthenes Behn built a $603 million communications empire that stretches from New Zealand to the Americas to Sweden. With 29 manufacturing companies scattered through 20 nations, Behn was still not satisfied. Since World War II he has put I.T. & T. in the consumer-goods business, now turns out such items as Capehart-Farnsworth radio & TV sets and Coolerator refrigerators, in addition to a broad range of microwave, switchboard and other communications equipment. But in Behn's empire all was not well. Last week Behn discreetly announced that he was turning over the operating reins to Major General William H. Harrison, president since 1948, though Behn would remain as chairman. The announcement did not tell the whole story. Behn, who owns only 17,000 shares, had apparently been squeezed out in the culmination of a fight for control of I.T. & T. that started in 1947. At that time Manhattan Millionaire Clendenin Ryan made a play for the throne, complaining against Behn's one-man rule and the fact that the company had paid no dividends in 14 years. Ryan succeeded in getting seven directors on I.T. & T.'s 23-man board before he gave up the fight (TIME, Jan. 5, 1948). Last March these directors, plus others who have fought Behn, set up an executive committee, began to nibble away at Colonel Behn's power. They thought that Behn was out of the country too much, and should not have gone into consumer goods in the first place. Chief power-nibblers among the old Ryan groups: Alleghany Corp. President Allan Kirby, financial partner of Robert R. Young (see above); New Mexico Publisher Robert McKinney, a cousin of Bob Young; ex-Governor Charles Edison of New Jersey; Chairman Arthur M. Hill of Greyhound Corp.'s executive committee; and Houston Oilman George Brown. In Manhattan last week, these five and four others on I.T. & T.'s executive committee persuaded the board of directors to change the company's bylaws, clipping Behn's powers and putting top control in the hands of the executive committee. While General Harrison will be nominal boss, the executive committee will run the show. It will not try to expand I.T. & T.'s consumer-goods line, instead will concentrate on I.T. & T.'s transmission equipment and other industrial products, in hopes of cashing in further on the new electronics age.

From Time Magazine... Monday, Jan. 05, 1948 The heavyweight fight between Sosthenes Behn and Clendenin Ryan—for control of the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. (TIME, Dec. 22)—ended this week without so much as a knockdown. Behn remained in control of the $397 million empire, as he had been for 27 years. Ryan, who had tried to get 16 of the 23 directorships (and control of the corporation), had to settle for seven.* Said Ryan: "I am satisfied; it gives the stockholders a bigger voice." *Ryan and his two principal backers, Financier Allan Kirby and Robert McKinney, cousin of Railroader Robert R. Young and chairman of Davis Manufacturing, Inc.; Houston's George R. Brown, who helped finance the purchase of the Big Inch pipelines; National City Bank's W. Randolph Burgess; Boston Shipbuilder Joseph Wright Powell; Missouri-Pacific Director J. Patrick Lannan. It appears that later on, Clendenin Ryan took over control of ITT and then used their wire tapping skills to his own ends. One of Broady's clients was Eversharp which was part of the Schick Eversharp group owned by Patrick J. Frawley, Jr. of The John Birch Society and Knights of Malta fame who was a close friend of Robert J. Morriss and Brent Bozell of YAF. Wonder if Robert R. Young was part of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad or some other railroad? James, given the fact that you have all this background info on Clendenin Ryan, you must have some interest in him either related to his funding of Ulius L. Amoss projects for the Polish MiG incident, the attempted kidnap of the son of Lenin incident or the links back to the death of Lavrenti Beria, correct? Or is it mostly just for his location in Baltimore and his relationship with Amoss as a white knight fund raiser with strong anti communist and anti union leanings? Did you know that Richard Condon also mentions Lavrenti Beria and The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in passing but not related to each other in any other way?

http://www.enotes.com/twentieth-century-cr...merican-mercury Trouble for the Mercury from Time Magazine Monday, Dec. 08, 1952 When William Bradford Huie took over the American Mercury two years ago, he promised to "recreate" the magazine in the great tradition of its first editor, Henry L. Mencken. But Bill Huie, who has been in hot water before with his books and articles (TIME, May 30, 1949 et seq.), found himself in trouble again. Almost at the start, he fell out with his backer, Manhattan Millionaire Clendenin Ryan. Five months ago the Mercury owed so much money that Huie was ready to close down. In time's nick, Huie found an angel: J. (for John) Russell Maguire, of Greenwich, Conn., who was operating principally as a Wall Street broker until the SEC forced him out for "flagrant violations" of the law. Later he made millions in manufacturing (Thompson submachine guns, electrical equipment, etc.) and oil. Last week Maguire's backing cost Huie the top section of his staff. Related Articles Mercury's editors Martin Greenberg, 34, and Gunther Stuhlmann, 26, resigned. Said their joint statement: "It had been our understanding that the magazine would strive to represent dynamic and sophisticated conservatism—in Mencken's words, 'Tory, but civilized Tory'—and that was the direction in which we sought to guide it." But in view of [Maguire's] lack of sympathy [with these views], we feel it impossible to continue." Recently Maguire put up money to help distribute Iron Curtain over America, by Southern Methodist University Professor John Beaty, a book that the oldest Methodist Church periodical in the U.S., Zion's Herald, calls the "most extensive piece of racist propaganda in the history of the anti-Semitic movement in America." He has also been a supporter of such propagandists as Merwin K. Hart, and worked with Allen A. Zoll, whose American Patriots, Inc. was listed by the U.S. Attorney General as a "Fascist" organization. Zoll at first was an account executive handling the Mercury's ads, later turned up soliciting subscriptions for the Mercury. To Editor Huie, Maguire's acquaintances came as no surprise. "I knew I was taking a calculated risk," says he. "I knew about Maguire's indiscretions and operations with the Christian Front crowd. But money to me is impersonal. If suddenly I heard Adolf Hitler was alive in South America and wanted to give a million dollars to the American Mercury, I would go down and get it—or Stalin." No matter who the backer is, Huie maintains he can control the Mercury's editorial policy, expects the magazine will ride out this storm, as it has so many others. Remember it was Russell Maguire who later hired George Lincoln Rockwell to work at The Mercury... Rockwell went to Brown University along with E. Howard Hunt and Anastase Vonsiatsky. Later Buckley was Godfather to Hunt's children.

Clendenin J. Ryan and his Freeport McMoran Copper hidden CIA interests... led me to find this page which is only included in its entirety because of numerous cross references. The Benno C. Schmidt Page Schmidt bio in "Cancer Crusade: The Story of the National Cancer Act of 1971," by Richard A. Rettig (Joseph Henry Press, 1977). "Rockefeller was instrumental in choosing Benno C. Schmidt for the panel. Around 1960, Schmidt had joined the board of trustees of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center at the request of [Laurance] Rockefeller, but was relatively inactive until 1965. He then became actively involved with Memorial Hospital for Cancer and Allied Diseases, first as a member of the board of trustees and chairman of the executive committee, and by 1970 as chairman of the board. He also became a member of the board of the Sloan Kettering Cancer Research Institute.... "Schmidt, a lawyer, had been a partner since 1946 of J.H. Whitney & Co., a New York investment firm, and managing partner since 1959. Much to the surprise of his staff, [sen.] Ralph Yarborough knew this New York lawyer-businessman. Schmidt was born in Abilene, Texas, in 1909, had attended the University of Texas, and had received both the A.B. and the L.L.B. degrees in 1936. Yarborough, who had a law practice in Abilene at the time, had taught in the Texas Law School and Schmidt had been in his class.... "But Schmidt was a Republican and his ties to Texas were to Yarborough's political opponents. Schmidt was a friend of John Connally, former governor of Texas, whom he had taught in law school. The conservative Connally wing of the Democratic party in Texas constituted the sworn enemy of the liberal Yarborough wing. Lloyd Bentsen, who defeated Yarborough for the Senate Democratic nomination in 1970, was a Connally Democrat. Schmidt was also close to George Bush, who, as the Republican candidate, ran unsuccessfully against Bentsen for the Senate in 1970...." However, these political differences were put aside, and Schmidt was chosen to chair the Yarborough panel. "He had worked for the general counsel of the War Production Board in 1941-42. Then, after three years as a colonel in the U.S. Army, he returned to Washington as general counsel to the foreign liquidation commission of the economic division of the State Department." He had also been chairman of the board of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Development and Services Corporation, established by Robert F. Kennedy; and chairman of the Ford Foundation's Fund for the City of New York. Schmidt - Cancer Crusade, p. 86 / National Academy Press, 1977 In 1967, Schmidt was a citizen participant of the Advisory Board of the Metropolitan New York Regional Medical Program, District 25, Yonkers, along with Mary Lasker and Benjamin Buttenweiser of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (who was a trustee of Lenox Hill Hospital during 1968-72). ASH founder and AHF research director George James, then Health Commissioner of the City of New York, was on the Advisory Committee. NY Metropolitan RMP / National Library of Medicine (pdf, 9pp) Former President George Bush was part of the Lasker network: "Schmidt gave a copy of the 'summary and recommendations' to George Bush, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, just before Thanksgiving. Bush was asked to pass this portion of the report on to the president so he would have it prior to the panel's presentation. The ambassador did convey the 'summary and recommendations' to John Ehrlichman, President Nixon's principal advisor on domestic policy, with the request that Ehrlichman transmit it to the president." Schmidt - Cancer Crusade, p. 122 / National Academy Press, 1977 Schmidt was chairman of the President's Cancer Panel in 1975, and ex officio member of the President's Panel on Biomedical Research. (FASEB Newsletter, Mach 1975.) President's Panels, FASEB Newsletter 1975 / tobacco document Sir Richard Doll's award from the General Motors Cancer Research Foundation: "Some 'old friends' on the committee which picked Doll, by the way, include: Jonathan Rhoads, Benno Schmidt, Lauren Ackerman, LaSalle Leffall, Brian MacMahon, Lewis Thomas, and Arthur Upton." (Memo from Knopick to Kloepfer, Tobacco Institute SVP of Public Relations, May 2, 1979.) Knopick to Kloepfer, 1979 / tobacco document The Advisory Committee of the Symposium on Cancer, presented by Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, the National Cancer Institute and the American Cancer Society, Sep. 14-18, 1980, included Laurance S. Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board of MSKCC; Benno C. Schmidt, Chairman of the Board of Memorial Hospital; James D. Robinson III, Vice Chairman of the Board of Memorial Hospital; Lane W. Adams, Executive Vice President of the American Cancer Society; Frank J. Rauscher, the ACS's Senior Vice President for Research; and NCI Director Vincent DeVita. The Program Committee included future AHF trustee Jerome J. DeCosse; Mathilde Krim; LaSalle D. Leffall, then immediate past president of the American Cancer Society, who shortly became a trustee of the AHF; and Frank J. Rauscher. Other participants included Sir Richard Doll ("The Interphase Between Epidemiology and Cancer Control"); Arthur C. Upton; Alfred G. Knudson (CTR 1986-94); John Weisburger, longtime research director of the AHF; R. Lee Clark and his assistant, Joseph Painter; and former Rep. Paul G. Rogers. International Symposium on Cancer, 1980 / tobacco document Schmidt retired as chairman of the board of overseers of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in 1990. His wife, Nancy, was also a member of its board. Pat Buckley (Mrs. William F. Buckley) and Nan Kempner were chairwomen of the benefit in his honor. (Benefits for Cancer and a Harlem School. New York Times, June 3, 1990.) CBS Inc. Benno Schmidt was a director of CBS during the 1980s. Betsey Cushing, a sister of CBS Chairman William S. Paley's second wife, Barbara (Babe), was married to Jock Whitney. Franklin Thomas, President of the Ford Foundation and a director of CBS and Cummins Engine Company, was close to Jock Whitney as well, and Schmidt and Paley had invested in Thomas's Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation in the 1960s. CBS director Henry Schacht, the chairman of Cummins Engine Company, was another of Thomas's cronies. (In All His Glory. The Life of William S. Paley. By Sally Bedell Smith. Simon and Schuster, 1990.) Babe Cushing Paley's death from lung cancer was featured in Congressional anti-smoking hearings in 1983. Edson Spencer, the CEO of Honeywell Inc. from 1974 to 1988, who manufactured anti-smoking "clean air" propaganda, was a director of CBS from 1985 until CBS merged with Westinghouse in 1997. Freeport McMoRan Inc. In 1935, officers and directors of the Freeport Texas Company included John Hay Whitney, chairman (19,850 common); Langbourne M. Williams Jr., president (1,000 common); Eugene L. Norton, chairman; Monro B. Lanier, vice president (800 common); David M. Goodrich (2,500 common); Godfrey S. Rockefeller (2,600 common); Chauncey D. Stillman (7,100 common); and Frank A. Wills, director (3,600 common). Kidder, Peabody & Co. held 4,728 common and 100 preferred. (78,196 Paid in Year to Grover Whalen. New York Times, May 7, 1935.) Its name was changed to Freeport Sulphur Company the next year. (Freeport Texas Co. Changes Its Name. New York Times, Dec. 10, 1936.) The Cuban-American Manganese Corporation was a subsidiary. M.B. Gentry, who joined Freeport Sulphur in 1935 as assistant to the president, was elected a vice president in 1940. He was a mining engineer who developed the Anaconda Copper Mining Company's Chuquicamata Mine in Chile. (Elected a Vice President Of Freeport Sulphur Co. New York Times, Dec. 27, 1940.) "Significantly, Freeport-McMoRan, back when it was Freeport Sulphur, positively heaved with CIA and elite heavy-hitters--not to mention persistent whispers of its involvement in the recovery of plundered gold stashed in Indonesia, where Freeport had the world's largest copper mining operation. Over the years, the Freeport senior management has included such luminaries as Augustus 'Gus' Long, Chairman of Texaco, who did 'prodigious volunteer work for Columbia Presbyterian Hospital'--which has been described as a 'hotbed of CIA activity'. Another director was Robert Lovett, who has been described as a 'Cold War architect' and was once an executive at the old Wall Street bank of Brown Brothers Harriman. He also served as an Under Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of War and Secretary of Defense. He was a best friend of Chase Manhattan Bank Chairman (and Warren Commission member) John J. McCloy. The Chase Manhattan and Citibank connection to Freeport was further enhanced by the board appointment of Godfrey Rockefeller, brother of James Stillman Rockefeller who was appointed Chairman of Citibank (then known as First National City Bank, or FNCB for short) in 1959. (Note, too, that Chase Manhattan and Citibank are the exact same two banks that were to issue the Project Hammer documentary letters of credit.) Godfrey Rockefeller was a one-time trustee of the Fairfield Foundation that financed a variety of CIA 'fronts'. Meanwhile, Stillman's cousin, David Rockefeller, was Chairman of Chase Manhattan and regarded as the 'goliath of American banking'. By a strange coincidence of fate, it was Robert Lovett and John J. McCloy who, together with Robert B. Anderson, formed Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson's team of financial experts concerned with tracking WWII gold looted by the Axis powers. Indeed, Lovett and McCloy were responsible for negotiating the secret agreement hidden behind the Bretton Woods Agreement concerning the establishment of the Black Eagle trust that was to make use of plundered WWII bullion in the postwar years." (Project Hammer Reloaded. By David G. Guyatt. Nexus Magazine Aug.-Sep. 2003;10(5 ).) Project Hammer Reloaded / Nexus Magazine Langbourne M. Williams Jr. Langbourne Meade Williams Jr. was married to Elizabeth Goodrich Stillman, sister of Chauncey Devereux Stillman, daughter of Charles Chauncey Stillman and granddaughter of James Stillman of the National City Bank, and a niece of Percy A. Rockefeller and Mrs. William G. Rockefeller. He attended the University of Virginia. (Elizabeth Stillman Engaged to Marry. New York Times, Apr. 15, 1930.) He was a boyhood friend of Buford Scott of Scott & Stringfellow, who was a director of P. Lorillard Tobacco Co., and they and a third friend were all married the same week. (3 Richmond Chums to Wed. New York Times, Sep. 11, 1930.) "Mr. Williams Sr. occupied an important position in the social world of Virginia and in the financial world of the nation. Born in Virginia on Sep. 12, 1872, he was descended on his paternal side from Col. John Dandridge, father of Martha Washington, and on his maternal side from Edmund Randolph, Attorney General in Washington's cabinet." His father, John Langbourne, established the Richmond investment banking firm of John L. Williams & Sons. His brother, John Skelton Williams, was a partner until leaving to be Controller of the Currency in the Wilson administration. Williams Sr. led a successful fight to oust E.P. Swenson from Freeport Texas Company, and Williams Jr. was installed as vice president and treasurer. (L.M. Williams Dies; Virginia Financier. New York Times, Apr. 3, 1931.) John L. Williams & Sons was the largest stockholder of Freeport Texas. John Tyler "Ty" Claiborne Jr., who was an usher at Williams Jr.'s wedding and his advisor in the proxy contest, was the principle securities analyst at Lee Higginson & Co. and he recruited John Hay Whitney. (Along the Highways and Byways of Finance. By Robert E. Bedingfield. New York Times, Apr. 18, 1954.) Williams graduated from the University of Virginia in 1924, and received a masters degree in business administration from Harvard two years later. He worked at Lee, Higginson in New York fpr a year before returning to his family investment firm. He became chairman as well as president of Freeport in 1957, after Whitney resigned to be ambassador to Great Britain. He was a governor of New York Hospital from 1941 to 1961, then an honorary governor until his death. (Langbourne Williams Is Dead; Retired Businessman Was 91. By John Holusha. New York Times, Sep. 14, 1994.) Williams was a trustee of the Bank of New York, and a director of the Sulphur Export Co., B.F. Goodrich Co., and United States Guarantee Co. (On Board of Bank of New York. New York Times, Apr. 16, 1941.) He was elected to the board of governors of the Society of the New York Hospital, which operated the New York Hospital and affiliates, including Cornell University Medical College. (On Hospital Board. New York Times, Sep. 12, 1941.) He succeeded James W. Husted [son of U.S. Rep.James W. Husted, Skull & Bones 1892], as secretary. (New Secretary of Society Of the New York Hospital. New York Times, Nov. 13, 1946.) It acquired land for the construction of a new building of the Hospital for Special Surgury. Stanhope Bayne-Jones, Skull & Bones 1910, was president of the joint administrative board of the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center. ($400,000 Paid Over For Hospital Site. New York Times, Feb. 27, 1951.) Mrs. Williams, Vassar 1927, was treasurer of the board of managers of the Bellevue Schools of Nursing, a member of the board of the Young Women's Christian Association, and a trustee of Vassar College. Mrs. Morris Hadley, wife of S&B 1916, was chairman of the board. (Leader in Welfare Here Elected Vassar Trustee. New York Times, Oct. 13, 1952; Mrs. Langbourne Williams Dead at 51; Welfare Worker Headed Junior League. New York Times, Nov. 27, 1956.) In 1948, W. Averell Harriman, S&B 1913, who was ambassador-at-large to Western Europe of the ECA, named Williams a member of his Paris headquarters staff, Alfred Friendly as public relations officer. (Finletter Appointed. New York Times, May 20, 1948.) He was to be a member of the New York City Committee of the Episcopal Church Foundation, headed by Harry M. Addinsell, appointed by Presiding Bishop Henry Knox. Other members were Prescott S. Bush, S&B 1917; Pierpont V. Davis; Russell E. Dill; Gayer G. Dominick, S&B 1909; Jackson A. Dykman; William B. Given Jr.; Eugene W. Stetson; Edwin S.S. Sunderland; Walter C. Teagle; and George Whitney. (Accepts City Leadership Of Episcopal Foundation. New York Times, Dec. 8, 1950.) Circa 1967, Williams was a trustee of the Virginia Institute for Scientific Research, founded in 1948, along with H. Rupert Hamner, former vice president of research of the American Tobacco Co. His boyhood friend, Buford Scott, was a contributor. Virginia Institute for Scientific Research / tobacco document The founder of the Institute, Professor of Chemistry Allen T. Gwathmey of the University of Virginia, had been an usher at Langbourne Williams' wedding in 1930. His lifelong research interest was the suface properties of crystals. Gwathmey died in 1963. Evaluation of Virginia Institute for Scientific Research, 1967 / tobacco document VISR News, Apr. 1963 No. 13 / tobacco document VISR News, Nov. 1963 No. 14 / tobacco document Godfrey S. Rockefeller Godfrey Stillman Rockefeller was the the grandson of John D. Rockefeller's brother William, and a son of William Goodsell Rockefeller, Yale 1892, whose cousin B. Brewster Jennings was the president of Memorial Hospital from 1958-68. (William Goodsell Rockefeller, B.A. 1892. Bulletin of Yale University. Obituary Record of Yale Graduates 1922-1923, pp. 173-174.) Obituary Record 1922-1923 / Yale University Library (pdf, 385 pp) Godfrey S. Rockefeller was on the board of directors of Freeport McMoRan for 50 years. He and his cousin Chauncey D. Stillman were elected together (Freeport Texas Elects 2 to Board. New York Times, Dec. 22, 1931.) He graduated from Yale in 1921, and two classmates in Skull & Bones 1921, Charles Harvey Bradley and John Sidney Acosta, were ushers at his wedding; also Henry Mali, John French, Richardson Dilworth, and his brothers, William A. and J. Stillman Rockefeller. Frederick W. Lincoln was his best man, and his uncle, Percy A. Rockefeller, S&B 1900, attended. (Miss Gratz a Bride. New York Times, Jun. 27 1923.) His wife, Helen Gratz, was from St. Louis, Missouri, and Mrs. Prescott S. Bush of Columbus, Ohio, formerly Dorothy Walker of St. Louis, was supposed to have been an attendant (G.S. Rockefeller to Marry June 26. New York Times, Jun. 7, 1923.) Mrs. Rockefeller was president of the Research In Schizophrenia Endowment (RISE), whose activists included Sen. Prescott S. Bush, Mrs. Prescott S. Bush Jr., and Dr. John Walker, S&B 1931, president of the board of managers of Memorial Hospital in New York City from 1965 to 1974. (Greenwich Fete May 4 to Aid Reasearch in Schizophrenia. New York Times, Apr. 24, 1960.) Mrs. Rockefeller also raised funds for the National Association for Mental Health, with Mrs. Albert D. Lasker as a member of her committee. (New Year's Ball Will Take Place In Grand Central. New York Times, Dec. 9, 1963.) Godfrey S. Rockefeller was a limited partner in Clark, Dodge & Company from 1936 to at least 1945. (Display Ad. 36. New York Times, Jan. 1, 1936 p. 43; Display Ad 194. New York Times, Aug. 9, 1945.) He was a stockholder in the Enterprise Development Corporation, a closed investment trust of heirs of William Rockefeller and Thomas F. Ryan, whose directors included Clendenin J. Ryan, Frederic W. Lincoln, and Morehead Patterson, S&B 1920. (Trust to Supply Venture Capital. New York Times, Mar. 31, 1948.) He was chairman of the Cranston Print Works, a Rockefeller-owned textile company, since 1946. (Godfrey S. Rockefeller, Dies; Executive in Textiles Was 83. New York Times, Feb. 25, 1983.) Godfrey Rockefeller was also elected a director of Benson & Hedges in 1946. (Other Company Meetings. New York Times, Apr. 12, 1946.) He exchanged his shares for those of Philip Morris in 1954. (Letter from Joseph Cullman to Rockefeller, Jan. 18, 1954.) Godfrey S. Rockefeller Dies / New York Times, Feb. 25, 1983 Cullman to Rockefeller, Jan. 18, 1954 / tobacco document "Certainly the real monarch of George Bush's Andover secret society, and George's sponsor, was this "Rocky's" father, 'Godfrey S. Rockefeller.' The latter gentleman had been on the staff of the Yale University establishment in China in 1921-22. Yale and the Rockefellers were breeding a grotesque communist insurgency with British Empire ideology; another Yale staffer there was Mao Zedong, later the communist dictator and mass murderer. While he was over in China, Papa Godfrey's cousin Isabel had been the bridesmaid at the wedding of George Bush's parents." (Excerpt from George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography - Part 2 of 8.) George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography / Internetpirate.com Charles A. Wight Charles A. Wight, a vice president of the Bankers Trust Company, was elected to the board of Freeport Sulphur in 1947. He was a director of Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. and McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., Inc. (Banker Elected to Board Of Freeport Sulphur Co. New York Times, Sep. 26, 1947.) In 1950, he was chairman of the executive council of Freeport Sulfur Company, and vice chairman of the 1950 United Hospital Fund Campaign under O. Parker McComas, the president of Philip Morris. Both were trustees of Lenox Hill Hospital, and Wight was treasurer. Wight was also a director of the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Company and McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. (Appointed Vice Chairman Of Hospital Fund's Drive. New York Times, Sep 11, 1950.) Benno Schmidt was a director of Freeport McMoRan Inc. from 1954 until 1997, when he retired and was named chairman emeritus. (Schmidt's bio also lists him as having been a director of Gilead Sciences Inc., where former AHF Trustee and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had been a director since 1988.) Other directors of Freeport McMoRan have included Robert W. Bruce III, president of The Robert Bruce Management Co. investment managers (1989 to the present); former presidential advisor Henry A. Kissinger (1988-1995); George Putnam, chairman of The Putnam Investment Management Co.; and also J. Taylor Wharton, chairman of the Department of Gynecology at the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, and Chancellor of the University of Texas System William H. Cunningham. Freeport McMoRan 1994 DEF 14A / Securities and Exchange Commission In the 1960s and 70s, Jean Mauze, the husband of Abbey Rockefeller, benefactor of the Memorial Center for Cancer and Allied Diseases attack on tobacco, was a director of Freeport Sulfur. (Freeport Sulfur's Powerful Board of Directors; Real History Archive.com; and $10,000,000 Asked in Cancer Attack, by William L. Laurence. New York Times, March 9, 1954.) Freeport Sulfur's Powerful Board of Directors / Real History Archive.com $10,000,000 Asked, 1954 / tobacco document Between 1969 and 1972, Robert C. Hills, the President of Freeport Sulphur, and Charles A. Wight, its retired Vice Chairman, were trustees of Lenox Hill Hospital, whose Chairman expressed the gratitude of its Board of Trustees to the Council for Tobacco Research for funding the work of Sheldon Sommers. Sommers was later a member of the CTR's Scientific Advisory Board. Other trustees of Lenox Hill included Benjamin J. Buttenweiser, Limited Partner, and Thomas E. Dewey, Jr., Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co.; and Honorary Life Trustee John J. McCloy, then Chairman of the Salk Institute, whose trustees engaged in assorted anti-smoking activism. Paul W. Douglas Paul W. Douglas was the President, CEO, and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Freeport Minerals Company (1975-81) and Freeport McMoRan (1981-83); also Chairman of The Pittston Corp. 1984-91, and a director of Phelps Dodge Corp. from 1983-1999. He was elected to the board of directors of Philip Morris when Mary Woodard Lasker's stepson, Edward Lasker, retired in 1980, and was on the board of Philip Morris until 1995. Paul W. Douglas was the son of Sen. Paul H. Douglas (D-IL), who in 1965 was one of four Senators who urged President Johnson to veto the Cigarette Advertising and Labelling Act because of its provision postponing the Federal Trade Commission's rule requiring health hazard warnings in cigarette advertising. His son, Philip Le Breton Douglas, married Elizabeth S. Kean, the niece of anti-smoker Gov. Thomas H. Kean of New Jersey. (Elizabeth S. Kean Affianced. New York Times, Dec. 12, 1982.) Genetics Institute Inc. Schmidt was a director of Genetics Institute Inc. from 1980 until it was acquired by American Home Products. James G. Andress joined the board in 1991; Fred Hassan, later the President and CEO of Pharmacia-Upjohn during its "partnership" in the World Health Organization's Tobacco Free Initiative, joined the board in 1992; and former American Health Foundation Trustee and NHLBI director Robert I. Levy, who was president of AHP's pharmaceutics division, joined the board in 1994. Genetics Institute Inc. 1996 DEF 14A / Securities and Exchange Commission OTA - Technology Transfer, 1982 Schmidt assisted in the Office of Technology Assessment project on "Technology Transfer at the National Institutes of Health" in 1982. Other participants included David Baltimore, Lester Breslow, Sir Richard Doll, Maureen Henderson, Joshua Lederberg, Arthur Upton, and Ernst Wynder. OTA - Technology Transfer / Princeton University Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc. Schmidt was a director since 1989 and retired as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Vertex Pharmaceuticals, March 26, 1997. "'Benno Schmidt was instrumental in the founding and early financing of Vertex,' commented Dr. Joshua Boger, President and CEO of Vertex." Charles A. Sanders, the former general director of Massachusetts General Hospital, emeritus director of Research!America and principal of the Washington Advisory Group, was named to the Vertex board on Dec. 12, 1996. (Mr. Benno C. Schmidt Retires as Vertex's Chairman of the Board of Directors, March 26, 1997. Vertex press release March 26, 1997.) Schmidt Retires, 1997 / Vertex Pharmaceuticals Vertex Pharmaceuticals 1997 DEF 14A / Securities and Exchange Commission Benno Schmidt, Walter Cronkite, and Arthur G. Altschul Sr. were honorary chairs of St. Bernard's School's fundraising campaign, circa 1999?. Altschul was a director of General American Investors since 1954, and chairman since 1961, until he retired in 1995. He was the son of Mary Lasker's friend, Frank Altschul. Benno C. Schmidt Sr. died in October 1999 at the age of 86. Benno C. Schmidt Sr. obit / St. Bernard's School Benno C. Schmidt Jr. Schmidt's son, Benno C. Schmidt Jr. was the president of Yale University from 1986 to 1992. "During his presidency, Yale's endowment grew from $1.7 billion to nearly $3 billion, the highest rate of growth among the major endowed private universities in this country.... Before joining Yale, Benno was the dean of Columbia University Law School where in 1973 he became, at age 29, one of the youngest tenured professors in Columbia's history." Another story of the remarkable success of people with the right connections. Benno C. Schmidt Jr. bio / Edison Schools Schmidt has been chairman of the board of Edison Schools (a private school franchise sort of like an educational McDonalds) since 1997. Cheryl Wilhoyte, Madison, Wisconsin's former Superintendant of Schools from 1992 to 1998, joined the company as Executive Vice President in 1998. Deborah M. McGriff, Milwaukee's former Deputy Superintendant of Schools, was Executive Vice President of Development. Joan Ganz Cooney, founder of the Children's Television Workshop, became a director in 2000. Edison Schools 1999 Form S-1 / Securities and Exchange Commission Edison Schools 2003 DEF M14A / Securities and Exchange Commission John Reed Schmidt Benno Schmidt Sr.'s son John Reed Schmidt is evidently named after his crony from Memorial Sloan-Kettering, Philip Morris director John Shepard Reed. He was a senior production associate with ABC News Closeup in New York, and a graduate Yale University."The bride, who will keep her name, is an associate with the New York law firm of Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine. She graduated cum laude from Yale University and received her degree from the Northeastern Law School. Her father is a physician in West Hartford." (Wendy Frances Conway Marries John R. Schmidt. New York Times, May 22, 1983.) Wendy Frances Conway Marries John R. Schmidt, May 22, 1983 / New York Times

Condon and Giesbrecht both mentioned: THE AMERICAN MERCURY and George Lincoln Rockwell and William F. Buckley, Jr. worked there at one time or another. Clendenin J. Ryan's ownership of The Mercury coincided with Buckley's publishing of God and Man at Yale. The fact that Condon knew about Gen Bonner Fellers, Ray S. Cline, Wickliffe Draper, Robert J. Morris and many others from that period leads me to believe he knew what they were up to even then. During 1923, while he and the noted drama critic George Jean Nathan were still editing the Smart Set, Henry Louis Mencken gleefully anticipated the new monthly to be published the following January by Alfred A. Knopf. Mencken planned "a serious review the gaudiest and damndest ever seen in the Republic."' Theodore Dreiser suggested several flashy titles. ''What we need," Mencken explained to his old friend, "is something that looks highly respectable outwardly. The American Mercury is almost perfect for that purpose. What will go on inside the tent is another story. You will recall that the late P. T. Barnum got away with burlesque shows by calling them moral lectures.''2 During the next decade, Mencken would thrust his arms wide, gather in as much of America as possible, and make it all part of the show. Under his forceful hand, the American Mercury would provide rollicking, highly irreverent commentary upon the American scene. From 1924 to 1933, ''Mencken'' and the ''Mercury" would become synonymous. This coupling would prove to be one of the magazine's greatest strengths as well as a salient factor in its decline. When the American Mercury was established, Mencken and Nathan were each given twenty-five shares of stockthe remaining one hundred were divided among Knopf, his wife, and his fatheras well as full editorial control.3 The magazine was intended for the intelligent, solvent, urbane American who was skeptical about brummagem utopias and the yearning to save humanity. ''The American Mercury will never have a million circulation,'' Mencken explained. "It is not headed in that direction. Its function is to depict America for the more enlightened sort of Americansrealistically, with good humor and wholly without cant. It is read wherever a civilized minority survives the assaults of the general herd of yawpers and come-ons. Its aim is to entertain that minority and give it consolation.''4 The American Mercury was called many things, a number of them vicious, but few called it dull. Even fewer called it unattractive. As Mencken wished, the magazine's rambunctious content was sedately clothed by its respectable title and the distinctive Paris-green cover. The paper was expensive Scotch featherweight, and the Garamond type was set in double columns. There were no illustrations in each issue of 128 pages.5 Mencken had chafed under what he considered the ostentation of the Smart Set's cover and the poor quality of its paper. With the Mercury, he had a magazine whose understated elegance set it apart from many of its competitors. As he had done when he and Nathan were editing the Smart Set, Mencken continued to live in Baltimore and make periodic trips to New York City. Highly efficient, Mencken and Nathan decided to handle submissions as they had done earlier. If the first reader liked the manuscript, then he forwarded it to his colleague, whose approval was also necessary for a piece to be accepted. Disagreements were rare, and authors received a quick response to their material. Encouragement and incisive criticism accompanied many letters of rejection. This editorial courtesy, the prompt response and payment, and the prestige of appearing in the Mercury helped to atone for the magazine's low rate of pay: two cents per word for prose, and fifty cents per line for poetry. During Mencken's editorship, the Mercury published William Faulkner, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Theodore Dreiser, Sherwood Anderson, Sinclair Lewis, and Edgar Lee Masters.6 But the magazine was also enlivened by a number of writers not actively courted by other magazines. Convicts and hoboes and dishwashers wrote for Mencken, as did taxi drivers and businessmen, physicians and clergymen, lawyers and diplomats and outdoorsmen. The Mercury remained open to newspapermen as well as academic critics, and the eclectic nature of its contributors benefited the magazine. The Smart Set had been primarily a magazine of fiction. But during his decade with the Mercury, Mencken's interest in fiction declined; he published less of it and reviewed it infrequently. The Mercury's nonfiction, as well as some of its more celebrated features, tended to be satirical. In fact, more than one-third of the essays published between 1924 and 1929 lampooned some aspect of the American scene.7 Some of the more vulnerable targets were assaulted repeatedly: pedagogy, chiropractic, Christian Science, Prohibition, puritanism, the sad credulity of rural America.s In "Americana," a feature continued from the Smart Set, the editors offered items gleaned from a variety of newspapers and magazines. Determined to prove the imbecility of the American mind, Mencken and Nathan did not lack material. For example, the Mercury recounted the story of the young man in Oregon who, believing that fasting would improve his health, died of starvation. And there was the sad tale of the wife who divorced her husband because, at the breakfast table, he took the milk for his coffee directly from a goat's udder.9 The initial printing for the Mercury's first issue was five thousand; a second printing was necessary, then a third. The January 1924 Mercury sold more than fifteen thousand copies, far surpassing the most optimistic expectations.'! By the end of the year, circulation had climbed past forty- two thousand." Nathan's resignation as coeditor in 1925 had no noticeable impact. (The men were heading in opposite directions: Nathan's interest remained literature, particularly drama, but Mencken was concerned with the American scene.)'2 By the end of June 1925, circulation had surpassed forty-six thousand.'3 April 1926 was marked by the uproar over "Hatrack,'' a chapter from Herbert Asbury's forthcoming book Up from Methodism. This episode brought the magazine and its editor even greater notoriety and placed both in the forefront of the battle against censorship. "Hatrack''the title is taken from an angular prostitute of that nameridicules evangelicalism, hypocritical religion, and the prurience of small-town life. The Reverend J. Frank Chase, secretary of the powerful Watch and Ward Society in Boston, found ''Hatrack" immoral, and a magazine peddler on Harvard Square was arrested for selling the issue in question. Mencken went to Boston to challenge the ruling, sold Chase a copy of the magazine, and was promptly arrested. Mencken was tried the next day and acquitted the following one. The victory cost over twenty thousand dollars in lost revenues and legal fees and a substantial loss of advertising, but the Mercury had taken a stand for freedom of speech, a cause that Mencken championed above all others. 14 At the end of 1926, Walter Lippmann called Mencken "the most powerful influence on this whole generation of educated people.'"5 Circulation approached eighty thousand in 1927 and peaked at eighty-four thousand in early 1928.'6 It has been argued repeatedly that the stock-market crash and the resulting depression began the Mercury's decline. Certainly, they proved to be major factors. Mencken's decision not to take the depression seriously hurt the magazine's credibility. Moreover, his iconoclasm proved less agreeable to the empty stomachs of the depression years. But circulation figures show that the magazine's popularity had begun to ebb prior to the crash in October 1929.l7 Mencken's satire, it appears, had run its course. It had been soinsistent, and in the end so successful, that there was less real need for it. Circulation continued to decline during the early years of the depression. A Jeffersonian liberal, Mencken defended laissez-faire capitalism and attacked proletarian literature. He was bitterly derided by the Left. In 1932, some of Mencken's old friends turned on him. May of that year saw the publication of the first issue of the American Spectator, edited by Nathan, Dreiser, Ernest Boyd (an Irish critic who had written a book about Mencken in 1925), James Branch Cabell, and Eugene O'Neill. Some of the American Spectator's features were outright imitations of those in the Mercury. 18 Mencken resigned as editor of the Mercury in December 1933, and his departure precipitated what Marvin Singleton has called ''the erratic downward course of the monthly.''l9 Henry Hazlitt, formerly of the Nation, edited four issues. When he was replaced by Charles Angoff, previously Mencken's assistant, the magazine moved to the Left. Knopf sold the magazine in December 1934 for only twenty-five thousand dollarsto Paul Palmer, formerly of the Baltimore Sunpapers.20 Never again would the Mercury evidence the quality or stability that it had shown under Knopf. In October 1936, the magazine was reduced to digest size, and the price was cut from fifty to thirty-five cents. Three years later, Palmer sold the magazine to Lawrence E. Spivak, a Harvard graduate who had become the magazine's business manager in 1933. Some old faces reappeared. In 1940, Nathan returned to his column on the theater. Angoff contributed to ''The Library" and served as both literary editor and managing editor, and Mencken wrote three pieces during 1939 and 1941.2' Under Spivak, the Mercury lacked the vitality that it had shown under Mencken. In 1946, the magazine merged with Common Sense. By December 1950, Spivak was reportedly losing forty thousand dollars an issue, and he sold the Mercury to Clendenin J. Ryan, the wealthy son of Thomas Fortune Ryan.22 Ryan published three issues under the title the New American Mercury and sold the magazine to William Bradford Huie in February 1951. In the issue of October 1951, Huie placed the legend ''Founded by Henry L. Mencken'' beneath the table of contents.23 The magazine reprinted several of Mencken's articles and ran a story by Herben Asbury about the Hatrack affair. In August 1952, Huie sold the Mercury to J. Russell Maguire, a wealthy oilman and munitions manufacturer. During Maguire's eight years, the Mercury ran more articles (much shorter ones) per issue and took a pronounced step to the Right. J. Edgar Hoover wrote for the magazine, as did Billy Graham, whose portrait graced the cover in January 1957. The Mercury defended Senator Joseph McCarthy and the doctrine of states' rights and attacked, among other things, the graduated income tax, the NAACP, the United Nations, NATO, the ACLU, and Zionism. In fact, for the remainder of its days the Mercury was engaged in a bitter battle with the Anti-Defamation League over charges of anti-Semitism. In January 1961, Maguire sold the Mercury to the Defenders of the Christian Faith, Inc., and the editorial offices were moved to Oklahoma City. Whereas earlier the magazine had been shaped by Mencken's skepticism, now it printed moral lectures and ran a number of reprints from fundamentalist periodicals. There was even an advertisement for recordings of Billy Sunday's sermons. Issues were missed now, and the magazine contained only sixty-four pages. In 1963, the Legion for the Survival of Freedom, Inc., bought the magazine and moved its offices to Texas. A religious editor was added to the staff. The magazine, which sometimes appeared late, attacked John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King. In April 1963, the Mercury became a quarterly. In June 1966, the magazine announced an agreement with the Washington Observor, a four-page, semimonthly publication: the periodicals had to be subscribed to concurrently.24 At the same time, the Mercury announced a merger with Western Destiny, a monthly. The Mercury also inherited Northern World, Folk, and Right, publications that Western Destiny had succeeded. Beginning with the winter 1966 issue, editorial offices were moved to Torrance, California. A year later, the Mercury's circulation was under seven thousand.25 The magazine lambasted the Jews and carried articles on eugenics.26 Under Mencken, the Mercury had discussed many aspects of black culture and had published the writing of George Schuyler, James Weldon Johnson, Langston Hughes, W. E. B. Du Bois, Walter White, and Countee Cullen.27 In 1967, the Mercury denounced racial integration and went so far as to state: "Negroes have never, at any time or place in the entire history of the world, created or maintained a culture above that of the stone age" (103:3-5). With the spring 1974 issue, the Mercury celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. The magazine drew upon its illustrious past in an effort to enhance its popularity. The lead editorial, ''If Mencken Would Return. . . ,'' announced righteously, and wrongly, that Mencken ''would clearly approve of the lonely course [the] Mercury has taken since his departure.'' The editorial spoke confidently of the magazine moving "into its second half- century" and continuing "in [Mencken's] footsteps' ' (110:3-4) . It was a very short half-century, and the magazine ' s course was not one that Mencken had plotted. In 1976, the Mercury published Austin J. App's "H. L. Mencken, Most Influential German-American Author." Marred by several factual errors, the piece lamented that Mencken's insistence upon freedom of speech had unintentionally "furnished ammunition to the proponents of pornography."28 The Mercury ran anicles attacking black studies, the supposedly pernicious influence of modern art in general and Picasso's paintings in particular, and attempts by homosexuals to gain equality under the law. One editorial questioned the existence of the Holocaust and declared that ''Adolph Hitler had embarked upon the greatest task of any man in history . . . the creation of a new culture on the ruins of the old'' (114:3-4). In the fall 1979 issue, the editor announced a change in ownership and bravely spoke of returning to monthly publication with a magazine twice as long as the present one.29 With the winter issue, editorial offices were moved to Houston. The next year, 1980, marked the centennial of Mencken's birth, and the spring iSSUe was dedicated to his memory. Besides reprinting one of Mencken's articles and carrying a centennial graphic, the Mercury ran a lead editorial about Mencken that elegized an earlier, simpler time when "the virus of social, racial and sexual equality did not find fertile soil in the minds of most Amencans" (116:3-4). This issue ended with a special supplement soliciting contnbutions so that computers could index biographical information about Amenca's fifteen thousand most dangerous political activists. This plea marked the magazine's lugubnous end. With no notice of cessation, the Mercury shut down after publishing one issue in its fifty-seventh year.30 Few Amencan periodicals have changed as drastically as the Mercury did. At its best, dunng the early years under Mencken, the magazine stood at the forefront of Amencan culture by examining this country with an enlightened skepticism. At its worst, the magazine drifted into the foul backwaters of fear and intolerance. But the Mercury's demise should not detract from its achievements. Because of its uncompromising stand against censorship, its positive influence upon other Amencan magazines, the cogency of its satire, and the opportunities that it offered to a variety of wnters, the Mercury succeeded, at least for a while, in fulfilling the high expectations that Mencken held for it in 1923.

From Time magazine... Behind the pink, tubby façade of rich Clendenin John Ryan, the soul of the selfless public servant throbbed. Unlike many another son of privilege, he did not collect show girls; he devoted himself to business and the sober pursuit of turning rascals out of government. His credentials were irreproachable: he was Princeton '28, Republican, a grandson of Financier Thomas Fortune Ryan. With other moneyed political innocents (and some toughened professionals), he plunged eagerly into the Fusion movement which made Fiorello La Guardia mayor of New York in 1934. The Little Flower made him his secretary, later gave him a couple of city posts, until the two reformers had a falling out in 1940. Noisy & Hopeful. Not until two months ago did Clen Ryan return to New York politics. This time his entry was noisy and his ambitions were high; he might even be a mayor-maker again. Ryan dumped $500,000 into something he called the National Foundation for Good Government. It would scotch corruption not only in New York but elsewhere. He railed at Governor Tom Dewey for not investigating Mayor Bill O'Dwyer's administration. He trotted down to City Hall with ten questions for O'Dwyer. Their substance: Is Slot Machine Tycoon Frankie Costello the real boss of New York City? Bill O'Dwyer contemptuously snorted "crackpot." Ryan was undismayed. He chirped back: "A question a day might keep Costello away." The next morning, resplendent in pearl-grey Homburg, Ryan was back at City Hall. This time he nailed to the front door of the Hall photostats of some old (and generally discredited) grand jury charges that O'Dwyer had been grossly lax as district attorney of Brooklyn. Ryan happily held every pose the photographers yelled for, withdrew the nail, and went away. The Wild Plot. Then the pros—Bill O'Dwyer and Tammany Hall—looked Clen up & down without great passion, spit on their hands and went to work. Before they were even half through they had made Clen Ryan look bad. In the dead of night Bill O'Dwyer summoned newsmen to City Hall, himself broke the wildest wiretapping story to hit the town since Justice Aurelio was overheard thanking Frankie Costello for his nomination (TIME, Feb. 7). A jaunty, 6 ft. ex-city detective and wiretapping expert named Kenneth Ryan (no kin to Clen) had been picked up. The mayor himself had broken him down in his City Hall office; $10,000 worth of telephone and tapping equipment had been found in the detective's Yonkers home. A plot was afoot, said O'Dwyer, to listen in on the telephones of several score of city officials (including his) and some big wheels in the Midwest. A prominent someone had given Ryan $100,000 to do it. At 7 that morning, after long questioning, Tapper Ryan asked permission to use a ladies' washroom near the mayor's office. Leaving his hat and coat on a chair, the tap expert beat it out a back window of City Hall and got clean away. While the cops bayed after him, Mayor O'Dwyer brought in the "someone" named by Tapper Ryan. This turned out to be a lawyer and private eye named John Broady, who, as it happens, works for none other than do-gooder Clendenin John Ryan and years before had gathered evidence for Ryan's annulment from the Countess Marie Anne Wurmbrand-Stuppach. This week Bill O'Dwyer and the rest of the pros handed the case over to the grand jury. Tapper Ryan, who surrendered after 48 hours, was indicted. Rich Man Ryan was questioned by the grand jury. Nobody had actually accused the chubby amateur of anything. They had just roughed him up some. New York City will elect a mayor this November and Tammany, it appeared, was bent on wising up simon-pures like Clen Ryan.

What can you tell us all about Clendenin J. Ryan? You are cited as being involved together with several organizations like YAF and American Mercury. The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for Freedom and the ... - Google Books Resultby John A. Andrew - 1997 - Political Science - 287 pages ... David Franke, George Gaines, Robert Harley, James Kolbe, Richard Noble, Suzanne Regnery, Clendenin Ryan, Scott Stanley, John Weicher, and Brian Whelan. ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0813524016...

From a previous posting by Paul Rigby: p.142: "Who, Amoss wondered, might be willing to invest in such a scheme? [To smuggle Stalin's son out of the Soviet Union – PR] He found the answer through a complicated chain of contacts, beginning with Mrs. Mary Vaughan King, who runs the Baltimore public relations firm, Counsel Services, of which the colonel is a client. It led to Clendenin Ryan, a somewhat quixotic multi-millionaire, who once served as an assistant to Mayor La Guardia, ran for the New York mayoralty himself on an independent ticket and the governorship of New Jersey, published a semi-political magazine, and sent large sums abroad to break communist-inspired strikes and influence voters in favor of anti-communist candidates for high office." Amoss ran International Services of Information and worked for Frank Wisner of the CIA. Even Carleton S. Coon worked for Amoss at the OSS as a Major under the Colonel. Coon and Amoss later worked with Robert Emmett Johnson in Baltimore at ISI. So now we have Amoss and Coon linked through Clendenin Ryan right into The Richard Condon Manchurian Candidate crowd like Brig Gen Bonner Fellers who was an ISI patron (Fighting Frank Bollinger), and "...that fascinating young man who wrote about man and God at Yale." (William F. Buckley, Jr. founder of YAF which was funded by Clendenin Ryan) and Ray S. Cline who was John Yerkes Iselin himself in Manchurian Candidate. Cline later took over control of R. E. Johnson when Cline ran WACL and murdered Archbishop Romero. What was the magazine Clendenin Ryan published? The American Mercury from 1950-1952, the Buckley years. What other groups did he help to start later in his career perhaps using his son Clendenin Ryan, Jr. as a go between and contact point with Doug Caddy his college roommate? The Young Americans for Freedom started at the Sharon estate of William F. Buckley, Jr. The Conservative Press in Twentieth-Century America - Google Books Resultby Ronald Lora, William Henry Longton - 1999 - Social Science - 744 pages The new purchaser of the Mercury was Clendenin J. Ryan, an erstwhile reformer who was a prominent financier and the son of an even more prominent financier, ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0313213909... The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for Freedom and the ... - Google Books Resultby John A. Andrew - 1997 - Political Science - 287 pages ... David Franke, George Gaines, Robert Harley, James Kolbe, Richard Noble, Suzanne Regnery, Clendenin Ryan, Scott Stanley, John Weicher, and Brian Whelan. ... books.google.com/books?isbn=0813524016... Anybody have anything else on this guy Clendenin Ryan? Do a google or a yahoo search on this guy and it may open your eyes. His family made their money in Copper apparently. Apparently Clendenin Ryan funded Ulius Amoss and his gang of spies and assassins and somehow Richard Condon found out about Bonner Fellers, Ray S. Cline and Wickliffe Draper and Condon even inserted names of several American Mercury writers to draw attention to this den of theives and their links to YAF, The American Mercury and The Pioneer Fund. Condon even mentioned American Mercury writers like Arnold Bennett, George Sokolosky, Westbrook Pegler and others from that circle of friends. Clendenin Ryan was involved with the Baltimore & Ohio railroad as well in some form or fashion and Condon mentions that company in ManCand, too. Richard Condon apparently wanted us to be able to follow the path from Bonner Fellers in Cairo, Egypt through ISI via Amoss and Coon into Baltimore, MD where the trail would be picked up with The American Mercury crowd which was first started in Baltimore by H. L. Mencken then later bought by Clendenin Ryan, who funded several illicit ISI projects. The links back into YAF began with God and Man at Yale (Buckley) via Clendenin Ryan, the publisher of The American Mercury in the early 1950's. Ryan's son also helped start YAF according to Doug Caddy while they were both students at Georgetown. Later the Mercury moved to East 57th Street in NYC when Draper was involved with that publication at the time when he also lived on 57th St in Manhattan. Richard Giesbrecht also isolated American "Mercury" in his statements to the FBI following the Winnipeg Airport Incident. Will those who could not accept the fact that Richard Condon knew what he was talking about finally admit their ill conceived or incorrect notions? Does anyone else have any information on Clendenin Ryan to share here?