Prouty on Vietnam: NSAM 263 and 273 60 years on

[Michael Griffith]

Part of what is disappointing about the OP and the article linked in the OP is that the authors keep repeating these fringe claims and never address or acknowledge contrary facts that have been presented to them. I know they are aware of these facts because I have personally presented these facts to them in this forum. 

As just one example, let's take a look at the original draft of NSAM 273, i.e., the version that JFK was going to sign when he returned from Dallas. Among other things, the original draft is further clear evidence that JFK was determined to win the war to keep South Vietnam free, and that he stipulated that all decisions and actions should be judged based on whether or not they contributed to this purpose:

          1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all decisions and U.S. actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose. . . .

Immediately after this statement, the draft mentions the 10/2/63 withdrawal announcement, i.e., NSAM 263.  Obviously, the objectives of NSAM 263 were to be judged by whether or not they helped South Vietnam to win the war and remain free, and if they began to harm that "central object," they would be abandoned.

Paragraph 6 directed that military and economic aid should be maintained at the same levels that they were during Diem's tenure:

          6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in the time of the Diem government…

Paragraph 7 called for "a wholly new level of effectiveness" in action against North Vietnam:

          7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action. . . .

Paragraph 10 called for making the case to the world that the Viet Cong were "controlled, sustained, and supplied" by the Hanoi regime:

          10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired that we should develop as strong and persuasive case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained, and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels.

None of these things should be the least bit surprising, given JFK's statements in the months leading up to the Texas trip, and given his statements during the Texas trip, in which he made it clear that he was determined to keep South Vietnam free and that he was opposed to abandoning the war effort.

However, you'd never imagine these things, much less know them, to read the way the defenders of the unconditional-withdrawal myth spin the original draft of NSAM 273. Nor do these authors ever bother to tell their readers that they are pushing a theory that is rejected even by most liberal Vietnam War scholars and historians, not to mention the overwhelming majority of moderate and conservative Vietnam War scholars and historians.

 

[Greg Doudna]

Michael G., is it consensus historians’ view that JFK would have signed NSAM 273 without any editing as it stands (as LBJ did sign it)? 

The earlier NSAM had the written 1965 objective of near-withdrawal (understood most read that as with conditions, nevertheless that stated policy and planning objective)—is it consensus historians’ view that that element was now being dropped or abandoned or repudiated in NSAM 273–and that JFK would have been OK with that dropping, abandonment, or repudiation of the stated 1965 timetable planning? 

It just looks like JFK by Nov 1963 was seeing Vietnam as a morass and looking for an acceptable wind-down or disengagement while not “losing” at the same time, whereas a majority of joint chiefs etc had no such intent or interest or belief in a feasible possibility of a 1965 near-end to engagement. And that these differences in wordings reflect internal battles over framing policy at staff/Joint Chiefs level? 

Did JFK usually sign such prepared draft NSAM’s unaltered or did he frequently have them revised or reworded, in practice? I.e. how certain do you feel that JFK if he had returned to Washington instead of being assassinated, would have knowingly signed an abandonment of a policy commitment to plan for disengagement/withdrawal (mostly) by 1965?

[Jeff Carter]

7 hours ago, Sandy Larsen said:

 

How do you guys know that 273 was written before Kennedy's death? The document may have been antedated to make it look like it was Kennedy's.

 

Bundy's initial draft was dated, at the top, November 21, 1963 . This draft also was distributed to certain persons within foreign policy circles - such as Bundy's brother William - on that day. There remain a few notes and memoranda related to that. Prouty had collected several of these drafts, and noted the differing typewriters used for dissemination. 

John Newman posted one of these drafts:

https://jfkjmn.com/new-page-77/

[Robert Morrow]

1 minute ago, Jeff Carter said:

Bundy's initial draft was dated, at the top, November 21, 1963 . This draft also was distributed to certain persons within foreign policy circles - such as Bundy's brother William - on that day. There remain a few notes and memoranda related to that. Prouty had collected several of these drafts, and noted the differing typewriters used for dissemination. 

John Newman posted one of these drafts:

https://jfkjmn.com/new-page-77/

I think that longtime JFK assassination researcher Ed Tatro went to the LBJ Library and was the first to find one of the drafts of NSAM 273. I may be wrong about this but I think I remember Tatro saying this at one of John Judge's COPA conferences.

[Roger Odisio]

11 hours ago, Jeff Carter said:

The new essay has a section devoted to NSAM 273.  It is not known why or under what direction McGeorge Bundy initiated the draft November 21, 1963. Fletcher Prouty was probably the first person to speculate on the origins and purpose of 273. You are correct - there is no indication anywhere that JFK knew of or had requested such a draft.

A dispute between Prouty and John Newman over 273 on the set of “JFK” is obliquely referenced in the Esquire Magazine “hatchet job” on the film published October 1991. At that time, Prouty had a more complete collection of NSAM 273 drafts and the misunderstandings were eventually resolved.

Jeff, we don't need to look for an indication Kennedy knew about or had requested 273.  He didn't.  You have clearly set out the reversal of Kennedy's policy that 273 was.  Kennedy views on war in SE Asia were developed over decades.  Before 263, he had spent concentrated time developing the policy in it with the advisers he trusted.  

263 was signed October 11.  Bundy's draft of 273 was started one day before Kennedy was murdered.  Johnson signed it one day after Kennedy was buried.

It is impossible to believe that in the time between Oct. 11 and Nov. 21 Kennedy would have so completely changed his mind, and without consulting those advisors, unilaterally ordered a policy reversal. A new policy in 273, that happens to be in line with Johnson's views (LBJ later told McNamara he never agreed with JFK on Vietnam but kept this mouth shut).  

"It is not known why or under what direction McGeorge Bundy initiated the draft [of 273 on] November 21, 1963."  Those are the key questions aren't they?

Why start writing the draft while JFK was still alive? They had to know he wouldn't sign it.  Who ordered it?

If you believe that Vietnam policy was a key reason JFK was murdered, is it too much to suggest that the answers to those questions are likely to lead to the planners of the murder?  That reversal of 263 was part of the plan from the start.

[James DiEugenio]

I thought the reason for 273 was to coalesce a policy after Hawaii in relation to the overthrow of the government in Saigon.

And as weird as Bundy's draft is, Johnson made it worse.

[Michael Griffith]

I forgot to mention that Fletcher Prouty actually appeared on a third anti-Semitic program: On 11/11/1992, he appeared on The LaRouche Connection TV program, a program created by a lunatic fringe anti-Semite and Holocaust denier named Lyndon LaRouche (LINK). The U.S. Justice Department's Office of Justice website says the following about LaRouche:

          LaRouche has had frequent encounters with the law and has voiced his blatant anti-Semitism. He has also made outrageous accusations against prominent political figures, such as accusing the Queen of England of being the head of an international Jewish drug conspiracy and calling Henry Kissinger a Soviet spy. The portrait of LaRouche details his political activities since the late 1960's, reveals who supports his neo-Nazi activities and discusses why and where his financial support originates (LINK; see also LINK and LINK).

Prouty apologists can offer only pitiful excuses and surreal denials regarding Prouty's prolonged association with anti-Semites and Holocaust deniers, his documented support of Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism, his shameful defense of L. Ron Hubbard and Scientology, his bizarre theories, and his bogus claims. 

Academics and journalists who reject the conspiracy view of the JFKA always pounce on authors who cite Prouty; understandably, they point to the citation of Prouty as an indication that the authors are not credible or believable. Oliver Stone's unfortunate reliance on Prouty's claims in his 1991 movie JFK provided critics with devastating ammo with which to attack the movie. Researchers who continue to cite and praise Prouty are embarrassing themselves and are doing considerable damage to our cause.

Edited February 5 by Michael Griffith

[Jeff Carter]

4 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Part of what is disappointing about the OP and the article linked in the OP is that the authors keep repeating these fringe claims and never address or acknowledge contrary facts that have been presented to them. I know they are aware of these facts because I have personally presented these facts to them in this forum. 

As just one example, let's take a look at the original draft of NSAM 273, i.e., the version that JFK was going to sign when he returned from Dallas. Among other things, the original draft is further clear evidence that JFK was determined to win the war to keep South Vietnam free, and that he stipulated that all decisions and actions should be judged based on whether or not they contributed to this purpose:

          1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all decisions and U.S. actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose. . . .

Immediately after this statement, the draft mentions the 10/2/63 withdrawal announcement, i.e., NSAM 263.  Obviously, the objectives of NSAM 263 were to be judged by whether or not they helped South Vietnam to win the war and remain free, and if they began to harm that "central object," they would be abandoned.

Paragraph 6 directed that military and economic aid should be maintained at the same levels that they were during Diem's tenure:

          6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in the time of the Diem government…

Paragraph 7 called for "a wholly new level of effectiveness" in action against North Vietnam:

          7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action. . . .

Paragraph 10 called for making the case to the world that the Viet Cong were "controlled, sustained, and supplied" by the Hanoi regime:

          10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired that we should develop as strong and persuasive case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained, and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels.

None of these things should be the least bit surprising, given JFK's statements in the months leading up to the Texas trip, and given his statements during the Texas trip, in which he made it clear that he was determined to keep South Vietnam free and that he was opposed to abandoning the war effort.

However, you'd never imagine these things, much less know them, to read the way the defenders of the unconditional-withdrawal myth spin the original draft of NSAM 273. Nor do these authors ever bother to tell their readers that they are pushing a theory that is rejected even by most liberal Vietnam War scholars and historians, not to mention the overwhelming majority of moderate and conservative Vietnam War scholars and historians.

 

First - no one voted you into a position where you get to declare what is or is not a “fringe claim”.

Second - there are distinct differences between utterances which are “factual” and utterances which express an “opinion”. In my observation, you constantly blur the line between the two.

Third - your repeated angry attacks against scholars promoting a Kennedy Withdrawal thesis constantly refers to an “unconditional-withdrawal myth”. This “myth” supposedly follows a line such as: “ Kennedy advocated absolute withdrawal no matter what, even if the Communists take over Vietnam”.  You generally name Prouty, Newman, DiEugenio, Galbraith, ands even Stone’s “JFK” film as perpetuators of this myth. However, the myth is itself a myth. I have read just about everything Prouty wrote regarding Vietnam and I have never come across anything resembling an advocacy of an “unconditional withdrawal myth”. I have never found any such statement in Newman’s work. Neither does such claim appear in the “JFK” film. When pressed, all you can say is Newman says something like it in the JFK Revisited series (released three decades after Stone’s “JFK” film). He does (in the third episode), but in the context of paraphrasing something SecDef McNamara said during debriefs from his trip to Vietnam with Taylor (Sept 1963). That you bolster this false notion of an “unconditional withdrawal” with rhetoric such as “fringe”, “nutty”,”crackpot” etc establishes only that your “opinions” often arrive with an attached agenda.

[Jeff Carter]

1 hour ago, Roger Odisio said:

Jeff, we don't need to look for an indication Kennedy knew about or had requested 273.  He didn't.  You have clearly set out the reversal of Kennedy's policy that 273 was.  Kennedy views on war in SE Asia were developed over decades.  Before 263, he had spent concentrated time developing the policy in it with the advisers he trusted.  

263 was signed October 11.  Bundy's draft of 273 was started one day before Kennedy was murdered.  Johnson signed it one day after Kennedy was buried.

It is impossible to believe that in the time between Oct. 11 and Nov. 21 Kennedy would have so completely changed his mind, and without consulting those advisors, unilaterally ordered a policy reversal. A new policy in 273, that happens to be in line with Johnson's views (LBJ later told McNamara he never agreed with JFK on Vietnam but kept this mouth shut).  

"It is not known why or under what direction McGeorge Bundy initiated the draft [of 273 on] November 21, 1963."  Those are the key questions aren't they?

Why start writing the draft while JFK was still alive? They had to know he wouldn't sign it.  Who ordered it?

If you believe that Vietnam policy was a key reason JFK was murdered, is it too much to suggest that the answers to those questions are likely to lead to the planners of the murder?  That reversal of 263 was part of the plan from the start.

John Newman spoke with McGeorge Bundy in the early 1990s regarding the draft of NSAM 273.  Bundy had a fuzzy memory, but did acknowledge he wrote the draft and added, cryptically, of the recommendations: “I tried to bring them in line with the words Kennedy might want to say.”

Bundy had been instructed to attend the meeting in Honolulu (November 1963), but it is not known by whom. Bundy wrote up “recommendations” supposedly reflecting a Honolulu consensus in the form of a draft NSAM, but it is not known what motivated him to do so.

There is no record anywhere which links Kennedy to the draft of this NSAM. Short of such a confirmation, it is difficult to consider the draft as an expression of “Kennedy administration” policy. This is because there is an established record of the extensive process leading to NSAM 263. There is no evidence of any “process” leading to the 273 draft.

What is striking is that the training/withdrawal plan from 263 entirely disappears beginning with the 273 draft, while the 1000 man December 1963 withdrawal remains and is used specifically to promote the idea that there was full continuity in Vietnam policies from Kennedy administration to Johnson administration.

[Michael Griffith]

6 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Nor do these authors ever bother to tell their readers that they are pushing a theory that is rejected even by most liberal Vietnam War scholars and historians, not to mention the overwhelming majority of moderate and conservative Vietnam War scholars and historians.

I understated things a bit. The vast majority of liberal Vietnam War scholars and historians reject the unconditional-withdrawal myth, and all moderate and conservative scholars and historians reject it. If someone is aware of a moderate or conservative scholar/historian who accepts the myth, please name him/her. I've been researching the Vietnam War for decades and have read dozens of book and hundreds of articles and papers. I'm not aware of a single moderate or conservative scholar/historian who accepts the unconditional-withdrawal claim.

3 hours ago, Greg Doudna said:

Michael G., is it consensus historians’ view that JFK would have signed NSAM 273 without any editing as it stands (as LBJ did sign it)? 

The earlier NSAM had the written 1965 objective of near-withdrawal (understood most read that as with conditions, nevertheless that stated policy and planning objective)—is it consensus historians’ view that that element was now being dropped or abandoned or repudiated in NSAM 273–and that JFK would have been OK with that dropping, abandonment, or repudiation of the stated 1965 timetable planning? 

It just looks like JFK by Nov 1963 was seeing Vietnam as a morass and looking for an acceptable wind-down or disengagement while not “losing” at the same time, whereas a majority of joint chiefs etc had no such intent or interest or belief in a feasible possibility of a 1965 near-end to engagement. And that these differences in wordings reflect internal battles over framing policy at staff/Joint Chiefs level? 

Did JFK usually sign such prepared draft NSAM’s unaltered or did he frequently have them revised or reworded, in practice? I.e. how certain do you feel that JFK if he had returned to Washington instead of being assassinated, would have knowingly signed an abandonment of a policy commitment to plan for disengagement/withdrawal (mostly) by 1965?

Bundy wrote the first draft of NSAM 273 after consulting with JFK. He tailored it to conform with JFK's views. The version that LBJ signed was not drastically different from the first draft. 

As Dr. Marc Selverstone has proved in The Kennedy Withdrawal, the JFK White House tapes contain not one shred of evidence that JFK saw Vietnam "as a morass" and that he was looking to pull out while not losing at the same time. For one thing, North Vietnamese sources have confirmed that the war was actually going well until Diem was assassinated in November 1963.

If you read the supporting documents behind NSAM 263 and 273, you see that the withdrawal was clearly conditional, that some support troops would remain, and that military and economic aid would continue. 

If you stop outside the JFKA research community, you quickly discover that the Stone-Prouty-Newman unconditional-withdrawal myth is a truly fringe theory that is accepted by only a handful of scholars/historians. Even the vast majority of liberal scholars/historians reject it, including ultra-liberals such as Moise and Chomsky. 

Edited February 5 by Michael Griffith

[Jeff Carter]

15 minutes ago, Michael Griffith said:

Bundy wrote the first draft of NSAM 273 after consulting with JFK.

On what basis do you make this statement?

[Roger Odisio]

33 minutes ago, Jeff Carter said:

John Newman spoke with McGeorge Bundy in the early 1990s regarding the draft of NSAM 273.  Bundy had a fuzzy memory, but did acknowledge he wrote the draft and added, cryptically, of the recommendations: “I tried to bring them in line with the words Kennedy might want to say.”

Bundy had been instructed to attend the meeting in Honolulu (November 1963), but it is not known by whom. Bundy wrote up “recommendations” supposedly reflecting a Honolulu consensus in the form of a draft NSAM, but it is not known what motivated him to do so.

There is no record anywhere which links Kennedy to the draft of this NSAM. Short of such a confirmation, it is difficult to consider the draft as an expression of “Kennedy administration” policy. This is because there is an established record of the extensive process leading to NSAM 263. There is no evidence of any “process” leading to the 273 draft.

What is striking is that the training/withdrawal plan from 263 entirely disappears beginning with the 273 draft, while the 1000 man December 1963 withdrawal remains and is used specifically to promote the idea that there was full continuity in Vietnam policies from Kennedy administration to Johnson administration.

When Salandria said he knew Kennedy was murdered by the top echelons of his own government, he fingered Bundy as a likely participant.

I thought that was based primarily on Bundy running the White House situation room at the time of the murder, and sending a message to Air Force One on the way back from Dallas that the lone assassin had been arrested.  Something no one could have possibly known at the time.

The message to the plane was part of the process to frame Oswald that began right away.  The officials on the plane were a prime target to be convinced that the murder had already been solved and to stay out of the way no matter what you think you saw in Dallas.

A message so quickly disseminated without even a pretense of gathering facts to support it is an indication it was planned in advance of the murder. 

Now add in the story of Bundy drafting a reversal of Vietnam policy that suits Johnson's views, not Kennedy's, before Kennedy was dead. It's another element to support Salandria's view.

[Greg Doudna]

6 minutes ago, Michael Griffith said:

As Dr. Marc Selverstone has proved in The Kennedy Withdrawal, the JFK White House tapes contain not one shred of evidence that JFK saw Vietnam "as a morass" and that he was looking to pull out while not losing at the same time. For one thing, North Vietnamese sources have confirmed that the war was actually going well until Diem was assassinated in November 1963.

If you read the supporting documents behind NSAM 263 and 273, you see that the withdrawal was clearly conditional, that some support troops would remain, and that military and economic aid would continue. 

But Michael, how can you deny (or Selverstone if so) that JFK was “looking to pull out while not losing at the same time”, when in your next breath you refer to NSAM 263 as “a withdrawal”? 

Was JFK intent on a conditional withdrawal or not? You seem to be arguing both ways simultaneously.

Also you say McBundy’s draft of NSAM 273 represented JFK’s thinking but you did not answer whether in your understanding 273 did or did not end the earlier stated 1965 timetable for a conditional intended withdrawal? 

In other words, was the 1965 planned (conditional) withdrawal of NSAM 263 for real as JFK intent, or not, and when exactly did that real intent (if so) get formally cancelled in top-level war planning by the US? And by whom exactly? 

[James DiEugenio]

From my review of Selverstone's very poor  and agenda driven book:

"The book moves toward the famous last words of Kennedy to Mike Forrestal before JFK went to Dallas. Forrestal said in 1971 that before the president departed Washington he told him that there would be a review of Indochina policy when he got back, Selverstone writes that, since in an earlier interview Forrestal did not mention that, then somehow Forrestal was embellishing. Since Forrestal had long passed, that is easy to say. He then writes that this typifies the ‘expansion of claims about Kennedy’s intentions” at a time when they seemed most laudable and prophetic. Meaning, by 1971, the war was a mess.

When I read that, I realized that this was what the book was really about. But, like any zealot, Selverstone is not aware that he has set himself up to have the plank sawed off beneath him. Because, as Peter Scott has noted, way back in 1967 Charles Bartlett and Edward Weintal wrote a book called Facing the Brink. It has a chapter dealing with the transition between Kennedy and Johnson on Vietnam. They confirmed what Forrestal said: That shortly before he was assassinated, JFK had ordered a complete review of American policy in Southeast Asia. (p. 71). That book was released in 1967, so it was likely being written in 1965-66. Which was before the war had gone south, before the media had altered course, and while Johnson was still rallying public opinion to save South Vietnam. Therefore, far from indicating any “expansion” of Kennedy’s intentions, what Selverstone has shown is his insistence on ignoring what the president was actually doing.

That insistence extends much further than Forrestal. In my review of Newman’s 2017 revision of JFK and Vietnam, I listed 19 people who Kennedy had revealed his intent to withdraw from Vietnam. This included senators, generals, ambassadors and journalists. Were all these people being deceitful? Or was Kennedy a pathological xxxx? If you do not deal with this evidence in any real way, then you can simply—and, as we have seen, wrongly—chalk it up as an “expansion of claims about Kennedy’s intentions”."

Edited February 5 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

More evidence of how agenda driven Selverstone's book is:

The third critical point, the November 27, 1961 meeting, is not even noted by Selverstone. Yet this event is of maximum importance. This White House meeting was attended by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Joint Chiefs Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer and Max Taylor among others. Although he called the meeting, Kennedy was the last to arrive. After making a bit of small talk, the president forcefully unloaded on the reason for the meeting. He was clearly frustrated by how hard he had to fight to get NSAM 111 approved, which denied combat troops but raised aid and advisors to Saigon. Kennedy said as clearly as possible, “When policy is decided on, people on the spot must support it or get out.” He demanded whole hearted support for his decisions. He then asked: Who was going to implement his Vietnam policy. McNamara said he would. (Newman, p. 145-46, emphasis added)

Why is this so important? And why is it inexplicable that Selverstone left it out? Because, in April, Galbraith would be in Washington again. And what Selverstone does with this trip is once more, just strange. He seems to want to make Galbraith the MC running the whole agenda. But the record does not support that. Galbraith had written another report in early April arguing against any further involvement with the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. He even warned of the possibility of an escalation to a Korean War conflagration. (Letter to Kennedy of April 4, 1962). Kennedy was very taken by this communication. And he read it to diplomat Averill Harriman and NSC assistant Mike Forrestal. Galbraith was then directed by Kennedy to talk to McNamara about the memo. (Newman, p. 235) According to Galbraith McNamara got the message. (James Blight, Virtual JFK, p. 129; Pentagon Papers, Vol. 2, pp 669-671)

Edited February 5 by James DiEugenio