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"JFK wasn't the hero..."


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 On the 56th anniversary of JFK's death, the Washington Post published this letter:

 

JFK wasn’t the hero of the Cuban missile crisis

 

As I recall, to avoid having Soviet missiles within 90 miles of Florida, President John F. Kennedy triggered the Cuban missile crisis by threatening to board Soviet vessels carrying nuclear-tipped missiles to Cuba. Then, he avoided disaster by agreeing to give up our missiles in Turkey in exchange for the Soviets not putting their missiles in Cuba. But just a few years later, Soviet submarines with nuclear-tipped missiles were off all our coasts. Yet, the roof did not fall in.

So, Kennedy won a temporary reprieve from having missiles near one U.S. coast by permanently giving up our right to base nuclear missiles in Turkey. Is running such a huge risk for such a paltry result really a sign of “extraordinary diplomacy”?

David Karro, Falls Church

 

 

 

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It was my brother's 7th birthday-- October 27, 1962.  We didn't get nuked. 

We're still alive-- no thanks to General Curtis "Bombs Away" LeMay and the Joint Chiefs.

So, yes, JFK and his brother Bobby were heroes that day.  Big time.

Thank God for the Kennedy brothers.

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The military information in that little note is so historically incorrect that its hard not to see it as an intentional slam on JFK.  First, the crisis was over complete squadrons of Soviet missiles already in Cuba - a combination of medium and intermediate ballistic missiles.  Almost instantly  virtually all of SAC and the young US ICBM force was at immediate risk and within a short period all of it - as well as every target in the entire continental U.S. would have been.  The Russian missile deployment was supported by a major Soviet ground force with more tactical nuclear weapons, including short range missiles and jet strike bombers.  That was all in place in Cuba, not at sea, when JFK initiated the embargo on incoming shipments to Cuba.

Secondly the missiles in Turkey were due to come out anyway, to a large extent replaced by the Polaris sub force - and JFK simply put a sub into the Med, immediately canceling out the effect of removing the missiles in Turkey.

Finally, comparing the Soviet sub launched missiles to the missiles in Cuba is blatantly incorrect, in range, number and warhead size. Not to mention that problems with Soviet nuke subs took the entire fleet out of action for several years in the early 1960s.

JFK's solution to what was an existential strategic threat was gutsy and effective and very likely saved us all...so did the courage of the Russian sub captain who refused his KGB officers order to fire a nuclear torpedo at a U.S. destroyer.

Edited by Larry Hancock
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43 minutes ago, Larry Hancock said:

 

 

JFK's solution to what was an existential strategic threat was gutsy and effective and very likely saved us all...so did the courage of the Russian sub captain who refused his KGB officers order to fire a nuclear torpedo at a U.S. destroyer.

This is the story of the Russian sailor who stopped a nuclear holocaust.

https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/oct/27/vasili-arkhipov-soviet-submarine-captain-who-averted-nuclear-war-awarded-future-of-life-prize

 

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1 hour ago, Larry Hancock said:

The military information in that little note is so historically incorrect that its hard not to see it as an intentional slam on JFK.  First, the crisis was over complete squadrons of Soviet missiles already in Cuba - initially IRBM's but with ICBM's following.  Almost instantly  virtually all of SAC and the young US ICBM force was at immediate risk and within a short period all of it - as well as every target in the entire continental U.S. would have been.  The Russian missile deployment was supported by a major Soviet ground force with more tactical nuclear weapons, including short range missiles and jet strike bombers.  That was all in place in Cuba, not at sea, when JFK initiated the embargo on incoming shipments to Cuba.

Secondly the missiles in Turkey were due to come out anyway, to a large extent replaced by the Polaris sub force - and JFK simply put a sub into the Med, immediately canceling out the effect of removing the missiles in Turkey.

Finally, comparing the Soviet sub launched missiles to the missiles in Cuba is blatantly incorrect, in range, number and warhead size. Not to mention that problems with Soviet nuke subs took the entire fleet out of action for several years in the early 1960s.

JFK's solution to what was an existential strategic threat was gutsy and effective and very likely saved us all...so did the courage of the Russian sub captain who refused his KGB officers order to fire a nuclear torpedo at a U.S. destroyer.

Larry,

       I read somewhere that Robert McNamara and the Joint Chiefs had flawed intelligence about the actual number of Russian nukes in Cuba on October 27, 1962, and had grossly underestimated the threat to the U.S.    Is that true?

       My impression was that JFK and Bobby had thwarted the Joint Chiefs' plans to bomb Cuba back to the Stone Age that day, in part, because they didn't want to commit genocide in Cuba.   In the process, they saved the human race and the planet.

     

     

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The estimates of Russian missile force in Cuba were largely accurate, well based on photo analysis - and in recent decades joint meetings of Russian and US historians have confirmed those estimates, actually overall the American estimates were low, we did not identify the number of nuclear warheads, nor did we ID the tactical nukes and nuke cable short range missiles.  We also grossly underestimated the ground forces and strike aircraft,  good on ballistic missiles, not so good on the rest.  We also were unaware of the nuke torpedoes deployed. And we also did not know they had covertly moved tactical nuclear missiles within ten miles of Guantanamo and those were fully operational.  There are some solid and very detailed historical works on all this, not sure what you have read ?

Certainly at first JFK and McNamara did not fully appreciate the difference in the threat of missiles in Cuba vs. USSR based on the much shorter flight times and very reduced angles of flight which would have negated our radar screens....not to mention that we had virtually no radar screen on the south....missiles in Cuba totally outflanked our massive expenditure on the radar nets we had set up to give advance warning of launches from the USSR. 

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10 hours ago, Larry Hancock said:

The estimates of Russian missile force in Cuba were largely accurate, well based on photo analysis - and in recent decades joint meetings of Russian and US historians have confirmed those estimates, actually overall the American estimates were low, we did not identify the number of nuclear warheads, nor did we ID the tactical nukes and nuke cable short range missiles.  We also grossly underestimated the ground forces and strike aircraft,  good on ballistic missiles, not so good on the rest.  We also were unaware of the nuke torpedoes deployed. And we also did not know they had covertly moved tactical nuclear missiles within ten miles of Guantanamo and those were fully operational.  There are some solid and very detailed historical works on all this, not sure what you have read ?

Certainly at first JFK and McNamara did not fully appreciate the difference in the threat of missiles in Cuba vs. USSR based on the much shorter flight times and very reduced angles of flight which would have negated our radar screens....not to mention that we had virtually no radar screen on the south....missiles in Cuba totally outflanked our massive expenditure on the radar nets we had set up to give advance warning of launches from the USSR. 

Thank you once again Larry for perspective,  especially in light of the date with CAPA going on.  I've read in recent years about JFK and the JCS not fully realizing the depth of Soviet weapons in Cuba being set up at the time.  That the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles they didn't know about could have reached not just Miami, Birmingham or maybe New Orleans. But NYC, Washington and Philadelphia, even Dallas or OKC.

I.E. if JFK had not protested the state department and JCS we might all be toast.  How many out there can conceive what an ICBM was.  Or what it has become?

Maybe John K?    

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He definitely deserves that credit,  honestly everybody underestimated the risk that Khrushchev was willing to take - and he in turn was seriously scared of the massive American strategic advantage at that point in time and felt it had to be countered that we might make a first strike.  JFK was actually sensitive to that point and raised it in a high level strategic review.

Actually by the time we fully realized what they had pulled off the initial missiles coming into operation were capable of taking out most of SAC and any other target east of the Rockies - with the next to be installed covering all the continental U.S.  The ballistic missiles being placed in Cuba were medium and intermediate range weapons - initially developed for use against western Europe.  The Soviets actually had so few intercontinental missiles that during the crisis they pulled a planetary probe off a space missile and reconfigured it with a nuclear warhead. 

The really scary part was that we literally had no radar in place at all to deal with missiles launched from only 90 miles off shore - there would have been no warning at all. Worse yet, at the height of the crisis, we were desperately trying to redirect radar installations and in the process triggered a couple of false alerts, one specifically warning of a missile from Cuba impacting Florida.  There was no time to respond and it was only when the local atomic blast detectors did not record an impact that anybody was willing to breath.

JFK did a masterful job of holding things together - and it was only years later that we learned the Soviet rocket forces had a standing order for their missile units was to launch rather than lose their weapons; if they had come under any sort of attack they would have launched and again after the fact we learned that we had missed a good number of their sites and entirely missed the warhead storage sites. 

Any strike of any sort against the installations on the island would have precipitated a full scale atomic exchange.  Its only been in the last couple of decades that historians have come to realize how dangerous it really was - and I remember being pretty darn scared even without knowing what we know now.  I recall hearing the broadcast that the Cubans had shot down one of our U-2s and we all looked around and figured it was done  (I happen live only about 30 miles from one of the first Atlas ICBM bases...downwind no less).  We assumed we would be a primary target.

Edited by Larry Hancock
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Larry,

     If I recall correctly, from watching (and reading) Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick's Untold History of the United States, the Joint Chiefs were also planning to nuke targets throughout the USSR and China on 10/27/62-- using, among other things, a fleet of bombers at Okinawa.  

     Did Oliver Stone tell that shocking story correctly, in your view?

Edited by W. Niederhut
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My respect for Stone as a historian is somewhat limited - being honest here - because I think he has a particular worldview and sensationalizes a bit.  My own view of the military situation during this era is in Surprise Attack and I try to be as balanced as possible.

But to your point, if you trace the evolution of the SIOP, which was the Nuclear strike plan, it is absolutely true that it evolved, under Eisenhower's direction, to contain a target list that included not only Russia and all the Eastern block nations but also China.  That plan had grown and been in place for some years before 1962 and continued under JFK although when he realized how much it limited his options and how simplistic it was, he immediately ordered it to be redefined.  There is no doubt he was appalled by it but as with many of our commanders in chief he had not really taken a close look at it until a crisis arose.

I present the evolution of the SIOP from its origins though JFK and beyond but if you really want the true and detailed history of it I would recommend Stockpile; the story behind 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons by Jerry Miller. Its not pretty but it is balanced and accurate.

In any event, that was the SIOP plan as of the Cuban missile crisis but it was nothing unique to that time or situation, it had been in place for years before that, signed off on by Ike and with very specific presidential direction on when and how it could be authorized.  JFK would have had to quickly come up with a new, tailored strike plan for Cuba if it had come to that - much as he had for Berlin, with a plan that at its maximum did involve nuclear weapons to be used against a Russian advance. 

The real risk was that if he had approved a limited tactical strike on the missile sites - as I described above - that would likely have caused a Russian launch of one or more of the Cuban missiles given that was Russian field doctrine.  And that could have lead to a very large scale retaliation with JFK having little time to exercise restraint.

 

Edited by Larry Hancock
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