Oliver Stone's New JFK Documentaries and the Vietnam War

[Paul Jolliffe]

On 8/26/2022 at 1:41 PM, James DiEugenio said:

Furthering the last, Nixon was a real prevaricator on this subject.

In his book No More VIetnams, he wrote that he never considered bombing the dikes or using atomic weapons.

False.  

He did so twice.  Once with Duck Hook, and once during the Easter Offensive.  The first is on paper and the second one is on tape. This is why RMN fought with a fleet of lawyers not to declassify his records. It did not really happen until after his death.  The guy had a lot to conceal.

Even a rather sympathetic biographer, Ambrose, once said that Nixon was actually a little nutty when it came to Vietnam. After doing some work on the issue of RMN and Vietnam, I agree.

 

Jim,

Do you think Nixon may have feared what might have happened to him personally if he accelerated a quick American withdrawal from Vietnam?

I suspect that Johnson did indeed have such fears.

[Paul Jolliffe]

On 8/28/2022 at 12:24 AM, Benjamin Cole said:

LBJ's quixotic venture venture into Vietnam remains inexplicable.

Ben, 

I have long suspected the LBJ knew exactly what happened to JFK, and LBJ long suspected who had a hand in it.  (The JCS.)

This is not to say he knew everything about it, nor that he was entirely correct. (The ultimate sponsors were beyond the JCS.)

Merely to point out that President Johnson was afraid of being murdered by his own National Security State.

And with good reason . . . 

[Michael Griffith]

There is ample evidence that JFK had no intention of completely disengaging from South Vietnam, and that he had every intention of aiding South Vietnam to prevent a communist victory there. Let us start by reviewing the official statement of U.S. policy on Vietnam that JFK approved at the 10/2/1963 NSC meeting: 

1. The security of South Viet Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet Nam to deny this country to Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet Nam. (Record of Action No. 2472, Taken at the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 2, 1963) 

This was reinforced in the McNamara-Taylor report that JFK approved in NSAM 263:

 a. The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United States security. For this reason, we adhere to the overriding objective of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing the Viet Cong insurgency as promptly as possible. (By suppressing the insurgency we mean reducing it to proportions manageable by the national security forces of the GVN, unassisted by the presence of U.S. military forces.) We believe the U.S. part of the task can be completed by the end of 1965, the terminal date which we are taking as the time objective of our counterinsurgency programs. . . .

c. The political situation in Vietnam remains deeply serious. It has not yet significantly affected the military effort, but could do so at some time in the future. If the result is a GVN ineffective in the conduct of the war, the U.S. will review its attitude toward support for the government. Although we are deeply concerned by repressive practices, effective performance in the conduct of the war should be the determining factor in our relations with the GVN.

 d. The U.S. has expressed its disapproval of certain actions of the Diem-Nhu regime and will do so again if required. Our policy is to seek to bring about the abandonment of repression because of its effect on the popular will to resist. Our means consist of expressions of disapproval and the withholding of support from GVN activities that are not clearly contributing to the war effort. We will use these means as required to assure an effective military program.

Note that the first paragraph assumed that U.S. forces would remain in South Vietnam until the end of 1965, and that this “terminal date” was an “objective,” not an unalterable, fixed determination. So, rather than indicating that JFK would initiate a complete withdrawal and disengagement as soon as he won reelection, NSAM 263 assumed that U.S. forces would be in Vietnam until “the end of 1965,” and even that was not set in stone but was an “objective,” since, after all, the “overriding objective” was “denying this country to Communism.” 

Here is what JFK was going to say about Vietnam in his speech at the International Trade Mart on 11/22/1963, the speech that he never got to deliver:

About 70 percent of our military assistance goes to nine key countries located on or near the borders of the Communist bloc – nine countries confronted directly or indirectly with the threat of Communist aggression – Viet-Nam, Free China, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. No one of these countries possesses on its own the resources to maintain the forces which our own Chiefs of Staff think needed in the common interest. Reducing our efforts to train, equip, and assist their armies can only encourage Communist penetration and require in time the increased overseas deployment of American combat forces. And reducing the economic help needed to bolster these nations that undertake to help defend freedom can have the same disastrous result. 

JFK said the following in his 5/22/1963 news conference when asked about withdrawing troops from South Vietnam:

QUESTION: Mr. President, the brother of the President of South Viet-Nam has said that too many American troops are in South Viet-Nam. Could you comment on that, and give us some progress report on what is going on?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I hope we could-- we would withdraw troops, any number of troops, any time the government of South Viet-Nam would suggest it. The day after it was suggested, we would have some troops on their way home. That is Number 1.

Number 2 is we are hopeful that the situation in South Viet-Nam would permit some withdrawal in any case by the end of the year, but we can't possibly make that judgment at the present time. There is still a long, hard struggle to go, and we have seen what happened in Laos, which must inevitably have its effect upon South Viet-Nam, so that I couldn't say that today the situation is such that we could look for a brightening in the sky that would permit us to withdraw troops or begin to by the end of the year. But I would say, if requested to, we will do it immediately. As of today, we would hope we could begin to perhaps do it at the end of the year, but we couldn't make any final judgment at all until we see the course of the struggle the next few months.

JFK made no secret of his desire to bring troops home from South Vietnam, but notice that JFK clearly made withdrawing troops dependent on the situation in South Vietnam. Note that he said "there is still a long, hard struggle to go." Of course, JFK knew full well that South Vietnam's leaders would never request a withdrawal of any kind unless they were confident it would not endanger the country's survival, so that was really a non-issue. And note that he added that he could not make a final judgment until "we see the course of the struggle the next few months."

Then, in his 11/14/1963 news conference, just eight days before the assassination, he once again talked about withdrawing troops from South Vietnam in response to a question:

QUESTION: Mr. President, in view of the changed situation in South Viet Nam, do you still expect to bring back 1,000 troops before the end of the year, or has that figure been raised or lowered? 

THE PRESIDENT: No, we are going to bring back several hundred before the end of the year, but I think on the question of the exact number I thought we would wait until the meeting of November 20th.

Not a word about ending aid or completely disengaging, not even an indication of an intention to withdraw all the troops anytime soon.

On 9/9/1963, JFK was asked about South Vietnam on NBC's Huntley-Brinkley Report. He said the following:

Mr. Huntley: Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that our Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it difficult to alter or shift that policy?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that is true. I think in the case of South Viet-Nam we have been dealing with a government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better. Since June, however, the difficulties with the Buddhists, we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn't been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may spread. So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time and we must be patient, we must persist.

Mr. Huntley: Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost, a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that.

On 9/2/1963, JFK told Walter Cronkite that ultimately it was up to South Vietnam to win or lose the war, that we would help them but that it was their war, and that he was against withdrawing because that would be “a great mistake.” He also suggested that our effort to defend Asia may need to be equal to the effort that we made to defend Europe: 

. . . in the final analysis it is the people and the government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear, but I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away. . . . 

We took all this--made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate--we may not like it--in the defense of Asia. . . . 

What, of course, makes Americans somewhat impatient is that after carrying this load for 18 years, we are glad to get counsel, but we would like a little more assistance, real assistance. But we are going to meet our responsibility anyway. 

It doesn't do us any good to say, "Well, why don't we all just go home and leave the world to those who are our enemies."

I'll take these statements, along with Bobby's April 1964 statements and Schlesinger and Sorenson's silence over any plans for a complete disengagement, over anything that McNamara, O'Donnell, Powers, and Mansfield later said. 

 

Edited September 1, 2022 by Michael Griffith

[Paul Jolliffe]

12 minutes ago, Michael Griffith said:

There is ample evidence that JFK had no intention of completely disengaging from South Vietnam, and that he had every intention of aiding South Vietnam to prevent a communist victory there. Let us start by reviewing the official statement of U.S. policy on Vietnam that JFK approved at the 10/2/1963 NSC meeting: 

1. The security of South Viet Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet Nam to deny this country to Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet Nam. (Record of Action No. 2472, Taken at the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 2, 1963) 

This was reinforced in the McNamara-Taylor report that JFK approved in NSAM 263:

 a. The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United States security. For this reason, we adhere to the overriding objective of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing the Viet Cong insurgency as promptly as possible. (By suppressing the insurgency we mean reducing it to proportions manageable by the national security forces of the GVN, unassisted by the presence of U.S. military forces.) We believe the U.S. part of the task can be completed by the end of 1965, the terminal date which we are taking as the time objective of our counterinsurgency programs. . . .

c. The political situation in Vietnam remains deeply serious. It has not yet significantly affected the military effort, but could do so at some time in the future. If the result is a GVN ineffective in the conduct of the war, the U.S. will review its attitude toward support for the government. Although we are deeply concerned by repressive practices, effective performance in the conduct of the war should be the determining factor in our relations with the GVN.

 d. The U.S. has expressed its disapproval of certain actions of the Diem-Nhu regime and will do so again if required. Our policy is to seek to bring about the abandonment of repression because of its effect on the popular will to resist. Our means consist of expressions of disapproval and the withholding of support from GVN activities that are not clearly contributing to the war effort. We will use these means as required to assure an effective military program.

Note that the first paragraph assumed that U.S. forces would remain in South Vietnam until the end of 1965, and that this “terminal date” was an “objective,” not an unalterable, fixed determination. So, rather than indicating that JFK would initiate a complete withdrawal and disengagement as soon as he won reelection, NSAM 263 assumed that U.S. forces would be in Vietnam until “the end of 1965,” and even that was not set in stone but was an “objective,” since, after all, the “overriding objective” was “denying this country to Communism.” 

Here is what JFK was going to say about Vietnam in his speech at the International Trade Mart on 11/22/1963, the speech that he never got to deliver:

About 70 percent of our military assistance goes to nine key countries located on or near the borders of the Communist bloc – nine countries confronted directly or indirectly with the threat of Communist aggression – Viet-Nam, Free China, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. No one of these countries possesses on its own the resources to maintain the forces which our own Chiefs of Staff think needed in the common interest. Reducing our efforts to train, equip, and assist their armies can only encourage Communist penetration and require in time the increased overseas deployment of American combat forces. And reducing the economic help needed to bolster these nations that undertake to help defend freedom can have the same disastrous result. 

JFK said the following in his 5/22/1963 news conference when asked about withdrawing troops from South Vietnam:

QUESTION: Mr. President, the brother of the President of South Viet-Nam has said that too many American troops are in South Viet-Nam. Could you comment on that, and give us some progress report on what is going on?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I hope we could-- we would withdraw troops, any number of troops, any time the government of South Viet-Nam would suggest it. The day after it was suggested, we would have some troops on their way home. That is Number 1.

Number 2 is we are hopeful that the situation in South Viet-Nam would permit some withdrawal in any case by the end of the year, but we can't possibly make that judgment at the present time. There is still a long, hard struggle to go, and we have seen what happened in Laos, which must inevitably have its effect upon South Viet-Nam, so that I couldn't say that today the situation is such that we could look for a brightening in the sky that would permit us to withdraw troops or begin to by the end of the year. But I would say, if requested to, we will do it immediately. As of today, we would hope we could begin to perhaps do it at the end of the year, but we couldn't make any final judgment at all until we see the course of the struggle the next few months.

JFK made no secret of his desire to bring troops home from South Vietnam, but notice that JFK clearly made withdrawing troops dependent on the situation in South Vietnam. Note that he said "there is still a long, hard struggle to go." Of course, JFK knew full well that South Vietnam's leaders would never request a withdrawal of any kind unless they were confident it would not endanger the country's survival, so that was really a non-issue. And note that he added that he could not make a final judgment until "we see the course of the struggle the next few months."

Then, in his 11/14/1963 news conference, just eight days before the assassination, he once again talked about withdrawing troops from South Vietnam in response to a question:

QUESTION: Mr. President, in view of the changed situation in South Viet Nam, do you still expect to bring back 1,000 troops before the end of the year, or has that figure been raised or lowered? 

THE PRESIDENT: No, we are going to bring back several hundred before the end of the year, but I think on the question of the exact number I thought we would wait until the meeting of November 20th.

Not a word about ending aid or completely disengaging, not even an indication of an intention to withdraw all the troops anytime soon.

On 9/9/1963, JFK was asked about South Vietnam on NBC's Huntley-Brinkley Report. He said the following:

Mr. Huntley: Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that our Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it difficult to alter or shift that policy?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that is true. I think in the case of South Viet-Nam we have been dealing with a government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better. Since June, however, the difficulties with the Buddhists, we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn't been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may spread. So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time and we must be patient, we must persist.

Mr. Huntley: Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost, a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that.

On 9/2/1963, JFK told Walter Cronkite that ultimately it was up to South Vietnam to win or lose the war, that we would help them but that it was their war, and that he was against withdrawing because that would be “a great mistake.” He also suggested that our effort to defend Asia may need to be equal to the effort that we made to defend Europe: 

. . . in the final analysis it is the people and the government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear, but I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away. . . . 

We took all this--made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate--we may not like it--in the defense of Asia. . . . 

What, of course, makes Americans somewhat impatient is that after carrying this load for 18 years, we are glad to get counsel, but we would like a little more assistance, real assistance. But we are going to meet our responsibility anyway. 

It doesn't do us any good to say, "Well, why don't we all just go home and leave the world to those who are our enemies."

I'll take these statements, along with Bobby's April 1964 statements and Schlesinger and Sorenson's silence over any plans for a complete disengagement, over anything that McNamara, O'Donnell, Powers, and Mansfield later said. 

 

Mike,

The Taylor McNamara report was only partly approved by President Kennedy.

Which was the only part he specifically approved in NSAM 263?

I B (1-3)

B. Recommendations.

        We recommend that:
        1.   General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes as:

        a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the Delta (IV Corps).
        b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out of 30 and static missions are ended.
        c. Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value.
        d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength.
        e. The training and arming of hamlet militia to an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.
        f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced.

        2.   A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.
        3.   In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.

So in NSAM 263, prepared for President Kennedy on October 2, discussed and verbally approved on October 5, and formally approved on October 11, 1963, our plan was to withdraw from Vietnam.

That Kennedy directed that his policy be enacted in a low-key manner proves that he knew he faced ferocious opposition from his own National Security State (and likely from members of his own cabinet, not the least of whom was McGeorge Bundy . . . )

Mike, 

This is not new. Revise all you like, but it won't work. Quoting self-interested parties decades after the fact blaming our debacle on the "anti-war" crowd or Congressional Democrats is incredibly weak sauce. 

This has been discussed for decades - Kennedy was getting out, regardless of whatever was happening in Vietnam. You can cite as many ambiguous campaign statements by Robert Kennedy in the spring of 1964 as you like, but there is no substitute for the official U.S. policy under President Kennedy: read it and weep.

Under President Kennedy's policy in 1963 at the moment of his murder, we were getting out.

[Chuck Schwartz]

Paul J., I agree your above post- especially your last sentence.  Here is a part of a speech RFK made in Feb., 1968 in Chicago.."

For years we have been told that the measure of our success and progress in Vietnam was increasing security and control for the population. Now we have seen that none of the population is secure and no area is under sure control.

Four years ago when we only had about 30,000 troops in Vietnam, the Viet Cong were unable to mount the assaults on cities they have now conducted against our enormous forces. At one time a suggestion that we protect enclaves was derided. Now there are no protected enclaves.

This has not happened because our men are not brave or effective, because they are. It is because we have misconceived the nature of the war: It is because we have sought to resolve by military might a conflict whose issue depends upon the will and conviction of the South Vietnamese people. It is like sending a lion to halt an epidemic of jungle rot.

This misconception rests on a second illusion—the illusion that we can win a war which the South Vietnamese cannot win for themselves. You cannot expect people to risk their lives and endure hardship unless they have a stake in their own society. They must have a clear sense of identification with their own government, a belief they are participating in a cause worth fighting for…

The third illusion is that the unswerving pursuit of military victory, whatever its cost, is in the interest of either ourselves or the people of Vietnam. For the people of Vietnam, the last three years have meant little but horror. Their tiny land has been devastated by a weight of bombs and shells greater than poopoo Germany knew in the Second World War. We have dropped 12 tons of bombs for every square mile in North and South Vietnam. Whole provinces have been substantially destroyed. More than two million South Vietnamese are now homeless refugees…

We can and should offer reasonable assistance to Asia; but we cannot build a Great Society there if we cannot build one in our own country. We cannot speak extravagantly of a struggle for 250 million Asians, when a struggle for 15 million in one Asian country so strains our forces, that another Asian country, a fourth-rate power which we have already once defeated in battle, dares to seize an American ship and hold and humiliate her crew…

These are some of the illusions which may be discarded if the events of last week are to prove not simply a tragedy, but a lesson: a lesson which carries with it some basic truths. First, that a total military victory is not within sight or around the corner; that, in fact, it is probably beyond our grasp; and that the effort to win such a victory will only result in the further slaughter of thousands of innocent and helpless people—a slaughter which will forever rest on our national conscience.

Second, that the pursuit of such a victory is not necessary to our national interest, and is even damaging that interest.

Third, that the progress we have claimed toward increasing our control over the country and the security of the population is largely illusory.

Fourth, that the central battle in this war cannot be measured by body counts or bomb damage, but by the extent to which the people of South Vietnam act on a sense of common purpose and hope with those that govern them.

Fifth, that the current regime in Saigon is unwilling or incapable of being an effective ally in the war against the Communists.

Sixth, that a political compromise is not just the best path to peace, but the only path, and we must show as much willingness to risk some of our prestige for peace as to risk the lives of young men in war.

Seventh, that the escalation policy in Vietnam, far from strengthening and consolidating international resistance to aggression, is injuring our country through the world, reducing the faith of other peoples in our wisdom and purpose and weakening the world’s resolve to stand together for freedom and peace.

Eighth, that the best way to save our most precious stake in Vietnam—the lives of our soldiers—is to stop the enlargement of the war, and that the best way to end casualties is to end the war.

Ninth, that our nation must be told the truth about this war, in all its terrible reality, both because it is right—and because only in this way can any Administration rally the public confidence and unity for the shadowed days which lie ahead.

No war has ever demanded more bravery from our people and our Government—not just bravery under fire or the bravery to make sacrifices, but the bravery to discard the comfort of illusion, to do away with false hopes and alluring promises…”

Later on in 1968, RFK was murdered.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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[James DiEugenio]

PJ: Do you think Nixon may have feared what might have happened to him personally if he accelerated a quick American withdrawal from Vietnam?

First, I truly think that Nixon was a little nutty about Indochina.  I really think such was the case.  Even Ambrose, who was sympathetic toward Nixon, thought this was so.  IMO, it stems from the fact that he was so intimately involved with the horrible mistake of  backing the French and even proposing Operation Vulture--one of the truly crazy operations ever proposed in Vietnam.  And then his administration doing exactly what Gullion said they should not do: repeating the French mistake, while easing them out.  And then propping up a dictator in the name of democracy. In fact, Nixon proposed inserting American combat troops way back in 1954

Second, in The Haldeman Diaries,  and throughout the work of the excellent Jeff Kimball, it is obvious that, as he himself admitted, Nixon was not going to be the first president to lose a war. That is  what he said to Haldeman.  And that is why he proposed bombing the dikes and using atomic weapons during the Easter offensive. When Cambodia and Laos failed, he and Kissinger resigned themselves to leaving, but only before Saigon fell.  They literally admit this on tape.  That they know the whole truce and agreements and the Thieu government and the proposed elections, this was all a mirage. Without American power, Thieu would collapse in a matter of weeks, maybe a few months.  So Nixon knew the whole Peace with Honor thing was BS as he was saying it.  This is another reason why I think he was pathological about Vietnam. And  to think of those speeches about a "pitiful helpless giant" and "the silent majority", man what a BSer.

BTW, in Kimball's book,  Kissinger knew exactly what buttons to push with Nixon. Ellsberg was a traitor, and this is a conservative country, our enemies are the liberals, and those dirty Hanoi commies etc.  Kimball writes that when Kissinger did this kind of thing, it would throw Nixon into a saliva spitting rage.  He writes that sometimes it was hard to understand what Nixon was saying because RMN was pounding the table and screaming at the top of his lungs. That is what I mean about Nixon being imbalanced on the subject.

How about this: Newman told me that if Nixon had bombed the dikes it would have killed 500,000 people.  More than both Nagasaki and Hiroshima combined.

I  think that Nixon and  Kissinger were war criminals.

 

Edited September 2, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[Ron Bulman]

20 minutes ago, James DiEugenio said:

PJ: Do you think Nixon may have feared what might have happened to him personally if he accelerated a quick American withdrawal from Vietnam?

First, I truly think that Nixon was a little nutty about Indochina.  I really think such was the case.  Even Ambrose, who was sympathetic toward Nixon, thought this was so.  IMO, it stems from the fact that he was so intimately involved with the horrible mistake of  backing the French and even proposing Operation Vulture--one of the truly crazy operations ever proposed in Vietnam.  And then his administration doing exactly what Gullion said they should not do: repeating the French mistake, while easing them out.  And then propping up a dictator in the name of democracy. In fact, Nixon proposed inserting American combat troops way back in 1954

Second, in The Haldeman Diaries,  and throughout the work of the excellent Jeff Kimball, it is obvious that, as he himself admitted, Nixon was not going to be the first president to lose a war. That is  what he said to Haldeman.  And that is why he proposed bombing the dikes and using atomic weapons during the Easter offensive. When Cambodia and Laos failed, he and Kissinger resigned themselves to leaving, but only after Saigon fell.  They literally admit this on tape.  That they know the whole truce and agreements and the Thieu government and the proposed elections, this was all a mirage. Without American power, Thieu would collapse in a matter of weeks, maybe a few months.  So Nixon knew the whole Peace with Honor thing was BS as he was saying it.  This is another reason why I think he was pathological about Vietnam. And  to think of those speeches about a "pitiful helpless giant" and "the silent majority", man what a BSer.

BTW, in Kimball's book,  Kissinger knew exactly what buttons to push with Nixon. Ellsberg was a traitor, and this is a conservative country, our enemies are the liberals, and those dirty Hanoi commies etc.  Kimball writes that when Kissinger did this kind of thing, it would throw Nixon into a saliva spitting rage.  He writes that sometimes it was hard to understand what Nixon was saying because RMN was pounding the table and screaming at the top of his lungs. That is what I mean about Nixon being imbalanced on the subject.

How about this: Newman told me that if Nixon had bombed the dikes it would have killed 500,000 people.  More than both Nagasaki and Hiroshima combined.

I  think that Nixon and  Kissinger were war criminals.

 

Pounding the table and screaming.  Great post Jim.

[James DiEugenio]

Thanks so much Ron.  

Compare that to JFK during the Missile Crisis.

Edited September 2, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

BTW, I think this is why Nixon did not want his files opened during his lifetime.

Kissinger hinted at this in a conversation with Haldeman.  He said that if that happened history would not look kindly on them.  

Talk about an understatement.

[Guest]

5 hours ago, Paul Jolliffe said:

Do you think Nixon may have feared what might have happened to him personally if he accelerated a quick American withdrawal from Vietnam?

I suspect that Johnson did indeed have such fears.

I would say Nixon had plenty to fear when he was asking Helms for the BOP files. He was playing a game that left him increasingly isolated. He didn’t know who he could trust. 

Despite the politicians act, I don’t think he (Nixon) cared about the Vietnamese or the US troops.
 

There is nothing in Johnson’s character that indicates he had any morality. He wouldn’t have cared about the Vietnamese or the US troops either. Johnson wouldn’t have to fear anyone, as he knew the way his bread was buttered, he knew the system, he was a corrupt man, why rock the boat?
 

[James DiEugenio]

LBJ to the JCS:  "Just get me elected and I'll give you your war."

This is from Karnow, and Newman used it in his book. 

And Oliver liked it and put it in the script for JFK.

Edited September 2, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

BTW, to show you who Nixon and Kissinger really were and in honor of the passing of Gorbachev, let me relate a tale of all three men, plus one other.

Ronald Reagan, of course, made his presidency by labeling the USSR the Evil Empire and maintaining that the Soviet Union was the base of all problems with humanity.  

Well, something happened to all this when he and Thatcher met Gorby and talked about him. They liked him and thought he was the real thing, a reformer--which he was. Thatcher tried to encourage Ron to cooperate with Gorby on a detente project. Reagan tended to agree with this. 

He then made a mistake.

He decided to call in Kissinger and Nixon separately to ask them what they thought of Thatcher's proposal.  Well Kissinger, the guy responsible for the genocides in East Timor, Bangladesh and Cambodia, did not agree.  He did not see Gorby as different or as a change agent.  Nixon was even worse.  After he said pretty much the same thing, he told Reagan's staffers not to let Reagan in the same room with Gorby alone. He would get taken to the cleaners.

When I read this in light of, for example, Gorbachev's spectacular proposal in Iceland, and what happened in Russia under Yeltsin, it basically capped for me just how ludicrous it was for the press to have bought into the PR of Nixon and Kissinger as  foreign policy mavens. Utterly ridiculous.  These guys were essentially Foster Dulles all over again.  Triple distilled Cold Warriors with no real vision of the future. 

In my view, Gorbachev was a once in a lifetime opportunity. Wasted.

Edited September 2, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[Michael Griffith]

We can learn much about the Vietnam War, and about the brutality that North Vietnam imposed on the South Vietnamese after the war, from the book A Vietcong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1985), written by Truong Nhu Tang. Tang was a high-ranking Vietcong official and served as a leader in the National Liberation Front and as the minister of justice in the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). 

When Tang could no longer stomach the “reign of terror” (his words) that the North Vietnamese communists were imposing on the South, and when he realized that his protests against the brutality were pointless, he quit his position as the PRG minister of justice and eventually fled the country. 

What makes Tang’s book so important, and at times so annoying, is that he never stopped believing in the justice of the Vietcong cause, and that he remained an admirer of Ho Chi Minh for many years after he fled the country. He had met Ho Chi Minh as a young student in Paris and was mesmerized by him. Only years later, long after he left the country, was Tang able to bring himself to acknowledge the ugly truth about Ho Chi Minh, such as the mass executions and bloody purges that Ho carried out in the late 1950s in North Vietnam (pp. 298-302). 

Here are some of things we learn from Tang’s book: 

-- The North Vietnamese imposed a “reign of terror” on the South that included “outrages of every description” (pp. 280-281). 

-- These outrages caused Tang to realize that North Vietnam’s communists were not interested in a genuine national unity government but in “the ruthless consolidation of power” (p. 281). 

-- Tang said the communist terror included “a wave of arbitrary arrests that scythed [slashed] through the cities and villages” (p. 279). 

-- Tang said that at least 300,000 people were put into the "reeducation" camps, and he noted that this figure only counted the number of former government officers, state officials, and members of South Vietnam’s political party who were formally summoned for reeducation (p. 282). He added, 

This figure does not include people who were arrested in the sweeps by governmental organs and military authorities that terrorized both Saigon and the provinces during that period. (p. 282)

-- The “reeducation” camps were “vicious” and “destructive” (p. 274). Tang complained about the camps to the PRG president, Huynh Tan Phat, but was told that the camps were necessary and would continue (pp. 274-276). He even complained about the camps directly to North Vietnam’s prime minister, Pham Van Dong, but to no avail (pp. 280-282).

-- One reason Tang was so upset about the camps was that he had personally persuaded many former South Vietnamese officials, functionaries, and professionals to report to the camps on the basis of North Vietnam’s and the PRG’s assurances that they would only be there for 30 days (pp. 277-279). He even persuaded two of his own brothers, Bich and Quyhn, to report to the camps on the same assurance.

-- When Tang saw his brothers at the Long Thanh detention camp, he was distrubed that they were “pale and thin” and looked “frightened,” and that the other prisoners looked “dazed” (p. 279). (Tang was eventually able to get Bich released, but Quyhn spent another 10 years in the camps. Quyhn’s “crime” was that he was a doctor who had attended a political gathering that the communists did not like.)

-- Another reason that Tang became increasingly troubled and distraught over the detention camps was that the former officials, functionaries, and professionals whom he had persuaded to report to the camps were not released after one month or even after one year, and he was ashamed that “this all happened during my tenure as minister of justice” (p. 282).

-- Even over a year after Saigon’s fall, communist brutality against the South Vietnamese continued:

Over a year had passed since the intentional sabotage of our reconciliation policy, and still the wave of official terror continued to swell. (p 287)

-- Tang felt terrible that he had convinced his family, all of whom lived in Saigon, that life under communist rule would be better than life under the Diem and Thieu governments. His own mother and his friends confronted him on the matter:

[His mother asked him] What had possessed me to inflict this misery on my family and my people? “Your Communist friends are full of double-talk—lies and violence.”

She had applauded the liberation of Saigon in April 1975, but in the intervening year her sympathy for the revolution had turned to repugnance.

My mother’s feelings were hardly unique. Talk about what was happening enveloped Saigon. And among my friends, much of it seemed directed at me. [Said his friends,] “At least under Diem and Thieu there was honor among thieves. But these [Communist] Party people are wolfing everything in sight.”

“Do you think it was such a wonderful idea to chase the Americans out? At least when the Americans were here, we had food. Now what do we have?” (pp. 287-288)

-- The mid-1973 Case-Church Amendment, which effectively assured North Vietnam that the U.S. would not intervene to stop another invasion of South Vietnam, played a key role in North Vietnam’s decision to resume military operations against the South, in violation of the recently signed Paris Peace Accords (p. 229). Hanoi’s leaders followed U.S. Congressional debates very closely (pp. 229-231).

-- However, the communists initially resumed their attacks on South Vietnam in a limited manner because they were not certain to what extent the Case-Church Amendment “might actually control American conduct, especially if there were to be a major escalation in the level of fighting” (pp. 229-230). The North Vietnamese were particularly worried about “the return of American air power” (p. 230).

-- Once it became apparent that the U.S. Congress would not authorize further military operations to protect South Vietnam, the communists decided to launch a full-scale assault on the South (pp. 230-240, 248-257).

-- Tang spends considerable time talking about how pleased North Vietnam was with the American news media and the American anti-war movement, and the fact that the communists viewed our news media and the anti-war movement as valuable allies (e.g., pp. 145-148, 207-216, 282-286).

-- The 1968 Tet Offensive was a military disaster. The communists “suffered agonizing and irreplaceable losses during the frontal assaults of Tet” (p. 192). It took the communists about two years to recover from the losses they incurred during the Tet Offensive (p. 204).

-- Tang deeply regretted the Hue Massacre committed by communist forces shortly before they retreated from the city toward the close of the fighting of the Tet Offensive (pp. 154-156).

-- In the 1972 Spring Offensive (aka the Easter Offensive), the communists suffered “prodigious” losses (pp. 211-212).

-- The communists were thrilled and grateful when the U.S. Congress “prohibited funds for American operations in Cambodia and Laos” after the highly effective U.S. attacks on North Vietnamese forces and bases in eastern Cambodia and Laos (p. 211).

-- North Vietnam’s bases in Cambodia and Laos were absolutely crucial supply points and staging areas for the communist war effort against South Vietnam (pp. 159-170). When Nixon authorized attacks on those bases, the attacks caused great damage and were very concerning to Hanoi (pp. 170-173, 179-184). (No wonder North Vietnam was so happy when our Democrat-controlled Congress forbade further attacks on those bases.)

-- The Soviet Union began supporting North Vietnam’s communists in 1948, and when China fell to the communists in 1949, this enabled Russia and Red China to begin supplying large amounts of weapons to Ho Chi Minh’s forces (pp. 25-34).

-- The B-52 attacks authorized by Nixon did severe damage and caused many troop casualties. However, assistance from Soviet intelligence prevented the B-52 attacks from being even more damaging. Soviet intelligence ships in the South China Sea provided advance warning of approaching B-52 raids in many cases (pp. 168-170). 

-- Before the launching of the last phase of the final offensive against South Vietnam, the Soviets supplied North Vietnam’s army with enormous amounts of weapons and supplies. This massive injection of war material “altered the balance of military forces” in favor of the communists (pp. 232, 250-251). (This was happening at the same time our Democrat-controlled Congress refused to honor our Paris treaty commitment to resupply South Vietnam’s army if the North invaded.)

-- The North Vietnamese attacked and seized the key southern province of Phuoc Long in January 1975 and were “jubilant” that the U.S. did not respond (p. 250). The fact that the U.S. did not respond to the attack on a key province that bordered Saigon was a clear signal that the communists had nothing to worry about from the U.S.

-- South Vietnam’s shortage of supplies, especially fuel, was a major disadvantage in the final months of the war (pp. 229-232, 248-253).

-- When the Americans left Cambodia, this enabled the murderous Khmer Rouge to take over that country (pp. 176-181, 254-255).

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that Tang was a genuinely moderate member of the National Liberation Front (NFL) and of the PRG. He admired Marx and Lenin, but he was not a hardcore communist. He believed Hanoi’s promises that under communist rule, the southern part of Vietnam would be allowed to form its own regional government that would be part of a national unity government, and that the southern region would have a genuine voice and influence on national policy. It is surprising how many times in his book Tang tacitly and overtly acknowledges that there were significant long-standing differences between northern Vietnam and southern Vietnam. He was shocked and disillusioned when he realized that North Vietnam had no intention of keeping its promises to the NLF and the PRG regarding a degree of autonomy and self-rule for the South, and he was furious over the brutality that the communists inflicted on the South.

Edited September 3, 2022 by Michael Griffith

[Benjamin Cole]

Mike Griffith:

There is little disputing the vicious repressive nature of communist dictatorships (although it was out of fashion for many decades to notice what was happening in  Beijing-CCP-China).

But, if to fight communism in Vietnam, we had to have permanent Phoenix Programs, to have a permanent military presence...you have to raise the question of costs vs. benefits. 

Vietnam is not vital to US prosperity. 

Some wars are losing propositions. 

Presently the US has withdrawn from Afghanistan, after 20 years, and several trillion dollars. The 40 million Afghans seemingly could not fire a single shot against the 40,000 Taliban who took over the country, and who are making it into a hellhole. 

But you can't build a bridge out of jello, and Afghanistan is not vital to US prosperity. 

In contrast, the Ukrainians appear ready to mount a defense. I predict Russia, larger and more powerful, will fail in its occupation of Ukraine, ever more so as Ukrainians develop methods to fight occupiers. 

US foreign, trade and military policies are made by multi-nationals. Somehow, the moral onus is the US should be involved, in nearly every square inch of the planet. 

The onus should be the other way around: If you want to tax US citizens and use the US military to do anything other than protect US shores, explain yourself. 

 

 

 

 

[James DiEugenio]

The problem was that South Vietnam was a manufactured edifice.

It was created by the USA.  It did not exist prior to the violation of the Geneva Accords and the installation of Diem.  

The Eisenhower administration then gave him millions to enlist an army. Thus bypassing the French, and taking their place. Not only was this opposed by the French commander Ely, but by the American military, through Ike's buddy Lawton Collins who also opposed it.  And, in fact, after visiting Saigon, he recommended Diem be replaced. (Defense Secretary Wilson thought America should just get out.)

Collins was correct of course, but Lansdale pulled off a magic trick. Just when Foster Dulles was about to give in to Collins' recommendation, Lansdale got DIem to use his army of about 80,000 men to pick a successful fight with the Binh Xuyen gang, which had a para military of about 1,200. This convinced Dulles to pull the telex and he sided with Lansdale and decided to stay with DIem. (See David Anderson, Trapped by Success.)

In other words, from the beginning, there was no real country or government or suitable leader in South Vietnam.  It was just a confection to stop Ho Chi Minh from winning the unification election of 1956. (Remember Kissinger about Allende: I don't see why we have to stand by and watch a country go communist just because the people vote for it.)

But the worst part of it is that there were other leaders the USA could have chosen who were not as unpopular or despotic as DIem, with his guillotines and his  tiger cages.  Just look at the men who signed the Caravelle Manifesto. Something almost no one talks about. The 18 signers were also anti communist.  But they did not see fascism as a viable alternative to Hanoi.  What caused their formal protest and press conference?

Phan Quang Dan, an articulate critic of Diem, ran for. a seat in the government.  Diem sent 8,000 ARVN troops in plain  clothes to file false ballots against him.  He still won in a landslide. But when he arrived to fill his seat he was arrested on get this-- charges of electoral fraud. (Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin, p. 114)

This is what caused the Caravelle Group to file their formal protest, which was really like a Declaration of Independence. (It was called this because that was the name of the hotel at which it was signed.) The group was very plain about it:  Diem had not made things better since he took office.  They were now worse. One of the things, among many, that they protested was that there were constant political arrests which filled the rafters of the prisons.  At the same time this neutralized any freedom  of speech or the press in Saigon. (ibid, p. 115)

Now , one of the signers was Phan Huy Quat. This was the man who Collins tried to push on Eisenhower as a capable replacement for the incompetent Diem, who he felt was doomed to fail. How pungent was the Caravelle Protest?  Madame Nhu's uncle signed it! It was so trenchant that the NY Times ran it as a front page story.

But guess what? The press in South Vietnam did not publish the manifesto, or even mention it. Diem did not mention it. His first reaction was to have the signees sent to political reeducation camps.

When Eisenhower heard about this protest, and that Diem had retreated into a cocoon, he told the CIA, State and the Pentagon to "consult together " to find a way to keep Diem in power. (ibid, p. 116)

America had crossed a familiar Rubicon. Fascism, repression, death and terror were fine, as long as it was being done by our guy.  And the whole time we were proclaiming we were standing up for democracy.

Utter BS.

 

 

Edited September 3, 2022 by James DiEugenio