Prouty on Vietnam: NSAM 263 and 273 60 years on

[James DiEugenio]

No, what Bundy admired in retrospect was that Kennedy had the good sense to see that we should not commit combat troops and begin a withdrawal program.

Unlike Rostow, Mac Bundy later realized he was wrong. Walt Rostow never admitted it.

[Robert Morrow]

1 hour ago, James DiEugenio said:

Let me add, the media was complicit in all this.  And it was not all because of ignorance or stupidity.

In late summer of 1964, when everyone knew Johnson would crush Goldwater, LBJ brought in Kate Graham and her senior  editors to the White House.  He then told them about his escalation plans in Vietnam.  Graham made no objections to them. And right then and there became a dyed in the wool Johnson fan. Knowing that what he was telling the public was simply false, and unfair to Goldwater.  She liked being at the center of power. And Johnson liked having her in his hip pocket. 

He said, "She is worth two divisions to me."

Kind of disgusting eh? But that is the way the game works.

 

Hey Jimmy, where does this come from? Not that I doubt you, I want to use it.

Lyndon Johnson had extremely close ties to high level media ownership and executives for decades. The LBJ -Graham family friendship was longstanding. Phil Graham was the one who used to brag that he played a key role in getting John Kennedy to put Lyndon Johnson on the ticket as Vice President in 1960. LBJ's henchman at the FBI was Cartha "Deke" DeLoach and he #3 at the FBI and in charge of the FBI media manipulation team or you could say Deke DeLoach did a lot of "public relations" for the FBI.

In the cover up of the JFK assassination, I see three corrupting forces at work: 1) Lyndon Johnson using his vast personal ties to the elite media 2) FBI and Deke DeLoach running their PR team to push the lone nutter narrative and 3) Allen Dulles, Cord Meyer and the entire CIA "Operation Mockingbird" media manipulation team pushing the lone nutter narrative. Combined that is a lot of media manipulation firepower!

 

[James DiEugenio]

Carol Felsenthal's book, Power, Privilege and the Post.

 

Edited February 11 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

My obit for Bradlee:

 

As many commentators have noted, what was astonishing about the Bradlee/Graham loyalty to Lyndon Johnson was not that it was a clear reversal of Kennedy, but that it continued even after the Tet offensive. This is why, in 1968, Kate Graham would have preferred Republican Richard Nixon over antiwar Democrat Eugene McCarthy. (ibid, p. 246) In the general election between Nixon and Johnson’s Vice President Hubert Humphrey, the Post did not make an endorsement. (James Brian McPherson’s The Conservative Resurgence and The Press, p. 234)

[Robert Morrow]

27 minutes ago, James DiEugenio said:

My obit for Bradlee:

 

As many commentators have noted, what was astonishing about the Bradlee/Graham loyalty to Lyndon Johnson was not that it was a clear reversal of Kennedy, but that it continued even after the Tet offensive. This is why, in 1968, Kate Graham would have preferred Republican Richard Nixon over antiwar Democrat Eugene McCarthy. (ibid, p. 246) In the general election between Nixon and Johnson’s Vice President Hubert Humphrey, the Post did not make an endorsement. (James Brian McPherson’s The Conservative Resurgence and The Press, p. 234)

Besides Kate Graham, you know who else was for Richard Nixon in the 1968 general election? VIETNAM WAR ADDICT LYNDON JOHNSON! Just read Luke Nichter's book on the 1968 election; it is a pretty good one: The Year That Broke Politics: Collusion and Chaos in the Presidential Election of 1968: Nichter, Luke A.: 9780300254396: Amazon.com: Books Johnson was undermining Hubert Humphrey for the entire 1968 presidential election (because HHH was not strong enough on Vietnam) and in the spring of 1968 (see Robert Dallek) after LBJ dropped out of the race he tried mightily to get his personal friend Republican Nelson Rockefeller to run for President.

Clark Clifford is quoted in that book saying LBJ wanted Richard Nixon to beat Hubert Humphrey. From where I stand, that is an obvious truth.

As someone who reads a lot about Lyndon Johnson, my conclusion is that the odds of Lyndon Johnson walking into a voting book in 1968 and voting for Hubert Humphrey or voting for George McGovern in 1972 are Zero, Zip, Zilch. No way in hell would LBJ do that no matter what his tepid public endorsements of HHH and McGovern were.

I am pretty sure Lady Bird voted for HHH in 1968, but there is a Zero percent chance LBJ could or would do it.

 

 

Edited February 11 by Robert Morrow

[W. Niederhut]

5 minutes ago, Robert Morrow said:

Besides Kate Graham, you know who else was for Richard Nixon in the 1968 general election? VIETNAM WAR ADDICT LYNDON JOHNSON! Just read Luke Nichter's book on the 1968 election; it is a pretty good one: The Year That Broke Politics: Collusion and Chaos in the Presidential Election of 1968: Nichter, Luke A.: 9780300254396: Amazon.com: Books Johnson was undermining Hubert Humphrey for the entire 1968 presidential election (because HHH was not strong enough on Vietnam) and in the spring of 1968 (see Robert Dallek) after LBJ dropped out of the race he tried mightily to get his personal friend Republican Nelson Rockefeller to run for President.

Clark Clifford is quoted in that book saying LBJ wanted Richard Nixon to beat Hubert Humphrey. From where I stand, that is an obvious truth.

As someone who reads a lot about Lyndon Johnson, my conclusion is that the odds of Lyndon Johnson walking into a voting book in 1968 and voting for Hubert Humphrey or voting for George McGovern in 1972 are Zero, Zip, Zilch. No way in hell would LBJ do that no matter what his tepid public endorsements of HHH and McGovern were.

I am pretty sure Lady Bird voted for HHH in 1968, but there is a Zero percent chance LBJ could or would do it.

 

 

More evidence, IMO, that LBJ's Great Society (and Civil Rights) legislation was a cynical, calculated ploy to woo the liberal, Democratic base.

From what  I have read on the subject, LBJ was never motivated by humanitarian idealism.

He was motivated by ruthless self-interest and self-aggrandizement.

What sort of bona fide liberal would have supported Nixon, instead of Humphrey, in 1968?

[James DiEugenio]

Its really startling that the Post would still support the war after the Tet offensive.

In fact, what they did was switch reporters to Peter Braestrup.  Because the guy they had on the beat was reporting Tet carefully and honestly.  So they switched to Peter.

Peter was utterly nutty about Vietnam. He tried to blame America's failure in Vietnam on the media.

BTW I think Johnson wanted Rockefeller to run because he had a better chance of beating RFK.

 

 

Edited February 12 by James DiEugenio

[Robert Morrow]

21 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

Its really startling that the Post would still support the war after the Tet offensive.

In fact, what they did was switch reporters to Peter Braestrup.  Because the guy they had on the beat was reporting Tet carefully and honestly.  So they switched to Peter.

Peter was utterly nutty about Vietnam. He tried to blame America's failure in Vietnam on the media.

BTW I think Johnson wanted Rockefeller to run because he had a better chance of beating RFK.

 

 

You think LBJ wanted Nelson Rockefeller to run because he wanted someone to beat Robert Kennedy?

You are 100% right. And remember Rockefeller was more hawkish on Vietnam than RFK was.

In the mid 1960's LBJ used to torture Hubert Humphrey and say wouldn't it be great if I and Nelson Rockefeller ran as a ticket in 1968?

Astoundingly, Republican Nelson Rockefeller was the TOP (behind the scenes) choice of

Democrat Lyndon Johnson in spring,1968!

From Robert Dallek’s book Flawed Giant, pp. 544-545]

Lyndon Johnson’s deep alliance with CIA and Eastern Establishment

 

 “Johnson’s choice as his successor was New York’s Republican Governor Nelson Rockefeller. The two men had a high regard for each other. Johnson saw Rockefeller as a sensible moderate who, in Lady Bird’s words, “was a good human being, a person who was for the disadvantaged, who was a man of compassion, with a capable and effective mind, and capable of being effective, getting things done.” He also believed that Rockefeller was the one man who could beat Bobby Kennedy, no small asset in Johnson’s mind.

Rockefeller reciprocated Johnson’s feelings. He saw the President as “a great statesman and great American patriot.” Rockefeller said later: “He was a tremendous guy.” They and their wives enjoyed a warm personal relationship. Nelson recalled how frank his wife Happy could be with Lyndon, telling him at the ranch not to drive so fast or drink too much. “She was successful in getting him to slow down, which I don’t think most people were.” …

     Toward the end of April [1968], Johnson invited the Rockefellers to the White House for dinner, where he urged the governor to declare for the Republican nomination. “He was very friendly about ’68, and very supportive of me for ’68,” Rockefeller said. Johnson also told him he would never campaign against him. Happy Rockefeller remembered how during that evening Johnson urged Rockefeller to run. “He did want Nelson to be President,” she said. Johnson encouraged others to back Rockefeller as well. On April 7, after Irwin Miller, a prominent member of “Republicans for Johnson” in 1964 had asked whether the president would object to his chairing a Draft Rockefeller Committee, LBJ have Miller “a full speed go-ahead.”

     Rockefeller did not need much prodding. On April 10, following a brief conversation with Johnson at New York’s St. Patrick’s Cathedral, where they attended Archbishop Terence Cooke’s installation, Rockefeller announced his “availability” for the Republican nomination. On April 30, after the White House evening, Rockefeller declared himself a candidate for the presidency.” [Robert Dallek, A Flawed Giant, p. 545]

           

Nancy Dickerson: Lyndon Johnson considered putting Nelson Rockefeller on the ticket as Vice President for the 1968 general election.

          "In the last year of the Kennedy Administration, there was much talk about whether or not he would "dump Johnson" as his running mate for the second term. When asked about it directly at a news conference, he was unequivocal and said, in part, "I don't know what they will do about me, but I'm sure that the Vice President will be on the ticket if he chooses to run." A couple of weeks later at dinner I asked LBJ whether he thought Kennedy would dump him, and he brushed the question aside, saying that he never thought about it. But during the next course it was he who brought up the subject again, and he repeated word for word all of Kennedy's press-conference answer, adding, "That doesn't sound like I'm not going to be around, does it?"

          Years later when Hubert Humphrey was having dinner at our house, I naively asked him whether it wasn't a relief to have as President a man who had been through the tortures of the post himself and understood what it is like, to which Humphrey replied, "There is no President who understands." I knew what he meant later when LBJ, Humphrey, Jack Valenti, Dick and I had an impromptu dinner at the Moyers' house. The President became expansive about those he loved and those he didn't, and then started talking about his choice for Vice President the next time around. There were rumors Hubert would be dumped, and LBJ did nothing that night to discourage them; in fact, he encouraged them. He mentioned the need for national unity during a war, and said that it might best be achieved by naming a Republican as a running mate. He extolled the virtues of Nelson Rockefeller, declaring him to be the "right kind of Republican" to form a consensus ticket. In effect, he was warning Humphrey that he had better not stray from the fold on the Vietnam war, or he would be replaced. Humphrey was humiliated, and the more Johnson played his cruel cat-and-mouse game, the more humiliated he felt. I clenched my teeth and wondered how he could take it.

 [Nancy Dickerson, Among Those Present: A Reporter's View of 25 Years in Washington, p. 230]

 

 

 

[James DiEugenio]

Johnson was obsessed with RFK's candidacy, and I think one reason he dropped out is that he could not take the humiliation of losing to him.

But he did not want to see him win so he tried to get Rockefeller to run against him.  Thinking that Rocky could appeal to a wider spectrum, including students and African Americans as he was perceived as being more liberal.

This is how LBJ was intent on injuring his own party in 1968, by limiting what Humphrey could say on the one hand, and by handpicking a safety valve in case RFK won.  

[Michael Griffith]

Has the Stone-Prouty-Newman camp ever responded to Dr. Larry Berman's 29-page critique of Newman's case for the unconditional-withdrawal myth? I'm referring to Dr. Berman's 29-page chapter titled "NSAM 263 and NSAM 273: Manipulating History" in the roundtable book Vietnam: The Early Decisions (University of Texas Press, 1997, pp. 177-206), edited by Dr. Lloyd Gardner and Dr. Ted Gittinger.

Among many other things, Berman documents that JFK clearly expressed his intention to win the war in both public and private statements that he made in the last four weeks of his life. Indeed, in the speech that JFK was going to give at the Trade Mart, he warned that we "dare not weary of the task" of supporting nations that were threatened by communism, and that reducing our aid to those nations would be dangerous:

          Our security and strength, in the last analysis, directly depend on the security and strength of others, and that is why our military and economic assistance plays such a key role in enabling those who live on the periphery of the Communist world to maintain their independence of choice. Our assistance to these nations can be painful, risky and costly, as is true in Southeast Asia today. But we dare not weary of the task. . . .

          Reducing our efforts to train, equip, and assist their armies can only encourage Communist penetration and require in time the increased overseas deployment of American combat forces.

Berman also documents that when LBJ was faced with Hanoi's vast escalation in South Vietnam in the 14 months following Diem's death, his holdover JFK aides were among those who recommended sending combat troops to stabilize the situation. 

To get some idea of how drastically Hanoi's leaders escalated their war effort after Diem's death, the first division-sized battle did not occur in Vietnam until late 1964. Until then, the Communists had never deployed more than a regiment or a battalion into battle--they usually only deployed a company or two. Yet, in late 1964, they attacked Binh Gia with a division (a typical division contained three regiments or nine battalions). This brings us back to the key point that LBJ and JFK faced very different situations--JFK was never faced with the kind of massive escalation that LBJ had to confront.

And, Berman documents that LBJ was initially reluctant to send combat troops to South Vietnam, and that it took considerable persuasion from former JFK aides and others to get him to change his mind.

[Jeff Carter]

Relying solely on public statements from the time, one could make a case for either withdrawal or engagement simply by cherry-picking from the self-contradictory record. Critics such as Prouty and Newman look closely at what was done rather than what was said. They give more weight to the production of NSAM 263 - culminating a period of intense concentration on a strategic plan for Vietnam led personally by Kennedy - rather than discourse which may have been subject to electioneering and political persuasion. The intention of 263 is not ambiguous.

What is notable with the argument that “JFK never faced” what LBJ “had to confront” - which was first broached in Les Gelb’s NY Times op-ed December 1991) - is that rhetorically it dismisses the withdrawal argument for its presumption regarding the “unknown”, while simultaneously presuming to in fact "know" the “unknown” (i.e. JFK would have reacted the same as LBJ). It also fails to factor the escalatory measures initiated by the Johnson administration, beginning with NSAM 273.

[James DiEugenio]

Oh no. Not that one.

Kennedy said that he would be branded an appeaser after the election.

 

[Roger Odisio]

53 minutes ago, Jeff Carter said:

Relying solely on public statements from the time, one could make a case for either withdrawal or engagement simply by cherry-picking from the self-contradictory record. Critics such as Prouty and Newman look closely at what was done rather than what was said. They give more weight to the production of NSAM 263 - culminating a period of intense concentration on a strategic plan for Vietnam led personally by Kennedy - rather than discourse which may have been subject to electioneering and political persuasion. The intention of 263 is not ambiguous.

What is notable with the argument that “JFK never faced” what LBJ “had to confront” - which was first broached in Les Gelb’s NY Times op-ed December 1991) - is that rhetorically it dismisses the withdrawal argument for its presumption regarding the “unknown”, while simultaneously presuming to in fact "know" the “unknown” (i.e. JFK would have reacted the same as LBJ). It also fails to factor the escalatory measures initiated by the Johnson administration, beginning with NSAM 273.

Exactly, Jeff.  Kennedy was faced with the dual task of developing the withdrawal policy he wanted, while at the same time shielding himself, as much as he could, from the "soft on communism" charge he knew Goldwater had waiting for him. 

The policy of 263 was clear and that's what is important.  Not thepolitical maneuvering.

Johnson didn't believe in the policy, as he later told McNamara. He wanted to "win", not withdraw. That's the fundamental change in 273.

Nevertheless for 273 kept in the language withdrawing 1,000 personnel by the end of '63, so he could pose as something of a peace candidate while painting Goldwater as a dangerous warmonger.

[Gene Kelly]

3 hours ago, Jeff Carter said:

Relying solely on public statements from the time, one could make a case for either withdrawal or engagement simply by cherry-picking from the self-contradictory record. Critics such as Prouty and Newman look closely at what was done rather than what was said. They give more weight to the production of NSAM 263 - culminating a period of intense concentration on a strategic plan for Vietnam led personally by Kennedy - rather than discourse which may have been subject to electioneering and political persuasion. The intention of 263 is not ambiguous.

What is notable with the argument that “JFK never faced” what LBJ “had to confront” - which was first broached in Les Gelb’s NY Times op-ed December 1991) - is that rhetorically it dismisses the withdrawal argument for its presumption regarding the “unknown”, while simultaneously presuming to in fact "know" the “unknown” (i.e. JFK would have reacted the same as LBJ). It also fails to factor the escalatory measures initiated by the Johnson administration, beginning with NSAM 273.

Well stated, Jeff ... knowing JFK , his actions would have spoken much louder than the words (if he had the chance).  The latter words are rhetoric for public perception ... I recall (although young at the time) that Goldwater was scary, and I agree with Roger that the policy of 263 was quite clear. 

Gene

[Michael Griffith]

23 hours ago, Jeff Carter said:

 

Given your refusal to concede the obvious fact that Prouty clearly fabricated his tale about Chiang and the Chinese delegation secretly attending the Tehran Conference, I suspect that nothing I say will cause you to change your position, but I offer this response for the sake of visitors and others.

Relying solely on public statements from the time, one could make a case for either withdrawal or engagement simply by cherry-picking from the self-contradictory record.

One, we’re not just talking about his public statements. We’re also talking about the JFK White House tapes and meeting minutes. Did you read Dr. Berman’s chapter?

Two, the record is not “self-contradictory.” In every single firsthand statement from JFK himself we see him reaffirming his determination to win the war. You cannot cite a single firsthand statement from JFK to support your view.

Critics such as Prouty and Newman look closely at what was done rather than what was said. They give more weight to the production of NSAM 263 - culminating a period of intense concentration on a strategic plan for Vietnam led personally by Kennedy - rather than discourse which may have been subject to electioneering and political persuasion. The intention of 263 is not ambiguous.

You are citing Prouty?! Anyway, as dozens of scholars have noted, NSAM 263 simply does not support the unconditional-withdrawal myth. In fact, it refutes the myth.

NSAM 263 itself is less than one page long and merely announces the 1,000-man withdrawal and refers to sections of the Taylor-McNamara report. If you read that report and the instructions that JFK himself gave to Lodge afterward, it is crystal clear that the withdrawal was conditioned on the situation on the ground and did not even involve the withdrawal of all troops. Moreover, the background documents prove that even if ground conditions permitted the gradual, phased withdrawal of “the bulk” of U.S. troops, we would continue to aid South Vietnam, and that the goal was to win the war.

What is notable with the argument that “JFK never faced” what LBJ “had to confront” – which was first broached in Les Gelb’s NY Times op-ed December 1991) – is that rhetorically it dismisses the withdrawal argument for its presumption regarding the “unknown”, while simultaneously presuming to in fact “know” the “unknown” (i.e. JFK would have reacted the same as LBJ). It also fails to factor the escalatory measures initiated by the Johnson administration, beginning with NSAM 273.

I know some here will never abandon this mythical spin. A few facts:

One, it is simply a fact that JFK never faced the kind of escalation and precarious situation that LBJ faced.

Two, some of the loudest voices for deploying combat troops to Vietnam were the JFK aides who remained in the White House under LBJ.

Three, the draft of NSAM 273 that was prepared for JFK made it abundantly clear that every action was to be judged by whether or not it helped to defeat the Communists.

Four, the indisputable and profusely documented facts are (1) that LBJ was reluctant to deploy combat troops, (2) that he was even reluctant to substantially escalate the war in any way because he wanted to focus on his domestic agenda, (3) that he only changed his mind when faced with the dire situation that developed in early 1965 and after former JFK aides and others repeatedly urged him to send combat troops, and (4) that even after he agreed to the first deployment of combat troops, he hoped they could return within a year.

These facts are a matter of record. They have been acknowledged, documented, and discussed by scholars from all across the political spectrum and on both sides of the Vietnam debate. Only a tiny handful of scholars/authors deny these facts, and only a tiny minority of scholars/authors still peddle the unconditional-withdrawal myth.

Edited February 14 by Michael Griffith