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The Kennedy Withdrawal: The Definitive New Book on JFK and Vietnam


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Barring the discovery of some new cache of documents and/or tapes, we now have the definitive book on JFK and Vietnam with Dr. Marc Selverstone's new book The Kennedy Withdrawal: Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam (Harvard University Press, November 2022). This book is very detailed and is packed with new information, including extensive use of presidential tapes and declassified documents. I listened to the audio version first, then read the book, and then re-read certain sections of the book. In a nutshell, here are the main points that Selverstone makes in the book:

-- JFK did not intend to totally disengage from South Vietnam but intended to continue providing economic aid and military aid, even if conditions on the ground permitted him to withdraw all U.S. military personnel from the country. JFK was determined to prevent a Communist takeover of South Vietnam on his watch.

-- The final version of NSAM 273 was not a drastic departure from the original draft, and it was not a drastic departure from JFK's Vietnam policy. JFK had been intensely interested in taking the war to North Vietnam. RFK even urged General Krulak "to devise a bolder set of options against Hanoi." JFK and most of his advisors believed that "actions against the North needed to be larger, more frequent, and more systematic." Selverstone also notes that JFK's "interest in supporting covert action against the North actually increased during his time in office."

Indeed, Selverstone makes a strong case that "had Kennedy survived Dallas and signed an early draft of NSAM 273, it is doubtful whether the operations it sanctioned would have been much different than those postdating its final version." After noting that the Bundy draft of NSAM 273 authorized sabotage operations against North Vietnam, Selverstone observes,

         Given Kennedy's enduring enthusiasm for those activities, he may well have authorized their continuation, regardless of whether NSAM 273 referenced a South Vietnamese or an American role in their execution; after all, actions against the North were always dependent upon U.S. support, both prior to Dallas as well as thereafter. (pp. 206-207)

-- JFK was viscerally, adamantly opposed to sending regular combat troops to South Vietnam.

-- Without JFK's knowledge, McNamara was going beyond JFK's intentions with the withdrawal plan and was the main driver behind the plan. On the other hand, some of JFK's more hawkish advisors were also going beyond JFK's intentions without his knowledge.

-- In JFK's eyes and in the eyes of most of his advisors, the withdrawal plan was conditional, i.e., it would depend on the situation on the ground. However, JFK was anxious to reduce the number of U.S. personnel in South Vietnam as soon as possible. 

By the way, Selverstone cites John Newman's book JFK and Vietnam and Newman's article "The Kennedy-Johnson Transition: The Case for Policy Reversal" a number of times.

Here is part of the publisher's description of Selverstone's book:

          In October 1963, the White House publicly proposed the removal of US troops from Vietnam, earning President Kennedy an enduring reputation as a skeptic on the war. In fact, Kennedy was ambivalent about withdrawal and was largely detached from its planning. Drawing on secret presidential tapes, Marc J. Selverstone reveals that the withdrawal statement gave Kennedy political cover, allowing him to sustain support for US military assistance. Its details were the handiwork of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, whose ownership of the plan distanced it from the president.

          Selverstone’s use of the presidential tapes, alongside declassified documents, memoirs, and oral histories, lifts the veil on this legend of Camelot.

Scholarly praise for the book includes the following:

“With the precision of a surgeon’s scalpel, the courage of a mountaineer, and the storytelling instincts of a mystery writer, Selverstone tackles head-on one of the most tantalizing what-ifs in modern history. The Kennedy Withdrawal weighs all the evidence, from every angle, to render a verdict that is at once surprising, convincing, and authoritative. This will surely be the definitive account of JFK’s intentions in Vietnam.” ― Andrew Preston, author of American Foreign Relations: A Very Short Introduction.

“A splendid work. I doubt there is any scholar anywhere who knows the archival material better than Selverstone does, and he is surely unsurpassed in his familiarity with the Kennedy tapes. His prose is consistently smooth, clear, and engaging. This book will be the go-to account on Kennedy and the Vietnam War for a long time to come.” ― Fredrik Logevall, author of Choosing War and the Pulitzer Prize–winning Embers of War.

“With the precision of a surgeon’s scalpel, the courage of a mountaineer, and the storytelling instincts of a mystery writer, Selverstone tackles head-on one of the most tantalizing what-ifs in modern history. The Kennedy Withdrawal weighs all the evidence, from every angle, to render a verdict that is at once surprising, convincing, and authoritative. This will surely be the definitive account of JFK’s intentions in Vietnam.” ― Andrew Preston, author of American Foreign Relations: A Very Short Introduction.

“This pathbreaking book redefines the terms of the long-running debate over John Kennedy’s Vietnam withdrawal plan. Weaving analysis and narrative together in compelling fashion, Selverstone cuts through the Camelot mythology to reveal the bureaucratic and political origins of the plan, as well as the reasons for its subsequent abandonment. A major contribution from a preeminent historian of JFK’s foreign policies.” ― Edward Miller, author of Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam. 

Dr. Selverstone is an associate professor in Presidential Studies at the Miller Center and chair of the Center’s Presidential Recordings Program at the University of Virginia. He earned a BA degree in philosophy from Trinity College (CT), a master’s degree in international affairs from Columbia University, and a PhD in history from Ohio University. A historian of the Cold War, he is the author of Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945-1950 (Harvard), which won the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

As chair of the Recordings Program, he has edited the secret White House tapes of Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon. He is the general editor of The Presidential Recordings Digital Edition, the primary online portal for transcripts of the tapes, published by the University of Virginia Press.

Edited by Michael Griffith
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  • Michael Griffith changed the title to The Kennedy Withdrawal: The Definitive New Book on JFK and Vietnam
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4 minutes ago, Chuck Schwartz said:

"JFK was viscerally, adamantly opposed to sending regular combat troops to South Vietnam."- this is why JFK was assassinated.

But the conspirators surely knew that JFK was determined to keep South Vietnam free on his watch, that JFK intended to continue providing economic and military aid to South Vietnam even if all U.S. advisors were withdrawn, and that the withdrawal plan was conditional. Max Taylor knew this. So did the Joint Chiefs. Read Selverstone's book. 

If the main motive of the conspirators was Vietnam, one has to wonder why they allowed LBJ to so horribly bungle the war effort. Either the conspirators were not powerful enough to control how LBJ handled the war or the conduct of the war was not a key issue for them. 

Edited by Michael Griffith
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5 minutes ago, Michael Griffith said:

You're welcome. I just added a blurb about Selverstone's qualifications to the OP.

Overall is this book slightly at odds with John Newmans thesis? John Newman is saying that JFK was withdrawing completely, but Selverstone is saying JFK was withdrawing BUT was going to keep on economic and military aid?

In the run up to his assassination JFK was already providing economic and military aid so JFK was simply planning on carrying on this indefinitely? 

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31 minutes ago, Gerry Down said:

Overall is this book slightly at odds with John Newmans thesis? John Newman is saying that JFK was withdrawing completely, but Selverstone is saying JFK was withdrawing BUT was going to keep on economic and military aid?

In the run up to his assassination JFK was already providing economic and military aid so JFK was simply planning on carrying on this indefinitely? 

Yes, Selverstone definitely rejects--and refutes--the idea that JFK was determined to totally disengage from South Vietnam no matter what. He makes a compelling case that JFK wanted to withdraw all U.S. military personnel as soon as was feasible, but that JFK had no intention of abandoning South Vietnam to a Communist takeover on his watch. And, yes, JFK was prepared to continue economic and military aid for many years.

Edited by Michael Griffith
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1 hour ago, Michael Griffith said:

Yes, Selverstone definitely rejects--and refutes--the idea that JFK was determined to totally disengage from South Vietnam no matter what. He makes a compelling case that JFK wanted to withdraw all U.S. military personnel as soon as was feasible, but that JFK had no intention of abandoning South Vietnam to a Communist takeover on his watch. And, yes, JFK was prepared to continue economic and military aid for many years.

It sounds like this book should be read in conjunction with John Newman's book "JFK And Vietnam" so one can make up their own mind.

JFK did set the date of 1965 for the withdrawal. It would seem somewhat that he would be breaking that promise if he was still giving economic and military aid beyond that date but he could maybe argue that the continuance of military and economic aid was a different thing. Much like the U.S. is giving military and economic aid to Ukraine, though not technically involved in that war.

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1 hour ago, Gerry Down said:

It sounds like this book should be read in conjunction with John Newman's book "JFK And Vietnam" so one can make up their own mind.

JFK did set the date of 1965 for the withdrawal. It would seem somewhat that he would be breaking that promise if he was still giving economic and military aid beyond that date but he could maybe argue that the continuance of military and economic aid was a different thing. Much like the U.S. is giving military and economic aid to Ukraine, though not technically involved in that war.

Selverstone's book has a lot of information that is not in Newman's book.

Continuing economic and military aid after the withdrawal would not have broken any promises. When JFK talked about "withdrawal," he never said or implied a total disengagement. 

JFK did not want to see 18 million people fall under Communist tyranny.

Edited by Michael Griffith
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If I recall the details correctly, Fletcher Prouty and Peter Dale Scott were among the first analysts to recognize that NSAM 273 was, in fact, a significant policy reversal of NSAM 263.

The gist of it was the NSAM 273 called for the U.S. to do whatever was necessary to defeat communism in Vietnam, whereas JFK and Galbraith had concluded that defeating Ho Chi Minh was up to the South Vietnamese.

Just when the American public is finally learning the truth about LBJ's well-disguised reversal of JFK's Vietnam policy, we get another "academic" snow job on the subject.

My hunch is that this new snow job will get ample coverage in the Mockingbird M$M.

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It's important that we understand the definition of "combat troops" as it was (and still is) commonly understood in the military and as JFK and his advisors (correctly) used it. I discuss this as a 21-year veteran of the U.S. Army. In one statement, JFK said that he had not sent "combat troops in the generally understood sense of the word." 

"Combat troops" referred to infantry troops or infantry marines. There are "regular" and "irregular" combat troops. "Irregulars" included combat troops with specialized training who belonged to elite units, such as the Special Forces/Green Berets and Force Recon (Marine Corps), etc. They also included combat-trained troops who did not belong to infantry units. This is why I have tried to make the meaning clear by using the term "regular combat troops." 

Around 3,300 of the 17,000 "military advisors" that JFK sent to South Vietnam were combat-trained personnel but were not "combat troops" as the military understood and used the term. These combat-trained advisors, some of whom were Special Forces/Green Berets, trained ARVN soldiers in weapons and combat tactics, accompanied them on missions, and often took part in battles. They were military personnel who were trained to engage in combat, but they were not classified or defined as "combat troops."

Also, we need to avoid the confusing false choice of withdrawal or involvement. "Withdrawal" did not mean total disengagement. It did not mean abandoning South Vietnam to Communist brutality. Period sources make it clear that everyone in the White House and the Pentagon understood this. JFK never, ever, ever--in any firsthand statement that he himself made--equated withdrawal with total disengagement. Thus, JFK would not have been breaking any promises by continuing to provide economic and military aid to South Vietnam if he had withdrawn all U.S. military personnel. 

As Selverstone documents, JFK had no intention of allowing South Vietnam to fall to the Communists on his watch. 

Edited by Michael Griffith
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