Oliver Stone's New JFK Documentaries and the Vietnam War

[Michael Griffith]

On 9/1/2022 at 7:57 PM, Paul Jolliffe said:

Mike,

The Taylor McNamara report was only partly approved by President Kennedy.

Which was the only part he specifically approved in NSAM 263?

I B (1-3)

B. Recommendations.

        We recommend that:
        1.   General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes as:

        a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the Delta (IV Corps).
        b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out of 30 and static missions are ended.
        c. Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value.
        d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength.
        e. The training and arming of hamlet militia to an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.
        f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced.

        2.   A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.
        3.   In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.

So in NSAM 263, prepared for President Kennedy on October 2, discussed and verbally approved on October 5, and formally approved on October 11, 1963, our plan was to withdraw from Vietnam.

That Kennedy directed that his policy be enacted in a low-key manner proves that he knew he faced ferocious opposition from his own National Security State (and likely from members of his own cabinet, not the least of whom was McGeorge Bundy . . . )

Mike, 

This is not new. Revise all you like, but it won't work. Quoting self-interested parties decades after the fact blaming our debacle on the "anti-war" crowd or Congressional Democrats is incredibly weak sauce. 

This has been discussed for decades - Kennedy was getting out, regardless of whatever was happening in Vietnam. You can cite as many ambiguous campaign statements by Robert Kennedy in the spring of 1964 as you like, but there is no substitute for the official U.S. policy under President Kennedy: read it and weep.

Under President Kennedy's policy in 1963 at the moment of his murder, we were getting out.

I am not revising at all. You are ignoring plain evidence that refutes the total-disengagement-no-matter-what view. For example, look at recommendation number 2, which you quoted. Look at the conditional wording, and notice that it didn't say "all U.S. personnel" but "the bulk of U.S. personnel":

. . . by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.

Again, note the "should be possible," not, "we're leaving by then no matter what." And notice that it said "the bulk," not "all" but "the bulk," which is consistent with Taylor's point that it might be necessary to leave behind a small force of trainers.

And look at recommendation number 3, which you also quoted. It stated this "long-term" program to replace U.S. personnel with Vietnamese would be done "without impairment of the war effort":

This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.

"WITHOUT IMPAIRMENT OF THE WAR EFFORT." This was all conditional on the situation on the ground. This was a "long-term program" that would not impair the war effort, because JFK had no intention of totally disengaging until South Vietnam was secure and militarily viable.

You are ignoring all the other JFK statements that show he had no intention of completely disengaging from South Vietnam until South Vietnam was able to stand on its own. Bobby said the same thing. 

I should add that you are correct in saying that NSAM 263 only approved part 1 B (1-3) of the McNamara-Taylor report. However, JFK did approve paragraph 1 B 6.a of the report as well, although not in the NSAM, as I noted in my previous reply, in that he approved the policy statement in 1 B 6.a at the 10/2 NSC meeting. Also, 1 B 6.a was mirrored in 1 B 1 (2-3).

[Sandy Larsen]

3 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Look at the conditional wording, and notice that it didn't say "all U.S. personnel" but "the bulk of U.S. personnel":

. . . by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.

Again, note the "should be possible," not, "we're leaving by then no matter what." And notice that it said "the bulk," not "all" but "the bulk...

 

Right. But nowhere does it promise anything beyond 1965!

 

[James DiEugenio]

Nice one Sandy.

As Kennedy knew, he had to arrange his withdrawal around the election.

Johnson was arranging his escalation around the election.

Newman pointed this out decades ago.

Kennedy understood the massive problem I just tried to point out.

There was no there there in South Vietnam.  Which necessitated more and more insertion of American power.  Which JFK was opposed to since that would turn it into a white man's war, a colonialist war.  And that is what LBJ did. He turned it into an American war.

With disastrous results.

 

Edited September 3, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

Another telling point about this issue is the following.

The only plans you will find in the JFK administration are for withdrawal.  And the oral testimony backs that up.

Again, this drastically changed after Kennedy's death.

LBJ put together a secret task force to begin planning for American entry into the war.  This coincided with the signing of NSAM 288 which mapped out a large air war over North Vietnam. That task force was led by William Sullivan, the man who disagreed with Kennedy over the withdrawal plan. It was then taken over by Bill Bundy. By the time Bundy took it over, American entry into the war was a done deal.

NSAM 288 was the key.  As I have said, what Kennedy would not do in three years, LBJ did in three months. 

Edited September 3, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[Michael Griffith]

5 hours ago, Sandy Larsen said:

 

Right. But nowhere does it promise anything beyond 1965!

 

But the statements that I cited straight from NSAM 263 alone prove that there was no fixed, unalterable plan to totally disengage from South Vietnam regardless of the situation on the ground. Of course it doesn't promise anything beyond 1965, because the "objective" was to have "the bulk" of U.S. forces out of Vietnam by the end of 1965--but, again, this was clearly, indisputably made conditional on the situation. IF South Vietnam's armed forces were enlarged enough and able to defend the country on their own, then and only then would the end-of-1965 objective be able to be met. 

There was no indication that JFK held the view that "we are getting out of South Vietnam by the end of 1965 no matter what, regardless of the situation on the ground." There was not even a hint of any such position. On the contrary, NSAM 263 argues strongly against that view, and JFK made it very clear in numerous other statements that he was determined to keep South Vietnam from falling to the communists.

I don't think you folks realize how bad it sounds to many Americans when you talk as though it would have been a great and wise act of statesmanship if JFK had handed over 18 million South Vietnamese to communist tyranny after he was reelected. What makes this position especially unfortunate is that JFK had no such intention. You are doing a disservice to his memory and are misrepresenting his intention when you claim that he would have abandoned South Vietnam regardless of the situation and the consequences.

Have you or any of those who agree with you bothered to watch Dr. Selverstone's 2016 video yet? 

 

[Sandy Larsen]

31 minutes ago, Michael Griffith said:

I don't think you folks realize how bad it sounds to many Americans when you talk as though it would have been a great and wise act of statesmanship if JFK had handed over 18 million South Vietnamese to communist tyranny after he was reelected.

 

We were finished with two wars in the 1960s and were living a good life. I don't remember ANYBODY wanting to go to war again. Had Kennedy decided to pull out, he would have framed it much differently than the way you have here and it wouldn't have sounded so bad. And we would have said "okay" and been done with it.

It was only when we were actually sending young combat troops in that the war had any support. But it only went downhill from there.

Then when it looked like we were going to get out under Nixon, the only people who were against doing so were conservative Republicans. And the funny thing is, they talked  about it exactly the way you do now! I mean exactly! All that stuff about our losing only because the government wouldn't let us win. I thought that that attitude had died out long ago, but apparently not. To me you're sort of like a fossil from the past.

 

[Benjamin Cole]

 

Boy, this incredible short film was produced not by leftists, but by the US Marine Corp, when Khe Sanh was Khe Sanh, and the mission was being lionized not demonized. The short film concludes that Khe Sanh is a US victory.

But who can watch this film and not wonder how on earth the US expected to win the VW? 

With every intel and material advantage, the US forces bombed enough around Khe Sanh to make you wonder if any bugs or shrubs were left alive, let alone people. 

Yet the Marine Corp film moderator informs viewers that soldiers in Khe Sanh are under constant fire. Planes cannot land. 

Westmoreland repeatedly described Khe Sanh as vital.

Even vital enough to use nukes: 

Journalist Richard Ehrlich writes that according to the report, "in late January, General Westmoreland had warned that if the situation near the DMZ and at Khe Sanh worsened drastically, nuclear or chemical weapons might have to be used." The report continues to state, "this prompted Air Force chief of staff, General John McConnell, to press, although unsuccessfully, for JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) authority to request Pacific Command to prepare a plan for using low-yield nuclear weapons to prevent a catastrophic loss of the U.S. Marine base."--Wikipedia.

Westmoreland put that in a book he wrote, as well. 

In the end, the US ended up withdrawing from Khe Sanh, still under gunfire, and saying that Khe Sanh was not that important anyway. 

It may be that Giap outsmarted the American generals, and his troops certainly outlasted US troops. 

If US soldiers were brave, then how to describe the NV and Viet Cong? 

Some wars are better avoided. 

 

 

 

Edited September 4, 2022 by Benjamin Cole

[Michael Griffith]

8 hours ago, Benjamin Cole said:

 

Boy, this incredible short film was produced not by leftists, but by the US Marine Corp, when Khe Sanh was Khe Sanh, and the mission was being lionized not demonized. The short film concludes that Khe Sanh is a US victory.

But who can watch this film and not wonder how on earth the US expected to win the VW? 

With every intel and material advantage, the US forces bombed enough around Khe Sanh to make you wonder if any bugs or shrubs were left alive, let alone people. 

Yet the Marine Corp film moderator informs viewers that soldiers in Khe Sanh are under constant fire. Planes cannot land. 

Westmoreland repeatedly described Khe Sanh as vital.

Even vital enough to use nukes: 

Journalist Richard Ehrlich writes that according to the report, "in late January, General Westmoreland had warned that if the situation near the DMZ and at Khe Sanh worsened drastically, nuclear or chemical weapons might have to be used." The report continues to state, "this prompted Air Force chief of staff, General John McConnell, to press, although unsuccessfully, for JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) authority to request Pacific Command to prepare a plan for using low-yield nuclear weapons to prevent a catastrophic loss of the U.S. Marine base."--Wikipedia.

Westmoreland put that in a book he wrote, as well. 

In the end, the US ended up withdrawing from Khe Sanh, still under gunfire, and saying that Khe Sanh was not that important anyway. 

It may be that Giap outsmarted the American generals, and his troops certainly outlasted US troops. 

If US soldiers were brave, then how to describe the NV and Viet Cong? 

Some wars are better avoided. 

WHAT???!!! This is utterly erroneous. Good grief, we decimated Giap's forces at Khe Sanh, and they eventually were forced to flee in such haste that they left behind huge amounts of war material, something they had never done before. 

Did you even watch the video that you linked? I ask because the video documents--and says--that Khe Sanh was an American victory, a resounding one.

I'm genuinely baffled as to how you could say that the video you linked indicates the war was unwinnable or that we lost the battle of Khe Sanh. Among other things, the video notes that our air supply operations to the base were never cut--"the air bridge is never cut" (starting at about 3:10 in the video). The video also points out that we were able to maintain continuous C-130 surveillance flights over Khe Sanh to direct attacks on the North Vietnamese forces (starting at about 10:15 in the video).

The video also notes that toward the end of the battle we actually attacked the North Vietnamese and pursued them, and that when we overran their base "the extent of the communist defeat becomes more apparent"--partly because they left behind huge amounts of war material (starting at about 13:15 in the video).

I'm guessing that you still haven't bothered to watch the two-part AIM documentary on the Vietnam War. The AIM documentary has a long segment on Khe Sanh that debunks the misleading reporting that our news media did on the battle at the time. The media's dishonest, Orwellian spin on the battle is another sad example of our news media reporting an American victory as a defeat. 

Let's get some facts straight about Khe Sanh:

First off, we withdrew from Khe Sanh only after we devastated the North Vietnamese and forced them to flee.  Good grief, Giap's forces lost over 50% of their troops in the battle. One NVese regiment lost 75% of its soldiers.

The air strip at Khe Sanh remained operational through the battle. During the months-long battle, the North Vietnamese managed to shoot down only four of our planes! Yes, just four. We continued to supply Khe Sanh by air at will and had no trouble air-evacuating our wounded. Moreover, unlike the French at Dien Bien Phu, we always maintained control of the high ground around Khe Sanh, which gave us a crucial advantage because we had the entire area surrounding the base ranged for artillery.

Not only did we control all the high ground and have the area around the base ranged for artillery, but we had additional--and tremendous--long-range artillery support from Army bases that were far out of range of Giap's artillery. The video that you linked talks about this fact as well. 

The North Vietnamese could never even get close enough to launch a ground assault ala Dien Bien Phu because of our air raids and artillery. There was never any hand-to-hand fighting at Khe Sanh because the NVese forces could never get that close. 

And because we controlled the high ground, the NV had to fire their artillery from long ranges. The only significant hit they ever scored was when one of their shells hit the ammo dump. Of course, our news media showed endless clips of the ammo dump exploding and smoking, usually without explaining the rest of the story, such as the fact that this was a one-off success and that their artillery was ineffective the vast majority of the time.

No, Giap did not outsmart us. Our commanders at Khe Sanh outsmarted him. They anticipated nearly his every move, and as a result were able to inflict horrendous damage on his forces.

Also, our forces were not "constantly under fire" at Khe Sanh. There were plenty of lulls in the action, partly because it took the NVese troops time to recover from each disastrous assault they launched. Again, the NVese forces lost over half of their manpower because they got slaughtered so badly every time they would pop up and attack us and because of our air raids and artillery barrages. There were also lulls in the NVese artillery bombardments, and many of their rounds landed too far away to harm anyone.

We know from North Vietnamese sources that our air raids around Khe Sanh were so effective against Giap's supply lines that his troops were nearly starving. NVese soldiers who were captured at the time said the same thing. The NVese POWs reported that there were several days when they had no food whatsoever, and that their rations had been cut to near-starvation levels.

Another revealing fact is that because of our counterattack and pursuit, Giap's forces were forced to flee so hurriedly that, as mentioned, they left behind huge amounts of war material. This is revealing because the NVese were known for never leaving anything behind when they withdrew. 

And when I say that Giap's forces left behind "huge amounts" of war material, I mean really huge. Specifically, they abandoned 182 rockets and mortars, 260,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 13,000 rounds of larger-caliber ammunition, and 8,700 hand grenades and mines.

If you are interested in reading the other side of the story, here are some articles you should read:

Right Marine at the Right Place | Naval History Magazine - April 2021 Volume 35, Number 2 (usni.org)

Airpower at Khe Sanh - Air Force Magazine

AIR POWER & THE FIGHT FOR KHE SANH (defense.gov)

 

[Benjamin Cole]

10 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

WHAT???!!! This is utterly erroneous. Good grief, we decimated Giap's forces at Khe Sanh, and they eventually were forced to flee in such haste that they left behind huge amounts of war material, something they had never done before. 

Did you even watch the video that you linked? I ask because the video documents--and says--that Khe Sanh was an American victory, a resounding one.

I'm genuinely baffled as to how you could say that the video you linked indicates the war was unwinnable or that we lost the battle of Khe Sanh. Among other things, the video notes that our air supply operations to the base were never cut--"the air bridge is never cut" (starting at about 3:10 in the video). The video also points out that we were able to maintain continuous C-130 surveillance flights over Khe Sanh to direct attacks on the North Vietnamese forces (starting at about 10:15 in the video).

The video also notes that toward the end of the battle we actually attacked the North Vietnamese and pursued them, and that when we overran their base "the extent of the communist defeat becomes more apparent"--partly because they left behind huge amounts of war material (starting at about 13:15 in the video).

I'm guessing that you still haven't bothered to watch the two-part AIM documentary on the Vietnam War. The AIM documentary has a long segment on Khe Sanh that debunks the misleading reporting that our news media did on the battle at the time. The media's dishonest, Orwellian spin on the battle is another sad example of our news media reporting an American victory as a defeat. 

Let's get some facts straight about Khe Sanh:

First off, we withdrew from Khe Sanh only after we devastated the North Vietnamese and forced them to flee.  Good grief, Giap's forces lost over 50% of their troops in the battle. One NVese regiment lost 75% of its soldiers.

The air strip at Khe Sanh remained operational through the battle. During the months-long battle, the North Vietnamese managed to shoot down only four of our planes! Yes, just four. We continued to supply Khe Sanh by air at will and had no trouble air-evacuating our wounded. Moreover, unlike the French at Dien Bien Phu, we always maintained control of the high ground around Khe Sanh, which gave us a crucial advantage because we had the entire area surrounding the base ranged for artillery.

Not only did we control all the high ground and have the area around the base ranged for artillery, but we had additional--and tremendous--long-range artillery support from Army bases that were far out of range of Giap's artillery. The video that you linked talks about this fact as well. 

The North Vietnamese could never even get close enough to launch a ground assault ala Dien Bien Phu because of our air raids and artillery. There was never any hand-to-hand fighting at Khe Sanh because the NVese forces could never get that close. 

And because we controlled the high ground, the NV had to fire their artillery from long ranges. The only significant hit they ever scored was when one of their shells hit the ammo dump. Of course, our news media showed endless clips of the ammo dump exploding and smoking, usually without explaining the rest of the story, such as the fact that this was a one-off success and that their artillery was ineffective the vast majority of the time.

No, Giap did not outsmart us. Our commanders at Khe Sanh outsmarted him. They anticipated nearly his every move, and as a result were able to inflict horrendous damage on his forces.

Also, our forces were not "constantly under fire" at Khe Sanh. There were plenty of lulls in the action, partly because it took the NVese troops time to recover from each disastrous assault they launched. Again, the NVese forces lost over half of their manpower because they got slaughtered so badly every time they would pop up and attack us and because of our air raids and artillery barrages. There were also lulls in the NVese artillery bombardments, and many of their rounds landed too far away to harm anyone.

We know from North Vietnamese sources that our air raids around Khe Sanh were so effective against Giap's supply lines that his troops were nearly starving. NVese soldiers who were captured at the time said the same thing. The NVese POWs reported that there were several days when they had no food whatsoever, and that their rations had been cut to near-starvation levels.

Another revealing fact is that because of our counterattack and pursuit, Giap's forces were forced to flee so hurriedly that, as mentioned, they left behind huge amounts of war material. This is revealing because the NVese were known for never leaving anything behind when they withdrew. 

And when I say that Giap's forces left behind "huge amounts" of war material, I mean really huge. Specifically, they abandoned 182 rockets and mortars, 260,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 13,000 rounds of larger-caliber ammunition, and 8,700 hand grenades and mines.

If you are interested in reading the other side of the story, here are some articles you should read:

Right Marine at the Right Place | Naval History Magazine - April 2021 Volume 35, Number 2 (usni.org)

Airpower at Khe Sanh - Air Force Magazine

AIR POWER & THE FIGHT FOR KHE SANH (defense.gov)

 

MG-

Yes, I watched the film I posted, that's why I posted it 

The film, produced by the US Marines, describes Khe Sanh as under constant fire, so much so supplies were air-dropped. 

In 1967, the NV/VC were routed, and retreated---but came back.

The final chapter, not in the contemporary film, is Marines abandoning the base under gunfire. 

Khe Sanh is in many ways a small version of the whole war---the insanity, with Westmoreland suggesting nuclear arms were needed to secure Khe Sanh, which was absolutely vital to the war effort.

Then the US retreating from the Khe Sanh base later.   

The huge US military advantage, incredible losses for the other side, but ultimate defeat. 

"American commanders considered the defense of Khe Sanh a success, but shortly after the siege was lifted, the decision was made to dismantle the base rather than risk similar battles in the future. On 19 June 1968, the evacuation and destruction of KSCB began. Amid heavy shelling, the Marines attempted to salvage what they could before destroying what remained as they were evacuated."---Wikipedia

What to say about this? This is a US victory?

Kissinger summed it up, when he said the problem with guerrilla warfare is the bad guys never do what you want them to. They fade when weak, they attack where vulnerable. 

Much as I loathe, detest and revile communist dictatorships (including the one in Beijing toasted by US multinationals, academic and financial elites), what can you say about the NV/VC soldiers?

Do you suppose they showed a lot of determination? The collapse of Afghanistan--did the Afghanis appear determined to beat the Taliban?  

If the US ultimately loses in Khe Sanh...what does that tell you? If US soldiers (understandably) just want to serve their tour and get out, what does that tell you? 

If Khe Sanh is a US victory....

 

 

 

[James DiEugenio]

From Peter Brush's "Operation Niagara"

General Giap claimed Khe Sanh was never of particular importance to the North Vietnamese. According to Giap, it was the U.S. that made Khe Sanh important because the Americans had placed their prestige at stake there. In the larger scheme of things, the fighting at Khe Sanh was of little lasting significance. Before the bombs and shells of Operation NIAGARA stopped falling on the Khe Sanh battlefield, U. S. President Johnson ordered severe restrictions on aerial and naval attacks against North Vietnam, declared the readiness of the U.S. to begin peace discussions to end the war, and declined to seek reelection to the presidency. In June 1968, the base at Khe Sanh was abandoned by the Americans. Ultimately, the U.S. would learn that it was unable to win at the conference table what it could not win on the battlefield.

Edited September 5, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

Khe Sanh took place around the time of the Tet offensive.

There has always been a debate about whether Khe Sanh was a diversion for Tet, or Tet was a diversion for Khe Sanh.

When I found the above article, this clinched it as the former.

Giap was a smart guy.  The combination of the two destroyed LBJ's presidency.

 

[Michael Griffith]

13 hours ago, Benjamin Cole said:

MG-

Ben, let me first address something James said in the reply after yours:

General Giap claimed Khe Sanh was never of particular importance to the North Vietnamese. 

So now you're relying on a murderous communist thug like Giap? If Khe Sanh was "never of particular importance" to the NVese, why did Giap commit 40,000 troops to it and divert large numbers of artillery pieces that would be sorely missed during the Tet Offensive? (Some put the number of Giap's forces at closer to 100,000). If you had bothered to read the articles I linked, you would have read a refutation of the NVese claim that they didn't really care about Khe Sanh.

In fact, the NVese also later claimed that they were not even trying to take the base but were merely trying to tie down American forces there, a laughable claim given the number of suicidal ground assaults they launched against the base.

Ben, now to your reply:

Yes, I watched the film I posted, that's why I posted it 

But you forgot to mention that the film said we won a resounding victory at Khe Sanh, and that when we counterattacked and pursued them, they were forced to leave behind huge amounts of war material, something they usually never did. 

The film, produced by the US Marines, describes Khe Sanh as under constant fire, so much so supplies were air-dropped. 

No, it does not. It includes several segments that show periods when Khe Sanh was not under fire. Will you ever watch the two-part AIM documentary Television's Vietnam, which includes a long segment on Khe Sanh? It includes interviews with soldiers who were at Khe Sanh during the battle. They were able to take leave and come back. Journalists were able to fly in and out. We had complete control of the air over Khe Sanh. Etc., etc., etc.

The NVese fired a huge amount of shells at Khe Sanh. Yes, certainly, there were times when the shelling made the air strip "hot" and forced our troops to take cover, but there were also plenty of times when firing was minimal or non-existent. There were frequent long breaks in the shelling because we had destroyed so many NVese artillery pieces and it took time for them to bring in more artillery pieces. And, as mentioned earlier, many of their shells were off target and landed too far away to do any damage at all, because they were forced to fire from less-than-optimal ranges.

I should add that we purposely allowed Giap to surround Khe Sanh. This was a conscious strategy to bait him into committing a large force to try to take the base:

Khe Sanh was a purposely orchestrated event by General William C. Westmorland
designed as bait to entice General Vo Nguyen Giap into a classic set-piece battle in an effort to destroy his army. (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1019240.pdf, p. 4)

Oh, and the film was not made by the Marines but by the Air Force. If you watch the film, the opening credits state that it was made by the Air Force (0:01 to 0:06 in the film).

Here is a very good Marine Corps video on the battle of Khe Sanh: Click Here.

In 1967, the NV/VC were routed, and retreated---but came back.

The battle occurred in 1968. The NVese hastily fled when we launched a ground counterattack.

Oh, yes, the NVese came back, after they saw that we were leaving, and they were careful to keep their distance when they came back, and they came back in much smaller numbers than they had during the battle.

Also, after the ammo dump got hit, our troops dug a huge complex underground to house the new ammo dump, a hospital, etc., and key parts of the base were connected by a series of tunnels and deep trenches. This was one reason that our casualties were so low.

To appreciate the ineffectiveness of the NVese artillery, we should consider the number of flights--both fixed-wing and helicopter--and the amount of supplies they delivered during the battle:

Throughout the siege, the smaller C-123s and C-7s landed on the airstrip to deliver their supplies and evacuate the wounded. All told, 12,430 tons of supplies were delivered and 4,250 passengers transported by USAF aircraft in 1061 sorties. In addition to these numbers, Marine helicopters transported 14,562 passengers and 4,661 tons of cargo keeping the overlooking hilltops in Marine’s hands.(https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1019240.pdf, p. 7)

The final chapter, not in the contemporary film, is Marines abandoning the base under gunfire. 

This is the same distortion that North Vietnam and our news media peddled. If you want to call the long-range shelling that the NVese did while we were dismantling the base after we had chased their forces out of the area--if you want to call that "abandoning the base under gunfire," that's your prerogative. Strictly technically speaking it's accurate, but it's also misleading.

Even after the bulk of our forces were gone and we had only a small force on Hill 689, the NVese did not dare launch any major attacks but only minor harassing attacks. Why do you suppose that was?

Moreover, our forces continued to patrol the entire Khe Sanh plateau for over a year after we dismantled the base. Also, later that year, in October, we reoccupied the area for two weeks with South Vietnamese forces, and they encountered only minimal opposition. Now, why do you suppose that was?

But that's not all. The Marines continued to hold Hill 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau until September 1969. What happened when the NVese launched a major assault on the hill? Well, they never did that. Why do you suppose that was?

Khe Sanh is in many ways a small version of the whole war---the insanity, with Westmoreland suggesting nuclear arms were needed to secure Khe Sanh, which was absolutely vital to the war effort.

More distortion. Westmoreland never said nukes were needed to secure Khe Sanh. You are talking about Westmoreland's internal statement that IF the situation at Khe Sanh or near the DMZ severely deteriorated, low-yield nukes "might" need to be used. But the situation never even got close to that point.

And I suspect that this will shock you, but dropping one or two low-yield nukes around Khe Sanh would not have been the end of the planet. The blast radius of the low-yield nukes at the time was about 8,000 feet, and the worst destruction would have occurred within about 4,000 feet of the center of the explosion, gradually and substantially tapering off from that point. I am not suggesting that we should have done this, but I am saying that it was not a crazy, reckless option when talking about areas that were miles away from any sizable populations.

Then the US retreating from the Khe Sanh base later.   

Okay, I'm guessing you didn't bother to read any of the articles I linked, right? We did not "retreat" from Khe Sanh. In military terminology, our withdrawal from Khe Sanh was not a "retreat." We left Khe Sanh because the NVese changed their tactics in the area after incurring such a terrible slaughter when they tried ground assaults. Plus, we no longer needed a fixed base such as Khe Sanh because we now had enough helicopters in the area to carry out mobile operations in the region. And, I repeat that we continued to patrol the entire Khe Sanh plateau for over a year after dismantling the base, and that we held Hill 950 until September 1969 for recon purposes because the hill provided a view of the entire plateau.

Another reason that we closed the base--actually, the main reason we did so--was that General Abrams had taken over command of U.S. forces in Vietnam, and closing the base was part of his successful Vietnamization strategy. Westmoreland recommended maintaining the base, but Abrams did not believe in Westmoreland's search-and-destroy approach. Therefore, he saw no need to maintain a base that was far removed from population and whose function could be done without maintaining it.

The huge US military advantage, incredible losses for the other side, but ultimate defeat. 

That was the warped spin put out by the communists, our news media, and our anti-war movement. How was Khe Sanh a "defeat" when we continued to patrol the entire plateau at will and held a key observation point overlooking the plateau for over a year after slaughtering Giap's forces when they tried to take the base?

"American commanders considered the defense of Khe Sanh a success, but shortly after the siege was lifted, the decision was made to dismantle the base rather than risk similar battles in the future. On 19 June 1968, the evacuation and destruction of KSCB began. Amid heavy shelling, the Marines attempted to salvage what they could before destroying what remained as they were evacuated."---Wikipedia

Of course Wikipedia repeats the leftist line on Khe Sanh. "Amid heavy shelling"? Well, amid heavy long-range and ineffective shelling. This was more harassing fire than anything else; it did not impede our dismantling and withdrawal operations. And, incidentally, that "heavy shelling" was intermittent because Giap had to keep moving his artillery periodically to avoid the kinds of devastating air attacks he had suffered during the battle. 

As for the claim that we did not want to "risk similar battles in the future," this was a PR-based statement because of the media-hyped negative perception of an American base being surrounded and cut off, even though we purposely allowed the base to be surrounded, and even though we inflicted horrendous losses on the enemy. In actuality, our commanders would have been only too happy to have had "similar battles in the future" where we baited the NVese to surround a position and then decimated their forces with air and artillery attacks and forced them to flee so quickly that they left behind massive war supplies. 

One of the reasons we withdrew from and dismantled the Khe Sanh base was that we realized that Giap was not going to be dumb enough to try a ground assault on the base again. But liberal sources never mention this; instead, they prefer, for some reason, to repeat communist talking points about Khe Sanh. Liberal sources also never mention that we continued to patrol the entire Khe Sanh plateau and held a key observation point for over a year after the battle.

Kissinger summed it up, when he said the problem with guerrilla warfare is the bad guys never do what you want them to. They fade when weak, they attack where vulnerable. 

Kissinger's comment has nothing to do with Khe Sanh. Giap's assault on Khe Sanh was not "guerilla warfare" but a traditional set-piece attack.

Much as I loathe, detest and revile communist dictatorships (including the one in Beijing toasted by US multinationals, academic and financial elites). . . .

I certainly agree with you on this point, but a few folks argue that brutal communist regimes are actually not all that bad if they have KFC, Domino's, McDonald's, and have schools of banking and finance.

what can you say about the NV/VC soldiers? Do you suppose they showed a lot of determination? 

Actually, NV/VC soldiers surrendered whenever they had the chance to do so, i.e., if they could surrender without being shot by their officers while trying to escape. You should read the accounts of former NV/VC soldiers about the draconian discipline imposed on them by their officers. During the war, over 200,000 NV/VC soldiers surrendered and became POWs.

In addition, it is worth noting that during the battle of Khe Sanh, NVese soldiers deserted in large numbers. Documents captured when we overran Giap's positions revealed that his desertion rate was an astounding 20-25%. This is mentioned in the Marine Corps documentary on Khe Sanh.

If the US ultimately loses in Khe Sanh...what does that tell you? If US soldiers (understandably) just want to serve their tour and get out, what does that tell you? If Khe Sanh is a US victory....

It is Orwellian spin to say that we "lost" at Khe Sanh. If you were to get 10 military experts in a room and describe the events at Khe Sanh as a hypothetical scenario, I'd bet good money that every one of them would say that the force that occupied the base, that decimated the attackers, that forced the attackers to flee, and that continued to do recon patrols in the area at will was the force that won.

As for the argument about U.S. soldiers, that is a sad head-shaker. Of course, of course, of course, most of our soldiers just wanted to serve their tour and get out. The same was true of our soldiers in the Civil War, in World War II, and in the Korean War. Most soldiers in any war, especially the draftees, do not want to be in a combat zone any longer than required, and naturally they are anxious to get back to their civilian lives. This universal reality does not change the fact that Khe Sanh was a resounding defeat for the North Vietnamese. 

 

Edited September 5, 2022 by Michael Griffith

[Paul Brancato]

4 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Ben, let me first address something James said in the reply after yours:

General Giap claimed Khe Sanh was never of particular importance to the North Vietnamese. 

So now you're relying on a murderous communist thug like Giap? If Khe Sanh was "never of particular importance" to the NVese, why did Giap commit 40,000 troops to it and divert large numbers of artillery pieces that would be sorely missed during the Tet Offensive? (Some put the number of Giap's forces at closer to 100,000). If you had bothered to read the articles I linked, you would have read a refutation of the NVese claim that they didn't really care about Khe Sanh.

In fact, the NVese also later claimed that they were not even trying to take the base but were merely trying to tie down American forces there, a laughable claim given the number of suicidal ground assaults they launched against the base.

Ben, now to your reply:

Yes, I watched the film I posted, that's why I posted it 

But you forgot to mention that the film said we won a resounding victory at Khe Sanh, and that when we counterattacked and pursued them, they were forced to leave behind huge amounts of war material, something they usually never did. 

The film, produced by the US Marines, describes Khe Sanh as under constant fire, so much so supplies were air-dropped. 

No, it does not. It includes several segments that show periods when Khe Sanh was not under fire. Will you ever watch the two-part AIM documentary Television's Vietnam, which includes a long segment on Khe Sanh? It includes interviews with soldiers who were at Khe Sanh during the battle. They were able to take leave and come back. Journalists were able to fly in and out. We had complete control of the air over Khe Sanh. Etc., etc., etc.

The NVese fired a huge amount of shells at Khe Sanh. Yes, certainly, there were times when the shelling made the air strip "hot" and forced our troops to take cover, but there were also plenty of times when firing was minimal or non-existent. There were frequent long breaks in the shelling because we had destroyed so many NVese artillery pieces and it took time for them to bring in more artillery pieces. And, as mentioned earlier, many of their shells were off target and landed too far away to do any damage at all, because they were forced to fire from less-than-optimal ranges.

I should add that we purposely allowed Giap to surround Khe Sanh. This was a conscious strategy to bait him into committing a large force to try to take the base:

Khe Sanh was a purposely orchestrated event by General William C. Westmorland
designed as bait to entice General Vo Nguyen Giap into a classic set-piece battle in an effort to destroy his army. (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1019240.pdf, p. 4)

Oh, and the film was not made by the Marines but by the Air Force. If you watch the film, the opening credits state that it was made by the Air Force (0:01 to 0:06 in the film).

Here is a very good Marine Corps video on the battle of Khe Sanh: Click Here.

In 1967, the NV/VC were routed, and retreated---but came back.

The battle occurred in 1968. The NVese hastily fled when we launched a ground counterattack.

Oh, yes, the NVese came back, after they saw that we were leaving, and they were careful to keep their distance when they came back, and they came back in much smaller numbers than they had during the battle.

Also, after the ammo dump got hit, our troops dug a huge complex underground to house the new ammo dump, a hospital, etc., and key parts of the base were connected by a series of tunnels and deep trenches. This was one reason that our casualties were so low.

To appreciate the ineffectiveness of the NVese artillery, we should consider the number of flights--both fixed-wing and helicopter--and the amount of supplies they delivered during the battle:

Throughout the siege, the smaller C-123s and C-7s landed on the airstrip to deliver their supplies and evacuate the wounded. All told, 12,430 tons of supplies were delivered and 4,250 passengers transported by USAF aircraft in 1061 sorties. In addition to these numbers, Marine helicopters transported 14,562 passengers and 4,661 tons of cargo keeping the overlooking hilltops in Marine’s hands.(https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1019240.pdf, p. 7)

The final chapter, not in the contemporary film, is Marines abandoning the base under gunfire. 

This is the same distortion that North Vietnam and our news media peddled. If you want to call the long-range shelling that the NVese did while we were dismantling the base after we had chased their forces out of the area--if you want to call that "abandoning the base under gunfire," that's your prerogative. Strictly technically speaking it's accurate, but it's also misleading.

Even after the bulk of our forces were gone and we had only a small force on Hill 689, the NVese did not dare launch any major attacks but only minor harassing attacks. Why do you suppose that was?

Moreover, our forces continued to patrol the entire Khe Sanh plateau for over a year after we dismantled the base. Also, later that year, in October, we reoccupied the area for two weeks with South Vietnamese forces, and they encountered only minimal opposition. Now, why do you suppose that was?

But that's not all. The Marines continued to hold Hill 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau until September 1969. What happened when the NVese launched a major assault on the hill? Well, they never did that. Why do you suppose that was?

Khe Sanh is in many ways a small version of the whole war---the insanity, with Westmoreland suggesting nuclear arms were needed to secure Khe Sanh, which was absolutely vital to the war effort.

More distortion. Westmoreland never said nukes were needed to secure Khe Sanh. You are talking about Westmoreland's internal statement that IF the situation at Khe Sanh or near the DMZ severely deteriorated, low-yield nukes "might" need to be used. But the situation never even got close to that point.

And I suspect that this will shock you, but dropping one or two low-yield nukes around Khe Sanh would not have been the end of the planet. The blast radius of the low-yield nukes at the time was about 8,000 feet, and the worst destruction would have occurred within about 4,000 feet of the center of the explosion, gradually and substantially tapering off from that point. I am not suggesting that we should have done this, but I am saying that it was not a crazy, reckless option when talking about areas that were miles away from any sizable populations.

Then the US retreating from the Khe Sanh base later.   

Okay, I'm guessing you didn't bother to read any of the articles I linked, right? We did not "retreat" from Khe Sanh. In military terminology, our withdrawal from Khe Sanh was not a "retreat." We left Khe Sanh because the NVese changed their tactics in the area after incurring such a terrible slaughter when they tried ground assaults. Plus, we no longer needed a fixed base such as Khe Sanh because we now had enough helicopters in the area to carry out mobile operations in the region. And, I repeat that we continued to patrol the entire Khe Sanh plateau for over a year after dismantling the base, and that we held Hill 950 until September 1969 for recon purposes because the hill provided a view of the entire plateau.

Another reason that we closed the base--actually, the main reason we did so--was that General Abrams had taken over command of U.S. forces in Vietnam, and closing the base was part of his successful Vietnamization strategy. Westmoreland recommended maintaining the base, but Abrams did not believe in Westmoreland's search-and-destroy approach. Therefore, he saw no need to maintain a base that was far removed from population and whose function could be done without maintaining it.

The huge US military advantage, incredible losses for the other side, but ultimate defeat. 

That was the warped spin put out by the communists, our news media, and our anti-war movement. How was Khe Sanh a "defeat" when we continued to patrol the entire plateau at will and held a key observation point overlooking the plateau for over a year after slaughtering Giap's forces when they tried to take the base?

"American commanders considered the defense of Khe Sanh a success, but shortly after the siege was lifted, the decision was made to dismantle the base rather than risk similar battles in the future. On 19 June 1968, the evacuation and destruction of KSCB began. Amid heavy shelling, the Marines attempted to salvage what they could before destroying what remained as they were evacuated."---Wikipedia

Of course Wikipedia repeats the leftist line on Khe Sanh. "Amid heavy shelling"? Well, amid heavy long-range and ineffective shelling. This was more harassing fire than anything else; it did not impede our dismantling and withdrawal operations. And, incidentally, that "heavy shelling" was intermittent because Giap had to keep moving his artillery periodically to avoid the kinds of devastating air attacks he had suffered during the battle. 

As for the claim that we did not want to "risk similar battles in the future," this was a PR-based statement because of the media-hyped negative perception of an American base being surrounded and cut off, even though we purposely allowed the base to be surrounded, and even though we inflicted horrendous losses on the enemy. In actuality, our commanders would have been only too happy to have had "similar battles in the future" where we baited the NVese to surround a position and then decimated their forces with air and artillery attacks and forced them to flee so quickly that they left behind massive war supplies. 

One of the reasons we withdrew from and dismantled the Khe Sanh base was that we realized that Giap was not going to be dumb enough to try a ground assault on the base again. But liberal sources never mention this; instead, they prefer, for some reason, to repeat communist talking points about Khe Sanh. Liberal sources also never mention that we continued to patrol the entire Khe Sanh plateau and held a key observation point for over a year after the battle.

Kissinger summed it up, when he said the problem with guerrilla warfare is the bad guys never do what you want them to. They fade when weak, they attack where vulnerable. 

Kissinger's comment has nothing to do with Khe Sanh. Giap's assault on Khe Sanh was not "guerilla warfare" but a traditional set-piece attack.

Much as I loathe, detest and revile communist dictatorships (including the one in Beijing toasted by US multinationals, academic and financial elites). . . .

I certainly agree with you on this point, but a few folks argue that brutal communist regimes are actually not all that bad if they have KFC, Domino's, McDonald's, and have schools of banking and finance.

what can you say about the NV/VC soldiers? Do you suppose they showed a lot of determination? 

Actually, NV/VC soldiers surrendered whenever they had the chance to do so, i.e., if they could surrender without being shot by their officers while trying to escape. You should read the accounts of former NV/VC soldiers about the draconian discipline imposed on them by their officers. During the war, over 200,000 NV/VC soldiers surrendered and became POWs.

In addition, it is worth noting that during the battle of Khe Sanh, NVese soldiers deserted in large numbers. Documents captured when we overran Giap's positions revealed that his desertion rate was an astounding 20-25%. This is mentioned in the Marine Corps documentary on Khe Sanh.

If the US ultimately loses in Khe Sanh...what does that tell you? If US soldiers (understandably) just want to serve their tour and get out, what does that tell you? If Khe Sanh is a US victory....

It is Orwellian spin to say that we "lost" at Khe Sanh. If you were to get 10 military experts in a room and describe the events at Khe Sanh as a hypothetical scenario, I'd bet good money that every one of them would say that the force that occupied the base, that decimated the attackers, that forced the attackers to flee, and that continued to do recon patrols in the area at will was the force that won.

As for the argument about U.S. soldiers, that is a sad head-shaker. Of course, of course, of course, most of our soldiers just wanted to serve their tour and get out. The same was true of our soldiers in the Civil War, in World War II, and in the Korean War. Most soldiers in any war, especially the draftees, do not want to be in a combat zone any longer than required, and naturally they are anxious to get back to their civilian lives. This universal reality does not change the fact that Khe Sanh was a resounding defeat for the North Vietnamese. 

 

I wonder how many millions of Communists would have to die for the US to be victorious? Maybe you could extend your worldview into the present. Do you think there would be military victory possible anywhere in the world now? Afghanistan? Ukraine? Taiwan? Us or them mentality has to go before the human race ends. 

[Sandy Larsen]

7 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

 

 

Hey Michael,

How is it you know so much about the Vietnam war?

 

[James DiEugenio]

When Harry Summers told Giap that the NVA never defeated the Americans on the battlefield, Giap replied:

"That may be true, it is also irrelevant."

Don't you understand anything about Vietnam Mike?

 Or as Paul B. says above, "I wonder how many Communists have to die for the US to be victorious?"  LBJ and Westmoreland were in the middle of an out and out mess.   I mean, really, does anyone think that Khe Sanh was more important than Tet? I don't.  But while Tet was going on, Westmoreland sent 45,000 men to Khe Sanh.

Giap was not trying to get a battlefield victory.  That was not central. The main point was to sap the will of the American army and, through that, to wreck the political consensus behind the war at home. Giap did both.

Take a look at the book Kill Anything that Moves by Nick Turse.  In that book, he shows how the Pentagon worked out a secret plan to hide a plethora of war atrocities.  There were many; into the hundreds.  There was also the study of the rising incidence of fraggings.  Which, by about 1970, there were  over two hundred yearly.(Col. Robert Heinl, July 1971 Armed Forces Journal)  How does one conduct a war with that many mutinies?

Or take  the two Winter Soldier conferences in Detroit and Washington. About 109 veterans ended up testifying about war crimes. 

So in the face of this, how can anyone call anybody else a thug?  I mean the cover up about Calley was kind of sickening, don't you think?

As Kissinger said, we should have never been there. And please do not give me that stuff about abandoning Vietnam to communism.  I don't see how Ben and Jerry's, Bank of America, McDonald's, a banking university etc constitute communism.  And it would have all happened decades earlier if the US had not broken the Geneva Accords. A point you wish to ignore. For what reason?

"I don't see why we have to sit by and watch a country go communist just because the people voted for it." Henry Kissinger on Allende.

Edited September 6, 2022 by James DiEugenio