Larry Hancock

First, thanks Chuck, that's always good to hear and I think David and I are going to be coming up with something very interesting this Fall in regard to our Red Bird leads paper....its gone far deeper than I might have imagined and I hope that we can offer something new (and probably highly controversial) in regard to the manipulation of Lee Oswald as a Castro agent (yes that didn't play as planned but it doesn't mean it wasn't in the plan. Now in regard to Joe's remark, I might as well just be blunt and stop beating around the bush. The following is strictly my personal assessment and not likely to change at this point. 1) As previously stated I find Prouty very credible when he talks about his day job, in that regard he is a very good source on how American military support for certain covert operations was organized and carried out from a logistics stand point. So...first hand experience, good stuff and very helpful. 2) After much research I found him not to be credible in regard to his remarks and purported insights in regard to the actual events in Dallas on November 22, which is one reason that I spent the time putting all the ARRB material (not just his interview) on a CD and making it available via JFK Lancer a long time ago. And it was not just the ARRB, it was more work involving some of my own research on the 112th rumor. 3) Initially I bought in to a good amount of his general geopolitical observations - over time I became a lot less sanguine about that and feel many of them were pretty speculative. That's one of the reasons I referenced some other sources on this thread, particularly in regard to Vietnam. But that is not a dig at him per se, we simply know a lot more about such things now than he did when he was giving commentary on them - not personal experience, commentary. 4) As to his JFK conspiracy hypothesis - its as good as a dozen others coming from people in D.C. over the years. He was certainly not alone in being suspicious, or even seeing conspiracy in some of the directions he pointed out. And he provided a few leads, names, groups to look at, etc. So did others. So his hypothesis passes the test of general credibility and actually of some consistency given others had the same suspicions. But to be even blunter a hypothesis is only "a supposition or proposed explanation made on the basis of limited evidence as a starting point for further investigation." Its very difficult to disprove a hypothesis which is essentially a suspicion. So my problem is this - where is all the work on his hypothesis, who treated it seriously, researched it in detail and wrote about that research? I asked once before, where is that body of work? If you champion his hypothesis you have the task of examining it and attempting to develop it into something provable, at least a theory or scenario with as much additional detail as you can develop - at least take it to the theory level where it can be critiqued. So in regard to a Prouty hypothesis....great....he registered it and gave you some leads,don't just endorse it, run with it.

A synopsis is difficult since what I took from it largely has to do with the organization and logistics of support for covert operations which required either actual American military elements - transport aircraft and ships primarily, weapons and ammunition on those occasions when the surrogate forces being used in deniable actions could be supplied with American materials consistent with the weapons they could get locally. The book deals with how Prouty helped set up the bookkeeping and tracking systems handled to source and track American supplies transferred to the CIA for covert ops....and where to store them, how to transport them etc. It also gives some good insight into how that evolved under the Joint Chiefs staff, how it was organized there, who reported to whom etc - given that all services were involved on some occasions. It was very helpful to me in researching and writing Shadow Warfare but also brought home that such support was relatively minor compared to the weapons and transport support that the CIA needed that could not come from the American military due to deniability issues. It also brought home the immense cost of deniable operations using American personnel and equipment. In regard to this thread, it helps to understand why Prouty would know and be able to comment on from direct experience as compared to what he appears to simply suspected or speculated about. Its really important to have a baseline to evaluate where one starts and the other begins and this was also very helpful to me in that regard since at that time I was reading everything Prouty related pretty much concurrently. In reading Prouty on Dallas or even on Vietnam it is important to read Prouty on his own day job. Just as it is in regard to reading his remarks to the ARRB - and all their internal memorandum on how that came about and how they processed and responded to it. In my view their military staff investigator was objective and extremely diligent and dogged - similar Horne on the medical area.

Richard, do you or anyone else have any further comments on this...it seems particularly significant to me - part of the entire issue of why in the world Oswald would only have four rounds and where were the rest....and I've not seen it get that much attention. I'd be interested in more pro and con comments on this - seems to me it goes along with Alyea's point about the hulls being picked up and tossed back down...as if both the clip and hulls were indeed just planted.

Actually for my money this one gives the most in depth insight into Prouty's own direct experiences and view into how SACSA and the Joint Chiefs actually supported special operations: https://www.ebay.com/itm/353644280879?chn=ps&_trkparms=ispr%3D1&amdata=enc%3A14MhaS4I4Q0OY8lprYDzvoQ65&norover=1&mkevt=1&mkrid=711-117182-37290-0&mkcid=2&itemid=353644280879&targetid=1262843335329&device=c&mktype=pla&googleloc=9026216&poi=&campaignid=12519034798&mkgroupid=121028924334&rlsatarget=pla-1262843335329&abcId=9300518&merchantid=191373216&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI3LTuw9v_8gIVCbjICh1EgwO2EAQYAiABEgKydvD_BwE also: http://www.prouty.org/ratville.html A little pricey now its true, but I for one learned the most from it - and it was a bit cheaper when I first got it...grin.

And of course Connie was my author (well actually I was her researcher, she writes far better than I ever could) in our docufiction November Patriots and later after she had researched exactly how and when her original draft for the story changed, we wrote it up for the third edition of SWHT....she was always a wonderful source of information about that era in Dallas as well as the various people she knew in the news media there.

I think we get lost in the fact that with multiple people and agendas in play around Oswald during 1963, a time slice of everything that was happening in a given month, if not a given week, has the effect of just creating seemingly random noise. Multiple actors, activities, agendas, all occurring in a given week or month....at this point I've come to accept that it won't make sense in a linear view - and absolutely nothing was precluded, even after his arrival in Dallas. Its like taking out several puzzles at the same time, intermixing the pieces, and expecting them to somehow all fit in one grand picture.

David, I'm pretty much of the impression that there was a propaganda program in place to build an incresingly "radical" image for Oswald.....linking that to signatures related to JFK's conservation tour (Oswald in Wisconsin in a restaurant guest list), Oswald at an Oak Ridge visitor center (or was that related to a trail to the East Coast for something planned there). Bits and pieces with Oak Ridge the wildest of the bunch (I can say I have a document about a scam that David Phillips ran against the Russians in Mexico City involving uranium..and got a black mark for doing). With Phillips one can never tells, sometimes he just appeared to throw stuff around to see if it would stick.

Paul, in that regard I would have to refer you to Newman's work in finding a very early document out of CIA a domestic office in California that refers to the use of the crypt. I think he makes a pretty good case that it was used multiple times; certainly it was used in Europe as well. I would defer to his research on that - you should definitely take a look at it. I've not followed it beyond that point.

My current view is that the Oswald segment was certainly hijacked, overlaid on CI and propaganda operations that started with the DRE and escalated with JMWAVE SAS personnel. That is what is being covered up in withholding the Case Officer files. Along side that I think several people, including Ruby, were brought in with the story of a false flag operation and were shocked by what really happened...and knew how much at risk they suddenly were. Basically the idea of a false flag attack was a type of cover in and of itself for the plotters. More to come on a possible scenario for the Oswald frame in the upcoming Red Bird leads monograph.

I'll try to respond to both Ray and Benjamin in one post. Yes Ray, Ed Martino thought it was extremely strange and certainly had never happened before. Afterwards he had two thoughts, first off his Dad had made a couple of remarks beforehand that might have gotten undue attention if Ed had been at school, heard the news and made some unthinking remark about his Dad talking about that just yesterday....who knows, but if a classmate repeated that and for some reason it got to the FBI I suspect it would have been uncomfortable at best. The second thought was that his Dad was already a little conflicted - and became much more so in later years, feeling he and some of his friends had been "used" to some extent, promised things that did not happen. Sitting around watching TV for the news out of Texas might have been both tense, stressful and ....beats me. I tend to think he realized he had said some things, even little things, that he didn't want repeated outside the house that day. Benjamin, certainly that is a good take on the wording, by itself its simply suggestive, combined with having Ed stay home and the things that John apparently said to his wife its probably more. However I would never have taken something this limited to corroborate Martino's remarks to his friends and their contacts with the HSCA. The rest is in SWHT, this was just the best I could give you outside the book. The Morales connections are much more extensive, and indicative of Martino having a role, not to mention his links to Ruby's associates via the Havana casino connections. "One still has to explain the CIA biography build of LHO, and what LHO was doing in the TSBD. That is not something Morales could pull off. And as I have said, to make LHO the patsy you have to make sure he is not down on the street waving hello at JFK." I attempt to address this in Tipping Point, by detailing the ways in which both the DRE and the CIA were using Oswald beginning in August. However a much more specific take on that is upcoming in the Red Bird leads study from David and myself. It offers a very precise scenario for who was creating an image for Oswald, who was in direct contact with him from New Orleans though Houston and on to Dallas and what was anticipated as the final step in controlling him on November 22 and setting an absolute Castro frame. Neither David nor I will be able to swear that is what really happened but its a pretty tight scenario with names and dates to extent what is in Tipping Point.

Benjamin, over the years we have been unable to cope with Amazon's rules about the Kindle version so even if one person objected to its quality they would take it down, we might get it back up with a new version then the same thing would happen again....sorry, its been frustrating to say the least. While I can't offer you the details and substantiation that is in the book about Martino's connections to Morales (which went on after the assassination) or some of the other points that are in the book, I can offer you this synopsis of what his son saw - which took some years to get him to put on paper, saying it was all uncomfortable for him would be an understatement. Perhaps it will help some: http://www.larry-hancock.com/documents/chapter 01/Events59-63.pdf

Hi Paul, I tried to develop the actual impetus plus the motives in much more detail than previously in Tipping Point, the fundamental, immediate motive was to kill JFK before he began what was most likely to have been a quick and successful negotiation (at Castro's request) with Castro to oust the Russians and take Cuba neutral while restoring relations, especially economic relations with the United States. I cite multiple State Dept personnel involved in the outreach who reached that conclusion after the assassination. Castro was so upset with the Russians and so committed to a restoration of economic relations that he offered the same deal to Johnson. So, would an attempted assassination have done it, turned JFK quickly and aggressively against Castro...perhaps so if the frame was solid enough to convince JFK after what would have obviously been a very in depth investigation... but that would have required an iron clad frame pointing not just to a crazed Castro sympathizer but to Castro or his agents directly. The risk of JFK being alive and not easily fooled would have been huge. So, quickly sabotaging the pending negotiations - which would likely have left the exiles in exile - was the impetus, and at one level the motive for the senior plotters, but for those directly involved it was fundamentally revenge over yet one more betrayal. Those people considered JFK a traitor and wanted him dead, policy and strategy were not the driving motives for them. Thinking about it I should add one more point, this is not me coming up with a hypothesis on the aims or motives (or plan for that matter), what I've tried to do is consolidate the remarks from people that were involved or heard from them about the attack - so as far as to replicating their thought process or what was necessary and what not, that would be just speculation on my part. I've tried to capture and describe motive, impetus and what happened from the sources I ultimately found credible - and consistent - and explore in detail, that's the closest I can get.

Benjamin, I'd have to refer you all the way back to SWHT talked for a detailed exposition on Martino, and why I take him seriously....including not only the two initially anonymous reports submitted to the HSCA by his close friends but alswo based on my own extensive inquiries with his son (you will find his story and observations on my web site). That plus his key role instigating and actually participating in the TILT / Pawley mission into Cuba which was under the operational oversight of Robertson and Morales. As to his coming forward, he certainly did not and never expected what little he did say to become public, nor did his wife or his family who had both kept certain of his actions suggesting foreknowledge even from the HSCA - until after his wife's death. What I can say is that for me his credibility was enhanced by the fact that never even in private did he overplay his own role, which he described strictly as a courier, having only been given some very general remarks in regard to Oswald being a patsy and not an active participant. What I have resolved for myself is that the only contact he had within the CIA was David Morales, and that went as far back as his time in Cuba. Otherwise he was angry with basically everyone he felt had abandoned him in Cuba, especially the American embassy staff there. In that regard we have extended insights into his own extreme anti-Castro views in both his book and his record. As to his post-assassination efforts to blame a conspiracy on Castro, those were entirely in sync with what the DRE was doing as well as some of his associates such as Sturgis - basically all trying to put into play what had been in the plan to point towards Castro but which fell apart with Oswald's arrest. But all that is superficial, just a part of what I go into in SWHT and really only refer to in Tipping Point.

In regard to Prouty as a source, I've always maintained that the information he provided based on first hand knowledge of government activities is very useful, I learned a good deal from the book which covers his descriptions of the logistics network and practices used to provide American military equipment and weapons for covert operations and used that in Shadow Warfare. Prouty also provided some descriptive context on how Joint Chiefs staff and SACSA worked that can be verified in other sources so that was good. It is also possible to document some of his own work in those roles...and as I described in my post, that work was at least sometimes not that much appreciated by CIA personnel in covert operations, specifically in the Cuba project. But other than anecdotes and speculation, I'm not sure what useful details he does provide us on Lansdale and the JFK conspiracy. Lansdale's career is pretty well documented - as is his personality. And Prouty's apparent tendency to exaggerate at least a bit is suggested by the details in his interview with the ARRB, where is most definitely does recant on certain of his JFK related statements - that makes he hesitant to take all of his personal comments literally. But the point is, over the last several decades there has been ample time for Prouty himself or others - including Garrison - to try and follow up on the specifics that Prouty offered and I just don't see that. I'm not saying that's easy, I'm saying that nobody seems to have tackled it and we don't have a body of work extending it so we are left with mystery and speculation - while other leads have been worked in extensive detail. We have names and groups and sources from other people that have and those I can evaluate and offer an opinion on (positively or negatively) because work has been done. I just don't see that work being done on his hypothesis so either it has and I missed it or somebody should do it if they really feel the hypothesis has merit.

First off, in regard to an operational use of Oswald I present a "scenario" for that in Tipping Point -- in that scenario I propose that he was already being operationally used in at least two and very possibly three ways by CIA officers in SAS and at JMWAVE beginning by August. Those have nothing to do with any earlier use by ONI, CIA or FBI. The reason he could be used in multiple ways at the same time is because he already had a public image created during the summer in New Orleans and that was sufficient for the propaganda operation which began at that time using both the DRE as an outlet and beginning an expansion of that using various aggressive anti-Castro right wing outlets such as INCA and others that I name in the book. You can even trace that via their news letters and the "Oswald recording/record" that was created for that purpose. Beyond propaganda SAS was integrating his identity into a counter intelligence operation targeting Cuban embassy staff both in Mexico City and New Orleans and we can come up with the names involved in that as well. The operations themselves have been documented for some time, with probably the most detailed exposition by Bill Simpich. Following that It was easy enough for certain CIA officers and DRE military wing people to use Oswald's legend and identity in an action that was intended to trigger action against the Castro regime....the attack in Dallas. We could actually call that a "false flag" operation that worked right up to the point that Oswald was taken into custody....just as Martino described. And some of the likely people involved in trying to make that false flag happen were indeed in Dallas....the details for that scenario will be offered relatively soon in the Red Bird leads paper David Boylan and I are wrapping up now.

I suppose I should be clear as to my view since it was mentioned above. At this point in time all I've really seen that would describe the Lansdale view of a conspiracy and the attack in Dallas is Lansdale's letter to Garrison. I've not seen any researcher do a detailed paper or book exploring that hypothesis, citing sources, naming specific people and dates and relating in detail about how it all translated to the attack in Dallas and what followed. When I see that I would be able to evaluate it and probably offer an opinion. As it stands his letter simply is not sufficient basis for me to even have an opinion - even though I spent an extended period of time years ago on Lansdale and found nothing "operational" myself. Which just means I didn't find it so I would say those who accept his hypothesis should have been working for years now to flesh it out with details and publish that research in some form. I've also seen the premise that Lansdale was running a false flag operation - so that would mean he was a good guy who got had, not a bad conspirator? The thing is I have seen no detail on that either, so somebody needs to do some homework there and write up something that can be evaluated. From my own perspective I can't see who would turn to Lansdale to run that sort of thing in the fall of 1963. Who would trust his skills, where would he get the contacts, who was actually involved in the false flag operation, what is its chronology. Basically I've reached the point where I expect that tossing out a few names and floating a scenario needs to be followed up by some real research - which raises the question of why Lansdale himself didn't do that since he claimed to have some starting point facts? Obviously I have my own hypothesis on the conspiracy and participants, and at this point have "operationalized" it in considerable detail in Tipping Point - with sources, motive, means, people, movements, roles etc. To reach an opinion on the Lansdale hypothesis I need to see comparable body of work - as I hope to see in the Newman hypothesis, the Alberelli hypothesis etc. For context though, for those who would like some counterpoint to Prouty's views about Diem and the American entry into Viet Nam, I would recommend some more contemporary works: Cold War Mandarin by Seth Jacops is exceptional as is Michael Swanson's Why The Vietnam War.

Fascination analysis Gil, thanks...looking forward to more...

I guess this shows how subjective photo ID can be, with all due apologies to Mr Masen I've always found him - well distinctively not good looking - and not at all a look alike for Lee Oswald if you are anywhere close to them, I put their photos side by side on my Web site long ago to illustrate that. Perhaps from a great distance but certainly not up close. Which of course is a totally subjective take on my part....I even asked Dick Russell how in the world he could comment on a similarity in his book and we had a laugh about it.

Actually John, I would agree that it is exceedingly difficult at preset for any nation to compete with China in the broad sense, simply because as a quasi dictatorship it can organize all its resources including its economy around very tightly crafted strategies. On the other hand, certain of its cultural habits and related practices may present a few speed bumps on its Silk Road Strategy, especially in Africa where its "debt trap" approach is a matter of considerable debate. What is certain is that it is using investment as an organized tactic and putting huge amounts of loans behind it. From one perspective that guarantees access to natural resources, the question is whether it makes friends in the longer term - the Chinese are going to have to do a better job at winning local hearts and minds than American corporations did in the 20th Century. However I wasn't really thinking of broad economic competition, I was thinking very specifically about the tactics used in acquiring specific resources, legal or otherwise. That can be something entirely different if here is enough money involved and enough third parties available. The term Yankee Trader came into being in the Pacific trade out of Boston and was often applied to highly profitable but often "sharp" practices not properly discussed in Boston society.

Strange how the U.S. used to be respected (and loathed a bit - in as "shrewd as a Yankee trader") for its economic and trade prowess and now we are perceived only in terms of our military - you might think a capitalist country would be sort of embarrassed not to be able to out trade, out deal, or generally compete economically with communist China. Hint - we really should be able to acquire, and process the raw materials we need four our economy without building artificial regimes or funding surrogate governments....

Actually the larger picture is that we really never seem to be able to weigh in and consider the local and cultural histories when we become involved, the culture in Afghanistan is tribal with warlords and local leaders always just doing the best deals they can to minimize banditry (or taxation) - and in the south that has involved opium - for centuries. Before we began supporting the Taliban against the Russians that trade was carried on pack animals, once we and the Saudi's began dumping in cash it moved up to hundreds of Honda pick ups. But we just show up and expect to change those traditional practices with "progressive" thinking and elections (and do it in a few years) and are always amazed when that effort fails. We also fail to note how different practices are even within the region - for reference take a look at how the Kurds fought large Isis formations to a standstill even in street to street fighting (destroying their own cities as necessary) - and how effective their women fighters (many expert snipers) were in those battles. But so as not to entirely give up my sarcasm, its interesting to see how many ultra conservative anti-immigration folks now want unrestricted immigration for "our" Afghans when before they wanted absolute travel bans - and how now they are forming welcome committees for incoming Muslims when before....well the hypocrisy is astounding.

Yep, there will never be a shortage of reasons for foreign intervention - strategic, humanitarian, security. And that will generally come to include cultural intervention (projecting our system of democracy and equal rights overseas), regime change, nation building, and all the opportunities that go along with it. After all, its worked so well for us....

That was pretty much the "mantra" for the period, the "domino" theory was first proposed for Iran right after the end of WWII and it was literally picked up and repeated for virtually every region around the globe - as soon as the various political and trade empires began to collapse in the face of anti-colonialism and local nationalism it was essentially cited as the explanation over again and again to turn each of them into a communist threat. ...depending on which variety of Communist was closest. And the Chinese became pretty influential in both north and central Africa ala Angola....of course the Cubans showed up too. There was always someone to take advantage of the local movement and the knee jerk reaction of communist threat followed. I think I covered that pretty repetitively in Shadow Warfare, at least it seemed repetitive to me. But you have to understand the depth of fear against Communism in that period, I saw it first hand, it was visceral. Everything was blamed on communists, every push for equal rights, every anti-colonialist movement, every Yankee Go Home sign or slogan. I mean it couldn't be us, or the Brits, or the French....clearly we were the good guys so it all had to be an international, evil conspiracy.

Biden appears to have caught a lot of the normal power brokers flat footed by actually not letting himself be talked into continued involvement - I think a number of them figured that in the end they could sway him as they did Obama. But beyond that, there really is no more big money to be made in Afghanistan, or Iraq or Syria for that matter. And with China, Russia and Iraq doing such a good job of presenting themselves as conventional/atomic threats (especially China, nice of them to begin tripling their ICBM force as a motivator) they are an obvious driver for the military industrial complex. There was nothing on that order of similar strategic threat in 63 (Russia would not see atomic parity until circa 1970 and China was not really a conventional player beyond their national boundaries, nor were they making the sorts of territorial claims they are now) when outside of SE Asia JFK was actually bringing certain areas of military spending under control. I will say though that in the early 60's the JCS consistently positioned China as the driving threat in SE Asia, which is why they kept reporting in that a conventional response would have to be on the scale that ultimately China would come in to Laos or Vietnam and they would have to answer with nukes.