Walker - Ruby Connection

[Jim Root]

Commission Exhibit 1248 is an interview with Virginia Marian Belasco, the Granddaughter of David Belasco and a friend of Jack Ruby's. David Belasco was known as "The Bishop of Broadway" and produced plays and operated the Belasco Theater in New York City.

David Belasco is credited with the discovery of Charlotte Walker a famous actress both on Broadway and in silent films. Charlotte Walker, in her Broadway debut, stared with such notables as Cecil B. DeMille and Mary Pickford in the long running play The Warrens of Virginia." Charlotte Walker was the aunt of Edwin Anderson Walker and mother of Sara Haden another well known actress. There is some evidence that Edwin Walker may have been in a Broadway production himself. While a cadet at West Point Walker had access to New York City and the Broadway productions that both his aunt and cousin were staring in.

Jack Ruby met Virginia Belasco while in San Francisco in 1936 and dated her while he was in New York in November of 1941.

The interview of Ms Belasco, conducted by agents Norton and Kidwell on Dec. 2, 1963, states: "..and advised she received a telephone call from EVA GRANT, from Dallas, Texas, about a month ago. It was just a social call concerning mutual acquaintances including JACK RUBY. She has never met EVA GRANT personally. BELASCO advised she first met JACK RUBY in about 1936 at the Jewish Community Center in San Francisco.....She also understands that RUBY has a cousin by the name of JUDY, who is employed as a waitress at Blum's Restaurant in San Francisco."

I have been reading a great deal about Ruby's associations with underworld figures and how those associations may connect within the assassination story. Just thought a call from Ruby's sister, Eva Grant, to Virginia Belasco, whose family had been instrumental in the careers of Walker's aunt and cousin, in the days immediatly before the assassination would be of interest as well.

By the way Virginia Belasco's father was living in Mexico preceeding the assassination.

Just coincidence.

Jm Root

[Gerry Hemming]

Commission Exhibit 1248 is an interview with Virginia Marian Belasco, the Granddaughter of David Belasco and a friend of Jack Ruby's. David Belasco was known as "The Bishop of Broadway" and produced plays and operated the Belasco Theater in New York City.

David Belasco is credited with the discovery of Charlotte Walker a famous actress both on Broadway and in silent films. Charlotte Walker, in her Broadway debut, stared with such notables as Cecil B. DeMille and Mary Pickford in the long running play The Warrens of Virginia." Charlotte Walker was the aunt of Edwin Anderson Walker and mother of Sara Haden another well known actress. There is some evidence that Edwin Walker may have been in a Broadway production himself. While a cadet at West Point Walker had access to New York City and the Broadway productions that both his aunt and cousin were staring in.

Jack Ruby met Virginia Belasco while in San Francisco in 1936 and dated her while he was in New York in November of 1941.

The interview of Ms Belasco, conducted by agents Norton and Kidwell on Dec. 2, 1963, states: "..and advised she received a telephone call from EVA GRANT, from Dallas, Texas, about a month ago. It was just a social call concerning mutual acquaintances including JACK RUBY. She has never met EVA GRANT personally. BELASCO advised she first met JACK RUBY in about 1936 at the Jewish Community Center in San Francisco.....She also understands that RUBY has a cousin by the name of JUDY, who is employed as a waitress at Blum's Restaurant in San Francisco."

I have been reading a great deal about Ruby's associations with underworld figures and how those associations may connect within the assassination story. Just thought a call from Ruby's sister, Eva Grant, to Virginia Belasco, whose family had been instrumental in the careers of Walker's aunt and cousin, in the days immediatly before the assassination would be of interest as well.

By the way Virginia Belasco's father was living in Mexico preceeding the assassination.

Just coincidence.

Jm Root

-------------------------------

Jim:

I just posted this on Gerald McKnight's thread.

GPH

_______________________________

Mr. McKnight:

As you know, Howard K. Davis ["Davy"] and I, visited with Gen. Walker during the late evening hours of July 4th, and continued through the late morning hours, of July 5th, 1963.

You might recall that upon leaving Walker's home on Turtle Creek Drive, and returning to rest at the apartment of Wally Welch's secretary [Welch had been a Fiorini/Sturgis operative]; we both had some rather serious exchanges regarding current report, and those that made reference to Walker's future plans.

[We were especially concerned about exactly which Miami Cuban exile entities he might align his organization with, and thereby tend to dominate the Miami scene -- just as Paulino Sierra was attempting to accomplish at that very moment !!]

We also disussed the fact that: Despite Walker having been shot at, less than 3 months previous, we were much chagrined that; throughout the night [and early morning hours] Walker had permitted us to sit just underneath where the bullet had struck his wall !!

We both concluded that he was either some kind of nut -- for wilfully exposing all three of us to an ongoing sniper threat; or that the shooting had been a "set-up" by him !! And/or. that he had acquiesced to same by other parties. Moreover, we did notice that he continued to have a small crew of "Gay" men still residing at his home. [of course, the term "Gay" was not used during that Era].

What we both wondered, and even after our return to Miami: Why didn't the extant "official?" law enforcement reports contain any quotes ["statements"] by said "house guests" ??!! They most certainly would fall under that category defined as being routiine "material witnesses"??!!

Are you aware of the report that: When the shooting occured, Walker was NOT seated alone; but was speaking with a rather notorious "visitor" that night ?! Another report identifies the bullet as a .38 calibre, but doesn't discuss the notable disimilarities (which still exist) between those used in automatic pistols, from those fired by revolvers ??!!

Chairs,

GPH

__________________________

[Gary Buell]

Are you aware of the report that: When the shooting occured, Walker was NOT seated alone; but was speaking with a rather notorious "visitor" that night ?!

__________________________

Hi Gerry. Not aware of that one. What report and who was the visitor?

[Jim Root]

Gerry

Two days before the attempted assassination of Edwin Walker, John J. McCloy received this information from John McCone. Remember that McCloy was now "out of the loop" in arms negotiations.

Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/

Washington, April 8, 1963.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers-Nuclear Test Ban 3/1/63-1/2/64. Secret. Circulated to McCloy.

With respect to the test ban treaty, I have not gone over the last draft./2/ However, it is my understanding that the present negotiating position provides for seven on-site inspections, seven black boxes within the USSR, and an inspection area of 500 square kilometers, and that the treaty deals with all the other issues which have been developed through the years. Some consideration is being given to reducing the seven on-site inspections to six, or even to five. There is also a difference of opinion as to the value of the black boxes.

/2/Reference is to a March 23 draft comprehensive test ban treaty. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/CRSC Files: FRC 77 A 59, Basic Policy, Pol 3-3, Proposals to President)

One would have to make a penetrating study of the results of the Vela experiments to make a final judgment as to the adequacy of the verification provisions of the treaty. However, Mr. Foster, at a recent Executive Committee meeting,/3/ stated that the threshold is on the order of one kiloton in granite, two kilotons in tuff, and 10 to 20 kilotons (and possibly 30 kilotons) in alluvium. He added that this was the threshold for a single test. Based on a theory of probabilities, he further concluded that a series of tests which included a meaningful number of underground shots in a single location would, with a small number of inspections, undoubtedly be detected and identified as nuclear rather than natural.

/3/Not identified; the test ban was not discussed in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during 1963.

On the basis of these threshold figures, I have expressed the view to Mr. Foster and to the President/4/ that the degree of verification is not sufficient, as it cannot prove adherence to a suspension of testing in an important area of yields. Of greater importance, however, is the fact that under present political circumstances a test ban between the U.S., USSR, and UK would not, in the final analysis, answer the "proliferation" problem because the Soviets cannot handle the Chinese Communists and we and the British cannot handle the French.

/4/In a memorandum for the record, April 4, McCone wrote he had told the President that day that former President Eisenhower had expressed opposition to the present draft treaty "because of inadequate verification, the threshold, etc.," and that he, McCone, agreed with this position and also opposed it because "the Russians could no longer handle the Chinese situation and we and the British could no longer handle the de Gaulle situation, and hence the proliferation problem. The President seemed to agree, and restated that he did not think we were going to get a treaty anyway." (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 4/1/63-6/30/63) McCone's memorandum of April 4 of a meeting held with Eisenhower on March 30 is ibid.

As for the advantages to the United States of further testing, doing so would yield a continuing improvement in our technology through the further development of small weapons, improvement of weight/yield ratios and increased knowledge of weapons effects. With respect to the first two of these items, improvements are important. Our failure to pursue them while the Soviets do so (clandestinely) would probably deprive us of our superior nuclear position. However, this would not necessarily affect the military balance as the improvements are expected to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, although important information would be provided. With respect to effects of testing, more study would be necessary before I would have an opinion.

There is a great danger of engaging in a treaty, living under it for a number of years, and permitting our laboratories to go downhill (which they undoubtedly would do) while the Soviets covertly pursue developments in their laboratories. The Soviets could then abrogate the treaty for some reason they claim provocative, and confront us with a situation under which they had made a significant forward step in their technology. This, as will be recalled, was exactly what they did in 1961. I do not see how we can avoid this risk if we engage in a treaty unless the treaty is subscribed to by all world powers and contains substantial penalties for such abrogation.

The Plowshare problem must be considered. Meaningful Plowshare experiments involve our most advanced weapons technology and, if the inspection arrangements outlined in the treaty are undertaken, it would mean exposing to the Soviets our most advanced weapons technology. This might mean abandoning Plowshare and therefore one must consider whether Plowshare is important to our national interest.

Intelligence will make some contribution to the verification of a test ban. Some indicators which have been meaningful in the past are now lost to us, some useful indicators are still available but they, too, could be lost. Aerial surveillance might help in some circumstances, and clandestine penetrations might also help. Soviet fear of the latter might also serve as a deterrent. No useful figure can be placed on the contribution of intelligence.

It seems to me that there has been an overemphasis on the importance of the test ban treaty and the whole issue of testing for many years, and most particularly, during the last two or three years. The issue at first centered around fallout. The most responsible scientific judgment seems to indicate that the effects of fallout were vastly overemphasized by the test ban advocates. I feel the whole issue should be brought into proper perspective and question whether much is to be gained by an agreement to stop testing so long as the United States, Soviet Union, and the British continue the production of fissionable material, nuclear weapons, and delivery systems at a high rate, and in addition, the French and the Chinese Communists pursue an independent and uncontrolled program, and rumor has it that the Israelis are now doing likewise. Hence, stopping testing does not slow down the arms race, does not remove the dangers of a nuclear holocaust, and does not end the proliferation problem.

One important consideration is that if we reach an agreement with the Soviets, we have "broken through" in our effort to negotiate with the USSR on an issue of disarmament, and this might lead to other more meaningful agreements. This consideration is important and we could sacrifice a great deal to accomplish such a "break through". However, this consideration is of value only if the test suspension agreement provides reasonable means of verification and reasonable guarantee for conformance with all treaty terms, including some protection against unilateral revocation or abrogation of the treaty. If, however, we are reckless on the question of verification, then the "break through" will be a decided disservice to the United States' security interests because it will establish a precedent for further steps in disarmament without adequate means of verification.

I have not personally studied the most recent developments in detection and identification techniques and cannot render a judgment on the proposed treaty. However, Mr. Foster's disclosure of the threshold set forth in the second paragraph of this memorandum represents a drastic departure from US policy so often stated, i.e. we will only agree to a suspension of tests which can, in the opinion of responsible and informed people, be verified with reasonable assurance.

Is this what began the movement toward Dallas?

Jim Root

[Robert Howard]

Gerry

Two days before the attempted assassination of Edwin Walker, John J. McCloy received this information from John McCone. Remember that McCloy was now "out of the loop" in arms negotiations.

Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/

Washington, April 8, 1963.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI, ER Subject Files, White Papers-Nuclear Test Ban 3/1/63-1/2/64. Secret. Circulated to McCloy.

With respect to the test ban treaty, I have not gone over the last draft./2/ However, it is my understanding that the present negotiating position provides for seven on-site inspections, seven black boxes within the USSR, and an inspection area of 500 square kilometers, and that the treaty deals with all the other issues which have been developed through the years. Some consideration is being given to reducing the seven on-site inspections to six, or even to five. There is also a difference of opinion as to the value of the black boxes.

/2/Reference is to a March 23 draft comprehensive test ban treaty. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/CRSC Files: FRC 77 A 59, Basic Policy, Pol 3-3, Proposals to President)

One would have to make a penetrating study of the results of the Vela experiments to make a final judgment as to the adequacy of the verification provisions of the treaty. However, Mr. Foster, at a recent Executive Committee meeting,/3/ stated that the threshold is on the order of one kiloton in granite, two kilotons in tuff, and 10 to 20 kilotons (and possibly 30 kilotons) in alluvium. He added that this was the threshold for a single test. Based on a theory of probabilities, he further concluded that a series of tests which included a meaningful number of underground shots in a single location would, with a small number of inspections, undoubtedly be detected and identified as nuclear rather than natural.

/3/Not identified; the test ban was not discussed in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during 1963.

On the basis of these threshold figures, I have expressed the view to Mr. Foster and to the President/4/ that the degree of verification is not sufficient, as it cannot prove adherence to a suspension of testing in an important area of yields. Of greater importance, however, is the fact that under present political circumstances a test ban between the U.S., USSR, and UK would not, in the final analysis, answer the "proliferation" problem because the Soviets cannot handle the Chinese Communists and we and the British cannot handle the French.

/4/In a memorandum for the record, April 4, McCone wrote he had told the President that day that former President Eisenhower had expressed opposition to the present draft treaty "because of inadequate verification, the threshold, etc.," and that he, McCone, agreed with this position and also opposed it because "the Russians could no longer handle the Chinese situation and we and the British could no longer handle the de Gaulle situation, and hence the proliferation problem. The President seemed to agree, and restated that he did not think we were going to get a treaty anyway." (Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 4/1/63-6/30/63) McCone's memorandum of April 4 of a meeting held with Eisenhower on March 30 is ibid.

As for the advantages to the United States of further testing, doing so would yield a continuing improvement in our technology through the further development of small weapons, improvement of weight/yield ratios and increased knowledge of weapons effects. With respect to the first two of these items, improvements are important. Our failure to pursue them while the Soviets do so (clandestinely) would probably deprive us of our superior nuclear position. However, this would not necessarily affect the military balance as the improvements are expected to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, although important information would be provided. With respect to effects of testing, more study would be necessary before I would have an opinion.

There is a great danger of engaging in a treaty, living under it for a number of years, and permitting our laboratories to go downhill (which they undoubtedly would do) while the Soviets covertly pursue developments in their laboratories. The Soviets could then abrogate the treaty for some reason they claim provocative, and confront us with a situation under which they had made a significant forward step in their technology. This, as will be recalled, was exactly what they did in 1961. I do not see how we can avoid this risk if we engage in a treaty unless the treaty is subscribed to by all world powers and contains substantial penalties for such abrogation.

The Plowshare problem must be considered. Meaningful Plowshare experiments involve our most advanced weapons technology and, if the inspection arrangements outlined in the treaty are undertaken, it would mean exposing to the Soviets our most advanced weapons technology. This might mean abandoning Plowshare and therefore one must consider whether Plowshare is important to our national interest.

Intelligence will make some contribution to the verification of a test ban. Some indicators which have been meaningful in the past are now lost to us, some useful indicators are still available but they, too, could be lost. Aerial surveillance might help in some circumstances, and clandestine penetrations might also help. Soviet fear of the latter might also serve as a deterrent. No useful figure can be placed on the contribution of intelligence.

It seems to me that there has been an overemphasis on the importance of the test ban treaty and the whole issue of testing for many years, and most particularly, during the last two or three years. The issue at first centered around fallout. The most responsible scientific judgment seems to indicate that the effects of fallout were vastly overemphasized by the test ban advocates. I feel the whole issue should be brought into proper perspective and question whether much is to be gained by an agreement to stop testing so long as the United States, Soviet Union, and the British continue the production of fissionable material, nuclear weapons, and delivery systems at a high rate, and in addition, the French and the Chinese Communists pursue an independent and uncontrolled program, and rumor has it that the Israelis are now doing likewise. Hence, stopping testing does not slow down the arms race, does not remove the dangers of a nuclear holocaust, and does not end the proliferation problem.

One important consideration is that if we reach an agreement with the Soviets, we have "broken through" in our effort to negotiate with the USSR on an issue of disarmament, and this might lead to other more meaningful agreements. This consideration is important and we could sacrifice a great deal to accomplish such a "break through". However, this consideration is of value only if the test suspension agreement provides reasonable means of verification and reasonable guarantee for conformance with all treaty terms, including some protection against unilateral revocation or abrogation of the treaty. If, however, we are reckless on the question of verification, then the "break through" will be a decided disservice to the United States' security interests because it will establish a precedent for further steps in disarmament without adequate means of verification.

I have not personally studied the most recent developments in detection and identification techniques and cannot render a judgment on the proposed treaty. However, Mr. Foster's disclosure of the threshold set forth in the second paragraph of this memorandum represents a drastic departure from US policy so often stated, i.e. we will only agree to a suspension of tests which can, in the opinion of responsible and informed people, be verified with reasonable assurance.

Is this what began the movement toward Dallas?

Jim Root

Great Post Jim.

As far as your last comment, I personally believe that 'it is possible' that the cover-up of JFK's assassination

(i.e. incompetence of non-investigated leads, destroyed documents obvious shennanigans with coached, steered WC Testimony etc) may be just as much related to protecting a singular or plural 'government operation(s) that was/were intertwined with the event of JFK's death, as much as covering up the conspiracy. But to sum it up, if there was a cover up that was orchestrated solely to 'protect the conspirators, and those who had foreknowledge were 'in the government' as I personally do. If the information you posted was directly associated with 'why' Kennedy was killed, then the individuals whose names are listed in your post would certainly fit in with a cover-up of that magnitude.

I think your post reveals another issue that placed Kennedy in opposition to the 'power structure' in Washington circa 1963.

[Jim Root]

Robert

What intriques me about this line of inquiry is that it is so consistant with the information I have collected over the years.

1) An Oswald connection to the U-2 aircraft

2) Oswalds defection to the USSR in 1959 (within days of his "defection" there was a meeting of the "principals" (including McCloy) where there was fear expressed that the summit meeting, scheduled for Paris in 1960, would force the US into a Nuclear Test Ban that we were not, for scientific reasons, yet prepared for.

3) Potential Oswald - Walker meeting while Oswald travels to Helsinki (along with the dates of the Helsinki Embassy notes that coincide with Oswald's travels).

4) The U-2 is downed and the Paris Summit is canceled.

5) Election of a new President and the announcement of McCloy as chief advisor to Kennedy in arms negotiations at the first press conference of John F. Kennedy.

6) Oswald begins his process of returning to the US

7) Walker begins his Pro Blue Program which leads to his resignation from the military within days of the State Department Decission that stated that Oswald had not renounced his citizenship and would be allowed to return to the US.

8) McCloy is "pushed aside" in the disarmament talks

9) Oswald returns to the US

10) McCone informs McCloy of the dangers of the new US position in disarmament talks

11) Two days later Walker is shot at.

12) Kennedy makes a major speech stating the "new" American position on a Limited Test Ban Treaty on June 10, 1963

13) June 11, 1963 Soviet Primier Kruschev accept the new US position

14) June 12, 1963 McCloy pens a letter to General Edwin Walker

15) General Maxwell Taylor continues to argue with President Kenndy over the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

16) Treaty is passed and signed in August of 1963.

17) Nov. 22, 1963 Kennedy is assassinated

18) December 1963 John J. McCloy is again the chief negotiator for the nuclear disarmament meetings in Geneva and a member of the Warren Commission

My three principle characters in this assassination drama, John J. McCloy, General Maxwell Taylor and General Edwin Anderson Walker can all be tied into this whole scenerio. First perhaps to get John F. Kennedy elected while at the same time derailing the Paris Summist and then secondly all can be associated to the assassination in one way or another.

Is it also just a coincidence that all three of these follows can be associated with an NSA employee named John Hurt and that Lee Harvey Oswald, while in custody on the night of the assassination, attempted to contact a person named John Hurt?

Jim Root

[Robert Howard]

Jim, Are you familiar with the Warren Comm. references to Jack Ruby in reference to 'violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1950?'

[Tim Gratz]

Jim Root wrote:

My three principle characters in this assassination drama,

He meant "principal" as in the most significant.

BUT none of his three principal suspects had anything to do with the assassination.

Why kill Kennedy after the test ban treaty was ratified? Just for revenge? If the motive was to stop the test ban treaty, Jim's conspirators acted a bit too late, don't you think?

I think it sad that with no evidence to connect these men to the assassination these men who contributed so much to our country, at personal financial sacrifice if nothing else, have their reputations sulllied by being linked to a hideous, violent, traitorous act!

This is worse that the worst abuse of Joseph McCarthy, IMO.

[Ron Ecker]

Why kill Kennedy after the test ban treaty was ratified? Just for revenge? If the motive was to stop the test ban treaty, Jim's conspirators acted a bit too late, don't you think?

Perhaps the test ban treaty was the straw that broke the camel's back. I imagine that the conspirators had a laundry list of reasons to get rid of JFK.

[Tim Gratz]

But again if the TBT was the "straw that broke the camel's back", why not get Kennedy before it was a done deal?

[Ron Ecker]

Because according to Billie Sol, the hit wasn't approved until that poker game in Texas.

[Tim Gratz]

Ron, can you enlighten me (possibly others?) on the "poker game"?

[Ron Ecker]

In rechecking Billie Sol's book (Billie Sol Estes: A Texas Legend), I see that the poker game in question (his source on the game and assassination details being Cliff Carter) occurred in May 1963, which was before the treaty was signed.

Estes explains that high stakes poker games played a role in politics and business life in Texas. This one was held at Brownies Restaurant on Grand Avenue in Dallas. Those he names as present were Carter ("who floated between the games and played the messenger role for Lyndon"), H.L. Hunt (who played in such games all over the country), W.O. Bankston (financial backer and personal friend of Sheriff Bill Decker), and D.H. Byrd (longtime LBJ friend and owner of the TSBD), who is quoted as telling a friend, "They used my building to kill the President."

The players felt that the Kennedys were going to ditch LBJ, leaving them without a power base in DC. Then the oil depletion allowance and defense contracts would be in danger. So the decision to kill JFK was made, and Carter was told to make the plans. Carter had Mac Wallace build the hit team, and Carter contacted Marcello and Trafficante to supply a back up team for Wallace and lots of unrelated people for diversion.

The plan was to blame the killing on a lone nut assassin, whom Wallace recruited. The Rambler station wagon was also Wallace's. Wallace shot from the grassy knoll, and Oswald from the TSBD. Loy Factor was also apparently involved, though Estes says that if true he doesn't know why Factor was allowed to live.

[Jim Root]

Tim wrote: "This is worse that the worst abuse of Joseph McCarthy, IMO."

I believe he meant to use "than" where he had written "that."

Except for my statement #3 (Potential Oswald - Walker meeting while Oswald travels to Helsinki (along with the dates of the Helsinki Embassy notes that coincide with Oswald's travels) each of the 17 other points in the timeline that I presented are facts!

My number 3 states clearly that there is the "potential" that Oswald and Walker could have met while Oswald traveled to Russia (see research done by Antti and myself paying particular attention to the Finn Air flight records that Antti was able to uncover in Helsinki). This point number three centers upon an area that the Warren Commissioners (McCloy included) failed to investigate despite the fact that the names of persons on potential flights that Oswald could have used were readily available to the CIA and the Warren Commission at that time (see research done by Chris Mills).

Tim continues with:

"BUT none of his three principal suspects had anything to do with the assassination."

If you are making the contention that none of my three potential conspirators pulled the trigger then I will readily agree with you Tim. If you can categorically eliminate them as potential conspirators where is your proof?

On the other hand all three persons that have become potential suspects through my research (McCloy, Taylor and Walker) are closely linked to the assassinated President and/or the investigation that took place after the fact:

Taylor's military career is revived after Kennedy is elected President.

Taylor is associated with Walker beginning in 1927.

Taylor is associated with McCloy beginning in 1941.

McCloy is the first person that Kennedy introduces to the press at his very first press conference upon becoming President.

McCloy is associated with Taylor beginning in 1941.

McCloy is associated with Walker beginning in 1943.

Walker is first associated with Kennedy during the "Pro Blue" controversy. Walker is distanced from Kennedy and the military at exactly the same time that Oswald is beginning to attempt to return to the United States from Russia (if Walker passed information to Oswald while Oswald was "defecting" to the USSR and if, upon Oswald’s return to the US, Oswald could identify Walker, this might have been a prudent thing for all involved in these sordid affairs).

Walker repeatedly is the point man for General Taylor in some of Taylor's most delicate Cold War successes.

Walker is associated with McCloy beginning in 1943.

All three (McCloy, Taylor and Walker) would be associated with a NSA employee named John B. Hurt and just by coincidence, perhaps, Lee Harvey Oswald would attempt to contact a person with this same name while in custody after the assassination. (The information about this attempted phone call would never make it into the Warren Commission Report and would only become public during the HSCA hearings, WHY?

The fact that McCloy, in particular, can be so closely associated with John B. Hurt is, IMO, of great interest and would, perhaps, provide McCloy with a vested interest in making sure that information about this attempted phone call to a person named John Hurt would never be presented to the public within the Warren Report).

John J. McCloy becomes a Warren Commissioner five months after he writes a note to Edwin Walker distancing himself form the General. As a Warren Commissioner, McCloy would neglect to participate in the questioning of Walker and it would not be pointed out that Walker, during WWII, had carried out at least two mission of particular significance to McCloy. Instead the Warren Report chooses to neglect the military career of Edwin Walker despite his connections to people such as McCloy and Taylor (etc.), WHY?

The Warren Commissions claim that Oswald attempted to assassinate Walker would be central to the findinds of the Commissioners that Oswald acted alone in assassinating Kennedy. Yet the commission neglected, perhaps just by chance, to investigate the associations and career of General Walker pre 1961.

No one ever questioned the fact that Walker was traveling in Europe and in the same direction that Oswald was traveling at the time of Oswald "defection" to the Soviet Union. Instead the Warren Report failed to identify the route Oswald took when traveling from London to Helsinki, WHY?

Tim goes on to ask:

"Why kill Kennedy after the test ban treaty was ratified? Just for revenge? If the motive was to stop the test ban treaty, Jim's conspirators acted a bit too late, don't you think?"

Almost immediately upon Kennedy's death McCloy is returned to the negotiating table for the US in talks that do in fact lead to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1968. While both McCloy and Taylor were openly opposed to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of August 1963, they both did ultimately see the success that they were striving for (a cmprehensive treaty) become a reality after Kennedy was eliminated.

To paraphrase Tim's question another way one could attempt to make a case for the absurdity of the involvement of Cuban refugees in the assassination story by asking, "Why kill Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs operation failed? Just for revenge? If the motive was to over through Castro, the conspirators acted a bit too late, don't you think?"

We all are led to our suspicions by the research that we have gathered or perhaps by our own prejudices and "gut" feelings. But to assume that a person or group of persons are beyond suspicion based upon their being great American patriots may just blind oneself from ever reviewing the facts with a clear and open mind.

Jim Root

[Ron Ecker]

Jim,

In LBJ's phone conversation with Hoover on 11/29, LBJ goes over names of those he is considering for the commission. Hoover has good things to say about everybody except one. When LBJ says, "What do you think about John McCloy?", Hoover says, "I'm not as enthusiastic about McCloy. . . . I'm not so certain as to the matter of the publicity that he might seek on it." (Ellipsis in original)

What do you make of that? If McCloy was a conspirator, was Hoover really out of the loop? I have always found the latter hard to believe. And Hoover's apparent reason for not endorsing McCloy, that McCloy might be looking for publicity, doesn't seem to make much sense. Did McCloy have some need for publicity? Or was there just some enmity between Hoover and McCloy? I've always wondered about this exchange.

Ron