CARL TRETTIN

[Leslie Sharp]

2 minutes ago, David Boylan said:

No to all three. I only had 60 mins to cover 47 slides. I had to delete 10 just to get in under the limit. 🙂 Plus I was going to miss happy hour!

I hear you. 🙂. Maybe grab a pint and elaborate here on EF?  If Oswald was on her doorstep, then he left and went "somewhere" for the next few days prior to surfacing at the Y. Right?

[Gerry Down]

6 hours ago, Leslie Sharp said:

Is it plausible Trettin and Joannides among several other agency officials were operating outside the official structure found here, or do you posit all of the COG were privy to if not directly involved in a plot to assassinate the Commander-in-Chief?

In order to understand how a CIA officer would operate outside the official structure, its necessary to understand the structure itself to begin with. 

[Leslie Sharp]

1 minute ago, Gerry Down said:

In order to understand how a CIA officer would operate outside the official structure, its necessary to understand the structure itself to begin with. 

Fully agree. Lot's of workarounds!

[Gerry Down]

6 hours ago, David Boylan said:

Gerry,

Special Operations. 1963, this branch was dealing with Autonomous Operations.

Bruce Cheever was Harvey's and later Fitzgerald's deputy. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=219634#relPageId=3

Sam Halpern was Exec Officer for SAS. - Halpern discusses Harvey's temper tantrum. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=162409#relPageId=33

Sometimes it can be hard to get ones head around this so bear with me.

The “Cuba Project” (aka SAS) was the overriding entity in the war on Cuba. So I take it that JMWAVE activities against Cuba were subject to SAS. So for example when David Morales (Chief of Cuban operations JMWAVE) and Bob Moore (Chief of  Maritime Operations JMWAVE) wanted to launch a sea raid against a target on the cuban coast, they had to run such operations not only by their boss Ted Shackley (Chief of JMWAVE), but also had to run it by:

• Chief SAS MOB (Miami Operations Branch) - Col Art Maloney
• Deputy Chief SAS MOB (Miami Operations Branch) - John Tilton

who I presume were located at Langley. I’m presuming here that “Operations” in the term “Miami Operations Branch” refers to all types of operations, whether it is special operations (i.e. paramilitary type operations) or covert action operations (which I understand generally refers to propaganda type operations. For example George Joannides was head of Covert Action at JMWAVE but he was only ever involved in propaganda operations and not paramilitary operations).

So for an important sea raid launched out of JMWAVE, the hierarchy would look something like this:

• Chief of SAS: Des Fitz
• Deputy Chief SAS: Bruce Cheever
• Chief SAS MOB (Miami Operations Branch): Col Art Maloney
• Deputy Chief SAS MOB (Miami Operations Branch): John Tilton
• Chief of JMWAVE: Ted Shackley
• Deputy Chief of JMWAVE (also Chief of Maritime Operations): Bob Moore
• Chief of Cuban Operations: David Morales

Not everyone in the above chain might be consulted on every sea raid, but the hierarchy would look something like the above.

You referred to Henry Hecksher as “SAS/SO/HH” which would be correct as he was the Chief of Special Operations for AMWORLD (which basically meant he was the boss of AMWORLD). Not sure who he would have been reporting to at SAS, perhaps directly to Des Fitz himself? (assuming there was not a dedicated Chief of Special Operations at SAS).

I have a picture in my mind of there being an SAS room at Langley where Des Fitz has a desk, Ed Stanulis (Chief of SAS EOB) has a desk, Col Art Maloney (Chief of SAS MOB) has a desk etc. and they are receiving cables from JMWAVE, Mexico City (perhaps from David Phillips) and from New Orleans (perhaps from Joannides or Trettin) on various actions being undertaken against Cuba in the form of paramilitary or propaganda efforts.

Do we know who at SAS was overseeing propaganda operations?

If i am correct that “Operations” in the term “Miami Operations Branch” refers to both special operations (i.e. paramilitary type operations) or covert action operations (which I understand generally refers to propaganda type operations), then any propaganda operation out of JMWAVE would have to be approved by Col Art Maloney at Langley? (though its hard to see how a Col. could be overseeing a propaganda operation as being a Col. (ie military man) would seem to suit him more to paramilitary operations than propaganda efforts.). If Col. Art Maloney was overseeing propaganda operations out of JMWAVE, then the chain of command for a propaganda effort out of JMWAVE would be Joannides, Phillips, Col. Art Maloney in that order? But i'm quite possibly wrong on that.  

[David Boylan]

On 1/10/2024 at 8:42 PM, Gerry Down said:

Sometimes it can be hard to get ones head around this so bear with me.

The “Cuba Project” (aka SAS) was the overriding entity in the war on Cuba. So I take it that JMWAVE activities against Cuba were subject to SAS. So for example when David Morales (Chief of Cuban operations JMWAVE) and Bob Moore (Chief of  Maritime Operations JMWAVE) wanted to launch a sea raid against a target on the cuban coast, they had to run such operations not only by their boss Ted Shackley (Chief of JMWAVE), but also had to run it by:

• Chief SAS MOB (Miami Operations Branch) - Col Art Maloney
• Deputy Chief SAS MOB (Miami Operations Branch) - John Tilton

who I presume were located at Langley. I’m presuming here that “Operations” in the term “Miami Operations Branch” refers to all types of operations, whether it is special operations (i.e. paramilitary type operations) or covert action operations (which I understand generally refers to propaganda type operations. For example George Joannides was head of Covert Action at JMWAVE but he was only ever involved in propaganda operations and not paramilitary operations).

First off, I am not an expert on the SAS and JMWAVE hierarchy. I would defer to Bill Simpich, John Newman and Larry Hancock. My understanding is limited. So with that in mind:

Shackley reported directly to Fitzgerald. He didn't have to run everything by Malony or Tilton.

On 1/10/2024 at 8:42 PM, Gerry Down said:

So for an important sea raid launched out of JMWAVE, the hierarchy would look something like this:

• Chief of SAS: Des Fitz
• Deputy Chief SAS: Bruce Cheever
• Chief SAS MOB (Miami Operations Branch): Col Art Maloney
• Deputy Chief SAS MOB (Miami Operations Branch): John Tilton
• Chief of JMWAVE: Ted Shackley
• Deputy Chief of JMWAVE (also Chief of Maritime Operations): Bob Moore
• Chief of Cuban Operations: David Morales

Not everyone in the above chain might be consulted on every sea raid, but the hierarchy would look something like the above.

You referred to Henry Hecksher as “SAS/SO/HH” which would be correct as he was the Chief of Special Operations for AMWORLD (which basically meant he was the boss of AMWORLD). Not sure who he would have been reporting to at SAS, perhaps directly to Des Fitz himself? (assuming there was not a dedicated Chief of Special Operations at SAS).

Special Operations reported directly to Fitzgerald. (I forgot to add Nestor Sanchez as a member of SAS/SO. He was case officer for Rolando Cubela/AMLASH-1. Cubela didn't trust Earl Williamson.) Shackley wasn't directly involved in Autonomous Operations. He and David Morales did form their own team called Commandos Mambises lead by Grayston Lynch with help from Rip Robertson. Fitzgerald chose his old friend Bob Moore to get Autonomous Ops off the ground. Moore and Fitzgerald both served in the Far East division. Moore had tons of military experience as the Ops Officer for OSS Detachment 101 in Burma where he trained the Kachin Rangers. Moore hired Bradley Ayers and Ed Roderick to train the Cuban exiles and get them up to speed for maritime operations. The Commandos Mambises would later join the AMWORLD project.

On 1/10/2024 at 8:42 PM, Gerry Down said:

I have a picture in my mind of there being an SAS room at Langley where Des Fitz has a desk, Ed Stanulis (Chief of SAS EOB) has a desk, Col Art Maloney (Chief of SAS MOB) has a desk etc. and they are receiving cables from JMWAVE, Mexico City (perhaps from David Phillips) and from New Orleans (perhaps from Joannides or Trettin) on various actions being undertaken against Cuba in the form of paramilitary or propaganda efforts.

Do we know who at SAS was overseeing propaganda operations?

I believe it was Seymour Bolten that handled PA-PROP for SAS but that might have changed by summer of 1963. 

On 1/10/2024 at 8:42 PM, Gerry Down said:

If i am correct that “Operations” in the term “Miami Operations Branch” refers to both special operations (i.e. paramilitary type operations) or covert action operations (which I understand generally refers to propaganda type operations), then any propaganda operation out of JMWAVE would have to be approved by Col Art Maloney at Langley? (though its hard to see how a Col. could be overseeing a propaganda operation as being a Col. (ie military man) would seem to suit him more to paramilitary operations than propaganda efforts.). If Col. Art Maloney was overseeing propaganda operations out of JMWAVE, then the chain of command for a propaganda effort out of JMWAVE would be Joannides, Phillips, Col. Art Maloney in that order? But i'm quite possibly wrong on that.  

Joannides reported to Phil Toomey who in turn reported to David Phillips. William Kent and Ross Crozier formed the DRE in 1960. Crozier was replaced by Joannides in Dec 1962. Joannides was in turn replaced by Tony Sileo in May 1964.

Edited January 15 by David Boylan

[Leslie Sharp]

104-10172-10106: GUITART, COMPIZANO AUGUSTIN.

07/23/63: CIA document: PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL: Memo for Chief, SAS/OS - C. Trettin: SUBJECT: Guitart Campuzano, Agustin. NUMBER: 201-727514. REFERENCE: Your memorandum, dated 18 June 1963. "A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below. A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed." 

104-10172-10106: GUITART, COMPIZANO AUGUSTIN.

08/05/63: Letter from Carl Teels to Dr. Guitart: "Dear Dr. Guitart, Please excuse my writing in English but I find myself short of time and it is quicker if I write in English. I am returning herewith the papers you forwarded to me and am also enclosing a visa waiver for (REDACTION). Visa waivers are of little value these days because of various restrictions that have arisen in connection with travel to the United States from Cuba via another country. This situation I will discuss with you when I am in New Orleans which I expect will be during the week of 12 August 1963. You mentioned that your son, (REDACTION) might contact me. To date, he has not called so I trust that there has been no need on his part to see me. Since I have received no word from you I suppose Rene has not yet answered your letter. Let us hope that we hear from him soon. I would like to discuss with you the possibility of contacting your friend (REDACTION) of (REDACTION). Perhaps by the time I arrive you will have had some good ideas on how best to carry this out. I'm looking forward to seeing you and will call you as soon as I arrive in order to make an appointment to see you. Best regards, Carl Teels."

 

A month after Rene Lafitte tells her husband to ignore Bill Dalzell’s antics which appear to have been related to Ed Butler, and just days after Oswald paid a fine for the August 9 demonstration, Pierre makes a note on August 16: 

Antoine’s Room – Martello,

E. Joanides [sic] and Labadie. Quigly [sic]

Interview st. demonstration

Call Holdout

 

Martello is a reference to New Orleans Police Department officer, Lt. Francis L. Martello (not to be confused with Francis “Monk” Martello). Lt. Martello happened to pass by as the August 9th confrontation between Oswald and Bringuier—described as nothing more than shadowboxing—broke out. According to Martello’s incident report, “[Oswald] seemed to have set them up, so to speak, to create an incident, but when the incident occurred, he remained absolutely peaceful and gentle.”

Although official records do not explain why Tampa based FBI Special Agent Stephen J. Labadie might have been in the French Quarter in New Orleans on August 16, a Lafitte entry of the following month, on September 24, reads “-Oswald D/T (Labadie/Florida),” indicating that SA Labadie was directly engaged in matters of keen interest to Pierre Lafitte and his superiors.

Quigly is a misspelling of the name Quigley, FBI Special Agent John L. Quigley who interviewed Oswald in the New Orleans jail before he paid a $10 fine and was released.

Holdout was a mystery. Perhaps Lafitte was referencing a confidential informer, or perhaps a code-name for a program. There are also reasons to speculate holdout could be a high-level double agent whose identity was so significant to a much larger set of circumstances that were unfolding under Angleton’s control that Lafitte dare not speak or write his name. In the following chapter of this investigation, we consider the possibility that "holdout" was the moniker of someone in the highest echelon of domestic intelligence who, having been persuaded that there was “righteous” justification for an assassination that would impact global politics for decades, came on board with the plot to permanently remove John Kennedy from that stage.

As noted previously, some datebook entries may have been created after the fact—a reflection on prior events, or notes for future reference—so we can’t know with certainty that Lafitte was present at this meeting at Antoine’s, nor is it clear that the meeting was held on the 16th. We do know however that on the 16th, Oswald was less than a fifteen minute walk from Antoine’s, this time standing in front of Clay Shaw’s International Trade Mart, passing out leaflets again. 

Lafitte’s datebook remains dormant for the next four days; then on August 21st, the day of the radio debate hosted by Bill Stuckey, he records:

Talk Joanides [sic] Cuba –

he refer to K org. in

Mex – similar setup now.

Discuss with King – Geo

+Charles about Havana

Mx trips. (Holdout) [followed with a check mark]

 

The cornerstone of the two entries made within a week of one another is George Joannides who maintained addresses in both Miami and, for a period in 1963, New Orleans. Investigative journalist Jefferson Morley, whose groundbreaking lawsuit against the CIA continues to reverberate, pursued George Joannides’ role as agency liaison to the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1978. Morley revealed that the agency personnel file for Joannides indicates that in 1963 he served as the chief of the Psychological Warfare branch of the Miami station with a staff of twenty-four and a budget of $1.5 million. As such, Joannides was also in charge of handling the anti-Castro student group that Lee Harvey Oswald had tried to infiltrate in New Orleans in August 1963. Known as the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (the Student Revolutionary Directorate), Joannides was responsible for guiding and monitoring the young Cuban exiles. According to the Directorate’s leaders in Miami, funding also supported the DRE chapters in New Orleans and other cities.

Morley shares that at least two leaders recall having had a close but stormy relationship with George Joannides whom they knew only as “Howard.” The records of the Directorate, now in the University of Miami archives, support their memories. The group’s archives show that “Howard” worked closely with the Directorate on a wide variety of issues. In his essay, “What Jane Roman Said,” Morley writes:

While the details of Joannides’ motivations remain concealed, the results of his actions in 1963 are well documented. According to a Kennedy White House memo, the CIA “guided and monitored” the Cuban Student Directorate in mid-1963. Declassified CIA cables show that “Howard” demanded that the group clear their public statements with him. In his job evaluation from the summer of 1963, Joannides was credited having established control over the group. He dispensed funds from the AMSPELL budget, which the Directorate’s leaders in Miami and New Orleans used to publicly identify Oswald as a supporter of the Castro government in August 1963. AMSPELL funds were also used within hours of the [sic] Kennedy’s death to link Oswald to Castro.

The results of his expenditures, it must be said, were consistent with US policy. The former Directorate leaders say their purpose in launching a propaganda blitz against Oswald was to discredit the Castro regime and create public pressure for a US attack on Cuba . . .

Morley also writes that Joannides “kept his hand in all of this secret. Joannides certainly knew of the Directorate’s contacts with Oswald within hours of Kennedy’s death, if not earlier [emphasis added].”

Also according to Morley, “Joannides did not report his knowledge in written documents. Such records might have been turned over to law enforcement and thus exposed the agency’s operations to public view. His actions were consistent with his duty to protect “sources and methods” and with Jane Roman’s observation that SAS was keeping information about Oswald “under their tight control.””

With Lafitte’s August 16 entry, those questions are laid partially to rest. We now know that Joannides met with FBI and New Orleans police on the heels of Oswald’s street demonstration of the 9th. Whether Joannides turned over records during that meeting, or merely gave FBI SA Labadie and SA Quigley, along with NOPD Martello, a verbal update on agency operations is unknown.

[Gerry Down]

6 hours ago, David Boylan said:

I believe it was Seymour Bolten that handled PA-PROP for SAS but that might have changed by summer of 1963. 

Joannides reported to William Kent who in turn reported to David Phillips. Kent and Crozier formed the DRE in 1960. Crozier was replaced by Joannides in Dec 1962. Joannides was in turn replaced by Tony Sileo in May 1964.

So whatever info Joannides gave Phillips at JMWAVE, Phillips was then passing it on to Seymour (or whoever had replaced Seymour in the summer of 1963) at SAS in Langley? Or could Seymour have been bypassed and he went straight to Fitzgerald?

[Leslie Sharp]

On 1/11/2024 at 2:08 PM, Gerry Down said:

So whatever info Joannides gave Phillips at JMWAVE, Phillips was then passing it on to Seymour (or whoever had replaced Seymour in the summer of 1963) at SAS in Langley? Or could Seymour have been bypassed and he went straight to Fitzgerald?

 

Edited January 13 by Leslie Sharp

[David Boylan]

2 hours ago, Gerry Down said:

So whatever info Joannides gave Phillips at JMWAVE, Phillips was then passing it on to Seymour (or whoever had replaced Seymour in the summer of 1963) at SAS in Langley? Or could Seymour have been bypassed and he went straight to Fitzgerald?

I suspect that Helms was getting some of these reports. He assured Luis Fernandez Rocha (DRE) that he (Helms) would be keeping a close on the DRE and would replace Crozier with a new guy (Joannides). 

Edited January 11 by David Boylan

[Gerry Down]

9 minutes ago, David Boylan said:

I suspect that Helms was getting some of these reports. He assured Luis Fernando Rocha (DRE) that he (Helms) would be keeping a close on the DRE and would replace Crozier with a new guy (Joannides). 

I know that Helms had a direct line to Joannides. But once Joannides gave info to Phillips, who was Phillips then passing that on to? To date i have not come across that info in the literature, just that Phillips was Joannides boss at JMWAVE but no mention of who was Phillips passing Joannides' info onto. 

[Leslie Sharp]

@David Boylan @Gerry Down How does this excellent structural background relate to the topic of the thread, CARL TRETTIN?

[David Boylan]

 

9 minutes ago, Leslie Sharp said:

@David Boylan @Gerry Down How does this excellent structural background relate to the topic of the thread, CARL TRETTIN?

Well, if you understand the reporting structure, you understand who Trettin was reporting to and who knew what was going on in New Orleans.

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=226681#relPageId=2

[Leslie Sharp]

11 minutes ago, David Boylan said:

 

Well, if you understand the reporting structure, you understand who Trettin was reporting to and who knew what was going on in New Orleans.

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=226681#relPageId=2

Do you have the org. chart to indicate Trettin's position within the hierarchy?
 

Structure isn't critical to this particular analysis; in fact, hasn't it been established that certain of these officers could have been operating outside officialdom if for no other justification than plausible denial? Was Trettin operating within a sub-structure created by Chief of Counter Intel? 

Edited January 11 by Leslie Sharp

[Tom Gram]

Was Trettin ever deposed by the Rockefeller Commission and/or Church Committee, etc.? I did a quick search and couldn’t find anything. 

[Ron Bulman]

3 hours ago, David Boylan said:

I suspect that Helms was getting some of these reports. He assured Luis Fernandez Rocha (DRE) that he (Helms) would be keeping a close on the DRE and would replace Crozier with a new guy (Joannides). 

I thought I'd read somewhere Helms directly replaced the contact with DRE with Joannides.  With an open direct line of communication to him, in spite of the chain of command.  Which implies to me, Angleton was kept directly informed of operations and developments.  Nutty thoughts?