HOWARD HUNT’S CLAIM THAT CIA HAD AN ASSASSIN UNIT AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ASSASSINATING PRESIDENT KENNEDY

[Douglas Caddy]

HOWARD HUNT’S CLAIM THAT CIA HAD AN ASSASSIN UNIT

AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ASSASSINATING PRESIDENT KENNEDY

BY

Steve P. Jenkins and Douglas Caddy

 

 

Prologue

The assassination of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963 was planned and carried out by powerful rogue leaders in the U.S. military aided by key elements within the Central Intelligence Agency. Those behind the coup to overthrow JFK believed that he could no longer be trusted to protect the national security of the country because of his attempt to build a relationship of peace with the Soviet Union through mutual cooperation in outer space projects. The coup’s goal was falsely to blame the Soviet Union for the president’s murder so that the U.S. could mount a sudden nuclear attack on Russia and destroy that country. The planners believed that the U.S. had the power to achieve this goal without the U.S. suffering a counter attack because for a brief period of time the U.S. still had the preeminent power to attack. Delay would mean the Soviet Union would soon possess nuclear war power that would make such a sudden attack unfeasible without the mutual assured destruction of both countries.

The Soviet Union immediately recognized that the assassination of JFK put it in imminent peril. Soviet President Khrushchev upon learning of JFK’s death rushed back to the Kremlin. He then delivered to President Lyndon Johnson a letter on November 24 that showed mutual understanding of what was at stake.

President Johnson and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover devised a strategy to prevent the military’s planned nuclear attack from going forward. The centerpiece of this strategy was the creation of the Warren Commission. President Johnson persuaded Chief Justice Earl Warren to head the group by telling him that without such a commission nuclear war might break out between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. LBJ used the same argument to persuade Senator Richard Russell of Georgia to join the Commission.

The goal of President Johnson and FBI Director Hoover, both of whom likely had prior knowledge of the assassination plan, was to prevent the U.S. military from  going forward with the nuclear attack while at the time making certain that the country’s future military and intelligence capabilities were not permanently harmed. LBJ and Hoover were afraid of what would happen if the American people learned that the military and CIA were behind the assassination of JFK in a coup whose aim was to use the crisis to launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union that would kill millions of Russians. An orchestrated cover-up of the assassination was deemed to be in the national interest. The alternative was too horrible to contemplate.

The purposely flawed Warren Commission report represented a compromise that all principal parties involved in the assassination or who were aware of its planning were unhappy with but who also recognized it as being necessary. Under the agreed compromise the military’s plan to attack the Soviet Union collapsed but none of the coup’s participants or those aware of the plan would ever face prosecution for the assassination or be investigated by the Warren Commission.

To divert attention from what was at stake Lee Harvey Oswald, who accurately described himself as a patsy, had to be killed soon after the assassination. Framing Oswald as a Soviet spy was an essential part of the coup’s plan to mobilize public outrage against Russia. Oswald was the perfect patsy because of his unique actions before and after his defection to Russia and then upon his return to the U.S. Ever since November 22, 1963 public attention has been focused primarily on Oswald as the sole assassin and never on the plan of the military and CIA to portray patsy Oswald as a Soviet agent as the excuse to attack the Soviet Union. The whole thing was a magic trick that has worked for almost six decades.

On October 22, 2021 President Joe Biden announced that disclosure of the remaining classified documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy would again be delayed, this time until December 15, 2022, nearly 60 years after JFK’s murder.

President Biden said that the delay was “necessary to protect against identifiable harm to the military defense, intelligence operations, law enforcement, or the conduct of foreign relations” and that this “outweighs the public interest in immediate disclosure.”

 What follows is the presentation of detailed evidence concerning the assassination of President Kennedy that provides insights and clues to what still is being withheld by the government.

 

***********

     Why and how was President Kennedy murdered? An article in The New York Times is the starting point in answering these questions. In the article Howard Hunt, who acknowledged that he was a bench warmer in the assassination but who may have played a greater role, sent a signal about the plot that has been long overlooked.

     On December 26, 1975, the New York Times published an article titled, “Hunt Says C.I.A Had Assassin Unit” by reporter John Crewdon. The article was based on an interview that Crewdon conducted with Howard Hunt at Elgin Federal Prison in Florida where Hunt was serving his Watergate case sentence. In the article Hunt declared that he had met with Colonel Boris T. Pash, who headed the P7 branch within the CIA, in 1954 or 1955 to explore the assassination of a double agent stemming from a CIA operation involving Albania.

     After the article was published, Colonel Pash contacted the New York Times that agreed to publish a subsequent article on January 8, 1976 titled, “Retired Colonel Denies Heading CIA Unit for Assassinations.”

     The Times interview of Hunt followed an article that appeared in September 1975 in the Washington Post that alleged Hunt had been assigned by a White House supervisor to assassinate columnist Jack Anderson. Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, promptly said his committee would investigate the charges concerning Pash and Jack Anderson.

     The Committee’s interview of Hunt in prison took place on January 10, 1976.  Committee professional staff member Frederick Baron conducted the interview. Key excerpts from the 82 page interview appear below.

      Hunt joined the CIA in 1949. Prior that he had been with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. His meeting with Pash took place about six years after he joined the agency. After Hunt made internal inquiries within the agency about there being a unit assigned to assassination, he was steered to Pash.

      Mr. Hunt. “When I first inquired around for the location of Colonel Pash and his assistant , the reaction I encountered was a rather jesting one, and the impression I gained was here were a couple of men who were drawing salaries and doing very little.

       “And so when Colonel Pash seemed reluctant to become involved in responding affirmatively to my questions, my inference was that Colonel Pash and [excised] could well not have such a capability but for purposes of employment and status, this was the job they had. But they didn’t want anyone to call upon them to activate their particular abilities.

     “Now that was my impression, and I was a little disgusted by it. I think I talked to the chief of the PP state later, who was of course well aware of the Albanian problem and I said that I didn’t get any satisfaction from Pash, but it doesn’t make any difference because we don’t have the name of the suspected individual.”

     “Mr. Baron. Just to stop here for a second and clear up some of these details, were you under the impression that what you just called wet affairs, assassinations, kidnappings, or other removals from the scene of troublesome individuals was the primary function of this unit that Pash and [excised] were running?”

      “Mr. Hunt. Yes. In fact the only. As far as I knew, they had no other function. If they had another function, I was never made aware of what it was.” 

     “Within a very short period of time after I had my interview with Mr. Pash, I was transferred to the Guatemala project, the overthrow of Guatemala.”

     Mr. Baron. “As you may know, William Harvey was tasked in 1961 with setting up an executive action capability at the CIA, tasked originally by Richard Bissell to carry out assassinations if required.

     “Do you have any knowledge from any source of any connection between what Harvey was doing in the early ‘60s in relation to assassination attempts of executive action capabilities and what General Pash was doing in the ‘50s, according to your story?”

     Mr. Hunt: “No, I don’t draw any relationship; really…..I would like to dilate a bit on that because it never occurred to me that the agency did not have an assassination capability. This perhaps was the result of my earlier contact with Colonel Pash or what I heard about him…..”

     Mr. Baron. “While we are on this limb away from the details of the Pash story, let’s follow up for a minute.

     “Were you knowledgeable of any assassination operation against other foreign leaders than Castro?”

     Mr. Hunt: “No, I was not.”

     Mr. Baron. “And were you aware if any assassination planning or assassination actions against any domestic political leaders?”

     Mr. Hunt. “No, I was not.”

     Mr. Baron. “Was it your impression when you left that conversation that it was indeed a function of Colonel Pash’s to carry out assassinations like this?”

     Mr. Hunt. “Yes.”

     Mr. Baron. “Was there any follow-up?”

     Mr. Hunt: “Albeit reluctantly, because my impression was that he was a man who really didn’t want to be disturbed. He was comfortable where he was.”

     Mr. Baron. “Colonel Pash was head of P7, which was one of the CIA’s planning branches.  “[Excised] who has also testified this past week on this subject, said it was his recollections of the charter of P7 was that it gave P7 responsibility for assassinations, kidnappings and other functions as higher authority may assign or as were not being performed by other units.

     “Does this square with the impression that you were given by your superiors of the functions of Colonel Pash’s unit?”

     Mr. Hunt. “Yes. I didn’t even know that [excised] was still alive. [Excised] then supports my functional recollections, let’s say.”

     Mr. Hunt. “Well, I note that the colonel has said that he was never involved in any assassination planning between 1949 and 1951.

     “Now of course in my recollection I put the period of time several years later, and I am always suspicious of non-service CIA record for a paramilitary personnel. And I would say Lucian Conein, for example, is an individual who was apparently in and out of the CIA and military capacity for a long period of time, from my own apparent devotion to this career of foreign service, in the foreign service and out of the foreign service to the Department of the Army and back.

     “So a mere referral of not having been assigned to the CIA at a particular time is something that I think would bear looking into, as it did in the case of Colonel Pash.”

      Mr. Baron. “Let me move you back in Allen Dulles’s heyday at the agency and ask you – and this is at a very general level, for some sort of picture first, your relationship to Dulles and secondly, the way he operated and made decisions both formally and informally.”

     Mr. Hunt. “Well, my direct exposure to Allen Dulles began in the wake of the Bay of Pigs when I was transferred to his office until I guess just before his retirement, by Dick Bissell. They needed someone in Dulles’ office to – I believe I’ve covered this in my autobiography, as a matter of fact – to answer the many questions that were coming in to the agency from let’s say the ‘Green Committee,’ that was investigating the Bay of Pigs failure, and the press, the New York Times; a lot of questions were being posed to Allen Dulles and to the agency about the Bay of Pigs, and I had about as good a view of certainly the political background of the effort as anybody because I directed it for a period of time until just before, when I resigned that post.

     “Mr. Dulles at that time was very harassed. Bobby Kennedy was harassing him almost daily at these meetings. The story had been put out, of course, that this was a CIA failure. None of us associated with the project, least of all Mr. Dulles, believe that for a minute. We looked upon it as a failure of nerve by the New Frontier since what had happened was that we had made – the president had given undertakings to the Cuban leadership and to our own paramilitary people, and had failed to carry them out.

     “However, this fact was successfully disguised for a number of years, but Dulles and Dick Bissell paid the price.

     “In any event, the Bay of Pigs cost Dulles his leadership of the agency, and I had the utmost respect for him. I was associated with him as an assistant for the special Cuban Bay of Pigs purposes, for a period of several months prior to, perhaps six months prior to his eventually retirement.

     “You see, I’m an unrepentant admirer of Allen Dulles and the way we used to do business. Why do I say that? Because the way we did business during Mr. Dulles’s directorate was precisely the way we did it in OSS during General Donovan’s creation and direction of that organization. In OSS, which was Allen Dulles’s training ground as much as mine, you had the feeling that no idea ever was stifled simply for lack of hearing. General Donovan was open to all sorts of suggestions just as Allen Dulles was later, and this was a great feeling for creative minds within the Agency, during a large part of my career, that if you had a good idea, it would be reviewed, considered and accepted or rejected on its merits.”

       Here is the link to the testimony of Mr. Hunt before the Senate Committee:

https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/1976-Executive-Session-Hunt-testimony-on-Pash.pdf?fbclid=IwAR29T5eX15JNpC5PmcCFn8OjPWxedih4WoBrd07uu4X9nIfuk8Ep6YJJTS0

     The foregoing review of Hunt’s testimony was taken after the Committee’s prior interview of Colonel Pash that occurred on January 7, 1976 in Washington, D.C. It made more sense for purposes of this article to learn what Hunt had to say in his interview before learning what Colonel Pasb had to say about Hunt’s allegations in the Times article.

     Key excerpts from the 59 page interview appear below:

     Mr. Pash: “However, throughout my activity with planning branch 7, we never had any request or any plans that we may have initiated to assassinate, as far as I know, you see.”

     Mr. Baron: “So you are saying assassinations could have been mentioned in the charter or in some addition or explanation of the charter, but as far as you were concerned, it was something that was on paper and was not an active function of P7.”

     Mr. Pash. “No, it wasn’t. We never once within P7, to my knowledge, discussed even the idea, should we develop something in that line. Neither assassination or kidnapping.”

     Mr. Baron. “To stay on that general level for a moment, in the rest of your associations with the CIA on detail from the Army, were you aware of any discussion of assassination plans  or attempts of even the suggestion that an assassination be attempted?”

     Mr. Pash. “No, I never heard that.”

     Mr. Baron. “But it would be your testimony that in terms of an organizational plan or even a serious request for forming an organizational plan for an assassination, you never heard such a plan with even a request?”

     Mr. Pash. “No, and I have never been – it has never been discussed with me in that position of mine privately by anyone, in other words informally have you considered that maybe we could kill somebody or something like that, or I think it would good to knock off so-and-so, and you fellows think you could plan it informally or something. No, never.”

     Mr. Baron. “So you are saying that if someone had come to you with such a request, you would have said, you will have to ask people at the top yourself.”

     Mr. Pash. “Yes. That I think would be my position.”

     Mr. Baron. “And at that time that would have been Frank Wisner, the head of OPC?”

     Mr. Pash. “I would have to get a yes from OP, and then I would probably – because you can’t really, you can’t plan. You know, my branch was supposed to plan something; well, an assassination is an operation. So really we don’t plan operations, a detailed operation. We plan, you might say, I don’t know whether I am making myself clear, but we plan an activity, like –. “

Mr. Baron. “Distribution of propaganda?”

Mr. Pash. “Or like resettling the Cossacks or sending balloons over Europe, we would develop a plan for the activity, but the operational plan, the detail still was not the responsibility of my unit, you see.”

Mr. Baron. “P7 was not a place that handled double agent problem?”

Mr. Pash. “No. Again you see, that was an operational thing.”

Mr. Baron. “P7 was not a place that handled double agent questions?”

Mr. Pash. “No. Again that was an operational thing.”

Mr. Baron. “And P7 didn’t deal with the details or even in a general way did not deal with double agent problems?”

Mr. Pash. “No.”

Mr. Baron. “So you’re saying that even if Howard Hunt has the dates wrong, you don’t recall any incident like the one he describes.”

Mr. Pash. “No.”

Mr. Baron. “Where do you think Hunt may have received the impression that there was an assassination unit which you headed?”

Mr. Pash. “I don’t think anyone would have that idea. I think it is idea that I had a special type. In other words, special, catch-all type, you might say, branch, and the only explanation I can give , as you know, as you know, Hunt was a spy story writer, and he wrote many books, and a man of that type only needs a couple of little incidental type things to let his imagination run. I think it is a figment of his imagination.”

Mr. Pash. “So when I found deficiencies in the CIA, I didn’t hesitate to make it known. As a matter of fact, when I returned from Europe in 1951, General Fry who was then Chief of Personnel told me informally that the Agency didn’t particularly want me to be assigned to Washington. I do not hold that against the Agency. I know some people felt that I was too demanding of the intelligence service.”

Mr. Pash. “There is something behind this which of course because of my maybe over dedication and at the same time my knowledge of the system of the Soviet Union and the way it works, but some people might be unwittingly duped. I don’t say that, you know, this is intentional, but somewhere along the line somebody is saying, well, let’s muddy this business some more, you see, and whether Hunt got paid for this or what,  or whether somebody might ask him to cook up some stories, I don’t know. I would like to find out.”

Mr. Baron. “Maybe I can just summarize my interest in this period of time. You didn’t – after the time you left the P7 and while you were still involved in the agency, you didn’t deal in any way with double agency problems, did you?”

Mr. Pasha. “No.”

Mr. Baron. “So the incident that Howard Hunt described is no more likely to have come up during this period of time than when you were in P7.”

Mr. Pasha. “No.”

Mr. Baron. “I have no further questions. I want to thank you for coming.”

Senator Schweiker, Committee member. “I concur. We thank you for your cooperation and for coming in and talking to the Committee.”

Senator Schweiker. “Would you stand and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you have given and are about to give to this Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Mr. Pash. “I do.”

Senator Schweiker. “Colonel, who would handle double agent problems under the set-up when you were there?”

Mr. Pash. “If I may say there were two divisions, there were maybe more. There was the research and analysis, but there was the Plans and Policy Division, and within the Plans and Policy Division were the planning branches, and I had Planning Branch 7 in the Plans and Policy Divisions. Then there was the Operational Division where all the operations, the actual operations were planned and conducted.

     “I only can say that based upon the organization, the planning for that sort of type of activity would be as far as I know in the Operations Division because that was a detail, you see.”

Senator Schweiker. “How could we handle double agent problems, from your knowledge.”

Mr. Pash. “Well, if you want just theoretical, there are many ways that this could be handled. One is you give a double agent some information which the enemy knows is false and you let him carry it back, and the enemy would catch him at bringing back false information, you see. This is such as, you know, right off my head, as a reaction to your question, that is such a detailed and highly limited from the point of view of the way things can be done, that you practically have to know the individual situation, you know the double agent, you would have to know his background, you would have to know your own operational group in detail in order to expose him to his people, you see, and nobody sitting in Washington would ever devise a plan on how to have a double agent.”

Senator Schweiker. “Where would it have to be done? You mean at the field level?”

Mr. Pash. “At the field level.”

Senator Schweiker. “And that would be under operations.”

Mr. Pash. “Yes, certainly it would be under operations, and it would be within the group that is handling the double agent because they know the background of it.”

Senator Schweiker. “Now, when you say within the group, what kind of a stricture would you call that? In other words, would there be a section?”

Mr. Pash. “I don’t know what the organization in Europe was but for instance, he mentions here – I am speaking theoretically --.”

Senator Schweiker. “It is a theoretical question, I realize.”

Mr. Pash. “Say he mentions that he was with the Balkan unit. Now the Balkan unit would have an independent unit, I don’t know. It could have been a part of the Eastern European unit, with a Balkan division in it.”

Senator Schweiker. “A geographical unit.”

Mr. Pash. “Now, the man in charge of operations into the Balkans really would be the person who would supervise the planning of an operation against a double agent.”

Mr. Baron. “Was there a period between the end of P7 and the time you left the CIA where you did other things at the Agency?”

Mr. Pash. “Yes.”

Mr. Baron. “And what did you move on to after P7?”

Mr. Pash. “There was – I really don’t recall the designation of the unit. I think it concerned Eastern Europe planning because most of my activity after that, which practically was 1951, and there was a unit, a group of people of Russian background in South America that the Agency was interested in trying to contact and utilize.”

     Here is the link to the testimony of Mr. Pash before the Senate Committee:

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=1430&fbclid=IwAR3ulB7wfmsbudugblAshzq1KHqMJ9SxzMTZSzqUOodBaSB16ct13Vd0LeM#relPageId=1

REGISTER OF BORIS T. PAPERS

https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf300002fn/entire_text/?fbclid=IwAR18OZDblMGDFPyFOxSnJph6UxoPlucxzsnmO6lthiv93xu_5jHCQ8C5qh8

PASH’S ALSOS MISSION

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alsos_Mission?fbclid=IwAR1JJ5rUhJpByNwu3eR4INUJpso7PcS7SR6ZxKMrWfwUQHioiLfAgxbxlfU

https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Alsos_Mission.html?id=jOkiAAAAMAAJ&fbclid=IwAR11gaUj-4GOx5ldduL1kFwk40zjxs3sRH6-lcWJDCifqhN7CE6BDfXn0T4

One can spend a year researching Col Pash. He worked with Earl Warren and John Mccone on the incarceration of American Japanese in World War II. He headed the Alsos project. He served as head of security of the Manhattan Project. He had an office at the Atomic Energy Commission in Tennessee and of course was assigned by the military to the CIA, which because of his background appointed him head of its Branch P7 whose assigned tasks were assassination and kidnapping. He was born in 1900 and retired from the military at age 57 in 1957, 6 years before 1963. But did he “retire?”

United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

by Alfred M. Beck, Abe Bortz, Charles W. Lynch, Lida Mayo, and Ralph F. Weld

1985

Page 557 excerpt: “Colonel Pash’s difficulties were compounded by the sudden successes of the First French Army. On 16 April the 6th Army Group had drawn army boundaries in the area to leave the city of Stuttgart in the Seventh Army zone of operations. French forces had cleared the east bank of the Rhine opposite Strasbourg by that date and General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, ignoring General Devers’ restrictions on his movements, exploited his advantage to thrust north and seize Stuttgart by 22 April. This forced Colonel Pash to move his team across a French rear area, a feat that took resolution, considerable bluff, and occasional strong language with French soldiery. The French Provisional Government never knew the nature of the search missions, but suspected that General Devers hoped to capture the remnants of the Vichy French regime, which had taken refuge in the German city of Sigmaringen, some fifty miles south of Stuttgart.

“The 1269th Engineer Combat Battalion less its Company B, left behind with the 6th Army Group T-Force, joined the ALSOS team at Freudenstadt on the morning of 21 April; the engineer contingent became Task Force White, after its commander, Lt. Col. Willard White. The entire command of scientists, engineers, and British technicians was known as Task Force A.45”

 

Lt. Col. Willard White was Lyndon B. Johnson’s brother-in-law. He was married to Josefa Johnson, LBJ’s sister:

 

https://www.geneagraphie.com/getperson.php?personID=I74876&tree=1

 

https://www.geneagraphie.com/getperson.php?personID=I74872&tree=1

 

http://tothosewhoserved.org/usa/ts/usatse03/chapter24.html?fbclid=IwAR0GoACg1-tuERl9tyfh_L0hJ9MarT7M35nox2TqnS9vVnm1Ew-fVtWGULo

 

Why President Kennedy had to be assassinated

 

      After the Bay of Pigs trauma and his firing of Allen Dulles as CIA head, President Kennedy in June 1961 issued National Security Action Memorandum 55, which took covert activities away from the CIA and placed these in the Defense Department. 

 

       That same month he met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Vienna and attempted to open the possibility of cooperation between the world’s two major powers.

 

       In June 1963 he delivered a renowned speech at American University in which he advocated world peace. In September 1963 he addressed the United Nations and declared that the exploration of outer space and landing on the moon should be a collaborative effort between the Soviet Union and the U.S.

 

      Finally, on November 12, 1963 – just ten days before his murder – he signed National Security Action Memorandum 271 addressed to the Administrator of NASA that directed specific steps be taken to implement cooperation with the Soviet Union on outer space exploration and a landing on the moon. He personally signed the memorandum and sent a copy to each major official in his administration that this was now to be national policy.

 

      Kennedy’s end run posed a threat to military and CIA. Mary Meyer Pinchot, JFK’s mistress, was later quoted as saying that he was moving too fast and could not be controlled. She, too, was killed the year after JFK’s death because she knew too much.

 

     Jacob G. Hornberger of The Future of Freedom Foundation in an article, “How to Understand JFK Conspiracy Theories” published on November 15, 2017, wrote that he embraced the theory of a U.S. National Security State Regime Change-Operation:

 

      "This is the only paradigm in the JFK assassination that makes any sense and in which all the contradictions, inconsistencies, and anomalies disintegrate. The operation was no different in principle from the ones carried out in places like Iran, Guatemala, Chile, and Cuba and for the same reason: to protect U.S. national-security from a political leader whose policies were perceived to pose a grave threat to U.S. national security.

 

      "One of the fascinating aspects of the Kennedy assassination has always been the reluctance or the refusal of the mainstream press to consider the matter from the standpoint of one of the bedrock principles of American jurisprudence — the presumption of innocence, especially since Oswald was claiming that he was an innocent man. In fact, not only did Oswald deny that he killed the president, he went a critically important step further — he claimed that he was being framed. The mainstream press has never shown any desire to confront that possibility and deal with it.

 

     "Indeed, they have simply accepted a set of very pat facts, all of which have all the earmarks of good frame-up. Moreover, within an hour of the assassination, it was being conveniently blamed on a purported communist, Lee Harvey Oswald, whose communist bona fides were being established with a press release by a CIA front organization in New Orleans called the DRE, almost immediately after Kennedy was pronounced dead."

 

      Among the reasons Kennedy had to be killed can be found in a book by Colonel Philip Corso, The Day After Roswell, which was published in 1997. His entry in Wikipedia discloses that in his book Corso “claims he stewarded extraterrestrial artifacts recovered from a crash near Roswell, New Mexico in 1947.

 

     “Corso says a covert government group was assembled under the leadership of Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the first director of Central Intelligence (see Majestic 12). Among its task was to collect all information on off-planet technology. The US administration simultaneously discounted the existence of flying saucers in the eyes of the public, Corso says.

 

     “According to Corso, the reverse engineering of these artifacts indirectly led to the development of accelerated particle beam devices, fiber optics, lasers, integrated circuit chips and Kevlar material.”

 

      Corso distributed Alien artifacts to major corporations in his position as Chief of the Pentagon’s Foreign Technology desk in Army Research and Development, working under Lieutenant General Arthur Trudeau. He did this in 1961 through 1963, the years that Kennedy was president. Such distribution required approval by the president as distribution of the Alien artifacts to major corporations was a highly classified project.

 

     The great fear of the military and CIA was that Kennedy would give away our nation’s most vital secrets, including our reverse engineering of the Alien artifacts, to the Soviets. 

 

                                 JFK, the Military and the Bay of Pigs

 

      President Kennedy was inaugurated on January 20, 1961. Immediately upon taking office the military and CIA presented him with their plan developed under the Eisenhower Administration to invade Cuba and depose Fidel Castro. The April invasion was to end in a debacle.

       Here is the account of the Bay of Pigs invasion by retired New York Police Detective James Rothstein in his 2020 autobiography, The Way It Was. At the time of the invasion Rothstein was 21 years old and was a bosun mate aboard the ship Essex. Later while serving in the NYPD, Rothstein was appointed as an investigator to the New York State Commission on Crime.

 

In early March of 1961, the Essex was at its homeport in Quonset, Rhode Island, when strange things started happening. Sailors were dispatched for rifle squad practice with a Marine leading the team. Old timers (salts) stated that this had not happened since WWII; something was up. The Essex sailed to the Norfolk Virginia Navy Shipyards. On Sunday morning all liberty and leaves were cancelled. Train cars loaded with supplies pulled up next to the ship and were unloaded onto the Essex. The word was we were sailing to Nova Scotia for special operations.

On Monday morning as the Essex sets sail, Rothstein is ordered to Winch #2 to prepare to take on cargo. Rothstein was the winch operator with his assistant, J.C. Adams. Armed marines and sailors were posted everywhere; only authorized personnel were allowed on the deck. The Essex pulls alongside a heavily guarded barge with two long cylinders on the deck. Rothstein loaded both cylinders on board and watches as they are sent below deck in the bomb elevator. The Essex then headed for the open sea in due haste. When the Essex reaches the Atlantic Ocean it made a sharp turn to starboard (right). We were going south. If the Essex was going to Nova Scotia, it would have made a turn to port (left). Something big was up.

As the Essex began to near the coast of Florida, a squadron of US Navy jets was seen approaching the Essex; they did a fly-by and prepared to land. The Essex was no longer designed for jets; it had been modified to have jets land and take-off. Now we knew for sure something was going on. When it got dark the Captain of the Essex, Captain Searcy, advised the crew that they were on a special mission. The Capt. ordered “Darken Ship and No Communication” was in effect until further notice. We were advised we were going to Cuba. General Quarters was sounded. We were going to war.

Every day after that, until three days before the Bay of Pigs invasion, we practiced for the invasion. The jets were painted white; the only markings were numbers on the planes. The numbers on the ships were painted over. The flags were taken down. When refueling and replenishing occurred, the flags would be raised as the ships started their approach and lowered again immediately.

Three days before the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, the bombing to soften up the beach at the Bay of Pigs, started. At night we headed to the beach. The Destroyers would go closer and bombard the beach. During the day, we would be out to sea and re-supply. On the day of the invasion, at approximately 0315 hours, Rothstein is manning the helm of the Essex when Capt. Searcy came out of his quarters. Capt. Searcy informs the crew on the Quarter Deck that the President of the United States, John Kennedy, has just ordered him to stop the bombing. Capt. Searcy knew that the revolutionaries would be killed. Orders were Orders.

The next three days were spent bringing survivors and bodies on board. Rothstein again manned the Winch #2 and the bodies were brought aboard in cargo nets and put in boxes and then taken to reefers. There were many cargo nets of bodies. The Bay of Pigs was lost and it would seal the fate of John Kennedy. One of the leaders of the revolution was CIA Operative Frank Sturgis. Sturgis and Rothstein would meet again years later. Detective Rothstein, of the New York City Police Department, would arrest Frank Sturgis when he came to New York to kill Marita Lorenz. That is another story.

     The two cylinders that was transferred to the Essex and lowered in the bomb elevator were likely nuclear bombs of some type. The military was prepared to drop these on Cuba if the circumstances of the invasion became dire. President Kennedy, upon learning of this intent, cancelled the invasion. To this day the role of the Essex has never been recounted fully in history.

Reorganization and Rivalries of America’s Armed Forces Leading up to Kennedy’s Assassination

     One method that has been utilized in evaluating evidence involving possible suspects in the assassination of JFK is to focus on who had the most to gain and then backtrack to see if the group being investigated had the means, methods and opportunity to carry out the project.

     Implicit in the above analysis is the flip side of the same coin, in other words who had the most to lose if Kennedy were not removed from power.

     This method has been used to focus attention on pretty much all on the list of potential suspects including, but not limited to: LBJ, anti-Castro Cubans, rogue intelligence officers, members of Organized crime and so on.

     One group that should be included in the list but has not received its fair share of attention is a faction within the U.S. military. In order to fully appreciate the ramifications of this new paradigm, a short review of history is in order.

     In the period following WW11 President Truman passed The National Security Act of 1947 and it involved a major restructuring of both US Intelligence and the Us Military. Prior to this there had been no separate US Air Force. Along with this creation of an independent Air Force was the creation of the office of Secretary of Defense, who had the responsibilities of oversight of all military branches. The first Secretary of Defense was James Forrestal, who had formerly occupied the position of both the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of the Navy.

     In addition to creating the Air Force as a separate branch of the military, the Act created the National Security Council.

     The act also created a peacetime non-military intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency. It is important to note that this agency took over some responsibilities that had been formerly handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and this dynamic resulted in one area of intense rivalry.

     During a long, protracted war, no country limits its expenditures available to conduct war. They spend all that is possible in an effort to win. Once the war is over, the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) a country spends on its defense is typically reduced dramatically. By the late 1940’s the Truman Administration reduced defense spending from a wartime high of nearly 90 billion dollars to less than 15 and a considerable amount of that 15 was spent on the Air Force and nuclear capability. As long as we had a monopoly on the A bomb it was believed that spending excessively on conventional forces was unnecessary. Without the A bomb, Russia continued to build its conventional forces.

     With the first use of the A Bomb it became clear that the playbook for conducting future wars had changed and in the earliest days only the Air Force had the capability of delivering this new weapon. As a consequence, the Air Force would receive a massive influx of capital and since cash is a limited resource this redirection of capital set up an intense rivalry between the Army and especially the Navy. One might assume that the interests of the Navy would have been well looked after by the new Secretary of Defense, who had been first and foremost a Navy man, but Secretary Forrestal fell to his death on May 22, 1949.

     Dwight D. Eisenhower was inaugurated President on January 27, 1953 and the Cold War was in full swing. A good case can be made that he was the perfect man for the job because as a direct consequence of his wartime leadership he knew as much or more about the entire Military Industrial Complex than anyone. This was coupled with the fact that Eisenhower was frugal by nature. Prior to the buildup leading into US entry into WW11, the percentage of GDP that went towards the military budget was less than 2 percent. At its height during the war this percentage of spending increased to more than 40 percent of GDP.

     Eisenhower was faced with a difficult choice. Russia was continuing to build its military readiness in the post-war era and was spending a huge percentage of its available resources towards that goal. Eisenhower held the view that continued expenditures at war time levels were detrimental to the long term health of our economy but he had to balance that with the reality of an adversary that did not seem to be concerned with such issues.

     The solution to the above dilemma was a concept referred to as Massive Retaliation. With the advent of the A Bomb, a new strategy had to be formulated on how to use it. In earliest days of Atomic warfare, the Air Force was assigned the delivery of such a weapon and they developed a strategy for when and how to use them. A private non-profit organization was created now known as the RAND Corporation and for decades its principal contractor was the United States Air Force, particularly the Strategic Air Command (SAC).

     Massive Retaliation had the potential to be effectively used as an tool of diplomacy but such a tool became less effective after 1949 because by then Russia had its own A bomb and in theory, could retaliate massively. Such a scenario forced the America to reconsider our strategy and raised questions of whether more focus should be placed on conventional forces, which of course would benefit the Army and Navy at the Air Force’s expense. At this point members of the SAC began to consider itself as a depreciating asset.

     It is important to acknowledge that even before the Atomic bomb was used against Japan, there were rival factions in the Manhattan Project. A group of scientists responsible for the bomb wanted to warn Japan before the bomb was used. Later rival factions were against the creation of a super bomb, commonly referred to as an H bomb.

      There was a faction within the Manhattan project that was against first use without warning and against the H bomb. This faction led by Oppenheimer was ultimately neutralized. General Leslie Groves, the military head of the Manhattan project and Col. Borris T. Pash, in charge of security for the Manhattan Project, were instrumental in neutralizing the impact of this rival faction.

     Like the Manhattan project, there were rival factions at RAND. There were those at RAND that developed the concept of Massive Retaliation and a rival group that eventually developed a more moderate response that could be metered out in a gradually escalating process as needed. This would ultimately be referred to as Counterforce. The leaders of the SAC, particularly General Curtis LeMay and his successor, General Thomas Power, sided with the faction behind Massive Retaliation and against those at RAND who believed that Counterforce was not only more humane, but more useful as a diplomatic tool.

     In the early days of the strategy of Massive Retaliation, it was proposed that we should drop eighty percent of our nuclear stockpile in an initial mission. This plan included the bombing of up to seventy cities and would not only destroy the industrial base of our adversary but it would also entail the loss of millions of lives. War planners had a term for this tactic, “Killing a Nation” that was telling for the loser in a nuclear war. The stakes were high and those who were tasked with our defense knew it.

     LeMay has been quoted “Native analysts may look sadly back from the future on that period when we had the atomic bomb and the Russians didn’t. Or when the Russians had acquired (through connivance and treachery of Westerners with warped minds) the atomic bomb-and yet still didn’t have any stockpile of weapons. That was the era when we might have destroyed Russia completely and not even skinned our elbows doing it.”

     The quotation referred to above is not the only example of LeMay’s mindset as he made many comparable statements over the years, both during and after his years of service.

     With the stakes as high as they were coupled with vulnerability of SAC to a first strike, whoever went first had a considerable tactical advantage.

     There is evidence that LeMay had a willingness to act pre-emptively and without presidential approval. Studies conducted at Rand indicated that SAC was vulnerable to a first strike and LeMay was well aware of this vulnerability.

     In 1954 President Eisenhower issued an update to the basic National Security Policy …” The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventative war or acts intended to provoke war.”

     While the SAC was not authorized to launch a preventative war, there is evidence of a plan by it to launch a first strike if intelligence established that Russia was preparing a first strike.

     In 1957 President Eisenhower appointed a committee to study SAC vulnerability to a first strike. The conclusion based on a simulation drill indicated the SAC was extremely vulnerable to a first strike and that meant the Massive Retaliation may not even be an option under those conditions. Robert Sprague who was part of the delegation that evaluated SAC performance in this study confronted LeMay on the vulnerability to a first strike. Lemay seemed unconcerned about such vulnerability and responded that he had access to daily reconnaissance over the Russia and that “if I see that the Russians are amassing their planes for an attack, I am going to knock the dooky out of them before they take off the ground.” The US national policy is that the president has the authority to order the first use of force and not the SAC Commander. Sprague responded that it was not National policy for the SAC Commander to launch a strike under these conditions to which LeMay responded,” I don’t care, it’s my policy. That’s what I am going to do.”

      At this point, it is reasonable to assume Sprague reported this verbal exchange to President Eisenhower. It is worth noting the change in LeMay’s resume that followed this exchange.

     In 1957 LeMay was promoted to Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and General Thomas S Power replaced General Lemay as the Commander of the Strategic Air Command. Between 1954 and 1957, General Power had been the Commander of the Air Research and Development Command, which was instrumental in planning for when and how to use nuclear weapons.

      General Power was in charge of the SAC from July 1957 until November 30 of 1964. This change of service date is also noteworthy.

     William Kaufman, of the RAND Corporation, is credited with reshaping President Kennedy’s Nuclear Strategy in the direction of Counterforce and away from Massive Retaliation. He had a confrontation with General Power over the subject. Counterforce would require restraint on the part of the SAC from striking cities in the opening rounds of conflict. Kaufman has quoted Power “Restraint? Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards. At the end of the war if there are two Americans and one Russian left alive, we win.”

     During the Cuban Missile Crisis, SAC was ordered to Defcon 2 by General Power on October 24, 1972. Shortly after the order was given, Power issued a message to Global Strategic Command on non-scrambled open radio channels, an act that has been interpreted as highly provocative at this highly charged moment in history.

     When America fully mobilized our nuclear forces when we went to Defcon 2 during the Cuban MIssile Crisis, our actions were exactly those that would have triggered LeMay to act pre-emptively. That should give an indication of how the Russians could have perceived these actions and potentially launched a first strike against America in an effort to avoid the loss of their nuclear forces. It is difficult to overstate how tense this situation was, and General Power took several provocative steps that had the potential to further escalate things. There was a scheduled test flight of an ICBM on October 26, 1962 and caution would have resulted in a change of this test schedule in order to avoid a miscalculation on the part of the Russians who had no way of knowing if the missile was a test or armed with a nuclear warhead. Power, who had the authority to delay the test, chose not to do so.

     In addition, a U2 Spy plane had made a pass over Siberia which had the potential to be misjudged as the flight of a nuclear armed bomber,

     With nuclear bombers in the air during the Missile Crisis, the bombers made a turnaround during flights over the northern flight route towards Russia and on at least one occasion, the bombers passed their normal turnaround point that was another opportunity for misjudgment on the part of the Russians.

     Simultaneous with the aforementioned provocative acts by forces of the SAC under General Power, General LeMay was encouraging President Kennedy to take out the missile sites in Cuba, a situation that had the potential to escalate dramatically. When Kennedy refused to do so, Lemay characterized this choice of action as weak. Had Kennedy launched an attack against the missiles in Cuba, it almost certainly would have created a circumstance that triggered the conditions that would activate LeMay’s plan for preemption.

     It is worth noting that once the missiles were discovered, not only LeMay but the entire Chief of Staff had advocated taking out the Cuban missile sites. Kennedy resisted.

     Claims are made in a book “The Limits of Safety” that Chief of Staff Thomas White had written to General Power that  the SAC Commander had authority to order retaliatory strikes if time or circumstance would not permit a decision by the President.  

     Once Russia developed its own nuclear forces, the price of Massive Retaliation might be Massive Retaliation aimed our way. Eventually Massive Retaliation as a tool of diplomacy gave way to MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction.

     In 1963, Mutual Destruction was not assured because it may have been possible to eliminate the Russian capacity to retaliate with a massive first strike. Time was of the essence, however, for such a bold plan because in 1963 the US had a significant numerical advantage in deliverable nuclear weapons but that window was closing because the Soviets were well aware           

of their vulnerability and they were racing to close the gap, which ultimately they did. This scenario is the background for the LeMay quote mentioned above.

     Another series of events had been developing over the decades leading up to 1963 and that is the nuclear monopoly of the SAC had ended. Miniaturization had made it possible to put tactical nuclear weapons onto the battlefield and perhaps more importantly it allowed nuclear missiles to be installed on submarines. These advances eliminated the SAC nuclear monopoly and brought them under the control of both the Navy and the Army.

     These developments suited the reorientation of policy towards Counterforce because it made it more practical to have a measured response. It did nothing to reduce the rivalry between the various branches of the military.

     One key advantage to submarine-based missiles was that they were far less susceptible to a first strike.

     The vulnerability of the SAC to a first strike was always a concern once the Russians had a nuclear capability of their own. If one reviews the RAND studies, first strike vulnerability comes up over and over again and the case was made pretty clear that whoever went first was likely to “win”.

     If Russia was to blame for the assassination of our President, a response would be appropriate and the only appropriate one had to be massive. In order to make such a response logical a first strike made it would have to be done in such a way that Russia could not retaliate. In theory the SAC had the capacity to do that and no other branch had similar capabilities.

     The SAC had the means to discover the plans of those intending to attempt to kill President John Kennedy on November 22, 1963 and piggy-back with that operation and utilize it as one last opportunity to destroy the Soviet Union while it was still possible to do so with minimal consequences. These forces were led by elements that believed an ultimate showdown between us and them was inevitable and that such a confrontation would be a nuclear one. Assuming these forces were correct it is more logical to have such a confrontation when we could “win.”

     It is important to emphasize that Russia was doing everything in its power to at least achieve nuclear parity with the U.S., at which time the consequences of a pre-emptive attack would change considerably, to the point where not only the U.S. was threatened, but all human life on Earth would be at risk.

Who Was Lee Harvey Oswald?

     Millions of words have been written about the innocence of Oswald. These were best be summed up by prominent author David Talbot on Facebook on November 4, 2021. He wrote that Senator Richard Schweiker, a member of the Church Committee, famously said, “the fingerprints of intelligence” were written all over Oswald. He was set up to take the fall for the “murder most foul.”  He was, as he shouted out to the press in the Dallas Police Station, nothing more than “a patsy.”

There Was a Plan A and Plan B for the Assassination

Plan A was to use the assassination of President Kennedy to trigger a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union.

Plan B was an attempt was to frame Oswald as the sole assassin of President Kennedy.

Plan B was an attempt to neutralize the assassination as a false flag event by twisting the facts, any facts, which might be useful to blame any foreign group for the killing. All key sources of authority/power played a role, including the military, the autopsy, FBI/Hoover, judiciary, Warren Commission, Chief Justice Warren, former CIA Directors Allen Dulles and John Mccone. Senior CIA officials or ex officials were on Plan B rosters but others in the CIA were still pushing Plan A.

Oswald was ultimately sacrificed by Plan B He was always going to be sacrificed by Plan A. He was too convenient for all involved. He was a patriot and was trained by the military to be false defector to the Soviet Union. When he left home on November 22, 1963 he likely was following an order from military intelligence that day until immediately after the shooting of JFK when he realized he had become  a patsy who had been set up to take the fall for the assassination. He has been treated horribly considering his service to our country.

The Autopsy was the first indication of Plan B

A full investigation of what took place at the autopsy is quite complex, well documented and continues to be disputed by scholars. What is not in dispute is that those involved in the official autopsy at Bethesda Naval Hospital, Maryland reached a conclusion that Kennedy was shot twice from behind that would support the thesis that a lone gunman shot and killed Kennedy.

While this conclusion is consistent with the conclusion the Warren Commission reached against Oswald, it stands in stark contrast with the conclusions reached by the medical staff at Parkland Memorial Hospital that treated the President in Dallas.

 

 

The Military’s Plan to Kill Kennedy as Plan A

     Distinguished researcher and author John Newman will publish by the end of 2021 his book on the assassination titled “Armageddon.” No one has done a better job than he in naming the military leaders behind JFK’s murder and why they did it. As thorough as the case Newman presents, three other persons must also be named as assassination conspirators: General Curtis LeMay, General Thomas Power and former CIA Director Allen Dulles.

Here is a link to Newman’s masterful presentation of his findings that occurred on June x, 2021:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d0JsR6w6pdg

President Lyndon B Johnson and FBI Director J Edgar Hoover

As Part of Plan B

     At approximately 4 pm on November 22, 1963 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover phoned Attorney General Robert Kennedy to inform him that “We have the man”. This early determination of lone killer would technically deprive the President’s brother of federal jurisdiction. This conclusion was reached in less than four hours of the shooting and before the Presidents body even arrived in Maryland for an autopsy.

     On the morning of November 23 at 10 am, J. Edgar Hoover called President Johnson to provide an update on the assassination. The call lasted a few seconds over 14 minutes. This call was recorded on a White House recording system along with other calls that day. The recording of this call has gone missing but there is a transcript of at least portions of this alleging that Oswald had made several contacts within the embassy/consul compounds in Mexico City of both Cuba and Russia and that this person had made contact with a Russian agent of the KGB who was affiliated with a group who had assassinations within its responsibilities.

     Hoover noted that photographs of the person in question had been taken and a review of those photos indicated that the person in question was not Oswald.

     In addition to the call to President Johnson on November 23 regarding this imposter in Mexico City, Director Hoover also sent a Memo to the Chief of the U.S. Secret Service James S. Rowley regarding the status of the investigation. On pages four and five of this memo, the subject of an impostor is raised and that both photos and phone recordings were reviewed and determined not to be those of Lee Harvey Oswald.

     On November 24 Director Hoover sent a memo to Deputy Attorney General Katzenback indicating a need to issue something to convince the public that Oswald was the real assassin and that there could be serious internal implications if the public thought that Oswald might be part of a larger plot.

     On November 25 Deputy Katzenback sent a memo to Bill Moyers at the White House on the need to convince the public that Lee Harvey Oswald killed the President and he had no confederates still at large.

     While initially expressing the opinion that he was against the formation of a federal commission to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy, Johnson ultimately established the committee that became known as the Warren Commission by Executive Order 11130. This took place on November 29.

     Also on November 29 President Johnson called Senator Russell and convinced the reluctant senator to become a member of the new commission. “We’ve got to take this out of the arena where they are testifying that Krushchev and Castro did this and that and kick us into a war that       can kill 40 million Americans in an hour…” Johnson had used the same argument to convince a reluctant Earl Warren to head the commission.

Supplementary Evidence Related to the Assassination

(1) Claude Barnes Capehart

https://newspress.com/the-capehart-case-what-is-the-cia-hiding/?fbclid=IwAR1RhOqvwE-vyfmeLbOlDqgYeb-1CnW0-yqH6Tt6FltpjPQMXMh-LOAiYM0

https://zodiackilleridentified.com/2019/11/27/the-zodiac-killer-and-the-cia/?fbclid=IwAR2FBRcRE385I_LA_TelcpBBWSFndXcKnGXM-6ZHa_UHJ5OTiTQJP9cG9Ts

(2) Relationship between Khrushchev and JFK that cut out U.S. military and intelligence community

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/d116?fbclid=IwAR3ZdIcrfWlhMGu7BYuLLoGjXBXPiBme1aSSqU8Ac0oMdoyeNDZ9cxf_IOc

(3) U.S. Navy and Finite Deterrence

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2021-10-14/how-much-enough-us-navy-and-finite-deterrence?fbclid=IwAR21ozCSkfhHCrmawU5NZEY-anrg4dFwNdtqze3StYWKJGfLBkhRVBz21-c

(4) LBJ Setting Up the Warren Commission

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/09/23/transcripts-show-lbjs-maneuvers-in-setting-up-warren-commission/0039146c-96b9-403e-b6f4-5e5525c1f63c/?fbclid=IwAR2eL0YDlOK4UbeC9MNjbvT22g9uKvjPV7bJu7bfmZbK5W-Y6C7omO5KZpg

(5) General Thomas Power and the Strategic Air Command

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_S._Power

(6) General Curtis LeMay

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curtis_LeMay

(7) Professor David Holloway on the Soviet Union’s development of the Atomic Bomb and the H-Bomb

https://www.manhattanprojectvoices.org/oral-histories/david-holloways-interview?fbclid=IwAR1Y38790y-Fkd7mPqSiqKB5Nn_WrNeTbqCaKfGHFOPt3KKYQcxCnMCgjBQ

(8) Operation Northwoods

https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/operation-northwoods/

https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=92662&page=1&fbclid=IwAR3ckBTv55d8v8dPg70sYEOKzoYEyf8v6CxaBkLFK91afVN83P1HzJhRixU

(9) When the Soviets Set Off the Biggest Nuclear Bomb, J.F.K. Didn’t Flinch

https://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/27447-when-the-soviets-set-off-the-biggest-nuclear-bomb-jfk-didn%E2%80%99t-flinch/?fbclid=IwAR23qd-HjsWaW6ZuQuRcm6c9j4rJLjd21MzM8qbzwOZBTX4qEOh1_uUMr68

(10) Phone call between President Johnson and FBI Director Hoover

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tI94noIhX2k

(11) Church Committee testimony of William K. Harvey

https://drive.google.com/file/d/14dwA2PEEbWGeP_2A4f6ee3UedkKmuBuJ/view?fbclid=IwAR3xX5UE7Se-PLhX_8W1lgpwGv1TZMn_yMOIIQokxw8yjy2aW5dCm9yVGbk

(12) Rex Bradford on the 14 minute tape missing from phone call between President Johnson and Director Hoover

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=364&fbclid=IwAR3jHn0eMhCjMRcSXhQeGN7K8oS3CKPLWdRquxZAhUv2q-OTtwhx6bYFKoQ

(13) Did the U.S. Military Plan a Nuclear First Strike for 1963?

https://prospect.org/world/u.s.-military-plan-nuclear-first-strike-1963/?fbclid=IwAR1z4sv7dsggv1NK4Gon5Pqv4Z8UqcsRRBc_QaqOguNePCE8R6i87D55fUk

(14) The General and World War III

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/06/19/the-general-and-world-war-iii?fbclid=IwAR0CScW3m3fneYHVmUFxYxS2g0JWftEgbinakzXFhnwyJxU8otiWyOOAHdQ

(15) A New Take on General MacArthur’s Warning to JFK to Avoid a Land War in Asia

https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/a-new-take-on-general-macarthurs-warning-to-jfk-to-avoid-a-land-war-in-asia/

(16) Defending a Strategic Force After 1960

https://www.rand.org/pubs/documents/D2270.html?fbclid=IwAR1AS09v9yHOgjl6wkwJKbBqA9e2tCS6qwbCWkZlSF6WcLnNifh6yByKqrg

(17) Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/d119?fbclid=IwAR2zSerZvb7CQQQkyiD8RH37DW3U4rGRkRhNstmJygGaF0_78yQQZKvbqhI

(18) Fail Safe (the 1964 film)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail_Safe_(1964_film)?fbclid=IwAR0Win5wvrQD6vypVNdnbB5P2X-ygnVyGcBGMw7VbuGyyvBVvC1DSKzbZqg

(19) Ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is the way to ensure peace

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/579506-ratifying-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-is-the-way-to?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=44211&fbclid=IwAR2F_q-An4FrGM_eqRKX0GcKPNoF2R91xuqTxxsIzt5OBPgT_8iOnfvHMUk

(20) JFK and the Military

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/08/jfk-vs-the-military/309496/?fbclid=IwAR0w98W96lJH-eGNe3J76pySLX-zUi55JXjT3jp7EBax3vKC4JMpb__T8xU

(21) Sylvia Meagher and Clay Shaw vs. Jim Garrison by Jim Eugenio

 

https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/sylvia-meagher-and-clay-shaw-vs-jim-garrison

(22) Letter from members of Congress urging President Biden to release the remaining JFK assassination classified documents

https://eshoo.house.gov/sites/eshoo.house.gov/files/LetterJFKAct199210721.pdf

(23) New Oliver Stone film “JFK Revisited”

https://youtu.be/KH3F7rT_eNQ

(24) Orleans Grand Jury Transcript of Thomas Beckham

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=1175

(25) Orleans Parish grand jury transcript of F. Lee Crisman

https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/garr/grandjury/pdf/Crisman.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0b67rtfbzRqom1T2MSAFGCXh7Etmqvtt0X1-di7u8yt7dS0ZW71OFA208

(26) Being There: Eyewitness to History autobiography by Douglas Caddy. Trine Day (2018). Chapter Four: The Kennedy Assassination

Epilogue

     President Kennedy’s administration spanned almost three years, from January 1960 to November 1963. During this period the military regularly came up with attack scenarios that involved use of nuclear bombs. JFK rejected these proposals.

     In 1963 powerful rogue officers in the Military and key elements in the CIA concluded that only a brief time existed for the U.S. to make a first strike against Russia. The U.S. then had an eight to one advantage over Russia that would soon expire as Russia armed itself.

     In 1963 JFK concluded that only a brief time existed for the U.S. to work out a nuclear arms treaty with Russia. Russia was the only other major power in the world. China was still fast asleep. The military and CIA disagreed with JFK’s geopolitical strategy and decided to remove him as an obstacle to their goal.

     JFK foresaw the future where the nuclear arms race would escalate in explosive power and shortness of time in which to inflict a first strike. The military was fixated upon the existing situation between the powers in 1963 that favored America.

     So who was right? JFK. Saner heads prevailed and the military’s plan in 1963 to attack Russia collapsed. Sixty years later we now live in a world where multiple hypersonic nuclear missiles launched by Russia and/or China could explode in the United States in five or less minutes after being fired simultaneously by enemy submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans a thousand miles off the coasts of the U.S.  Senator James Inhofe (R.-OK), former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, recently said after China had launched a hypersonic missile that encircled the earth that “We are in the most endangered position our country has even been in terms of what China is demonstrating, clearly what they have the capability of doing.” Few American recognize the mortal threat that we face. Most Americans are caught up in silly things.

    

     A relevant viewpoint is expressed in an editorial “Folding America’s Nuclear Umbrella” in the November 13-14, 2021 weekend Wall Street Journal: “The botched Afghanistan withdrawal is President Biden’s biggest foreign policy blunder, so far, but at least he can say he was following his predecessor and trends in public policy. If Mr. Biden scales back America’s nuclear deterrent by adopting a ‘no first use’ policy or its equivalent, the strategic damage to the U.S. may be worse and the White House will have no one to blame…..Now the Biden Administration is in the middle of its Nuclear Posture Review, set to conclude in the coming months, and Washington and foreign capitals perceive that significant changes may be afoot. Last month the Financial Times reported that NATO countries as well as Japan and Australia were pressing the U.S. not to abandon its long-standing ambiguity on nuclear weapon use…..The fallout would be felt in Europe and Asia, as U.S. allies recalculate America’s role, and China and Russia press for advantage with newfound peace of mind about the possibility for escalation. Folding America’s nuclear umbrella would invite a geopolitical storm.”

      The U.S. military today is different from that in 1963 because it recognizes that while America is still the preeminent power in the world, Russia and China are fast making strides to reverse this. The only thing standing between our being annihilated in the not too distant future in a first strike by China and/or Russia or forced to surrender under a threat of annihilation is the readiness of our military. Now is the time for all Americans to rally in support of our military.

     November 22, 2023 will mark the 60^th Anniversary of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. A thousand patriotic researchers and writers have engaged in relentless labor over the past six decades in ferret out the truth of what happened that fateful day, a day that changed America forever. They and countless others will not rest until there is a day of reckoning that will occur when the government finally releases its remaining classified documents on JFK’s assassination.

The Authors

Steve P. Jenkins is an intelligence expert who has come in from the cold.

Douglas Caddy is an attorney in Houston and member of the Texas and District of Columbia Bars. He is a graduate of Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and New York University School of Law.

This article was prepared for presentation at Judyth Baker’s Ninth Annual JFK Assassination Conference by Mr. Caddy in Dallas November 19-21, 2021.

Coming soon – the next installment on this article: 544 Camp Street, A Central Nexus in the JFK Assassination Conspiracy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited November 14, 2021 by Douglas Caddy

[Chuck Schwartz]

Good essay, Doug.  LeMay was nuts.  He wanted to go to war against the soviet union and china.  JFK recognized LeMay was insane and the relationship between the 2 was obviousy very bad and, as it turns out, to be lethal.   There is a couple of threads on this website about Pash.  Linda Minor said this about Pash, "Or have you heard of Pash's subordinate, Col. Willard White, who was married to LBJ's sister Josefa for a number of years?"

[Douglas Caddy]

44 minutes ago, Chuck Schwartz said:

Good essay, Doug.  LeMay was nuts.  He wanted to go to war against the soviet union and china.  JFK recognized LeMay was insane and the relationship between the 2 was obviousy very bad and, as it turns out, to be lethal.   There is a couple of threads on this website about Pash.  Linda Minor said this about Pash, "Or have you heard of Pash's subordinate, Col. Willard White, who was married to LBJ's sister Josefa for a number of years?"

Chuck: 

Thanks for your incisive comment and for calling my attention to prior postings about the mysterious Col. Pash in our forum. I was unaware of these.

Doug

[David Andrews]

Brushed away here is the fact that high military and intelligence leadership - and many lesser players in each - were not punished for nearly starting WW III, as well as greatly, um, inconveniencing the new federal administration.  To the contrary, they prospered through the Johnson administration.  Why?  One would think the nuclear threat and the inconvenience would be unforgivable, even if the JFKA in itself were eminently excusable to Johnson and the non-plotters in government.

Edited November 14, 2021 by David Andrews

[Benjamin Cole]

   Jacob G. Hansberger  is properly  "Hornberger." 

[Chuck Schwartz]

David, for various reasons, LBJ wanted to be president. LBJ saw what happened if you went against the high military and intelligence units.  So, LBJ made peace with these units and retained his presidency until it was obvious he was not going to be re-elected din 1968.

[David Andrews]

7 hours ago, Chuck Schwartz said:

David, for various reasons, LBJ wanted to be president. LBJ saw what happened if you went against the high military and intelligence units.  So, LBJ made peace with these units and retained his presidency until it was obvious he was not going to be re-elected din 1968.

Yet LBJ coerced  Curtis LeMay's retirement in 1965, for opposing him and McNamara on the scope of the Vietnam bombing campaign.*  LBJ also put the compliant Westmoreland, and then Abrams, in charge of ineffective ground war strategies, replaced the war-depleted McNamara, and resigned himself, opening the way to Nixon - who now had the support from above that he didn't capture in 1960, signaled in part by the RFK assassination.  Johnson seems less like a president that feared the military and more like one who obeyed the highest economic and social powers.  The military was just a willing instrument in the JFKA, greenlighted from above.**

"Delay would mean the Soviet Union would soon possess nuclear war power that would make such a sudden attack unfeasible without the mutual assured destruction of both countries."  But there was nothing but delay on Johnson's part, starting with the delay in creating the Warren Commission, then the year-long investigation that blamed no one, then the abandonment of Cuba.  Nuclear war may have been held out as a carrot, but the carrot was snatched away and replaced with the sop of Vietnam - unless, of course, Vietnam was the real prize in the first place, a thought that is not admitted here.

Vietnam and the riddance of electorally supported Kennedy "arrogance"*** was all the military was ever going to get, and probably all they worked for from the beginning, and they knew it.  Johnson claiming the Warren Commission was needed to stave off nuclear war was a dodge used to install a coverup that would satisfy early JFKA critics and bury the trail of the conspirators.

Otherwise, what, exactly, explains the preference for the paper's Plan B over its Plan A?

_____

*All of that contradicting the low-intensity conflict concept developed under Eisenhower in the face of, first, the American nuclear bombing of Japan, and second, the debacle of Truman's "police action" in Korea, neither salutary to America's reputation nor to the developing sophistication of warfare.  LeMay and his like-minded ilk were already beyond the closing door by the day of Kennedy's death, while Kennedy inherited their blame for their obsolescence.

**Indeed, the failure of Nixon-Kissinger bombing campaign in Vietnam and Cambodia may have been the deciding factor in Nixon's assasination-through-scandal.  Through opposite motives from Kennedy, he was destroyed in the tension between old and new schools of warfare.  More fancifully, one could call his character assassination an example of low-intensity politics.

***A perceived arrogance expressed in Dulles's remark, "He thought he was a God."  Yet Dulles himself was swayed to do nothing but obfuscate the Oswald-Soviet connection while co-directing the WC with McCloy.  So the "rogue" factor, did it exist, did not go very high up, and the higher-ups were content with the prize of Vietnam.

Edited November 14, 2021 by David Andrews

[Douglas Caddy]

I shall be speaking about this article at Judyth Baker's Ninth Annual JFK Assassination Conference on this Friday, Nov. 19, at 3:45 pm. The conference can be viewed on Zoom.

Edited November 17, 2021 by Douglas Caddy

[Douglas Caddy]

It was my privilege to speak yesterday at Judyth Baker's Ninth Annual JFK Conference in Dallas..

[Guest]

@Douglas Caddy Thanks for this contribution and sharing your thoughts with us. 

[Douglas Caddy]

On 11/14/2021 at 3:34 AM, Benjamin Cole said:

   Jacob G. Hansberger  is properly  "Hornberger." 

I guess it is a matter about how one looks at the whole article, which has 10,762 words. One misspelling by an 83 year old author is not a bad average.

[Douglas Caddy]

Moscow Says U.S. Rehearsed Nuclear Strike Against Russia This Month

By Reuters

|

Nov. 23, 2021, at 9:16 a.m.

 

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-11-23/russia-notes-significant-increase-in-u-s-bomber-activity-in-east-minister

[Paul Bacon]

20 hours ago, Douglas Caddy said:

I guess it is a matter about how one looks at the whole article, which has 10,762 words. One misspelling by an 83 year old author is not a bad average.

Age is no excuse Doug.  We're still going to have to dock you (1) point.

[Paul Jolliffe]

19 hours ago, Douglas Caddy said:

Moscow Says U.S. Rehearsed Nuclear Strike Against Russia This Month

By Reuters

|

Nov. 23, 2021, at 9:16 a.m.

 

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-11-23/russia-notes-significant-increase-in-u-s-bomber-activity-in-east-minister

Yikes!

The ghost of Curtis LeMay lives on!

(Stanley Kubrick's 1964 take on this 2021 story):