What Is Your Theory?

[Brad Milch]

Hi, Greg

Thanks for the kind comments & I hope all is well in your life. I'm researching the life of Bill Decker presently. He goes back to the days of Bonnie & Clyde & worked for the then Dallas County sheriff Smoot Schmid. Schmid organized the original posse that went after Bonnie & Clyde (it later teamed up with the then Texas Governor Miriam 'Ma' Ferguson & Texas prisons Chief Lee Simmons hiring of former Texas Ranger Frank Hamer to locate & kill Bonnie & Clyde). The combined posse was successful in locating & executing Bonnie & Clyde due primarily to information J. Edgar Hoover's Bureau of Information was leaking to the posse via his Dallas & Louisiana agents (FBI Dallas Field Office File #26-4114, available online). Decker was flown by Schmid to northwest Louisiana to attend the autopsy of Bonnie & Clyde & was photographed standing behind their mutilated bodies following their brutal ambush & murders.

Years later as Sheriff of Dallas County, Bill Decker hired Deputy Sheriff Eugene Boone, the finder of the 'Oswald rifle' in the TSBD (who was a Decker loyalist). You'll notice in the 6th Floor museum's interview of Boone posted on YouTube that Boone is not asked if HIS car was parked in the area behind the stockade fence. Why? Probably to play down that Decker's officers initially were inspecting a suspected crime scene that consisted of where Decker's officers & staff parked their cars during work hours.

That's about as far as I am on Bill Decker at the moment. Within the past 10 years, US TV documentaries on J. Edgar Hoover have disclosed that Hoover had a file on Henry Wade, indicating Hoover mistrusted Wade.

I believe the issue of similar worded Sheriff's Departments witness statements originated from Sylvia Meagher in her 1967 book, 'Accessories After The Fact'. I remember reading some witnesses Sheriff department statements in the WC volumes while I was in high school. The school's library had a new set of all the volumes. Some of the commenters when I was on site in the early '70's gave me the impression they knew some of those witnesses in some capacity back when Dallas was a much smaller southern town than the appearance it gives today.

What was cool about visiting Dealey Plaza in the early 1970's was the realization that I was standing in the heart of the Dallas law enforcement community. The layout resembled a small family. The County jail, Records building & Red Court House were all a part of a legal system that routinely interacted with each other in the process of arresting people, conducting trials, incarcerations & prisoner releases along with the parking tickets & other infractions that bring in operation funds from law violators. At the time I was there, some of those employees that worked for those operations would walk over & let me & my friends know that they thought Decker was up to his ears in the ambush that occurred there. They scoffed at the idea that big time shadowy Federal operatives could have set up an ambush right under Bill Decker's nose without his prior approval & consent.

That perspective presented to me on site in Dealey Plaza in the early 1970's & repeated here has been long lost when the public focus of the ambush shifted to the CIA after the Frank Church Committee in the 1970's.

An interesting related side note: Law enforcement in Waco, Texas stands to rake in an enormous amount of revenue from the recent biker shootout at a restaurant bar there. Do the math: 170+ confiscated & impounded motorcycles, cars & trucks that will probably be auctioned off (if the owner cannot pay the impoundment fee or the vehicles are held as evidence), numerous weapons & body armor gear confiscated, attorney's & bail bondsmen fees, court costs, court fines, probation officers fees, community service & counseling costs & fees. Insurance rates jacked up or dropped. Some licenses revoked to boot. The bikers involved in that shootout will pay dearly for it from their wallets. Had they not openly intruded into law enforcement territory they might have been able to assassinate each other privately without the hassles they now face for being stupid.

What I was told by Dallas locals was basically that an ambush of JFK in Bill Decker's territory (right outside his 'front yard') could not have occurred for free. Everything associated with law enforcement everywhere in the world involves a cost to someone. Nothing associated with law enforcement is ever free & no one enters a lawman's territory without being noticed; particularly when a horrific crime is enacted against a president & Texas Governor within yards of where the Head Honcho (Bill Decker) runs his operation.

The opposite side of this perspective is to look at the JFK ambush site being Bill Decker set up as a patsy. The original patsy too (before the focus shifted to Oswald). This is an area I've never seen any JFK researcher venture into.

BM

edited to update info & correct typos

Edited May 20, 2015 by Brad Milch

[Greg Parker]

Thanks for the additional info Brad.

I wouldn't automatically discount that scenario at all.

[Mark Knight]

LBJ is such a good suspect, I ask -- what if we suppose, just for sake of analysis, that LBJ had nothing to do with JFK's murder, How do we size up [a] the assassination, and the way the cover-up has taken place?

With the assumption LBJ had nothing to do with JFK's murder, a striking fact is that LBJ nonetheless was such, is such, a good suspect. Right there I pause. Surely the plotters could see this beforehand, and what a beautiful distraction LBJ would have appeared to be. Of course he would go with the tendered patsy. To save his own hide. And to protect the plotters who were about to do him the biggest possible favor.

As for the cover-up, LBJ is not held in high regard by the Right or the Left, from what I've observed. Because of this, there's no reason I know to continue until today the cover up of LBJ's culpability, if there was any, in JFK's death.

Therefore, despite LBJ's being the most perfect suspect, as Robert Morrow and others argue effectively, I come down on the side of believing LBJ was the plotters' good fortune. Not merely because he would become a magnet for suspicions and therefore a great distraction. But also because LBJ was going to change the way the White House did business, in both Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

I tend to believe as you do...to a degree. Jon, I think that the question might have been posed to LBJ as, "If you were president, what would you do differently than Kennedy?" No mention of a murder would need to have been made. THEN, after the assassination, a simple phone call to LBJ, reminding him of what he said, and telling him of Don Reynolds' congressional testimony that very day...once they had him by his cajones, his heart and mind DID follow...and Don Reynolds was swept under the rug.

[Jon G. Tidd]

It's easy for me to argue LBJ foresaw the assassination, given how he ducked down in his car, according to at least one report, before some witnesses knew an assassination was in progress.

On the other hand, I'm struck by the report that LBJ huddled, crying in the AF-1 restroom shortly after arriving on AF-1. This report, if accurate, indicates LBJ was undone initially by the assassination, suggesting it came as a surprise to him. I concede he gathered his composure quickly.

I believe LBJ knew early on the afternoon of 11-22-63 that powerful, hidden individuals had delivered the presidency to him because those individuals preferred how he would act as president to how JFK was acting. I may be wrong. But if there was a conspiracy to kill JFK, I believe it had to be approved at very high levels here in the U.S. and carried out by skilled individuals who would disappear. Such an enterprise would hinge on whether LBJ was preferable to JFK.

Domestically, LBJ was more effective than JFK. Most pointedly in the civil rights arena. So certainly, JFK was not killed for his stance on civil rights. Authors have focused on Viet Nam as a reason for installing LBJ. I'm not convinced this is the only reason he was installed. Again I may be wrong. But, and on this I'm sure I'm correct, it's not clear how JFK would have dealt with Viet Nam. I understand the arguments and have studied the NSAMs. JFK was not sure which way to go in Viet Nam, although in the best case scenario he was inclined to withdraw American troops from Viet Nam. In 1963, if you want full-throated war in Viet Nam, you don't kill JFK to get LBJ. It's not a good bet from a risk standpoint.

I think the issue that tipped the balance was JFK's foreign policy in the Middle East. Yes, as Chuck Schwartz has written, JFK supported Israel. But Israel in 1963 was just one country in a contentious Middle East.

FWIW: I believe in Israel. But I'm opposed to war anywhere, Middle East included.

[Brian Schmidt]

I highly doubt the LBJ huddled and crying report. I've always regarded it as propaganda.

[Greg Burnham]

Jon G. Tidd said: [...]

Authors have focused on Viet Nam as a reason for installing LBJ. I'm not convinced this is the only reason he was installed. Again I may be wrong. But, and on this I'm sure I'm correct, it's not clear how JFK would have dealt with Viet Nam. I understand the arguments and have studied the NSAMs. JFK was not sure which way to go in Viet Nam, although in the best case scenario he was inclined to withdraw American troops from Viet Nam. In 1963, if you want full-throated war in Viet Nam, you don't kill JFK to get LBJ. It's not a good bet from a risk standpoint. [...]

John F. Kennedy Speech

Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy on Indochina before the Senate, Washington, D.C., April 6, 1954

Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be told the blunt truth about Indochina.

I am reluctant to make any statement which may be misinterpreted as unappreciative of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu and elsewhere; or as partisan criticism of our Secretary of State just prior to his participation in the delicate deliberations in Geneva. Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of the Congress which have been briefed – if not consulted – on this matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or an alarmist in my evaluation of the situation. But the speeches of President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and others have left too much unsaid, in my opinion – and what has been left unsaid is the heart of the problem that should concern every citizen. For if the American people are, for the fourth time in this century, to travel the long and tortuous road of war – particularly a war which we now realize would threaten the survival of civilization – then I believe we have a right – a right which we should have hitherto exercised – to inquire in detail into the nature of the struggle in which we may become engaged, and the alternative to such struggle. Without such clarification the general support and success of our policy is endangered.

Inasmuch as Secretary Dulles has rejected, with finality, any suggestion of bargaining on Indochina in exchange for recognition of Red China, those discussions in Geneva which concern that war may center around two basic alternatives:

The first is a negotiated peace, based either upon partition of the area between the forces of the Viet Minh and the French Union, possibly along the 16th parallel; or based upon a coalition government in which Ho Chi Minh is represented. Despite any wishful thinking to the contrary, it should be apparent that the popularity and prevalence of Ho Chi Minh and his following throughout Indochina would cause either partition or a coalition government to result in eventual domination by the Communists.

The second alternative is for the United States to persuade the French to continue their valiant and costly struggle; an alternative which, considering the current state of opinion in France, will be adopted only if the United States pledges increasing support. Secretary Dulles’ statement that the “imposition in southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally…should be met by united action” indicates that it is our policy to give such support; that we will, as observed by the New York Times last Wednesday, “fight if necessary to keep southeast Asia out of their hands”; and that we hope to win the support of the free countries of Asia for united action against communism in Indochina, in spite of the fact that such nations have pursued since the war’s inception a policy of cold neutrality.

I think it is important that the Senate and the American people demonstrate their endorsement of Mr. Dulles’ objectives, despite our difficulty in ascertaining the full significance of its key phrases.

Certainly, I, for one, favor a policy of a “united action” by many nations whenever necessary to achieve a military and political victory for the free world in that area, realizing full well that it may eventually require some commitment of our manpower.

Permit me to review briefly some of the statements concerning the progress of the war in that area, and it will be understood why I say that either we have not frankly and fully faced the seriousness of the military situation, or our intelligence estimates and those of the French have been woefully defective.

But to pour money, materiel, and men into the jungles of Indochina without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of “united action” assumes that inevitability of such victory; but such assumptions are not unlike similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper basis for determining the extent of American participation.

In February of 1951, for example, the late Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink, then head of the United States Military Advisory Group, in Indochina, told us of the favorable turn of events in that area as a result of new tactics designed by Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. In the fall of that same year, General De Lattre himself voiced optimism in his speech before the National Press Club here in Washington; and predicted victory, under certain conditions, in 18 months to 2 years, during his visit to France.

In June of 1952, American and French officials issued a joint communique in Washington expressing the two countries’ joint determination to bring the battle to a successful end; and Secretary of State Acheson stated at his press conference that:

“The military situation appears to be developing favorably. … Aggression has been checked and recent indications warrant the view that the tide is now moving in our favor. … We can anticipate continued favorable developments.”

In March 1953, the French officials again came to Washington, again issued statements predicting victory in Indochina, and again joined with the United States in a communique planning military action and United States support which would achieve their new goal of decisive military victory in 2 years.

In May of 1953, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles told the Congress that our mutual security program for France and Indochina would help “reduce this Communist pressure to manageable proportions.” In June an American military mission headed by General O’Daniel was sent to discuss with General Navarre in Indochina the manner in which United States aid “may best contribute to the advancement of the objective of defeating the Communist forces there”; and in the fall of last year General O’Daniel stated that he was “confident that the French-trained Vietnam Army when fully organized would prevail over the rebels.”

In September of 1953, French and American officials again conferred, and, in announcing a new program of extensive American aid, again issued a joint communique restating the objective of “an early and victorious conclusion.”

On December 2, 1953, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson told the Women’s National Republican Club in New York – in words almost identical with those of Secretary of State Acheson 18 months earlier – that “In Indochina…we believe the tide now is turning.” Later the same month Secretary of State Dulles state that military setbacks in the area had been exaggerated; and that he did not “believe that anything that has happened upsets appreciably the timetable of General Navarre’s plan,” which anticipated decisive military results by about March 1955.

In February of this year, Defense Secretary Wilson said that a French victory was “both possible and probable” and that the war was going “fully as well as we expected it to at this stage. I see no reason to think Indochina would be another Korea.” Also in February of this year, Under Secretary of State Smith stated that:

“The military situation in Indochina is favorable. … Contrary to some reports, the recent advances made by the Viet Minh are largely “real estate” operations. … Tactically, the French position is solid and the officers in the field seem confident of their ability to deal with the situation.”

Less than 2 weeks ago, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, stated that “the French are going to win.” And finally, in a press conference some days prior to his speech to the Overseas Press Club in New York, Secretary of State Dulles stated that he did not “expect that there is going to be a Communist victory in Indochina”; that “in terms of Communist domination of Indochina, I do not accept that as a probability”; that “we have seen no reason to abandon the so-called Navarre plan,” which meant decisive results only 1 year hence; and that the United States would provide whatever additional equipment was needed for victory over the Viet Minh; with the upper hand probably to be gained “by the end of the next fighting season.”

Despite this series of optimistic reports about eventual victory, every Member of the Senate knows that such victory today appears to be desperately remote, to say the least, despite tremendous amounts of economic and material aid from the United States, and despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu. It is, of course, for these reasons that many French are reluctant to continue the struggle without greater assistance; for to record the sapping effect which time and the enemy have had on their will and strength in that area is not to disparage their valor. If “united action” can achieve the necessary victory over the forces of communism, and thus preserve the security and freedom of all southeast Asia, then such united action is clearly called for. But if, on the other hand, the increase in our aid and the utilization of our troops would only result in further statements of confidence without ultimate victory over aggression, then now is the time when we must evaluate the conditions under which that pledge is made.

I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, “an enemy of the people” which has the sympathy and covert support of the people. As succinctly stated by the report of the Judd Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in January of this year:

“Until political independence has been achieved, an effective fighting force from the associated states cannot be expected. … The apathy of the local population to the menace of the Viet Minh communism disguised as nationalism is the most discouraging aspect of the situation. That can only be overcome through the grant of complete independence to each of the associated states. Only for such a cause as their own freedom will people make the heroic effort necessary to win this kind of struggle.”

This is an analysis which is shared, if in some instances grudgingly, by most American observers. Moreover, without political independence for the associated states, the other Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this as a war of colonialism; and the “united action” which is said to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely to end up as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention, without participation by the armed forces of the other nations of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the peoples of the associated states, with increasing reluctance and discouragement on the part of the French – and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground – such intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina.

This is not a new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon my return from the Far East as follows:

“In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam Government among the people of that area. To check the southern drive of communism makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms. The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure.”

In June of last year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act which would have provided for the distribution of American aid, to the extent feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom and independence desired by the people of the Associated States. My amendment was soundly defeated on the grounds that we should not pressure France into taking action on this delicate situation; and that the new French Government could be expected to make “a decision which would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment or resolution.” The distinguished majority leader [Mr. Knowland] assured us that “We will all work, in conjunction with our great ally, France, toward the freedom of the people of those states.”

It is true that only 2 days later on July 3 the French Government issued a statement agreeing that:

“There is every reason to complete the independence of sovereignty of the Associated States of Indochina by insuring … the transfer of the powers … retained in the interests of the States themselves, because of the perilous circumstances resulting from the state of war.”

In order to implement this agreement, Bao Dai arrived in Paris on August 27 calling for “complete independence for Vietnam.”

I do not wish to weary the Senate with a long recital of the proceedings of the negotiations, except to say that as of today they have brought no important change in the treaty relationships between Vietnam and the French Republic. Today the talks appear to be at an impasse; and the return from Paris to Saigon of the Premier of Vietnam, Prince Buu Loc, is not a happy augury for their success. Thus the degree of control which the French retain in the area is approximately the same as I outlined last year:

Politically, French control was and is extensive and paramount. There is no popular assembly in Vietnam which represents the will of the people that can ratify the treaty relationship between Vietnam and the French. Although the Associated States are said to be “independent within the French Union,” the French always have a permanent control in the high council and in the Assembly of the Union and the Government of France guides its actions. Under article 62 of the French Constitution, the French Government “coordinates” all of the resources of the members of the Union placed in common to guarantee its defense, under policies directed and prepared by the French Government. French Union subjects are given special legal exemptions, including the privilege of extraterritoriality. The French High Commissioner continues to exercise powers with respect to the internal security of the Associated States, and will have a similar mission even after the restoration of peace. When Vietnamese taxes affect French Union subjects, there must be consultation with the representatives of the countries concerned before they are imposed. The foreign policy of Vietnam must be coordinated with that of France, and the French must give consent to the sending of diplomatic missions to foreign countries. Inasmuch as the French did not develop experienced governmental administrators before World War II, they have guided to some degree actions within the local governments by requiring the Vietnamese Government to turn to them for foreign counselors and technicians.

Militarily, French control is nearly complete. The United States has in the past dealt primarily with the French military authority, and these in turn deal with the Associated States. Our equipment and aid is turned over to the French who will then arrange for its distribution according to their decision. The French are granted for a period of time without limit facilities for bases and garrisons.

Culturally, the French are directly in contact with the training of intellectual youths of Vietnam, inasmuch as France joined in the establishment of the university, installed a French rector, and provided that all instructions should be in French.

Economically, French control of the country’s basic resources, transportation, trade, and economic life in general is extensive. In Vietnam, estimated French control is nearly 100 percent in the field of foreign commerce, international and coastal shipping, and rubber and other export products. The French control 66 percent of the rice export trade. Moreover, possession of property belonging to the French cannot be changed without permission of the French; and France shares the veto right under the PAU agreement on matters affecting France’s export and import trade.

All of this flies in the face of repeated assurances to the American people by our own officials that complete independence has been or will be granted.

In February of 1951, for example, the American Minister to the Associated States, Donald Heath, told us that the French colonial regime had ended and that “all Indochinese Government services were turned over to the Indochinese States.” This is untrue. In November of 1951, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk again assured us that:

“The peoples of the Associated States are free to assume the extensive responsibility for their own affairs that has been accorded them by treaties with France.”

Last year, the Department of States assured me that:

“France had granted such a full measure of control to the 3 states over their own affairs that … these 3 countries became sovereign states.”

In February of this year, Under Secretary of State Smith stated that the representatives of the Governments of Vietnam and of France would “meet in Paris to draw up the treaty which will complete Vietnamese independence.”

As I have said, those conversations began in July, and broke off 10 days ago. And again Secretary Dulles stated last week that:

“Their independence is not yet complete, but the French Government last July declared its intention to complete that independence, and negotiations to consummate that pledge are underway.” –They are underway 9 months after the pledge was originally given.

I do not believe that the importance of the current breakdown of these negotiations has been made clear to the Senate or the people of the United States. Every year we are given three sets of assurances: First, that the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second, that the independence of the Associated States will soon be completed under steps “now” being undertaken; and, third, that military victory for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just around the corner, or lies 2 years off. But the stringent limitations upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign states remain; and the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is largely the result of these limitations. Repeated failure of these prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of their reiteration, and they have caused this Nation to delay definitive action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may well be past.

It is time, therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the difficult situation before us without the false hopes which predictions of military victory and assurances of complete independence have given us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first, that without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated States, without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable officer corps, a military victory, even with American support, in that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and, second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union.

Instead of approaching a solution to this problem, as Secretary Dulles indicated, French and Vietnamese officials appear to be receding from it. The Vietnamese, whose own representatives lack full popular support, because of a lack of popular assembly in that country, recognizing that French opinion favoring a military withdrawal would become overwhelming if all ties were entirely broken, have sought 2 treaties: one giving the Vietnamese complete and genuine independence, and the other maintaining a tie with the French Union on the basis of equality, as in the British Commonwealth. But 9 months of negotiations have failed thus far to provide a formula for both independence and union which is acceptable to the parties currently in the government of each nation. The French Assembly on March 9 – and I believe this action did not receive the attention it deserved – substantially lessened the chances of such a solution, through the adoption of a tremendously far-reaching rider which declared that France would consider her obligations toward Indochinese states ended if they should revoke the clauses in the French Constitution that bind them to the French Union. In other words, Mr. President, the French Parliament indicated that France would no longer have any obligations toward the Associated States if the present ties which bind them to the French Union – ties which assure, because of the constitutional arrangement of the French Union, that the French Republic and its Government are always the dominant power in the union – were broken.

I realize that Secretary Dulles cannot force the French to adopt any course of action to which they are opposed; nor am I unaware of the likelihood of a French military withdrawal from Indochina, once its political and economic stake in that area is gone. But we must realize that the difficulties in the military situation which would result from a French withdrawal would not be greatly different from the difficulties which would prevail after the intervention of American troops without the support of the Indochinese or the other nations of Asia. The situation might be compared to what the situation would have been in Korea, if the Japanese had maintained possession of Korea, if a Communist group of Koreans were carrying on a war there with Japan – which had dominated that area for more than a century – and if we then went to the assistance of the Japanese, and put down the revolution of the native Koreans, even though they were Communists, and even though in taking that action we could not have the support of the non-Communist elements of country.

That is the type of situation, whether we like it or not, which is presented today in connection with our support of the French in Indochina, without the support of the native peoples of Indochina.

In Indochina, as in Korea, the battle against communism should be a battle, not for economic or political gain, but for the security of the free world, and for the values and institutions which are held dear in France and throughout the non-Communist world, as well as in the United States. It seems to me, therefore, that the dilemma which confronts us is not a hopeless one; that a victorious fight can be maintained by the French, with the support of this Nation and many other nations – and most important of all, the support of the Vietnamese and other peoples of the Associated States – once it is recognized that the defense of southeast Asia and the repelling of Communist aggression are the objectives of such a struggle, and not the maintenance of political relationships founded upon ancient colonialism. In such a struggle, the United States and other nations may properly be called upon to play their fullest part.

If, however, this is not to be the nature of the war; if the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain aloof from the conflict, as they have in the past, then it is my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle.

The facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and atomic retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no avail, once such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to doubt, to review, and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people, then, as Thomas Jefferson once said:

“If we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion by education.”

===========END QUOTE===================================

Insomuch as the United States' continued failure by 1963 to enlist the earnest backing of the Native Peoples of Indochina in our struggle against so-called Communist aggression from the north, as evidenced by the Viet Cong in the south, it is no surprise that JFK's position to withdraw from that struggle had NOT changed from what it had long been since as early as the 1950's. Indeed, only if his objections to our involvement in Vietnam--that he delineated above--were no longer germane could we reasonably expect that he would have escalated US involvement had he lived to serve a second term. As he stated above, without the support of the Vietnamese people no amount of American intervention (money, personnel and/or materiel) could hope to be successful. By 1963 the situation had not changed in terms of garnering that support. Indeed, it had deteriorated even further. The government of Diem had failed to unite the population of the south in resistance against the North Vietnamese backed Viet Cong. Because JFK always opposed any US intervention without the support of the native population, if there was to be any chance of him escalating the war, Diem had to be done away with first. Theoretically, if the next Chief Executive of that country could unite the populace against the North, that would have allowed a case to be made to JFK for escalation. Two weeks following the death of Diem, a State Department Cable was sent out to those participating in the upcoming Honolulu Conference; a cable which confirmed that the agenda for discussions at the conference had NOT changed following the death of Diem due to the new political climate that resulted therefrom. Implementation of the JFK Withdrawal Policy remained the focus:

“(2) MILITARY, INCLUDING REPORT ON PROGRESS IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF TASKS ASSIGNED AS A RESULT OF THE MCNAMARA, TAYLOR MISSION*, AND OUTLINING PLANS FOR CONTROL OF INFILTRATION AND SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DELTA CAMPAIGN.”

[*Again note that the ONLY portion of the McNamara-Taylor (Mission) Report that was approved by JFK was the part recommending a complete withdrawal of the bulk of all US personnel by the end of 1965. There is no indication in this cable that he had changed his mind or that he was re-considering his earlier decision–not even in light of the changed political situation in South Vietnam.]

The assassination of Diem was like a shot across JFK's bow. When it became unequivocally apparent that JFK was not going to allow escalation under almost any circumstances, he too, had to be done away with. While I don't believe Vietnam was the entire motivation for his assassination, it played a significant part.

Edited May 29, 2015 by Greg Burnham

[David Andrews]

Domestically, LBJ was more effective than JFK. Most pointedly in the civil rights arena. So certainly, JFK was not killed for his stance on civil rights.

You're correct here literally, but are arguing a posteriori, as the times had changed. For his and RFK's limited support of MLK and their action against various violations or ignorance of civil rights in the South, the Kennedys were hated during JFK's administration.

Johnson - who was more than privately a racist - introduced sweeping civil rights legislation from a variety of motives: to carry on the "Kennedy legacy"; to satisfy his vanity in outstripping JFK in effectiveness; to distract from the Vietnam War and reduce anti-war demonstrations in the US; to attempt to neutralize the association of civil rights and anti-war protesters; to secure the African-American vote for the Democrats; to bridle Southern politicians, George Wallace among them, thus eliminating contenders for the 1968 Democratic nomination.

Johnson could pull all this off in large part because of Kennedy's violent death and social reaction to it: "The time had come" under Johnson; it had not come yet while JFK was alive and the incumbent.

I would put the Kennedy stance on civil rights, as it was perceived during his administration, in comparison to previous administrations, high on the list of reasons his death was desired by those US whites who hated him, including those with the power to have him killed or contribute to his killing. But not at the highest rank, I concede.

Edited May 29, 2015 by David Andrews

[Greg Burnham]

Domestically, LBJ was more effective than JFK. Most pointedly in the civil rights arena. So certainly, JFK was not killed for his stance on civil rights.

You're correct here literally, but are arguing a posteriori, as the times had changed. For his and RFK's limited support of MLK and their action against various violations or ignorance of civil rights in the South, the Kennedys were hated during JFK's administration.

Johnson - who was more than privately a racist - introduced sweeping civil rights legislation from a variety of motives: to carry on the "Kennedy legacy"; to satisfy his vanity in outstripping JFK in effectiveness; to distract from the Vietnam War and reduce anti-war demonstrations in the US; to attempt to neutralize the association of civil rights and anti-war protesters; to secure the African-American vote for the Democrats; to bridle Southern politicians, George Wallace among them, thus eliminating contenders for the 1968 Democratic nomination.

Johnson could pull all this off in large part because of Kennedy's violent death and social reaction to it: "The time had come" under Johnson; it had not come yet while JFK was alive and the incumbent.

I would put the Kennedy stance on civil rights, as it was perceived during his administration, in comparison to previous administrations, high on the list of reasons his death was desired by those US whites who hated him, including those with the power to have him killed or contribute to his killing. But not at the highest rank, I concede.

Agree 100%.

[Jon G. Tidd]

I believe JFK wanted peace not war, certainly not nuclear war, which is clear from his American University speech and his backdoor dealings with Castro and Khruschev.

Viet Nam, however, had become by 1963 a problem that just wasn't going to go away. There's no use IMO arguing about U.S. policy toward North and South Viet Nam following the Paris deal of 1954. The fact is, as 1963 dawned, the U.S. was committed to propping up the South Vietnamese Government. Propping it up against a fierce and determined onslaught by [1] Viet Cong (indigenous South Vietnamese) forces, and [2] North Vietnamese (NVA) forces. In 1963, the Viet Cong (National Liberation Front, or NLF) were the chief military problem for the South Vietnamese Government.

The Viet Cong fought much better than the South Vietnamese Army.

Added to this was the fact that Diem and his brother Nhu suppressed Buddhists, whom they believed sided with the communists, which led to the famous self-immolation of Buddhist monks in Saigon.

JFK could have taken a hike from South Viet Nam at any point during his presidency. But he didn't. Because an American hike from South Viet Nam would have led sooner or later, probably sooner, to a communist takeover in the South. JFK didn't want this. He didn't want war either. He was snookered well before his death. It's impossible, I believe, to say with certainty how JFK would have dealt with Viet Nam. I do believe he would have been more honest to the American People than LBJ was about American military presence in South Viet Nam.

[Guest Mark Valenti]

"I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. . . . [The United States] made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia."

[Greg Burnham]

"I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. . . . [The United States] made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia."

JFK made various statements to members of the media that appear to contradict the official policy that he had set in place. I believe you are quoting from his interview with Walter Cronkite, if I'm not mistaken. This was not the first or only time that JFK publicly positioned himself contrary to his actual policy. JFK appreciated the power of television and the danger of sound bytes long before the latter had been fully exploited (by today's standards) to pigeon-hole a politician. He knew that with the 1964 presidential election looming in the not too distant future that it would have been political suicide to allow his opposition to paint him as "soft on Communism." Whatever he said "on the record" to the media would potentially be used against him in the court of public opinion. So he operated through back channels often circumventing those whom he had placed in advisory positions. His having dictated the McNamara/Taylor Report--without the participation of McNamara or Taylor--speaks volumes as to his true intent, on the one hand, but also to the demands imposed by political resistance to his authority, on the other.

[Glenn Nall]

Through my reading and study, I've come to the conclusion that it was LBJ. It wasn't just LBJ alone by himself, but LBJ was the lynchpin at the epicenter of other conspirators(Texas Oil, CIA, industrialists/war profiteers) whom he had deep ties to, and whom had a vested interest in JFK being eliminated. LBJ was going to be personally and politically ruined and go to prison. LBJ had Big Oil and MIC money behind him, as well as the Texas political machine. He had deep relations and contacts throughout congress, the state of Texas, industry and commerce, as well as law enforcement to ensure he got off scot-free. I see the who and the why right there. LBJ had a clear motive and wouldn't have any problems finding willing co-conspirators.

a few really sound theories i've encountered in here - I'm personally leaning toward LBJ as the most likely benefactor as more and more evidence comes to light.

But I'm a bit surprised that more is not made of his impending imprisonment - perhaps it's because so few people can empirically relate to the horrors of prison.

everyone - well, most everyone - can agree that he was a dirty, greedy son of a bitch and more than capable of murder for his own ends; it is tough to imagine even him killing the POTUS. But I'm dead certain that the fear of prison, coupled with everything else that was going on, was enough to motivate him.

There's a question someone asked in Quora.com: "is the negative representation of LBJ in the movie Selma an accurate one?" After considering a number of appropriate replies, I settled on something to the effect that I haven't seen the movie, but from what i know of LBJ, an accurate representation of him couldn't have reached a proper depth of negativity.

I have lots of fun in Quora, but I will actually learn many things in this fantastic forum.

[Greg Burnham]

JFK played both sides against the middle - a trick most politicians learn early. Publicly condemn X, use back channels to feel out X for rapprochement. History and momentum (the "big mo") determine which road was traveled. With JFK in particular, action was the theme and driving principle. Take action.

What does "leaving Vietnam" actually mean, anyway? Remove each and every soldier, adviser, spy, CIA cover, etc? Given the then-current trend toward installing infrastructure in country, there would have been no easy way to whittle that down to the nub any time soon in the early 60's. Every action the US and its allies were taking in Vietnam at that time mitigated against any sort of full removal. Again, it seems to be the JFK two-track system of leadership.

As I've previously pointed out, the only portion of the McNamara/Taylor Trip report that was approved by JFK as per NSAM 263, in which it was incorporated by direct reference, was SECTION 1, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - PART B - Paragraphs 1 - 3, aka: The recommendation to withdraw "the bulk of US personnel" from Vietnam by the end of 1965. All of the collateral items (a through f) support JFK's stated goal of completing the military campaign, which would allow the remaining US "personnel" to come home by the end of 1965. So the withdrawal policy was not limited to military (ground troops), military advisors, or intelligence assets. Its scope reached all personnel. General Harkins was instructed to review with Diem that which would be necessary to "complete" the military campaigns in the Northern and Central areas by the end of 1964 and the Delta by the end of 1965. The choice of words is important: "necessary to complete the military campaign(s)."

Also note that in paragraph 3 [below] the order was given to withdraw the first 1,000 troops by Christmas of 1963. After JFK's assassination, those first 1,000 troops were, in fact, withdrawn. That "orders" to withdraw the first 1,000 had already been issued in compliance with NSAM 263 prior to the assassination--and subsequently carried out after the assassination, lends additional credence to JFK's commitment to withdrawal.

Further note the language in that same paragraph [3] instructing that any explanation of this 1,000 troop withdrawal should be "low key" within a broader context. This is consistent with his having recognized the danger to his re-election that this policy posed. If the opposition applied the wrong "spin" to these actions he would not be re-elected and could therefore not implement what he believed to be in the best interest of the Unites States and possibly the world. So the "explanation" was to be "low key" and the caveat that the withdrawal was consistent with a "long-term program" that would not impair the war effort was added for "political" reasons. JFK was covering all bases.

Lastly, in order to prevent his true withdrawal policy from damaging him before an election year, he gave the order through the use of a National Security Action Memorandum. He did not issue an Executive Order. By contrast, National Security Action Memoranda, are TOP SECRET documents. The unauthorized disclosure of their content is a serious crime. Public debate and potential criticism of his Vietnam withdrawal policy was therefore circumvented, as disclosure by his opposition of his true intent [NSAM 263], would have been a violation of law.

==============

The only recommendations from the McNamara/Taylor Trip Report that were approved by JFK as per NSAM 263:

[sECTION] 1: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

B. Recommendations.

We recommend that:

1. General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes as:

a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the Delta (IV Corps).

b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out of 30 and static missions are ended.

c. Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value.

d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength.

e. The training and arming of hamlet militia to an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.

f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced.

2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.

3. In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.

====================

JFK was preparing to declare "Victory!" in Vietnam and bring our boys home.

Chicago Tribune

October 31, 1963

Edited May 30, 2015 by Greg Burnham

[Jon G. Tidd]

This part was misleading to JFK:

2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.

There was no way the training and advising functions being carried out by U.S. Army troops in South Viet Nam could have been assumed by South Vietnamese Army officers and non-coms by the end of 1965. The SVN Army was in terrible shape. Its generals were mostly corrupt and inept. Its soldiers had no combat skills or desire to fight. The political leadership in SVN was teetering. The whole thing was on a downward trajectory. The optimism expressed in ¶2 is a lie. Or a big self-delusion.

IMO, if JFK really believed ¶2, he was, I'm sorry to say, not well-suited to his job.

I get that JFK believed in "nationalism"; that he saw the conflict in Viet Nam as a struggle for "nationalism"; that he understood the conflict in Viet Nam pretty well from his early 1950s visit to Viet Nam as a congressman. I also get that JFK didn't, for political reasons, want to be seen as handing over SVN to the communists. As I try to reconcile these facts with NSAM 263's incorporation by reference of ¶2 of the McNamara-Taylor Report, I come away with the view JFK was playing juggler when it came to Viet Nam.

FWIW, I think JFK, as a political animal, would not have cut and run in Viet Nam. Like LBJ, he would have left that to his successor. Fact is, in 1963, the U.S. is committed to propping up the SVN Government. That commitment was based on assumptions and had consequences.

Bottom line: If in the early fall of 1963 you favor war in Viet Nam, why do you sign up to kill JFK? It's a bad deal, a bad bet. You get an assassination and LBJ as president. LBJ doesn't do anything different in Viet Nam from what JFK was likely to do. GENERALLY SPEAKING.

Those who disagree: Bring on the American University speech. Bring on "The Unspeakable". Bring it all on. Then look at Viet Nam in 1963. And tell us what JFK was going to do there.

[Jon G. Tidd]

Mark Valenti @ post #61: right on.

RFK turned against the war by 1968. But as you write, Mark, in 1964 RFK was a true believer in the war. Because his brother JFK had been a true believer in the war.

Meaning, killing JFK had nothing to do with the Viet Nam war. Sorry James Douglass.